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PREFACE
How came any reasonable being to subject himself to 
such a yoke of misery, voluntarily to incur a captivity 
so servile, and knowingly to fetter himself with such a 
sevenfold chain?
Thomas De Quincey, 
Confessions of an English Opium Eater (1821).
Today some ... call the U.S. invasion of Iraq the greatest 
strategic military disaster in American history, a mas-
sive squandering of lives and resources that will afffect 
the Middle East and reduce the power of the United 
States ... Yet compared with what is at stake in Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, Iraq may well turn out to be a mere 
sideshow ... The U.S. failure to secure this region may 
well lead to global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and 
a drug epidemic on a scale that we have not yet expe-
rienced and I can only hope we never will.
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos (2009), p. xlii
De Quincey’s idiosyncratic confession was recently (2009) reissued in a 
series entitled “Great Ideas”. Certainly after reading the following text, 
one can doubt how “great” De Quincey’s idea was. That is not our concern, 
but how should we label the idea of answering the same question by alter-
ing ‘himself’ into ‘others’ or, more precisely, ‘oppressed (and, therefore, 
involuntary) others’ ? That is, indeed, exactly the question dealt with in 
the following history: why, when and how are foreign people enslaved by 
making them opium addicts?
The use, trade, chemistry or efffects of opium are not a blank page in 
historiography, anthropology, economics, chemistry or medical sciences, 
let alone in practical politics and political morality. Books and articles 
have been written on all these of separate aspects of the phenomenon, 
mostly by experts and published in not very popular publications. They 
seldom cover the relationships between all or the most relevant aspects 
over a sufffĳiciently long stretch of time, so that experts easily lose sight of 
the larger dimensions of the Opium Question. 
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However, the most serious failures of the bulk of these publications are 
the stringent victim approach (poor addicts who must be cured at great 
cost) and a fundamental distortion of history. Typical sentence: 
In an Egyptian medical treatise of the sixteenth-century B.C., Theban phy-
sicians were advised to prescribe opium for crying children just as, three 
and a half millennia later, Victorian babies were dosed with the opiate God-
frey’s Cordial by their nurses to keep them quiet.1
Apart from the untenable historical comparison, this leads either to a 
popular historiography of opium use and the efffects of addiction with 
botanical knowledge about poppy growing, or to one in which the victims 
(mostly Chinese) are transformed into the perpetrators through a combi-
nation of ignorance, prejudice and, eventually, ideological blindness. 
Unprovable references to remote historical situations are too often used 
as legitimating the production, distribution and consumption of opium 
and other drugs. The assessment of these products is also distorted, when 
isolated from their historical, social or cultural contexts. Finally, one has 
to acknowledge, that the times of Euro- or Western- centred—historiog-
raphy are defĳinitely over, which automatically implies that the darker 
sides of European history shall be stressed more.
Many examples will be given to illustrate all this. A most recent and 
curious one offfered by serious historians—which does not show all of 
these “misunderstandings”—is the following:
Chinese consumers and their merchants and middlemen created the mar-
ket for imported opium, which was thought to be superior to the domestic 
supply that had earlier provided the major source.2 
At least four serious mistakes are made in one sentence: (1) as we will 
prove in all possible detail, the Chinese opium market was created by 
Western colonizers and imperialists, in particular the Dutch, English and 
American dealers, smugglers, etc. and their militant governments; (2) 
Chinese poppy cultivation and/or opium production was started after this 
Western assault was successful and after Western coastal colonies in 
China were established; (3) there was no Chinese domestic supply before 
the Westerners started their Opium Wars, let alone an inferior one; (4) if 
one writes about ‘imported opium’, then one may expect that it is not 
available in China (in sufffĳicient quantities), while import was nearly 
1 A. Hayter, Opium and the Romantic Imagination (London: Faber, 1971), p. 19.
2 R. Murphy, K. Stapleton, East Asia. A New History (Boston: Longman, 2010), p. 167.
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always done by foreign (in this case: non-Chinese) importers: who, then, 
must have created ‘the Chinese market for imported opium’? 
To avoid all those mistakes and misinterpretations a new approach is 
introduced, namely to describe and analyze the History of the Opium 
Problem. This is a history of the production, consumption and distribu-
tion of opium and its derivatives from the time they form an objective 
political, social, economic or cultural problem in a specifĳic period and 
place. The fĳirst time that this happened in world history, one of the theses 
of this study, is on the west coast of India (Malabar or Kerala) after 1660 
due to the Dutch assault in the framework of the establishment of their 
Asian trade empire. 
The practical consequences of the Dutch opium policy at the time 
were far-reaching; even so, in hindsight, it must have had a world—his-
torical signifĳicance, because all other opium—imperialists followed the 
Dutch example to some extent. In addition, we can establish that before 
this “moment” no opium problem existed, although there was always 
some narcotic consumption. This has marked consequences for a histori-
ography covering the substantial moral exploitation of opium use and its 
problems. Furthermore, a defĳinition of Opium Problems is derived from 
the practical features “in the fĳield”, not based on some theoretical or ideo-
logical stand.
The following History of the Opium Problem takes a perpetrator’s point 
of view, although it is impossible to forget the victims. Apart from the 
Asian perspective,attention is also paid to an autonomous early internal 
European opium trade and the household consumption of opium. The 
intention is to discuss, whether this is problematic as well. 
However, the main focus will be on the Opium Question as a creation 
of Western imperialism and colonialism in Asia. This is not a result of 
some ideological standpoint, but simply a consequence of proper histori-
cal and political-economic research.
It is natural to compare this Western opium assault on the East to slav-
ery between Africa and the Americas. This would not be an exaggeration.3 
The “coolie labor” in the 19th-century was already similar to African slave 
3 The most cruel perpetrators, the Calvinist Dutch, did both in the most extreme man-
ner, but even their zealous attempts failed to develop a slave trade in the East as large as 
that in and between Africa and the Americas (see part 3). They created a new form of slav-
ery as K. Ward analyzed and described: empire building through forms of forced migra-
tions, penal transportation, “legalized” slave trade. In this way the Cape of Good Hope 
colony developed into a penal colony long before the English designed Australia in the 
same format or long before coolie labor became popular.
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labor for contemporaries. The latter was, however, not directly accompa-
nied by the opium trade, which was the case in the coolie trade, often 
involving the same traders and coolie-holders. 
This history still seriously burdens the relationship of the West and the 
East today, which is too often characterized by wars and serious repres-
sions, of which the two Opium Wars in the 19th-century or the Pacifĳic part 
of World War II may be the most spectacular. However, from about 1500 
onwards, there were hundreds of warlike conflicts started by the West 
against the East (almost never the reverse: “Pearl Harbor” was the second 
time in a millennium!), sometimes of a genocidal character. 
Ahmed Rashid’s quotation above refers to the two wars the Bush and 
Obama administrations are fĳighting at present with their English or Dutch 
allies. The Afghanistan war is defĳinitely a new Opium War from which 
Rashid hopes that it will not lead to a global ‘drug epidemic on a scale that 
we have not yet experienced’. 
Astonishment about this Western behavior is not the only motive to 
write his bestseller. Rashid:
Above all, arrogance and ignorance were in abundant supply as the Bush 
administration invaded two countries in the Muslim world without any 
attempt to understand the history, culture, society, or traditions of those 
countries.4 
Without exaggerating the performance of the Bush family, Rashid’s 
remarks about the present political conduct must be an Aha experience 
for a historian of the Opium Problem. Time and again this astonishment 
was the reaction seen when writing about the opium history from 1500 
onwards. It could make readers pessimistic and impatient, but I still hope 
that this story will help to stamp out this ‘arrogance and ignorance’ and, 
more importantly, to avoid the ‘drug epidemic’ Rashid predicts. 
For several reasons explained in the fĳirst part of the study, this history 
of the opium problem is not a history of opium use or poppy culture. It 
starts around 1500 with the Asian activities of the Portuguese in particu-
lar. As indicated above, it is the Dutch narco-military machine starting a 
good century later which plays its lesser-known key role (part 3). Of 
course, the story is often told of how through the Opium Wars the English 
imperialists addicted China in the middle of the 19th-century (part 2). 
They learned this largely from the Dutch and brought it to its logical con-
clusion by addicting China.
4 A. Rashid, Descent into chaos (London: Pelican Books, 2009), p. xlii.
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The British and French went further, with the important assistance of 
American smugglers and their clippers. From their “possessions” in China 
and Southeast Asia, certain innovations in opium management were 
introduced. They exported, furthermore, to the other side of the Pacifĳic, 
the USA, and the opium snake started to bite its own tail. Both are largely 
responsible for leaving a heritage of present production centers in 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East of world-economic importance. A 
new cycle of exploitation and repression of the minds of the people start-
ed, which could eventually be followed-up by Rashid’s ‘drug epidemic’. 
This is my outline of the main thesis of the following study. A second 
thesis shows its limitations. 
From the very beginning of the Portuguese and, certainly, the Dutch 
opium assault on the East, it becomes evident that the decision—makers 
were well informed about the very nasty efffects of opium on the minds of 
people. They even detested the opium users and prohibited their own 
people from using it on penalty of serious punishments. Therefore, igno-
rance can only apply in a limited way to most implementers of the deci-
sions made, but not to most authorities of the time. The moral protests in 
most Western countries starting during the second half of the 19th-centu-
ry against opium use, smoking and addiction have, therefore, a soundly 
hypocritical character. 
In addition, they were too late. New drugs like heroin or morphine, 
derived from opium but with much more devastating efffects, were being 
distributed while people still worried about the comparatively innocent 
activity of opium smoking. In the 19th-century a new kind of moral agent, 
representatives of the medical professions (from hospital doctors to 
apothecaries), counterattacked the anti-opium complaints. As will be 
demonstrated, they started to defend its usefulness while prescribing its 
products wholesale. The new chemical and pharmaceutical industries in 
Europe and the US became the nearly invincible economic interests to 
support the modern narco-military machines. 
Now, the Western gate was opened for the Trojan horse of the narco-
military opium industry and their ravaging warriors, the drug-dealers 
with their supporters in the state and local bureaucracies. The other side 
of this coin is that the classic Asian opium production (India) and con-
sumption (China, Southeast Asia) lands are largely liberated of the evil. 
What remains there as regions of production (Afghanistan and Myanmar) 
is nearly fully dependent on Western consumers.
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This is, in short, the second chain of arguments of this study. With both 
chains, several important details are discussed in their historical or 
 politico-economic contexts: the role of the state (military, violence, wars, 
prohibitions, etc.); the ideological institutions (religion, churches, mis-
sionaries, value systems, etc.); the narco-dealers with their tactics and 
support; the modern industrialization; the astronomical profĳits; the 
efffects on foreign policies and other features. 
There are also limits to this study since it is not possible to deal with all 
of the perpetrator or victim countries. The main focus will be on the 
British, Dutch and French imperialist opium activities in China, India and 
Southeast Asia, including their function as models for the New Imperialists, 
Japan and the USA. Since the opium history of the present Indonesian 
archipelago is not well known outside Dutch archives and some Dutch 
expert publications, it is treated here in great detail for the fĳirst time in 
English. 
This preface ends with some technicalities. The aim of this large global 
and interdisciplinary study is also to make a new kind of handbook for 
students of the opium problem. It is the fĳirst time that such a book has 
been written, which implies that it has a certain experimental and intro-
ductory character. A study about a historical, social, economic, etc. prob-
lem like opium, compared rightly by many to slavery, is by defĳinition 
“controversial”. Although slavery is recurring, alas, in several areas at pres-
ent, it does not have the same social and economic impact as in the 16th-
19th-century. The Opium Problem, which originated almost the same 
time, has in fact increased century after century. It is massively present 
throughout the whole world. It stands now, of course, also for its deriva-
tives as heroin and morphine, while the cocaine problem is also addressed 
in passing. In the media and elsewhere it daily leads to highly contradic-
tory arguments and actions. 
Certainly with this subject, any author is unable to come up with a val-
ue-free description, analysis or judgment. It must be “enough” that no 
description or analysis is given without a careful argumentation, indica-
tion of the sources used, etc. 
A handbook presupposes the availability of a broad range of data and 
that is true in this case as well. This is, furthermore, guaranteed by the 
method used known as Gesellschaftsgeschichte (H.-U. Wehler and others). 
In many parts new archival material could be used, while the attempt is 
made in the numerous quotations to reproduce original voices in time 
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and place. These quotations are, therefore, relatively extensive. There are, 
at the moment, few publications with so much quantitative data over 
such a long period. Extensive appendices are used and many notes point 
time and again to alternative interpretations and literature. The result is a 
specifĳic insight in the socio-economic relations of many countries over a 
period of several centuries. 
The other side of this picture is that many geographical and other 
names in the quotations and elsewhere are unknown in present spelling 
and that exotic currencies are often difffĳicult to compare. A glossary is only 
of limited use to avoid misunderstandings in these fĳields. 
Chronologically, the Dutch assault on Asia occurred about a century 
earlier than the English one. The latter is chosen, however, as a kind of 
model for the whole study. Its story is better known, although probably 
some new vistas are opened on it. In addition, the reader can become 
more familiar with the—probably unexpected—complexities, which are 
detailed in the other chapters and parts. 
A practical problem of this history is, of course, where to stop. Several 
logical possibilities were available. Anonymous readers advised stopping 
immediately after World War II. Many events in a History of the Opium 
Problem indeed came together around that period: the liberation from 
colonial exploitation of countries like Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), 
China, India, etc. These countries played a pivotal role in this history. 
Finishing an opium history in 2011, inevitably leads to commemorate the 
important revolution of 1911-1912. A fĳirst promising attempt to solve the 
very extensive Chinese Opium Problem, however, just failed (see ch. 31). 
This happened not in the least because one had to deal not only with the 
addiction of a substantial part of the population, but with a most serious 
political, social and economic problem. One defĳinitely succeeded to solve 
such an Opium Problem around 1950 for the fĳirst time in history, thanks to 
the victory over the fully opium contaminated Nationalists. For all these 
reasons “1950” became the end of this history, with the hope that a follow-
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 PART ONE






There are few histories so critical about the relationship between the 
West and the East as the history of the opium monopolies, their enor-
mous accumulation of capital in ‘the world’s most valuable single com-
modity trade of the nineteenth-century’1 and the current nearly unsolvable 
narcotic problems in the USA and Europe. Their mutual relations in the 
heydays of Western imperialism and colonialism could be described as 
follows:
Thus as tea drinking rose in England, opium smoking rose in China ... The 
sale of the Bengal [poppy] crop became so valuable that the East India 
Company … soon came to depend on its sale for fĳinancing the government 
of India.2 
This might suggest that there was a free relationship between England 
(and “its” Bengal) and China. That was not the case: the tea-drinking 
English spread death and destruction before they could start consuming 
their national drug and before they could dope millions of people in 
China. 
In the most recent history of the decline and fall of the British Empire, 
Brendon recapitulates the many evils of the highly repressive rule of forty 
thousand rather stubborn English over forty million Indians. The white 
rulers were characterized by their own English boss as ‘so vulgar, igno-
rant, rude, familiar, and stupid as to be disgusting and intolerable ...’3 
These men and women established a ‘despotism tempered by paternal-
ism’. Not very innocent, and this easily led to a conclusion like the follow-
ing, a remark made in passing by its author: 
In economic terms, Company India was engaged in building perhaps the 
world’s fĳirst “narco-military” empire, an empire in which power and profĳit 
remained as closely linked as ever they had in the Mercantilist Age of the 
eighteenth-century.4 
1 F. Wakeman, in J. Fairbank (ed.), 1978, p. 172.
2 E. Dodge, p. 266.
3 P. Brendon, p. 48.
4 D.A. Washbrook, in: A. Porter (ed.), p. 404. Also quoted in P. Brendon, p. 55.
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Neither the opium problem nor the West-East relation was confĳined to 
the rise or ‘decline and fall of the British Empire’ alone: as shall be demon-
strated below, many similar Western powers preceded and accompanied 
this most powerful conquering machine, while strongly participating in 
the attempt to establish a “narco-military (Far) East”. Did they succeed in 
this belligerent aim? 
All these West-East attempts were accompanied by poverty, many mil-
lions of addicts, substantial extension of wars and genocide, serious cor-
ruption on all sides, brutal perpetrators and helpless and even disgraced 
victims. In the Western colonies of Asia in the 16th to 20th-century one 
sees how missionaries tried to make the Christian religion in the most lit-
eral sense “opium for, later, of the people” as a well-known writer could 
have written in 1848 (see, for example, ch. 6  or 13). 
Ill. 1. Papaver Somniferum, Bently & Trimen, 1830 
Source: J. Wiselius, 1886, p. 1 
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It is remarkable that an adequate description of these relationships with 
the accompanying facts seems still difffĳicult. The main reason is certainly 
not a lack of sources for the historians. No, this history hits too hard on an 
open sore in the conscience of the Western colonizers including their 
“home fronts”, and we are, therefore, saddled with largely a legitimizing 
historiography comparable with the one of a few other items like 
Western—induced slavery and racism.5 
In Africa “The West” obtained bodies and brought them to the Americas 
to work in chains; in Asia they doped the minds in order to create a sed-
entary, peaceful and quiet workforce.6 The undeniable guilt of Western 
governments from the 16th-century onwards is so obvious after even a 
superfĳicial confrontation with this dossier that one is surprised to fĳind a 
non-ideological and non-legitimizing historiography only in rather mar-
ginal expert literature. 
The most clearly demonstrated attitude is silence about the subject or 
down-grading its importance.7 In both the UK and the Netherlands, the 
two most important countries at stake, books from amateurs like Ellen La 
Motte, Jack Beeching, Maurice Collis or Ewald Vanvugt were the fĳirst to 
5 See for this relationship in particular J. Nederveen Pieterse, p. 223 fff. or 339 fff. about 
Christianity as a ‘slave religion’ under the heading: ‘Strange Opium’. Of course, the com-
parison between slavery and compulsory or induced addiction requires a rather compli-
cated description and explanation, which cannot be given in the following study: I can 
only point to the phenomenon of the relationship.  
6 Only the British after their long stay and detailed governance in British India started 
also with an Indian emigration policy in the second half of the 19th-century and exported, 
for instance, “free workers” to the other colonies in South Africa or the Guyanas (the so-
called Hindustani also found in Dutch Guyana). In this way the “political heat” of the pro-
letarians at home could be cooled, while a divide and rule game could be played between 
the several ethnic groups in the new home.  
7 The most remarkable fact is that in the special volume about the historiography of 
the British Empire, opium was not discussed besides listing some titles with the word 
“opium”. R. Winks (ed.). Notwithstanding a remark as given in note 3, in this entire fĳive-
volume History of the British Empire, “opium” is hardly a subject worthy of analysis. In 
some more specialized literature like T. Rawski and L. Li (ed.) or even the pre-war impor-
tant publications of C. Remer and F. H. King, opium is not worth discussing. That is strange 
for other reasons because a high offfĳicial like H. Morse wrote extensively (and in favour) of 
opium, as we will see below. For the Dutch Empire, the main historians and main histori-
cal works like the old and modern edition of the Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 
or special studies of Van Dillen, Boxer until Gaastra and H. van den Doel, opium is, at best, 
discussed in passing. In France, the situation is not better. The famous F. Braudel, vol. 1, p. 
261 treated opium as similar to tobacco and preferred to write about the latter. He also 
suggested mysteriously that ‘humanity had need of compensation’ and that opium was 
one of the “solutions”. In the other two volumes opium was awarded only a few words (vol. 
2, p. 223; vol. 3, p. 523). In F. Braudel’s, E. Labrousse’s many volumes of Histoire Economique, 
there is not a single word about opium.
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cover up their national opium histories. It is now necessary to make the 
connections, to provide an adequate context for this fundamental assault 
on the East, and to ask anew about the characteristics of their own and 
other colonial empires. 
The images the offfĳicial legitimizing historiography has created, since 
the two Opium Wars resulted in a Western “victory” were so strong that a 
full inversion of the roles of perpetrator and victim could occur: for “all 
men in Western streets” China is still largely identifĳied with isolation 
(“closed door” policy) from the rest of the world, tea and opium. A general 
historian provides the most common classical myth as a self-evident 
truth:
As European, particularly English, consumption of tea increased, it became 
the principal cargo and produced enormous profĳits. But the old difffĳiculty 
of fĳinding anything to exchange in China, a self-sufffĳicient country, was not 
easy to solve.8 
Below I argue that the last thing one should say about “China” is, that it is 
or was a self-sufffĳicient country: it was always open to international trade 
and other contacts, even during the late Qing era. In an historical, eco-
nomical or political sense the fĳirst sentence in the quotation has nothing 
to do with the next. The suggestion, furthermore, that we are confronted 
here with a constant element in Chinese history, is certainly misleading. 
In fact, here again the main political economic legitimation is given for 
attacking China: a country which is ‘closed’ should be ‘opened’ by force, 
etc. 
Dodge probably does not know it, but in a theoretical sense we are con-
fronted here with a basic contradiction in nearly all European economic 
thinking since Aristotle, the antagonistic relationship between the oikos 
and the market. The fĳirst concept (literally: house, household) became 
directly related to an autarkic or self-sufffĳicient state, which too often 
aggressively strove to become a monopoly in many senses, negating the 
market forces and interests. Below we shall explain how this is to be 
understood in the case of China versus the British and other empires. The 
latter identifĳied itself largely with the global market, but this identifĳica-
tion leads to serious difffĳiculties in theory and also in practice.
Carl Trocki opens one of his highly stimulating books with a sentence 
referring to other fĳixed opinions about China:
8 E. Dodge, p. 264.
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For European observers, one of the most enduring nineteenth-century 
images of the Chinese … was that of the opium “wreck”. The hollow-eyed, 
emaciated Oriental stretched out on his pallet, pipe in hand, stood as the 
stereotype of Asiatic decadence and indulgence. He was the icon of all that 
was beyond the pale of Christian morality and human decency. Even if we 
went beyond the picture to learn that it was Westerners, really English and 
Americans, who were most actively involved in selling the drug in Asia, the 
association between the “Chinaman” and his pipe was fĳixed. The victim had 
come to stand for the crime, and the image has acquired an extraordinary 
historical durability.9 
There are other positions to legitimate in opium historiography: the one 
of the offfĳicial public perpetrators (here the colonial governments, their 
bosses in the homelands and the leaderships of the Protestant and 
Catholic churches) and of their often private offfĳicial executioners (from 
producers and traders to military, bureaucrats and settlers supported by 
their clergy); the one of the homeland supporters (mostly medical stafff, 
politicians) and, ultimately, of the opposition against opium (other politi-
cians, intellectuals and scientists and, in the end, even some individual 
missionaries). In the victims’ countries or circles the legitimated positions 
are not only of governments or leaders (from emperors to warlords), but 
also of collaborating producers, smuggling trafffĳickers, etc. and, ultimately, 
of the addicts and their supporters, who have to rationalize their addic-
tion. Apart from the obvious analysis of the trade, profĳits and losses, and 
their contexts, all this is also part of the opium problem as discussed 
below.
Of course, one can simply deny the ravaging efffects of opium and call 
this ‘a misconception ‘.10 In the past or at present the most used rational-
izations in this kind of literature are found in both the perpetrators’ and 
the victims’ media: “Man is by nature cruel and war-like”; “By defĳinition 
pagans go to hell, unless they are converted to Christianity”; “Man was 
9 C. Trocki (1990), p. 1. The image was so strong that also Western and Chinese oppo-
nents of opium consumption used it regularly. It is remarkable that Trocki publishes 
exactly these images and in C.Trocki (1999a). See as well the most recent publication 
I could consult: J. Lovell, passim.
10 Even recently by W. Bernstein, p. 289, on highly shaky grounds, ‘academic research’ 
(he does not gave a source) should have proved that ‘it was largely a social drug that 
harmed only a tiny percentage of users’. He did not even consider that a ‘tiny percentage’ 
in China (let alone in the whole of East Asia) immediately concerns many millions of peo-
ple. Bernstein writes himself that ‘about one Chinese person in a hundred inhaled enough 
opium to even be at risk of addiction’ (Idem). If this kind of reasoning should be relevant, 
Bernstein does not realize that this concerns at least four million people only in China at 
the time, apart from their surroundings of related victims.
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prepared from time immemorial to eliminate his fellow men”, “Man in 
antiquity was already an addict or consumer of all kinds of drugs”11, “The 
Yellow, Black and Red races are clearly inferior to the White race”12; “We 
conquer your country and claim that it is our property” (the classical set-
tler’s claim); “It is our world mission to civilize and pacify the earth”; “If 
you do not want to follow our demands, we have the right/ we are obliged 
to force you to do so in the name of mankind”; and so on. 
A fĳixed element in all this is the generalizing abstract language, which 
is immediately neutralized by asking about the concrete details. The 
European 19th-century, with all its new ideologies, was the richest in 
inventions of this kind. They still haunt our minds. Its rigidity is camou-
flaged in legitimating literature at issue by sportsman-like challenge—
response dichotomies, etc. Take, for instance, the following text in an 
important but very imperial English historical atlas. One can read:
For much of the 19th-century the Chinese failed to understand the chal-
lenge presented by Western powers. After a peak of prosperity under the 
Ch’ing in the 18th-century, they regarded themselves as the centre of world 
civilization and were slow to realize that Western power, with its superior 
technology, productivity and wealth, had overtaken them. Such attitudes 
informed their negative responses to British attempts to develop diplomatic 
relations from 1793. Matters came to a head when the Chinese tried to end 
the illicit trade in opium with its damaging economic efffects. They were 
defeated by the British in the First Opium War and in 1842 forced to cede 
11 Even C.Trocki (1999a), chapter 2 or P-A. Chouvy in his chapter 1 has the anti-histor-
ical attitude to present a prehistory of opium as if this in whatever form can explain or 
legitimize the spreading of opium under colonial and imperialistic conditions by Western 
powers. Recently, the same was tried by W. Bernstein, p. 287. The most erudite, detailed 
and well illustrated example is Merlin’s overview of the prehistoric and ancient Egyptian, 
Greek or Roman experiences with the opium poppy, apart from about 25 other kinds of 
papaver (in fact 28 genera and some 250 species as J. Scott, p. 1 reveals). The feeling of 
‘uncertainty’ (p. 281) Merlin has about his subject must also arise from the fact that his 
research on Papaver somniferum never came across The Opium Question (or its origins); 
it was this question which makes his research more interesting than would otherwise be 
the case.
12 One of the more clever ideologues of British imperialism, Sir Alfred Lyall, compar-
ing the Roman with the British Empire, ends a study about the many elements of Indian 
religious sects and the way the British handled this diversity with: ‘A modern empire 
means the maintenance of order by the undisputed predominance of one all-powerful 
member of a federation ... it is the best machine for collecting public opinion over a wide 
area among dissociated communities. It is the most efffĳicient instrument of comprehen-
sive reforms in law and government and the most powerful engine whereby one con-
fessedly superior race can control and lead other races left without nationality or a 
working social organization.’ (p. 306). Indeed, it is this powerful race which introduced 
and managed the production and distribution of opium in a quite mechanical way.
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Hong Kong and fĳive treaty ports in which foreigners were permitted to trade 
free from Chinese jurisdiction.13 
Did those Western powers really ‘overtake’ China more than infĳiltrating 
some places on the coast? Were ‘they’ (who?) really regarding themselves 
seriously as the center of the world and did this really have negative con-
sequences for the West? Were ‘they’ really so slow to understand the chal-
lenge, and which kind of challenge was this? What were, anyway, the 
attempts of 1793, the Macartney kotow, other than a highly arrogant 
insult of a Chinese emperor by a minor English “diplomat” and a rather 
fraudulent attempt to make an opium deal with this emperor? Only the 
word ‘illicit’ in the quotation could provoke a small murmur and the ques-
tion of since when was it not allowed to prohibit afffairs which were, also 
at that time, perceived in China and England as criminal? 
 
13 The Times Historical Atlas, ed. R. Overy, p. 256. See also p. 193 for statistics of relation 
“export” of Chinese silver and “value of opium” until 1836. See for the narrative of the 
Opium Wars J. Roberts, chapter 14, E. Dodge, p. 270 fff. and J. Spence, chapter 7, but still the 
best is F. Wakeman’s contribution to the Cambridge History of China (1978). It is remark-
able that few traits of this appear in the more recent Oxford History of the British Empire or 
the given Times Historical Atlas. A better modern treatment is C. Munn, chapter 1 and pas-
sim.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE POLITICS OF GUILT
We talk of the heathen, the savage, and the cruel, and 
the wily tribes, that fĳill the rest of the earth; but how 
is it that these tribes know us? Chiefly by the very fea-
tures that we attribute exclusively to them ... the Euro-
pean nations, while professing Christianity, have made 
it odious to the heathen ... On them lies the guilt, the 
stupendous guilt of having checked the gospel in its 
career ... 
The barbarities and desperate outrages of the so-called 
Christian race, throughout every region of the world, 
and upon every people that they have been able to 
subdue, are not to be paralleled by those of any other 
race, however fĳierce, however untaught, and however 
reckless of mercy and of shame, in any age of the 
earth.
William Howitt, Colonization and Christianity. 
A Popular History of the Treatment offf the Natives by 
the Europeans in all their Colonies (London: 
Longman, 1838), p. 7-91
Below, examples are discussed of many warnings about opium at the very 
beginning of awareness about it in the West. To start with a few 19th-
century opinions are given. The question is never explained why even in 
the English Parliament (April 1840; two years “after Howitt”) a Tory poli-
tician as famous as Gladstone declared: 
I do not know how it can be urged as a crime against the Chinese that they 
refused provisions to those who refused obedience to their laws whilst 
residing within their territory ... A war more unjust in its origin, a war more 
calculated in its progress to cover this country with disgrace, I do not know 
and I have not read of. The right honorable gentleman opposite spoke of 
1 The last part of this quotation is also used by K. Marx, vol. 1, p. 779. The well-known 
William Howitt (1792-1879) was a Quaker, poet and author of about fĳifty books. He married 
Mary Botham, Quaker, poet and author as well. Marx called him ‘a specialist in Christian-
ity’.
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the British flag waving in glory at Canton. That flag is hoisted to protect an 
infamous contraband trafffĳic ... we should recoil from its sight with horror.2
Gladstone’s biographer, Lord Morley, much later summed up his under-
standing of the case in the following words:
The Chinese question was of the simplest. British subjects insisted on smug-
gling opium into China in the teeth of Chinese law. The British agent on 
the spot began a war against China for protecting herself against these mal-
practices. There was no pretence that China was in the wrong, for, in part, 
the British Government had sent out orders that the opium smugglers 
should not be shielded; but the orders arrived too late, and, war having 
begun, Great Britain felt compelled to see it through ...3
That the British government was willing to accept Chinese complaints 
seems to be palliative. If true, than the government would not have pun-
ished China to pay all costs, to cede many coastal settlements and above 
all, to accept legal, massive opium imports. 
Anyway, Gladstone was preceded by, for instance, the rather paternal-
istic doctrine of Edmund Burke (around 1795) that colonial government 
was a trust for the benefĳit of the subjected people, and that therefore the 
opium trade should be condemned: this trade is nothing more than a 
‘smuggling adventure … the great Disgrace of the British character in 
India’.4 It was soo followed by an early representative of the Protestant 
Church of England, the educator Thomas Arnold of Rugby School, later a 
historian at Oxford. He mentioned (ca. 1846) that forcing opium on China 
was ‘a national sin of the greatest possible magnitude.’ It took much more 
than fĳifty years before the fĳirst sign of an abolition campaign was heralded 
and this ‘smuggling adventure’ of the British could be ended. One reason 
for this can be found in the Gladstone debate as well. 
The right honorable gentleman attacked by Gladstone was the famous 
historian Thomas Babington Macaulay. He was a Whig member of the 
cabinet defending the imperialistic attack on China with fĳierce national-
2 Quoted by F. Wakeman in J. Fairbank (ed.), 1978, p. 195. In J. Roberts, p. 252 and W. 
Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1090, 1091 there are a quite diffferent readings and quotations of the 
same part of Gladstone’s speech. I combined what all three left aside, hoping they did not 
err.
3 Quoted in W. Willoughby, id., p. 1091.
4 P. Brendon, p. xviii and 103. Burke certainly knew that at the time the EIC offfĳicially 
prohibited the opium trade, but nevertheless stimulated or did not object to smuggling. 
The EIC and/or its offfĳicials traded Bengal opium through Calcutta. Burke, however, was 
apparently not mislead.
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ist rhetoric. Macaulay: those who are forbidden by the Chinese govern-
ment to trade in opium
belonged to a country unaccustomed to defeat, to submission or to shame; 
to a country ... which had not degenerated since the great Protector vowed 
that he would make the name of Englishman as much respected as ever 
had been the name of Roman citizen. They knew that, surrounded as they 
were by enemies, and separated by great oceans and continents from all 
help, not a hair of their heads would be harmed with impunity.5
The government pretended not to attack China in support of opium traf-
fĳic, but for ‘the security of future trade and the safety of English citizens’. 
Of course, the safety of the English citizens would never have been in dan-
ger if the war against China had been stopped. And the profĳitable and 
future trade was, in particular, opium, while the successful lobby for the 
fĳirst war came from the largest opium trader, William Jardine and his 
money!
This way of dealing with the East was only the beginning: a Second 
Opium War (1856-1860) was also provoked by the British, and it was much 
more devastating (the destruction of the Summer Palace in Beijing led to 
an international outcry; etc.).6 The historical website The Victorian Web 
writes today without any hesitation: 
The Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars were the direct result of China’s isolation-
ist and exclusionary trade policy with the West. Confucian China’s attempts 
to exclude pernicious foreign ideas resulted in highly restricted trade.7
And in the Wikipedia one can still read the opinion, in all respects nonsen-
sical:
The Macartney Embassy is historically signifĳicant because it marked a 
missed opportunity by the Chinese to move toward greater trade with the 
Western world, and thus, toward industrialization. This failure to industri-
alize early would continue to plague the Qing dynasty as it encountered 
5 Quoted by F. Wakeman, idem.
6 P. Brendon, p. 106 etc. His description of the English barbarian behavior and its inter-
national reaction is clear, but it is typical for the legitimating (and also here illogical) char-
acter of even this book, that he immediately adds a note (p. 108) in which he tries to 
convince the reader of the miracle that English military could destroy something while it 
remained intact and that, in fact, the Chinese themselves destroyed the palace! 
7 P. V. Allingham on “The Victorian Web” under ‘England and China: The Opium Wars, 
1839-60.’ The DTV-Atlas Weltgeschichte (1997), p. 369 makes history very simple: after “Opi-
umkrieg” only come the words ‘beweist die Überlegenheit europ. Wafffen’ (‘proves the 
superiority of European arms’)! 
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increasing foreign resistance and internal unrest during the nineteenth-
century.8
So, even in 2009/10 the reasoning is deemed relevant: it is Chinese’s own 
guilt that the fĳirst “regular” relations between the West and the most 
important country/ government of the East concerned drugs and two 
narco-wars. This implied: if the Chinese had accepted opium from us, 
they would not have been killed. Or: if they had accepted being doped, we 
would not have started a war. In our present public morality this suggests 
that the underworld has become the upper-world. 
It seems as if there is not much diffference between blaming the victims 
in the time of George Macartney (“the man of 1793”) or John Adams and 
today, between an earlier and present attitude to punish the arrogance of 
those who resist Western repression. Macartney’s adventure during his 
kotow (the act of deep respect shown by kneeling and bowing) to the 
Chinese emperor led a former president of the United States, John Quincy 
Adams, to tell an audience in 1841 about the fĳirst Opium War:
The cause of war is the kotow!—the arrogance and insupportable preten-
sions of China, that she will hold commercial intercourse with the rest of 
mankind, not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and 
degrading forms of relation between lord and vassal.9
This is one hundred percent demagogy and repeated time and again as 
the ultimate struggle between the despotic Orient and the “rights” of the 
democratic West to achieve the Western perception of equality, diplo-
macy and commerce!10 It was trumpeted around without any form of res-
8 Wikipedia and New World Encyclopedia under ‘Macartney Embassy’. See for this 
episode part 2-2. 
9 Quoted in J. Roberts, p. 253. Of course here Adams pointed to the kotow of George 
Macartney. See also H. Morse, p. 199, 200 who still defends Adams statement, while using 
the generalizations “destruction of foreign property” and “the need for better protection” 
instead of writing about the 1.2 million kilo of opium (!) confĳiscated by the Chinese author-
ities and destroyed, which triggered the war.
10 See H. Morse, p. 200. Morse (1855-1934) was at the time an important British bureau-
crat in China (collaborated with Robert Hart, was Commissioner of Customs and Statisti-
cal Secretary, Inspector General of Customs, etc.) and historian, who wrote among others 
the fĳive-volume Chronicles of the East India Company, 1635-1834. Morse quotes here another 
important person, the Protestant missionary Fr. Hawks Pott (1864-1947), top church 
bureaucrat of the Episcopal Church in China and twice decorated by the Chinese govern-
ment. It is remarkable that Lodwick nowhere mentions this Hawks Pott, although a repre-
sentative of his church, Reverend Yen, was ‘one of the most prominent of the anti-opium 
crusaders’ (Idem, p. 52 fff.) simply because he was one of the very few Chinese clergymen. 
Recently (2004), Harry Gelber defended the same position as Adams, which he also 
repeated in H. Gelber, p. 188.
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ervation as Hosea Morse was still doing in 1922 when “evaluating” the 
fĳirst Opium War:
As has been the rule from the outset, England bore the brunt of the battle 
in securing the rights of the West, and the privileges secured to her as the 
result of the war, became the heritage of all the Western Powers coming 
later into the fĳield.’ And the racist element is seldom far away ‘where a bold 
aggressive race comes, especially in matters of trade, in contact with a 
weaker race ...’11
Of course, the British had no rights at all, only better guns. All this does 
not take into account that the British at that time had, in the propaganda, 
the same aspirations as the Chinese (to convert the ‘rest of the world’ into 
their civilization), with the large diffference that the British shot their 
Christian way through the world with their superior arms technology and 
the Chinese emperors claimed to impress only Chinese, which largely 
failed. (Ever seen Confucians trying to convert Western Christians?).
This reasoning and pretext, furthermore, do not belong to the American 
bourgeois world of John Adams, which had successfully revolted against 
the colonial British just half a century before, but to a classical European, 
very old-fashioned political thought in which monarchs determine the 
course of history and all the rest of society and culture does not matter at 
all. Our way of writing foreign history like the Chinese one is still largely 
written in this monarchical “Peking Way”, as if the duck of the same name 
is the only food one can swallow in the Chinese kitchen.
And what was the meaning of ‘commercial intercourse … upon terms 
of equal reciprocity’? This “trade” was only to the benefĳit of the British 
state and the merchants, who were looking for state protection of their 
opium trade. The most famous among the latter was William Jardine, the 
wealthiest opium dealer in Canton; like all other Westerners he was run-
ning a monopoly trade, which was not “free” at all. This kind of armed 
trade was a classical measure in an oikoidal (colonial) state economic pol-
icy which wanted to be compensated for its “loss”. Therefore, Adams was 
not referring to strict (capitalist) commercial trade: Chinese tea, etc. for 
money; tea which was made a hype by capitalist enterprise, so that they 
already got huge profĳits for their small investments. The same was the 
case with porcelain and silk in the framework of the 19th-century China 
and chinaware fashion. 
11 H. Morse, p. 200. A few years later another authority, the American professor and 
diplomat Westel Willoughby, provided a strong criticism of the earlier behavior of the 
British Government.
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In addition, the Chinese could not use Western products; silver money 
was enough in exchange for their tea and porcelain. The highest British 
colonial administrators knew this perfectly well, like the trade commis-
sioner for China, Robert Hart:
[The] Chinese have the best food in the world, rice; the best drink, tea; and 
the best clothing, cotton, silk, fur. Possessing these staples and their innu-
merable native adjuncts, they do not need to buy a penny’s worth else-
where.12
No, here the British state wanted to be compensated in the trade balance 
which was “negative” vis-à-vis China and the British state, including its 
enterprise in India (British East India Company, EIC), used opium as this 
compensation by use of arms. What a good defĳinition of “Free Trade”! 
“Reciprocity” could only concern the way the Chinese defended them-
selves against this brute intruder. All these were the classical and main 
elements of an oikoidal political economy, which will be discussed at the 
end.
However, the main mistake in several quotations above is that at least 
implicitly—and for the laymen directly—the impression is given that the 
Chinese were the bad guys: a pagan foreign emperor who pretends to be 
our ruler and “yellow” Chinese refusing not only “honest trade”, but also 
spreading opium in the world; an assault on the innocent citizens of the 
West, which had to be punished as severely as possible! 
Of course, politicians or their historians did not communicate to the 
public, that a war on drugs was necessary to increase the profĳits of Western 
governments and their traders; instead, it was meant to restore the 
Christian morality not to be dependent on hallucinating stufff. And indeed, 
the hypocrisy of the colonial powers was so structured that they forbade 
opium use for their white citizens but not for the indigenous populations 
on largely racist grounds: from the Chinese one could accept the tea, but 
nothing else, that drink was hallucinating enough.13 
Therefore, the legitimation of these wars had to involve the creation of 
a so-called foreign enemy, a classical trick. The three most important 
Western imperialist powers in Asia until ca. 1900 were the Dutch, British 
and French. They organized the production and trade of opium on the 
12 Quoted in W. Bernstein, p. 287. For Robert Hart, see ch. 32.
13 In 19th-century Canton, the main opium port after the Lintin Island period, opium 
was always called “tea”. H.Morse, p. 360. That is not far from another colonial use, at least 
during my stay in Kenya in the 1980s where “drinking tea” (tchai) was synonymous with 
doing corrupt business.
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largest possible scale and with tremendous profĳits with all the conse-
quences not only for the indigenous peoples and societies but for the own 
societies as well. Before that date many individual American skipper/
smugglers were heavily involved in the whole region and after that date 
the USA started its colonial effforts in Asia. This truth had to be silenced as 
much as possible and could be easily given a theological turn in the direc-
tion of an original sin. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE “ORIGINAL SIN”
Opium, like alcohol, told an English statesman, is one 
of these few cases in which the imposition of a heavy 
duty enables us to serve God and the Mammon at the 
same time.
J.A. Wiselius (1886), p. 19
 To the classical means of political or moral legitimation belongs the his-
tory of the “original sin”. It is always painted in black and white, but serves 
important aims. In this case: who or what can be accused of using or pro-
ducing opium for the fĳirst time, must be guilty for ever. The most pleasant 
option is being able, armed with some blunt historical weapon, to accuse 
the victims, enemies or competitors: “They did it themselves!”; “Because 
our competitor challenged us we had to respond!”; “They, the consumers, 
wanted it themselves!”; “Man is by nature an opium addict!”, “From time 
immemorial people used and liked opium and similar drugs!”, etc. Most 
symptomatic sentences in this legitimating history are quotations like 
those given above or in the previous chapter. What are the answers to the 
question of who or what invented and/ or introduced the opium evil? 
Was it an evil? If not, there is no problem of eternal guilt. If so, people 
are quick to confess that “the other” made the mistake, notwithstanding 
the serious problem, that in a Christian theology an “original sin” is 
 inherited. Only Roman Catholics can get rid of it by “baptizing the 
 question”, a possibility not available to Calvinist Protestants who are 
 predestined to remain evil. The following answer can be found in a 
nearly offfĳicial publication of, chronologically, the fĳirst perpetrators 
and players of the key role in this dossier, the Calvinist Dutch colonial 
authorities: 
The use of opium seems to be introduced in the East Indies archipelago by 
foreigners, presumably Chinese; upon the arrival of the Dutch its use was 
probably already known in Java, although on a small scale. Soon it was a 
trade product among those of the East Indies Company; opium became 
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increasingly important until in 1676 the Company got the exclusive import 
rights in Mataram, in 1678 in Cheribon and a bit later in Bantam.1
This looks like a clean chronological story, but the second part of the 
quote has nothing to do with the fĳirst part. That is to say, not in a proper 
historical sense: it only suggests that some earlier small-scale use and pro-
duction (if any) increased into a large-scale, booming industry. But this 
causal relation does not exist as is demonstrated in the third part of this 
study. Here we have to decide whether one could perceive the specifĳic 
introduction of opium as an original sin. 
A modern Anglo-Saxon historian gave this story of the original sin 
another turn: of innocent tobacco-smoking Dutch sailors and copying 
Chinese:
Opium smoking in China arose from the contact of Chinese traders with 
the Dutch in Java, who had the habit of mixing a little opium with their 
tobacco. This practice had an enormous and inexplicable appeal to the local 
Chinese, who were soon smoking opium straight and who introduced the 
custom to the mainland in the mid-seventeenth-century.2
In a well-documented history of the tea trade and, among others, the 
practice of exchanging tea for opium (see part 2), Martha Avery blames 
the Chinese directly:
The smoking of opium mixed with tobacco had become established in 
China in the course of the seventeenth-century. Opium was a domestic 
product, not introduced from outside, as evidenced by the seventeenth-
century trade in shar’ to Bukharan merchants.3
She “forgot” that her fĳirst mentioning of this shar’—here seen as a variety 
of Chinese tobacco—, included the remark ‘it probably contained opi-
um’4 without any proof substantiating the certainty in the quotation. Let 
alone, that the information, that the present trade route for opium and its 
1 Encyclopaedie, vol. III, p. 106. One must remember that it looks as if the Chinese were 
treated in the East Indies and other colonies like the Jews in Europe: they sufffered peri-
odically from harsh pogroms. It certainly concerns racist remarks here. Notwithstanding 
this, one must be careful to extend this comparison too far.
2 E. Dodge, p. 266. L. Lewin attested this way of smoking tobacco as a typical and 
original Chinese custom (L.Lewin, p. 62, 63). A peer reviewer, however, informs us, that 
this habit of madak smoking remained confĳined to the South-Chinese coastline during the 
entire 18th-century. It was apparently also the reason for the 1729 prohibition of opium by 
the Chinese emperor.
3 M. Avery, p. 138.
4 Idem, p. 117.
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derivatives is similar to the old one for Chinese tobacco, can be used as 
proof!5
We arrive on slightly more solid ground with an early pharmacological 
lexicon about drugs, the often translated and republished Phantastica of 
Ludwig Lewin (original from 1924).6 He, fĳirst, comes up with archaeologi-
cal evidence that Swiss lake-dwellers of 2000 years BCE had a commercial 
poppy culture.7 Lewin projects more “certainty” about this through 
Homer’s Odyssey because the beautiful Helena mixed wine and some stufff 
with which one could forget pain and sorrow. Lewin immediately reacts 
with: without any doubt, this must have been opium, as if he personally 
made the mix. 
In his view ancient Egypt is the oldest location of poppy production, 
after which this culture spread in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean 
regions. And indeed, Lewin can produce several quotations from ancient 
authors who apparently wrote about poppy including its soporifĳic efffects. 
There are medical papyri of ancient Egypt which suggest that Papaver 
somniferum is used somehow as a painkiller and means to kill people 
rather painlessly, as is still done today. This is also the case in most other 
medical treatises and practices in antiquity up to the Greek and Roman 
healers like Hippocrates or Galen. The latter two are the main sources for 
the medical doctors of future centuries. More than proving that opium is 
5 The following reasoning is as good/bad as hers. Wikipedia informs us as follows: the 
shar(-pei) is a well-known kind of Chinese dog, already known from pictures of the Han 
dynasty (200 BCE-220 ACE). After the English invaded China, they introduced their own 
bulldog, bull-terrier and mastifff as fĳighting dogs; the English, looking for an inimical Chi-
nese dog, introduced the shar(-pei) as a fĳighting dog. However, although used as a house-
dog the shar was a very peaceful dog who was a bit ‘reserved’ towards foreigners and could 
not fĳight the English “devils”. Therefore, the shar had to be saved recently from extinction, 
and websites (www.worldwidebase.com) can now even report that the shar is a typical 
fĳighting dog and a cross between a mastifff, a chow-chow and a polar dog!
6 L. Lewin, p. 53-78.
7 The same was done recently by T. Dormandy, p. 16 fff. See also Wikipedia “Opium”. It 
is mentioned that in Neolithic settlements throughout Switzerland, Germany and Spain, 
Papaver somniferium was found even as far back as 4200 BCE. Since this info is given under 
the heading “Opium”, it is very misleading. All kinds of papaver including opium poppy 
are used fĳirst and foremost for their oily seeds. This kind of use is self-evident since it does 
not require the rather complicated treatment to produce a medicine or an aphrodisiac. 
That knowledge is not forgotten, but less well known in particular by those who are look-
ing for solutions to the opium problem in Afghanistan or elsewhere today. See, for 
instance, the following scientifĳic articles by O.N. Denisenko, G.A. Stepanenko in the jour-
nal Chemistry of Natural Compounds (1977), p. 477-478; A. Sengupta, U.K. Mazumder in 
Journal of the Science of Food and Agriculture (2006), p. 214-218; M.M. Ozoan, C. Atalay in 
the journal Grasas y Aceites (2006), p. 169-174.
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known as a medicine in a very small circle among the elite is not possible, 
however. For China, Lewin reminds us of a source from about 1000 ACE in 
which the fĳirst mention of opium strictly as a medicine is given.
Most impressive, however, is Mark David Merlin’s study of the ‘ancient 
opium poppy’. Every possible trace of Papaver somniferum L. is discussed 
in taxonomy, botany, archeology, and so on.8 He rightly has been left 
‘with a feeling of uncertainty’ about the controversial result of the current 
analyses of the 9 sections and 99 members of the genus Papaver: only two 
members of one section (Mecones) have been the focus of much biochem-
ical research because they contain morphine. 
There is no consensus about the taxonomy, nor about the ancestry of 
the opium poppy, nor about the use of parts (stem, seeds or leaves) of the 
plant or the technique of this use. Also the geographical origin of the plant 
remains in doubt; Anatolia seems to have the best papers. Another impor-
tant aspect is that Merlin stresses how the opium poppy was used as 
human food, animal fodder, lubricating and cooking oil, apart from medi-
cine and psychoactive drug for ritualistic and recreational purposes. The 
archaeological record as such is also strongly modifĳied, but even this 
author does not or cannot properly link archaeological sites to a typical 
use of opium. 
In European antiquity and medieval times many herbaria were made. 
They form good proofs of the popularity of Papaver somniferum. Some 
include detailed graphic designs, sometimes these designs are trans-
formed into mythical or magical pictures. In the Greek asclepieia (places 
of worship to the god of healers, Asclepios) among the many prescrip-
tions sometimes opium was also distributed, but in the most famous 
Capitulare de villis of Charlemagne (ca. 800 ACE) Papaver somniferum is 
not mentioned at all.9
Much later, from about 1000, there was some trade in medicinal prod-
ucts mixed with opium from the Arabian peninsula throughout southern 
Asia all the way to China. There is some evidence of this in an early 
Chinese medical encyclopedia, as Lewin already mentioned.
The botanical history must be consulted further. The fĳirst printed cop-
ies of herbaria appear at the end of the 15th-century; the fĳirst systematic 
ones seem to have been made at the beginning of the 16th-century in 
8 M. D. Merlin, p. 28 fff., 281 fff.
9 F. Bouman a.o. (ed.), p. 172.
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Italy.10 Bazzi tells how the authors of these collections often refer to 
authorities in antiquity (Strabo, Galenus, Plinius, etc.), only to make their 
own views more important, but without a proper support from those 
authorities. 
Bazzi describes one herbarium which consists of two parts: the fĳirst has 
45 pages on which the healing capacities of 74 drugs are given; in the sec-
ond part 150 plants are given in their ‘natural dimension’ (?) with their 
drugs. Only 19 of the latter are given also in the fĳirst part. It concerns at 
least partly a translation of an older work, apparently from the 12th-centu-
ry or much earlier (Bazzi is not very clear about it), but it is often re-issued. 
All this is interesting, but I refer to it because one can fĳind there papavero 
listed once in the fĳirst part of the codex, while it is never mentioned in the 
second part.
There is, furthermore, a special kind of literature in the Middle Ages, 
monographs on specifĳic drugs. The most spectacular are those of the so-
called theriaca, a wonder drug composed of many ingredients.11 Below are 
given more details of its prescription. In this highly detailed study about 
medieval medicine in West Europe, however, opium is certainly not a 
common product used in whatever form or for whatever purpose. In addi-
tion, it is always used in a mixture with other ingredients; its isolation is a 
result of modern chemical and/or pharmaceutical experiments. 
Recently the study by Leigh Chipman appeared to prove this. It is not a 
study about opium, but about the highly popular Arabic pharmacology in 
the 13th-century. In the very long appendix I counted 817 prescriptions for 
all possible cures.12 Nearly all of them consists of a combination of herbal 
products and specifĳically treated minerals (although in a few “boy’s urine” 
was used) like the following example:
ashyāf al-ward [rose eye-powder with ingredients] ... Maccassar and red 
sandalwood, rosebuds, gum arabic, gum tragacanth, Socotran aloes, safffron, 
opium, rosewater, boxthorn, horned poppy’ which should be excellent to 
cure ‘external dressing, good for hot inflammations and swellings, analgesic, 
good for scabies, corrosion of the eyelashes and chemosis.13 
10 See for the following the article of Franco Bazzi in: G. Baader, G. Keil (ed.), p. 209-
227.
11 See the article by Joachim Telle in: Idem, p. 297. He also reported (p. 318) about the 
fĳirst competition between the “academic doctors” and the popular healers in about the 
12th-century. One strategy used was to keep a specifĳic recipe secret to increase its market 
value. See further ch. 8 and 13.   
12 L. Chipman, p. 185-270.
13 Idem, p. 237.
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In all 817 prescriptions I found opium only 39 times and a reference to 
diffferent poppy products about 30 times (black, white poppy, horned 
poppy, poppy seed and poppy syrup). It is a reminder as well that there 
are many uses of poppy without the possibility of producing opium.
This proves convincingly, that opium and the poppy plants were not at 
all favorite ingredients among the famous Arab medical doctors and phar-
macists. Their most important were camphor, cardomom, frankincense, 
honey products, mastic, myrrh, pepper, pomegranate, rose and rosebuds 
or vinegar and violet. This must have had remarkable consequences since 
these Arab specialists and their knowledge traveled not only in the 
Mediterranean, but in all countries bordering the Arabian Sea, Indian or 
Pacifĳic Ocean. They were highly respected in all monarchical or aristo-
cratic courts, which were much later the fĳirst targets of the Western mer-
chants and military. 
Derived from this tradition was the Yunani or Unani medical treat-
ment practised by the hakims in Islamic India. Around 1200 ACE these 
doctors could carry out surgical operations for which opium was used as 
an anaesthetic.14 
There was an alternative medicine tradition in India derived in some 
way or other from the vedic. This classical ayurveda medical knowledge, 
developed in the north of India, is quite complicated and applicable to 
very diffferent aspects of the health problem.15 Although stories about its 
ancestry are mostly exaggerated, its sources must have provided a good 
basis to judge the use of poppy plants or opium. However, the only thing 
which is mentioned is: 
Also opium was introduced—probably based on Islamic sources—as an 
efffĳicient medicine to cure diarrhoea.16 
From all the examples given one may safely conclude, that opium was 
well known but not a very popular substance before—say—the 16th-cen-
tury in Western Europe and the Mediterranean countries or South Asia, 
that it was rather expensive, while the date of the Original Sin cannot be 
found in Adam’s and Eve’s time. Therefore, my decision not to study the 
history of the use of poppy for its oily content or as medicine or religious 
14 The article by Claudia Liebeskind, in: J. van Alphen, A. Aris (ed.), p. 45. She writes in 
fact: ‘The Muslim doctors were among the fĳirst to use anesthetics ... Opium, or one of its 
derivatives was used as a narcotic.’ This is highly ambiguous, because these derivatives 
were the result of modern 19th-century European laboratory isolation experiments.
15 See the article by Dominik Wujastyk in: J. van Alphen, A. Aris (ed.), p. 19-37.
16 Idem, p. 21.
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Ill. 2. Frontispiece from Itinerario, Jan Huygen van Linschoten, ca. 1595
Source: Wikipedia.
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medium, but as mass produced and traded luxury, as aphrodisiac, as mon-
ey, seems reasonable. 
Until the 16th-century opium was simply not a historical, social, eco-
nomic, medical or moral problem. Therefore, the questions remain of 
when and why this occurred and what were the efffects. The following 
study aims to answer these and related questions.
The fĳirst mentioning of opium, relevant to that aim, is apparently made 
by the Dutch Protestant scholarly traveler, Jan Huyghen van Linschoten 
(1563-1611). 
Van Linschoten traveled to the East in the service of a Catholic 
Portuguese bishop of Goa. The English Wikipedia (not the Dutch!) writes 
that he is ‘misusing the trust in him, for reasons unknown’ by copying top-
secret Portuguese nautical maps. None of the present secret services can 
boast of a similar result: it enabled the British and Dutch East India 
Companies ‘to break the 16th-century monopoly enjoyed by the 
Portuguese on trade with the East Indies’ and to start the conquering of 
the largest empire ever.17 However, this was a really world-historical deed 
in the history of opium also, as is explained below. 
The world heard of these secrets in all possible detail after Van 
Linschoten wrote a bestseller in 1598, which was quickly translated into 
English and many other languages. It is said to concern the earliest 
authentic account of the habit of “opium eating”. However, 35 years ear-
lier Garcia de (or da) Orta (1501-1568), a Portuguese botanist and physi-
cian lived in Goa. He mentioned the existence of something like opium 
with several relevant details quoted by Linschoten. At that time, the 
famous Italian physician Fallopius (1523-1563) apparently stated that 
Persians used it to increase sexual pleasure. 
However, in my view, it was the Portuguese writer/ trader/ soldier 
Duarte Barbosa (?-1521) who was really the fĳirst of the colonizing 
Westerners to mention the existence and difffĳicult use of opium.18 One of 
17 See the contribution of Rui Manuel Loureiro in: E. van Veen, L. Blussé (ed.), p. 169 
about Linschoten and Cornelis de Houtman who ‘had collected enough intelligence to 
guide his expedition to safe harbour’ because he was formerly resident of Lisbon.
18 D. Barbosa, vol.1, p. 122, 123 described how the king of Cambaya was brought up by 
eating ‘poison’ in ‘such small doses that it could do him no evil’, because his father wished 
that ‘they might not be able to kill him by poison.’ Barbosa continued with: ‘And he could 
never give up eating this poison, for if he did so he would die forthwith, as we see by expe-
rience of the opium which the most of the Moors and Indians eat; if they left offf eating it 
they would die; and if those ate it who had never before eaten it, they too would die ... This 
opium is cold in the fourth degree ... The Moors eat it as a means of provoking lust, and the 
Indian women take it to kill themselves ...’ This is nearly literally copied by Linschoten/
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the “secrets” Van Linschoten discovered and copied in Goa in his master’s 
library must have been Barbosa’s report! In his own text it is easily to see 
how he copied parts of Barbosa’s book, without mentioning the source.19 
Therefore, the following quotation of the whole of Linschoten’s short 
78th chapter, titled ‘Of Amfĳion, alias Opium’, should be perceived as a 
compilation of the Western opium knowledge until 1600, but also as the 
formulation of the original sin. It sounds as follows in old Biblical English:
Amfĳion, so called by the Portingales, is by the Arabians, Mores, and Indians 
called Afffĳion, in latine Opio or opium: [It] commeth out of Cairo in Egypt, 
[and] out of Aden, upon the coast of Arabia, which is the point of the [land, 
entring into] the red Sea, sometimes belonging to the Portingales; but most 
part out of Camaia, & from Decan, that of Cairo is whitish, and is called 
Mecerii, that of Aden … is blackish & hard. That which commeth from 
Cambaia and Decan is softer and reddish. Amfĳion is made of sleepe balles 
[or Poppie], and is the gumme which commenth forth [of the same], to ye 
which end it is cut up and opened. The Indians use much to eat Amfĳion, 
specially the Malabares, and thether it is brought by those of Cambaia and 
other places, in great aboundance. Hee that useth to eate it, must eate it 
daylie, otherwise he dieth and consumeth himselfe, [when] they begin to 
eate it, and are used unto it, [they heate at the least] twenty or thirty graines 
in waight [everie day], sometimes more: but if for foure or fĳive dayes hee 
chanceth to leave it, he dieth without faile: likewise he that hath never eaten 
it, and will venture at the fĳirst to eate as much as those that dayly use it, it 
will surely kill him: for I certainly beleeve it is a kinde of poyson. Such as 
use it goe alwaies [as if they were] halfe a sleepe, they eate much of it 
because they would not feele any [great] labour or unquietnes [when they 
are at worke], but they use it most for lecherie: for it maketh a man hold 
his seede long before he sheddeth it, which the Indian women much desire, 
that they may shed their nature likewise with the man: although such as 
eate much thereof, are in time altogether unable to company with a woman, 
& whollie dried up, for it drieth and wholly cooleth mans nature that useth 
Paludanus. In a note to this page the editor explains that Barbosa used for opium the word 
amfĳiam from the Arabic afyun, which could be derived from the Greek opion, juice. The 
Dutch used from the beginning the word amfĳioen or amphioen. Barbosa indicates on his p. 
154 (and vol. 2, p. 214 fff.) that the North Indian Gujarat (Cambaya, Surat, etc.) was the trade 
connection between the Middle East and the rest of India, but also with Malacca, Sumatra 
and China. Many products were exchanged, including opium. See also T. Dormandy, p. 19 
fff. also mentions the “Greek” opion, not knowing that opium is a later Latinization of afyūn, 
etc. and, therefore, erroneously suggesting that in ancient Greece and Rome there was a 
widespread use of opium.
19 See previous note. In the introduction to the new Dutch edition of Linschoten’s 
Itinerario Professor Kern did not mention Barbosa at all, who was certainly Van L.’s source. 
In the two volumes of the English translation Barbosa is mentioned twice, but only in 
notes of the editor (vol. 1, p. 46 and 116) and without any relevance to the subject.
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it, as the Indians themselves do witnes: wherefore it is not much used by 
the Nobilitie, but onely for the cause aforesaid. 
Back in Holland Van Linschoten worked together with a learned friend 
called Paludanus.20 The latter wrote an ‘annotatio’, a further explanation, 
for many chapters of the book. In this case, Paludanus clearly diffferenti-
ates between two kinds of opium. The fĳirst is a juice resulting from pres-
sure on the leaves and heads together.21 The second kind is the juice 
resulting from cutting the heads, ‘which is the right opium’. The former is 
sweet, the latter is ‘heavy, close, fast and bitter’; the smell of it ‘provoketh 
sleepe’. The best opium is ‘that which easily melteth in the water [and is] 
soft, white, and without grossenes or kernels … and is by the Turkes called 
Maslac.’22 According to him, from this stufff Turks eat daily ‘a quantity of a 
pease’ whereupon they do not sleep, but which gives them courage when 
going to war. Paludanus concludes, however, that those who use it daily 
become stupid and slow, sleepy in their words and work. 
Connected to Paludanus and his Dutch context, one can indicate a 
most important constellation which makes it possible to point to the 
location of the Original Sin. Paludanus was somehow involved in estab-
lishing a hortus botanicus as hortus medicus in Leiden. These gardens can 
be considered spatial extensions of herbaria. In no other 17th-century 
European country was the concentration of them as high as in the Dutch 
Republic. Every university had its garden. In England, for instance, only 
20 His proper name was Berend van den Broecke (ca. 1550-1633) and he was born in 
Enkhuizen (others say Steenwijk), an important seaport at the time. He studied in Padua, 
was well-known for his collection of curiosities and plants. The University of Leiden asked 
him to establish a hortus botanicus as medicinal garden. The model for this garden had to 
be the hortus of Padua. Recently the lost original design of the garden was found in a cata-
logue of ceiling designs. See F. Bouman et al. (ed.), p. 27. 
21 Paludanus mentions that the Greeks had a special name for it, meconium. This is 
Latin, however. In Greek, furthermore, meikoon has many meanings and uses, as Liddell-
Scott, p. 1126 indicates: poppy seed, poppy juice, poppy head or ‘the ink-bag of the cuttle-
fĳish’ and no connotation to addiction. Even Liddell-Scott is duped as it refers to the Ilias, 8. 
306, which does not refer in any way to Papaver somniferum. Also, Pausanias does use 
meikoon as metaphor for an architectural ornament and not in 5.20.5 but in 5.20.9.
22 By taking the pains to compare several old dictionaries, one can obtain a good exer-
cise in humility about human knowledge. Their authors too often simply copy their prede-
cessors as Van Linschoten was doing with Barbosa, without correcting the mistakes. Even 
copying is an art in itself. Take, for instance, maslac, the present Turkish word for ‘butter’ 
(margarine). The Webster’s (1913) writes “maslach” indicating ‘(med.) An excitant contain-
ing opium, much used by the Turks’. A 2002 dictionary (Thomas Nordegren’s lexicon 
about drugs, etc., p. 414) provides four spellings (maslac, maslak, masmach and masmoch) 
all referring to a Turkish and Egyptian ‘colloquial term for hashish’ or even ‘containing 
hashish’, which can be every quantity. A 1818 Nouveau dictionnaire d’histoire naturelles... 
writes (vol. XIX, p. 434) about ‘Maslac. Ce nom est celui de l’Opium, en Turquie.’
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Oxford had one; in France there were only two; in Belgium the fĳirst garden 
was established at the University of Leuven in 1738, etc.23 Around 1650, 
the Dutch Republic was in its Golden Age and leading in these plant col-
lections, but also in the medicines based on these resources or in the pub-
lications related to them. 
In Amsterdam it was Johannes Snippendaal (1616-1670) who organized 
the hortus for a long period. He wrote an important catalogue of eight 
hundred plants grown in the garden in which several kinds of poppies are 
mentioned. About one-third of these plants had some medicinal efffect, 
but nothing is given about some special opium treatments. This was 
remarkable in the most complicated prescriptions of Nicolaes Tulp (1593-
1674), one of the most famous doctors of the Dutch Republic (see 
Rembrandt’s ‘Anatomical Lesson from Tulp’).24 
This Amsterdam hortus of one hectare became an experimental gar-
den for the Dutch East and West Indies Companies from 1682 onwards, 
but again there is no trace of any specifĳic opium treatment.25 Compared 
to what “everybody” knew from Van Linschoten’s bestseller Itinerario, one 
is tempted to question the specifĳic silence around opium in the most 
advanced European country and the most abundant trade in the stufff by 
the same Dutch merchants in Asia. This “mystery” will bring us to the 
heart of the Opium Problem in our study and the very location of the 
“Original Sin”, in many senses a real Garden of Eden. 
In the Middle Eastern culture one can fĳind illuminating parallel histo-
ries before the Dutch started their specifĳic trade. Take the region with the 
ancient custom of qat chewing in Yemen, Somalia, etc.26 Currently, it is a 
real common people’s custom, but that was not always the case. All the 
details and connotations related to qat are similar to those for opium. 
That concerns not only the present situation where qat is the most 
 important cash crop in North Yemen, and indeed ‘the most important 
crop of any kind’.27 
23 F. Bouman a.o. (ed.), p. 26.
24 Idem, p. 188 fff.
25 Idem, p. 209 fff.
26 It is also known as chat, jaad, or khat and concerns an evergreen shrub that grows 
naturally on the mountain sides of specifĳic locations. There is, of course, also a Western 
medical assessment of qat or khat as given in an article of S.W. Toennes et al. in the British 
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology (2003), 125-30 or see www.biopsychiatry.com/khat-qat.
htm. For history and practice of qat see now J. Kennedy, p. 60-79. See also G. Vögler, 
K. von Welck (ed.), vol. 2, p. 850-872 including the German translation of J. Kennedy’s 
contribution.
27 According to Kennedy it is, therefore, ‘totally unrealistic at this time’ to talk about 
banning qat or replacing it with another crop (p. 233).  
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As a ‘recreational drug’ it is mentioned for the fĳirst time in the 14th-
century. Its use is for a long time confĳined to small numbers of sufĳis, some 
wealthy individuals and perhaps some of the farmers who grew it. But 
around 1565 the elite’s knowledge about its negative and positive efffects 
allows detailed comparisons with opium, alcohol and hashish. At that 
time Al-Haythemi concluded that the use of qat must be avoided, but 
compared to opium it is much milder.
There is also a clear historical and cultural relation with the production 
and consumption of cofffee. Some scholars think that both qat and cofffee 
were introduced together by a mystic around 1420; for others this is only 
one of the legends surrounding the use of qat. The Yemeni city Mocha 
(al-Mukhā), an enormous storehouse and transit harbor for all kinds of 
products at the turn of the seventeenth-century, also became the logo of 
the best cofffee in the world.28 
It was drunk, fĳirst, by holy men around Mecca both for medicinal pur-
poses and to keep awake during their devotions. The same word for cofffee 
(qahwa) was used for qat. Cofffee drinking spread in the 15th-century from 
Yemen to other parts of the Middle East; in the next century it was very 
popular among the “jet set” of Istanbul and Cairo. “Europe” discovered 
cofffee and its trade thanks to the Dutch merchant Pieter van den Broecke, 
who arrived in Mocha in 1616. Van den Broecke and his followers also pur-
chased opium here.29 
One hundred years later the Dutch repeated a practice, which we will 
meet time and again among most colonial powers: to exchange cofffee for 
qat30 or pepper and tea for opium. The earliest decision to make such 
deals will be discussed in detail below (ch. 11) as the real original sin in 
opium history.
28 C. Brouwer (2006) provides an excellent and very detailed study of the trade of Al-
Mukha (1614-1640) highlighting not only the cofffee trade, but also the trade in pepper, 
cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, cardamon, textiles, etc. In short, “everything”, except qat, and 
only a few remarks about opium. That is symptomatic enough.  
29 Idem, p. 49-51. They were small lots, whereas cofffee (cauwa in Brouwer’s writings) 
was shipped more systematically and in larger quantities. See also C. Brouwer (1996), 
p. 228, 274.




The search for the original sin brings us, indeed, in or near the Garden of 
Eden, the Middle East. More importantly, we are confronted with many 
connotations surrounding the use of Papaver species, including the opi-
um poppy, Papaver somniferum. So, up to the beginning of the 16th-cen-
tury small quantities of Papavers are used among many herbs for personal 
food and energy (oil of the seeds) and for economic, medical and luxury 
or recreational reasons. The last two applications in particular could be 
directly connected to death and poison, to impotence as well as to a sex-
ual palliative or temporary stronger sex activity, to a restricted use among 
the elite (warriors, etc.). Indeed, in the Middle Eastern medical and court 
life of the Ottoman empire, many of these elements of Papavers were 
known. It was surrounded with legends and more or less embedded in an 
elite culture.
Arab and Muslim traders spread hallucinogenic products, knowledge 
and customs from the Middle East into the North Indian societies via 
Hormuz, Surat and similar merchant cities from—say—the 14th-century 
onwards. At that time it was just a very small item in an extensive trade 
assortment of these caravan and maritime merchants. 
In other words, China has nothing to do with this “original sin”. It is 
also ridiculous to refer to Neolithic circumstances to explain the use of 
opium as an aphrodisiac; its history can only start where all relevant ele-
ments are available concerning ecological, economic, social and cultural 
preconditions. The most important aspect for our study is: there was no 
opium problem nor an “Opium Question” as a mass phenomenon! 
But why then referring to some “original sin”? The answer can be found 
at the provisional end of our history. A modern highly ambiguous British 
writer on The Paradise also came across Muslim opium producers and 
traders in Afghanistan. To introduce the second part of his historical anal-
ysis, covering the years 1000-1500 (ACE), he talks about such a meeting 
with an Afghan opium farmer and ‘his dangerous but very pretty crops’ (!):
The opium, the farmer said, was not as healthy as it looked … Did he smoke 
it? No. People said Iranians liked it, but he personally had never tried the 
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stufff. How did it make them feel? He shrugged. Like they were in al-jenna, 
the Garden of Paradise. No, he couldn’t sell me a few kilos ...1 
This British dealer in Paradise reacts like one of the British soldiers in 
Helmland, who are accused of only guarding the poppy fĳields and playing 
arch-angel at the gate of Paradise in stead of fĳighting the Taliban, who 
‘also got rid of hashish and opium.’2 
The earliest Western intruders in the Middle Eastern world, those of 
the 16th and 17th centuries, started to create these “Afghanistan interest(s)” 
and committed the original sin. They pointed to bewildering aspects of 
the opium use in a contradictory way as well, because they were confront-
ed for the fĳirst time with a regular use of new kinds of herbs and plants in 
medicine, the kitchen, religion or elsewhere in the Levant, Middle East or 
India. Their curiosity about what could be useful for themselves or in the 
militant exchange they organized with these new worlds, also changed in 
these centuries in a rather drastic way in the wake of an intensifĳication of 
Western imperialism and colonialism: opium became, fĳirst and foremost, 
an isolated “Asian product” unconnected to any original social, ecological 
and economic context. This isolation was executed under the most barba-
rous circumstances: the original sin.
Did an Opium Question originate in the 17th, develop in the 18th-cen-
tury and explode in the 19th-century? Indeed, how this happened and 
what are the consequences still felt today form the subject of the follow-
ing historical analysis, which does not aim at legitimizing any behavior. 
Because the English were by far the most exuberant profĳiteers of the 
Opium Problem, their performance will be discussed fĳirst. It gives us the 
opportunity to sketch the general case, whereupon the analysis of the 
Dutch, French or Chinese performances can provide us with the neces-
sary details, defĳinitions of an Opium Question and comparisons. In par-
ticular the Dutch assault of the East is interesting not so much due to Jan 
Huygen van Linschoten’s text as to their “fĳirst commitment of the original 
sin”, the example which was followed by all other Western opium inter-
ests.
1 K. Rushby, p. 39.
2 Idem, p. 43.
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PART TWO 
THE BRITISH ASSAULT 
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ACTUAL SINS
How did a people who thought themselves free end up 
subjugating so much of the world ... How did an empire 
of the free become an empire of slaves? How, despite 
their “good intentions”, did the British sacrifĳice “com-
mon humanity” to “the fetish of the market”?
Niall Ferguson.1 
As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess 
all things. I set no value on objects strange or  ingenious, 
and have no use for your country’s manufactures.
Qianlong Emperor in a letter to King George III (1793).
The opening sentences of the much acclaimed work by David Edward 
Owen (1934) about the British opium policy tell us, that it concerns ‘the 
most curious chapters in the annals of European expansion.’2 This must 
be perceived as an intentional understatement. His astonishment is real: 
how is it possible that one-seventh of the revenue of British India was 
drawn from the subjects of another state as payment for a habit-forming 
drug: this must be ‘one of the most unique facts that the history of fĳinance 
afffords.’ Again, a stifff upper-lip exclamation, which continues with the 
qualifying phrase, ‘still more grotesque’, that the opium sent to China was 
produced ‘under the aegis of a state-administered monopoly which exist-
ed principally for supplying that market’. Owen points to only a part of the 
problem faced in this study. As so often when subjects are hotly debated, 
some authors try to get an “above the parties” position to acclaim author-
ity and objectivity. Owen’s book is an excellent example of this genre; a 
Chinese contemporary wrote less abstractly about this opium import: ‘.. 
1 Quoted by N. Ferguson, p. xiii. It is a pity that Ferguson did not try to answer this 
question. Apparently because in the end ( p. 365, 366) he was quite satisfĳied with the 
Empire’s performance in world history, notwithstanding his demonstration ‘how often it 
failed to live up to its own ideal.’ Happily P. Brendon has done a more relevant job.
2 D. E. Owen, p. vii. See the relevant remarks of C.Trocki (1999a), p. 174 about Owen 
and Morse and their approach.
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the import ...it was thought, led to a moral and physical deterioration of 
the Chinese.’3 
Eighty years earlier as a direct comment on what happened in China, 
Karl Marx wrote in the New York Daily Tribune (20 September 1858):
Besides its negative result, the fĳirst opium-war succeeded in stimulating the 
opium trade at the expense of legitimate commerce, and so will this second 
opium-war do if England be not forced by the general pressure of the civi-
lized world to abandon the compulsory opium cultivation in India and the 
armed opium propaganda to China. We forbear dwelling on the morality 
of that trade, described by Montgomery Martin, himself an Englishman, in 
the following terms: ‘Why, the “slave trade” was merciful compared with 
the “opium trade”. We did not destroy the bodies of the Africans, for it was 
our immediate interest to keep them alive; we did not debase their natures, 
corrupt their minds, nor destroy their souls. But the opium seller slays the 
body after he has corrupted, degraded and annihilated the moral being of 
unhappy sinners, while, every hour is bringing new victims to a Moloch 
which knows no satiety, and where the English murderer and Chinese sui-
cide vie with each other in offferings at his shrine.
The man quoted by Marx was not simply ‘himself an Englishman’. 
Montgomery Martin (c. 1801-1868) was a British author and civil servant. 
He was the fĳirst Colonial Treasurer of Hong Kong from 1844 to 1845. He 
was a founding member of the Statistical Society of London (1834), the 
Colonial Society (1837), and the East India Association (1867). In short, a 
high-placed and esteemed offfĳicial, supporter of the imperialist adven-
tures of the British Empire. A stronger confession of the British bad con-
science is difffĳicult to fĳind.4
The “original sin” had several other moral and sometimes theological 
elements. Take the case of the efffects of opium eating or smoking. In the 
Middle East authorities warned against opium use or prohibited it from 
the middle of the 16th-century. Despite this ban, the available trade data 
from the “Arabian” side talk about marginal quantities in the overall trade. 
Its function was largely: providing medicine and, sometimes, giving pres-
3 S. G. Cheng, p. 149.
4 A relevant reminiscence to this comparison between slavery and opium addiction 
can be found in L. Blussé (2008), p. 65 where he states: ‘It is indeed ironic that Britain, the 
nation that prided itself on having fĳirst exposed the excrescences of the American slave 
trade (in which it had been by far the greatest participant) after it had lost the American 
colonies ... was engaged in the master planning of another kind of enslavement in Asia: 
opium addiction.’ For M. Martin see also C. Munn, p. 47 fff. and a long quote on Idem, p. 
21.  
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ents to smooth the trade; a method soon copied by the Portuguese or 
British.5 
This could prove that in the prehistorical phase of our story, the bad 
efffects on individual health and society were already known. In moralistic 
terms: opium was branded as something rotten, which had to be eradi-
cated. Two centuries later, successive Chinese and other governments 
prohibited the production and/ or use of opium. They acted accordingly 
with strong measures but failed for many reasons, as we will see. 
At that time they must have reacted mainly to the efffects of the 
Portuguese and Dutch trade results, which will be discussed in part three. 
From the foreign perpetrator’s side, there were not so many criticisms on 
the use or selling of opium. Protestant religious circles in America and 
England started a Western anti-movement at the end of the 19th-century 
(see ch. 29). Apart from the existence of a dubious double morality (one 
for own people and one for foreigners; let alone for the racially “underval-
ued” and uncivilized ones), double institutional moralities were asking 
for trouble. In our case it concerns an immanent contradiction: the nor-
mal bourgeois morality perceived opium production, distribution and 
trading as criminal acts, but the state earning huge profĳits with them, was 
accepted for a long period in the West.
 A Private English Asian Trading Company
The many East Indies Companies were in fact all ventures of combined 
state and private interests. Which element dominated varied per country, 
the strength of the private interests involved and per period. The fĳirst 
English activities in which private interests dominated struggled for sur-
vival in Surat on the northwestern Indian coast. This was where the cor-
nerstone of the British Empire in India was build, while everybody thought 
that the real future of the British in the East was to be found in the spice 
trade of the Moluccas. In 1920 Rawlinson wrote about the fĳirst factors in 
the beginning of the 17th-century:
… there is nothing romantic about the sturdy merchants who founded the 
factory at Surat. They were not consciously empire-builders. They did not 
come, like the Portuguese, with drum and trumpet to convert the East to 
the True Faith. They had no Camoens to sing their praises. They were not 
even supported, like the Dutch, by the State, from which, indeed, they 
5 D. Hall, p. 277.
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received scant encouragement. They combined, in Puritan fashion, piety 
and profĳit; their objects were the glory of God, and the advancement of the 
company’s (and, incidentally, their own) interests.6 
It may be that the English did not have a superb poet like the Portuguese 
Camoens, but Rawlinson’s references to Milton (‘the greatest of the 
Puritans’) and his Paradise Lost was not a bad compensation.7 Certainly, 
the Jesuits were eager to convert the pagans and, in particular, to do this 
together with the rulers of some realm. As a second step, they decided 
that everybody else in it must be Roman Catholic as well. They were 
excellent mediators between State and Trade, metropolis and colony. 
Maybe the Puritan ‘objects were the glory of God’, but they had quite 
diffferent problems: their God and the supporting clergy were theologi-
cally in variance with trade and money deals, the very source of all evil in 
the world. If not or if they had to strike a balance between God and the 
Mammon, they were fully hypocritical. That was their normal way of life 
with a bad conscience. But conversion of the naked heathens of India was 
a clear objective; their moral conduct was distasteful, and if not baptized, 
they could be killed at will; if baptized, they always remained racially 
“undervalued”. The Dutch were more extreme in this than the English, 
since the English colonizers had a large proportion of Anglican and more 
cultivated aristocrats, which largely failed among the Dutch. Both were 
colonizers like the Portuguese and Spaniards, and both were, in the end, 
empire builders, while sending a large part of their underworlds to the 
East.
Whether all this supports the famous Max Weber thesis remains to be 
seen.8 Here in India the English company may be ‘founded and supported 
by the Puritan middle class’ (as if the Anglicans were absent), but in par-
6 H. Rawlinson, p. 2. The fĳirst and second English trips to the East were ca. 1600-1605 
and directed to Sumatra and Bantam looking for spices. At nearly the same time, the 
Dutch traveled to the same destination. The Portuguese and Spaniards preceded them by 
nearly a century, but that story cannot be told here. During the third English voyage (1608) 
part of the fleet under Hawkins sailed not to the spice countries, but to India. He arrived 
at its west coast in Surat, which became the fĳirst English basis in India. For Surat and the 
fĳirst Englishmen, see K. de Schweinitz Jr., p. 73-80. See for the diffferences between EIC and 
VOC also Idem, p. 75 and M. Roelofsz, p. 70, K. Chaudhuri (1978), p. 6fff. and 19 fff.  
7 H. Rawlinson, p. 19, 20. For the action of the Jesuits, Idem, p. 31 fff. and passim.
8 Without studying Weber in an appropriate way and very critically, this is simply not 
done. Even the always interesting Jack Goody forgot his critical mind and did not study the 
recent literature, while devoting a whole book in order to prove how the ‘brilliant’ Weber 
still gave the right answers to Western questioning “The East”. See J. Goody. See my writ-
ings on Marx and Weber 1978-1, 1978-2, 1999, etc.
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ticular in its function of ‘inveterate enemies of the Catholic powers’.9 Still 
in 1920 Rawlinson treats the fĳirst masters of the inexperienced English 
pupils, the Portuguese who had lived there a century already, in a classi-
cally hypocritical way:
At Goa, and throughout Portuguese India, corruption and venality were 
widespread, for the Portuguese, too proud to earn money honestly by trade, 
were driven to make it by less honourable means … rotten to the core ... 
justice was bought, public offfĳices were put up for sale, and the martial spirit 
degenerated into efffeminacy, sloth, and indolence, as in the last days of the 
Roman Empire.10 
Why hypocritical? Not that the facts mentioned were false, but because 
he did not refer to the similar situations in the “Puritan” British and Dutch 
Empires existing long before their last days. By 1630 Rawlinson reports 
exactly the same stupidities of the English in Surat.11 Alas, the power of 
the Puritan God reached far into the East and punished this Sodom by 
sending a devastating famine in 1631. One did not understand this heav-
enly message, and hypocrisy continued to rule the deeds of the Westerners 
in conquering the East and spreading opium. 
These Puritan or Anglican Englishmen arriving in Surat (ca. 1607) start-
ed practically the largest of these East Indies companies, the British East 
Indies Company (below: EIC) and the most extensive colonizing practice 
in India. However, it took these ‘sturdy’ Puritan merchants nearly 150 
years before they defĳinitely ousted their main competitor from India, the 
Dutch with their company (below: VOC), and later from the position as 
main profĳiteer of the opium trade, the most hypocritical trade ever dealt 
with.12 
9 H. Rawlinson, p. 19.  
10 Idem, p. 15, 16. He refers to J.H. van Linschoten’s story of how the Portuguese women 
made love to men ‘before the very eyes of their husbands, whom they drugged with datura’ 
(see also W. Schouten’s stories in ch. 10). On p. 19 he continues with: Surat, where the Eng-
lish stayed, ‘was not, like Goa, overrun with degenerate half-castes.’
11 Idem, p. 98. Discipline was poor, prayers neglected: ‘Sundays were spent in feasting, 
drinking and gambling and the beastly sin of whoredom and most polluted fĳilthy talk ... 
Bribes were freely taken by the authorities ... and all, from the President downwards, 
indulged in private trade.’ See also p. 130, 131. For bribes see also note 42.
12 For the rigorous competition in the East between the Dutch and English in the early 
17th-century, see O. Prakash (2005). This competition had everything to do with the Euro-
pean competition of the two nations in the 17th and 18th centuries. For the diffferent strat-
egies of the Dutch and English and for the dominating mercantile elements among the 
latter, see also R. Brenner, p. 168 fff. Brenner sketches the internal English transformation 
of the trade landscape by the “New Merchants”. Typical may be an English commentator 
at the time quoted by Brenner (p. 172): ‘The Dutch as they gain ground secure it by vast 
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While in the EIC the mercantile element may have been much stronger 
at fĳirst than in the VOC, inherent to these companies were continuous 
conflicts between the headquarters in London or Amsterdam and the 
companies in the East and their regional headquarters. In England and 
the Netherlands, the national political changes and ideologies (including 
moralities) seriously influenced the decisions of the companies. They 
were more often than not in variance with the trade and military plans in 
the Far East. And in the Far East serious tensions arose between the 
bureaucrats of the company headquarters and the commanders or trad-
ers in the fĳields. 
In addition, the EIC sufffered from competition with other English trad-
ing activities of, for instance, the tycoon Courteen, who could even bribe 
the king with £10,000 to grant a full royal patent.13 That was not the case 
with the VOC. After an initial period in which several private companies 
were set up and voyages to the Indies fĳinanced, the VOC received an abso-
lute monopoly in 1602. It became a state within the state, as the EIC did 
150 years later.
Opium on a List
At the very start of the EIC adventure, however, all these tensions were far 
in the future. The fĳirst trips to the East did not yield much profĳit, but every 
time Londoners were willing to spend capital to build ships and gather 
enough people to make these dangerous voyages. 
The sixth trip of 1609 was a most remarkable one. The King himself was 
heavily involved and the help of the Puritan and Anglican Gods were 
invoked since ‘blasphemy, swearing, drunkenness, and gambling’ were 
severely punished, and every morning and evening the captains were 
ordered to join together with prayers to these Almighty Gods for their 
protection. In all things they were to uphold also ‘the honour of our King 
and the reputation of our trafffĳick’. 
From “London” the captains received strict instructions about what 
had to be their cargo to India and what they had to bring back. One may 
expenses, raising forts and maintaining soldiers; ours are for raising auctions and retrench-
ing charges; bidding the next age grow rich, as they have done, but not afffording them the 
means.’ For the early history of the EIC see Idem, p. 21 fff. It makes no sense to mention the 
internal English development, not in the least because in Brenner’s 734 pages the word 
“opium” cannot be found.
13 R. Brenner, p. 171; K. de Schweinitz Jr., p. 40-54.
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suspect that this choice was based on the experience of the previous fĳive 
voyages and of the demands of English consumers:
Their cargo consisted of cloth, lead, red lead, tin, quicksilver, vermilion, 
sword-blades, kerseys, and red caps. They were to load up with indigo, 
calico, cotton yarn, cinnamon, sandal, ginger, opium, gum benjamin, oliba-
num, aloes and lac ... and above all pepper (400 tons if they could) ..., but 
too much anxiety for pepper was not to be displayed for fear of putting up 
the price.14
This must be the fĳirst time that a Western source asked for Eastern opium. 
It is in variance with Om Prakash’s reasonable opinion concerning the 
17th- and 18th-century opium trade:
Unlike most other tropical agricultural raw materials, Europe did not take 
any Indian opium whatever. Indeed, the trade in the product had tradition-
ally been confĳined to Asia.15
Rawlinson does not give an explanation for “opium” in this list; it had 
apparently no specifĳic meaning for him. There is no proof given whether 
opium was shipped to London. Still: there is no reason to doubt the quota-
tion and, therefore, the question can be posed: who was in need of opium 
in England at that time? 
Certainly, the fĳirst decades of the 17th-century were marked by a sig-
nifĳicant increase in luxury imports as there was, for instance, the sky-
rocketing consumption of tobacco.16 Probably this product would have 
been brought to other Eastern ports in the beginning of the intra-Asian 
trade, as the Dutch were doing with opium or qat later? Was it used as a 
medicine or as a luxury? 
One knew from Van Linschoten’s Itinerario, the bible for this sixth voy-
age also, what the qualities of and problems with this product were.17 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, at this juncture one can only conclude 
that it must have concerned a small amount of opium relative to the very 
small profĳit on many products made on this trip and that somebody in 
London wants to eat from this “forbidden fruit”. 
14 H. Rawlinson, p. 48. Later (p. 127, 128) he gives a list of goods which were transported 
to Surat from all directions by caravan and ship. From Persia were imported ‘drugs and 
fĳine Carmanian wool’ and from Calicut came ‘garnets, opium and salpetre’. Persia (Egypt, 
Turkey) was the classical land of opium production used as medicine. For Calicut, see 
part 3. 
15 O. Prakash (1988), p. 73.
16 R. Brenner, p. 42 fff.
17 Probably they had read another Linschoten book, because Rawlinson always talks 
about the Itineratio, p. 31, 34, 153, etc.
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A second example of hypocritical behavior is related to the historiogra-
phy of the opium problem. This concerns the period just before the First 
Opium War, discussed in the next chapter. 
Priscilla Napier wants to defend the highly criticized deeds of a famous 
family member, the unsuccessful Lord Napier (1786-1834), creator of a 
fĳiasco called the ‘Napier Fizzle’.18 This ‘Chief Superintendent of Trade at 
Canton’ was the fĳirst sent by Palmerston to show the Chinese the practice 
of “free trade with a gun to the head” and to force the “opening of China”. 
In Priscilla’s ambiguous defense, however, it is said that this was not 
Napier’s intention but originated ‘from the 19th-century American cap-
tain’ who abruptly ordered ‘open up or we fĳire’ in Japan.19 No, a reapprais-
al is needed: ‘William John’, it is true, played his part ‘to open up normal 
18 J. Beeching, chapter 2; J. Lovell, p. 5-8.
19 P. Napier, p. ix.
Ill. 3. The Opium War and China in the cartoons 
Source: published on “Holachina.blog”, 29-3-2009, but originally these are French cartoons 
designed by Honoré Daumier ca. 1860: a British or French admiral forcing opium down the 
throat of a Chinese person (mandarin?), used time and again on book covers and  posters. 
The other is called ‘The Royal Cake or the Western Empires sharing China between them’, 
published in Le Petit Journal, 1898.
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trade with China’ but, alas, he was onfronted with ‘the disastrous results 
of Imperial China’s refusal to play along with this plan.’ 
Priscilla Napier went far in her reappraisal and in blaming the victims 
of the British assault. She dares to stress the
determination of the British Government ... and of the East India Company’s 
directors in London not to sell opium to China ... Dutch merchant seamen, 
Americans, Parsee entrepreneurs and British get-rich-quick adventurers … 
were the bad guys (italics from P.N.).20 
On the cover of her book Priscilla shows a scene from 9 September 1834: 
the HMS Imogene and Andromache bombarding Tiger Island ‘in their 
forcing of the Bocca Tigris passage’ up to Canton.21 The picture does not 
show what happened thereafter: both ships were rendered totally useless 
by simple Chinese measures (some cables and twelve sunken barges load-
ed with stones); they could neither go on nor go back and were complete-
ly under Chinese control. Napier failed in a miserable way and died a few 
days later. However, Priscilla did not mention how Lord Napier was urged 
to attack by his friends, the most rigorous opium traders and smugglers 
Matheson and Jardine (see next example).
On the back cover of the book there is a skyline of Hong Kong two years 
before the handover to China (1997). A text erroneously suggests that 
Napier established it, although in 1841 the barren, rocky site got its fĳirst 
houses as a result of a new and more successful “free trade’s bombarding 
policy” in order to transform the Chinese into opium addicts.
Long before Priscilla, it was the important American offfĳicial, 
Willoughby, who wrote in the 1920s about the hypocrisy of the English in 
forcing the import of opium and war upon China as follows: 
No mention was made of opium in the Treaty of Nanking, and, therefore, 
the importation of the drug into China remained illegal under the Chinese 
law. By a treaty supplementary to that of Nanking, signed a year later, the 
British Government pledged itself to discourage the smuggling [1843]. This 
pledge was, however, almost immediately broken, and Hongkong became 
a base of operations for the contraband trade in opium ... As a further facil-
itation to this illegal trade, a British ordinance was passed which enabled 
Chinese boats, many of which were engaged in this trade, to fly the British 
20 Idem, p. 65.
21 It concerns a many times pictured event. See also J. Beeching, plate 3 after p. 192 and 
the map near the title page. M. Collis, p. 192. The destruction brought by the world’s fĳirst 
all-iron steamer, Nemesis (1841), is the alternative. See J. Lovell, opposite p. 171.
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flag, and out of this permission arose the “Arrow” incident which led to the 
second war between Great Britain and China22
A last example concerns a more complicated case of what could be called 
“in-built hypocrisy” of the British colonizers from the same pre-Opium 
War period. The leading fĳigure at the time was Sir Stamford Rafffles, one of 
the main builders of the British Empire in the East. In the British histori-
ography he is still pictured as a most humane, enlightened, erudite and 
competent man; from a Dutch colonial point of view at the time and for 
later Dutch commentators (like Baud) he was a most controversial man, 
but that is something like the calling the kettle black. As far as the colo-
nized have a voice, they are or should be rather critical about the man. 
Anyway, around 1814 he helped his friend Alexander Hare to build a 
colony on 1400 square miles of land privately acquired in a dubious way 
from the Sultan of Banjarmasin.23 Rafffles assisted Hare, a man who could 
have been described in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, who peopled 
his colony with convicts, slaves and kidnapped women (‘of loose morals’). 
In the middle of it Hare build himself a residence surrounded by dwell-
ings of women. His house was ‘higher than the tallest tree and [with] 1,650 
poles’ for which a hundred convicts had to work for twenty months. After 
Rafffles had to leave his job as Governor- General of Java (1816), Hare’s col-
ony began running at a loss. Hare had to start a new life going from scan-
dal to scandal. Like in Australia, this was an example of how colonization 
was practized by the British.
It was around 1820 that Rafffles himself started the very young settle-
ment of Singapore as a model for all colonial ventures to come. 
Immediately, it was clear who would be the fĳiercest enemies of this plan: 
the English bureaucrats and the traders in India. Rafffles had to establish 
Singapore by keeping expenses to a minimum. His representative, 
Farquhar, however,
defying Rafffles’s instructions … introduced a tax-farming system, auctioning 
monopoly rights to sell opium and arrack, or Asian spirits, and to run gam-
bling dens.24 
The above mentioned James Matheson, the most vigilant opium trader, 
cooperated with Farquhar. From Matheson is told and quoted:
22 W. Willoughby, vol. 2, p. 1092.
23 S. Alatas, p. 36 fff.
24 C. Turnbull, p. 15.
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In May 1819, when Singapore had hardly been taken possession of by Sir 
Stamford Rafffles, its commercial possibilities were foreseen by the 22 year-
old James Matheson, making his second voyage to China as Supercargo of 
the opium ship Marquis of Hastings: “As far as two or three observations 
and conversations enable me to speak, I have formed the highest opinion 
of Singapore as a place of trade ... the situation of the settlement is truly 
delightful, being within 4 miles of the direct tract for China; and the mild 
sway of Major Farquhar has attracted settlers from all parts of the village, 
which consisted of 200 houses and containing now upwards of 2,000 ... the 
Java Government having declined to interfere with our possession.25
The cooperation of English and Dutch bureaucrats with this drugs baron 
was too much even for Rafffles. Upon his return, he intended to eradicate 
gambling, opium smoking and the opium trade. But at the very beginning 
of the most profĳitable opium century for the English and Dutch, and 
twenty years before the start of the Opium Wars, Singapore had fallen 
already prey to Matheson’s business:
The well-to-do, who included the Europeans, Jews, Armenians, Eurasians, 
Parsees and rich Chinese, sufffered mainly from over-indulgence in food and 
alcohol ... Among the mass of the population, poverty, malnutrition, over-
crowding and excessive opium smoking took the heaviest toll.’ ... ‘Much of 
this misery stemmed from the deadly habit of opium smoking which was 
the centre of controversy. Most Europeans regarded it merely as a bad habit, 
soothing and soporifĳic, harmful only if taken to excess. [Those who] cam-
paigned to open the eyes of the government and the community at large to 
the medical and social evils of opium smoking ... estimated in 1848 that 20 
per cent of the entire population and more than half the Chinese adults 
were opium addicts. Rich Chinese, who smoked high-quality opium, were 
not seriously harmed, but the poor smoked the refuse. Addicts were reduced 
to begging and living on rotten fĳish and decaying vegetables around the 
market, ending up in prison or the pauper hospital, or driven to suicide ... 
The well-to-do Chinese found the opium farm lucrative, the less wealthy 
Asians made no protest, while European merchants were content to see 
taxes levied on opium rather than on commerce, property or salaries ... the 
opium farm continued to be the mainstay of the revenue up to the twenti-
eth-century.26 
25 M. Greenberg, p. 97.
26 C. Turnbull, p. 62 and 63. In S. Couling’s Encyclopaedia (p. 258) Jardine, Matheson 
& Co is described without the word ‘opium’, only that it sent ‘the fĳirst free ship with free 
tea from Whampoa, March 22, 1834’! Also with the text: ‘In 1842 business was transferred 
to Hongkong. The fĳirm has always been prominent in all effforts for the welfare of the col-
ony.’ See also C.Munn, p. 42 fff.
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In the next decades Singapore, still a settlement under the direct respon-
sibility of the EIC (“Calcutta”) became infamous world-wide for its crimi-
nal milieu, many brothels, robbed and beaten sailors and, of course, the 
opium business. In the 1880s the world-wide antisemitic movement was 
also fostered, thanks to a concentration of Jews in the opium business. 
This, however, does not mean the reverse, that opium business was a 
Jewish afffair, as a Singapore merchant remarked:
For the opium trade, pure and simple, in itself, I care nothing; it is wholly 
in the hands of Jews and Armenians, and I know little about its ins and outs: 
but there is no doubt that Opium enters largely into, and forms an impor-
tant part of, the Native trade of this city ... All those prahus and junks which 
we see lying offf Tanjong Ru ... are all small parts of one great trade.27
The remark again says something about life in Singapore and, further-
more, about the new hypocrisy which was added to the older ones. 
A Moral Question
It was at the turn of the century that the anti-opium movement grew 
strong enough in the several mother countries to put some pressure on 
(colonial) governments. But, for instance in Singapore, this movement 
encountered opposition from the tax-farmers, most European and 
Chinese merchants and the English language press. A commission 
appointed by the Colonial Offfĳice advised that opium smoking was a ‘fairly 
harmless, fashionable vice among the rich’ but relatively ‘pernicious’ 
among the poor; only some rickshaw pullers were addicts, etc. 
In 1907 this local controversy resulted in what was called a ‘compro-
mise’: the government took over the manufacture and sale of opium, a 
move the Dutch government had already made in Java a century earlier.28 
In the 1930s Singapore became superfĳicially a more peaceful and safe 
place: opium dens were disappearing under the controls and restrictions 
on opium smoking and brothels, with mostly imported East European 
girls, were declared illegal. Behind secret doors, however, the criminal 
societies flourished more than ever and gang fĳights were common. An 
underworld and upperworld divided the Hypocritical Society. 
27 Quoted in C.Trocki (1999a), p. 117. Trocki himself adds to the confusing by naming 
his chapter 6 ‘In the hands of Jews and Armenians’ without brackets. 
28 Idem, p. 114. Around 1870 the French colonial government of Cochinchina came 
with an innovation of this governmental involvement in the opium business, the Opium-
regie-model (see ch. 19 and 23).
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The examples, one of a start and another of a developed constellation, 
show the characteristics of the perpetrator side in this opium dossier. At 
least until the beginning of the Second World War this all belongs to rath-
er common scenarios, reactions and developments among the colonial 
powers and their settler and immigrant populations in the British, French, 
Dutch and other colonies. There were, however, substantial diffferences 
due to the scale of the opium problems in the East Asian region, the 
accompanying violence, the money interests or the involvement of gov-
ernments. 
These diffferences are analyzed in detail below. Then it will become 
apparent that something special exists between “victim country China 
and Opium”. The Chinese inside China are clearly the most afffected vic-
tims of the European assaults. However, the Singapore example could 
lead to the question of whether this was also true for the Chinese outside 
China? This perpetrator-victim relationship requires concrete analysis 
and diffferentiation not generalizations (see ch. 15 and 25). 
As mentioned earlier, I am not intending to tell a chronological story of 
the use or trade of opium29, but rather provide a historical analysis of “The 
Opium Problem”: this concerns the introduction of opium as a luxury 
(not as a medicine which was or is not a problem before the 19th-century), 
as a mass product and as a major element of imperialist policy in the Far 
East. When can this specifĳic combination be signaled in history? And what 
are the consequences for the course of the opium problem in the main 
countries afffected?
What matters, furthermore, are the enormous profĳits of the monopoly 
position in production and trade sustained by the power of arms and 
always extending the scale of consumption. No Chinese in China had or 
achieved such a monopoly position, only Western colonial governments. 
Next, it is also a geographical problem: as one of the most important chap-
ters in the history of Western imperialism, this opium history is fĳirst and 
foremost confĳined to the whole of East Asia before it became a Western 
problem around the First World War. Therefore, the start of the present 
drug problem is given here.
But apart from the narrative and its (quantitative) analysis of these 
subjects, we have to discuss the problem arising from the policy of the 
British colonial state to become compensated for what it considered 
the unbalanced trade and monetary relationship with China. That was a 
29 A useful chronology is given in E. Vanvugt, p. 416-423.
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circumstance which was so fundamental that two wars were fought with 
the Chinese Empire in order to arrive at a “balanced” situation. 
Until the beginning of the 19th-century the British Empire was the 
most important slave-trading “nation”; thanks to these opium wars it 
remained a “mind-trading nation” as well for more than a century. The 
question posed above this chapter has been complicated by the same 
Niall Ferguson (in the end a remarkable defender of the British Empire30), 
in the following comment on these wars: 
The only real benefĳit of acquiring Hong Kong as a result of the war of 1841 
was that it provided fĳirms like Jardine Matheson with a base for their opium-
smuggling operation. It is indeed one of the richer ironies of the Victorian 
value-system that the same navy that was deployed to abolish the slave 
trade was also active in expanding the narcotics trade.31 
This seems to be the best start for the following chapter.
30 N. Ferguson, p. 366.
31 Idem, p. 166. An interesting illustration of the moral element is, that in the period 
1850-1870 of all the cases before the Magistrate (in average about 5,000 a year) less than 
1 % was related to opium problems. See C. Munn, p. 133.
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CHAPTER SIX 
TEA FOR OPIUM VICE VERSA
Increasing Bengal opium production results in a 
reduction in the profĳit per unit of opium sold, but it 
will not tend to increase the consumption of the del-
eterious Drug nor to extend its baneful efffects in Soci-
ety. The sole and exclusive object of it is to secure to 
ourselves the whole supply by preventing Foreigners 
from participating in a trade of which at present they 
enjoy no inconsiderable share—for it is evident that 
the Chinese, as well as the Malays, cannot exist with-
out the use of Opium, and if we do not supply their 
necessary wants, Foreigners will.
Governor-General of India to the Directors of the EIC, 
July 1819.1
The British opium-assault on China in the 19th-century transformed the 
Opium Problem from a one-sided Dutch show of Western imperialism 
into its main objective from both a Western and East Asian point of view. 
Trocki formulates this diffferently at the start of the relevant chapter in his 
opium history: 
The years between 1780 and 1842 were formative years for the opium trade. 
They were also the formative years of the British Empire. ... Though difffĳicult 
to prove beyond question, it seems likely that without opium, there would 
have been no empire.2 
The second sentence may be true and the third interesting and provoca-
tive. However, the stated years were not the formative years of the trade. 
They should be fĳixed about 120 years earlier as we will see in the next part 
of the study. The third sentence, furthermore, is too pessimistic, because 
I think that the given thesis can be proved, indeed, beyond question. 
Although the defĳinite conclusions can be drawn only at the end of the 
study, in this part a general support of this aim should be undertaken by 
means of a new quantitative and qualitative assessment of the British epi-
1 Quoted in A. McCoy, p. 367.
2 C.Trocki (1999a), p, 58 and 59.
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sode in which the Opium Wars occurred. Basic to its understanding is the 
triangle relationship between China and Britain through India: so, what 
does it mean “tea for opium vice versa”?
An Analysis from Within
John Crawfurd (1783-1868) was a clever colonial administrators and dip-
lomats in India, Singapore, Java or Burma “running” the British Empire in 
the East together with people like Robert Hart, Warren Hastings or 
Stamford Rafffles. He was also a prolifĳic author who published, for instance, 
a three-volume History of the Indian Archipelago (1820). Several times in 
his long career he proved to have a rather intimate knowledge of the opi-
um business. On the eve of the fĳirst Opium War, he wrote in 1837:
Opium is an article calculated to become of vast importance to the agricul-
ture and commerce of India. The growth of the poppy is, at present, con-
fĳined to a few districts of the lower provinces of Bengal, pretty much in the 
Map 1. The global triangle of trade, ca. 1820 
Source: D. Meyer, p. 36
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same way as the growth of tobacco is confĳined to a few districts of France, 
for the purpose of the government monopoly in that country. In the great 
province of Malwa, however, in the centre of India, it is now freely culti-
vated, paying an export duty; and to this we, in fact, owe the vast increase 
which has taken place in the trade in it, within the last twenty years. In 
India there is a considerable local consumption of this article, especially in 
some of the northwestern provinces; but the great marts for its consump-
tion are the Malayan islands, the countries lying between India and China, 
and above all, China itself. We believe we shall not overrate the whole 
export produce of opium from India, at 24,000 chests a year; nor the export 
value of every chest, at £120 sterling; making a total value of £2,880,000. 
The wholesale price of the article to the consumers will certainly amount 
a sum of not less than three-and-a-half millions sterling. This is probably a 
larger sum than is paid by foreign nations for all the wines exported from 
France, Spain, and Italy.3
How to assess this “analysis from within the system” in which the main 
elements of the commercial Opium Question are given? It provides, fĳirst, 
the important sense of proportion. In our present crisis, when everybody 
talks about billions as if they are packets of butter, we easily forget the 
tremendous purchasing value of a million English pound sterling, 
American dollars, French francs or Dutch guilders as -ultimately—the 
main colonial currencies in the Asian 19th-century.4 
Crawfurd also gives an estimate of Indian export to the whole of East 
Asian “clients”. A pamphlet at the time (1840) compares the Indian gains 
of this triangle trade appropriately as follows: it allowed India
to increase ten-fold its consumption of British Manufactures ... to support 
the vast fabric of British dominion in the East ... and, by the operations of 
exchange and remittances in Teas and other Chinese produce, to pour an 
abundant revenue into the British Exchequer and benefĳit the British Nation 
to the extent of six millions annually.5
Before the ‘white foreign opium devils’ poured into China, there existed 
already a flourishing tea trade with England: in 1668 the fĳirst tea (145.5 
pounds !) was consumed in England, and it became a booming business 
from which the English sold twenty per cent to other countries in Europe. 
3 Quoted by C.Trocki (1999a), p. 93, 94. See also P. Brendon, p. 102.
4 It is probably sufffĳicient when Crawfurd compares £2.8 million with “all the wines 
exported ...”. Another measure is that the 30 million pounds of tea consumed every year 
around 1840 cost only £2 million (P. Brendon, p. 102); it is a tea trade which increased to 85 
million pounds around 1870. One can also point to the facts that £1 of—say—the year 1800 
is now about £ 32; one Dutch guilder of 1800 would be now twenty guilders, etc.   
5 Quoted by P. Brendon, p. 102.
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In the East this trade was divided up between the private company, EIC, 
and the private individuals known as British Country Traders, ‘each stim-
ulating the other’ in the 1750s, 1760s and 1770s.6
From a Chinese point of view this export was and remained small com-
pared to its own consumption of 1800 million pound around 1850. One 
concluded, therefore, that it was hardly surprising that the export price 
only increased by 6 % notwithstanding the enormous increase of the tea 
export after the First Opium War was “won” and the trade became “free”.7 
Who exactly decided or discovered that tea could be paid not only with 
silver, through bills of exchange on London, but also by opium from 
Bengal is difffĳicult to say. Below the EIC decision is reconstructed, but 
country traders may have discovered the relationship earlier. The export 
of opium from Bengal is one way to indicate what was going on; the rela-
tionship between the company (EIC) and the country traders is another. 
What Furber says about the latter’s prehistory, is a good introduction to 
what follows:
In the 1750s the sum raised by the company’s supercargoes [in Canton] 
from the sale of bills of exchange to country traders was negligible; by 1781-
82, it reached one million taels (c. £333,000), and it was to rise to £500,000 
a year by the end of the century. The opium export in country trade from 
Calcutta rose from 125,000 current rupees in 1774-75 to over a million 
current rupees in 1786-87 (£12,500 as compared with £100,000). The net 
annual profĳits on the English East India Company’s China trade were at 
least £234,000 in the mid-1770s, reaching £418,000 in the 1783-84 season, 
and rose to £800,000-£900,000 level by the close of the century.8
What follows is not only a reconstruction of these trade movements dur-
ing the end of the 18th-century, but mainly the elementary features and 
fundamental importance of the opium trade for the British Empire. 
Remember that this story must be seen as a model for the whole Western 
opium history, the subject of this book, as still the most neglected part of 
Western imperialism in the East. 
6 H. Furber, p. 176.
7 P. Brendon, p. 437.
8 H. Furber, p. 176, see also p. 244 in which he indicates that in the 1790s ‘twenty mil-
lion pounds of tea [went] annually around the Cape of Good Hope to be sold in London 
for approximately £2,700,000 annually.’
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The Bullion Game
This triangle—business became largely an English and American afffair 
before and after the Opium Wars, but it took a long time before this was 
an undeniable fact. From the beginning of its involvement in the realm 
the EIC was faced with the necessity of taking out large quantities of bul-
lion and coin to fĳinance its trade. It was a continuous exporter of treasure 
(mainly silver Spanish dollars/peso) and not many English goods. A symp-
tomatic example: in 1751 fĳive ships left England for China with a cargo of 
£137,600 worth of silver and only £20,809 in goods.9 
The Portuguese, Spaniards and Dutch had to do this as well and started 
much earlier. Over a period of three hundred years the Spanish transport-
ed silver and gold at a value of about 400 million “dollars” and the Dutch 
about 250 million “guilders” in the period 1602-1800.10 The reason for this 
is quite simple: the Westerners had next to nothing to offfer the Asians 
and, therefore, they had to pay in cash for the goods they purchased. 
It is very strange that most later historians and the governments of the 
traders as main supporters of “free trade” made such a fuss about the most 
normal exchange procedure. The bullion question is only a bit more com-
plicated, but for our aim the following is appropriate. 
England’s commerce was an European structured trade and its 
European goods (woolen goods, broad-cloths, etc. together with some 
lead and sometimes copper or tin) were offfered to the Chinese in such a 
way that a loss was concealed by a process of bartering for Chinese goods. 
So, if the selling of these goods (bartered with English goods) was as “prof-
itable” as the costs of the English goods (bought with money in England), 
the whole transaction was commercially in vain. There was only one 
9 H. Morse (1926), vol. 1, p. 307-313 provides a very long list of ships (1635-1753) with 
their (silver) stocks. The example comes from this list, which is distorted elsewhere. See M. 
Greenberg, p. 6, and for the following, see his fĳirst chapter on ‘the old China trade’ from 
which only a few characteristics can be given here. See also J. Beeching, p. 15-40. For a quite 
diffferent description of the triangle business between Europe, India and China, see J. Rich-
ards (1981).
10 C.Trocki (1999a), p. 42 provides an overly high amount for the Dutch. See for the 
latter F. Gaastra, p. 139 fff. The strange question always arises of whether profĳits could be 
made “under these circumstances”. Well, Gaastra only informs us that the goods imported 
back to Europe with a value (or “Asian cost”) of 30 million could be sold for 92 million in 
the 17th-century. In the 18th-century goods with an “Asian cost” of 90 million could be sold 
in Europe for 214 million (Idem, p. 147). If a breakdown of “Asian cost” had been given, a 
much larger profĳit could have been noted. See Appendix 4 for a relevant discussion around 
1810 in the East Indies. 
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product from China with which very good profĳits could be made in 
England and that was tea; with chinaware the profĳits were not bad, but 
much less. 
In short: in this process the Chinese needs and the private English ones 
matched; they concerned a normal mechanism of supply and demand. 
The public (or state) interest in the silver story concerned fĳirst and fore-
most a national relationship between Spain and England, former ene-
mies, and another one between England and China. In addition, the silver 
was not used that much as normal money but as a means of barter in the 
form of Spanish silver coins (“dollars” or “pesos”). The big profĳits with tea 
were made at home “in English money”.11
For both trade relations the tea trade was highly profĳitable until the 
moment the Spanish coins could not be obtained.12 That moment came 
when Spain entered the American War of Independence in 1779 and the 
silver market was closed until 1785. In addition the competition with 
Bengal opium started or became apparent for the British. The Malwa and 
Turkish opium arrived on the Chinese drug market imported, fĳirst, by 
West-Indian, Portuguese and American dealers.13 It was the start of a 
fĳierce competition. After this period the situation went from bad to worse 
for Westerners. The English and other Europeans wanted to consume 
more and more tea, while the supply of European silver remained uncer-
tain. A further complicating factor was the specifĳic and not very clear rela-
tionship between the English state and a private capitalist enterprise such 
as the EIC or, practically, their representatives in India.14 
11 The English state easily could pay its silver owed to Spain thanks to the taxes or 
licenses it could ask from the tea imports from China. Its next source of revenue was the 
yearly “profĳit” of the colony of India.  
12 For the importance of the Spanish-American silver money see the article of Carlos 
Marichal in: S. Topik et al. (ed.), p. 25-53 in particular p. 41-43.
13 See below and D. Owen, p. 68 fff.
14 D. Washbrook in: A. Porter (ed.), p. 409, did not see this whole constellation. He only 
sees India sufffering from a drainage of silver from its monetary system, which lead to the 
‘efffective contraction of the money supply’. Then the question becomes urgent of where 
the Chinese and the Indian silver went, and there was, in fact, only one address: “London” 
and not Indian silver for China (p. 403). In addition, Washbrook correctly stresses the 
importance ofp the opium trade: ‘Cotton, silver, and above all opium reached a growing 
number of consumers in China and South-East Asia’ (p. 403). For China he relies only on 
an unsubstantiated opinion of John Crawfurd. This man proposed in 1837 the opium trade 
to China ‘as a great national advantage’ with 400 million consumers for whom ‘opium has 
been more or less an item of consumption ever since we knew them. During the last fĳifty 
years it has been constantly on the increase ..’ Neither Crawfurd in 1837 nor Washbrook at 
present mention that this trade to China was prohibited and that one had to wage wars to 
get it there. Apparently, his ‘ever since we knew them’ means: since the fĳirst time we smug-
tea for opium vice versa 55
So, what could be done in this time of uncertainties? In the Crawfurd 
quotation above an answer was given, but the following shows its absur-
dity:
The solution was fĳinally found in India. It was discovered that while the 
Chinese had little taste for British goods, they were eager to accept the 
produce of British India, particularly raw cotton and opium, though China 
itself produced the one and prohibited the other.15 
The author does not comment on the remarkable aim to ram something 
unwanted and even prohibited down the Chinese throat or to plan a trade 
with products the potential client has in abundance! Still, the very cir-
cumstances under which specifĳic persons made the decision to pay for tea 
with opium remains more or less in the dark. An attempt to reconstruct it 
runs as follows.16
The Decision
One could expect that the decision must have been concocted in India 
around the year 1781 during the discourse about the Bullion Crisis. The 
main players here were the Board of Directors of the EIC and the main 
representative of the English state in India, the fĳirst Governor- General, 
Warren Hastings. But the fĳirst initiative “to do something” apparently 
came from those English people daily involved in poppy planting and 
opium production in India. They were the civil servants of the Patna fac-
tory, who largely worked for their personal benefĳit. Before 1773 these 
civil servants of the EIC even claimed a monopoly on the cultivation of 
poppies.17
They constructed the myth that their privileges and immunities were 
formerly somehow enjoyed by Mughal princes. It was an addictive and 
poor excuse to legitimize its own wrong actions, but other high spirits 
among the English like Rafffles used the same reasoning.18 Even Owen 
gled opium to China and tried to dope its population. For the raw opium from India there 
were other good clients like the Dutch and French colonizers in Southeast Asia (see 
below).
15 M. Greenberg, p. 9; see also G. Cressey, p. 135.
16 See for the following D. Owen, chapter II.
17 J. Spencer Hill, p. 1.
18 S. Alatas, p. 13 wrote in his intriguing Rafffles essay that Rafffles ‘stressed the need to 
acquire Banka and what he considered to be legitimate British claims by right of conquest. 
The British, he reasoned, inherited the right on Banka through the Dutch. The Dutch had 
surrendered its dependency, Palembang.’ Banka was (together with Billiton) the main 
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starts his analysis of this historical decision with reference to the use of 
opium in Mughal India. It is questionable to refer here to a past practice 
in subjugated India, apparently to legitimize the further exploitation of 
the one or subjugation of the other. Owen’s remarkable assessment is, 
that it only concerns ‘one of the less savory aspects of westernization of 
the East.’! 
It is, furthermore, ‘conceivably, of course’ that Mughal rulers ‘might 
have developed’ the opium trade and production. This is an untenable 
proposition since, for instance, the Mughal’s power rested on land and 
never on sea; they never had the intention to conquer something further 
than their “own” India. Last but not least they prohibited opium use (see 
ch. 12) and never had the intention themselves to develop even ‘an [opi-
um] industry badly organized’, apparently ‘an essential feature’ of Warren 
Hastings’s westernization of India, ‘an excellent and convincing ratio-
nale’! No, in Owen’s words: concerning opium, Mughals were ‘incapable 
of great evil.’19 An Indian historian, quoting Jan Huygen van Linschoten, 
gives Owen’s words a relevant twist: this ‘great evil’, opium, consumed by 
the Mughals in reasonable quantities, was received from the Dutch!20 
island with profĳitable tin mines; it belonged to the Sultan of Palembang but the Dutch had 
captured it. For this see further ch. 16 with more data about Rafffles opium obsession. 
 Rafffles behavior in the Palembang Massacre case is described by Alatas (p. 18) as: ‘Rafffles 
activity preceding and following the Massacre expressed an amoral political philosophy, 
but as he was a member of an amoral generation of empire-builders, big and small, he was 
not alone in holding to this philosophy.’ This is a good introduction to the decision process 
as described below.
19 D. Owen, p. 18. See also Michael Mann’s article in H. Fischer-Tiné, M. Mann (ed.), 
p. 5. This reader hings on the supposition that some British civilizing mission connected to 
their colonization of India has some relevance. As is rightly accepted: ‘... from a colonizer’s 
view, one might conclude that the civilizing mission almost completely failed.’ (p. 25). But 
then follow another 340 pages apparently because ‘from the point of view of the colonized, 
the cultural and civilizational changes and deformations are evident’ (Idem). ‘Deforma-
tions’ certainly, but this general statement as such is too ambiguous. In particular, because 
it is followed by the contradictory statement that the ‘efffects of the civilizing mission’ can 
be proved ‘on individual cases’. A few of these individual cases can be found in the new 
elite, but that’s all: this is too little for billions of colonized people who still sufffer from the 
Western colonization projects. It is, furthermore, an untenable remark that ‘with very few 
exceptions’ nobody paid attention to this British “civilizing mission”. In a book in which 
even the name and writings of a Thomas Rafffles is negated or Marx is only mentioned 
once in a distorted way, such an opinion can be expected. See, for instance, the excellent 
introduction in J. Bastin, p. ix-xx, which should be accompanied by S. Alatas, chapters 1 
and 5, in which the practice of the British “civilizing mission” is well illustrated.
20 S.P. Sangar, p. 204 fff.
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The motivation of the greedy English Patna offfĳicials, however, was only 
money. The substantial amounts of this opium money were very welcome 
and should be increased as quickly as possible since it
now found a compensation for the scanty allowances made to them by their 
masters in England.’ They were otherwise rigorous people. Notwithstanding 
a ‘dreadful famine’ in Bengal ‘several of the poorer farmers were compelled 
to plough up the fĳields they had sown with grain, in order to plant them 
with poppies, for the benefĳit of the engrossers of opium.21
Dutch opium interests competed heavily with earlier Indian Patna mer-
chants. When the English returned after one of their defeats, it was no 
longer in the role of traders, but of foreign occupiers. Indigenous opium 
merchants were virtually excluded from the opium business. The new 
English rulers had to cope with the Dutch and French competitors, but 
succeeded in getting the upper-hand and establishing a monopoly on 
Patna opium. It is the old policy of all colonial powers to arrive at the sole 
management of some product and to destroy a “free market”. Only a few 
private persons (‘an irresponsible body’, Owen) received the profĳits, and 
claimed that they exercised a “monopoly” of Mughal origins.
The “Mughal myth” was not unwelcome to Warren Hastings who nur-
tured it by fĳinancially supporting “old Indian” initiatives. In 1772 he was 
appointed the governor of Bengal and directly confronted with the Patna 
gang. Fifteen years later he himself was famously accused of corruption 
(acquitted in 1795). He, as Governor-General, representative of the British 
state, was also “The Company” (EIC). His position remained very unclear 
constitutionally. That could not be said of many of his public statements 
like
we exercise dominion, founded on the right of conquest’ which is no right 
at all; his patriarchal way of governance ‘lessens the weight of the chain by 
which the natives are held in subjection  and it imprints on the hearts of 
our countrymen the sense of obligation and benevolence…’22 
21 Quoted by J. Rowntree, p. 16 fff. The author accepted as the truth a historically (and 
economically) untenable comparison between some ‘opium monopoly’ of the Mughal 
emperors and an ‘opium monopoly’ of the EIC. In fact it concerns a trick of probably 
 Warren Hastings himself to project the English occupation as a continuation of the 
Mughal empire. As we will discuss later there was no such Mughal monopoly, because a 
few rich private Indian merchants in Patna and Bengal at the time sustained the opium 
business in conjunction with, among others, the Dutch VOC. What the EIC did was “origi-
nal” from about 1780 onwards and it was certainly no monopoly in the strict economic 
sense, but more of a politically hegemonic position expressed in several branches of the 
economy.
22 Quoted in Wikipedia “Warren Hastings”.
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This man, notwithstanding his lip-service to free trade, was responsible 
for the establishment of what is mostly called the EIC opium monopoly. 
On behalf of this policy he urged that
opium was not a necessary of life, but a pernicious article of luxury, which 
ought not to be permitted but for purposes of foreign commerce only, and 
with the wisdom of the Government should carefully restrain from internal 
consumption.23 
The Patna monopoly of some private people became transformed into an 
opium monopoly of the Bengal government at the suggestion of Warren 
Hastings (1773). The exclusive privilege of supplying opium was awarded 
to one Meer Muneer, an Indian who already acted as contractor for the 
English Patna people. 
Muneer, a monopolist in the cultivation the poppies, was obliged to 
deliver the drug to the factory in Calcutta only, in which it was refĳined and 
further distributed by means of public auctions. In this way a regular 
income developed for the Government as well, which was ‘a fĳield for 
development’. The fundamental principle of this monopoly was that cul-
tivation could be undertaken only with the EIC + government’s permis-
sion (other cultivation was illicit, heavily fĳined or destroyed). The poppy 
peasant (ryot) had to sell his product only to the offfĳicial agency and at the 
stated price.
The prohibition of opium was never considered. Owen states:
To blame the company for having refused to embark on such a course would 
be to impute to the eighteenth-century a standard of social ethics utterly 
foreign to it. The free traders in the court of directors and elsewhere were 
moved by no desire to suppress the sale of opium. ... had the Indian admin-
istrators sought to forbid poppy cultivation, it is doubtful whether success 
could have been achieved. There were many more important things to be 
done, and the company’s position in Bengal was too uncertain to have made 
of prohibition anything but an utopian experiment.24
So, according to Owen, false and very opportunistic considerations ruled 
the crucial decisions based only on strict colonial interests, not influenced 
by any Indian practice. Owen underestimated, however, many standards 
of social ethics at the time. 
First, Owen’s (and Warren Hasting’s) considerations negated the many 
Chinese prohibition edicts in the 18th-century as not worth considering. 
23 Quoted by J. Rowntree, p. 17 and by D. Owen, p. 23.
24 D. Owen, p. 25, 26.
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The only opposition, the one of the available really free traders in the 
colonial elite, could not succeed in destroying the monopoly position(s). 
Their arguments faded away under the heavy load of all the opium money 
pouring in. Outside England there was strong opposition to the opium 
business on ethical grounds offfered by Thomas Stamford Rafffles. Inside 
England the moral opposition came from Edmund Burke and his allies in 
the House of Parliament, but even this failed. ‘The crux of Hastings’s 
defense is to be found in the profĳits which his monopoly brought to the 
company’s treasury.’25
Another development must have influenced the decision as well. 
Spencer Hill was one of the few who rightly pointed to it:
Up to this time, though a very small trade in the drug with China had been 
carried on, the bulk of the manufacture was disposed of to the Dutch mer-
chants at Batavia. In 1781 however the war with the Dutch ... closed this 
market, and Mr. Hastings had to fĳind other purchasers for his wares.26
The Dutch opium business will be the subject of our story later. It shows 
that although the English kicked the Dutch out of the poppy fĳields in 
Bengal, the opium traders were too dependent on the Dutch money. It 
must have been this dependence which brought Hastings to look for the 
Chinese market. 
Karl Marx mentioned another important element in this case. There 
was not only a production monopoly of English offfĳicials in Patna, but also 
a distribution monopoly. This was twofold: for the direction India-London 
(tea, etc.) and for the India-China route (opium). This
coastal ship trafffĳic of India and between the islands including the internal 
Indian trade became a monopoly of the higher offfĳicials of the EIC. The 
monopoly of salt, opium, betel and other goods was a source of inexhaust-
ible wealth. The offfĳicials themselves fĳixed the prices and treated the unlucky 
Hindi at will. The Governor-General participated in this private trade. His 
benefĳiciaries got contracts under circumstances through which they—
more clever than the alchemists—made gold from nothing ... The trial of 
Warren Hastings bristles with these examples. Take this: an opium contract 
is given to a certain Sullivan at the moment he starts a trip ... to one of the 
opium districts ... Sullivan sells his contract for £40,000 to a certain Binn; 
on the same day Binn sells it for £60,000. The last seller and executioner of 
the contract states, that he later earned a substantial profĳit. According to a 
parliamentary list the offfĳicials and the Company received six million pound 
25 Idem, p. 37. In a decade, 1773-1784 the yield was not more than £534,000, peanuts 
compared to what was to come.
26 J. Spencer Hill, p. 2.
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sterling in this way from the Indians in the period 1757 to 1766! Between 
1769 and 1770 the British policy led to a famine thanks to the buying up 
of all rice and the refusal to sell it except for unbelievable prices.27 
Hastings’s position is not yet presented in its entirety. He also ordered 
that the best opium was to be reserved for export and the inferior version 
sold for home consumption. First, cargoes of opium (3450 chests) were 
sent by him to Malacca and China on the Company’s account (1782). The 
ships were armed and supplied with soldiers of the Company. The repre-
sentative of the EIC in Canton was completely surprised when these ves-
sels arrived. He did not know how to handle opium, which was prohibited 
in China (‘it was necessary to take our measures with the utmost cau-
tion’). He found two Hong merchants who were willing to buy the stufff, 
whereupon he gave them a much better price than his superiors in 
Calcutta had envisaged. The most remarkable message from Canton was 
that if there was any ‘urgency of need’ to send a second consignment,
long credit must be allowed, as the purchaser can have no prospect of sell-
ing any considerable part of it here. This is the clear proof that the opium 
habit was not yet generally prevalent throughout China.28 
These fĳirst steps of the English in the “opium dark” were the result of a far-
reaching and rather complicated decision process. It lead to a much dis-
cussed follow-up: the fĳirst British diplomatic opium mission to China, the 
abortive Cathcart embassy of 1787.29 In its instructions it is stated that 
the prosperity of India
would be promoted by procuring a secure vent for (its) products and man-
ufactures in the extensive Empire of China, at the same time that the pro-
duce of such sales would furnish resources for the Investment (teas, etc.) 
to Europe.30 
In fact the Cathcart and Macartney embassies (1793) both failed for dif-
ferent reasons, but the result was important: no deal with the Chinese 
could be made, while they became warned about the aims of the British 
and directly renewed the laws prohibiting opium use and trade (1795-
96). But the British decision-makers in India and London did not want to 
27 K. Marx, vol. 1, p. 780, 781.
28 J. Rowntree, p. 18.
29 The British had lobbied for an embassy to go before the Chinese emperor and 
make requests. The fĳirst embassy, the Cathcart Embassy of 1788, was called offf with the 
sudden death of Cathcart before his arrival in China. Another embassy, the much debated 
Macartney embassy, followed soon thereafter (1792).
30 Quoted by M. Greenberg, p. 9.
tea for opium vice versa 61
stop this process anymore and started substantial smuggling campaigns 
armed to the teeth and on a large geographical scale: now the English 
narco-military underworld in Asia was a fact. 
Remarkably enough,Americans soon joined this world after gaining 
their independence, making the relationship “tea for opium” applicable 
worldwide. It is not necessary to recall the event, the Boston Tea Party (16-
12-1773), which triggered the American “Revolution”.31 But the Americans 
had to cope with the same problem as the English in the beginning of the 
19th-century:
If Chinese had not bought opium from the Americans, then United States 
imports of silk, porcelain and tea would have had to be paid for in silver 
coin. But there was not enough silver available in the United States ... Opium 
smuggling had turned out to be good for the dollar.32
That was also the case for the pound sterling, because after 1804 little or 
no silver had to be sent from Europe to China by the EIC. On the contrary: 
the flow of silver was reversed by 1810. From China millions in silver bul-
lion could be shipped to India to pay for the opium.33 
In 1827 the Bullion Crisis became a real Chinese one. Fear of this was 
expressed by the Chinese in an edict of forty years earlier (1785) in which 
it was forbidden to pay for opium with silver. A quick and relevant mea-
sure which must have been taken as a reaction to the Bullion Crisis of the 
British and Warren Hastings’s “solution”. The Chinese could not know 
how aggressively the British would jump into opium smuggling and that 
their greed would motivate even fully fledged Opium Wars. 
It was the start of a century of unprecedented profĳits for the smugglers, 
EIC, British Indian government, “London” and USA merchants and bank-
31 See H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 82 fff. It could be a very symbolic story about tea smug-
gling profĳitable thanks to an English Tea Tax which led to the Hancock trial, in which this 
smuggler was defended by John Adams. More important was the theory and practice of 
the creed: “No taxation without representation!”, etc. Two years later the American War of 
Independence started. It is the same Adams who later defended Ambassador Macartney’s 
kotow adventure in China and the British assault on China to carry on the opium trade, etc. 
See part 1.2.
32 J. Beeching, p. 36; see also J. Lovell, p. 251.
33 For the silver reserves of China, see the article of Yeh-Chien Wang in T. Rawski and 
L. Li (ed.), p. 57 fff. The famous German Staatswörterbuch by J. Bluntschli described already 
in 1857 how European traders paid with silver coins in China in the 18th-century. It contin-
ues with: ‘Thanks to the opium import of the English, things turned in the other direction: 
now China had to pay in 1833-34 already 4,976,841 dollars in silver and 375,906 dollars in 
gold’ (vol. 2, p. 436). This is much more than the table indicates. Since no sources are men-
tioned, I cannot check these fĳigures.
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Ill. 4. Patna, India: four interiors of an opium factory; “mixing”, “drying”, “stacking”, ca. 1850 
Source: J. Wiselius, 1886, p. 118, 127 and several times reproduced later: see, for instance, 
D. Duco or (www.plantcultures.org). The preparation of the opium balls is shown in 
→
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the fĳirst picture; the second not only demonstrates children’s labor but also the kneading 
of the balls; these must be dried in a drying department (3) before stored in a ‘stacking 
room’ (4).
chapter six64
ers: in the middle of the century opium was—in cash terms—already the 
largest single commodity traded in the world. Most helpful to this success 
were the smuggler’s infrastructure, the corruption and the “ideological 
assistance” of religious authorities. A short impression of their impor-
tance will sufffĳice.
Opium Shipping
In the fĳirst period of the opium trade the drug was smuggled to China in 
Indian crafts. They used vessels of 500-800 tons built from Malabar teak 
in the shipyards of Bombay and Hugly. Their rounded lines were unsuit-
able for beating windward. They ran up the China Sea before the South-
West monsoon and returned with the North-East one. They were called 
wallahs by their British owners and commanders. They brought to Canton 
not only opium but also raw cotton, rice, pepper and tin from the Malay 
states. 
The opium dealers were not satisfĳied with this ‘Country Trade’ vessel, 
whereupon a special type of ship was developed mostly on the banks of 
Hugly. That became the opium clipper, which was as important as the tea 
clipper in trade and smuggling.34 These vessels had
to beat to windward against the monsoons. They carried the drug from 
Bombay and Calcutta to the Canton River and Hongkong via Singapore ... 
In the early days the clippers delivered their outward cargoes to the receiv-
ing ships lying offf Macao or at the Lintin and Cap-sing-moon Anchorages: 
but after the Opium War Hongkong became their usual discharge port.35
34 Basil Lubbock documented in many books the history of the sailing ships, the 
‘China Clippers’, the ‘Colonial Clippers’, the ‘Nitrate Clippers’ and, of course, the ‘Opium 
Clippers’. Knowledge of “ship jargon” is a prerequisite. In this last book Lubbock provides 
a register of the whole opium fleet from 1823-1860 (appendix B), which does not provide all 
the ships involved in the opium trade, but it is still revealing. From this appendix one can 
calculate the following fĳigures. In total 99 ships are mentioned with a total tonnage of 
20,852. The movement of the trade is as follows: from 1823 -1840, 7,822 tons were involved; 
from 1840-1850 already 10,238 and from 1850-1860 there was a temporary collapse (Opium 
Wars) to 2,792 tons. The owners were mostly the captains of the clippers, but the largest 
opium traders had also the most ships: the Scottish-English fĳirm Jardine-Matheson had 14, 
the USA fĳirm Dent &Co 13 stood far above the others, but the Calcutta-based Cowasjee-
Rustomjee family and the USA fĳirm Russell both had 7 ships, etc. Jardine-Matheson 
became the strongest supporter of the war against China. It is remarkable that the richest 
opium dealer ever, the Sassoon family, had apparently no ships until 1860 and is not men-
tioned by Lubbock at all.
35 B. Lubbock, p. 13.
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There was one exception to the general small size of these clippers, which 
was Jardine Matheson & Co’s’ famous full-rigged flagship Falcon of 351 
tons, which carried the drug to ports far outside the treaty areas. Its most 
important duty was to discover and opening up of new markets.36 To this 
aim it was heavily armed with broadside and other guns 
so that pirates and Imperialists, wreckers and marauding fĳishermen, all 
hesitated before attacking her, though they thought little of trying to cut offf 
a small schooner.37
These clippers were not only able to sail against the monsoon, they could 
also carry three lots of opium from Calcutta to the depot on the island of 
Lintin (Canton Bay, twenty miles north-east of Macao) in a single season. 
The motivation of the opium traders like Jardine, Matheson, Dent, etc. is 
clearly given as follows:
Our idea [in building a new clipper] is that the opium trade after the expi-
ration of the East India Company’s charter is likely to be so much run upon 
by speculators of every description for the mere sake of remittance without 
a view to profĳit that it can hardly be worth our while pursuing on the old 
plan unless by operating on a large scale, and on the secure footing of always 
being beforehand with one’s neighbours in point of intelligence.38 
Before the middle of the century another new type, the steamer, was 
introduced. First and foremost as war-ship (Nemesis), so that the gunboat 
diplomacy could start, and the fĳirst commercial steamer was called, of 
course, the Jardine, built in Aberdeen. Now this kind of diplomacy went 
hand in hand with the opium and tea trade. The profĳits were too exorbi-
tant not to take the investment risks. 
Opium Smuggling39
Since 1729 it had been strictly forbidden to import non-medicinal opium 
into China; until the end of the Second Opium War it had to be smuggled 
in not by the EIC alone, but by many licensed private vessels (“country 
ships”) and American clippers as well. The risks could be minimized by 
36 Idem, p. 14.
37 Idem, p. 14. Lubbock does not give a defĳinition of “Imperialists”, but they must be 
the European competitors of the English, the Dutch or French! For Jardine-Matheson & 
Co see M. Greenberg, p. 135 fff.
38 Quoted by M. Greenberg, p. 140.
39 For the following see B. Lubbock, p. 30 fff., including the quotation. See in H. Morse 
(1926) under ‘running of goods’. Good discussion recently in C. Markovits.
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using fast ships, islands offf the coast like Lintin, hidden small harbors and 
bays, Chinese collaborators (compradors), corruption, Macao as an old 
place occupied by foreigners, etc. The English and American smugglers 
accepted the risks of sufffering under draconian anti-opium laws thanks to 
the very large profĳits.
The fĳirst Chinese edict against opium must have been a reaction to a 
small import of 200 chests by Portuguese merchants in Macao. The users 
must have been just a few people in the elite, probably only confĳined to 
the court. To control the movements of foreign ships better the emperor 
ordered that all foreign trade had to be confĳined to Whampoa, the port of 
Canton (1745). The next measure imposed ten years later was ambiguous 
as it demanded import duties, including on opium consignments, which 
could be interpreted as a kind of approval. If true, it was soon corrected by 
new government anti-opium directives.
Around the middle of the 18th-century the import was increasing but 
still limited to 1000 chests a year distributed to several destinations, smug-
gled by Dutch, Portuguese and some English ships. The EIC considered it, 
at that time, ‘beneath the dignity of the Company to smuggle and would 
not allow her Indiamen to carry opium.’ This honorable motive was soon 
set aside by company servants and country captains alike. Apparently 
they “discovered” that opium was the only marketable alternative when 
specie had become scarce.40 
Smugglers pocketed the main profĳits, while “London” could not or did 
not want to prevent this, as Warren Hastings’s decision-making was 
remarkably ambiguous. The Chinese reacted with new edicts in 1799, in 
1800 and in 1809. It took another six years before the fĳirst Chinese collabo-
rators of the ‘foreign opium devils’ were arrested and executed. It was all 
in vain. 
From India the illicit export was pushed so that prices soared (see 
Appendix 1). Apparently, the English producers and merchants were 
angered by the new American competition: some Americans smuggled 
opium from Turkey into China! The American drugs barons Russell and 
Dent became nearly as important as the English Jardine and Matheson. In 
the third position came the Jewish Sassoon and Parsee smugglers. 
After the First Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the ports 
of Hong Kong and other places were “opened”. Still, as Lubbock remarks: 
40 H. Furber, p. 292.
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‘Opium was contraband by Chinese law, but not by British.’41 He men-
tions a new legal defense of the Chinese: opium aboard British ships was 
under British law, but once landed it was liable to Chinese law. 
Immediately after the treaty in the new colony of Hong Kong, there were 
80 clippers engaged in carrying opium to and from this port; 19 of which 
were registered to Jardine, Matheson and Co. In the interwar period opi-
um imports grew so quickly
that illegal trade dominated all foreign trade … and all authorities agree that 
the drug was the most important item among China’s imports until the fĳinal 
decade of the century.42
The following fĳigure shows how much opium was smuggled into China, 
the majority through Hong Kong (1 chest = ca. 65 kilo).
Beeching’s description of the situation shortly before the First Opium 
War is illustrative for the atmosphere of the antagonists, the Chinese 
Commissioner Lin Tse-hu (Lin Zexu) and the smuggler’s with their enor-
mous stocks and backing by the “whole British Empire”.
41 B. Lubbock, p. 277.
42 E. LeFevour, p. 7, 8.
Figure 1. Opium Smuggling into China and Shanghai, 1837-1860
Sources: J. Fairbank, Trade and diplomacy on the China Coast, p. 229; Y. Hao, The commer-
cial revolution in nineteenth-century China, table 9, p. 130; H. Morse, The international rela-
tions of the Chinese empire, vol.I, p. 358, 465, table G, p. 556; D. Meyer, p. 62.
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By 12 May 1839, 1600 Cantonese violators had been arrested, and 42,741 
opium pipes had been surrendered ... 28,845 catties of opium on sale in 
Canton—the equivalent of 2,900 chests—had also been impounded by the 
authorities in the fĳirst onslaught. During the next seven weeks 11,000 more 
catties of opium were surrendered. But compared with the huge quantity 
accumulating offfshore at Lintin, this was nothing. Captain Elliot, in a letter 
to the Foreign Offfĳice, estimated that nearly 20,000 chests of opium had 
already arrived in China and waited there unsold. To these must be added 
“upwards of 20,000 in Bengal, 12,000 in Bombay ... upwards of 50,000 
chests ready for the market, and the crop of the current year ... soon [to be] 
added to this stock.43 
It took a Second Opium War to erase this legal “flaw”: where opium land-
ed simply became an “international concession”, so that English and 
American smuggling could be transformed into legal trade for the occu-
pied territory. They became the locations of further smuggling into China. 
For all Chinese governments (Imperial, Taiping, Republican or whatever 
opposition) opium imports, smuggled or not, always remained illicit and 
part of the Western colonization of China. It is difffĳicult to deny this.
What must be seen clearly is that the drugs barons themselves, always 
in favor of war to “open” China so that legalization could follow, also 
remained strong supporters of smuggling. In a letter of 2 December 1842 
William Jardine wrote to his companion in the opium trade, the knighted 
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy in Bombay:
Hong Kong and the smugglers will, to be sure, be powerful engines of coun-
teraction, on our part, bit if slow operations, and not to the extent of pre-
venting much loss and disappointment to speculators, what the future fate 
of opium Trade is to be is a question of much interest.44
Opium Corruption
The second main “help” to the opium success was the corruption and 
mafĳia-like practices which spread all over India and all along the Chinese 
coast from Macao to Manchuria and implicated all of the parties involved. 
In one quote Greenberg discloses that the opium mafĳia circuit was well 
established in 1835 around Canton:
The local Mandarins raised their price for ‘protection’ to a flat rate of $10 
per chest. Dents and Jardines jointly proposed to pay the Chinchew Man-
43 J. Beeching, p. 77; see also J. Lovell, p. 58 fff.
44 A. Le Pichon (ed.), p. 520.
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darins $20,000 per annum and no others to be allowed to trade in the Bay. 
Jardine wrote Captain Rees, in command of the Colonel Young: “If you could 
manage to make the mandarins attack everyone but your own party it 
would have a good efffect.[!] My principal fear is that numbers may bring 
down the displeasure of the Government authorities on the dealers and 
boatmen, while competition among sellers will reduce prices very much.45 
As already mentioned, not only English but also Americans were traders, 
smugglers, clipper captains, etc. There were, however, a few American 
merchants who declined on principle to handle opium. J.P. Cushing with-
drew from the scene in 1821, Olyphant & Co never touched it. 
To this system of corruption belonged not only the receivers of money 
at some stage or some position but also ‘the growing tribe of addicts who 
needed a steady supply and would gladly break the law to get it.’46 In 1835 
the number of addicts was estimated at two million. Whatever is true (see 
ch. 31), the corruption knew its conjuncture, anyway: the Chinese 
Repository of April 1839 reported ‘Bribes for low-ranking offfĳicials and the 
water forces were set, in the summer of 1838, at the rate of $75 per chest 
(about 133 lbs).’47 What would the mandarins raise now, three years later, 
for their ‘protection’ if apparently lower offfĳicials received seven-fold ?
The opium corruption destabilized the Chinese society much further. 
The continued influx of British-Indian opium and the subsequent ‘oozing 
out of fĳine silver’ was against Qing law and attested to the complete break-
down not only of the old trade mechanisms, thanks to the continuously 
increasing smuggling, but also of the government’s power of confĳining the 
foreigners to Canton-Guangzhou only. It was nearly true that, ‘no region 
of the empire, however remote, was safe from opium’s ubiquitous reach, 
not even the Qing ancestral homeland in Manchuria.’48 
Prohibition sufffered another setback when peasants in coastal areas 
lured by profĳits ‘ten times that of planting the rice crop’ started (or were 
urged) to cultivate poppies. An incentive was not only the direct pay-
ment, but later as the Opium Wars ended, the access to many coastal set-
45 B. Lubbock, p. 141. Italics in original. One cannot say that the captains and owners 
or the EIC were not warned about the consequences of their illegal trade. This is shown, 
for instance, in the letter from the 6th of March 1822 signed by the ‘Hong Merchants’ 
quoted in B. Lubbock, p. 53 fff. For the consequences see also p. 276 fff. For all opium prohi-
bition acts of the Chinese offfĳicials H. Morse (1926).
46 J. Beeching, p. 36.
47 L. Kwong, p. 1484 note 55. The Chinese Repository was an English-language publica-
tion in Canton. See J. Lovell, passim.
48 Idem, p. 1485.
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tlements occupied by ‘foreign devils’. These were highly attractive for 
people looking for work, entertainment and, probably, another belief sys-
tem. All this corrupted the Confucian or Taoist norms and values con-
cerning the family, self-discipline and self-interest.49
Religion as Opium
Everything is extreme in the history of opium and that is also the case 
with religion at the moment that a European Manifest announces that 
religion is the opium of/for the people. The third “help” on the opium 
scene is, namely, formed by the representatives of the Western religious 
denominations. They became part of the opium scene in many respects. 
For many missionaries, it was difffĳicult to communicate in the Chinese 
language. They all had great trouble expressing their principle thoughts in 
Chinese, starting with the name and idea of God or the meaning of their 
basic rituals: the miraculous transformation of bread and wine into 
Christ’s blood and body now had to be made acceptable through the use 
of rice and tea!50 Only a very few normal Chinese accepted the Western 
Christian creeds, except for opium addicts: they apparently expected to 
score their stufff much more easily. 
The missionaries had, furthermore, to worry about the conduct of their 
fellow white devils (nearly all opium smugglers) who sometimes even 
lived with or—even worse—married an Asian mistress, like a partner of 
Jardine. Most important, however, it was evidently possible for missionar-
ies and opium smugglers to work hand in hand: a lethal blow to Christian 
morality and its many supporters?.
The most widely discussed example concerned a colorful German cler-
gyman Carl Gutzlafff (1803-1851) sent by a Dutch Missionary Society to 
Siam. Later, around 1829, he happened to go to Macao. His influence was 
based on his ability to speak several Chinese dialects fluently. Soon he 
was invited by the smuggler William Jardine, who confessed to Gutzlafff as 
follows: 
... our principle reliance is on opium ... by many considered an immoral 
trafffĳic, yet such trafffĳic is so absolutely necessary to give any vessel a reason-
49 See K. McMahon, several chapters; the website ‘Asia for Educators’ with selections 
of Confucius’s writings like the Analects or Tao (Dao) Laozi. The American sinologist 
 Daniel Bell plays a remarkable role as a professor at the Tsinghua University in Beijing and 
as writer about China’s “New Confucianism”. See also Wikipedia “Religion and Drugs”.
50 J. Beeching, p. 60 fff. also for the following.
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able chance of defraying her expenses that we trust you may have no objec-
tion to interpret on every occasion when your services may be required ... 
The more profĳitable the expedition, the better we shall be able to place at 
your disposal a sum that may be hereafter employed in furthering your 
mission ...51 
Gutzlafff accepted the deal: he ‘would be free to spread the gospel ... so 
long as he did not object to the opium sold from the ships’. He embarked 
on one of the opium clippers to ensure the success of the opium negotia-
tions with local mandarins and authorities. He was, therefore, directly 
involved in opium smuggling, but also in deals with other products or in 
getting detailed information about prices or market conditions.52
If necessary, he accompanied the British Navy when it was threatening 
bombardments of coastal settlements, or acted offfĳicially as administrator 
in Hong Kong.53 A book in English and a magazine Gutzlafff was printing 
in Chinese were also paid for by the drugs baron. Happily, that he was on 
board in a tremendous storm and could call on God to prevent the destruc-
tion of the opium clipper Sylph.
For Jardine it was more important that his business showed fabulous 
gains thanks to Gutzlafff’s eight years of service. In, for instance, the years 
1831-’33 his business increased from 14,225 chests to 23,693 chests of 65 kg. 
Later Gutzlafff even ‘hired an intelligence network of Chinese willing to 
spy for the British’ and was active in opium and military espionage for 
nine years.54 
Notwithstanding Gutzlafff’s strong support of the use of ‘British bayo-
nets’, in their service he learned also how to organize door-to-door sales-
men, trading by retail in Christian literature. Though not a medical man, 
51 Quoted in Idem, p. 61 and in M. Collis, p. 82 ot J. Lovell, p. 27. For another and longer 
quotation from Jardine’s letter to Gutzlafff, see M. Greenberg, p. 139 note 4. I do not know 
which is the original but, because the gist is the same, I have chosen the better written 
version. See now also B.Fischer, p. 263. The most illuminating for the role of Gutzlafff is the 
correspondence between him and Jardine-Matheson given in A. Le Pichon (ed.), starting 
with p. 144 note 6 (following quote). This correspondence is of the utmost importance for 
the whole opium afffair around the Opium Wars.
52 A. Le Pichon (ed.), p. 167, without any reason under the fake name ‘Humbug’ (!), 
p. 197 or 206, etc. 
53 See, for example, A. Le Pichon (ed.), p. 378, 576. J. Beeching, p. 90 fff., p. 115 fff. Beech-
ing is not convinced of Dr. Gutzlafff’s scholarly abilities, but his work (alone and in coop-
eration with others) on a Chinese translation of the Bible and several books on China 
(directly translated in Dutch) prove the reverse. See also the Wikipedia article ‘Karl Gütz-
lafff”, called ‘the Grandfather of the China Inland Mission’. See also the characterization of 
Gutzlafff in B. Lubbock, p. 99 fff. 
54 J. Beeching, p. 140 fff., 166 fff., 208.
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he ‘commended himself to the natives by the practice of medicine among 
them, having also adopted the native garb and assumed one of their clan 
names.’55
Gutzlafff, a supporter of mass conversions, attracted many Protestant 
sectarian preachers, and his booklets with controversial translations in 
Chinese of Biblical texts had a marked influence on the leading spirit of 
the Taiping, Hong Xiuquan. 
The end of his splendid career came when, on a preaching tour in 
Europe, a competitor of another denomination discovered that these 
salesmen were often criminals and opium addicts, Chinese devils in stead 
of white ones. It is remarkable that the most recent Gutzlafff biography is 
silent about his long opium career, while stressing that the Taiping strong-
ly prohibited opium production and use (‘the opium pipe is as a gun 
directed to yourself.’).56
The dubious role of missionaries in China is discussed further below 
(ch. 29). Now we must look at what was the benefĳit of all this “help” for 
deliberately expanding an opium market in China, i.e. increasing the 
number of opium addicts. This profĳit was fĳirst and foremost received in 
the newest British settlement, Hong Kong.
Opium Banking in a Crown Colony 
The rather barren rock on which one of the most important modern mon-
ey capitals, Hong Kong, would arise was ceded by China to Britain in 
1842. It was part of the settlement for the First Opium War. Six warships 
and 7000 troops were needed to guarantee opium imports by the British. 
Hong Kong became the center of this naval force (Hong Kong as the 
‘Gibraltar of the East’57) and of the opium trade for a very long time. 
The opium was not only destined for China, it was soon exported also 
to Southeast Asia and the USA. Here and in Shanghai the British policy to 
transform opium from a luxury good into a bulk commodity was defĳinite-
ly organized and fĳinanced. As we will see, this policy followed the exam-
ple of the Dutch, and with great success. A Hong Kong example: for 
decades the most important dealer in raw opium, Jardine, Matheson & 
Co, also traded prepared opium to the USA. In January 1860 ‘it held 
55 K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 331.
56  See the article of Martin Herzog, Gottes zweiter Sohn. in: Die Zeit, 2-12-2010, p. 22. 
See also the article of Jen Yu-Wen about the relationship of Gutzlafff and the Taiping.
57  G. Endacott, p. 204.
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fĳive-eights of all opium stock in the United States. Its agent in San 
Francisco was Edward & Bailey’58 (see further ch. 28). And about Shanghai 
it is written, for example, that in 1904 the foreign (mainly English) ton-
nage of shipping entered is nearly eight times that of 1864; exports 
increased nearly seven times in the same period. Silk, raw cotton and rice 
were the common products in this trade. ‘However, opium trade com-
prised the major balance of general commodity exports.’59 
Hong Kong was from the beginning the center of the triangular trade 
described above and in the next chapter. At least offfĳicially the India-
China opium trade ended after 1911 when the Republican period started in 
China, and war-lords created a permanent mess until 1949, while exploit-
ing the enormous narcotic market to fĳinance their wars. Mao liberated 
China from these military profĳiteers; he also ended foreign domination, 
opium addiction and trafffĳicking with its related corruption (see further 
ch. 31). This example was not followed by the British in Hong Kong. On 
the contrary.
The main players in the opium gangs fled to this city, which had always 
participated somehow in the illicit business. Now, after World War II it 
again benefĳited from the drug trade as in the earlier days and once again 
Hong Kong became a world distribution center of opium, heroin and oth-
er narcotics. Before providing a few data concerning the period until 
Hong Kong’s transformation from British Crown colony into a “normal” 
Chinese city (1997), some background information on the capital basis of 
this spectacular opium history is needed. 
In the third quarter of the 19th-century the British Empire was at its 
zenith and Hong Kong celebrated its high position as well. “London” was, 
therefore, also the world’s leading international capital market, providing 
a string of foreign loans to capital-hungry states, and Hong Kong was its 
branch in Asia.60 The City’s merchant banks were powerful thanks to the 
Empire’s military-political framework, but they were the most capable 
ones of providing sterling loans and placing transactions with a broad 
range of domestic and offfshore investors. It is estimated that between 
1870 and 1914 total sterling loan issuance amounted to about £4 billion. 
British merchant banks raised at least 40 per cent of this sum. 
Not only a naval, trade and opium center, Hong Kong also became the 
main banking center. Today it still holds this position in Asia with its sev-
58  E. Sinn, p. 22.
59  Z. Ji, p. 41.
60  E. Banks, p. 166 for the following also S. Chapman.
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eral hundred large banks. From the beginning the one center was closely 
connected with the other under the umbrella of the British Crown. It had 
serious consequences for the behavior of the British in Asia and not only 
in this Crown Colony. One quote of many:
And all the British exhibited disdain for the various lesser breeds who 
shared the colony with them, jumpers on the band-wagon of Empire, the 
sprinkling of Eurasians and Portuguese, Parsees and Sindhis, Jews and 
Armenians, Frenchmen and other disreputable Europeans ... Sir Vandeleur 
Grayburn of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank is said to have commented, 
“There is only one American in the Bank and that is one too many.” But in 
particular they looked down upon the 98 per cent of the population who 
happened to be Chinese.61 
In the most literal sense, the British colonial elite lived in Hong Kong high 
above the vulgus. The most senior British bureaucrats, military men and 
leading merchants, the taipans, lived together on the Peak, the cool 
heights, overlooking the homes of the Chinese masses. The latter had no 
rights whatsoever and were ruled in every sense by a British Governor 
with his supreme power and a direct line to the Colonial Offfĳice in London. 
Even the British expatriates had practically no influence until 1894 and a 
bit more after some “constitutional reform” in 1916. This dictatorship was 
“legitimized” with the rationalization: “If We have to give you, Europeans, 
democratic rights, We have to do this also with the Chinese, which is 
impossible!”
Hong Kong was a role-model for most of the later foreign coastal settle-
ments of the Western imperialists. The fate of this city can be sketched in 
a few quotations. The British offfĳicial Davis reported already in 1844 that
... “almost every person possessed of capital who is not connected with gov-
ernment employment, is employed in the opium trade” and later in the year 
said that opium was in general trade along the whole coast.62
Notwithstanding half-hearted missionary lobby work and other pres-
sures, Hong Kong’s fate remained closely connected to this specifĳic prod-
uct and trade, because until long after 1900 
61  P. Snow, p. 2, 3. That the British had such an opinion of Americans at the beginning 
of the 19th-century is more obvious like, for instance, Rafffles’ American hate as shown in 
S. Alatas, p. 30 fff.
62  G. Endacott, p. 73.
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the fĳinances of the Hong Kong government have become as dependent on 
opium as any addict on his drug.’ Half of its revenue still derived from the 
poppy in 1918.63
A few backgrounds of the city’s banking history seem appropriate since 
competent analysts also sketch nowadays a broader perspective of Hong 
Kong’s and Shanghai’s role in Asia, namely that they 
consciously or unconsciously introduced a complete commercial capitalist 
system to China. Seeking maximum profĳits through trade and commercial 
activities was the main function of commercial capitalism ... The foreign 
agency houses engaged in opium trade and the cotton business not only 
through the former East India Company … but also through Chinese local 
merchants to build up and expand the distribution networks … Commercial 
capitalism was developed before fĳinance capitalism in China.64 
What about the main actors in this banking history? “London” was, of 
course, most prominent. The two top merchant bankers of the British 
Empire, Baring and N. Rothschild, raised a total of nearly £2 billion in 
sterling loans in the period 1860 to 1904. It was in the 1880s that they 
received serious competition from the USA from J.P. Morgan. 
Chapman provides a table concerning the capital of the leading mer-
chant banks in the whole Empire around 1875. They are divided over three 
groups of seven banks: the Jewish, the Anglo-American and the Anglo-
German groups. The fĳirst group has by far the most capital power, with 
£27 million compared with 7 and 4.2 million respectively.65 With these 
transactions they transformed their clients as well, which became now 
fĳirst and foremost institutional investors. They were mostly states like the 
belligerent Japan66 and other institutions able to support debts, so that 
debt issuance gravitated from loans to securities. Individual investors 
could now easily jump these “debt-wagons” and allowed merchant banks 
and brokers to place obligations with a broader number of clients. 
The top merchant banks, of course, did not enjoy complete control of 
these foreign loan markets. In particular in the new Asian markets, small-
er fĳirms like the colonial Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC), Jardine 
Matheson, the Hong Kong Bank, etc. or new American bankers like 
Goldman Sachs could make a very good business. 
63  P. Brendon, p. 640. See also the excellent article by E. Sinn.
64  Z. Ji, p. 40.
65  S. Chapman, p. 44.
66  E. Banks, 170 fff., 224 note 39.
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HSBC, still one of the largest banks in the realm, was established by the 
opium dealer Dent&Co (1864 -65) and the shipowner Sutherland.67 It 
became one of the main fĳinanciers of the Chinese government since 
between 1874 and 1898 HSBC negotiated nine loans totaling £30 million. 
By the late 19th-century the HSBC was the largest and leading foreign 
bank in China, because it also issued bank notes in 1, 5, 10, 50 and 100 dol-
lar denominations. For more than half a century until the mid-1930s, the 
bank efffectively set the foreign exchange rate in China’s fĳinancial mar-
kets.  
Opium dealers Jardine Matheson were from the beginning of Hong 
Kong the chief merchant bank and shipowner for a long time. They gradu-
ally used their opium fortune to invest in the railway and similar sectors 
or to provide the Chinese government with loans. 
The Hong Kong Bank was strongly involved in loan activities to Japan. 
Especially before and during Japan’s wars against Russia and China, the 
activities of these merchant banks increased: almost all of Japan’s rail-
ways, industry, harbors, arms, etc. were bought or erected with the sup-
port of the Hong Kong Bank. Later this happened in cooperation with 
Barings or Rothschild, if the loans were too big as, for instance, a 1923 loan 
of £60 million. This relationship persisted after World War II as Japan 
started a new wave of industrialization (see further ch. 27).68 
The Sassoon family opium and cloth business was also strongly con-
nected to Hong Kong and later Shanghai. The sons extended the business 
of father David, and it soon became three times larger in the later 
Edwardian years. Of E.D. Sassoon it was written:
All the Eastern Banks look upon this fĳirm as quite A1. They are very keen 
energetic people ... spending very little money ... They possess very consid-
erable property in Hong Kong and other eastern centres and do a very large 
trade in opium.69
Although the older D. Sassoon & Co Ltd was also largely involved in the 
export of opium from India to China, it was perceived as ‘a more or less 
declining fĳirm’. It was slow to respond to the openings in pure fĳinance and 
preferred its mercantile past, while leaving much of the initiative in bank-
ing and Chinese loans to the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, of which it had 
been a co-founder in 1864. Among the many London-based banks in the 
67  G. Endacott, p. 118, see also p. 258, 259. See table 8.1. in D. Meyer, p. 199. For HSBC 
see Idem tables 5.3 and 5.4 p. 109 fff. Z. Ji, p. 45-50.
68  E. Banks, p. 366 fff.
69  Quoted in S. Chapman, p. 131.
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period 1885-1915, the main ones specializing in trade to and in India and 
the Far East were Boustead, Matheson, Dent Palmer & Co, D. Sassoon and 
E. Sassoon & Co.70 Nearly all were heavily involved in the opium business 
(see further ch. 31).
Exorbitant Opium Revenues
It is quite astonishing that older publications like the well-known British 
Opium Policy (1934) could state:
In the almost perennial friction that marked Anglo-Chinese relations during 
the nineteenth-century opium must be assigned an important but by no 
means a preeminent part.71
The following table with rather conservative estimates shows how much 
opium money circulated only at the English national level during an 
entire century. 
Table 1. Trade between England, China and “British” India, 1800-190072
period annual export from 
England to China 
in £
annual export from 
China to England 
in £
annual opium-export in 
given period from 
“British” India to China in 
£
[1800-1820] [500 000] [2 000 000]  [750 000]
1821-1825 610 637 3 082 109 1 058 252
[1826-1832] [750 000] [3 200 000] [1 500 000]
1833-1835 850 159 3 779 385 1 955 236
1836-1839 911 560 4 273 858 3 209 958
70  Idem, p. 58 fff.
71  D. Owen, p. 51.
72 Adjusted computation of J-W. Gerritsen’s table, p. 58, derived from successive Par-
liamentary Papers (London). For the details of the fĳirst export column J. Rowntree, p. 288, 
for every year in the period 1859-1903. Adjusted with data mentioned by Crawfurd and 
Greenberg. See also J.F. Richards (2002-2), ‘The opium industry..’. Gerritsen did not indi-
cate that the fĳigures concern the (average) yearly export in the indicated period and not the 
whole export in the indicated period as Greenberg’s calculations show. He also did not give 
the fĳigures for all periods which I estimated as given in [...]. During the Second Opium War 
(1856-1860) there was apparently no interruption of any trade. In addition, Gerritsen has 
generally lower fĳigures per year than Greenberg, but because the former gives an estimate 
over the largest part of the 19th-century apparently from one and the same source, 
I reproduce them here. One can perceive these fĳigures, therefore, as the lowest estimate. 
The third and fourth column concern, of course, “normal” export. His book, one of the lat-
est Dutch books on the opium business, became a thesis from the “Elias School” 
(J. Goudsblom, A. de Swaan), but he did not consult the main opium literature at all, like 
M. Greenberg, F. Wakeman, C. Trocki, J. Richards, etc.
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period annual export from 
England to China 
in £
annual export from 
China to England 
in £
annual opium-export in 
given period from 
“British” India to China in 
£
[1840-1842] First Opium War ? ?
1842-1846 1 783 888 5 323 388 3 712 920
[1847-1853] [1 800 000] [7 000 000] [5 000 000]




4 440 402 9 886 403 9 540 211
[1863-1877] [7 640 000] [11 000 000] [10 000 000]
1878-1882 8 054 823 12 662 927 11 909 815
1883-1887 7 956 483 9 951 754 9 770 775
1888-1891 8 585 911 6 717 512 8 207 818
[1892-1900] [7 600 000] [6 000 000] [7 000 000]
These fĳigures need some explanation. Opium export to China initially 
meant that the British flag followed the British trade. The competition of 
the Dutch merchant-state in the 17th and a large part of the 18th-century 
was too strong. English opium trade existed, but remained marginal.73 
In the 19th-century the Americans and French were the main competi-
tors or enemies (Napoleonic Wars); later also the Russians. At the end of 
the 19th-century even the Japanese aggressively attacked the British hege-
mony by joining the club of “Imperialists”. However, in the end the British 
carried offf the Chinese prize, but had to leave parts of this cake to all the 
other as small change or desirable booty. 
From the last part of the 18th-century the main export from China to 
England concerned tea, but porcelain or silk were also beloved articles in 
England and other European countries. From India they were transported 
to England for a continuously increasing market. 
Apart from the EIC there were numerous private traders-smugglers in 
India, but until 1834 the EIC was the main mediator between China and 
England because it now had the monopoly on the opium production in 
Bengal (Bihar) and in fact also on the export abroad.74 It had to pay an 
73  H. Morse (1926), vol. 1, p. 306 starts his general state of receipts and disbursements 
to China in 1762 on purpose. Until 1771 there are mostly negative results.
74 Rajat Kanta Ray in P.J. Marshall (ed.), p. 522. See also an informative article on 
‘Opium and the British Indian Empire’ (2009) on the website of the Drug Policy Alliance 
Table 1. Continued 
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annual interest of around £2 million on its debt to the British state. The 
opium revenues could easily be used to this aim.75 
After a century of prohibition and under the threat of the British and 
French governments, China had to legalize opium and the opium trade in 
1858 after two wars. It hoped an eight percent tax would help solving its 
fĳinancial woes.76 But the background of this act is more important while 
showing in all shocking details what imperialism meant for these Eastern 
countries.77 
The British colonial government through the EIC started to import opi-
um into China around 1780. They had to make a sufffĳiciently extensive 
drug market so that they could compensate for their extensive purchases 
of tea, silk, porcelain and handicrafts; a nearly worthless product received 
in this way an exorbitant trade value through its upgrading as a mass 
product.78 
The table also shows that in the whole century the revenue of the opi-
um export for the state (EIC and/or British Colonial Government) was not 
less than £526 million for Bengal and Malwa opium together (for Bengal 
(DPA), www.drugpolicy.org/library/opium india.cfm and, in particular, E. Balfour, vol. 3, 
p. 28-39.
75  See table in N. Ferguson, p. 167.
76 In E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 37, Sir Robert Hart’s statistics are mentioned, among which an 
import duty, etc. is given of ‘100 taels of Chinese sycee or silver (£3 = 10 taels)’ per chest. 
This resulted in about £3,000,000 tax annually. See for Hart’s calculations also below and 
in Part 6-3. In W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1093 there is a description of how the British nego-
tiator ‘permitted’ the Chinese government not a duty of 60 taels per chest but only 30, 
‘a lower duty than England levied on Chinese silks and teas’.
77  For the following see J. Osterhammel in A. Porter (ed.), p. 147 fff. who did not analyze 
the dynamics of the British opium trade. In Wikipedia under “Opium Wars” the newest 
novel of the Indian writer Amitav Gosh, Sea of Poppies (2008), about the Bengal produc-
tion is mentioned. It describes more about British trade until 1920. An interesting blog is 
also tamala-mind.blogspot.com with a whole chronology of the opium production, trade 
and war from 1700 until 2009 in Afghanistan—Helmand were the British troops are, 
apparently, doing nothing but saving the central production area in the world today. It is 
good to mention also the earliest British protest against these activities from no one less 
than a Major-General R. Alexander (who served in Madras) with a book titled: Rise and 
Progress of British Opium Smuggling the illegality of the East India company’s monopoly of 
the drug and its injurious efffects upon India, China and the commerce of Great Britain (3e 
edition; London: Judd & Glass, 1856). Later a Royal Commission on Opium (1895) was the 
start of the prohibition of British involvement in production and trade, although this com-
mission supported opium production and use. 
78  This should be the place to investigate further how the EIC performed this job. This 
exceeds the aim of this introductory part. One has, for instance, to refer to improved culti-
vation techniques and also to the pricing policy which was intended to attract the afffluent 
Chinese merchant classes, both around 1800. Much information can be found in A. Le 
Pichon (ed.). See also below the paragraph ‘On the Chinese Side’.
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opium alone £337 million; see Appendix 1), which is nowadays compara-
ble to about £ 16,832 million! 
Recent calculations (Wakeman, Greenberg) come to substantially 
higher estimates than Crawfurd’s and a bit higher than the estimates in 
the table. Greenberg, for instance, could provide the annual opium ship-
ments from India to Canton alone and expenditures from 1800-1839. 
A few rounded offf fĳigures from his list of arrivals in Canton are: in 1800 
about 4,500 chests valued at $ 2.4 million (= at the time £ 530,000) which 
increased slowly to a annual export of 5,000 chests (value about £ 600,000) 
in 1810; in 1820 it is about 5,500 chests (value nearly £ 2 million). In the 
next decade there is a strong increase until an import of 19,000 chests val-
ued at £ 3 million; in “Crawfurd’s 1837” 35,000 chests were imported in 
Canton valued at probably £ 4 million.79 
In his magnum opus on criminality in Shanghai Wakeman talks about 
the other large Chinese center of the opium trade:
Modern Shanghai was literally built on the opium trade. Before the 1850s 
Shanghai served as the terminal port for the coastal opium trafffĳic, which 
was carried on in a semi-public way ... opened to foreign trade on November 
11, 1843 and soon afterward Jardine’s, the biggest British company operat-
ing in China set up a branch and began hiring compradors ... By 1845 ... 
Shanghai outstripped Chusan … as a center of opium trade, which rose from 
16,500 chests in 1847 to 37,000 chests in 1858, constituting nearly half of 
the total opium imported to China. By 1860, two years after the opium trade 
was legalized, Shanghai’s share of the trade came to 60 percent of the total.80
Wakeman estimates that in 1880 nearly thirteen million pounds of opi-
um was imported from India.81 The highest estimates, however, come 
79  M. Greenberg, p. 220, 221; see also C.Trocki (1999a), p. 95; J. Spence, p. 129; F. Wake-
man in J. Fairbank (ed.), 1978, p. 172. All had the same source, namely, Hosea Morse. Li 
Chien-Nung, p. 26 fff. has substantially larger fĳigures: by 1790 the import was more than 
4,000 chests a year; after 1810 this was increased to 10,000 chests; from 1820-1830 the aver-
age annual fĳigure was 16,000 chests and in 1836 it totaled more than 20,000 chests. 
80  F. Wakeman (1995), p. 34. Most of this opium was imported by Jardine, Dent, Lind-
say and Sassoon. One could also read this quotation to suggest that Chusan rose from 
16,500 to 37,000, but that would make the position of Shanghai too fantastic: it is, there-
fore, supposed that the fĳigures concern Shanghai.
81  It remains obscure whether Wakeman uses the metric or an English measurement 
for a pound: in the fĳirst case it equals 0.5 kilo and in the other 0.3 kilo: a diffference between 
3.9 million and 6.5 million kilo, or respectively about 60,000 and 100,000 chests. In my view 
the two highest fĳigures must be close to what really happened. In a famous German ency-
clopedia an Indian export is mentioned in 1886/87 of 95,839 chests of 68 kg, which is 6.5 
million kg. Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (1900), vol. V, p. 1023. Here, however, 
the destination of this export is given as only 70% for China, 20% Strait settlements and 
the rest to Cochinchina.   
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from two authorities in the late 19th-century opium business. The fĳirst is 
William H. Brereton, a ‘well-known pro-opium leader’82 at the time 
Protestant missionaries started their ambiguous opposition against opi-
um consumption and the other is Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General 
of Customs in China. From his biography one gets the impression that 
without him there would have been no British Empire in the East. This 
genius published detailed fĳigures about the consumption, import of for-
eign opium, production of Chinese opium and their value.83 Remarkably 
enough both gentlemen came to the same result: the value in 1881 of the 
foreign opium import was £16,800,000 and the native opium was worth 
£8,400,000, so that the Chinese smoked in one year the tremendous 
amount of £25.2 million. In addition, there was also smuggled opium.
If Hart’s fĳigures are used, the given total of the opium fĳigures of £526 
million must be doubled to come close to the “truth” for the foreign opium 
only and for the Canton import only! Wakeman states that in the early 
part of the 20th-century, $40 million worth of opium came into the port of 
Shanghai every year.84 The diffference can be explained by the geographi-
cal situation. 
The fĳigures in the table are derived from data published in London 
(Parliamentary Papers); the fĳigures from Hart are Chinese ones, while 
India is situated in between. This could mean that the highest and “true” 
result is gained in China, and in India a substantial part of the booty is 
“taken apart” before the rest is transmitted to the motherland.85 That this 
is still only the trade part of the whole opium picture and its exorbitant 
profĳits, and not the production side, will be discussed later. 
One thing which remains largely in the dark is the export destination 
of the Indian opium: usually only about 70 per cent went to China, the rest 
went to Southeast Asia. After about 1880 this export to China decreases 
because opium is imported from Persia and Turkey into China, while in 
this country one started to produce opium as well. The British compen-
sated this “Chinese loss” with an increase of the Southeast Asian export 
(to its colonies like Strait Settlements, Burma, etc.). 
82 K. Lodwick, p. 76, see also p. 84.
83 The calculations from Hart are given in E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 37. See further ch. 31.
84  F. Wakeman (1995), p. 35.
85  The given possible solution of the problem has an earlier example. Wakeman states 
(Idem, p. 173) that from 1830 onwards, at least £4 million yearly (of the profĳits) had to be 
carried back from India to England. 
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Furthermore, around 1900 in many Asian countries British, Dutch or 
American merchants must have taken over large parts of all trade (see the 
Philippine case in ch, 28). Research incorporating all Asian possibilities is 
not available. If it were, one might not be surprised if the fĳigure of £526 
million is tripled. 
On the Chinese Side
It is much more difffĳicult to fĳind, but the Chinese side also has its quantita-
tive data. In 1800 once again an emperor issued a proclamation forbid-
ding the import and cultivation of opium in Yunnan and elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, in 1827 the foreign imports had increased to nearly 10,000 
chests per year; ten years later to 40,000 chests; in 1856-57 the import 
was 70,000 and in 1881 it was 90,000 chests of about 65 kilo each. Per 
chest or pikul a duty had to be paid to the Chinese authorities of £10, 
which was about 30 taels.86 After about 1885 the imports fell to 50,000 
chests annually (1897) until 1905; then it dropped quickly to about 
30,000 in 1911, but always 3,000 to 5,000 chests were smuggled in.87
Was there much consumption already before 1800 along the coasts? 
Nobody knows, but the afffĳirmative answer cannot involve a Chinese 
import but a Dutch and Portuguese one or of a British smuggler from 
India. This smuggling always continued in addition to the British imports 
and was estimated at 20,000 chests annually in the 1820s. 
The Staatswörterbuch wrote in the middle of the century about China’s 
import:
Among the imported goods in particular opium should be mentioned. ... 
Before 1767 Europeans imported only 200 cases for medical treatment 
86  E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 34. This encyclopedia concluded that in the 18th-century the 
use of this drug was limited in China to medical purposes only and that its cultivation was 
limited to the province of Yunnan. Now its suggests that long before the English imported 
their opium, the Chinese were already addicts. See also D. Meyer, p. 32 fff., 61 fff. or R. 
 Newman (1989), p. 525 who reproduced the propaganda talk of the opium-merchants and/
or the British Government (including its Royal Commission of 1894) that opium was ‘an 
essential part of the lifestyle of millions of Chinese’. Also, Newman does not ask himself 
why the opium business was laden with so many moral judgments. (Notwithstanding this, 
he wrote an interesting article: see ch. 31) For similar fĳigures to those of Balfour, see V. 
Shih, p. 474 who mentions Hosea Morse as his source. J. Fenby, p. 9 writes that by the late 
1830s, already 1400 tons (= about 22,000 chests) were landed annually on the Chinese 
coasts.
87  See K. Lodwick, p. 12; R. Newman (1989), p. 525 note 1 gives an export fĳigure of 
94,835 chests in 1879-80, but this export does not need to be the same as the import in 
China.
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alone. The English import [in China] started in 1780 at a low level. Not-
withstanding its prohibition from 1800 onwards it was increased enor-
mously and all attempts of the Chinese emperors to repress the opium 
consumption, are in vain ... The opium is smuggled in armed ships; the 
Parsees and other Indian merchants sell it in India; the agents of the large 
English merchant houses in China advance them 2/3 or 3/4 of the value 
and the former transport it on [English] cost with quick ships. The profĳit of 
the houses Jardine, Matheson and Co must have been 75 million francs in 
twenty years. The import was in 1849 increased to 36,459 cases and in 1855 
to 53,321 cases, but the average price seems to be decreased since 1839 
from 966 to 657 rupees. Thanks to this depreciation is the extension of the 
poppy production in India not favored by the government any more.88
That was an ambiguous conclusion. It took some time before the Chinese 
government reacted in a relevant way to the smuggling and silver drain, 
but this cannot be a reason for the Western arrogance and brutality: the 
Chinese government had other things to do dealing with the many peas-
ant revolts everywhere in the country. 
Still, fearing the moral downfall of society, it had prohibited the sale of 
opium already in 1729 and not as thought in 1800 and in 1799 it forbade the 
import of opium for smoking purposes. There was, furthermore, an ongo-
ing debate among the Chinese mandarins over legalizing the opium trade. 
Therefore, there must have been much “understanding” (in the sense of 
‘knowledge’) of the impact of the Western opium challenge. The legaliz-
ing option was, however, always rejected, and the authorities even issued 
new prohibition laws involving the death penalty, appointed efffective 
crime-fĳighters, and tried for decades to avoid by all means the “Western” 
illicit opium trade and smuggling. 
This legalizing debate proves, anyway, that the moral question could 
be superseded. There was, however, also the economic question: the drain 
of silver to India could cause a depreciation of copper cash against silver; 
copper money was the normal payment of the land taxes. Discontent 
increased in some provinces because commodity prices were rising.89 In 
addition, the annual export of silver had increased to the alarming level of 
perhaps ten million dollars in 1839. 
At that time the Chinese wanted to ban all British trade to China in 
order to stop the import of 1,400 tons opium annually by the EIC, where-
upon the British government initiated its fĳirst Opium War incited by the 
88  J. Bluntschli (ed.), vol. 2, p. 445. At least this last remark must be wrong as the table 
shows: very big business had to come, including by and in favor of the British government! 
89  E. LeFevour, p. 6 fff.
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opium dealers. The offfĳicial Chinese crime-fĳighter, Lin Zexu (or Tse-Hsu), 
not only ordered the casting of a million kilos of opium into the sea, he 
even wrote a letter directly to Queen Victoria questioning the moral rea-
soning of this British government (1839). He asked the Queen:
Where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very 
strictly forbidden by your country; this is because the harm caused by 
opium is clearly understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your 
own country, then even less should you let it be passed on to the harm of 
other countries—how much less to China.90
The letter-writer pointed out that there was a death penalty in China on 
all dealings with opium. Whether the Queen ever replied is not recorded 
in the literature; silence reigned also about opium itself in the Treaty of 
Nanking, the result of the fĳirst Opium War. The Chinese refused to legal-
ize the drug, and the British refused to stop its production in India. Matters 
now aggravated rapidly: the ‘social disorder which had probably fĳirst 
stimulated demand increased rapidly after the war’ (LeFevour), and 
already in 1845 the trade probably put China £2,000,000 into debt.
90  Quoted by K. Lodwick, p. 27.
Ill. 5 Battle at Canton, ca. 1845 
Source: Holachina.blog, 29-3-2009. See also en-Wikipedia ‘British ships in Canton’ for 
another battle (May 1841).
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All in vain: the British, assisted by the French, started a Second Opium 
War, even conquered Peking only to demand the allowance of the opium 
trade and consumption, whereupon the emperor had to surrender and 
legalize the opium business (1858). The British poured in a tremendous 
amount of new opium as the table shows.
The usual corruption of the Chinese bureaucracy could now be 
enhanced at the same pace as the doping of the Chinese population on a 
scale that victim “China” became for the whole world the guilty opium 
country. A royal commission appointed by the British Parliament (1893) 
‘whitewashed completely’ both the opium practices current in India and 
the opium trade/ production policy of its colonial government in the rest 
of Asia.91
There was, however, another serious efffect of the opium assault on 
China: Chinese (who?) started to produce opium themselves, and this 
import substitution undermined the British (and French) trade monopo-
ly. In 1879 the British trade had increased to 5,000 tons annually. It is said 
that at the end of the century the province of Szechwan alone already pro-
duced 15,000 tons per year.92 Half a century later (1908) the emperor and 
the British government agreed ‘to steadily reduce Indian opium exports 
to China’.93 But:
Much of the impetus for ending the trade came from a new, militant form 
of Chinese nationalism. The self-strengthening movement viewed opium as 
both symbol and cause of Chinese weakness before the West.94
This happened from 1949 onwards due to the new Chinese Maoism. This 
was not the end of the England-China opium relationship, which was 
91  See also the long article on the ‘Opium Problem’ in Encyclopaedia of the Social 
 Sciences, 1949, vol. 11, p. 473. It is revealing how the highest British offfĳicial in China around 
1910, Alexander Hosie, eloquently transformed the Chinese into the “bad guys” (see ch. 30). 
As usual, this kind of report has a strong alibi character. For this, it is not even necessary to 
support the current policy directly, but to provide a so-called “balanced” result so that all 
parties involved can continue with their “business”.   
92  J. Osterhammel in: A. Porter (ed.), p. 161. See for this fĳigure ch. 31. Here a serious 
lacuna in our knowledge arises. First, there is the question of why exactly did the Chinese 
begin producing opium? Answer could be: after the devastating Taiping and other revolts, 
the country was so impoverished that planting opium made fĳinancial sense and helped 
save the late Qing economy. On the local or provincial level, some leader must have argued 
like this. There is the second, no less important question: who started this production? 
Was it Chinese production or opium production in China, started by a foreign power? 
Americans could have suggested this plan to undermine the British competition. 
93  R. K. Newman (1989).
94  DPA article, note 74, p. 7.  
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 formally connected with July 1, 1997 the date of the transfer of Hong 
Kong to China. 
At last, an efffect must be mentioned for discussion later (ch. 29), which 
seems to be the most mysterious aspect: not the English, French and oth-
er foreigners who attacked China with devastating efffects were made the 
guilty party in history books and public opinion, instead it was the 
Chinese, the victims. One example out of many from a serious American 
scholar at the end of the 1960s:
The strong identifĳication of opium with China in the public eye can prob-
ably be ascribed to the appeal of the romantic, mysterious, and esoteric. 
The Opium Wars doubtless served to focus attention on the opium habits 
of the Chinese, but it was the occultation which whetted the interest and 
invited flamboyant conjecture as to what went on in panoplied opium 
dens.95 
This is an “Umwertung Aller Werte”, or the victim became the perpetra-
tor.




In northern India opium was drunk rather than 
smoked, and judging by the frequency with which 
opium shops appear in miniatures of the period, 
opium addiction seems to have been a major problem. 
Since the Company had the monopoly on the growing 
and trade in the substance, which by the 1850s  provided 
an astonishing 40 per cent of their exports from India, 
it of course made no attempt to control the problem.
William Dalrymple1 (2009)
It may be that around 1850 India also had many opium addicts (whatever 
defĳinition is used by whom), but China was the primary target country of 
what nowadays would be called a narco-military regime. India was its 
home base and the country of production of the drug. 
It had two major production regions, the northeastern Patna and 
Benares, oriented to Calcutta, and the central Malwa, oriented to the 
western Bombay or Goa. Both already had an opium history before the 
English started colonizing the eastern regions of India from the second 
part of the 18th-century onwards. This earlier history, which shows India 
mainly as a victim realm of other Western colonizers, will be discussed in 
3.3. As a follow-on from the previous chapter, it is logical to deal now 
mainly with the 19th-century opium situation in India, the competition 
between the two production regions and the 20th-century consequences.
Chaudhuri provides a framework for such a task in rather abstract 
terms:
The consolidation of the position of opium in the eastern market was 
greatly helped by other circumstances, such as the utilization of the China 
trade as a channel of remittance from India to London, and the increasing 
stake of the Indian government in the revenue from opium.2 
The meaning of ‘utilization of the China trade’ is explained in the previ-
ous chapter, but what does a ‘consolidation of the position of opium’ 
1 W. Dalrymple, p. 102 note.
2 B. Chaudhuri, in: D. Kumar, M. Desai (ed.), p. 312.
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mean from an Indian perspective? Is this only a matter of more revenue to 
the Indian government and private interests? We shall have to look into 
the course of a whole process of production—trade/investments/trans-
port—consumption, including the long-lasting and substantial smug-
gling practices and some other “details”.3 This again concerns the rather 
brutal changes of the triangle relationship England—India—China after 
the Opium Wars. Two of the three parties involved can now be character-
ized as follows. 
The Chinese remained uninterested in English products, had a serious 
drain on their silver, lost two wars and had to accept a substantial occupa-
tion by foreign powers, corruption among many offfĳicials, a growing army 
of Chinese opium addicts and a government which remained strongly 
opposed to opium. This apart from tremendous revolts started by the 
Taiping and many other sects to which the fully undermined state was 
nearly helpless. 
The private English merchants including the EIC were, fĳirst, over-
whelmed by the very quick extension of the highly lucrative tea consump-
tion in the homeland and Europe (much less of other Chinese products). 
Earlier this had to be paid by the English state with silver bullion, which 
was difffĳicult to obtain from the Spanish colonies during the war with 
Spain and Napoleonic wars in general. In establishing a narco-military 
regime in the Far East as a very profĳitable and close collaboration between 
smugglers and the state, its own serious Indian problems could be solved 
with a very bad conscience. A not unimportant aspect was that the British 
could upgrade their status of mafĳia into legitimate merchants and their 
opium war into a “legitimate conquest”. In addition, it could occupy many 
coastal settlements, strongholds for further imperialist expansion into the 
interior of China.
The third party in the triangle cannot be characterized briefly, but the 
following section provides an outline of the Indian opium activities and 
problems in the given framework and triangle relationship. 
Monopoly Opium Production
A quantitative presentation seems to be a good start to discover the 
“Indian profĳits” during a long 19th-century. 
3 Like E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 38 and 39.
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The story of the origin of the EIC+Government monopoly at the end of 
the 18th, beginning of the 19th-century has already been sketched. How 
is the situation about a century later?4 
The EIC had already collapsed (1834), and the British (Colonial) 
Government had accepted sole responsibility. Its monopoly position was 
extended now in a typical oikoidal (state-bureaucratic) way. Around 1900 
the British Empire in Asia was in its most extensive size. It controlled 
what now is Pakistan, India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Bangladesh, Burma 
(Myanmar), Malacca and Singapore, North Borneo and Hong Kong and 
one of the International Settlements in China (including naval station 
Weihaiwei). In other words: mile after mile the total sea route of the opi-
um trade from India to China was under British military control. 
Everywhere there were naval stations and army garrisons (both in Hong 
Kong, for instance).
The production center for all or most of these countries was British 
India. Around 1915 poppy cultivation was located in 32 districts of the 
‘United Provinces of Agra and Oudh’, south of the Himalaya and Nepal (at 
present Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand). Around 1905 no fewer than 
4 E. La Motte (p. 44 fff.) provides very long quotations from descriptions of the Opium 
Department found in Statistics of British India, Financial Statistics (1920), vol. II, p. 159 fff. 
These quotations are used in the text. See for a few quantitative data of the production 
further on and in Appendix 1 below. 
Figure 2. Decennial Average Opium Revenues in India, 1798-1936 ( x 1,000 Rupees)
Source: J. Richards, 2002-2, p. 156.
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613,996 acres were under poppy cultivation. For diffferent reasons (in -
creased production in China or Turkey, international anti-opium actions, 
etc.) this acreage decreased quickly: immediately before World War I it 
was 144,561, but then it started to increase. At the end of the war, it had 
doubled again.
This whole area came under the control of one Opium Agent, with 
headquarters at Ghazipur. Here was established ‘a well managed factory 
where the crude opium is manufactured into the form in which it passes 
into consumption.’5 The cultivation and the manufacture of the opium 
were under the ‘general control of the Lieutenant Governor and the Board 
of Revenue of the United Provinces, and the immediate supervision of the 
Opium Agent at Ghazipur’. Possession, transport, import and export of 
opium were regulated by rules framed under the Indian Opium Act. The 
Opium Agent granted all licenses for cultivation, in which the area to be 
cultivated is fĳixed
and the cultivator is bound to sell the whole of his production to the Opium 
Department at the rate fĳixed by Government. ... In March, April and May 
the opium is made over to the offfĳicers of the Department, and weighed and 
tested, and as soon as possible afterwards each cultivator’s accounts are 
adjusted, and the balance due is paid him. After weighment the opium is 
forwarded to the Government factory at Ghazipur, where it is manufactured 
in 3 forms—(a) opium intended for export to foreign countries, departmen-
tally known as “provision opium”—(b) opium intended for consumption in 
India and Burma, departmentally known as “excise opium” and (c) medical 
opium for export to London.6
This is followed by an instruction about the form and weight of the opium 
(balls, cakes), its packing in several kinds of the chests (mostly containing 
forty cakes). The provision opium is sold by public auction in Calcutta; it 
is the Bengal Government which has to do all the paperwork of the auc-
tions and sales month by month. At these public auctions, apparently sold 
to private buyers and the China market only, the document states about 
the situation in 1917:
5 A very detailed description of what happens in India from the poppy fĳields to the 
auctions in Calcutta is given in J. Wiselius (1886). I could not discover an English example 
of this sophistication. Jacob Adolf B. Wiselius (born in 1844) traveled in and wrote exten-
sively about the geography and economy of Southeast Asia, British India or the Philip-
pines. His comparative studies about the colonial systems in British India and the Dutch 
East-Indies are highly interesting. In 1885 he published a comparison between the prison 
and compulsory labor systems in both colonies (and added a treatise about the jute pro-
duction in Bengal). I used his comparison between the two opium regimes (1886) and his 
earlier analysis of the French in Cochinchina (1878). 
6 E. La Motte, note 4 above.
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In addition to this 4,500 chests were sold to the Government of the Strait 
Settlements, 2,200 to the Government of the Netherlands Indies, and 410 
to the Government of Hong Kong. The duty levied by Government on each 
chest may be taken to be the diffference between the average price realized 
and the average cost.7
So apart from sales to private persons there is a not insignifĳicant sale from 
government to governments. Since the end of the 19th-century, govern-
ment monopolies had existed in most Asian colonies. In every colony the 
foreign government regulated the distribution through auctions and gov-
ernment shops. In British India there were nearly 18,000 drug shops at 
the end of World War I. Apart from opium, other intoxicating drugs like 
ganja, charas, bhang, all forms of hashish, were made available. The excise 
duty only on opium consumed in India was at least £5 million a year from 
1907-1912; during the war years this decreased to about £1.6 million a 
year, but then it increased again to £3 million a year after the war. La 
Motte concluded in a remarkably American patriotic way:
A national psychology that can review these fĳigures with complacency, sat-
isfaction and pride is not akin to American psychology. A nation that can 
subjugate 300,000,000 helpless people, and then turn them into drug 
addicts—for the sake of revenue—is a nation which commits a cold-
blooded atrocity unparalleled by any atrocities committed in the rage and 
heat of war.8 
We will see later whether La Motte is sufffĳiciently informed about the 
American involvement in drugs in those years.
Another, more relevant remark concerns the role of the new imperial-
ist Japan. What is called above the “medical opium for London” was being 
manufactured into morphine by three British fĳirms (two in Edinburgh 
and one in London), ‘which morphia the Japanese are buying and smug-
gling into North China.’9 In the Appendix data are given about the British 
Indian export of opium to all kinds of destinations, among others, to 
Japan. In 1911 this export was zero, soon thereafter it is valued at £80,000. 
From then onwards a tremendous increase can be seen that parallels the 
defĳinite losses in the export to China after that date. Directly after the war 
the Indian export of opium increased to £500,000. According to La Motte, 
the Japanese ‘are ardent smugglers’, the British monopolist is their source, 
and the Indians their opium producers. 
7 Idem.
8 E. La Motte, p. 52, 53.
9 Idem, p. 46 and for the details Idem, p. 11-17.
chapter seven92
The consequences and strategic implications will be discussed in the 
Japan chapter (5.1); in the existing smuggling network the Japanese, 
indeed, are becoming the new “big players”. 
Monopoly Smuggling
Let’s go back to the beginning of this spectacular development. The in-
between nation, India, sufffered a sharp decline of its profĳits from trade in 
Indian textiles and had to rely strongly on the tea trade, opium produc-
tion and export.10 Before the Opium Wars all colonial powers had serious 
difffĳiculties with the extensive smuggling of opium, which was prohibited 
by the Chinese government. However, they had to use it and collaborated 
closely with its representatives the Jardines, Mathesons or Sassoons put-
ting all risks on the shoulders of—in our terminology—mafĳia bosses. 
After the Opium Wars the British colonial state was also transformed 
from a criminal institution into a “legitimate occupier” of foreign territo-
ry. Still all depended on the white stufff to keep the money machine, the 
EIC and the British Empire in the East going. 
This triangle relationship was the imperialist setting in which occupied 
India had to live and act as both victim and perpetrator. All elements 
mentioned can be found here, but their position within the main opium 
production country was quite diffferent. Here the British state with its col-
laborating mafĳia had to intervene in the production. Let’s fĳirst take a look 
into the Indian opium smuggling scene.
One of the most important Indian opium smugglers, Jamsetjee 
Jejeebhoy (1783-1859; below J. J.), left a detailed business correspondence 
from which his deeds and results can be derived.11 He was a Bombay-
based merchant from the beginning of the 19th-century belonging to the 
small but powerful group of Parsees merchants. Their role became impor-
tant because they acted as brokers to the British. 
These Parsees lived here long before the Portuguese physician Garcia 
de Orta from Goa observed in 1563 that
10 I. Habib, p. 340-347.
11 For the following, see the article of Asiya Sidddiqi in: Idem (ed.), p. 186-217and the 
Wikipedia article on “Sir Jamsetjee Jeejebhoy, 1ste Baronet”. For J. J.’s opium business, see 
also M. Greenberg, passim and, most importantly, the correspondence of Jardine and 
Matheson in A. Le Pichon (Ed), passim.
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there are merchants [...] in the kingdom of Cambai ... known as Esparcis. 
We Portuguese call them Jews, but they are not so. They are Gentios.12 
In fact, Parsees originated from Persia, and they mostly do have a 
Zoroastrian belief system. Landowners, ship-builders, bankers, money 
lenders were Parsees. However, it is not very strange that Parsees were 
confused with Jews, their main competitors. It was David Sassoon (1792-
1864) who was the leader of the Sephardic Jewish community in Bombay. 
Like J. J., he was heavily involved in the opium trade, a middleman 
between British textile fĳirms and merchants in the Gulf region.13 Later he 
became a major player in the triangular trade: Indian yarn and opium 
were carried to China to buy goods sold to Britain, where he obtained 
Lancashire cotton products. 
Sassoon established an offfĳice in Shanghai, and his sons and grandsons 
were among the largest opium traders to China. It is said that ‘one fĳifth of 
all opium brought into China was shipped on the Sassoon fleet’. Thanks to 
opium they became not only the wealthiest family in India, but also the 
largest real estate dealers in Shanghai. They became, of course, English 
aristocrats, married into the Rothschild family, and belonged among the 
richest people in the world. It formed an easy example for the antisemitic 
propaganda, in this case mainly the British one, of the dubious theory of 
“Jewish world dominance” (see further ch. 31). 
The Parsees built about thirty vessels from Malabar teak for the EIC in 
the last part of the 18th-century, ranging between 300 and 1000 tons, 
repaired ships of the Royal Navy and were rewarded by the British with 
tracts of land. But they were accustomed to other kinds of sea-faring busi-
ness as well. They served European agency houses, which were the main 
representatives of the Bombay government at the time. As after 1806 EIC 
servants were not permitted to trade in order to prevent corruption, the 
indigenous merchants became part and parcel of a close-knit group. 
12 Quoted in Wikipedia article ‘Parsi’. Garci de Orta played a not unimportant role in 
the early history of opium. See further ch. 10. For the Parsees see N.Randeraad (ed.), p. 
17-41. A. Le Pichon (ed.), p. 83 note 19.
13 The Sassoon family came to prominence in the second half of the 19th-century 
based on the earlier work of David Sassoon. See C.Trocki (1999a), passim; the article of 
Chiara Betta in: I. Baghdiantz McCabe et al (ed.), p. 269-287 (also interesting for the Par-
sees); the article of Jonathan Goldstein in: D. Cesarani, G. Romain (ed.), p. 271-291 with 
Zionist apologetic and several Wikipedia articles. C. Betta is also published on Internet as 
PDF, but with the warning “First draft, do not quote” which is rather odd and a good exam-
ple of abortive communication; besides that, it is rather similar to the article in I. Baghdi-
antz McCabe et al (ed.).
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Monopoly trade was nurtured, and competition among the members of 
this group was almost non-existent. Nepotism was widespread in this 
scene of ‘friends’ and ‘neighbors’ (as they called each other). It fĳitted cor-
rectly with the monopoly position of the EIC and what was called the Old 
China Trade, the heart of which was the opium business.
Things became more complicated as industrial Britain expanded, and 
this community was also shattered by what was called “free trade”. 
Bombay was flooded with new European fĳirms from the rising industrial 
cities of Liverpool and Glasgow, rather than from London. The old inter-
Asian or ‘Country trade’ almost disappeared. A victory of the “free traders” 
over the EIC led to a new assault on China of people who were looking to 
industrialize that country or to fĳind resources for the British industry. 
They also provided new motives to attack China, which made a mockery 
of something like “free” trade: it was “free” as long as the British traders 
profĳited from it.
The opium career of Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy (J. J.), with his ‘best managed 
business this side of the Cape’, started as an agent of various Parsee mer-
chants. In this function he not only made several voyages to China and 
exported cotton to Europe, he also amassed a fortune during the 
Napoleonic wars. On one of his trips his ship was captured by a French 
warship in the Indian Ocean, and on that occasion J. J. made the acquain-
tance of the young William Jardine. It was the beginning of his opium 
career: J. J. became the principal collaborator of Jardine-Matheson in 
Bombay from 1822 onwards. In the 1830s J. J. transacted more than £1 mil-
lion worth of business annually and remitted to London through China 
about £150,000 each year.14 Like all famous opium smugglers J. J. was 
nominated ‘Sir’ and ‘Baronet’; his son became automatically the 2nd 
Baronet, etc. 
For the Parsee, Jewish, etc. merchants, the 19th-century was a golden 
period, but the risks taken were substantial as well. When the trade with 
China was interrupted by the First Opium War, several Parsees of Bombay 
committed suicide.15 
14 In the Wikipedia article (note 200) opium is mentioned in passing; it is suggested 
that he earned his money with the trade in bottles. It is also remarkable that a whole para-
graph is devoted to his philanthropy, with the remark that Sir J. J. spent in total £230,000 
to this aim in his whole life, which is about the amount he remitted in two years to his 
accounts in London.
15 A. Guha, p. 1933.
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They were later described as typical compradors, close supporters and 
business partners of the foreign occupiers. That was not the most sympa-
thetic position in the eyes of indigenous nationalists. In this very spectac-
ular 19th-century, however, this bond led to other trouble:
Alongside increasing risks in the opium smuggling business due to a hostile 
Chinese Government, the Parsi opium traders became increasingly depen-
dent on a single monopolistic European Agency House of China, Jardine 
Matheson and Co. Together with Remington Crawford and Co and J. J. and 
Sons as partners, it had ... formed the Malwa Opium Syndicate to control 
the market.16
What J. J. earned is given above, and the Jardines, Mathesons, etc. had a 
much larger profĳit, but the smaller traders found themselves cornered, at 
least during the years of the Syndicate’s existence. The following table 
provides the relative value of the opium trade over other items over two 
years.
Table 2. India’s Foreign Trade in select items by Value, 1849 -1850 in £17
1849 1850
Exports
Opium 5 772 526 5 973 395
Raw Cotton 1 775 309 2 201 178
Imports
Cotton Twist and Yarn 909 016 1 131 586
Cotton Cloth 2 222 089 3 371 618
A Western Competitor
The British were not the only Western colonizers left in India after the 
French were defeated. From the beginning of the 16th-century, the 
Portuguese and Spaniards were the only representatives of that fabulous 
Western civilization, who came to plunder and convert the Eastern pagan 
barbarians. The former are the most important characters in our story.
These Portuguese were fĳirst driven out of West India and Ceylon 
(Sri Lanka) by the Dutch around 1620-1665 and later out of East India 
by the Dutch, French and English (see ch. 10). In Goa, south of Bombay, 




short-lived but spectacular opium region and a real competitor to the 
English opium trade.18 
The EIC, in control only of the Bengal opium production in the east 
(Patna and Benares), attempted by all means to restrict supplies of this 
opium. After 1810 when trade became a bit more “free”, the private traders 
and smugglers turned to the cheaper but slightly inferior Malwa opium to 
avoid EIC control. Here one is confronted with the monopoly practice: 
traders are defĳined as “smugglers” when they do not obey the rules of the 
English and their EIC. Chinese governments, who always prohibited opi-
um use and import, were the only ones which could rightly talk about 
smugglers: the EIC and its supporters. Anyway, three years later the EIC 
simply prohibited the export of Malwa opium through Bombay. 
The private traders promptly turned to Portuguese ports and the acquisition 
of Portuguese papers for their ships. Damão in the Gujerat was ideally 
placed, close to the Malwa production zone, and it became the centre of 
the Portuguese opium trade, handling about two-thirds of exports in the 
1820s.19 
Diu and Surat could also share in this trade, but Goa was too far south. 
The British stationed troops in Portuguese India allegedly to “protect” the 
Portuguese from French attacks; they made several offfers to buy 
Portuguese India; strong diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on 
Lisbon to prohibit the opium trade. The EIC even bought the whole 
Malwa crop: all in vain. It only resulted in a massive increase in the pro-
duction of Malwa opium! 
Everybody became increasingly nervous. The Company blocked the 
overland route between Malwa and Damão, but the opium dealers 
responded by sending the stufff north across the desert and, in the end, by 
sea to the Portuguese harbors. Then the EIC forced the Malwa exports 
through its own ports in West India, Bombay in particular, whereupon 
the Portuguese reacted by lowering tarifffs in Damão. A bitter tarifff war 
between the two cities raged in which the British even blockaded the 
Portuguese port for a while. 
The important studies of Souza reveal that by 1771 the Portuguese 
imported 800 chests of Indian opium annually.20 From 1784 to1799 this 
18 For the following I rely mainly on G. Clarence-Smith, p. 22-61, but see also the rele-
vant discussion in C. Markovits.
19 G. Clarence-Smith, p. 25.
20 See, for instance, his contribution to E. van Veen, L. Blussé (ed.), p. 357, 358. Souza, 
p. 358 states that ‘at the beginning of the nineteenth-century it is presently estimated at 
indian profits 97
export to China was increased to an annual average of 1,359 chests, while 
by 1828 it had again increased to an annual average of 2,196 chests.
The end of the game arrived in 1843 when the British seized the lower 
Indus valley and cut offf the northern route. The Portuguese responded by 
importing Turkish and Persian opium and even planned to develop a new 
production zone in its African colony, Mozambique. However, their West 
Indian opium trade withered away.
The Portuguese had, however, another iron in the opium fĳire, namely 
Macao. Around 1800 until the Opium Wars, this city, leased from the 
Chinese government, became the center not only of the opium trade into 
China but also of a conspicuous spending of the opium profĳits. Famous 
for its fashion, elegance, prostitution, luxury and gambling, Macao had a 
specifĳic attraction: in 1822 ‘there were nearly three times as many free 
non-Chinese women as men’. 
After the Opium War the competition with neighboring Hong Kong 
was too intense, but Macao could still rely on its pirates, who chased prof-
itable opium ships with their well-armed lorchas, clashing with the always 
inimical British. Its new wealth came as the Portuguese renewed their 
extensive experience as African slave traders and slave holders, and start-
ed a Chinese ‘coolie’ export to all possible destinations including the 
American Far Western gold fĳields.
In 1906 representatives of a USA opium commission (including a bish-
op) stated that much more was wrong with those Portuguese. Blaming 
the victims was a normal practice, and the ‘coolies’ sent to the USA ‘con-
taminated’ (!) that country. Portugal, however, was a special factor 
because
through the possession of her colony of Macao, on the China coast, where 
considerable quantities of crude opium were annually imported from India, 
converted into smoking opium, and shipped to United States, Canada, and 
Mexico.21
around 4,000 chests annually’. This cannot be true, since Greenberg arrived at 4,500 chests 
for the Canton import of the English in 1800 alone (see previous chapter). It would have 
been a bit too strange if the Macao-based Portuguese took up more than half of this opium 
trade, since Souza also states that ‘the Portuguese merchant fleet at Macao as a whole was 
not a force that could compete with the Companies …’ (p. 358). The importance of Macao 
is, as indicated in the main text, in providing a much more diversifĳied pattern of its trade, 
including the important coolie-trade and entertainment services. Sousa’s studies make it 
clear how necessary it is to start new research into the whole pattern of the opium trade in 
the realm, including a realistic who-is-who in this trade. 
21 Quoted by C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 632.
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Here in Macao an international meeting point of under- and upper-
world was, indeed, located, of supply and demand in slaves and drugs. 
Narco-business Revenues
All this should be seen as the meaning of ‘the consolidation of the posi-
tion of opium’ (Chaudhuri above). The English opium production in India 
and part of the Eastern trade remained a British government monopoly 
until 1920. Smuggling was attacked not only to sustain the moral hypoc-
risy, but fĳirst and foremost to uphold the monopoly prices. The following 
fĳigures demonstrate the value of the production. At its peak around 1890, 
British government opium was
one of the most valuable commodities moving in international trade. Each 
year, export opium leaving Calcutta and Bombay averaged over 90,000 
chests containing more than 5,400 metric tons. This staggering amount 
would meet the annual needs of between 13 and 14 million opium consum-
ers in China and Southeast Asia ... Each year opium revenues poured 93.5 
million rupees (9.4 million pounds sterling) into Government of India cof-
fers, approximately 16% of total offfĳicial revenues.22
Let’s now illuminate the background interests of this whole constellation 
in more detail through a short analysis of this Indian middle position in 
the triangle trade, which is characterized by a duality: both loser and win-
ner in the Western narco-business.
The following balance of trade clearly demonstrates its situation before 
the fĳirst Opium War: the export to the UK is at least 60% tea; the export to 
China is nearly all opium; the import of the UK dominates fully, while the 
Chinese import is small; the balance shows how British India depended 
on China/opium.
As stated, the British opium production was concentrated for a long 
time mainly in the government opium factories at Patna and Benares and 
then sent to Calcutta and sold by auction to merchants, who exported it 
to China until ca. 1850 largely by smuggling. After the Opium Wars, offfĳi-
cially, the opium arrived at Canton, where some bureaucrats of the 
Chinese government and Chinese merchants distributed the stufff along 
the coast and into the interior of the country. 
However, the smuggling along the coast was now offfĳicially prohibited 
by both the Chinese and the English governments. The former because 
22 DPA article, p. 2. For a much more detailed estimate see E. Balfour, p. 37 and 
J. Wiselius (1886), chapter VIII.
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Table 3. Balance of Trade of “British” India with selected countries, 1828/9 (x Rs. million)23
Country Merchandise
Export % Import % Balance  %
United Kingdom  53,7 48 34,8  65 18,9  33
China  28,4 26  7,4  14 21  37
France   6,5  6  2,9   5  3,6   6
United States   3,3  3  0,8   1  2,5   4
Total 111,29 100 53,63 100 57,66 100
tax incomes were evaded, the latter because the monopoly prices were 
negatively afffected. Therefore, the Royal Navy also chased Chinese opium 
junks and India-based opium clippers.
This concerns the so-called “provision opium” (for instance, around 
1880 already amounting to 50,000 chests). The British colonial govern-
ment always kept a changing reserve (for instance in 1878 not fewer than 
nearly 50,000 chests; three years later 22,000 chests, etc.) with which it 
could easily influence the prices. There is a third “source”, namely the 
quantity of about 4000 chests of Bengal opium, which are consumed in 
India itself (called “abkari” or “excise” opium).
The average production cost of a chest of Bengal opium (‘including 
interest on the capital and all indirect charges’) is given as 421 rupees; the 
average price realized on a chest around 1880 was 1280 rupees, and there-
fore the profĳit is rs. 859. From outside the British-occupied territory in 
India, mainly from Malwa, opium is delivered for shipment to China. The 
British Indian government levied a duty on it of rs. 700 a chest. 
During the 19th-century this kind of import became more important. 
In 1820 its value was only 1% of 53 million rupees; fĳive years later, it had 
increased to 20% of this total trade valued at 58 million rupees; and ten 
years later, opium from Malwa is 35% of all import from the interior.24 
Wiselius stresses that opium was the second most important revenue of 
the British colonial government in 1885 (£9 million) after the land rent 
(£22 million); in third place came the salt tax (£3.6 million), and this was 
already the case for 40 years.25 There was no single product that could 
compete with this.26
23 Derived from K. Chaudhuri, in: D. Kumar, M. Desai (ed.), p. 872
24 T. Kessinger in: Idem, p. 253.
25 J. Wiselius (1886), p. 191, 195.
26 It is ridiculous that the maps in the Times Historical Atlas, R. Overy (ed.), p. 258-259 
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About twenty years later it was reported about the triangle relation-
ship that 
it was Britain’s heavy adverse balance of trade with China that prevented 
bullion moving from India to England since the balance of indebtedness 
between the two latter countries was extremely unfavourable to India.27
Based on these fĳigures for the decade with the main profĳits (1870-1883), 
the gross and net revenues of the Bengal production for the British were 
calculated as the following few examples of selected years indicate:
Table 4. Opium Revenues and Expenditures of the British Colonial Government in India28
Year Gross Revenue in £ Expenditure in £ Net Revenue in £
1800 372 502  105 381 267 121
1810 935 996   96 188 839 808
1820 1 436 432  135 726 1 300 706
1830 1 341 988  319 964 1 022 024
1838 ---- ---- 1 586 445
1840 1 430 499  556 222 874 277
1850 3 795 300 1 044 952 2 750 348
1857 ---- ---- 5 918 375
1860 6 676 759   918 467 5 758 292
1871 ---- ---- 7 657 213
1875 8 556 000 2 341 000 6 215 000
1880 10 317 300 2 067 492 8 249 808
1881 10 480 000 2 028 000 8 452 000
1882 9 862 000 2 057 000 7 805 000
1883 9 499 000 2 282 000 7 217 000
One must realize that before the British colonial government (on several 
levels) started to cash its revenues, many English private entrepreneurs 
and landowners in India had already made stupendous profĳits in the 
Indian poppy production, in the fĳields and factories or through the land 
rent (poppy land). In addition, there was a substantial private opium 
trade. Wiselius tells:
As said, all opium brought to the Calcutta market is provision-opium, which 
all is exported to China except a few thousand pikuls. On average, thus, this 
export is 40-45,000 pikuls. About the same amount of Malwa-opium is 
imported into China by privates.29
do not even mention opium among the many products and on p. 190 apparently on the 
wrong location. 
27 K. Chaudhuri, in: D. Kumar, M. Desai (ed.), p. 872.
28 Included are data from J. Wiselius (1886), p. 194 and 203 note 1.
29 Idem, p. 202.
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In a proper economic assessment this should be considered as well. One 
has to realize also that production is sold to the excise department, but 
the receipts realized by the provincial governments on the sale of opium 
are not included in the table (see also Appendix 1). 
The colonial government of the whole of “their” India earned its opium 
money at the Calcutta auction, from the Malwa pass duty and the cost 
price money credited by the excise department to the opium department. 
This last re-sale increased to about £381,000 from, for instance, 1870-1880, 
but the main deals were made in the other actions. Also the average 
(=Bengal + Malwa opium) export price per chest increased sharply. In the 
decades after the Opium war, for instance, the export prices per chest of 
Bengal + Malwa opium realized at the Calcutta auctions ranged from 
£127.81 in 1874 to £139.16 in 1882 (see further Appendix 1).30
Lord Hartington, a secretary of the colonial state, declared in the House 
of Commons (16 August 1880) that the revenues of British India are much 
higher than estimated, thanks to the always increasing consumption of 
opium and because in British India itself opium is heavily taxed. 
The profĳitability of opium had several consequences. A British colonial 
commissioner, for instance, thought the land revenue of the peasants 
‘ridiculously low’ relative to the size of the opium consumption in ‘his’ 
Assam. Around the 1870s the income from the sale of opium exceeded the 
land revenue demand by as much as 40%. Therefore, peasants (in his view 
nothing but ‘rack-rent tenants’) had to cater for much more land reve-
nue.31 Cash crops like indigo and opium were typical under the British 
rule. The British generally did not force opium cultivation (except occa-
sionally), but it was made “attractive” because force was the alternative: 
opium advances were interest-free; part of the production could be sold 
to private traders at higher than the fĳixed government prices, etc.
However, the vulnerability of the poppy to fluctuations in the weather ... 
and the rigidity with which the opium advances were recovered by the 
government ... forced the cultivators into indebtedness, and it was partly 
because of this that a number of them remained tied to opium cultivation.32
The last table demonstrates the value of British India’s opium export rela-
tive to the two other major export articles, cotton and indigo.
30 According to Idem, table p. 194.
31 B. Chaudhuri, in: Idem, p. 122.
32 Idem, p. 146.
chapter seven102
Table 5. Value of Main Export Products from “British” India in selected years, 1813-1930 
(Rs. Million)33
Year Indigo Opium Cotton
1813 15,6   1,2   --
1820 11,3  12,1   5,6
1830 26,7  19,9  15,3
1850 18,4  59,7 22
1860 20,2  90,5  56,4
1870 31,8 116,9 190,8
1880 29,5 143,2 111,5
1890 30,7  92,6 165,3
1900 21,4  94,5 101,3
1910  3,3 127,6 360,5
1920  4,1  25,2 416,7
1930   ---    --- 464,1
It is only at the end of the 19th-century that the importance of opium 
export decreases, mainly because the Chinese produced their own much 
more cheaply, the Indian government agreed to stop opium exports to 
China,34 and the smuggling from Southeast Asian production regions was 
increasing every year. This last story will be told below (part 4). It will be 
shown as well that the suggestion from this last table (1930 = no opium 
export) is certainly no indication that the Opium Question was solved. 
Not in India which remained a production land although, offfĳicially, only 
for medical purposes, and certainly not for the rest of the world. 
In all those years British India exported a total number of nearly 80,000 
chests or about 5.6 million kilo of raw opium. It was delivered to countries 
where government opium monopolies existed. On top of this, about the 
same volume was smuggled to these countries.
The very active League of Nations Opium Commission used the follow-
ing prices.35 Raw opium was perceived as 70% of the value of the pre-
pared opium; prices are mostly expressed in tahil = 38-39 grams metric 
equivalent. The price per tahil of prepared opium ranged from $ 6-8 in 
Southeast Asian countries, to $ 3-3.3 in Hong Kong or about $1.5 in Macao. 
This concerns the smuggler’s price which is about 15% lower than the offfĳi-
cial monopoly price.
33 Derived from K. Chaudhuri in: Idem, p. 846. For reading this kind of statistics it is 
enough to assume that 1000 Rupees = £100.
34 D. Kumar, in: Idem, p. 919.
35 Compare Idem, vol. 1, p. 17 fff and the statistics p. 172 fff.
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Table 6. Exports of Raw Opium from “British” India to Asian Countries, 1922-1935 
(in chests)*36
Country 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1935
Straits 
Settlements
1820 3000 2400 2027 1520 1013  253
Hong Kong  150  240  210  196  147  98   24
Ceylon  60  15  35  31  24  16   4
Netherl. Indies 1800  300 1500  964  723  482  121
Siam 1650 1500 1400 1391 1044  695  174
Sarawak  55  12  144  87  65  44   11
British North 
Borneo
 60  84  36  58  43  29   7
Union of Indo 
China
1700 1355 2420 1762 1321 881  220
Totals 7285 6506 8145 6516 4887 3258  814
* 1 chest = 140 lbs = ca. 65 kg.
Since most of the known 5.6 million kilo raw opium was transported to 
Southeast Asia, an average value of $5-6 can be taken per tahil of prepared 
opium, which is $ 130-156 per kilo or $ 91-109 for raw opium. It gives a 
turnover of $509-610 million in thirteen years’ time! The smuggler’s price 
is used here, so offfĳicially—say—about $ 575-700 million were earned by 
the government monopolies in the realm.
Two remarks remain. Later on, in particular in the detailed analysis of 
the most important Dutch opium nation, a much higher turnover and 
profĳit for the same years are found. Apparently, only the tip of the iceberg 
was shown to the members of the League of Nation Opium Commission. 
Furthermore, one has to consider the enormous amounts of money that 
were extracted from all the people living in these countries, the victims of 
the opium dealers, most of the time their own governments which were 
bound to protect them from evil and exploitation. These governments 
continued until the bitter end with their business, notwithstanding their 
solemn treaties to stop deliveries and opium production. Indeed, as the 
last table shows, the Indian deliveries decreased substantially, but no one 
checked these fĳigures, nor the strongly increased smuggling practices, nor 
the imports from other countries like Turkey or Iran.
36 Commission, vol. 1, p. 176.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE INVENTION OF AN ENGLISH OPIUM PROBLEM
I am told that in your country opium smoking is for-
bidden under severe penalties ... that is because the 
harm caused by opium is clearly understood ... it would 
be better to forbid the sale of it, or better still, to forbid 
the production of it ...
Letter from Commissioner Lin Zexu (Tse-hsu) 
to Queen Victoria, 18391
Questions
From the earlier chapters it is clear how the British took over every initia-
tive in the East Asian opium business at the end of the 18th-century. In 
their “Victorian century” the British not only provoked China as well as 
India with huge smuggling operations, wars and stringent exploitation to 
swallow and to produce opium, respectively. Trocki’s argument can be 
supported to a large extent: the British Empire in the East was sustained 
mainly by its fabulous opium profĳits. 
This is illustrated well by the cover illustration of Beeching’s The 
Chinese Opium Wars: it is a design of four opium-smoking Chinese (as 
puppets, shaven bald and symmetrically seated) under a huge picture of 
Queen Victoria (1837-1901). Well, a pioneer study of Berridge and Edwards 
demonstrated convincingly that earlier than 1839 a substantial opium 
consumption existed in Britain itself among urban workers and peasants, 
as well as morphine among medical professionals and the social elite.2 In 
this respect Lin Zexu was not well informed, but he predicted the future 
in Victorian England as will be shown.
Now intriguing questions can be tabled. For instance, whether the 
same people who were brutal enough to deliberately turn the Chinese 
1 Quoted from J. Beeching, p. 75, 76 and others. There are many variations of this let-
ter; it seems as if nobody has read this letter, like me!
2 See V. Berridge, G. Edwards and I consulted the well illustrated but badly written 
website http://drugs.uta.edu/drugs.html called ‘Victorian’s Secret’. E. Kremers, G. Urdang, 
p. 92-110. 
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society into addicts during the reign of Queen Victoria and were knighted 
by her for it tried to do the same with “their own kin” in England? More 
precisely: is it obvious that, while the colonial English (and others) got 
Chinese tea for their English-Indian opium, the “English-English” got to 
swallow Chinese tea plus Indian opium? 
But the use of opium by Europeans in the East was largely forbidden: a 
white Christian civilized Britain had to be far ahead of indigenous, primi-
tive folk which was—so it was assumed—by nature willing to consume 
opium until addiction followed. Does this imply that there must have 
been people who brought the stufff to the “homeland”, who propagated its 
use, who made vast sums of money out of it, who tried to keep its excesses 
silent, who had to struggle against the related criminality or to forgive the 
sinners if they converted to the decent and prudish Victorian family life? 
From the viewpoint of the British practices in the ‘homeland’, funda-
mental questions are, of course, how discrepancies between a colony and 
England could develop and how a use accepted in England could be per-
ceived later as the worst danger for mankind?
Before answering these and related questions, a sketch must be given 
of the indigenous British opium consumption in and before the 19th-cen-
tury.
Map 2. Sources of Opium Imported in Britain in the 19th Century
Source: V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. 5.
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An English Home Market for Drugs
As described in the fĳirst part, opium and opiates, in whatever form, were 
components in many medical recipes used in Europe and the Middle East 
at least from early modern times. Before there existed a relevant profes-
sional medical infrastructure (a network of medical doctors, pharmacies, 
hospitals, pharmaceutical industry and so on), the population largely had 
to rely on its own medical knowledge and “home remedies” to cure many 
kinds of sicknesses, pains and sorrows. In most countries in Europe, this 
infrastructure did not exist at all before 1900. Even in the most developed 
part, like England or France, it appeared around 1850.3 At this time the 
fĳirst restrictive legislation is imposed as well.
In town and country, therefore, one knew the most fantastic recipes 
handed down over generations. They often were regional, while some 
families had their own private recipes. Certainly in the 18th-century they 
were mixed sometimes with “authoritative” prescriptions of famous 
quacks or university professors from elsewhere in the country or Europe. 
The confĳidence in them rose when those quacks had to cure princes, prel-
ates and aristocrats as well.
Among the hundreds of substances the British liked to swallow in 
times of pain and sorrow was opium. This mostly took the form of lauda-
num and was generally mixed with something, mainly alcohol. Pure and 
processed opium was practically unavailable, and had lethal consequenc-
es because nobody knew its potential. That was even the case with an 
uncontrolled intake of laudanum. But what was called ‘narcotic deaths’ 
appeared in the statistics only after 1863.4
During most of the 19th-century, the corner shop was the center of 
popular opium use, not the doctor’s surgery. Markets often had one stall 
for vegetables, one for meat and a third for pills. Untrained midwives, 
“doctors” or herbalists concocted their own mixtures; before 1840 hardly 
any apothecaries or pharmacists existed. Drug sellers were a motley group 
with all varieties of qualifĳications: basket makers, retailers, factory opera-
tors and the like. Their number was estimated in the 1850s to be between 
16,000 and 26,000. However, there were also people who took an examina-
tion set by the Pharmaceutical Society or who worked under the jurisdic-
tion of the Society of Apothecaries.
3 A highly relevant history of the “health-industry” in society is G. Göckenjan.
4 V. Berridge, G. Edwards, table 3 and 4 p. 275-277. I am not going to comment on this 
feature of the Opium Problem.
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Laudanum was often kept by the shopkeepers in large containers; they 
measured it in bottles large and small, dirty and clean. This happened not 
only in urban workers’ quarters but also in villages. Twenty or twenty-fĳive 
drops could be had for a penny; everyone had laudanum at home in some 
form or another. It was used as a painkiller or a sedative, remedy for 
coughs, diarrhoea and dysentery. 
In short: around 1850 opium was sold openly and quite normally to 
retailers and customers. These self-medication practices in town and 
country were based on a pre-industrial knowledge. 
The opium basic to all kinds of mixtures was only occasionally deliv-
ered from India or China. It originated mostly from Turkey and had a 
quite diffferent trade history: it was a product embedded in old (medieval) 
trade relations from the Mediterranean directly to countries in Europe. 
Even at the end of the 19th-century, Turkish opium still made up over 70 
per cent of this specifĳic English market as the following table shows.
Table 7. Sources and Quantities of England’s Opium Imports, 1827-1900 (in lbs)5
Year Turkey % India China Persia Egypt France Rest
1827 109 921 97 --- --- --- --- --- 3 219
1837 70 099 88 --- --- --- 3 768 1 118 5 618
1847 --- -- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1857 125 022 92 --- --- --- 3 014 --- 8 387
1867 258 862 95 --- --- --- --- --- 14 660
1870 275 838 74 --- 11 002 9 154 50 868 11 559 13 244
1875 381 631 71 25 861 34 182 36 606 --- --- 94 617
1880 288 764 72 --- 34 699 45 258 --- --- 31 653
1885 657 686 93 5 786 3 758 37 040 3 012 --- 2 817
1890 360 963 80 9 223 --- 30 035 3 543 33 704 13 725
1895 362 572 95 8 240 --- 3 890 --- 3 180 5 184
1900 619 292 74 96 397 3 317 36 640 --- 39 751 37 933
 
Without elaborating further on the following data, they are given to dem-
onstrate how the Turkish influence persisted also on the continent, in this 
case Germany.6
5 Derived from Idem, p. 272-273. The whole table provides the annual quantities from 
1827 up to 1900. 
 























































































































































































































































































































































The English data show that the 110,000 lbs from 1827 remained an aver-
age until about 1860. In the next decade this import nearly tripled. From 
1870 onwards the Turkish import from Smyrna and Constantinople dou-
bled again until 1900. From the other destinations the imports were neg-
ligible until the end of the 19th-century.
In previous centuries English opium had come mainly from Turkey, 
but not many reliable fĳigures are available. There is some evidence that 
opium was known by a few people in the late sixteenth-century. The 
quantities must have been very small. An apothecary, Zacharie Linton, 
had half an ounce of opium among his many drugs in 1593!7 This matched 
the situation in other European countries, as will be revealed later (ch. 10 
or 13).
The opium imports at British ports suggest that it was still not a big 
business 200 years later: Liverpool imported 120 lb in 1792, Dover 261 lb in 
1801. The bulk, however, arrived in London where a small group of “Turkey 
merchants” dominated the Levant trade from the time of Elizabeth I 
(1533-1603). This more or less monopoly trade ended in 1825, leaving the 
import of opium open to free trade. 
These merchants used drug brokers in the Mincing and Mark Lane area 
of London to conduct detailed sale negotiations. On the open market 
many drugs including opium were sold; auctions of opium took place at 
Garraway’s Cofffee House, which was the center for London drug sales. 
The large players in this business were wholesale houses like Allen & 
Hanburys and the Apothecaries’ Company. In the 1830s there were only 
three brokers specializing in drugs and spices, but 20 years later there 
were already about 30. 
Opium was just a commodity like tea, and it belonged to a general 
drugs business closely connected to the apothecaries trade. Later some 
fĳirms, like Thomas Morson and Sons Limited, became specialized in the 
pharmaceutical industry. This company did everything: wholesaling, 
manufacturing and retailing from 1821 onwards. In 1900 it abandoned this 
last activity. Morson was the fĳirst manufacturer of morphine in Britain.
Among its hundreds of drugs, the most prestigious wholesaler, the 
Apothecaries’ Company, manufactured 26 opium preparations in 1868, 
including two morphine preparations. Others were selling poppy cap-
sules at 1s. 10d for a hundred, opiate plaster, morphine acetate, several 
varieties of laudanum or syrup of white poppies, raw and powdered 
7 V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. 284 note 8.
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 opium, etc. Before the Pharmacy Act (1868) limited the sale of drugs to the 
professional pharmacists, the wholesalers’ opium stocks were available to 
any dealer. 
Some commentators claimed to diffferentiate between Turkish and 
Indian opium; the latter was deemed ‘much softer and fouler ..’. Some 
Indian opium was brought to the motherland and supported by scholars 
propagating a product of the ‘own colony ... rather … than that we should 
go to the rascally Turks’.8 The efffort was in vain, as can be seen in the 
table. The relatively strong increase of the Indian import at the end of the 
century was most likely due to the dominant position of Sassoon & Co, 
the largest dealers in Indian opium on the English market as well.9 At 
that time many expatriates arrived back in the “metropolis” with their 
accumulated wealth and conspicuous consumption, including the “real 
opium” known from the colony.
Among the category “Rest”, some opium was from English origin. 
However, the labor intensiveness of poppy cultivation and of opium col-
lection made English opium uneconomic for large-scale production. 
Turkish opium was not grown by large landowners, but by individual 
peasants chiefly in Kara Chissar and around Magnesia. It arrived at 
Smyrna by mule, often through the hands of three or four diffferent mer-
chants, which increased the price. In Smyrna the quality was checked, 
and the opium packed in hermetically sealed zinc-lined wooden cases. In 
August the shipment to Mediterranean harbors began and from there 
into other parts of Europe over land and sea. A traveler to this region in 
1850 visited the places where this so-called Opium Smyrnacum was grown 
and gave a vivid description of the situation:
Near a few small dwellings were the poppy fĳields. In the buildings cauldrons 
were walled up and vessels and stages constructed to dry the opium cakes. 
These fĳields, because of their noxious fumes, were left alone by the old 
Turkish people during the morning and after sunset. They are perceived as 
highly dangerous, reason why the peoples hide themselves in the evening 
in their dwellings ... I myself, experienced in the morning and evening how 
dizzy, depressive and uneasy one becomes if nearing too close to the poppy 
fĳields. This is not the case in daytime. If, after sunset, the humidity of the 
air increases ... a highly narcotic fume spreads, which gives inexperienced 
people headaches and unpleasant feelings within a quarter of an hour.10
8 Idem, p. 4.
9 Idem, p. 177.
10 X. Landerer, p. 293 (my translation. H.D.).
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So, the London ‘Turkey merchants’ and their clients were warned, and 
certainly the pharmacists who had to read this professional publication. 
The following table shows how extensive this Turkish trade was in Merry 
England in the 19th-century. 
The meaning of this becomes clear (?) in the following calculation. In 
1827 about 113,000 lbs opium are imported. Next is given an ‘actual home 
consumption [of opium] in 1,000 lb’ of 17,000 lb in 1827.11 The obvious 
question is: what happened to the other 96,000 lb? Exported again? It is 
11 Idem, table 2, p. 274 apart from an average consumption per person in this year of 
1.31 lb and a not very clear ‘estimated home consumption in lb. per 1,000 population’ of 
nearly 2 lb. There are many difffĳiculties with these data: there is no mention of which pop-
ulation fĳigures were used (from England + Wales + Scotland ?); in table 3 the totals nearly 
never correspond with the given breakdown; there is no defĳinition of “actual home con-
sumption” or of “estimated home consumption”. It is stated that the latter ‘is obtained by 
subtracting the amount of opium exported from that imported’ which is obvious, but why 
estimate when one has ‘actual’ fĳigures as well? And what do the six negative estimations 
mean in this defĳinition? That the export is higher than the import minus the home con-
sumption? The total population of England alone in this year is about ten million, so that 
an “actual home consumption in lb. per 1,000 population” of 1.31 leads to 13,100 and an 
‘estimated home consumption in lb. per 1,000 population’ of 1.95 leads to 19,500 lb, but 
never to 17,000.
Figure 3. Five-year averages of actual and estimated home consumption of opium 
per 1,000 population in England, 1825-1905
Source: V.Berridge, G.Edwards, p. 35.
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important to realize that the import-opium to a large degree was not the 
same as the export-opium. The latter concerned in all probability end-
products, all possible processed goods of the fledgling and quickly expand-
ing British pharmaceutical industry. Eventually, this was comparable to 
the French import in England. New research should be done to discover 
the details. 
The total population of England in 1827 was about ten million and 
therefore a supposed consumption of 1.95 per 1000 leads to 20,000 lb in 
1827. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), the most famous opium (lauda-
num) consumer at the time, drank an amount costing two pounds and ten 
shillings each week. This was a pint (0.5 liter) a day, which must have had 
some efffect on the national statistics.12
So, let’s conclude that the “opiumization” of the British people in the 
19th-century started with these very small amounts of the drugs dissolved 
into dozens of opium-related products and opiates. In the middle of the 
century, the opium import had doubled, and the English population had 
doubled as well. However, the consumption of opium had tripled, and at 
the end of the century this happened again. To discover the reasons 
behind this, the following efffects and contexts of the “opiumization” of 
the English must be considered. 
The Creation of the English Opium Problem
Let’s, fĳirst, quote Berridge and Edwards extensively, because they outlined 
the basic features of the medical source of The Opium Problem:
The medical dimension to the “problem” of opium use was more than a 
case of professional strategy. There is a danger, in stressing the theme of 
professionalization in connection with narcotics, that doctors come to be 
seen as some autonomous body, working out their designs on opium in an 
isolated way. ... For in reality the medical profession merely reflected and 
mediated the structure of the society of which it was the product. ... This 
was at its clearest in the new ideological interpretation of narcotic use 
which began to be established in the last quarter of the century ... The strict, 
militant, dogmatic medicalization of society … (Michel Foucault) found its 
expression in the nineteenth-century in the establishment of theories of 
disease afffecting a whole spectrum of conditions. Homosexuality, insanity, 
even poverty and crime were re-classifĳied in a biologically determined way. 
12 B. Hodgson, p. 59.
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Concepts of addiction ... of “inebriety” or “morphinism” ... were part of this 
process. These emphasized a distinction barely applied before between 
what was seen as “legitimate” medical use and “illegitimate” non-medical 
use ... the “disease model” of addiction arose through the establishment of 
the medical profession in society ... The “problem” of opium use found a 
major part of its origin in ... this form of ideological hegemony ... The moral 
prejudices of the profession were given the status of value-free norms.13
People who are connected somehow to this “medical complex”—apart 
from politicians and bureaucrats—include Sir Robert Christison (1797-
1882), a professor of Materia Medica at Edinburgh, who was the investiga-
tor of opium eating and advocate of the benefĳits of coca chewing; Sir 
Thomas C. Allbutt (1836-1925), Regius professor of physics at Cambridge, 
who was enthusiastic about hypodermic morphine and an addiction spe-
cialist; Dr. Francis E. Anstie (1833-1874), editor of The Practitioner and 
advocate of new and more scientifĳic remedies, including hypodermic 
morphine; Dr. John C. Browne (1819-1884), the fĳirst man to produce 
chlorodyne; Dr. Norman Kerr (1834-1899), temperance advocate and 
founder of the Society for the Study of Inebriety, who opted for the “disease 
view” of addiction.14
But The Opium Problem did not arise from the minds and outlook of 
the medical profession alone. This elite, largely with a new, educated, 
middle-class outlook (upwardly mobile), had to work in a context in 
which most people had a lack of access to medical care, of whatever qual-
ity. Therefore, long after 1850, in the most direct way ‘opium itself was the 
“opiate of the people” [including] in some areas, a positive hostility to 
professional medical treatment ... in the popular culture of the time.’15 In 
some regions, like the poverty-stricken and rheumy Fens, this popular 
opium consumption was much more extensive than elsewhere and, gen-
erally, in proletarian city quarters much more than in the country.16 
A related development, as indicated in the quotation, concerned the 
gradual transformation of some shopkeepers into specialized druggists 
and pharmacists. This process began with the establishment of the 
Pharmaceutical Society (1841) and continued with many activities in the 
following years to achieve a monopoly of practice for its own members.17 
13 Idem, p. xxix, xxx.
14 See Idem, pictures after p. 178.  
15 Idem, p. 37.
16 See the dramatic description of a Fens district town in B. Hodgson, p. 48 fff.
17 E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 99 fff. Still it took the Pharmacy Act of 1933 before member-
ship of the Pharmaceutical Society was compulsory. Therefore: ‘Each registered pharma-
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In the end the British government became worried and established a 
Select Committee on the Sale of Poisons (1857). Next came the Pharmacy 
cist conducting an establishment for the dispensing of drugs is authorized to dispense 
poisons also.’ Even: ‘Inspectors, who must be registered pharmacists, are appointed by the 
Society.’ (Idem, p. 100). Like other medical professions it became its own judge! One dared 
to call this new law ‘the Magna Charta of British pharmacy’ of a ‘self-governing commu-
nity’ (Idem.). The American lexicon spiced this by making the comparison with ‘the prin-
ciple employed by England in relation to her colonies ...’ 
Ill. 6. The Pharmacist’s Competition, ca. 1866
Source: V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. 128. This praise for Freeman’s chlorodyne was adver-
tised at the cost of the dangerous chlorodyne made by Dr. Collis Brown.
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Act (1868), which established a system of registration and examinations 
basic to this pharmacist monopoly. It also achieved to a large extent a 
monopoly on prescription and the restriction of the availability of drugs 
and poisons, including opium and opiates, to specifĳic shops and purses. 
However, the government was well aware that overly stringent restric-
tions on opium sales ‘would only create an illicit market’.18 Now, opium, 
along with 22 other drugs, was to be kept under lock and key. It could only 
be sold to adults, in the presence of a witness or on production of an offfĳi-
cial certifĳicate. This had to be signed by a clergyman or other authority. 
The sociologically new aspect was the cooperation for the fĳirst time by 
diffferent factions of the English elite—the political, religious and eco-
nomic one—in a concerted action against the lower classes.
The given awareness of an “illicit” market and the whole theater of 
authoritative or religiously legitimated allowances was a reproduction of 
the shopkeeper’s self-interest and the state’s or patriarchal elite’s willing-
ness to intervene in the lives of the citizens of the lower classes. But, in the 
same stroke, it created more detailed norms and values every time and, 
therefore, the sins committed when violating them, including the subse-
quent punishments. 
The third new feature of The Opium Problem was, therefore, the insti-
tutionalization and interventionism of the law-and-order state and the 
invention of a specifĳic criminality. The mood in which this occurred was 
described by a Dr. Richardson in 1892 who thought that opium smokers 
were ‘very dangerous under those circumstances [smoking. H.D.] ... they 
might rise up, and be mischievous to anyone who might perform an 
experiment upon them, however simple it might be.’ 19 For Dr. Richardson 
the alleged ‘menace’ was not only the supposed criminal act against 
another individual, but the contamination of the entire English people as 
well. 
Long before Dr. Richardson conjured up again the dangerous character 
of opium or opium poisoning, it had already become a concern of those 
involved in the mid-century public health movement. For this movement 
the image was created of opium (in whatever form) as a criminal product 
(threatening the public health). For example suicide, defĳined as a crimi-
nal act, was at the time very often committed by means of laudanum over-
dose. This product was also used to kill people of all ages (accidentally or 
18 B. Hodgson, p. 117.
19 Quoted in Idem, p. 199.
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otherwise). Berridge-Edwards provides statistics of ‘narcotic deaths’ from 
1863 onwards until 1910 caused by the intake of ‘opium’, ‘laudanum’, 
‘soothing syrups’, ‘chlorodyne’, ‘morphine’ and ‘cocaine’. The last four cat-
egories were listed from 1891-1908; they were apparently not available 
before the 1890s.20 
The result of this movement, which gained momentum at the end of 
the century, was the classifĳication of the users of these drugs as criminals, 
as deviant from the norms of established society, and of opium as a prob-
lem drug. Together with the development to defĳine the production and 
trading of opium (and its derivatives) as ‘illicit’, the public health move-
ment also created a specifĳic kind of criminal organization, now known as 
the drugs mafĳia. 
The next feature of The English Opium Problem involves the activities 
of the strongly religious anti-opium movement.21 These became impor-
tant motivators concerning the abolition of ‘evils’ in China, ranging from 
opium smoking to foot-binding.
The main organization in this fĳield was the Society for the Suppression 
of the Opium Trade (SSOT) established in 1874, which was dominated by 
Quakers. The SSOT became a typical pressure group of the Victorian age 
like the Anti-Slavery Society or the Anti-Corn Law League combining 
humanitarian and commercial motives. The humanitarian one hinted at 
the morally unacceptable opium use; the other motive at the failed trade. 
Suffferers from the latter motive, mostly representatives of the new 
industrial world, had an expectation of an enormous trade with the 400 
million Chinese population. However, the expected huge profĳits that did 
indeed come went to the commercial world (including its bureaucratic 
support) which accepted and conducted the illicit imports of opium. The 
“poor Chinese” did not accept British manufactured goods but had to 
swallow the British “commercial product” opium. A formal pro-opium 
organization did not exist, but the imperial interests were powerful 
enough. Important fĳigures in the British-Chinese relations like Sir Robert 
Hart or W. Brereton (see ch. 31) wrote pro-opium pamphlets.
After 1885 the anti-opium movement and the SSOT weakened consid-
erably. The missionaries among its members tried to form their own anti-
opium movement. This was in vain: what could be seen as a major result 
of the movement, the establishment of the Royal Commission on Opium 
20 Idem, p. 275-277.
21 See for the following Idem, p. 173 -194.
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(1895), resulted in a polite whitewash of the Anglo-Indian opium govern-
ment and its business. 
The remaining anti-opium societies under the leadership of Joshua 
Rowntree could not change the unavoidable decline of the movement. 
Their support within the English population was too small; the govern-
ment, medical and entrepreneurial pro-opium policy was too strong. The 
anti-opium stand did remain represented among a section of the medical 
elite. 
Another question to be mentioned here is related to the outbursts of 
racism, xenophobia and anti-Chinese (violent) activities at the end of the 
19th-century in London or Liverpool. In the USA the many anti-Chinese 
actions in those years were much more dangerous for the Chinese victims 
and had far-reaching consequences (see ch. 28). Still, these English actions 
are remarkable enough.
In the fĳirst place, because there were hardly any Chinese in England! 
Was this racism largely a reproduction of a bad British conscience? In 1861 
in the whole country, an estimated 147 Chinese lived among twenty mil-
lion people.22 Twenty years later this was increased to 665. Again ten 
years later 302 lived here permanently, while 280 had a temporary visa. 
The settled Chinese serviced Chinese seamen; they lived more or less 
together in two narrow streets of dilapidated houses. 
Indeed, in the 1860s descriptions of opium smoking as a domestic phe-
nomenon started, of “Dark England”, of one opium den in the East End 
visited even by the Prince of Wales. Many famous authors (Dickens, Oscar 
Wilde, Conan Doyle, etc.) pictured or used opium or cocaine in the 1880s. 
The anti-opium propaganda advertised the connection to the immoral 
conduct of the British towards China and created an image of the ‘Great 
Anglo-Asiatic Opium Curse’ which ‘would somehow come home to roost’. 
Opium den jokes appeared in Punch.
Soon after this decade, the discourse took on a grim tone, like that of a 
London County Council inspector and ex-policeman who visited an opi-
um den (1904) run by
cunning and artful Chinamen’ and commented later on this ‘oriental cun-
ning and cruelty ... was hall-marked on every countenance ... until my visit 
to the Asiatic Sailors’ Home, I had always considered some of the Jewish 
inhabitants of Whitechapel to be the worst type of humanity I had ever 
seen ...23 
22 For the following see Idem, p. 195 fff.
23 Quoted in Idem, p. 199.
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The last feature of The British Opium Problem concerns its international 
efffects. It is clear that the main performers, the dealers, were certainly not 
the main authors of the opium drama, let alone the “willing audience”. 
Who pulled the main strings, let’s call them “the imperial interests”, could 
endure the pressure of what could be called “the home interests” for a 
long time. Around 1900 rather fundamental cleavages are apparent in 
both “groups”. At that time both had only a limited influence on an increase 
or decrease of the use of opium, because they never attacked the colonial 
policy or the so-called “free trade” of their governments in any relevant 
way. 
Their controversies were fought far above the heads of the citizens and 
victims in many international conferences. They were largely attended by 
Western participants, although the Japanese as new imperialists were 
also active there to deny their aggressive opium policies in the East (see 
ch. 27). The 1909 Shanghai conference organized by the US government 
was one of the most influential. When organizing the follow-up confer-
ence (The Hague, 1911), one country, the most powerful one, did not par-
ticipate and, therefore, did not subscribe to the many recommendations: 
Great Britain. It did not allow interference in its most profĳitable business 
with China. Instead, it sent an interesting series of excuses. The main ones 
were that it was busy negotiating with China bilaterally about the opium 
problem on its own terms.
In addition to this, the British Government was greatly concerned over the 
morphine and cocaine trafffĳic; for it had been shown beyond a doubt that 
immense quantities of these drugs were being smuggled into British India 
to take the place of opium, also that in China they tended to supplant the 
use of opium which the British Government had agreed that India should 
soon cease to export, and the production and use of which China on her 
part had agreed to suppress’ ... [On these considerations several other gov-
ernments were highly interested] … ‘in the manufacture of and trafffĳic in 
these drugs. They were particularly important to Germany, as one of 
the largest producers ... the Italian Government has proposed that the pro-
duction and trafffĳic in the Indian hemp drugs be included as part of the 
program ....24
What had happened, therefore, around 1900 was a serious proliferation 
of the opium problem into a general drugs problem with quite new aph-
rodisiacs. Next, the country of British production was infĳiltrated by these 
new products. They were produced again by a Western country, by one of 
24 Quoted in C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 635.
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the strongest British competitors, the leading nation in chemistry, 
Germany. The World War on Drugs could start. 
Whoever still thinks that this “war” only concerns opium and other 
drugs is mistaken. They have not yet been cpnvinced by the previous 
analysis of the tea for opium trade or of its above ground and underground 
elements. All these things concern economic practices with a strong tra-
dition within old British colonies like, for instance, Kenya with its colonial 
tea production. 
From a not very important part of the Opium Commonwealth, Kenya, 
the following message was sent, which also forms an appropriate end of 
this fĳirst historical analysis of the opium problem:
Kenya will step up lobbying for a review of the import duty charged on tea 
by Pakistan to help curb smuggling through the neighboring Afghanistan. 
... Pakistan currently charges 10 per cent import duty, alongside a 15 per 
cent sales tax and an additional 10 per cent value-added tax ... Smugglers 
charge between 15-per cent overall duty on their consignments. Only last 
month, Kenya raised the red flag over a sudden surge in Afghanistan tea 
imports with market analyst linking the trend to a syndicate in which sus-
pected billionaire terrorists in the war torn country were seeking to “hide” 
their dirty money in the wake of a US-led crackdown on opium growing.25
The World War on Drugs continues. In Kenya an invitation like: ‘Let’s 
drink chai (tea)!’ is too often the start of a solid case of corruption, a con-
clusion also drawn by a US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 
It assesses Kenya as a ‘transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin 
and hashish, as well as some Southeast Asian heroin. West African, par-
ticularly Nigerian, trafffĳickers are active behind the scenes in Nairobi ...’26 
This stufff arrives for transport to Europe and the US. Indeed, in this year 
almost 20 mt of hashish was discovered on one of those beautiful beaches 
near Mombasa, ‘one of the largest seizures ever made in Africa’. The traf-
fĳickers were caught; corrupt police inspectors remained in offfĳice, thanks 
to ‘influential politicians and government offfĳicials’; a British citizen was 
arrested for growing 150 opium poppies … an accident ... [but] … a previ-
ous year 30,000 plants were discovered ...
 
25 Article from Allan Odhiambo, Kenya seeks reduction in Pakistan tea import duty, 
in: Business Daily, December 30, 2009 (www.businessdailyafrica.com).
26 US Department of State, 1996. International ..Report, March 1997 in: http://www.
state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/index.html.
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CHAPTER NINE
A FIRST REFLECTION
As mentioned earlier, this opium history of the British Empire serves as a 
kind of model for the whole history in this study. The aim is to discover 
through a short overview the main practical features of The Opium 
Problem, helping the reader to systematize the whole study of a new and 
complicated opium history. In part 7 one can read the result of this 
attempt. The following is only a fĳirst reflection on this model.
The most general conclusion is that two contradictory developments 
were documented in this mainly 19th-century history: the fĳirst concerns 
British imperialism in Asia with its specifĳic consequences for British (and 
other) perpetrators and Chinese, Indian and other victims. The second 
development has a largely European impact, in many respects contrary to 
the Asian one. The former is the subject of this study; the other will be 
explored in several places below (ch. 10, 13 and 22). Conclusions relevant 
for the whole study are difffĳicult to make now, but how can we understand 
this fĳirst practical description of a new opium history? Astonishment is an 
obvious reaction, reflecting that of a contemporary critical supporter of 
the whole opium business, the Dutch traveler Jacob Wiselius (1886). His 
painstakingly detailed analysis of the British Indian opium culture led to 
his complaint that the budget of the British colony
has formed itself to the easily received and conspicuously flowing opium-
revenues ... the attentive traveler ... is confronted everywhere and with each 
step by the extravagant wealth of the governmental services. Thanks to the 
opium British India could establish itself in grand style and in the develop-
ment of this means to wealth it could itself perceive as a state, which not 
only consumes money, but is able to manage [the colony] so that money is 
produced as well. It leads, however, to carelessness … Notwithstanding its 
fabulous profĳits and heavy taxing ... it is not enough to compensate the 
expenses, so that the British-Indian defĳicit increases per year with three 
million pound sterling.1
1 J. Wiselius (1886), p. 204. To support this opinion, Wiselius reminds not only of the 
construction of 30 railways at the same time, highly speculative public works, etc., but also 
the 8-9 month exodus of the entire British administration to a cool mountainous environ-
ment or the conspicuous salaries of the highest offfĳicials. All made possible by opium.
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Wiselius’s economic reflection and comparison between the English and 
Dutch colonial system leads to his conclusion that if the British would 
lose the opium revenues, ‘it should be the fĳinancial destruction of the 
colony’. Reason: opium was a major part of the British budget, while this 
was not the case in the Dutch East Indies, according to Wiselius. The 
British knew this: ‘But what can we do about it—as has already been 
asked for years.’2 The only thing Wiselius wants to criticize about the 
British opium policy is the hypocrisy of announcing that the continuation 
with the opium production and trade is ‘in the interest of the Indian peas-
ant, to his advantage and happiness’. 
Backed by these ambiguous thoughts, the following reflections receive 
more than a couleur locale. 
1.
A core problem of the Opium Question seems to be the compensation of 
the British state for a “non-balanced” situation with the Chinese empire 
or, eventually, the Indian colony. To understand what is at stake here, let’s 
give a not overly simplistic example.
On local shop level it already looks like a quite remarkable problem: if 
a client wants to buy a Chinese teapot in a shop, he has to pay $ 20 in cash. 
The normal (and decent) reaction after this transaction is that he or she 
leaves the shop and goes at home to enjoy the pot. It’s a good case of sup-
ply and demand. However, the state balance theory and related practice 
at issue says something very diffferent: After paying for the teapot with the 
$20, the client tells the shopkeeper: ‘Mister, I have a problem: now that I 
have paid with these dollars, my stock of dollars at home has decreased by 
twenty, and therefore, I need compensation from you for this loss!’ Of 
course, the shopkeeper is embarrassed (“This is not my problem!”), and 
after pointing in vain to the fact that the client received a teapot in 
exchange for $20, the client starts threatening him with hell and the devil. 
The shopkeeper tries again: ‘But I do not ask you for compensation 
because my stock of teapots has been decreased by one,’ but his client 
insists on getting compensation. The shopkeeper, still polite, after asking 
which kind of compensation the client proposes: ‘You have to buy this 
white powder from me!’ He becomes really upset. Now he can only choose 
between two serious, bad alternatives: consuming the opium  himself and 
2 Idem, p. 208.
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risking becoming an addict or starting to sell this prohibited article and 
becoming a criminal.3 While both alternatives lead to a morally and eco-
nomically based fĳirm denial by the shopkeeper, the next day the client 
comes back with a gang of thugs and destroys the whole shop. This hap-
pens so often that the shopkeeper surrenders and becomes a client of his 
own client. 
This “transaction” was demonstrated by the British colonial state twice 
in China, and it concerned the triangle relationship between the deliver-
ies of tea, porcelain and silk by the Chinese which were paid through 
“India” by “London” with the silver coins used at the time, whereupon the 
English (through India) asked for compensation, and the Chinese had to 
buy opium from the British Empire ... for silver. 
2.
I have demonstrated how closely “a criminal State and illicit Capital” 
worked together in the colonies under the dictum of ‘Free Trade’. It had 
nothing to do with ‘free’ or ‘trade’, but only with a monopoly of violence. 
Niall Ferguson, as quoted above, should be more critical. Below, the major 
theme is elucidating this fundamental contradiction between the 
European capitalist and market-oriented economic development and the 
oikoidal economic development oriented to state exploitation of Western 
colonies in Asia.
Indeed, the opium history reveals that in these colonies, Western, 
strict, narco-military regimes were established, which would have been 
impossible in the home country. It concerned the cooperation between 
the English State, its military-imperial arm, imperial bureaucracy and pri-
vate entrepreneurs in the colonies. The most “spectacular” members were 
the smugglers, pirates, traders, bankers, gangsters like the Jardines, 
Mathesons, Dents, Sassoons, etc. with their collaborators in China and 
India (see further ch. 31). It is a specifĳic cooperation with a history going 
back to the 16th and 17th-centuries, when pirates did the “dirty work” in 
European waters for their English, Dutch or French governments. 
Now, this cooperation went much further: the pirates are immediately 
supported and sometimes replaced by the regular army and navy. They 
3 A third alternative is also demonstrated in China: throw the stufff away (in the sea), 
upon which the client is enraged. He cannot get the compensation asked, while the “value” 
of his product is also denied.
chapter nine124
all, including the British government representatives, were dealing 
 violently in only a few products, among which opium often made up the 
largest share. In addition, they knew perfectly well that they were per-
forming illicit and criminal acts with a product that was undermining the 
public health and society . 
The picture is more complicated: the private entrepreneurs often were 
or became the English landowners of the poppy fĳields or their representa-
tives, the English opium factory proprietors or their representatives, the 
English opium ship builders or the English opium propagandists and 
church-owners, or the English tax and duty payers and not only the 
English smugglers. 
It is even more complicated: the Jardines or Sassoons became aristo-
crats; they frequented Queen Victoria’s court with all possible pomp and 
were, therefore, sanctioned by the Queen. She was honored as the 
Empress of opium-producing colonies. This calls for new investigations 
in, for instance, the sources of the European monarchical wealth, but also 
the remarkable fact that the Western narco-military regimes in Asia were 
of a monarchical nature. Even the republicans at home (Dutch in 17th and 
18th centuries, the French at least in the 19th-century) acted as if they 
were monarchs in the Far East (see for instance ch. 14).
3.
Contradictions between West and East can be found in abundance. Take 
the Sassoons who became probably the richest family in the world, thanks 
to their extensive Asian opium empire and including their fĳinancial and 
familial cooperation with the Rothschilds. However, they also gave the 
growing anti-Semitic movement the “hard” proof that a so-called “World 
Government of Jews” existed. Nonsensical accusations but the realities 
behind them had, ultimately, far-reaching and lethal efffects for other 
Jews. They also led to the appropriate renewal of problems like “the guilt 
of the victims” or much better: ethnic cleansing, taking the relation 
between the irresponsible behavior of an elite, calling itself Jewish, and 
the large majority of people who were Jews (or labeled so by others) as a 
pretext for pogroms.4
4 My analysis of the thought of Hannah Arendt (H. Derks, 2004) is, among others, 
devoted to this problem. For reactions on the opium trade in England see J. Miskel, 
p. 189-229.
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As Dr. Richardson demonstrated in the previous chapter, this “Jewish 
racism” was immediately connected to the Chinese and Oriental “dan-
ger”. Apparently, they both triggered a xenophobic and racist movement, 
but there must have been serious diffferences between the repression of 
Jews and that of Chinese. Regarding this relationship between Jews and 
Chinese, one could suggest that in the East, Jews were among the top opi-
um dealers and Chinese, their main victims.
An influential part of the Chinese elite in Southeast Asia, however, did 
not act diffferently from those Jewish dealers (see ch. 25). And in the East 
Indies, several serious pogroms against the Chinese were organized by 
both the Dutch colonizers and later the Indonesian authorities. This puz-
zling constellation did not exist in the West, where too often both Jews 
and Chinese were the victims. In short: opium played a main role in all 
these events, and it is worth exploring these relationships in detail in the 
colonial histories. 
4.
Other contradictions between the British opium history in England and 
its colonies concerned the decision-making political systems.
Under the influence of the French Revolution and Enlightenment in 
Europe, a separation between the three powers in the state was realized, 
but—more importantly—a strong separation was achieved between reli-
gion and state and between the private economy and public (state) econ-
omy, between the civilian-bourgeois and the aristocratic-feudal 
(aristocracy and church) worlds. What is called the “Industrial Revolution” 
aggravated all these cleavages in the classical monarchic-aristocratic tra-
ditions and countries from 1750, and civilian, bourgeois governments 
called ‘democracies’ were established.5 
But “abroad”, through colonialism and imperialism, fully “new” values, 
norms and customs developed which created the new phenomenon of 
state-capitalism, which was nothing but a restoration of old practices 
(aristocratic, absolutist, monarchical, religious) in a new framework. They 
were important diffferences, notwithstanding the generally racist atti-
tudes of all colonialists as part of the legitimization of their repression and 
exploitation: these diffferences existed between Roman Catholic (Spanish, 
Portuguese and French) and Protestant (English, Dutch, USA) imperial-
5 See further H. Derks (2008).
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ism and colonialism. It should be obvious that these diffferences became 
apparent in the opium history as well. 
5.
The opium performance of the British lead to exaggerations in the histo-
riography as well. A few examples will sufffĳice. Spence showed how ‘pro-
foundly important’ opium was between 1830 and 1950 
but they do not prove that without opium there would have been no British 
Empire, or no state building and anti-Communist victories by the GMD. 
Both regimes were larger and more enduring than the juice of the poppy 
that in part sustained them.6 
Chinese historians and commentators pointed early on to diffferent con-
nections and their consequences. Huang (1935), for instance, wrote:
Few friends of China ever realized the important role the evil of narcotic 
drugs played in ruining this great nation .... opium and its allied drugs serv-
ing as a check to hold China back from developing into a modern state. In 
fact, opium has been the source of offfĳicial corruption, civil strife, famine, 
banditry, poverty, military tyranny, and other kindred social and economic 
vices which handicap China’s progress ...7 
Both provocative opinions are worth testing in the following study. To 
which extent did the British Empire depend on opium? What victory 
would Chiang Kai-shek have had without opium? And which of the evils 
listed by Huang were committed by Chinese leaders or regimes? It is cer-
tain that Huang’s verdict cannot concern China alone. It has to be related 
to India and Southeast Asia, including the Indonesian archipelago as well. 
Until recently, the opium historiography was not more complicated 
than Spence’s or Huang’s views. Full attention must be paid to the many 
contradictions. It is time to incorporate other important elements of the 
“opium argument”, for example, that the West received “a bad cigar from 
its own Asian box”, a tremendous drug problem which is a daily concern 
of governments in the USA and Europe.
And regarding the earlier periods in this history, one has to consider as 
well that the current Opium Problem is not simply the historical conse-
6 In the American Historical Review, February 2002, p. 171. GMD is an abbreviation for 
the Kwomintang of Chiang Kai-shek.
7 Quoted from Garfĳield Huang, Secretary General National Anti-Opium Association of 
China (21 October 1935) by J. Marshall, p. 19.
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quence of Western imperialism in Asia, there is a second source more or 
less independent of the former. This concerns the lively trade and cultural 
relations between the Levant and Western European countries from the 
early modern period onwards. 
6.
Arabian and older medical knowledge inspired European pharmacists, 
apothecaries, doctors, quacks or sorcerers to use opium and opiates in 
their preparations. Many medical resources, including opium-related 
products, were traded from the Middle East into Western European ports, 
from Venice and Marseille to Antwerp, London and Amsterdam. Over 
several centuries the “doctors” experimented with aristocrats and mon-
archs, who could not avoid death and pain. Nomadic healers added their 
experiences about how to cure pains and sorrows to the existing common 
knowledge among peasants and urban workers. Certainly until the mid-
18th-century, the rich enjoyed no longer life expectancy than the poor: ‘… 
it was not possible simply to purchase better health’.8 Then came a 
European century with regional and temporary diffferences in this respect. 
One assumes that the unhealthy industrialization in England did not 
improve the health in town and country. Some even talk of a deteriora-
tion; some improvements could have been negated by the unhealthy situ-
ation. Whatever the case, even at the end of the century, child mortality 
did not difffer in proportion to the family income. 
The impact of the public health movement must have been limited, 
although sewer drainage, clean water supplies and a certain professional-
ization of health offfĳicials were not unimportant. This public health ‘was 
supplied “from above “ to a public not fully cognizant of its benefĳits, and 
even against its will ... the result of paternalistic measures’.9 Only at the 
end of the century did improvements appear because this health move-
8 J. de Vries (2008), p. 190. De Vries’s fĳifth chapter, from which the quotation is derived, 
is full of opinions about the 19th-century English health situation and a search for the 
‘primary cause’ of an improvement at the very end of the century. Whatever the many 
merits of this book, De Vries has no afffĳinity to the ideological backgrounds of this public 
health movement or the theory of disease as described by Berridge-Edwards already a 
quarter of a century earlier. About the consumption of medicines in the household, not a 
word, let alone one about opium in whatever form. The household-market contradictions 
(see p. 204 fff.) and their underlying concepts remain too shallow in a book about house-
holds. See H. Derks (2008).
9 J. de Vries (2008), p. 192.
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ment ‘met with a new positive response “from below” ... a happy conjunc-
ture ..’
Based on the “opium experiences” in the English households, it seems 
obvious that after 1860, the learned defĳinitely ousted the experienced, and 
a new development started with serious consequences for the Opium 
Problem in the West. This concerned something like a permanent strug-
gle between the old “homeopathic” and the new academic medical knowl-
edge. 
De Vries still perceives of the household as a production unit. In my 
view, this is an anachronism at best, and the opium history demonstrates 
it. In the second part of the 19th-century, something new happened in 
England. As if they had to colonize a primitive world full of superstition 
and magic, the new “medical or health foreigners” in their white uniforms 
(apparently inherited from the colonial dress of the masters) acted rigor-
ously: no quarter was given to the home remedies by this new army; 
household medicalization had to be replaced by external production 
units and professional people in the pharmaceutical, chemical and medi-
cal realms. 
Their professional knowledge became a monopolized one. Their kind 
of knowledge became isolated, specialized and one-sided, without com-
prehensive relations with other external social or economic relations and 
realities. Their products were intended for a market which had fĳirst to be 
created: the households had to be stripped of any “production-unit” abili-
ties and transformed into “consumption units” fĳirst. Next phase: they had 
to become consumption units oriented only to specifĳic products and to 
swallow more of these new products every time, stimulated by the new 
distribution channels from the same professionals.
The consequences were far-reaching. I only point to the fact that the 
English consumption of that bad, immoral, sinful, unhealthy product of 
opium (in whatever form) doubled and tripled under the new market 
conditions in England. Not enough: brand new products like heroin, mor-
phine, chlorodyne, chloral, cocaine, codeine arose ... all successful prod-
ucts from the same sources. All these new products needed consumers; 
especially major consumers called “addicts”. Household opium products 
and recipes had to vanish or were criminalized; only monopoly market 
opium was available. Still, the household traditions remained alive in cor-
ners of society where they gradually became “utopianized”. 
This transformation from household medicalization (and its typical 
infrastructure and internal European opium trade) to industrialization of 
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new chemical products (and its new infrastructure) seems to be a major 
precondition for a worldwide transformation also in the opium trade, 
business and production. 
In the same period, but concerning the other side of the globe, a British 
Royal Commission (1890s) had not yet complained that the British ‘had 
fĳixed a terrible evil upon the Chinese people by the pressure put upon 
that society to accept the import of Indian opium’.10 In fact, this commis-
sion was one of the most efffective supporters of the use of opium ... in the 
East, which was a last demonstration of an invented Western tradition 
from the beginning of colonialism. This commission also showed what 
the medical profession brought to the fore in a most urgent social 
 question. Indeed, at the end of the 19th-century, the new high priests over 
life and death had occupied the subject and its discourse without much 
knowledge or experience about it or only with one-sided technical 
 methods.. 
Around 1900, a new “opium-wave” was organized in the reverse direc-
tion within the British Empire: from the East to the West. The traditional 
dealers in the Far Eastern opium markets were awake and had discovered 
new opportunities in ‘homeland’ markets. Their products started to 
appear as well on the domestic market: the War On Drugs could begin.
It should be a matter of major concern to investigate the role of the 
pharmaceutical and medical industries and professions in this war. In my 
view, they occupied a pivotal position in the transformation of an Asian 
Opium Complex organized by “the West” into a Western Opium Complex 
organized by “the East”. 
7.
The tables give an estimate of the opium profĳits of the British Empire. Is it 
possible to compare them with the revenues of other products? In this 
10 This Royal Commission on Opium ultimately produced seven volumes and 2500 
closely printed pages, examined 723 witnesses and held 70 days of public hearings in India, 
because it had to investigate the role of the British colonial government of India in the 
production and highly lucrative trade. The front of “anti-opiumists” (a majority of Chris-
tian Protestant missionaries) was well represented with many witnesses, but in the end 
the Commission struck a balance and compromised, a fact which meant that the govern-
ment won the battle. In hindsight, however, it was the beginning of the end of this rather 
shocking chapter in the imperialist history. In the offfĳicial Oxford history of the British 
Empire, it is still a subject which has to be treated in passing. That was not the case in the 
past as one of the interesting sources for opium proves, George Watt’s Dictionary of eco-
nomic products of India, vol. VI-1, p. 17-105 (ca. 1893).  
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case, there is a difffĳiculty. However spectacular these British profĳits were, 
their calculation was for several reasons greatly underestimated. First, the 
data used concern only the profĳits received through the exploitation of 
the British-Indian colony and its trade relations with China. In addition, it 
is necessary to include the opium profĳits of some other colonies and their 
trade relations, like Hong Kong, Burma or Singapore, which gathered 
immense capital through opium tax farming, etc. Next, one has to con-
sider that these revenues only concern colonial government profĳits and 
not the immense profĳits of private smugglers, bankers or shipping compa-
nies.
Still, this does not produce a realistic answer to a highly relevant ques-
tion like: how much has the West gained by exploiting the East through 
opium? This British story was copied by Dutch or French, Portuguese or 
American opium exploitation. In particular, the Dutch opium history is 
reconstructed below in some detail, so that by the end of this book we can 
come to a more realistic assessment. Future researchers have to ponder 
another problem closely connected with this one: should compensation 
be given to “The East” for their opium exploitation? If the main victims of 
crimes could be named, they can ask for some form of fĳinancial satisfac-
tion. Couldn’t they? 
8.
Finally, everywhere in Asia and elsewhere in the Third World, “indige-
nous” voices of protest were heard. One cannot forget the experiences of 
the victims of Western exploitation. Now that China, India and Brazil are 
becoming the leading nations economically, they also want to rewrite 
their histories, and this time not in an Eurocentric or American way. This 
will unavoidably lead to many very unpleasant histories surfacing about 
the colonial and imperialistic frameworks, to which also this opium his-
tory belongs. A recent study by Madhusree Mukerjee is, for instance, a 
relevant example from the Indian context.11 
It discloses how the classic British imperialist, Winston Churchill, 
while an inspiring war-leader for the British home front, was actually a 
menace for the whole British Empire. His role in the ridiculous partition 
plans in Palestine or India served only British interests, while burdening 
11 M. Mukerjee, Churchill’s Secret War. The British Empire and the Ravaging of India 
during World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2010). which I know only from a book review 
of D. Rothermund in H-Soz-u-Kult, 16-9-2010.
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those countries with a very bloody future. Furthermore, he sent two mil-
lion Indian men into battle to defend their foreign master’s interests. 
Next, Churchill deliberately did not provide any relief or help during 
the terrible famine in Bengal for mainly racist reasons. In 1943, two to 
three million people fell victim to this calamity, which could have been 
avoided.12 
This history was “forgotten”, a fate which could easily happen to the 
opium history of the Dutch, which will now be described in more detail 
than the British one. The Dutch role in the opium trade and related busi-
nesses is known to some Dutch experts or amateur historians, but not to 
foreign scholars and a broader public, including a Dutch one. That is a 
pity, because the Dutch role is historically of much greater importance 
than the British one, although the latter earned the largest profĳits from it.
12 In India itself the situation was aggravated by mismanagement of the British colo-
nial government and the speculation of Indian traders, as Amartya Sen already disclosed. 
Churchill, however, kept his substantial grain reserves for his own use, among others to 
support the British position in southern Europe at the end of World War II. See also 
D. Kumar, M. Desai (ed.), vol. 2, p. 530 fff.; I. C. Dear, M. Foot (ed.), p. 438 fff. about the Indian 
army and p. 891 about the major imperial crisis in India during the war. See Idem, p. 183-









From the main competitor of the British colonial state comes the accusa-
tion (1906): the opium problem exists
in particular thanks to the English [who] increased the opium misuse in 
China tremendously: at the moment this consists of nearly twenty million 
kilo every year, from which 3/4 is produced in China itself; in all other 
countries together only one to two million kilo is used as a luxury.1
A chutzpah: besides giving the wrong numbers, this competitor was the 
Dutch colonial government. At that time it was one of the largest distribu-
tors of opium and the largest producer of cocaine in the world! In addi-
tion, it will be suggested below that the British learned the job of doping a 
foreign population from the Dutch. 
In 1676, for instance, before the EIC, the Dutch East Indies Company 
(VOC) obtained one of its trade monopolies for raw opium, and appar-
ently it was allowed to be the fĳirst imperialist to grow poppies.2 That is 
only one item in a chain of events and decisions which I want to unravel 
in this third part. It concerns nothing less than the story of how the Opium 
Question came into the world as an Original Western Sin and not a 
Chinese, Indochinese or East Indies one, in short, not as the currently pre-
vailing, widespread image. 
As the English must have learned much from the Dutch, so the latter 
were zealous pupils of the Portuguese, eager to copy from them how to 
live, trade and be cruel in the East as an intruder. The southwestern coasts 
of India, called Malabar in the 17th-century, now known as Kerala, must 
have been the area in which their main confrontation took place.3 At that 
1 The Dutch Encyclopaedie, vol. III, p. 103.
2 In their long article in the Encyclopaedie, vol.III, p. 102-111 (ca. 1906) and another long 
article in its 1934 edition, p. 1249-1263 on the Dutch opium performance, the authors were 
inspired by George Watt’s Dictionary. They sketch the Dutch history of opium in specifĳic 
details, comment on the Royal Commission report, mention carefully the opinions of sup-
porters and attackers (regret the activities of the latter), document extensively the produc-
tion, chemical substance, trade, consumption and profĳits. See for the following also T. 
Addens; M. de Kort; E. van Luijk/ J. van Ours; J. van Ours; E. Vanvugt.
3 For the following I largely used the documents and comments gathered in one of the 
many volumes of the Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiës (RGP), no. 43 also for the history of 
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time the Dutch had already established a bridgehead in Ceylon: in 1656 
Colombo was captured from the Portuguese after a siege of seven months. 
Thus, after 150 years in a city they largely built themselves, there came an 
end to the Portuguese hegemony on the island. Colombo now became the 
Dutch base for many new operations against the Portuguese empire, the 
Estado da Índia.4 
In fact, a small part of it was the Malabar coast, attractive not only for 
its famous pepper but for many other reasons. A description from 1661 
details the beauty of its beaches and its cities like Calicut or Cochin. At the 
same time Wouter Schouten described the surroundings of Quilon as 
the coast with beautiful forests of high fruit-bearing coconut palms. Near 
the city we saw water on both sides surrounded by handsome green lands. 
In short, this land of Malabar was beautiful similar to the Earthly Paradise 
... And then he saw further on the inimical Malabarians in a village behind 
a palisade with canons ready to attack us..!5 
Later, in more peaceful times, an 18th-century traveler reminds himself 
of a Portuguese saying: ‘China is a country to earn money, Cochin a place 
to spend it.’6 
These interesting qualities of the region could be an additional reason 
why the lethal competition between the Portuguese and the Dutch lasted 
for decades before a decision was reached. For the future of the opium 
trade in East Asia, that “moment” was of the utmost importance. 
Notwithstanding their basic unfriendly relationship, there was also 
some mutual influencing and communication. It is therefore worthwhile 
to describe the situation along the Malabar coast as a decor for the “clash 
of civilizations”.7 For both parties the homeland-colony relation was 
the VOC a main source. Below I call this volume “Kerala”. For the meanings of Malabar see 
the interesting lemma ‘Malabar’ in Hobson-Jobson, p. 539-544.
4 I have to refrain from discussing the important role the Portuguese military, mer-
chants and missionaries played from 1500 onwards in West and East Africa, the Middle 
East, the Indian Ocean, etc. I only mention here the excellent overview of S. Subrahman-
yam (1993) and volumes IV and V of the General History of Africa: the contributions of J. 
Devisse in: D. Niane (ed.), p. 635-673 and of A. Salim in B. Ogot (ed.), p. 750-776. The many 
volumes on the website of A. van Wickeren are also interesting. More recently, there is the 
interesting volume by E. van Veen, L. Blussé (ed.) with contributions by Om Prakash (p. 131 
-142), George Souza (p. 342-370) and others. Highly informative are the relevant reports of 
the contemporary travelers (more than the administrative or merchants’ reports of the 
VOC) like the 17th-century bestsellers of J. H. van Linschoten (1595) or of the Dutch medi-
cal doctor W. Schouten (1676).   
5 W. Schouten, p. 192.
6 Kerala, p. xxii.
7 For general information about this relationship, see the informative website www.
colonialvoyage.com organized by A. van Wickeren.
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important, not only in a political or military respect but certainly also in 
cultural terms. 
Above I have shown how important the “health complex” was in the 
English opium situation. Is something similar to be found centuries ear-
lier as a demonstration of this homeland-colony relationship? This will 
contribute to a better understanding of who were these fĳirst Western con-
querors and colonizers of India.
Portuguese Elite versus Portuguese Folk 8 
As shown in the English example, the proliferation of opium in society 
depends on the relationships between the participants in the «health 
business». Century-long struggles were waged between the medical doc-
tors, apothecaries and pharmacists on the one side, and the folk-healers, 
who were dominant for a very long time, on the other. The latter could 
remain active because there was an overwhelming support for them not 
only among the so-called common folk, but also among the elite: the 
belief in many kinds of (semi-)magical practices, in particular in matters 
of life and death, pain and sorrow, was widespread.9 Portugal was no 
exception to this rule. 
The English example (ch. 8) talks about a revolutionary development 
in this elite-folk relationship. Around 1850 for many reasons, the “profes-
sionals” defĳinitely won the struggle in that country. This was not only a 
matter of market power leading to a monopoly position with its monopo-
ly prices, but also of the state’s defĳinition of power and of intervention.10 
For instance: some defĳinition of disease or health used by the health 
authorities had serious consequences for which kind of medicine was pre-
scribed and used or not. Consequently, also scholars unaware of the one 
interest or the other later legitimated the one position or the other. 
8 The following is largely based on T. Walker’s work about the contradictions between 
the folk-healers and the academic doctors, which perfectly fĳits with the Berridge-Edwards 
study.  
9 Interesting are the articles of Thomas Hauschild, Wolfgang Schneider and Irmgard 
Müller in the remarkable 1,600 pages work of G. Völger, K. von Weck (ed.), vol. 2, p. 618-
650.  
10 To understand this whole complexity, one could read G. Göckenjan’s chapter on 
‘Medical police’, p. 94-109 in which police as ‘Polizei’ had a much broader range of action 
as a London bobby. His book is a goldmine for the study of the new bourgeois “health-
machine” developed mainly in countries like Germany and France in the last part of the 
18th and 19th centuries. 
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Today, this is still reproduced in the regular clashes between the aca-
demic professionals in their white uniforms and the homeopathic healers 
in jeans. The heated debates mostly involve black-white dichotomies. 
Only wise or tolerant people know, for instance: ‘Postulating a sharp divi-
sion between popular and elite medicines ... fails to capture the medical 
reality of early modern Europe. Both the lay and the learned worlds shared 
medical practices and concepts ...’11 
I think, however, that the negation of those sharp divisions is largely 
wishful thinking and also a very recent phenomenon in which “chemical 
doctors” and “plant doctors” have started to cooperate. This happened 
under the influence of the Chinese health infrastructure in which acu-
puncture, a wide use of medicinal plants and traditional healing methods 
go hand-in-hand with modern technology, chemical medicines and the 
like (see ch. 31). 
In early modern Europe all health products, the good and the bad, were 
still natural products (vegetable, animal and mineral); they were all found 
in nature. They could not be produced by some technological processing. 
Those in the profession of medical doctor or healer could not handle 
those products in any other way than keeping them as they were, crush-
ing or heating them. The usual medicine was a mixture of many of these 
natural ingredients, probably supposing that if one did not work, the oth-
ers would. The swallowing of pure, single ingredients must have been an 
exception. What the Arab handbooks prescribed from the 10th-century 
onwards was soon common practice mixed up with some local variants of 
plants, minerals or animals. 
In the European Renaissance under the influence of humanism or 
Venetian trade skills, the fĳirst improvements occurred. Still, the diffferenc-
es between academic medical doctors and other healers were not so 
much related to the medicines prescribed and the related experiential 
knowledge, but to the class of the patients and of healers/doctors, their 
positive relationship to the religious and worldly authorities, their work 
environment (universities) and some specifĳic activities including the 
related knowledge. One example of the latter: anatomical experiments 
could never be done by folk healers. Because it concerned an expert activ-
ity, these experiments were immediately criticized by other learned peo-
ple in the harshest terms. Not only the ‘disgusting preoccupation of 
physicians with excrements’ and other similar vices were discussed or 
11 For this problematic see M. Lindemann, p. 11-17. See also G. Göckenjan, p. 267-305.
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their avarice (a common medieval complaint), but the new practices of 
anatomical experiments as
a form of public execution in which at one time they used to cut up con-
demned criminals, still alive and breathing, with savage tortures. Today, on 
account of reverence for the Christian religion ... the man is fĳirst killed.12 
This was written at the beginning of the sixteenth-century. Learned writ-
ers about medicines in this period explained that some medicines worked 
not just through their combination of elementary qualities ‘but through a 
special occult power inherent in their whole substance or species’.13 This 
kind of discourse was essentially common to medicine, natural philoso-
phy, astrology and magic. It concerned the standard discourse among the 
erudite humanist elite of late Quattrocento Florence. 
Cures by non-material means (prayer, incantations) were applied 
alongside treatments involving internal and external medication. And the 
stars also had a remarkable influence on human diseases. In addition, the 
limits of medicine were announced time and again, including the conten-
tion that ‘the good practitioner can do nothing and the patient dies any-
way ...’14 If detailed prescriptions are given, the symptoms of the patients 
remain very unclear, so that nobody could check the results. 
All this could refer to the specifĳic Portuguese antagonisms at a later 
stage between the folk-healers and the learned medical doctors. This 
clash occurred in the fĳirst half of the 18th-century. This is, of course, about 
two centuries after the main clash between the Portuguese and the Dutch 
along the Malabar coast. 
How the Portuguese medical profession dealt with these folk healers 
was very crude compared to the way the English professionals did much 
later. The elite perceived those healers as the ones stealing most of their 
paying patients. However, the Portuguese method to eliminate this com-
petition was of the most rigorous kind. Relations between the Holy Offfĳice, 
the Royal Court and the medical doctors created a constellation in which 
hundreds of healers were treated like infĳidels, criminals, sorcerers, here-
tics; in short as people who could be sentenced or killed under whatever 
pretext.15 
12 N. Siraisi, p. 198. See also M. Lindemann, p. 111.
13 N. Siraisi, p. 227.
14 Idem, p. 237.
15 See T. Walker’s statistics in the chapters 8 and 9. It is interesting how he could indi-
cate that in a university like Coimbra, the main crime was ‘superstition’ and in the Inqui-
sition-dominated Evora ‘pact with the Devil’ (see p. 394).
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The subtitle of Walkers’ study refers to both ‘repression’ and 
‘Enlightenment’, for some a contradictio in terms. That is not the case, as is 
demonstrated from around 1715 onwards in Portugal. Indeed, elsewhere 
in Western Europe the witch hunts were over16; these Portuguese trials 
were very late. But also in Portugal, where folk healers were an accepted 
phenomenon extending back many centuries, there was a specifĳic con-
stellation needed before the Inquisition trials started.
Here a liberally trained and “foreignized” Inquisitor-General super-
vised the Holy Offfĳice. This institute had the most dangerous defĳinition of 
power. It was primarily responsible for bringing folk healers to trial after 
torturing them nearly to death, although before this period it seldom 
obstructed the healer’s work. 
This new activity of the Inquisition was directly and indirectly support-
ed from quite diffferent sources: a king, sympathetic to certain enlighten-
ment ideas; expatriate physicians in London, Utrecht and Paris lobbied 
for it; Portuguese university-trained people, who had infĳiltrated the ranks 
of the Inquisition.17 
In short: it is a similar decision-making elite constellation to the one 
employed in England 150 years later (see ch. 8). In this perspective 
Portugal did not lag far behind. The methods used were very crude, but 
diffferent institutions with diffferent motives cooperated to arrive at the 
same aim. In Portugal, furthermore, the object of repression was not yet 
the medicine itself, its production, trade and distribution, but the person-
al infrastructure of the health industry, including its transformation into 
a more modern shape.
This Holy Offfĳice of the Inquisition, supported by the imperial adminis-
tration, exercised the policy of sending exiled convicts (degradados) to 
the colonies as a form of forced colonial emigration. Sooner or later, all 
other Western imperialists did the same. Few of these convicts returned 
to Portugal due to poor health or the expense of a homeward voyage. A 
remarkable characteristic of this emigration was the following:
… note that no mágicos were ever required to leave the Atlantic rim; none 
were sent east to the Estado da Índia. Instead, most were sent to Angola ...18 
16 In “progressive” Holland, for instance, the last period of the active witch hunts 
lasted from about 1560-1600. Still thirteen people were weighed to prove whether they 
were witches in the period 1674-1743 in the town of Oudewater. The suspicion exists that 
this concerns an ambiguous way of earning money. M. Lindemann, p. 110 writes about the 
cross-fertilization of religion and Enlightenment in “health” matters.
17 T. Walker, p. 395.
18 Idem, p. 303.
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Why this is the case is not specifĳied. Generally, the small Portuguese colo-
nies were perpetually in need of “new blood”; soldiers, laborers and 
European-born women including African slaves. The secular state sent 
convicts to its conquered lands abroad already from the 15th-century 
onwards; that the “regular state”, the Roman Catholic church, was even 
more active in this policy was certainly applauded. Magic healers may not 
have been allowed to go to Asian colonies because much more enlight-
ened people lived in the Estado da Índia.19 Probably one feared that “white 
magical Portuguese” would undermine the Portuguese idea of superiority 
in an Arab and Hindu world, much more civilized compared to black 
Angola: “failed magic” must certainly not be favorable to the authority 
which is responsible for it! 
Anyway, the aggressiveness of the Portuguese elite—enlightened or 
not—contrasted sharply with the normal, daily behavior of the peoples 
around the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean with which they tried to com-
municate and trade. And, let’s not forget, the Arab medical knowledge 
was miles ahead of the Portuguese, when the latter arrived in the realm 
around 1500 (see 1.3). 
Arab Trade in Peace
Before the Western powers started with their imperialism and colonial-
ism, Middle Eastern powers had lively commercial, cultural and political 
connections also with the west coastal countries of India with the Arabian 
Sea in the “middle”.20 Centuries-old trade relations had been developed 
along the “Arabian coasts” and the many caravan routes. The latter includ-
ed not only the famous Silk Road, but a whole network from the Middle 
East (and, therefore, the Mediterranean) into the northern Indian regions 
and commercial cities like Surat(ta) in the West and along the River 
Ganges to Bengal in the East. Along these routes opium reached even 
China, although no quantities are known, and probably only medical pro-
fessionals or healers were the customers.
In the period 1300-1500 the character of the Asian trade ‘was essentially 
peaceful’. I found a remarkable confĳirmation of this in the writings of 
Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, the Dutch Minister who played a key role 
19 This could be a conclusion from Idem, p. 78.
20 See for the following the fĳirst chapter of A. Das Gupta, p. 1-33; S. Subrahmanyam 































































































after 1815 in the reconstruction of militant Dutch colonialism and imperi-
alism. His role will be discussed later (ch. 16). In his famous Contributions 
to the Political Economy of the State (Bijdragen) he wrote:
The trade relations of the Arabs (in India called Moors), whatever their 
extension through the whole of Asia, appear to be fully peaceful and free 
of all force of weaponry. The mutual interest and the commercial advan-
tages were the basis of the good relationship between the Arabs and the 
Princes and People of India … The Portuguese, however, could get the 
upper-hand by means of their arms, took possession of the trade notwith-
standing the competition of the Arabs.21 
For two centuries, until the beginning of the fĳifteenth-century, the 
Chinese merchants with their large junks had a rather intense relation-
ship with the Malabar coast. The Arab dhouws from Egypt or Persia, how-
ever, which had always dominated had their basis mostly in Calicut, 
where they met the Chinese and then departed for the people of Cathay. 
Merchants from the northwestern trading cities like Surat or Diu partici-
pated in these routes to which also the caravan trade was connected. 
Apart from classic robberies, trade was peaceful because the diffferent 
Arabian traders did not compete among each other; to minimize risks 
they had shares in mutual ventures. Against outsiders they acted as if they 
exercised some kind of monopoly, although this concept can easily lead 
to misunderstandings. The Chinese merchants experienced the efffects of 
this as the King of Calicut treated them badly after many decades of 
peaceful trade, upon which the Chinese took revenge, sacked the city and 
disappeared from the coast. 
Das Gupta explains the Arabian trade morality as follows:
The inviolability of the trade caravans was generally recognized and plun-
dering of them censured. In the Muslim States that had been the case for a 
long time before. The unity of the gigantic Caliphate ... had established the 
freedom of trade and security of the trader so fĳirmly that they continued to 
exist even after the one large state had been divided into a number of prin-
cipalities ... As soon as a people participated in international trade it found 
itself compelled to abide honorably by the unwritten law of the inviolabil-
ity of the trader because the principle of reciprocity required it and other-
wise trade would be broken offf. And trade had become a necessity.22 
This is not quoted here to create some romantic picture of the past; “good 
old times” almost never existed. It is given because of the tremendous cul-
21 G.K. van Hogendorp, vol. X, p. 3.
22 A. Das Gupta, p. 7.
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ture shock the Western European traders brought. This in all respects: the 
Portuguese claim ‘to monopolize the spice trade called for a total exclu-
sion of Asian shipping from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.’23 That 
meant protracted war against indigenous peoples and powers. 
The Portuguese (a century before the Dutch or English and French) 
used new kinds of vessels and arms technology. They acted and were soon 
treated as invaders only, notwithstanding their diffferent factions (royal 
warriors, employees of the Estado da Índia with private business, or pri-
vate traders) with diffferent commercial and shipping interests. 
Next, whatever these diffferences, they all had monopolizing aims, 
whereupon trade was automatically transformed from a peaceful into a 
military afffair. As other Westerners came into the area, they also were 
competed against in a lethal way.
In the meantime a permanent religious war was raging in Europe, like 
the Eighty Years’ War, the Thirty Years’ War, and so on. The antagonistic 
Christian belief systems were all propagated on the Malabar coast and 
elsewhere. But the culture shock was much deeper: Westerners were 
highly arrogant, demanding real monopolies with a gun to the head of the 
indigenous rulers; they destroyed whole landscapes at will or activated 
conflicts between ethnic groups and acted repeatedly in a genocidal way 
against indigenous peoples; they did not bring much merchandise from 
the West that was useful for the East and became simply new competitors 
in the existing inter-Asian trade; they largely perceived indigenous people 
as animals or racially “undervalued”, obvious prey for fun, hunt and con-
version; and so on and so forth.24 
Many legitimating doctrines were always available in the West. For 
this kind of trading practices, there was the code of conduct known as the 
Mare Liberum (“From the Liberty of the Sea”; 1609), constructed by the 
Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius. Its rules were acknowledged by all European 
powers as a true doctrine. The reason for writing this code was highly 
symptomatic: the VOC asked this lawyer to legitimate the capture of a 
very large Portuguese ship (the Santa Catharina) in the Strait of Malacca 
in 1604, which yielded the VOC a profĳit of 3 million guilders. In fact, the 
fĳirst draft of Grotius’s code was titled De Iure Praedae, On the Right of 
23 O. Prakash, in: E. van Veen; L. Blussé (ed.), p. 132.  
24 H. van Santen, p. 208, concluded concerning the diffference between the VOC and 
its Asian competitors: ‘The companies seem to have had at their disposal far greater mari-
time and technological means for enforcing their policies than were available to their 
Asian competitors ... Violence was a necessary part of the market strategy of the VOC.’ 
Below, in ch. 13 we have to elaborate further on the subject “violence”.
Portuguese Lessons 145
Piracy!25 A mutual tolerance and cooperation, as the Arabian trading 
morality prescribed, were not envisaged: the sea is a matter of “free for all” 
and in practical terms: but for “us” only and “among us”, only for the one 
with the best warriors and guns. 
The Portuguese arrived for the fĳirst time in India in 1498, more precise-
ly in Calicut, where the ruler was friendly to foreign traders.26 Just two 
years later Cabral showed his new military strength by destroying a fleet 
from several Arabian powers and slaughtered all the people. That was 
only a testimony of cruelty, not a serious military victory. The Portuguese 
ships were far better armed and much more manoeuvrable than the 
Muslim ships, which were mostly small commercial vessels and old gal-
leys. 
The petty rulers on the Indian West coast had to accept the new 
Portuguese repression and occupation. Goa, in the middle of this coast-
line, became the seat of the Portuguese Viceroy and the headquarters of 
all operations against the African east coast (Mozambique, Mombasa), 
the Arabian peninsula and much further to the east up to Macao, the 
main Portuguese location in China. 
The Egyptian Mamaluks and their allies became the fĳiercest competi-
tors in the Arabian Sea. The Portuguese build a series of fortifĳications in 
the Persian Gulf with Hormuz as their main seat. In a time of relative 
peace, a lively trade developed from this city with the Persians, Turks, and 
other Arabian peoples and countries. The Portuguese conquered or con-
trolled main centers in this web, after which they tried to get on speaking 
terms with their former enemies, now backed by their strongholds. 
Notwithstanding this, most indigenous peoples and powers remained 
suspicious and inimical thanks to their periodic, highly cruel behavior. 
An important aspect in this trade was that the Portuguese and later the 
Dutch or English did not bring many products needed in the East, but act-
ed mainly as intermediaries between the African, Arabian and Indian 
countries and buyers of resources for an European market. A network, 
including its products, was intensifĳied which was already well known to 
the many African, Arabian, Indian or Chinese merchants. The merchant 
communities accepted this more or less, because these strong, terrifying 
Christian intruders could always be bypassed by smuggling and piracy. 
25 See a review of the newest edition of Mare Liberum (Leiden: Brill, 2009) by F. 
Jens ma in NRC- Handelsblad 12-12-2009. Today one relies on this book to legitimate, among 
others, the catch of whole fĳish populations in foreign (coastal) waters of weak countries. 
26 For this history see S. Subrahmanyam (1993); the second essay in Idem (2005), 
p. 17-45 and the excellent website of Arnold van Wickeren www.colonialvoyage.com.
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That became the daily practice branded by the European intruders as 
“illicit”, “forbidden” and “asking for serious revenge” and not perceived as 
legitimate resistance.27 Notwithstanding this, several famous trade ports 
could not withstand the new competition and declined.
On the Malabar Coast
This situation existed also on the Malabar coast from the moment Cabral 
demonstrated the strength of the Portuguese: Calicut or Cannanore 
declined, while Cochin could adjust to the new situation. In particular, 
the Zamorin in Calicut—overlord of many Malabar rulers—tried to expel 
and dislodge the Western enemy. The southern rulers from Cochin, etc. 
accepted them as a weapon against their own enemy, the Zamorin: the 
enemy of their enemy became the best friend of the newly arrived trad-
ers-warriors. 
For nearly a century the Portuguese remained in complete control, 
which they extended to the Chinese and Japanese coasts as well: in 1514 
they arrived offf China, while the fĳirst English ship came in 1626. The 
Portuguese onslaught was also responsible for transforming Islamic soci-
ety in Malabar (Kerala) or, more precisely, for drastically changing the 
mutual relations of the Islamic and dominant Hindu societies on the 
coast and further inland regions.28 
The arrival of the Portuguese was the trigger for the militarization of 
the Muslim community and a start for its emancipation from Hindu dom-
ination as well. From this fĳighting the Portuguese, and later the Dutch and 
English, benefĳited greatly: divide and rule became daily practice, with all 
the tricks available from extensive European experience. For the 
Europeans, Hinduism and its variants remained the most foreign religion, 
as revealed in the many pejorative remarks about Hindu gods, rituals and 
temples in the European voyage literature. A characterization as
27 A good example of the relation of Portuguese intruder versus “pirates” around the 
middle of the 16th-century is C. Boxer (1985).
28 For the following see S. F. Dale, whose frontier concept may be debatable, but who 
wrote an excellent study about the many efffects of the foreign (Portuguese, Dutch and 
English) assaults on the Malabar societies. See also eyewitness W. Schouten’s story 
(p. 239-249) about the arrival and cruel assault of the Portuguese on the Malabar coast.
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Islam, clear cut, individualistic, democratic, simple—Hinduism, abstruse, 
caring little for the individual, essentially undemocratic and extremely 
complicated’29 
is a present-day monotheistic generalization. Islam, represented by the 
Arab and Muslim merchants, smugglers, pirates and cities like Calicut, 
was a more direct competitor at sea, however, and an inimical monothe-
istic religion. Cabral, commander of the second Portuguese fleet, was 
instructed to remind the Zamorin of Calicut 
 that all Christian princes were obliged to fĳight against Muslims, who should 
be expelled from Calicut ... [and] that all ships of Meccan Muslims were to 
be attacked if encountered at sea.30 
Cabral was, like Vasco Da Gama, highly suspicious and full of misunder-
standings about the newly discovered societies and quickly ready to 
avenge alleged cheating in business. He and his priestly advisers were at 
fĳirst not even aware that there was no Christian society here! 
Cabral provoked a round of serious violent exchanges which he ended 
by seizing fĳive ships from Muslim merchants, murdering or burning their 
crews alive and then bombarding Calicut. When Da Gama returned in 
1502 with a huge fleet armed to the teeth, he burned a pilgrim ship bound 
for Mecca on the open sea, including all persons who came from Calicut. 
Then he approached this city to demand that the Zamorin expels the 
Muslim merchants, the foundation of the Zamorin’s wealth and prosper-
ity. The Zamorin refused, whereupon Da Gama seized another ship, 
decapitated the crew, mutilated the bodies and sent the remains to the 
Zamorin, while bombarding the city. Message: you had better deal with 
the Portuguese than with these ‘dogs of Mecca’. 
29 Quoted in K. de Schweinitz Jr., p. 57.
30 S. F. Dale, p. 38 fff. also for the following cruel story.
→
Map 3. East Asia according to Portuguese mapmakers ca. 1550
Source: J. H. van Linschoten, Itinerario, vol. 3 found by J. H. van Linschoten during his stay 
in Goa and issued anew by him with a Dutch legend: ‘Exact design of all the coasts and 
countries from China, Cochinchina, Cambodia, Siam, Malacca, Arrakan and Pegu includ-
ing all the neighboring large and small islands. Furthermore are designed all clifffs, reefs, 
sandbanks, dry places and shallow waters: everything what the old and best maps show 




This and other similar events31 were the start of a systematic attempt to 
forcibly seize control of the spice trade and initiate the European assault 
on the East. Before sailing back to Portugal, Da Gama left behind a flotilla 
guarding their factories and chasing away or attacking “inimical” vessels. 
It remained there for the rest of the century, which meant a constant state 
of war.32 The Muslims countered this blockade by gradually developing a 
system of naval guerrilla warfare to attack Portuguese ships. The 
Portuguese retaliation was always carried out in a disproportionate way, 
so that not only ships were destroyed but also mosques, villages or towns 
were burned and, if possible, the people killed. The overall militarization 
of the region resulted in local Islamic societies in which no distinction 
was made between merchants and “pirates”, in fact, resistance fĳighters 
against the intruders and Portuguese colonizers. Whatever friendly con-
nections Portugal established against Calicut and trade monopolies, the 
Zamorin they could not destroy: in 1571 the Portuguese were even kicked 
offf its coasts.
At sea the Portuguese could not stop the Muslim competition from 
Malabar33 or from Persia, Egypt or Turkey, while on the land their monop-
oly did not reach further than the cannons of their many coastal strong-
holds. Also, several Asian traders of the northwestern coast (from Surat to 
Hormuz) continued their traditional business with Middle Eastern and 
East Asian countries. Still, it is clear that the Portuguese had a hegemonic 
position over nearly the whole west coast of India from 1500 onwards. 
31 S. Subrahmanyam (2005), p. 35 fff. mentions another hair-raising event of about 1557 
in which the Portuguese destroyed everybody and everything with 8000 victims ‘the 
greater part of them useless [inútil] people’ for no other reason than the Portuguese lost 
confĳidence in some appointment and were tired of waiting. The activities of Simão de 
Andrade around 1520 in China (e.g. his hunt for young girls of Chinese well-to-do families 
to sell them as slaves) were shocking. Many times the serious cruelties and devastations 
on Ceylon are described. See for all these actions C. Boxer (1985), p. 127 fff., 87 fff. (the total 
devastation and murder of the rich commercial but largely unarmed entrepôt of Broach), 
the punitive expeditions of Ruy Freyre, etc. See also A. van Wickeren, part 10, ch. 3 and part 
12 ch. 3.
32 S. Subrahmanyam (2005), p. 46 fff.
33 S. F. Dale, p. 23 fff. about the four communities (two Hindus, two Muslim) who car-
ried out all commercial activities. The Muslim Pardesis, from Persia or Arabia, resided 
seasonally along the Malabar coast. They were specialized in the very profĳitable spice 
trade between Kerala and West Asia, participated in the trade routes from here up to Ven-
ice. The second Muslim community, the very influential Mappilas, were also prosperous 
maritime merchants but bound to the region by intermarriage with the local population. 
The Portuguese called all these Muslims the ‘evil generation [which] continues to increase 
in Malabar’. 
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This ended defĳinitively in 1663 at least for the Malabar coast, Ceylon and 
the Coromandel coast of east India.
The situation became complicated after the arrival of European com-
petitors of the Portuguese. Many times the newcomers were hailed as lib-
erators from the Portuguese plague by people who did not yet realise the 
menace posed by these northern Europeans.34 From the beginning of the 
17th-century, particularly the Dutch (not yet the English trader-warriors) 
undermined the Portuguese hegemonic regime bit by bit. Their main base 
was the Indian archipelago (later Indonesia) from which they expanded 
their trade relations to China and Japan, but also to the east coast of India 
(Coromandel, Bengal, etc.) and Ceylon. From the latter island they 
jumped to the Malabar coast (Kerala), the most southern part of west 
India. 
From the Portuguese the Dutch learned many things. They had had fre-
quent European trade relations with the Portuguese in the 16th-century.35 
In the Asian sphere they fĳirst copied the Portuguese organization of the 
trade by means of combining “passports” (cartazes) with monopolies. 
This concerns exclusive rights of trading with some product or with some 
country, location or ruler. If someone else wanted to trade at the same 
location, etc. he needed a cartaz of the monopoly holder which could be 
obtained for a certain compensation.36 The Dutch added to this proce-
dure the drawing up of a contract in which the trade conditions were 
fĳixed. This gave them a “legal” basis for their claims and for reprisals after 
the inevitable violations of these contracts by “smuggling” practices, etc. 
Also, the policy of divide and rule using the indigenous potentates was 
efffective after building up a position of strength. 
The Dutch next learned that a network of fortifĳications had to be part 
and parcel of the monopoly position in the region. And fĳinally, they cop-
ied from the Portuguese the habit of combining trade with preaching the 
Christian belief (Calvinist). A Jesuit missionary explained the situation: 
34 That happened also in the Indonesian archipelago as Georg Rumphius, p. 35, 50, 62, 
69, etc. could report in 1678. Rumphius Lant-Beschrijvinge is a remarkably detailed descrip-
tion of nearly all the settlements in the Moluccas, the spice islands, including their Portu-
guese history. The most dramatic aspect is the fate of the people of the Banda islands who 
‘welcomed the Dutch, whom they saw as their saviours from the detested Portuguese’: a 
few years later they were all eliminated by the Dutch driven by their hunger for nutmeg 
and mace! See J. Villiers, p. 749 and below. 
35 See the contribution of J. Paviot in: E. van Veen; L. Blussé (ed.), p. 24-35.
36 O. Prakash in: E. Locher-Scholten and P. Rietbergen (ed.), p. 187 fff.
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If there were no merchants searching in the East and West Indies for earthly 
treasures, who could then transport the preachers bringing the celestial 
treasures.37
What they did not learn from the Catholic Portuguese was their extensive 
cultural accommodation to the local people and cultures: intermarriage 
was normal, as was learning each other’s languages, customs, clothing, 
etc. This always remained a specifĳic characteristic of the paternalistic 
Portuguese colonization.38 The background to this is that their settlers in 
Goa, Macao, Mozambique or Brazil tended to separate themselves from 
Portugal, whereupon they decided “to go native”.
Apart from their excessive greed, the Protestants mostly remained sep-
arated from and suspicious-inimical to indigenous neighbors in the colo-
nies; their racial prejudices were quite diffferent from those of the Catholics 
(and the Portuguese ones difffered from the Spanish). Massacres remained 
a more relevant option than racial intermixture. 
The Dutch did not copy the Portuguese lessons easily: after excesses 
or—at the end of the 19th-century—a so-called “ethical movement” was 
propagated to “go native” in order to penetrate the indigenous societies 
much better and counteract all forms of nationalism more efffectively in 
the colonies. Finally, in the 19th and early 20th-century in the Dutch colo-
nies, so-called Indos were born as a result of intermarriage between main-
ly Dutch men and indigenous women. They remained the most staunch 
defenders of Dutch interests.
In the 17th-century the Calvinist Wouter Schouten described the difffer-
ences between the Portuguese and Dutch on the Malabar coast as follows:
Better than the Dutch they knew how to discipline reluctant people to work 
for them. First thanks to the Portuguese language which could be learned 
rather easily by the Indian people ... Second, there is the Portuguese image-
worship, which looks so similar to the idolatry of these pagans, as I could 
see with my own eyes. It looks like as if the latter learned many of those 
ridiculous gestures of the Portuguese and vice versa ... Third, the Portuguese 
are able to suppress the Indians quite easily by their flattery and deceitful 
37 Kerala, p. xxxvii.
38 See my article about the Mozambique colonization of the Portuguese in H. Derks 
(ed.), p. 63 fff. W. Schouten’s description of the Portuguese, p. 247, 248 full of the usual rac-
ism. He is, in particular, not a friend of women. Still, there are exceptions: Dutch mer-
chants often married indigenous women in Surat. However, they were of Armenian 
descent, foreigners to the inhabitants of Surat, and Christianized. See F. Pelsaert, p. 18 fff. 
Highly relevant are M. Meilink-Roelofsz, p. 237 fff. and M. Barend-Van Haeften, chapter 6. 
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temptations. We have not learned this, so that we have to pay the pearl 
fĳishermen much more.39 
The question is a popular theme in historical research which was, appar-
ently, dominated by a Weberian approach for a long time.40 This largely 
concerns a minor problem, however, which is not going to be discussed 
here.41 What Schouten describes points to a real diffference, but the Dutch 
lack of ability to deal with foreign societies has been largely sublimated by 
an enormous cruelty expressed against foreign people in Asia (see ch. 13). 
The normal, very Christian-Calvinist-inspired language of people like 
Schouten already indicates this clearly: indigenous people are not only 
ridiculed because they worship strange gods (‘damned gods’), they are 
often compared to animals and always treated within the most rigorous 
friend-enemy framework. Any opposition against a Dutch imperialist 
assault had to be eliminated (killed) with the help of God, who is a Dutch 
local War God always urging the elimination of enemies. If one does not 
succeed directly in this aim—the Dutch can always made mistakes—one 
has to compromise even with “brown and yellow” people, until one’s 
strength is regained. These thoughts and attitudes would have greatly 
reduced the Calvinists’ willingness and ability to proselytize.
39 W. Schouten, p. 188. Earlier (p. 179, 180) he talks about how at the Coromandel coast 
(Southeast India) he met Dutch men who were married to Portuguese mestizo women 
and “even” with Indian women still called ‘brown animals’, notwithstanding their conver-
sion to Christianity: these “deserters” never intended to go back to “patria”. Much later, in 
the 19th and 20th centuries it was not unusual in the Dutch East Indies for Dutch “whites” 
to marry indigenous women, from whom the so-called “Indo’s” descended.
40 K. Chaudhuri (1978), p. 145 fff.; S. Subrahmanyam (1993), p. 271 fff.; J. van Leur; 
J. Goody, passim.
41 I have devoted many contributions to the Weberian approach. For the latest, see my 
programmatic article (2008). The much discussed theory of the sociologist J. C. van Leur is 
uninteresting not because it is very old-fashioned (1955), because it was based on that part 
of Weber’s oeuvre which was already heavily criticized at that time, the Calvinism-Capi-
talism thesis. It is more important to note that the diffferences between a Catholic and 
(Calvinst) Protestant imperialism and colonialism is still relevant if one analyzes them by 
means of Weber’s oikos—market theory. That cannot be done here. For Van Leur see also 
F. Gaastra, p. 97, 108. For the behavior of Dutch merchants, etc. in Surat (also compared to 
the non-Calvinist Protestants, the English) see also the Van Linschoten editor H. Terpstra, 
p. 83 fff. or p. 99 (Baldeus’s advices) or the stringent power instructions from the VOC 
Directors against Surat (p. 100 fff.).
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What Did the Dutch Learn about Opium from the Portuguese? 
Opium undoubtedly belonged among the many products in the assort-
ment of the Asian and Portuguese merchants long before Dutch or other 
European ships were seen in the Indian Ocean. Barbosa (1516) states: 
The Chinese are also great navigators ... they go with all their goods to 
Malacca ... for the return voyage they ship drugs of Cambay, much afĳiam, 
which we call opium, wormwood, safffron, etc.42
The story goes that already during the fĳirst phase of the Portuguese assault 
on the Middle Eastern and West Indian coasts (Aden, Red Sea, Calicut, 
Diu, etc.), Admiral Albuquerque envisaged a commercial future. In a let-
ter to King Manuel (1-12-1513), he asks him to send a large stock of mer-
chandise. In particular, he proposes to exploit a poppy-growing culture on 
the Azores and to start growing poppies in Portugal: thanks to his own 
devastating attacks on the Middle East, the opium trade to India had 
come to an end, the price had soared eight-fold, and it was a much beloved 
article in India. Every year, he wrote, I need a shipload of opium, which is 
very important.43
I doubt whether the Portuguese started to grow poppies at home in 
order to import opium into the Middle Eastern and Indian realm. To my 
knowledge the Portuguese trade in opium played only a minor role any-
way. Around 1600 it is still so rare that is reported: ‘In 1589 and again in 
1616, opium occurs in the tarifff of duties on imported goods.’44 
This changed drastically under the influence of the Dutch and English 
success in the opium trade.45 Their low profĳile in the opium business 
before then is not strange because—notwithstanding Albuquerque’s 
opinion—‘the total consumption ... seems to have been quite small until 
about the middle of the seventeenth-century’.46 And that was exactly the 
time the lessons were learned and the Dutch pupils ousted their masters 
(around 1660; see further next chapter). Until that date the Dutch had 
traded opium under the same conditions as the Portuguese.
In the Middle East opium was apparently known from the 11th-century. 
It is, anyway, frequently mentioned in Persian literature and was intro-
42 Quoted by J. Rowntree, p. 7. Barbosa also mentions that the opium coming from 
Aden commanded a higher price than the Malwa drug from Cambay. 
43 D. Owen, p. 2; A. van Wickeren, part. 6.2. (The Trade with Malabar), p. 2.
44 J. Rowntree, p. 7.
45 See among others G. Clarence-Smith, p. 25, 26 and passim.
46 O. Prakash (1985), p. 145; see also O. Prakash in: E. van Veen; L. Blussé (ed.), p. 136. 
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duced there from a country west of Iran (Turkey, Egypt?). As in China a 
century later, in 1621 a Persian ruler, Abbas I, tried to enforce the prohibi-
tion of wine drinking and opium consumption. It can be assumed that in 
the seventeenth-century, it was not consumed only as a medicine.47 Still, 
the cultivation, consumption and export remained limited in Persia and 
elsewhere in the Middle East for the simple reason that the technique of 
large-scale production became available in Persia from India only in 1850. 
Abbas’s prohibition of opium consumption came at a time when not 
only the Dutch and English, but also the Persians challenged the 
Portuguese might and undermined the Estado da Índia. In 1622, for 
instance, the Persians conquered one Portuguese stronghold after the 
other with the assistance of six English ships, including the large fortress 
of (H)Ormuz. But it took another thirty years before the last Portuguese 
stronghold in the Persian Gulf, Mascate, surrendered to the Persians. 
Another opium relationship between the Portuguese and Dutch con-
cerns Jan Huygen van Linschoten, described at length in 1.3. He was a 
zealous pupil for many years, while serving as the Protestant Archbishop 
in Goa. He copied “top secret” nautical maps and Duarte Barbosa’s trea-
tise about amphioen, amfĳion, afyūn or related names like taryāk (later 
called opium).48 We may suppose that he also knew the writings of the 
physician and botanist Garcia de (da) Orta, who lived earlier in Goa, man-
aging a garden with many herbs to study their healing powers. De Orta 
must have been familiar with the means of treating the many kinds of 
poppies (including Papaver somniferum) as this was common knowledge 
in the Middle East from about the 11th-century. De Orta (1563) wrote, for 
instance, that he
47 Regularly, holy men lashed out at those who ‘drank ‘araq (an alcoholic spirit), took 
opium, smoked, played musical instruments, shaved their beards ...’ and so on, as was the 
case, for instance, in Aleppo. See A. Marcus, p. 221. The actual use of alcohol and opium 
‘remained relatively restricted and almost entirely hidden, due largely to powerful Muslim 
prohibitions and to limited availability. Smoking tobacco ‘mixed with intoxicating drugs 
… was widespread and open’ (Idem, p. 233).  
48 I thank Dr. Timothy Walker (University of Massachusetts)for his information on 
the Portuguese performance. In the sixtieth chapter of Linschoten’s story, Paludanus 
refers to a ‘Garcius ab Horto’ and ‘Garciae’. Linschoten lived in Goa about twenty years 
after the death of Garcia de Orta, but he used De Orta’s writings. A large part of Lin-
schoten’s chapter thirty on the Portuguese (p. 145-152) is copied by W. Schouten, p. 248 fff. 
without referring to the source. For the following see also the long and well documented 
article of S. Shahnavaz. For Garcia de (da) Orta see also J. Villiers, p. 726. See also the con-
tribution of Arie Pos about Van Linschoten’s stay in Goa in: E. van Veen; L. Blussé (ed.), 
p. 89-108. Remarkably enough, Pos posed several interesting questions, but none about 
the originality of Linschoten, nor about the opium-amphioen problem. 
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knew a Secretary of Nizamoxa, a native of Coraçon [Khurāsān], who every 
day eat three tollas, or a weight of 10½ cruzados ... though he was a well-
educated man, and a great scribe and notary, he was always dozing or sleep-
ing; yet if you put him to business, he would speak like a man of letters and 
discretion ...49
From De Orta also comes the information that opium is mixed by the rich 
not only with nutmeg, etc., but even with ambar, which is not the well-
known resin ambre jaune, but the name for the intestines of the sperm 
whale, found floating on the seas in the tropics.50 Rowntree quotes 
Barbosa and some ‘Acosta [sic], a Portuguese doctor and naturalist’, stat-
ing that around 1590 opium was not much heard of outside of medical 
recipes. At the same time the reverse is claimed: ‘Though condemned by 
reason, it is used so extensively that it is the most general and familiar 
49 Quoted by the editors in F. S. Manrique, vol. 1, p. 58 note 25.
50 Idem, p. 59 note 30.
Ill. 8. People from the Malabar Coast, ca. 1600
Source: J.H. Van Linschoten, Itinerario: ‘The Machometizes of Cananor, the mortal ene-
mies of the Portuguese; Inhabitants of Malabar between Goa and Cochin on the seaside 
there where the pepper grows.’
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remedy of degraded debauchees.’51 One may suppose that in those 
 societies the appearance of debauchees was quite exceptional. Until the 
middle of the 17th-century, indeed, the information is not representative 
enough and rather contradictory.
Van Linschoten never reports directly about De Orta’s studies, but 
writes extensively about herbs he saw during his Itinerario or copied from 
the Portuguese.52 For instance, in chapters about the herbs betel and 
dutroa or the areca nut, the addictions of Indians and Portuguese are 
described. It was copied in the seventeenth-century by many writers like 
the Portuguese priest Fray Sebastien Manrique, who traveled extensively 
in Bengal, Arakan (more or less East Bangladesh or NW Burma) and China 
in the 1630s and 1640s. With the approval of the Pope, he published his 
Itinerario about ten years later.
In Arakan he found ‘a plant called Anfĳion, resembling our hemp ... When it 
is in flower it is called Posto. From this plant and its fruit a very bitter black 
extract is obtained, called by them Anfĳion, which is largely used by Orientals 
to assist in the gratifĳication of lust and lewdness, by increasing their sexual 
power ... [then follows the information about the doses and poisonous char-
acter well known from Linschoten, De Orta and Barbosa] … This Anfĳion 
mixed with any proportion of oil is a powerful poison ... The rich, moreover, 
usually mix these drugs [M. points to post, bangue and opium] … with 
nutmeg, mace, cloves, Borneo camphor, ambar, and almiscre, all heating 
substances which act as an incentive towards the attainment of that par-
ticular end to which all their barbarous and bestial luxury is addressed ... 
For, being mere Barbarians and people ignorant of our true and sacred 
religion, they think only of pleasures of the flesh, believing that the highest 
pitch of human beatitude lies in them.53
During his visits to the Arakan public markets and shops, he is astonished 
about what is sold there in abundance. Not only all kinds of precious jew-
elry and stones, but also products from almonds to incense, vermilion to 
indigo, opium to tobacco, and so on. Among ‘drugs’ he does not subsume 
opium, but nutmeg, pepper, cinnamon, mace and cloves.54 Also on the 
51 J. Rowntree, p. 7.
52 He had many opportunities to plagiarize Portuguese writers. Not only Garcia de 
Orta, but many Portuguese botanists were active in the same period. Christobal Acosta 
(1515-1594) studied mimosa, pineapple, tamarind; Filippo Sassati (1540-1588), who was in 
Goa, came with the acacia; while Barbosa also discovered cardamom on the Malabar 
coast. They were eager to discover new plants and to merchandize them, like Vasco da 
Gama himself who discovered the quality and value of the Malabar spices.
53 F. S. Manrique, vol. 1, p. 58-60. In the extensive notes the editors often refer to Garcia 
de Orta, Linschoten or some Hobson -Jobson article.
54 Idem, vol. 1, p. 380 fff.
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main route to Bengal, he arrived at markets with many kinds of products 
like ‘cotton, cloth, silk, herbs, much opium and poppy-seed, things I have 
already fully described’.55 It is noteworthy that he did not report about 
opium in his reports on China.
Whatever Manrique’s opinion about “barbarian lust”, his religious ene-
my, the Calvinist Schouten, gave the following impression of the life and 
times of the fĳirst Portuguese colonizers on the West coasts of India in the 
same period. Their ‘very promiscuous’ women are always accompanied in 
public by their slaves:
the slaves for bearing their palanquins or parasols, the women slaves for 
carrying some prayer book [and boxes] with betel, areca nuts and the like. 
There is no man who may talk to another’s husband or daughter without 
serious trouble, but some women are so tricky ... to play a wonderful theater. 
They give their husband fĳirst the juice of the sleeping herb dutroa. When 
he sleeps sound, she spend a good time with her lover. ... Women ... chew 
from early in the morning unto late in the evening, at home or in public, 
betel and areca nuts. Many are so addicted to it that they even continue 
with it in church. They also like very much to take snufff; they always carry 
with them a small snufff box ... Just like heavy smokers of tobacco they 
become slaves to their bad customs and dirty lust.56 
For the efffects of dutroa, consult the original Linschoten chapter (the 
61st) which is written with much more passion and spectacular details: 
the drug is so efffective that her husband can keep his eyes open without 
seeing how his wife makes love to someone else in his presence, etc. It 
concerns here a poppy-like herb, which is also deadly if one takes too 
much of it. Neither Linschoten nor Schouten give comparable details 
about the use of opium among the Portuguese. This is remarkable with 
such an attractive environment for it in Goa and other centers.
Recent research apparently shows how the Portuguese bought opium 
and medicinal plants in Persia from 1550 onwards. Opium was also used 
‘as a recreational substance or reward for garrison troops’.57 The main 
way to disseminate opium and medicinal herbs was through the 
Portuguese maritime colonial network: offfĳicials, commanders and 
55 Idem, vol. 2, p. 99, see also p. 118.
56 W. Schouten, p. 249; in p. 267 he adds that too much of dutroa results in ‘crying or 
laughing like mad before death’; is less consumed than ‘one is for sixteen hours totally 
crazy or one sleeps twenty-four hours ...’ .
57 According to a conference report on ‘Portugal, the Persian Gulf and Safavid Persia’ 
(September 2007 in Washington) this research is done by Timothy Walker. See www.iran-
heritage.org.
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 missionaries with their organizations were the agents. Indian opium and 
Indian medicinal remedies were also transferred through these channels. 
In the sixteenth-century the Portuguese (like the Asian merchants) 
brought opium in small quantities from the Middle East as far as NE India, 
Bengal. It was in the next century that the Dutch arrived in Bengal from 
Batavia to transport opium further to the Far East, mainly to the East 
Indian archipelago and also to China. In this way the Far Eastern market 
was probably opened up initially to Indian opium by Pieter van den 
Broecke.58 In July 1614 he was on the Comores writing that Arabs brought 
textiles here from Gujarat but also ‘much anfĳion’; next month he arrived 
in Chihiri, two days out of Aden: ‘From here comes the best afffĳioen from 
Arabia Felix, which is exported in large quantities’; in September he 
reports from Aden that he ‘sometimes’ bought a lot of ‘anfĳioen’. About 
Ceylon (1615) he states that the people like ‘anfĳion’ as well as many other 
products like dried fĳish.59 About Djibla (1616): ‘Here the best anfĳioen of 
the whole of Jemen is made ...’ as if he is familiar with several qualities of 
opium. Four years later, he arrives in an Arabian village and reports: ‘here 
the best anfĳioen of the whole of Arabia is made, which is exported every-
where ...’60 
During his long stay in Surat, one of the main trading ports in the realm, 
he must have become very familiar with the Arabic trading business 
(including opium). One of the very few times he provides concrete fĳig-
ures, he gives the contents of 46 small ships traveling from Goa: no opium 
is mentioned (1624). The next year 15 vessels from Malabar arrived in 
Surat with ropes, coconuts, afĳion ‘and other merchandise of little value’.61 
Therefore, one can safely conclude that opium was not an important 
product for anybody, although it was regularly sold, a known product, but 
58 The most irritating editor of his writings, W. Coolhaas, clearly does not like “Bel-
gians”, because he accuses Van den Broecke of excessive careless behavior (in his language 
as if he had to write as a 20th-century professor or in his bookkeeping in Surat where v.d.B. 
stayed for eight years, although C. knows nothing about this bookkeeping), of telling sto-
ries only in his own advantage, of liking too much wine and women, of vanity, of a lack of 
authority on the ships he commands, and so on. See introduction to Broecke, vol. 1, p. 2 fff.
59 See respectively Broecke, vol. 1. p. 18, 27, 33, 77. Here opium is indicated as afĳioen, 
afffĳioen or afĳion as a translation of the Arabic afyūn; later the Dutch always talked about 
amphioen. Broecke states that the dried fĳish was named ‘bonnitis’, which must be the 
bonito fĳish, a small kind of tuna fĳish well-known in the Indian Ocean. After Van den 
Broecke’s rather precise report that this fĳish was used also as money, Coolhaas thinks it 
clever to remark that B. is mistaken: it must be kauri-shells (p. 77 note 4). 
60 Broecke, respectively p. 99 and 245; see for a similar message, p. 27.  
61 Idem, p. 302 and 304.
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not very interesting. This was certainly true for the Dutch. While they 
already traded along the Malabar coast regularly, the Dutch started to buy 
opium from Surat in 1640 and earlier.62 With this step, the VOC also 
became closely involved in the Arabian and Asiatic trade network. For 
example, an offfĳice in the Persian Gamron (Bandar Abbas) was founded in 
1623 where not only silk, wool, spices or cotton fabrics were purchased, 
but also opium. In Surat, opium arrived from several sources, not just 
from Malwa. 
The VOC—Batavia (Council) placed its fĳirst order with
the Surat factors for a modest amount of 187 pounds of opium. In 1641, 
the Council received a mere 42½ pounds of Malwa opium from Surat .... It 
has been estimated that between 1640 and 1652, Batavia received, on an 
average, only 500 pounds of opium per annum from Surat.63
However, Prakash forgot the documents he published earlier about the 
Dutch relations with Surat.64 Even in the pre-Van den Broecke period, in 
1602, two Dutch factors arrived in Surat, but they were killed by the 
Portuguese; fĳive years later there were again contacts, which were damag-
ing for the Dutch. Starting a decade later, however, a regular relationship 
between VOC Batavia and the northwestern coast of India was estab-
lished.65 The details are not necessary here.
There were several opium deals between 1620 and the happenings in 
1641- 1652.66 The VOC Directors in Amsterdam were informed that opium 
is also exported from Surat and other places in the region (1620). Two 
years later (February and March 1622) 1,187 pounds (6 packets) of opium 
were transported by a Dutch ship, the Sampson, from Surat to Batavia 
(value 1 pound for 1 florin) and 380 pounds by another ship, the Weesp. 
Just a few months later the Governor-General in Batavia himself ordered 
‘200 to 300 catties of good quality opium’ of the kind sent by a new ship. 
Another VOC representative asked in the same month for ‘300 to 400 
62 O. Prakash (1985), Idem. Also for the next chapter this is an impressive and indis-
pensable study. Although he used diffferent archival sources than I did for the next Mala-
bar chapter, his conclusions are not that diffferent from mine. The same can be said from 
his treatment of the Bengal relation to VOC Batavia (see below chapter 13 and 14).
63 Idem, note 11.
64 In O. Prakash (1984) useful documents of the trade in the realm are edited and col-
lected. A new 2007edition could not be consulted. For the early (1620-1650) Dutch profĳit-
able trade with Surat and neighboring cities, see H. van Santen. Opium was not yet much 
traded, but copper, cotton, saltpeter, indigo, etc. were. The Dutch also succeeded in dis-
mantling the large spice trade of Gujarati merchants with the Indonesian archipelago. 
65 Idem, p. 14 fff.
66 Idem, p. 134, 193, 195, 199, 203  
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 catties of good quality opium’ while complaining that the ‘lot sent with 
the Sampson was found to be of very poor quality’ (one catty weighs 1.25 
Dutch pounds).
Again a year later, the VOC Batavia wrote to its representative in 
Coromandel (East Indian coast): ‘Since a large amount of opium had been 
received, no more of it was to be bought until further orders.’ Apparently, 
opium was also imported in Batavia from the eastern coast, allowing a 
comparison of its quality.
Including the information given about the years until 1652, it can be 
concluded that the early Dutch opium trade was—like that of the 
Portuguese—not impressive at all. Then suddenly a dramatic change 
occurred in this trade, which was directly connected to the Dutch take-
over of the Malabar coast. How dramatic this was is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
When the Dutch started the defĳinite attack on the Portuguese bul-
warks in December 1661, our witness is again Wouter Schouten. He 
describes at length all the battles in which the Portuguese are assisted by 
the so-called nairos, a kind of aristocratic warrior, who like the ancient 
Spartans do nothing but train in the fĳighting arts, making armaments and 
love to each others wives:
They do not surrender easily, but remain at their place strong as a post, 
while attacking notwithstanding fĳire, swords or bullets: by using opium they 
are fully out of their senses. And further on: ‘The enemy, frantic by the 
opium, stands like a wall and shoots, hacks and cuts with big knifes every-
thing and everybody within its reach.67 
The “opium coast” was conquered, and the consequences of this were so 
far-reaching that a detailed analysis of what actually happened is required. 
Schouten immediately changes the tone of his information. About the 
Zamorin, the overlord of several petty rulers along the Malabar coast, he 
reports:
It seems as if the Zamorin is regularly dazed and his memory lags behind. 
This must be the result of excessive opium use. All the kings of Malabar 
67 W. Schouten, p. 194, remarks about opium as one of many merchandises, p. 233, 237 
in Surat and Ahmadabad, both cities in Guyarat. Earlier he talked extensively about the 
luxury life of the kings and courts of Persia (p. 228 fff.), but without mentioning the use of 
opium. For these Hindu warriors, also called “Nayars”, see S.F. Dale, p. 16-18 and passim. 
They form the basic military force of every Malabar state. Apparently, Barbosa was the fĳirst 
to report about their existence and function (S. Dale, p. 21 fff., 238, 239 notes 25 and 30, 44). 
Dale does not mention opium use.
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demonstrate the same behavior, and numerous other people in the whole 
of the East Indies are addicted.68 
This is not the East Indies, and we can only conclude that the chiefs and 
their nairos are potential opium users. In addition, Schouten later lists 
which kind of products are grown in Malabar: between eleven names ‘and 
many more fruits and vegetables’, opium is also mentioned without any 
specifĳic emphasis.69 
But English merchant-adventurers provided other interesting news 
from the opium front. Still pupils of the Dutch, they already warned 
“London” about what was going to happen:
In their letter dated January 1, 1666, the English factors in Malabar reported 
to the Court of Directors in London: “the natives of those parts not being 
able to live without ophium which now they cannot have but from the 
Dutch ... they have all the pepper which is the growth of those parts in truck 
for it.70
Indeed, there was some specifĳic relation between the Dutch, pepper and 
opium in Malabar. That was not discovered even by Carl Trocki, who 
established a pre-English opium trade of the Dutch only in Southeast 
Asia, where ‘the Dutch seem to have been the fĳirst to make it a “little” 
luxury, rather than an exotic medicine’ because they changed ‘the man-
ner in which opium was consumed.’71 Alas, such a peaceful attitude was 
never demonstrated by the Dutch, unless the enemy was too strong, as 
the following chapters will show.
 
68 W. Schouten, p. 253, 254.
69 Idem, p. 267.
70 Quoted by O. Prakash (1985), p. 170 note 79.
71 C. Trocki (1999a), p. 34, 35. He made no special study of the case. It is, however, really 
serious that the most recent Dutch publication, E. Jacobs, missed this whole economic 
development and thinks that the Dutch started to deal with opium in 1677 on Java only 
(Idem, p. 128), continuing with statements that the ‘VOC shipped the Bengal raw opium 
only to Batavia’ (Idem) and never connected the Malabar (Kerala) coast with the pepper-
opium deals. See also Idem, note 249. Further research could reveal whether the Dutch 
absorbed a few Indian practices, such as blending tobacco with medicinal (and mildly 
narcotic) herbs.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
PEPPER FOR OPIUM VICE VERSA
From about 1650 until 1663, the Dutch struggled and ultimately succeed-
ed in expelling the Portuguese from the Malabar coast. It was not an easy 
job. The fĳirst Dutch merchants, who had appeared in Surat and on this 
coast fĳifty years earlier, were caught by the Portuguese and hanged in 
Goa. The managers of VOC Malabar did not accept this and initiated the 
fĳirst skirmishes against the Portuguese.1 It took sixty years before they 
defĳinitely kicked out their competitor from this region, while the 
Portugese retained the northern coast with the capital of their empire, 
Goa. 
The Dutch headquarters of the Malabar coast was located in Cochin. 
The trade carried out by the Dutch was the same as for the Portuguese: 
export of pepper (64%), rice (10%) and cardamom (6%). Indeed, for all 
East India Companies, pepper was the product which had the highest pri-
ority until the 19th-century, and Malabar pepper was considered the best. 
It is important to state that from a recent investigation into the Portuguese 
pepper business in the 16th and 17th centuries, no relationship with opi-
um was discovered.2
The Dutch expectations about the profĳits with this pepper, however, 
were overly optimistic. Van Goens, the admiral who expelled the 
Portuguese, wrote to the VOC Directors in Amsterdam, the Seventeen 
Gentlemen, that four million pounds of pepper were available annually 
on the Malabar market. He wanted to buy this with goods worth not more 
than 150,000 Dutch florins. He expected to make at least a 100% profĳit, 
and thus a pound of pepper should be purchased for 1½ stuiver (fĳive cent 
piece). Van Goens expected to sell one and a half million pounds of 
1 See for the general data about the Malabar period, H. Terpstra, chapter IV symptom-
atically titled ‘The Fighting Corner. The Dutch on the Malabar Coast’; S. Gaastra, p. 52 fff.; S. 
Subrahmanyam (1993), passim and, of course, the long introduction to Kerala, p. xxii-lxv 
written by H. K. s’Jacob. It is a pity that the Dutch economic historians, De Vries and Van 
der Woude, did not understand at all what was going on in these Asian regions. See, for 
instance, J. de Vries, A. van der Woude, p. 499 fff.  
2 For the Portuguese pepper trade, which was “liberated” in 1570 in the sense that their 
monopoly was negated and German and Italian business people could join the business, 
see the article of P. Malekandathil.
chapter eleven164
 pepper in Surat, Ceylon, Persia or Bengal, and the rest could be shipped to 
Europe. At very least, he needed a pepper monopoly along the Malabar 
coast.3 But the situation became much more complicated than testing all 
these propositions, which was difffĳicult enough.
I could not discover who made the fĳirst decision to create a close com-
mercial link between pepper and opium. In hindsight, this decision 
became the pivotal element in the whole history of opium. In the Generale 
Missiven (GM), the most important VOC documents, I discovered opium 
(amphioen) listed for the fĳirst time in the 1641 data. Apparently, it was not 
worth mentioning earlier, although opium was purchased by the Dutch 
before that date. In addition, it was also directly connected to pepper in 
the following way:
To increase the already attracted capital and to get more pepper we have 
ordered director Croocq in Surat ... to deliver a quantity of amphioen and 
similar goods, which are appreciated by the Malabarians ... (12-12-1641)4
This, however, seems to be only a way of pleasing political or commercial 
partners with a present, which we know was the usual method of smooth-
ing deals for the Portuguese. It is very diffferent from what happened ten 
years later when we read for the fĳirst time that 
ships have to bring rice from Bengal to Ceylon, while the yacht Sperwer has 
to bring 480,000 pound powdered sugar to Surat, destined for Persia and 
20,000 pound opium to buy pepper in Malabar.5
3 Kerala, p. xlvii.
4 GM, II, p. 145. The meaning of the quotation is not very clear, unless one studies the 
background extensively, which is not possible or necessary here. For instance: ‘the already 
attracted capital’ is my translation of the old-Dutch aengetogen capitael, but what opium 
had to do with this kind of capital is not clear. The attention given in the GM to opium is 
worth mentioning in all its thirteen voluminous books published so far. The fĳirst volume 
(ed. W. Coolhaas) was published in 1960, the last volume in 2007. I guess that another fĳive 
volumes will be published. One may hope that one of them covers the many omissions, 
etc. See Both, introduction of P. Rietbergen, p. 12, 13. The fĳirst volume covers the years 1610-
1638 in which “amphioen (opium)” never appears in the extensive indexes. In the follow-
ing volumes this is 6 times (1639-1655), 14 (1655-1674), 70 (1675-1685), 77 (1686-1697), 58 
times (1698-1713), 63 (1713-1725), 31 (1725-1729), 55 (1729-1737), 56 (1737-1743), 82 (1743-1750), 
50 (1750-1755) and in volume thirteen 55 times (1756-1761). This suggests that “amphioen 
(opium)” is mentioned every time less, but that is not the case, because the volumes cover 
fewer years every time! In proportion to volume two covering 16 years, the trend should be 
quite diffferent: 6, 12, 112, 112, 62, 84, 124, 110, 150, 188, 160, and 176 times. This reflects better 
the attention the product got in these basic VOC writings.
5 GM, II, p. 447.
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In the same year we hear of another ship which brought 7,000 pound of 
amphioen from Bengal to Malabar.6 And more precise, at the time the 
Dutch controlled the Malabar coast in 1663:
As elsewhere the VOC tried to pay for this Malabar export as much as pos-
sible without money; it was extremely economical with gold and silver 
money and species. Opium was the main import product and the main 
means to exchange with pepper.7 
What did this mean in the daily practice? First, that elsewhere the normal 
use of opium as a present for the authorities continued or that opium was 
only one unimportant trade item among many others.8 
In Malabar, however, the Dutch negotiated with the local rulers (rajas) 
not only an export monopoly (pepper, etc.), but also an import monopoly 
(amphioen = opium). And indeed, most of the rajas promised to deliver 
pepper and prohibited the import of amphioen to all others except the 
VOC. With Ali Raja, the Muslim merchant ruler of Cannanur, north of 
Malabar, the VOC had to make special deals. The merchants of Cannanur 
were the main opium traders with the Middle East, and they mostly 
imported it via Surat. 
6 Idem, p. 507.
7 Kerala, p. lvi.
8 See, for instance GM, II, p. 349, 622, 754 or Idem, III, p. 202 (1658), p. 547 (1667), p. 695 
(1669), p. 807 (1672) about ‘amphioen and other small things’, etc.
Ill. 9. Destruction of three Portuguese galleons at the Malabar coast, September 1639
Source: C. Boxer (1977), p. 23. Portuguese attacked in the Bay of Goa by a Dutch VOC–
squadron. Painting by Hendrick van Anthonissen (1653), Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. 
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As early as 1664, the VOC Governor of Ceylon, Hustaert, complained to 
his commander on the Malabar coast that the costs of the war against the 
Portuguese were so high that profĳits from merchandise could not com-
pensate this. In addition, the competition with the “Moors” (the Middle 
Eastern Muslim traders from Turkey, Egypt, Persia, and north Indian cit-
ies like Surat or Cannanur) and the English had not been eliminated. The 
Malabar rulers were dishonest, notwithstanding the pepper monopoly 
the Dutch had received in most areas. Now even the import monopoly 
(opium) was complicated:
[From the import side] amphioen came by sea and from the land in abun-
dance, so that we did not gain a profĳit on the main merchandise, but 
remained ... 30,000 lb unmarketable in the VOC warehouses ... so that we 
are obliged to think about how all our means can be invested to increase 
the advantages in the trade.9 
After making changes in the Dutch management, Hustaert ordered 
aggressive negotiations with the Muslim merchant-king Adersia now that 
the VOC had ousted the Portuguese: while it was a new arrangement that 
he must decrease his imports of amphioen, he should already be aware 
that any pepper or copper found on his ships would be considered smug-
gled and confĳiscated. The Dutch intended to take the same measures 
against the amphioen delivered by the Zamorin: if he tries to sell it over-
land to countries like Cochin, etc. ‘it shall be declared a good booty’.10 
The strategic importance of opium is explained through the following 
section in the instructions of Hustaert (6-3-1664):
As a good merchant one has to accommodate to diffferent times and cir-
cumstances, in which the merchandise becomes cheaper or more costly, 
like it happened with the amphioen. Two years ago it realized not 100 but 
110 lb pepper but now, thanks to the smuggling of a large quantity by sea 
and over land in several places, it brings not more in than 2½ rixdaalders 
per lb. This should have been avoided so that such a huge quantity as 30,000 
lb not remains unmarketable in the warehouses. Now also 16,000 lb came 
in from Bengal, we have to sell it against pepper even if the price has to 
decrease until 60 lb pepper, otherwise the amphioen will wither and be 
spoiled.11 
9 Kerala, p. 15. One (Amsterdam) lb is 498 grams.
10 Idem, p. 19. The Zamorin had refused to give the VOC an opium monopoly, because 
he asked customs from the Muslim traders of the north (Surat, etc.) who smuggled the 
opium to/from elsewhere. The VOC now hoped to get an opium monopoly in Surat itself.
11 Idem, p. 27.
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Hustaert’s colleague, Godske, wrote a long memorandum to his successor 
four years later (5-1-1668) in which again the relationship between pep-
per and opium is stressed. He had quarreled about it with his boss, 
Admiral Van Goens and had, therefore, to leave his Malabar position for 
an appointment in Persia. Thanks to this, we can follow a large chapter of 
the history of the stock of opium in the previous quotation.
Godske complains about the substantial “smuggling” practices over 
land, but feels they are the result of the price policy of the VOC and, in 
particular, of Van Goens: They ‘have no other origin than the price of 
amphioen and other merchandise at a fĳixed and too high level ...’12 It 
would take too much space to recount the whole conflict between the 
gentlemen,13 but the following substantiation of Godske is illuminating:
What a serious damage the Company sufffered by fĳixing the price of amphi-
oen at a too high level and by keeping it during four or fĳive years in the 
warehouse, can be proved as in the previous year in Cochin from a parcel 
of 10,000 lb 5,000 lb. were cleared with the offfĳices of Calicoijlan and Coi-
jlan: earlier they were willing to pay 90 lb pepper per lb amphioen, while 
now with pain in Cochin and in both offfĳices only 40 [lb pepper per lb 
amphioen] could be received. And if this parcel had to remain in stock 
another year, it was not even worth a stuiver [a fĳive cents piece].14 
Godske, furthermore, points to another fundamental difffĳiculty of all early 
imperialist adventures: the Portuguese, Dutch, etc, were quite able to 
control the coast, sack cities most cruelly to obtain a monopoly position 
from some ruler, but they could not stop the continuous “smuggling” 
overland. In addition, the controlling was also a costly afffair. In this case, 
the result was selling even the VOC’s ‘new perfect Bengal amphioen’ for 
50 lb of pepper to one lb of opium. Godske proposed:
no better means is possible [to avoid all the trouble with pepper/amphioen 
in warehouse and smuggling] to distribute and to make profĳits both by sea 
and along the land roads through a proper [and free] marketing ...15
He was right, and within a year (November 1669) he got it when it was 
announced that “smuggling” would be counteracted by lowering the price 
12 Idem, p. 52.
13 Later Van Goens defends himself ambiguously through a letter of two friends to the 
VOC government (see Idem. p. 78-81) in which they even deny that the opium had to be 
sold at a fĳixed price: from the beginning of his appointment, Godske could have lowered 
the price if necessary (p. 81).
14 Idem, p. 52.
15 Idem, p. 53. Literally taken, my translation is probably ambiguous, but Godske’s 
(Old) Dutch is less clear than, for instance, Hustaert’s or Van Goens’.
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of opium: from 100 lb of pepper per pound of opium, the price decreased 
to 40 p.p.p.p.o., which is nearly the price of the private “smugglers” (35 
p.p.p.p.o.). We assume that the “smuggling” stopped, but free competition 
was not even considered.16 
This points to another characteristic of all imperialist and colonialist 
policies of Western powers: whatever they say about themselves as pro-
tagonists of “free trade”, they always try and succeed to undermine all free 
marketing of products in a fair competition. They achieve monopolies for 
areas or whole countries or exclusive rights for dealing in specifĳic prod-
ucts, which means that “free” is used only in the sense of “free for me, but 
forbidden for you”. 
Along the Malabar coast (as elsewhere), the antagonism of “free mar-
ket” versus monopoly with fĳixed prices popped up time and again. The 
local Malabar merchants knew how to handle the existence of the monop-
olies and how to use the passports they received from the VOC. In a very 
long memorandum with many annotations by other people, a VOC 
Governor of Ceylon, Van Reede, writes to his offfĳicials in Cochin (1681-82) 
about problems in the city of Kayamkulam, south of Cochin:
With the amphioen it is nearly the same as with pepper, because they are 
imported by sea and over land and, thus, difffĳicult to keep to their fĳixed price. 
Therefore, one has to follow the market when selling. The merchants of 
Calicoilan are warned to keep to their contract which was made with them 
in 1674. However, they insist that they are merchants of the Company and, 
therefore, have the same rights as those the Company itself received from 
the rajas: to be allowed to freely trade in all pepper and amphioen, while 
preventing others from doing the same.17 
In this way the VOC received a dose of its own medicine. It did not accept 
this because the consequence was, indeed, a really free market. This was 
the same as smuggling for the VOC and even worse, the merchants (Baba 
and Poelicare) had sold amphioen and pepper to the English: ‘thanks to 
this disturbance, the amphioen received a very low market [price]’ (Van 
Reede). 
16 GM, III, p. 699.
17 Kerala, p. 186 -188. Around 1700 there were still many VOC complaints about this 
city south of Cochin: trade with the English from which it now buys amphioen (Idem, p. 
373), while north of Cochin, in Calicut, the seat of the Zamorin, the English have a fĳixed 
trading post. Not only they, but all kinds of Muslim merchants from Surat, etc. as well as 
the French (Idem, p. 366). The Dutch had lost their hegemonic position on the Malabar 
coast. 
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Three years later, further information was given about the amphioen 
stock in Cochin. On the orders of his boss in Ceylon, the main VOC offfĳicial 
in town, Huijsman, strongly advised his senior merchant to sell as much 
amphioen as possible against a lower price. Why? Because
the present contracting parties want to deliver nearly no pepper because 
they have enough amphioen, which was imported with 20 little Muslim 
ships from Surat(ta), while also the price of the pepper was increased ... But 
the main reason and problem was that we, the VOC itself, had about 20,000 
lb of bad Bengal amphioen in stock, which shall not improve in quality but 
grows bad ... 18 
He argues, furthermore, to bring as much bad amphioen on the market so 
that the price of the smuggled opium collapses.
In 1698 in a memorandum from the VOC offfĳicial in Cochin, Zwaarde-
croon, new characteristics of the pepper + amphioen trade are revealed:
The amphioen from Surat(ta) is a product which is rather popular on the 
Malabar coast, but its quality is not as good as the Bengal one. Still, it can 
be used as compensation for perishable Bengal amphioen which is to the 
disadvantage of the VOC. Therefore, it cannot be seen as contraband or 
confĳiscated upon orders of the VOC, nor can the Muslim merchants from 
Surat(ta) be seen as smugglers. However, the Bengal amphioen never 
received as high prices in our [monopoly] pepper contracts with the [Mal-
abar] rulers as in Batavia and in the east. In addition this, the Bengal amphi-
oen earlier gave rise to fraud and quasi-profĳits, in particular, when it was 
used in exchange for pepper, while later this pepper had to bought anyway 
for cash ... it should be best, therefore, to write offf the Bengal amphioen in 
the future and that the VOC should profĳit from high market prices [for the 
Bengal amphioen] elsewhere. ...
 It may be known ... that we decided not to sell the last ten chests of 
[Bengal] amphioen to Cochin. 
 Apart from all the considerations above, the Malabar coast is flooded by 
amphioen sold by the pirate William Kidd for next to nothing, while even 
the English and the Danes ... imported amphioen ... if foreign Europeans do 
this, we cannot avoid it ... So, it seems the best option to send the ten chests 
to Batavia …19 
Apparently, Zwaardecroon was reacting to complaints by VOC Bengal, 
which sold opium to VOC Malabar, but did not get its money. The case 
18 Idem, p. 206, 207. 
19 Idem, p. 335, 336. Originally the Scottish William “Captain” Kidd (1645-1701) was 
hired by aristocrats to catch pirates. Thanks to many debts, he became a famous one him-
self. In the end he was arrested in New York, extradited to London and hanged. Earlier (p. 
306) Zwaardecroon reported that Kidd imported more than 100 chests of amphioen.
chapter eleven170
demonstrates how many difffĳiculties were connected with trade in general 
and, in particular, with the exchange of pepper against opium. The follow-
ing table shows how in about half a century of the Malabar pepper trade, 
the payment consisted of an estimated half a million lbs of opium. It is not 
only a “proof of the argument”, but a good introduction to the following 
chapter as well.
Table 9. Bengal Opium Exported to the Malabar Coast, 1657-1718 (selected years; in 
Dutch pounds)20
Year Quantity Year Quantity Year Quantity
1657  6 238 1669 11 844 1683  8 421
1659    --- 1671 N.A. 1688  3 280
1661  6 800 1673 22 713 1690 17 835
1663 16 048 1675  8 555 1692 50 025
1665 N.A. 1677 N.A. 1705  2 900
1667 11 560 1681 22 910 1710  2 610
Total 1657-1666  55 198 + 3 estimates of 4 760 = 69 478
Total 1667-1676 153 753 + 1 estimate of 8 500 = 162 253
Total 1677-1686  57 721 + 7 estimates of 8 400 = 116 521
Total 1687-1696 153 821 
Total 1697-1718   6 960 + 1 estimate of 1 450 = 8 410
Total 1657-1718 427 453-510 483
 
20 Calculated according to O. Prakash (1985), p. 171; see also E. van Veen, L. Blussé (ed.), 
p. 285 for quite ambiguous data: exports to Malabar are only given in the form of textiles 
after 1701; p. 288 fff. only exports from Bengal to Europe are given, etc.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
THE BENGAL SCENE
Opium ... The Arab afyūn is sometimes corruptly called 
afīn, of which afīn, “imbecile”. is a popular etymology. 
Similarly the Bengalees derive it from afĳi-heno, “ser-
pent-home”.
Patna ... is the most celebrated place in the world for 
the cultivation of opium. Besides what is carried into 
the inland parts, there are annually 3 or 4000 chests 
exported, each weighing 300 lbs ...
Guillaume Raynal (1777)1
The VOC’s participation in the Indian trade started with a trading post at 
Petapuli (Nizampatnam) in north Coromandel in 1606. K. Chaudhuri 
made an interesting general remark about companies like the VOC:
... specifĳic examples and the general evidence from the records of the trad-
ing companies prove conclusively that in the main port towns of India, the 
Red Sea, or China, the organisation of the market in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries followed lines that were to be found in contemporane-
ous Europe.2 
An amendment is necessary here: this conclusion does not match the very 
violent ingress of the Europeans and the reactions of the indigenous eco-
nomic and political interests to their repression. That would have been an 
exceptional situation in the European trade networks. Until the 17th-cen-
tury the usual reasons for starting a war in Europe were of a religious or 
dynastic-political nature. Thereafter, both remain necessary, because 
pure trading interests are never favored by war; the combination of these 
three leads to “monopoly wars”, which is nothing but the dynastic motive 
to become the sole ruler in a market. The result is still the elimination of a 
market and, therefore, of the basis of every trade (see further below). 
1 Quoted in the Hobson–Jobson, p. 641, 642.
2 K. N. Chaudhuri (1978), p. 145.  
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This makes Chaudhuri’s discussion of Max Weber’s thought about 
types of merchants and the availability of ‘capitalistic profĳit-making 
enterprises … [which] ... operate in markets that may be entirely free or 
subject to substantive regulations’3 more or less suspect. In their continu-
ous attack the English could be included in the category of these private 
market-oriented, capitalist merchant-pirates only in the fĳirst phase of 
their arrival in the realm. The same is true for the Dutch voyages in the 
pre-VOC period, the time of the so-called “Voor-Compagnieën” (“Pre-
Companies”). 
The EIC, however, was like a state with an army and monopoly claims. 
It was fĳirst indirectly and later directly supported by the British state 
(London and the king). This was also the case with the Portuguese, the 
Spaniards, the French and the VOC, whatever diffferences there were in 
the degree of state involvement. “Monopoly” is the catchword in all these 
state-private ventures, and this remained the main characteristic of 
Western imperialism and colonialism until far into the 20th-century. 
For the historical, economic and other interpretations of the Western 
collision with “Asia”, the following aspect is of overriding importance, 
about which no misunderstanding should exist: it is much too easy to say 
that an “open” and “free” Western capitalism conquered the “tradition-
bound” or “closed” East.
With the Battle of Plassey in 1757, a new period started in the north and 
east of India, because it was seen as the start of the British Empire. It was 
sanctioned more or less by the grant of the diwani of Bengal to the EIC, 
which is the right of rulers and a state to collect taxes. A fundamental 
British reconstruction of the north and east of India included the opium 
regime. 
The cultivation of poppies remained in the hands of the peasants, but 
‘the entire crop belonged to the company’s government, and private sales 
were forbidden’.4 Indian entrepreneurs and merchants who had been 
active in the opium business did not give it up. They could continue only 
‘by grace of the enormous bribes they paid to the company servants’.5 
Already in 1786 the English obtained the Benares opium (and saltpeter) 
monopoly, and the powerful merchant magnates were seriously weak-
ened or eliminated (what happened with the Malwa opium center around 
Bombay is told in ch. 7).
3 Idem, p. 146.
4 K. Chatterjee, p. 116.
5 C. Trocki (1999a), p. 45.
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The reverse side of this coin was that English private fortunes were 
now being made in Bengal, Bihar or Patna. People like George Vansittart, 
Ewan Law or William Young made handsome profĳits in the 1770s as the 
plans for the opium conquest of China were gradually formed. One devel-
opment went even further. After the Battle of Plassey, the British became 
the territorial ruler (1772) and now this 
elevation to the status of ruler compelled it to attend to problems that either 
it had ignored or had fallen outside the scope of its authority prior to 1765. 
The regulation of taxes and dues, charged upon trade in transit, was one of 
the fĳirst areas to draw the company’s attention.6 
Indeed, this often led to two conflicting interests. The common aim was 
to exploit the Indians, eventually with the help of Indians (compradors). 
At the same time, however, the trade interest had to consider the state 
interest as parasitical: if it could not squeeze enough from the Indians, it 
had to compensate its costs through the trade interest. This is another 
defĳinition of the ambiguous position of Warren Hastings (see ch. 6). 
The English used their colonial whip to enhance their authority, tease 
their competitors and increase production. Chatterjee writes about this 
period:
The intensifĳied English efffort to penetrate the opium business had both a 
corporate and a private dimension. Through the 1760s, increasingly aggres-
sive British private traders, together with gomastahs employed for the pur-
pose of buying opium for the English company’s corporate business, 
unleashed a regime of tyranny and oppression over the opium growers. 
Ramchand Pandit’s memoir described vividly how the English “gentlemen”, 
as he described them, compelled the opium growers to accept low prices 
by placing peons over them.7
There were, however, also harsh conflicts among the European opium 
buyers. In the summer of 1767 French gomastahs decorated poppy fĳields 
around Bihar with flags claiming a right to all the opium produced on 
those lands. The EIC retaliated by forbidding the peasants to sell opium to 
the French:
6 K. Chatterjee, p. 129.
7 Idem, p. 114. Middlemen or agents called gomastahs operate between the producers 
and the great merchants or bankers as the latter’s representative; they are mostly engaged 
at monthly wages. A peon is a person with little authority, often assigned to do unskilled or 
drudgerous tasks; an underling. In this case, it must be someone, who knows how to han-
dle a club or is doing ‘police service’ (Hobson–Jobson) .
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French gomastahs were imprisoned and French aurungs were plundered of 
all opium and other goods stored there. The punitive measures against the 
French company spilled over into the French textile enterprise and English 
gomastahs destroyed textiles being woven for the French.8
Around 1790 after many reorganizations, the revenue administration of 
the English concerned mainly the land tax, the salt and the opium monop-
olies, and the customs and excise fees (the sair). The opium revenue had 
been managed ever since 1773 by a contract with Indian merchants, who 
paid a royalty to the EIC. A few years later the contract was awarded to the 
highest bidder on a four-years’ agreement. The EIC servants had a right of 
inquiry ‘to prevent the oppression of the opium peasants’; the best basis 
for bribes. The consequences of this rather corrupt constellation for pro-
duction and trade are sketched in some detail in chapter 6.
There was a specifĳic reason for the harsh regime imposed on poppy 
growers. No goods other than saltpeter and opium were ever made sub-
ject to formal control. Not because both were cultivated exclusively in 
Bihar, but because both were military strategic goods: the fĳirst as a raw 
material for gunpowder; on the second supported the offfĳicials’ main gov-
ernmental and personal profĳit-making method, while the bullion and tea 
trade came to depend on opium.9 For all these reasons the opium history 
of India in the 19th-century was largely a British government afffair. 
In the previous chapter, however, it was shown how important the opi-
um trade from Bengal to the Malabar coast was already in the 17th-centu-
ry when English merchants were not yet very active. In this “Dutch 
century” the centrality of the Bengal–Bihar (Patna, Benares) scene as the 
production and trade region is also indicated. We must examine whether 
and to what extent opium was interesting for other areas than Malabar in 
this century. 
More specifĳically: is opium also to be seen as one of the major links 
between Mughal India and the outside world? That world was dominated 
to a considerable extent by violent Western intruders, with the Dutch 
becoming much more important than the Portuguese or English and 
French. The Portuguese appeared on the scene almost at the same time as 
the Mughals. The dynasty of these important rulers was founded by Babur 
after entering Delhi in 1526. 
8 Idem, p. 115. An aurung is ‘a place where goods are manufactured, a depôt for such 
goods.’ (Hobson-Jobson).
9 Idem, p. 155 is not as explicit, but points clearly to this constellation.
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The Dutch Connection
The Dutch arrived in Bengal nearly a century later at Hugli on the mouth 
of the Ganges. They were not yet interested in opium but sought rice, 
sugar, saltpeter and slaves. In the view of one of the fĳirst Governor-
Generals, Jan P. Coen, slaves were needed as willing labor in the Dutch 
colonies in the East Indies. Time and again he urged buying as many 
slaves as possible. In a letter to Commander Van den Broecke, for instance, 
he asked (8 May 1622):
Any number of slaves, particularly young people, could be sent to Batavia. 
Even if this number was 100,000, the Dutch territories were extensive and 
productive enough to support them adequately.10
In practice, Coen never received such numbers, only about 30-80 slaves 
from Coromandel or Surat in particular. Soon these requests were not 
repeated. Indeed, a wide gap existed between what was ordered and what 
was ultimately delivered, as we will see below for opium also. It proved, 
however, that the Dutch wanted to be sedentary slave holders in their 
new East-Indies settlements and not only slave traders.11 The situation 
was no diffferent with the establishment of colonies in the West Indies 
(Surinam, Dutch Antilles).
Regarding the Mughal realm, however, Coen and his successors never 
intended to establish colonies like the French or English did (except 
Ceylon12), but only to establish trading strongholds in or outside existing 
settlements. Coen was not very impressed by the profĳitability of the 
Bengal region within the framework of his inter-Asian trade network. 
Later, VOC Batavia judged the cost of the Malabar trade in the period 
1663-1702 as too high relative to the profĳits. This must be taken with a 
large grain of salt because the Dutch were accustomed to gross profĳits 
10 O. Prakash (1984), p. 203 and passim.
11 Scholars do not realize the serious diffferences in theory and practice between the 
two positions. I discussed them in an analysis of the diffferent positions of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans: the former were the traders, indiffferent to the fate of their “cargo” 
and the latter the holders, who were establishing their own model society by eradicating 
an indigenous one by means of a slave labor-force from elsewhere. All Western settlers in 
history tried to establish societies in the latter way from the Romans to the Portuguese and 
Spaniards to the Zionists in Palestine. See H. Derks (1986), p. 288 fff.  
12 Its opium history must have been a strange one, because C. Uragoda mentions the 
Portuguese as masters of Ceylon once, jumps over 150 years of Dutch rule and starts with 
the English rule from 1815-1915. Before the British introduced opium on the island (see 
Appendix 1), opium was apparently only used in Ayurvedic medicine.
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often exceeding 1,000 percent, at least in their spice trade. But some local 
VOC offfĳicials blamed the building of extensive fortifĳications and the pay-
ment of high salaries instead of attacking the endemic corruption of 
Dutch offfĳicials.13
This kind of complaint soon changed in the typical inter-Asian com-
modity chains. First thanks to the experience that the Indian merchants 
were at least as clever as the intruders: spices imported by the VOC on the 
Indian east coast as cheaply as possible in order to create a better trade 
position for opium were transported overland by the Indian merchants to 
the west coast. In Surat the strongest competition came from the Indian 
merchants with their own VOC spices!14 The other side of the trade issue 
showed that in the 1630s Batavia discovered considerable amounts of 
inexpensive raw silk in north-east India. It connected this silk trade to 
Japanese customers, and around 1650 silk was probably the single most 
important cargo shipped to Japan. 
This Japanese trade was highly advantageous for the VOC: Japanese sil-
ver was exchanged for Chinese gold in Formosa (Taiwan); this gold could 
then be invested profĳitably in textiles on the Coromandel coast. Prakash 
continues with:
Due to the importance the Company attached to this trade, its employees 
were not allowed to engage in it on their individual account. That, however, 
did not prevent them from doing so on a fairly large scale on a clandestine 
basis. Indeed, in a high-value, low-bulk item such as opium which was ideal 
for contraband trade, the volume of the clandestine trade was often as large 
as that on the Company’s own account.15
For the fĳirst part of the 17th-century, information about the Bengal–VOC 
relationship is still meager.16 In that period the level of opium trade of the 
13 About this opium corruption see K. Ward, p. 88, 89. Kerala, p. lxxxv gives all the 
details of the receipts and expenditures over 38 years. If I give the additions (7,211,890 
guilders versus 11,502,000), it reveals, indeed, a negative balance of about 4.3 million guil-
ders, which is a very large loss in those times. However, this is only a small part of the story: 
the huge profĳits made with pepper in Europe are not considered, and we further know 
almost nothing of the “value of the costs”: in this case opium is bought in north-east India 
for an unknown price and used as means of exchange. Apart from this, Cochin is largely 
used as a refreshment station for ships and crews on the long route from Batavia to 
Amsterdam and that only adds costs!  
14 F. Pelsaert, p. 54, 55.
15 O. Prakash in: E. Locher-Scholten and P. Rietbergen (ed.), p. 185.
16 In the Dutch “offfĳicial” VOC historiography like F. Gaastra (1991) almost nothing is 
mentioned about this whole constellation. But the more interesting H. Furber, p. 258, 259 
mentions several fĳigures on the opium trade between 1613 until the beginning of the 18th-
century which are seldom right or presented in a systematic way. Half a sentence refers to 
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Dutch was also negligible. As shown, this changed in an explosive way 
after the relative defeat of the Portuguese. But this concerned, fĳirst, the 
quantity in one region. 
In the second part of the century, the Dutch exported Bengal opium 
not only to the Malabar coast, but also to Southeast Asia (Malacca, Manila, 
Arakan or the East Indies archipelago), Ceylon, Maldive Islands, Gujarat 
(Surat, Cambay) and the Persian Gulf/Red Sea (Bandar Abbas, Hormuz or 
Jeddah).17 Bengal’s opium fĳigured in the inter-Asian trade as the VOC’s 
second-best product after raw silk. This leads to a new characteristic of 
the Dutch opium trade: after 1660 it became not only a mass product for a 
specifĳic location like the Malabar coast, it was spread over the East in a 
rather short period. Did it remain a mass product for other areas as well?
The following interesting table shows several aspects, primarily the 
sharp increase in the quantity of the opium trade for the archipelago. As 
such, the answer to the question is afffĳirmative. 
 Next, a certain pattern is found: until 1667 there was a negligible 
amount of opium trafffĳic apparently everywhere, after which it increased 
very quickly. In the last ten years 43 times more was offfĳicially exported to 
the archipelago than in the fĳirst ten years. 
Sinha writes:
From the beginning the Dutch took the lead in the opium export trade from 
Hugli, and ... the Dutch succeeded in retaining their lead in this item ... 
Before Plassey the French and the English together did not export even half 
the quantity of opium which the Dutch exported.18
After the Battle of Plassey, in the period 1765-1775, the English con-
quered Bihar and Benares, including Patna, the main production area of 
opium. If we may believe Raynal, as quoted above the chapter, about half 
a million kilo (ca. 3000 chests x 300 lbs) was exported annually from 
Bengal around 1770. This is not a bad estimate.
some Malabar relationship, etc. Three statements of Furber are certainly true: First, ‘there 
is no evidence for extensive use of opium in the Malay archipelago in the sixteenth-cen-
tury’. Second: ‘Opium was the chief source of corruption in the Dutch company’s service 
in the last half of the seventeenth-century ... private fortunes of hundreds of thousands 
of guilders were made ... the company had been defrauded of 3,800,000 guilders.’ For 
that time unbelievable amounts of money and at present only comparable with fortunes 
of billions of guilders. Third: what the Dutch did with opium in Bengal and the East 
Indies ‘laid the foundation for its [EIC’s] monopoly of Bihar opium after the conquest of 
Bengal ... enormous profĳits for the so-called “opium contractors” among the company ser-
vants, who supplied the country traders.’  
17 O. Prakash (1985), p. 28.
18 Quoted in C.Trocki (1999a), p. 46.
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Table 10. Bengal Opium Exported to the East Indies Archipelago, 1659-1718 (selected 
years; in Dutch pounds)19
Year Quantity Ordered Quantity Exported
1659 N.A.   1 360
1663 N.A.   –
1667   2 000-3 000   2 346
1671  12 000-15 000   5 600
1675  25 000  26 643
1679 N.A.  28 450
1683 N.A.  33 216
1687 N.A.  43 229
1691  87 000  87 000
1695  58 000  88 305
1699 145 000  69 020
1703  87 000-145 000 120 580
1707 145 000-174 000  39 005
1711 145 000-174 000 116 000
1715 145 000-174 000 159 935
Total 1659-1669: ca. 27 726
Total 1708-1718: 1 197 845
TOTAL 1659-1718: 3 614 001
At that time the Dutch were still the largest opium customer-dealer. They 
increased this trade in the 18th-century again about 10 times from 1718 
onwards. Or: for the whole of the 18th-century, on average 112,000 
pounds of raw opium were exported each year from Bengal and appar-
ently also imported in Batavia, which comes to the unbelievable amount 
19 Quoted from O. Prakash (1985), p. 150-151. The totals are the result of all the fĳigures 
given in the period. D. Duco, p. 41 and 241 note 117, gives diffferent data. J. Richards (1981), 
p. 61, mentions quite diffferent fĳigures also based on a forthcoming publication (unknown 
to me) of Prakash: for ‘the late 1670s’ he mentions an export of ‘35 Dutch tons’ (= 35,000 
kilo) a level which is reached twenty years later. For the early years of the 18th-century, 58 
tons is given, whereas in 1715 for example about 80 tons are exported. E. Vanvugt (1988), p. 
24 fff. has also diffferent and sometimes wrong fĳigures. It is senseless to discuss them here. 
The trend is everywhere the same, although the most recent (E. Jacobs, p. 128 fff., a Gaastra 
dissertation) has completely wrong fĳigures. This is unbelievable since she directly referred 
to the studies of Prakash, Baud and Vanvugt (Idem, p. 400 note 63). In a following note 65, 
Jacobs refers to an important document, Adriaan van Ommen’s memorandum of 1688, 
suggesting that all authors mentioned above used this highly suspicious document. This 
remains a wild allegation when it is not mentioned what was wrong with Van Ommen’s 
document.
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of 11 million pounds in a century.20 Compared to this, the English were 
minor players in the opium trade of this period.
Now, several pressing questions require an answer, if possible.
Mughal Production and Consumption
An obvious question is how opium functioned in the enormous Mughal 
empire and society? Although there is much support for the thesis of the 
Dutch “original sin”, it would be good to know more about the popularity 
of opium among the indigenous peoples in the pre-Dutch period. That is 
not an easy problem, about which I only can make some reasonable 
guesses. 
At the moment scholars do not go beyond the statements of Chatterjee. 
His excellent study describes how Patna opium drew non-European buy-
ers from all over in the beginning of the 17th-century. He adds: ‘The par-
ticipation of the European companies in this export trade expanded it 
considerably. But business in ... opium was not a new phenomenon. The 
additional demand of the European companies merely enlarged its scale.’21 
However, a note is appended to this argument:
The available sources make it impossible to calculate the extent to which 
the demand of the European companies enlarged this export trade. But the 
descriptions of Patna’s export market, especially in EFI, volume 1, confĳirm 
the view that the presence of the European companies increased the com-
petition among merchants for the purchase of Patna’s traditional export 
commodities.22
This is not very helpful. The reference to EFI, William Foster’s thirteen-
volume document collection, The English factories in India (1906-1927), 
is too British, covers in fact only forty years (ca. 1620-1668) of a period in 
which the British were still a minor factor in all trade in the realm. There 
were plans enough to invest in various things, but there is no proof that 
they did so. Only the Portuguese and Dutch trade is relevant in this frame-
work, and the former were simply not active in the opium trade deserving 
of this name. The English had no market network at the time in which 
opium could be sold profĳitably. And, as shown above, the Dutch really 
20 D. Duco, p. 41. Below we have to confront these data with our analysis of the situa-




started with a relevant opium trade only after 1660. So, we have to walk 
on a diffferent path to get to the beginning of an answer about opium pro-
duction, consumption or trade.
The image of an opium-stricken Mughal India is nurtured in particular 
by the much quoted François Bernier (1625-1688). Take, for instance, 
David Owen who writes:
In offfĳicial circles of Moghul India the poppy and its derivative seem to have 
had their uses. The emperors themselves discovered in the seeds a subtle 
means of dealing with political enemies, “whose heads the monarch is 
deterred by prudential reasons from taking offf”. An infusion of poppy seeds 
in water, explains Bernier, “is brought to them early in the morning, and 
they are not permitted to eat until it be swallowed. This drink emaciates 
the wretched victims; who lose their strength by slow degrees, become tor-
pid and at length die.23 
Fancy stories like this, uncritically publicized by the famous Report of the 
Royal Commission on Opium (1894-95), functioned largely to portray a 
terrible Asian opium past in which honest Westerners played their legal 
opium profĳit game to the benefĳit of mankind. First, opium seeds used in 
this way are fully innocent, even if they could be dissolved in water. Owen 
did not check the information from the Royal Commission. Bernier did 
not wrote about seeds, but about the poust which 
is nothing but poppy-heads crushed, and allowed to soak for a night in 
water. This is the potion generally given to Princes confĳined in the fortress 
of Goaleor, whose heads the Monarch is deterred by prudential reasons 
from taking offf. A large cup of this beverage is brought to them early in the 
morning ...[etc.]... who lose their strength and intellect by slow degrees, 
become torpid and senseless, and at length die.24
Bernier provides this explanation in a story in which a captured prince 
was brought before Aurungzeb, who released the handsome man. This 
prince proposed to Aurungzeb ‘that if it were intended to give him the 
poust to drink, he begged he might be immediately put to death’. All this, 
however, did not happen this time. The method was apparently known 
and feared among the few captured Mughal princes! 
Still, it is not very realistic to believe that poppy heads do have these 
efffects.25 We do not intend to provide a more realistic opium image of 
Mughal India here, but the following could form a start.
23 D. Owen, p. 3 fff. 
24 F. Bernier, p. 106, 107.
25 See, for instance, the long quote in the next chapter of the VOC historian Pieter van 
the bengal scene 181
In particular, the Muslim reign of Akbar (1556-1605) was a golden age. A 
standardized tax system was introduced; there came general prosperity in 
agriculture and a buoyant trade everywhere. His successors expanded the 
empire at the cost of the Hindu confederacy of Maratha. It reached its 
largest extent around 1700 (not the Malabar coast) under the reign of 
Aurangzeb (1658-1707). European travelers reported about the Mughal 
court of the latter showed an ostentation without parallel among 
European courts.26 
Aurangzeb’s orders prohibiting the use and sale of opium may have not 
been very efffective.27 It proved, however, that there was some opium 
problem in India. Did it exist only at the extensive Mughal courts? Or did 
it concern political and economic competitors in trade or production? Is 
it possible to defĳine this specifĳic Mughal opium problem? 
The fĳirst aspect is a purely economic one. The Portuguese, Dutch and 
other foreigners poured in much gold and silver to pay for the local prod-
ucts or as bribes for the many kings. This afffected remote inland regions 
like the Deccan as well as the coast. It is even claimed that the expansion 
of the Mughal empire depended on this influx of gold and silver. After 
about 1660 Bengal was a prominent ‘silver-consuming region’. Since the 
Dutch opium trade was pivotal to the foreign presence, it meant that the 
splendid culture of the Mughals was a product of a narco-military regime. 
In this case Aurangzeb’s opium prohibition was theoretically directed to 
the very source of his own wealth, which is not very understandable. 
But quite a diffferent conclusion could be drawn. Because the opium 
purchased on a large scale with silver and gold in Bengal was in turn used 
by the Dutch in a barter exchange for pepper, it is possible that Aurangzeb’s 
prohibition concerned this barter exchange. It also undermined his gold 
and silver income. This remarkable example of inter-Asian trade, this 
time between the East (Bengal) and West (Malabar) Indian coast, proved 
that his power could not be extended to the latter. 
Another perspective concerns the internal organization of the Mughal 
empire. It can be said that the strong centralized administration of the 
Mughals in the North directed the economy in particular ways. An im -
Dam with quite diffferent information about poppy heads and that of the VOC physician, 
Engelbert Kaempfer, about an opium mixture. 
26 See for the luxury of the court, the chapter by Tapan Raychaudhuri in: T. Raychau-
dhuri, I. Habib (ed.), p. 180 fff.
27 S. P. Sangar, p. 204. This author discusses opium, post, bhang, dhatūra and tobacco 
with many quotations from the Mughal period. See also D. Hall, p. 203.
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portant factor was that the Mughals had a fairly sophisticated monetary 
system.28 Together it formed the backbone of the classical oikoidal 
society (not the modern), in which the centralized political-military enti-
ty is not yet combined with economic capitalist monopolies: the powerful 
Indian opium producers-merchants were private interests, and that is, in 
fact, even the case with the coin minters.29 
The modern capitalist concepts and violent practices backed by some 
Western oikoidal state powers were introduced by the Western invaders. 
In the 17th-century they could upset but not yet revolutionize the Indian 
economy and society, as happened from about 1760 onwards. Thus, cer-
tainly until this date, people like Aurangzeb were confronted with power-
ful merchant families in Surat, Agra, Delhi or Benares, Coromandel or 
Bengal. 
Chaudhuri and others gave them a name and described their deeds, 
including Indians with ‘the sinister reputation of Omichund’ or Jews, 
Greeks and Armenians.30 The latter had already operated for centuries in 
India and continued troubling the activities of the EIC in the 18th-century. 
They all had a major stake in the opium trade as did, for instance, the 
Parsees and Jews in the 19th-century. In short: Aurangzeb’s prohibition 
could have been directed at limiting the economic power of these mer-
chants.
A third view is possible on this remarkable rule which hits at one of the 
most serious activities of important private interests. Under Aurangzeb’s 
regime the struggle was still raging between the Portuguese and Dutch 
for supremacy. Since opium was a typically Dutch afffair, his prohibition 
could be a form of taking sides in this struggle. His practices were fol-
lowed by Muslim scholars active in the Southeast Asian peninsula and 
archipelago. Hall’s description probably illustrates the background of 
Aurangzeb’s prohibition as well:
The Muslim scholars … gave impetus to the political expansion of Islam and 
also strove to promote a sense of unity among the Muslim communities … 
in opposing the advance of Portuguese and, later, Dutch power ... it showed 
28 K. Chaudhuri (1978), chapter 8 and, in particular, p. 174 fff.
29 The oikos concept is also used by J. van Leur, p. 53-60, but in an ahistorical and 
uncritical Weberian way. See H. Derks (1986), passim or H. Derks (2008). A more to the 
point approach can be reached by a “flexibilization” of the classical Marxist positions, 
starting with Marx’s own interpretation of the opium use in India. An interesting article is 
I. Habib, passim. See for the military side also S. Halperin, p. 136-150.  
30 K. Chaudhuri (1978), p. 146 fff. and the contribution of Sushil Chaudhury about the 
Armenian merchants in: I. Baghdiantz McCabe et al (ed.), p. 51-73.
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itself in punishments for using tobacco and opium similar to those  es -
tablished at the same time by Aurangzeb in Mughal India, in anti-European 
propaganda … in stimulating an interest in Mecca and the pilgrimage, and 
in spreading a knowledge of Arabic literary works ...31
In this case, however, Aurangzeb gambled wrongly on the losing party. 
His own defeat could be seen as a consequence of this choice. 
The above considerations concern the production and trade relations 
of the opium business in Mughal India.32 Usually (and erroneously) an 
opium problem is only defĳined as a matter of spreading addiction. What 
about this side of the problem? 
It is well known that in Mughal India, the consumption of opium 
(afyūn or afĳim) and many other intoxicants (bhang, charas, ma’jun, ganja 
or hashish) was widespread among the court, as several authors have 
31 D. Hall, p. 203.
32 For a general assessment of the VOC and Mughal India relationship see the article 
by O. Prakash in: E. Locher-Scholten and P. Rietbergen (ed.), p. 183-201.
Map 4. Sketch-map of North Hindostan showing the Opium districts Behar and Benares 
and the landscapes of the Malwa and Nepal Opium Cultures, ca. 1880
Source: J. Wiselius, 1886, appendix.
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 disclosed.33 A source that uncovers this side is François Pelsaert (1595?-
1630). He was a clever and controversial VOC merchant who lived for 
 seven years in the center of Mughal India, Agra. In 1627 he wrote an exten-
sive historical treatise and an intelligence report for VOC Batavia about 
the previous century of the Mughal society and political developments, 
the kinds of products, about coins and measures, or the position of the 
rich and poor.34 
An often repeated remark in these writings sounds both reasonable 
and uncritical in the mouth of a representative of a violent Western 
nation: 
[The fruitfulness of the land] should be much more abundant but the peas-
ants have been treated so cruelly and without any mercy. The villages, 
which are not able to pay the full rent (because of limited harvests), are 
abandoned; wives and children are sold under the pretext that they are 
rebellious. … So lands remain empty and uncultivated, reclaimed by the 
jungle …35
Pelsaert often comments on the subject of opium. At the beginning of his 
chronicle, he tells the anecdote that a king ‘who always consumed much 
opium’ fell offf the forty steps of a staircase and died in 1556.36 Another 
story reveals how a princely prisoner-addict is personally given his stufff 
by the king.37
The trade of Agra is described in detail. The exports mentioned are 
amphioen (opium), salt or painted cloth.38 Alas, no quantities are given. 
About the present Punjab (Pakistan), he describes how much sugar and 
‘much amphioen’ is grown around the city of Multan, which is  transported 
33 By a.o. K. Lal; S. Mukherjee; S. Sangar. As I write this, an announcement is circulat-
ing of the 21.European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies (26-29.07.2010) in Ger-
many. The abstract of a paper of Nirmal Kumar (‘The creation of morals: alcohol and 
opium consumption among the Mughal elite’) is published as well. 
34 He was controversial because he speculated privately in indigo or in diamonds with 
the money of the VOC; sold young female slaves in particular or had a rather dangerous 
afffair with the wife of an important Mughal offfĳicial, who died in his house under strange 
circumstances, etc. In addition, the adventurer Pelsaert is a clever reporter about the his-
tory and society of the Mughals.
35 F. Pelsaert, p. 295. His description of the sharp antagonism between rich and poor is 
also rigorous, p. 308 fff. Although he had to come up with the usual remarks about the non-
Christian pagans (to flatter his own VOC Directors), he is clearly sympathetic to Islam, 
while Hinduism remains Greek to him. 
36 Idem, p. 72, 73.
37 Idem, p. 112.
38 Idem, p. 254.
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to Agra via Lahore39; Srinagar is also an opium-consuming city.40 A gen-
eral remark about the rich-poor antagonism in Mughal society is that the 
servants are apparently big opium consumers. After listing their many 
kinds of labor—a diffferent servant for every task—he writes:
But they eat constantly much hashish or amphioen, so that they do not feel 
the continuous labor or fatigue. Therefore, they walk around rather dizzy, 
so that if somebody asks them something they only answer after being 
pressed to do so.41
It is difffĳicult to understand how somebody can become tired of helping 
his master onto his horse a few times a day, or ringing a bell if his master 
has to cross the street, cleaning his master’s chair, etc. According to 
Pelsaert, the reason for the opium consumption is exhaustion: he thinks 
that a servant walks ‘25 to 30 coss’ every day, where one coss equals 5 
kilometers! These servants earn 3 to 4 rupees in 40 days. Can they affford 
opium if they do not have Papaver somniferum somehow at their dispos-
al? It is difffĳicult to believe that these servants could be opium addicts. 
Who then are the opium consumers?
The author writes extensively about the position of the well-to-do 
women and their wealth ‘pressed from the sweat of the poor’. These wom-
en must always be prepared to spoil their husbands with all kinds of aph-
rodisiacs, including opium. Apparently, they themselves constantly drink 
wine. Pelsaert reports about other representatives of the elite, for instance, 
that the Rajputs were excellent soldiers ‘because the quantity of opium 
they ate excited them’.42 This reminds me of the later report of Willem 
Schouten about the aristocratic nairos of the Malabar coast. The Hindu 
Rajputs or Rajas were also the subject of Bernier’s travel report, which has 
nearly the same information as Schouten. Bernier:
They might be said to form a species of Gentile nobility ... From an early 
age they are accustomed to the use of opium, and I have sometimes been 
astonished to see the large quantity they swallow. On the day of battle 
they never fail to double the dose, and this drug so animates, or rather 
inebriates them, that they rush into the thickest of the combat insensible 
of danger.43
39 Idem, p. 278.
40 Idem, p. 283, 284.
41 Idem, p. 310.
42 Quoted by S. P. Sangar, p. 203.
43 F. Bernier, p. 39, 40.
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Are other soldiers good opium consumers as well, which is not an unim-
portant question since a Mughal army is quite large? Pelsaert comes up 
with an extensive calculation of what Akbar left behind as a treasure in 
gold, silver, books (24,000 ‘written by great authors’), canons, other weap-
ons (8,575,971) and about two million horses.44 More recent calculations 
support this picture more or less. Around 1650 there were 185,000 horse-
men, 7,000 cavalrymen and matchlock-bearers, 40,000 artillery men as 
well as 40,000 infantry. To this should be added about 4.7 million retain-
ers, including 300,000 horsemen in the employ of the zamīndārs. 
Altogether this is close to fĳive million warriors. However, the total of non-
military personnel in army service and
the nobles and the imperial establishment and the families of all the people 
thus employed ... has been estimated at some 26 million, a remarkably large 
fĳigure for a population estimated at a mere 100 million ...45 
The bulk of this 26 million is maintained at a level of bare subsistence, but 
the fĳive million soldiers mentioned were paid at rates well above that 
level. If we suppose that the latter are opium clients, is it possible to com-
pare this potential consumption to the production? 
It is rather difffĳicult. Bernier goes into extensive detail on the Bengal 
trade in cotton cloth and silks
in particular of the Hollanders ... The Dutch have sometimes seven or eight 
hundred natives employed in their silk factory at Kassem-Bazar ... Bengale 
is also the principal emporium for salpetre ... Lastly, it is from this fruitful 
kingdom, that the best lac, opium, wax, civet, long pepper, and various 
drugs are obtained ...46
This must concern information about the early 1660s. It does not suggest 
that opium is already a booming product in foreign trade (see table 
above). 
44 B. Narain, S. R. Sharma (ed.), p. 33-35. The calculations are not very good: 1,068,248 
horses must be 1,962,547; their 7,281 commanders should be 7,312, etc. The same calcula-
tions, including the errors, are also in F. Pelsaert, p. 116-121. See for similar calculations 
Idem, p. 246 fff. about the aristocrats of Agra. In addition, there are numerous wrong num-
bers in one or the other text. Narain and Sharma reproduce only Pelsaert’s chronicle and 
not the much more interesting Remonstrantie, in my view at least, the “intelligence” report 
for the VOC Directors. But their edition is much more critical than the one of the Dutch 
editors Kolfff and Van Santen. 
45 See the contribution of Tapan Raychaudhuri in: T. Raychaudhuri, I. Habib (ed.), 
p. 179.
46 F. Bernier, p. 439, 440.
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About twenty years later a more detailed assessment is possible. A VOC 
account of the year 1688 states that in Bihar the annual output of opium 
in a normal year is about 8,700 maunds, which is about 600,000 Dutch 
pounds. This account provides the following clue, namely 
that of the total output only about 0.6 percent was consumed within Bihar. 
Another about 10 to 12 percent was sent to other parts of the Bengal region. 
The exports to Agra and Allahabad reportedly accounted for yet another 
34.5 to 46 percent of the total output. The remaining 41 to 55 percent was 
exported to other national and international markets. The average amount 
procured annually by the Dutch Company around this time was approxi-
mately 1,000 maunds [68,000 Dutch pounds], accounting for about 11.5 
percent of the total output. This, of course, does not take into account the 
illegal private trade carried on by the Company’s servants in this item, 
which often matched the trade carried on by the Company.47 
A fĳirst conclusion: in this year 1688 the Dutch offfĳicially exported to the 
East Indies 758.82 maunds (51,600 pounds) and to Malabar 48.24 maunds 
(3,280 pounds), which is a bit more than 800 maunds in total.48 Therefore, 
about 200 maunds are exported to the other destinations mentioned. 
Let’s suppose that the VOC servants privately traded the same amount, 
then one can say that the Dutch in this specifĳic year together distributed 
about 1,600 maunds, and about 7,000 maunds remained somehow in 
northern India.
What does this mean? What kind of proportion did this consumption 
take? A preliminary calculation runs as follows, based on the reasoning 
that Agra and Allahabad were the most important destinations of the opi-
um export. At that time Agra was a big city of 500,000 inhabitants and 
Allahabad of ca. 200,000. 
Together they consumed, therefore, about 3,500 maunds or, on aver-
age, 0.01 maund per person in a year. This equals about 340 grams or less 
than 1 gram a day: nobody can become an addict from this! If one should 
say: opium consumption was only something for the elite at that time 
(say, about 10% of the population of these cities) a consumption of 3,500 
maunds results in about 0.05 maunds per person per year, or 4.5-5 grams 
per person per day. There is a good chance of becoming an addict or at 
least dependent on opium with this daily quantity! Certainly, if it con-
47 O. Prakash (1985), p. 58. On p. 150 for the year 1688-89 Prakash mentions an export 
of only 51,600 pounds and a quantity ordered of 97,000 pounds. One Bengal maund = 68 
Dutch pounds = 75 lbs avoirdupoids = 34.05 kilogram. 
48 O. Prakash (1999), table 6.2 p. 150 and Idem (1985), p. 171
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cerns opium of the Patna quality (and not of the Malwa) at the end of the 
18th-century, world-famous according to the Frenchman Raynal. 
A second calculation focuses on the fĳive million well-paid members of 
the Mughal courts and army. If they consumed the 7000 maunds of the 
remaining Bengal production, the consumption per person per year 
should be about 50 gram, an entirely negligible quantity. 
There are historians (Sinha) who deny that the cultivation of opium 
was encouraged in Mughal India.49 Probably not by the emperors and the 
courts, but certainly by many merchants-producers. The only conclusion 
I can draw from the above is that there must have been a reasonable con-
sumption of opium among what could be called the elite. This, however, 
did not lead to a substantial addiction problem. In all probability, 
Aurangzeb’s prohibition must concern not the consumption or even a 
moral point of view, but the production and trade relations. 
Of course, one knew about the bad efffects of excessive opium con-
sumption, resulting in serious personal problems. Several Asian govern-
ments warned against opium or prohibited its use, but—for the time 
being—we should judge these actions as now analyzed for the Mughal 
empire: not from the consumption side.
One thing is clear: in Mughal India there were no negative moral values 
associated with aphrodisiacs, including opium. Kumar is right to combine 
this moral understanding with the openness about sexuality in the whole 
of Mughal society. West Europeans, mainly missionaries, Protestant trav-
elers and British occupiers demonstrated a totally negative Christian per-
ception of sex or lust with, furthermore, not the least understanding of the 
common use of numerous herbs. The Portuguese were more flexible in 
both respects. Kumar even pointed to the ‘criminalization of herbs and 
medical preparations’ as a consequence of British rule.
Another thing is clear as well: it was the Dutch merchants who pushed 
this Bengal opium production, and after the English took over power in 
India, they remained the main customer until the British transferred this 
trade to the Chinese empire. The target of the Dutch was not India but the 
East Indies archipelago. That will be the setting of the next chapters: they 
deal with those who brought the real Opium Problem into the world, 
which deserve detailed explanations.
49 C.Trocki (1999a), p. 45.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE “VIOLENT OPIUM COMPANY” (VOC) IN THE EAST
… a robber-state along the North Sea ... which build 
railways of stolen money and by way of payment dopes 
with opium, gospel and gin those who are robbed..
Multatuli (Max Havelaar, 1859)
It seems as if a royal monopoly is used as a means to 
get an advantage for the state treasury from an abuse, 
which one is unable to resolve.
J.C.Baud (1853).1
‘The Dutch had used the drug in Java and elsewhere 
not simply as an article of commerce—trading it for 
pepper—but as a useful means for breaking the moral 
resistance of Indonesians, who opposed the introduc-
tion of their semi-servile but immensely profĳitable 
plantation system.’
Jack Beeching2
A “Heart of Darkness” avant la lettre
Joseph Conrad’s horror story about Belgian imperialism in Congo (1899; 
1902) was published at the same time that Multatuli’s famous book found 
its fĳirst readership. Both told the world about what really happened in the 
colonies: of the Dutch in the East Indies and of their civilized neighbors, 
the Belgians, in Africa. For the Dutch Guyana (“West Indies”) their image 
as extremely cruel and greedy slave holders was established long ago by 
the books of the Scottish soldier Stedman (ca. 1790) and others. 
The Asian opium history of the Dutch imperialists and colonists start-
ed long before these publications were written. Its chain of opium histo-
1 J.C.Baud, p. 194.
2 J. Beeching, p. 23, 24. In the very British J. Lovell no comparison is made with the 
Dutch East Indies or whatever other ‘opium realm’.
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ries documents the “heart of darkness” of world history, the Western 
assault on a non-Western world. Slaves and opium, the capture of body 
and mind of non-Westerners in order to establish and expand a Western 
civilization. 
Compared to the magnitude of the Opium Problem in this constella-
tion, the subject is not popular among the general historians of the 20th-
century of all political viewpoints. It is largely left to the willing amateur 
historian, probably to keep the item in the colorful and spectacular world 
of popular historiography. Notwithstanding their sometimes remarkable 
achievements, the disadvantage is that it can be neglected and even dis-
missed by the decision-making elite. Its members expect fĳirst and fore-
most decision legitimating and supporting writings, which are difffĳicult to 
produce in the opium case. For slavery one can point to the glorious, early 
19th-century, British abolition project (Wilberforce), but at the very 
moment a new wave of fabulous opium profĳits were pouring out over the 
Western world. Westerners themselves were still ‘strictly against the use 
of opium by [their] own people’.3 
In this book the Dutch performance must also constitute the “heart of 
darkness”. It is much less well known than the English one: its history 
remained in the dark, notwithstanding that it strikes the heart of the 
Opium Question. The English performance as sketched above can only be 
perceived as a copy of the Dutch example, which will be discussed below. 
General elements, from the bullion game4 to the accompanying 
Christian conversion activities, from the colonial organization to the rise 
of some protests at the end of the 19th-century, will not be repeated or 
only referred to in passing. Only the basic elements of the opium business 
will be highlighted: its initiators, aims, scope, profĳits or corrupting efffects 
on all levels of society and immanent hypocrisy (fĳirst importing it, later 
condemning the indigenous users of the stufff5). 
3 M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 287 note 3.
4 For the serious bullion problems the VOC always had, see the documents in GM, II, 
754; IV, 442 fff; V, 232, 415, 498; VI 79, 271, 335, 449; VIII, 30, 81; XII, 78; XIII, 54-58, 162 fff. and 
so on. It is the difffĳicult story of getting gold and silver, exchanging European coins for 
indigenous ones, re-minting coins, etc. Many millions of Dutch coins were transported 
from Holland to the East. Many of the ships involved in these transports were lost due to 
shipwrecks: the sea route must be a cemetery of ships interesting for treasure hunters like 
Lara Croft, Indiana Jones, etc., but not for us. See K. Glamann, p. 50-73. 
5 Only one example here: Rijklof van Goens, one of the highest and most influential 
VOC offfĳicials around 1660, the admiral who was probably the person most responsible for 
introducing opium as a mass product along the Malabar coast (see ch. 11), was highly den-
igrating towards Javanese aristocrats for using opium. See M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 11. 
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The Dutch Opium Image
An obvious question must be answered at the start: What did the fĳirst 
Dutch conquerors, colonizers and merchants in the East know about the 
product with which they became notoriously linked in history, opium?
The answer can be found in two sources. Some of these colonizers 
judged everything as strange, dangerous, good or bad that deviated from 
their homeland experience. This background knowledge (which can be 
diffferentiated at least between elite and common folk information as the 
Portuguese example shows) had a local or regional European background, 
it was not necessarily of purely Dutch origin. A large percentage (40-65%) 
of the largely illiterate, lower-class personnel of the VOC came from 
abroad, mainly from war-stricken Germany. This rose to 50-80% by the 
end of the VOC period.6 The other source of knowledge was based on new 
experiences as conquerors, traders or colonizers in tropical Asian coun-
tries. Let’s elaborate for a while, fĳirst, on the homeland knowledge about 
opium, referring to what was already mentioned in ch. 8 and 10.
Laudanum Paracelsi
Before 1800 no relevant health infrastructure existed in England, and 
there was not much diffference between the knowledge of learned doctors 
and mendicant folk-healers. The majority of families in town and country 
had to rely on their own inherited knowledge and experience in matters 
of pain and illness. 
However, in relatively developed and rich cities in Western Europe, 
like the Flemish or Dutch ones, a rather reasonable health infrastructure 
already existed in the 17th-century, with hospitals, doctors and apothecar-
ies, including an established trade in resources. Local authorities were 
keen to regulate this still difffuse health market, primarily because they 
were confronted all too often with serious health hazards. One of the foci 
of their attention was the medicine distributed or prescribed in town.
One symptomatic example will sufffĳice here. In 1663-64 the Flemish city 
of Ghent issued the following regulation:
Article XIV. Because there should be no suspicion of fraud, the [local] apoth-
ecaries are not allowed to make [medicines like] the Triakel, Mithridaet ... 
Laudanum Opiatum ... and the like, unless some of the Doctors College 
has independently inspected the ingredients needed to compose these 
6 F. Gaastra (1991), p. 81.
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medicines ... whereupon the Doctor has to give a written testimony to the 
apothecary in which date of the day and year is given when the ingredient 
was made and the visitation done ... this on pain of a fĳine of six guilders for 
every composite without such a testimony and of confĳiscation of the com-
posite ...7 
These three opium products had nearly the same price: per 1 dragma (= 
3.9 gram), namely 1 stuyver (= fĳive Dutch cents); the triakel was slightly 
more expensive: seven cents per dragma. The triakel (theriaca, treacle, 
thériaque) was one of the best known.8 It was imported to Western 
Europe through Venice, the main mediator between Arab countries and 
the West. It was apparently invented by one of the internationally famous 
Arab medical doctors of the 12th and 13th centuries and used as an anti-
dote, wonder-drink and the like, esepcially for kings and popes. 
One of these learned men, the Egyptian Aboul Mena ben Abi Nasr ben 
Hafffahd, made the fĳirst manual for apothecaries, the fĳifth chapter of 
which concerned opiates (ca. 1250). A French translation from 1844 also 
mentions the thériaque, composed of about seventy ingredients, of which 
honey was the largest one and ‘opium choisi’ the second.9 Once the 
Venetians had distributed the recipe and the product in the second half of 
the 15th-century, the custom arose of preparing it in public with much 
pomp, attended by the worldly authorities as well as the “experts”. The 
sales talk about its use in antiquity by Roman emperors made it more 
expensive and attractive. 
As an antidote it was perceived as the ultimate medicine against all dis-
eases, pains and other nasty states. Vanderwiele: ‘ ... the triakel is a true 
panacea. It is immediately clear that the healing efffects in particular had 
7 L. Vandewiele, p. 11, 12.
8 See P. Boussel, H. Bonnemain, p. 93 fff., 99, 109, 181; M. Lindemann, p. 61, 264; the 
articles of Wolfgang Schneider and Rudolf Schmitz in G. Völger, K. von Weck (ed.), vol. 2, 
p. 630-639 and 650-662. Andromachus, a Greek physician to Emperor Nero (AD 54-63) is 
named as the inventor in Smith’s Classical Dictionary (not in the OCD, Lübker or Kleine 
Pauly). Pharmacists use the Latin, anyway, theriaca andromachi. The fĳirst publication of 
his text, a recipe in 174 lines, however, dates from 1607. This makes it rather difffĳicult to 
expect that authorities in a Flemish city gave detailed instructions concerning some 
“andromachian” medicine. Theriaque is still the name of a US government database about 
side efffects of drugs with 3,300 monographs (see www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7855764). 
Certainly the wonder drink made by Panoramix in a big cauldron, which made Asterix and 
Obelix invincible, was a good example of a treacle.
9 See Idem, p. 99. In L. Vandewiele p. 13 all the ingredients are listed as well but with-
out quantities.
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to come from the opium in it.’10 Even in 1774 there was a public prepara-
tion of theriaca in Liège. 
Of course, nobody knows whether products as spectacular as these 
resulted in the expected healing. The method of composing something 
from many components (sometimes the theriaca had more than one hun-
dred ingredients) was also a medieval Catholic way of thinking, and prag-
matically inspired by the idea that one of them must provide relief. This 
kind of thinking is still demonstrated in the following illustration and 
Pozzi’s explanation in 1892:
It was, therefore, not an ill saying, though an old one perhaps, that the 
government of Venice was rich and consolatory like its treacle, being com-
pounded nicely of all the other forms—a grain of monarchy, a scruple of 
democracy, a dragma of oligarchy, and an ounce of aristocracy—as the the-
riaca so much esteemed is said to be a composition of the four principal 
drugs, but never found to be genuine except here, at the original dis -
pensary.11
10 L. Vanderwiele, p. 13.  
11 Quoted by B. Hodgson, p. 21 from Hester Piozzi’s book, Glimpses of Italian Society 
(1892). For the theriaca see also E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 56, 438.
Ill. 10. Venice and its Treacle
Source: B. Hodgson, p. 21.
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Modern times arrived when the components of these composites were 
‘isolated’ and sold as separate products, made by professionals. In a subse-
quent stage after opium, heroin, morphine or codeine were ‘isolated’ in 
the 19th-century.
The next product mentioned in the Ghent regulation, mithridate (mith-
ridatum or mithridaticum), was comparable to the fĳirst and sometimes 
even considered theriaca itself. It was mostly “defĳined” as the father of all 
medicines, the theriaca as the mother. Indeed, it was a semi-mythical 
antidote and poison composed of 64 ingredients. Opium is also an impor-
tant ingredient, but this time in the form of the thickened juice of poppy 
heads. Around 1800 in England one could still prescribe this “medicine” 
and also several other composite preparations.12
Laudanum opiatum, fĳinally, is composed of only fĳive ingredients, but 
here opium is the main one, as the thickened juice of poppy heads. It is 
normally consumed in pill form; in the 19th and 20th-century it was most-
ly taken as a tincture. There are many kinds of laudanum. Paracelsus (ca. 
1490-1540) is thought to have invented it. The most popular variant is 
called Laudanum Sydenhamii after the English physician Thomas 
Sydenham (1624-1689), who was a staunch supporter of opium and its 
treacle form. This was also the case with his well-known contemporary, 
the Dutch colleague Franciscus Sylvius (1614-1672), and later with the 
world-famous Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738).13 
The opium and many other ingredients had to come from the Levant 
trade with Venice as the intermediary between Turkey or Persia and 
Western European countries. The position of Venice deteriorated over 
time, but these trade relations were so strong that in England or Germany 
certainly the opium for the offfĳicial health market was imported from 
Turkey and not from the Far East until about 1930 (see ch. 8). 
Another important diffference concerned the method of consumption 
of health products, opium in particular: the majority of the descriptions 
still considered opium smoking a typical Eastern custom (and, therefore, 
detestable). Western medicinal consumption of opium involved tinc-
tures, pills and ointments. It concerns one of the many mistakes in the 
12 V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. xxiv.
13 Idem, p. xxiv for a long quotation of Sydenham. See also B. Hodgson, p. 19, 24. In 
Germany Johannes Hartmann (1568-1631) experimented with his students in 1615 with 
numerous opium preparations. In 1674 improvements were reported in one of the fĳirst 
Opiologia’s from Georg Wedel. Opium was prescribed for all possible diseases. See Rudolf 
Schmitz, p. 655. So, what the authorities in the city of Ghent demonstrated was really 
“modern”.
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Western perception of the Opium Problem: opium’s morphine content, 
which is the addictive element, is to a specifĳic degree (30%-60%) negated 
by heat, depending on the smoking method used.
Notwithstanding this, smoking was seen by the representatives of the 
Western health market as a negative, health-deteriorating activity; only 
primitive people like sailors smoke, and until recently sailor’s tobacco was 
the strongest kind, whereas civilized city-people smoked with a perfumed 
and fĳiltered kind of device.
The Sailor’s Health
It was the VOC which cared for the health of its sailors much more than 
the EIC, as they had to go on long voyages to the strange Eastern lands. 
Ill. 11. List of Medicines in the Ship’s Doctor’s Chest, ca. 1660
Source: A.F. Leuftink, p. 31. This list contains a typical European selection of medicines 
which seems obvious, but is not: one did not resort to indigenous Indian or East Indies 
cures and methods during those centuries. Laudanum Opiatum is mentioned (left row 
12th place from above); in the middle of the other row ‘Therebint. Venet.’ could refer to the 
Venetian theriaca, while another Papaver-extract is given as well.
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Medical personnel were available on nearly all ships, with their instru-
ments and a specifĳic chest full of pills, tinctures and ointments.
After long deliberations among the decision-makers of the VOC, with 
advice from medical doctors, a list of 144 ingredients was drawn up for the 
medicine chests on their ships. They consisted of some single products 
like specifĳic seeds, oils or minerals. Most of them, however, were prepara-
tions like ointments, tinctures or syrups based on complicated recipes: 
‘For the preparation ... of the often prescribed opium preparation Theriac, 
one used 60 diffferent ingredients.’14 
Indeed, the content of the chest in the 17th and 18th centuries was ulti-
mately based on old European knowledge and traditions. Because the 
overriding idea was that diseases were caused by bad fumes in the envi-
ronment leading to fermentation or putrefaction inside the body, one 
needed preparations causing vomiting, laxation, coughing, sweating and 
so on, and specifĳic treatments like blood-letting. Opium in whatever form 
(laudanum, belladonna) was used as a painkiller, to stop excessive diar-
rhoea, and added to many proprietary cures like a stimulant for sweating, 
against syphilis, typhoid and the like.15 The market was large for these 
opium products: in the 1770s about 2,000 sailors per year died of typhoid 
alone on VOC ships.16 
Leuftink rightly concluded:
There seems to be a remarkable contradiction between the large interest ... 
in the availability of medicines and the evidence of being powerless against 
the serious diseases on board.17 
That was not the only contradiction: the West European use of opium as 
a major means to relieve oneself of pain and sorrow contrasted strongly 
with the West European perception of Eastern opium. 
The Asiatic Opium Image of the Dutch
It is likely that the fĳirst knowledge about “Asia” was derived from Jan 
Huygen van Linschoten’s Itinerario (1596) and other writings at the time 
(Barbosa or De Orta), although one cannot exclude the possibility 
14 A. Leuftink, p. 30.
15 Idem, p. 127, 137. 
16 Idem, p. 139. For related USA chests for military use during the American Revolution 
(ca. 1776), see E. Kremers, G.Urdang, p. 153.
17 A. Leuftink, p. 30.
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that Portuguese or Spanish merchants or prisoners talked about it some-
where. 
In the fĳirst relevant analysis of the opium problem and trade, Baud’s 
1853 study, he reviewed the earliest Dutch and English travel literature 
around 1600, but could not fĳind many references to opium. Concerning 
Ill. 12. Several Amputations and the Cauterization of Wounds, 1657
Source: A.F. Leuftink, p. 213, originally published in Johannes Scultetus, Magazijn ofte wa -
penhuis der chirurgijns [Arsenal of the physicians], 1657. As painkiller one used alcohol and 
also opium (laudanum), if they were available!
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the Moluccas, Bantam and Aceh, there were recommendations to trade in 
many products including amphioen (opium). He revealed several contra-
dictions in this literature, but concluded that only the “Spice Islands” cer-
tainly knew about opium and
that those who began to eat or smoke opium could be found only among 
foreign Asians and among the rich and important people of the indigenous 
population.18 
Later, there were many Dutch travelers like Valentijn, Schouten, Pelsaert 
who wrote extensively about what they knew of opium. These traveler-
writers also reported about opium (amphioen) in a context of death and 
delirium. Take, for instance, the passage in the popular story of the sur-
geon Wouter Schouten, the Oost-Indische Voyagie (1676), which was 
immediately translated into several European languages:
In this month of February [1659] I saw in Batavia how the breasts of an 
Indies man were pinched offf by the hangman with glowing pincers. Next, 
the lower parts of his body were broken upon the wheel. The reason was 
that the man after using amphioen (a wicked custom of these Indies men) 
became mad and drunk, started to shout “amuck” ... in which condition he 
had killed fĳive people ... It is said that this kind of killing was committed 
often, inside as well as outside Batavia. The reason is mainly the use of 
amphioen, popular among these people. During my stay in Batavia this was 
already the third amuck runner who was broken upon the wheel thanks to 
his murders.19 
A report from Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), a German physician who 
had joined the VOC, confĳirms that opium is smoked in Java:
[There is] also [another] strange use of opium among the nigritas [Java-
nese]; for they mix with it tobacco diluted with water so that when kindled 
the head spins more violently. In Java, I saw flimsy sheds [made of] reeds 
in which this kind of tobacco was set out [for sale] to passers-by. No com-
modity throughout the Indies is retailed with greater return by the Batavi-
ans than opium, which [its] users cannot do without, nor can they come by 
it except it be brought by ships of the Batavians from Bengal and Coroman-
del.20
18 J. C. Baud, p. 89. See also J. Meiss, p. 56.
19 W. Schouten, p. 50. Schouten reports here about a slave from Bali, a certain Polo, 
who fĳirst killed his Chinese master, then himself. His corpse was brought to the gallows as 
food for the birds; see Idem, p. 109 note 14. That he killed fĳive people must be an exaggera-
tion.
20 Quoted by C. Trocki (1999a), p. 35.
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Again, like the Portuguese, the Dutch ships arrived with opium in very 
small quantities. In all probability both copied the behavior of earlier 
merchants like the Arab or Middle Eastern ones which traded in all kinds 
of drugs and aphrodisiacs. In the East Indies, for instance, Bantam 
(Bantĕn) on West Java was an important commercial center long before 
the Portuguese came. For the Dutch, who refrained largely from becom-
ing users themselves, opium remained a means provided for economic—
strategic reasons: it smoothed the trade with indigenous rulers as they 
started to settle here and there in the archipelago.
VOC physician Kaempfer reported about other qualities of opium and 
confĳirmed Schouten’s remarks:
People who have an unstoppable aversion in life or in their diseases ... pre-
pare themselves for their death. In their revenge against their fate, they also 
look to kill other people. To this aim they swallow a piece of opium with 
the result that they are overcome by a frenzy to such a degree that they go 
on the street with a dagger to kill all they meet, friend or foe, until they 
themselves are fatally stabbed ...21 
In Palembang (Sumatra) in 1642, the VOC obtained a monopoly from the 
Sultan to import opium and textiles. The population of the entire 
Sultanate was obliged to maintain a fĳixed number of pepper plants. 
Neglect of the gardens ‘was severely punished, as were opium smoking 
and gambling’.22 This must have been an order of the Sultan, who was 
interested increasing production as much as possible. If the Dutch could 
not buy pepper, there were always other Europeans available. For the 
Dutch this was smuggling and in variance with the monopoly contract in 
a double sense: neither the pepper nor the opium trade was supported.
Elsewhere, the opium strategy had another face. The notoriously 
repressive clove cultivation of Ambon or Amboina was fully developed by 
the Dutch in the 1660s. To regulate the yields, the Company not only car-
ried out hongi expeditions (destruction of yields to keep the price as high 
as possible) but ‘even considered importing opium, in the expectation 
that it would make the Ambo(i)nese lose their work motivation’.23 Indeed, 
cloves were for the European markets (and some Asian VOC clients); opi-
um, like slaves, only for the indigenous market. These strategies did not 
change until opium (amphioen) became a profĳitable trade product in its 
own right. This situation developed in the 1660s through the barter trade 
21 Quoted by R. Schmitz in G. Völger, K. von Welck, vol. 2, p. 658.
22 E. Jacobs, p. 66.
23 Idem, p. 18.
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on the Malabar coast as indicated earlier when opium served as “money” 
and as a mass product. Only from that date onwards is Baud’s conclusion 
valid concerning the period 1620-1740:
In one and a half centuries [the VOC] succeeded in increasing the use of 
opium on Java twenty-fold, while continuously complaining that the turn-
over was not large enough.24 
What about the Dutch headquarters of the VOC where the lawyer Pieter 
van Dam (1639-1701) worked? He was the fĳirst offfĳicially appointed histo-
rian of the VOC. The Board, The Seventeen Gentlemen, explicitly ordered 
him to write its history in detail, including all the failed actions, so that 
they could learn what to avoid in the future. Normally, the historians of a 
company exaggerate the glorious deeds of their subject, but here the 
directors asked for the truth. In 1693 they were deeply concerned about 
‘the astonishing course of events and near total chaos and corruption in 
the government of their business in India’.25 
However, in all seven volumes Van Dam did not answer one of my 
burning questions: who decided to deal in opium on the Indian coasts in 
the way described above, and why exactly was this product chosen?26 
Was it so easy or normal to deal in a controversial product as described by 
Van Dam or Van Linschoten? 
Shortly before he died, he published the following about opium, as if 
the information was not available:
Amphioen, in Latin opium, comes from Patna and from Gualoor, a land-
scape in Hindustan; it is the gum from cut up balls, which is rather popular 
in Asiatic nations, and they like it very much. The young and also the com-
mon men use those balls prepared in boiled water instead of amphioen. 
The Persians say that their aristocrats invented the fĳirst use of it, when they 
could not get to sleep for worrying about important matters. The common 
man [in Persia] and neighboring countries followed. Only a few people do 
not use it. 
 One takes daily a quantity as large as a pea. This doe not so much induce 
sleep, but strengthens the mind, in particular in war or on long voyages. 
When runners have to bring messages or letters over land, they are sup-
posed to become strong and to feel no sorrow nor labor. However, most of 
the time one uses it for sex [literally: for the unchastity]. Those who take it 
daily become sleepy and stupid or uncontrolled in their words and deeds. 
24 J. C. Baud, p. 116.
25 P. van Dam, GS 63, p. X.
26 It is the same with the decision to exterminate all who were racially “undervalued” 
by the Germans. Was this order given in writing? Was it Hitler or not? Etc.  
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It is a lethal poison, unless one uses it in a modest and prudent way. There-
fore, those who like to use it should start with a bit, so that they can become 
accustomed to it. But after they stop taking it for four or fĳive days, they can 
develop a lethal sickness; those who never used it and swallow 10 to 12 
grains will die.27 
Pieter van Dam wrote this partly based on the reports of captains of VOC 
ships or of administrators in the VOC settlements.28 The author points to 
Persia as the country of origin, which is acceptable since the word “amphi-
oen” is derived from the Arabic “afĳiun”.29 Like Jan Huygen van Linschoten, 
whose writings of a century earlier he knew perfectly well, Van Dam dif-
ferentiates between the use of the juice and the poppy balls. The latter 
were consumed by the “lower or uninformed classes” as a kind of arti-
choke; the juice-product was reserved for the aristocrats. And he again 
stresses the dangers (poison, etc.) and attractions (war, sex), although 
he—as a Calvinist—defĳined sex as a sin and war as the best means to 
punish the unbelievers and primitives. 
His contemporary Engelbert Kaempfer arrived in 1689 in Batavia 
before continuing on to Deshima, Japan. Here he learned from Japanese 
colleagues a specifĳic prescription with Papaver somniferum:
.... a secret against impotency, which was communicated to me by an expert 
Japanese physician, as somewhat very valuable. Take as much as you please 
of crude opium, put it into a piece of linen, and suspend it in the smoke of 
boiling hot water; what sweats out of the linen, and sticks to the outside, 
afffords the best and purest opium. Take this substance, mix it with twice 
the quantity of ambergrease, and make it up into small pills. A few of these 
pills taken inwardly, at night before you go to bed, are said to be excellent 
stimulating medicine in that case.30
27 P. van Dam, GS 76, p. 32, 33. 
28 He is partly quoting from J. H. van Linschoten, vol. 2, p. 112, 113 without mentioning 
the source.
29 They say that both “opium” and “afĳiun” could be derived from the Greek, but this 
must be part of the 19th-century legitimation history. According to the OED “opiate” is 
used for the fĳirst time in 1543 as a purely medical latinization; it is a means inducing sleep. 
The OED does not even indicate a year of fĳirst use for “opium”, which is usually done. It 
took another sixty years before one started using the narco-connotations of opiate. In the 
19th-century Dutch writers in the East Indies knew perfectly well that the word opium had 
nothing to do with Latin, but was only a corruption of afĳioen or apioen. See N. Struick, p. 3 
note.
30 E. Kaempfer, p. 300 in 1995 edition; same text in the 1727 edition p. 51, 52. Amber-
grease is a waxy substance formed in the intestine of sperm whales and used chiefly as a 
spice in the East. 
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It would be interesting to ascertain whether these Japanese physicians 
had experimented with opium themselves or fell victim to the Dutch (or 
eventually Portuguese) advertisement of their opium trade. Since 1609 
the Dutch had been traveling to Japan for the highly lucrative silver and 
silk trade, but en passant “medical knowledge” was exchanged as well. 
The obvious reason for the VOC to circulate opium as a mass product 
was to save bullion and gain better opportunities in the intra-Asian trade. 
However, knowing what kind of stufff it was, they must have thought that 
the end justifĳied the means: everything was allowed when making a prof-
it from “primitive pagans” and, certainly, if you could keep them quiet “in 
the same stroke”. 
Double Dutch Violence
Why is the Dutch government also referred to here? In his highly relevant 
historiography, Van Dam published many documents. One, about the 
public status and legitimation of the VOC, states
that the traveling to and trading with the East Indies is not a private venture, 
but a large, important activity of the State, so that the consequences of its 
[the VOC’s] acts afffect the common case ... [elsewhere is indicated] that the 
investments are made from the State’s fĳinancial resources, hoping that these 
in the future will result in large profĳits benefĳiting the good inhabitants of 
our country ... [therefore] ... the military sent out have to swear fĳidelity to 
the States General and His Highness, the Prince of Orange … [The VOC is, 
therefore, called a] public authority ... to do harm to our common enemy 
and to promote the right and honorable commerce ...31 
The decision-making people in the 17th-century could have had their 
doubts about the honorable character of their trade, but did not mention 
much about it. So, let us suppose that they had no scruples at all. Both 
aims (“enemy” and “commerce”) are fulfĳilled in an extravagant way. 
The VOC was, indeed, a commercial venture as well as a war-machine. 
Basic to both are the monopolies and claims its governors (the so-called 
Seventeen Gentlemen), the States General (the Dutch government) and 
the Prince of Orange (simply an army general, Stadhouder, not even admi-
ral of the dominant fleet) announced out of the blue. They were the main 
means of a threefold strategy: rule by conquest where the VOC claimed 
direct territorial sovereignty (Banda islands, Batavia, etc.); authority and 
31 P. van Dam, GS 63, p. 73, 74.
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Figures 4 and 5. Schematic Diagrams of the Organization of the VOC—General and of the 
VOC—Asia 
Source: Adapted from F.S. Gaastra, De geschiedenis van de VOC (2nd edition, Zutphen, 1991) 
by A. Meilink-Roelofsz et al., p. 106, 108.
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trade through monopoly contracts; trade by treaties with excessively 
strong Asian rulers.32 
These aims of the decision-makers provided the power and authority 
of the executors: captains of ships, admirals of fleets, commanders of 
strongholds, governors of settlements or whole countries. With these 
“legal possibilities” they committed large-scale atrocities, built forts, 
appointed leading persons, encamped soldiers, toppled regimes or made 
treaties with foreign potentates. These master-merchants were in prac-
tice also absolute masters over life and death of not only their own sol-
diers and sailors, but also of foreigners if that was opportune: they could 
attack and kill them, destroy their cities, steal their products, sink their 
ships, etc. Indeed, the octroy (charter; authorization) given to the VOC 
and its executors was also a license to kill. 
Van Dam provides the relevant documents like the one in which the 
limits of the acts of the VOC are given. ‘Limits’ is here the understatement 
of the century:
… nobody from these countries is allowed to sail, to trade or to negotiate, 
except the Company, within the limits given in the octroy, that is to say: … 
the meridian touching the Cape of Good Hope, which goes directly to the 
southern and eastern meridian one hundred miles east of the Salomon 
islands ... [etc.] ... All seas, gulfs, straits, creeks, bays, rivers still to be dis-
covered between those two meridians, will be comprised in this con-
tract. … here it is forbidden to everybody to trade in the East Indies beyond 
the Cabo Bona Speï, except the East Indies Company … it is furthermore 
forbidden from these countries or royalties ... in someone else’s service than 
of the Company’s, to sail or to trade on penalty of loss of life, ships and cargo 
…33 
This and similar octroys are declarations of war against everybody who 
does not act in the interest of the Dutch State—VOC in about half of the 
world! One can only be astonished about the ‘arrogance and ignorance’ 
(see Rashid in the Preface) of these Seventeen Gentlemen in declaring this 
trade war, and assuming that people on the other side of the globe would 
accept this without counter-violence, revenge, guerrilla warfare and other 
countermeasures.
32 See K. Ward, chapter two, for a more detailed analysis of these forms of the imperi-
alist power play. J. Somers, p. 57 fff., the newest Dutch political-juridical analysis at issue, 
does not understand the wrong impact of the Mare Liberum doctrine, nor the impact of 
the monopoly theory and practice.
33 P. van Dam, idem, p. 76, 77.
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It was inevitable that these actions would be taken. They triggered a 
chain of bloodshed until one of the parties was exhausted, which started 
again when it recovered. In the Dutch case this endless war stopped 
around 1950 when they were defĳinitely kicked out of the Indonesian archi-
pelago. The Dutch side (and other Western powers who declared the 
same wars) assumed it had some ‘right to conquer’ which was nothing but 
risking the use of better canons and guns instead of trading in a peaceful 
way, as it was a regular daily practice in Western Europe at the time. 
However, it assumed that another does not have such a right or, at 
least, that he has to accept all consequences resulting from this “right”. A 
new salvo was the only legitimation. The only legitimate act, resistance, 
nearly always led to a greater proliferation of violence from the intruders 
and not to negotiations with restitution of damages or other acts of repen-
tance. That was, certainly, “forgotten” as a matter of principle when later 
the unavoidable (and legitimate) guerrilla war against the Western repres-
sion started. And afterwards, one did not look back in anger.34
34 In January 2009 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Afffairs, M. Verhagen, visited Indone-
sia to talk also (along with the usual business) to the relatives of the victims of a Dutch 
mass-murder incident in the Javanese village of Rawagede (1947). In that year about 450 
men were murdered by Dutch soldiers looking for resistance fĳighters. Verhagen promised 
much, but did not apologize for this event, nor did he pay compensation as that would 
have been perceived as a declaration of guilt. Earlier, in December 2008, the Dutch Ambas-
sador had already said “Sorry” about “Rawagede”, but refused to apologize for it. In the 350 
Map 5. Octroy area of the VOC during 1602-1795 
Source: M. Meilink-Roelofsz et al. [ed.], p. 101.
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Who are the enemies of the Dutch State—VOC elite? For this relatively 
small Calvinist group, the closest enemies in Holland or other provinces 
were certainly their own inhabitants, bureaucrats, soldiers or sailors. Only 
a few decades earlier the whole population had been Roman Catholic. 
The new preachers were fanatic sectarians always ready to fĳight each oth-
er and the fabled “rest of the world”. Many of their hairsplitting arguments 
are to be found in long series of measures fĳixed in rules and contracts 
about who is allowed to benefĳit from captured ships and goods; who will 
be punished with monetary fĳines for the slightest mistakes; draconian 
death penalties for anyone daring to attack the authority of the Calvinist 
elite or punishments for corrupting everybody outside this elite, and so 
on.35 
The legitimation for these continuous internal suspicions and severe 
punishments is not only the vengeful Calvinist concept of God, but cer-
tainly also the relation between an absolute, unassailable position of the 
elite and the folk who had to do the dirty work for the VOC. This folk 
belonged largely to the scum of the nation, the mercenaries roaming 
around in war-stricken Europe.36 The distance between the rich and the 
poor in—say—prosperous Amsterdam of the Golden Age is represented 
in the offfĳicial annual remunerations: 7000 guilders for the mayor and 200 
for a VOC soldier.37
In the outside world, the arch-enemies were the former masters, 
Catholic Spain and Portugal. They had already captured the largest parts 
of the non-European world. The new Protestant imperialists wanted their 
share and, if possible, all of it. 
In the 17th and the largest part of the 18th-century, England was not a 
real enemy of the Dutch in the East. They appreciated each other as the 
enemy of their enemy; as a “well-armed friend”, who must sometimes 
learn a harsh lesson from the strongest in the permanent competition. In 
addition, the “friend” had the wrong Protestant belief and government, 
years of the Dutch occupation of the archipelago, it is estimated that several million indig-
enous peoples were killed by the Dutch. There is not even a list of all the “Rawagedes”; that 
would be a long list, because at least one conflict was occurring somewhere in the archi-
pelago every year. It took another two years before an offfĳicial apology and some money 
was given.   
35 See, for instance, Idem, p. 78-91.
36 C. Boxer (1965), p. 244.
37 This 35: 1 relation represented no real diffferences. The mayor could easily get a mul-
tiple of that amount through additional sources, while the VOC soldier’s payments were 
reduced by all kinds of fĳines. For all possible wages, etc. in the 16th–18th-century, see J. de 
Vries, A. van der Woude, part four.
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notwithstanding the fact that a Dutch Stadhouder could become king in 
England (William III). Several English-Dutch Wars were fought at sea in 
Europe, which were ultimately lost by the Dutch in the West as well as in 
Asia. 
In the East the English only gradually arrived at a hegemonic position 
thanks to its fleet and the occupation of the largest land mass. This result-
ed, however, in something of a status-quo at the end of the 18th-century. 
Roughly: “British” India and the “Dutch” East Indies on opposite sides, 
“French” Indo-China in between, and China as prey for everybody.
Until about 1750 Holland was still “master of the Asian seas”. It was able 
to make a deal with the English EIC in another octroy (1619) which stated 
that no other body except the two Companies will be allowed to benefĳit 
and profĳit from a mutual treaty.38 This is a rather exceptional situation. 
After 1600 the normal daily practice among the main European countries 
was extensive and cruel religious wars on land and on sea (between “offfĳi-
cial” fleets of private or state-pirates).39 
All the people involved in these ventures were accustomed to showing 
no mercy to anybody, using torture routinely and slaughtering innocent 
people wholesale. It is very difffĳicult to fĳind elsewhere an example of such 
a prolonged lethal “friendship” between these West Europeans, who made 
up their minds to conquer the “rest of the world”. Notwithstanding all 
this, gradually rules of the game developed (“Mare Liberum”; Protestants 
and Catholics must not fĳight each other, etc.) and some treaties or bonds 
which lasted longer than a few months. 
Outside the European world, everybody was an enemy by defĳinition. 
This was due not only to their misunderstood commercial competition 
but also to cultural self-exaltation or racist and religious connotations in 
Western belief systems. Here a general cruelty was envisaged (to exploit 
the “other” and to convert them by all means) which was normally not 
done with European enemies. 
The main consequences were that Westerners thought they could (for 
some: had the right to) expropriate and exploit the bodies (slavery) and 
souls (opium) of those foreign people at will. At least from about the 14th-
century, in Western Europe neither slavery nor opium existed as social 
phenomena, was not allowed or not available on a mass production scale. 
For the outside world Europeans developed forms of racism to justify 
38 Idem, p. 77.
39 D. Starkey, M. Hahn-Pedersen (ed.), part 1; for the 19th and 20th-century European 
wars, S. Halperin is indispensable.
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slavery and the opium exploitation.40 The internationally operating 
Catholics fĳirst invented strategies to incorporate (violently) those who 
were deemed “racially impure”; the Protestants were much more rigorous, 
always prepared for the sharpest forms of segregation up to genocidal 
elimination of specifĳic colored and/or non-Christian groups. This is not 
the whole picture but the main context of the stupendous violence and 
cruelty of the West European nations towards non-European countries. 
Monopoly Wars
From the Portuguese the Dutch learned many things as was described in 
ch. 10. One important subject is not mentioned there: the monopoly game. 
The Dutch learned from the Portuguese attempts to monopolize both the 
Euro-Asian and the intra-Asian trade in spices. They soon extended this 
to almost all other products. This monopoly game was only successful if it 
was based on military power: threatening, destroying or slaughtering peo-
ples and their cities and land for the slightest reasons. 
One of the fĳirst of the ferocious Dutch civil conquerors, Governor-
General Jan Pietersz Coen, wrote to his VOC Directors in Amsterdam in 
1614:
You gentlemen should well know from experience that in Asia trade must 
be driven and maintained under the protection and favor of your own weap-
ons, and that the weapons must be wielded from the profĳits gained by the 
trade; so that trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without 
trade.41
Among the highest Portuguese or Spanish offfĳicials, like the Crown lawyer 
Joao Pinto Ribeiro, it was commonly held that wars could only be fĳinanced 
from trading profĳits. He wrote that the Dutch ‘understood this truism 
much better than the authorities’ in Europe. He should have pointed out 
the global constellation in this matter: there was an intimate relationship 
between the colonial and the internecine European wars; expansion in 
the East provided resources for these European wars and was to a consid-
erable extent generated by them. Or: treaties among European powers 
40 See the article “slavery” in E. Cashmore (ed.), p. 312-316.
41 Quoted by C. Boxer, VI-3, also for the following remarks about Joao Pinto Ribeiro. In 
F. Gaastra, p. 94 there is a table which gives the fĳigures about the indigenous service per-
sonnel and slaves in 20 Dutch settlements (‘Indische Comptoiren’) in the year 1687-88: 
3,605 of the former and 2,384 slaves. The most extensive households were apparently in 
Ceylon (nearly 3,000 in total) and Batavia (about 2,000). M. Ricklefs (1981, 1993).
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Ill. 13. Cargo List of Nine Homewardbound Eastindiamen, 1690 
Source: A. Meilink-Roelofsz et al. [ed.], p. 80. Pepper and saltpetre belonged to the largest 
part of the cargo; tin, silk and sapan-wood came next. Whatever other products (dragon-
blood, marmalade or bird’s nests) were shipped, no opium was carried back to Europe. 
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and their changes made it possible/impossible to make commercial 
agreements in Asian waters between, for instance, the English and Dutch 
against the Spaniards and Portuguese until the fĳirst couple fought in 
Europe the four English-Dutch Wars.
There are scholars who argue that ‘the principal export of pre-industri-
al Europe to the rest of the world was violence’. In my view this is a rather 
obvious remark, but Prakash thinks otherwise:
Violence on sea was a weapon of the last resort, to be used as sparingly as 
possible, for the simple reason that it was by no means a cheap process. 
Ordinarily, both sides would fĳirst seek to resolve conflict and only in the 
event of a deadlock would either side resort to actual violence.42
Certainly, actions were often costly, and especially for the greedy Dutch, 
this argument was an important part of the considerations. However, this 
would mainly concern the actions on land which require large bands or 
armies of Western soldiers and longer (sometimes permanent) occupa-
tions, fortifĳications and so on. Earlier, Prakash made the relevant remark 
that ‘by far the most crucial element in the new situation was the armed 
superiority of European ships over their Asian counterparts’. To support 
this, he tells the story of six English ships which in 1612 
congregated offf the Arabian coast and hijacked, in succession, fĳifteen pass-
ing ships from India, culminating in the capture of the great 1000-ton ves-
sel Rahimi, which belonged to the mother of the Mughal emperor. The 
prizes were taken to a nearby anchorage and plundered at will. ... the Eng-
lish could do this with impunity …43 
The cost? Nothing, but some ammunition. This is pure piracy in search of 
a prey. The risks of this were minimal once the ship had arrived in Asian 
waters, and the gains often enormous. For the underpaid scum of the 
Western nations, this was not only a welcome, but a necessary “additional 
income” or status at home. That situation changed as soon as Europeans 
landed and the Indian potentates knew this perfectly well when they told 
each other that they could be ‘master only of land and not of the sea.’ 
Of the 4,700 ships which were fĳitted out by the VOC (transporting 
about one million people from Europe to Asia), there were only a few 
which were not involved in this kind of piracy somewhere in the realm. 
Most of them were also involved in bombardments of coastal settlements 
before they started to plunder these villages or cities and murder all who 
42 O. Prakash in: E. Locher-Scholten, P. Rietbergen (ed.), p. 192.
43 Idem, p. 186, 187.
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could not take refuge in the jungle or interior. Westerners mostly did not 
dare to go there, being afraid of armed enemies (much better guerrilla 
fĳighters) or wild beasts, as well as sicknesses or other “revenge of the coun-
tries”. For all European conquerors and heavily armed pirate-merchants, 
violence was not so much ‘a weapon of the last resort’ but a necessary 
means to arrive at their aims. 
Map 6. South Asian Centers of VOC trade during 1602-1795
Source: M. Meilink-Roeloftsz et al. (ed.), p. 102.
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All this was not the case, or to a much lesser degree, in the communica-
tion and trade between the Asian countries and cultures. Earlier, the 
example was given of the Chinese merchants who traded peacefully for 
several centuries with Indian Ocean countries, but once they were treated 
in a highly treacherous way by Calicut rulers, they violently took revenge 
and never returned again. That is a good defĳinition of “violence of the last 
resort”! 
Violence, therefore, should be defĳined in a much broader sense for the 
Western side, in its culture and setting, than for Asian contexts. In illus-
trating this, one could start with the quite diffferent perceptions of war 
and the willingness to use more advanced weapons. Owning and display-
ing them were always deemed necessary in order to keep pressure on the 
indigenous people to deliver pepper, tea, opium and other products for 
the most favorable conditions and prices. In addition, there is a typical 
Western obsession with war and weapons, which were not available in 
Asia for a very long time. How astonished the Europeans were to discover 
in the middle of the 19th-century that the Chinese had had good canons 
for a long time already, but used them largely for fun and not to kill people 
and destroy cities or landscapes in genocidal waves. 
One cannot forget that when new European powers started to join the 
imperialist rat-race initiated by Portugal and Spain, they were also 
involved in genocidal European wars like the the Eighty Years’ War (Spain 
against the Netherlands) and Thirty Years’ War (Catholic against Prot-
estant rulers). There was, furthermore, an acceleration in all these wars in 
all respects.44 
Next, there were the “rules” of the monopoly game. The Westerners’ 
attempts to obtain a monopoly were nearly always accompanied by a sub-
stantial military show to fĳight offf the European competitor or to put pres-
sure on an Asian potentate or to help the “other” king, chief or aspiring 
aristocrats to overrule his/her indigenous competitor.45 It became a kind 
of mantra like, for instance: 
44 See the overviews in S. Halperin and H. Derks (ed., 1989).
45 Dutch historians, for a large and dominant part Orangistic and Christian oriented, 
have always tried to whitewash the national history. Hardly any attention is paid to the 
exorbitant violence of the VOC, let alone its basic elements like the monopoly principle 
and practice. F. Gaastra, p. 11, even states that the monopoly concept has received a less 
negative image and stresses only ‘the professional and commercial ability’ of the VOC 
authorities. The historians during the Nazi period glorifĳied Jan Pietersz. Coen, one of the 
most cruel VOC conquistadors among many. Gaastra, now the offfĳicial VOC historian, still 
continues with this without any reservation. The alternative E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 48, is 
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… will the VOC receive permission of the King of Siam that it will trade tin 
there; [but] Malayan pirates are active there, making the waters insecure; 
at the moment the Mores export tin, but we must attempt to get a monop-
oly there …46
Or, when in 1678 the VOC decided again to launch large military opera-
tions against some king in Java, one of its leaders
reprimanded the king’s offfĳicials for having allowed Bantĕn shippers to sell 
opium and textiles at Jĕpara in violation of the VOC’s monopoly …47
And the consequences of obtaining such a monopoly mostly involved 
establishing a garrison in the capital as a continuous warning symbol, 
installing the highly provocative Portuguese invention (the cartaz or 
passport system) in which the occupying foreign power “allows” an indig-
enous private or public power to deal in products of its own country. Time 
and again the latter tried to “smuggle” or wriggle out of the situation, pro-
viding a reason for one punitive expedition after another full of the most 
cruel murder and genocidal practices. 
In short: after the fĳights end and the threat of new ones overshadows all 
activities, a monopoly (or its variant) is established as a chain of intended 
violence of an institutional character which basically destroys commer-
cial, social or cultural markets by foreign political-military means; there is 
no basis of legitimation for establishing such a monopoly, but rather a 
threat. 
The Dutch VOC state was the fĳirst in history to establish an opium 
monopoly in the 17th-century, an example followed by the English EIC at 
the end of the 18th-century. It was repeated by numerous colonial govern-
ments even at the beginning of the 20th-century. Without much exagger-
ation one can say: since the Dutch established the opium monopoly on 
the Malabar coast in 1663 through severe military violence, almost all 
Asiatic wars have had a strong narco-character through to the present, 
including the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars. In 1677 there followed an 
opium monopoly for the Mataram (West Java) countries, in 1678 one for 
wrong as well. He thinks that it is an Eastern custom to secure a monopoly which Dutch 
merchants learned in Batavia when accustoming themselves to the Eastern way of life. 
The sources of the monopoly practice and theory must be discovered in Western Europe 
in late medieval and early modern time (see the scholastic ius gentium, etc.), but the 
“monotheistic way of dealing with economic matters” is not the subject here. See H. Derks 
(2008).  
46 GM, IV, p. 348.
47 M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 49.
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Cheribon, and so on, although opium as merchandise was not very well 
known at the time.
How the objects of their aggression reacted to this enforced opium 
trade can be learned from the following examples from 1671, years before 
a monopoly was obtained and Western opium could be imported. A VOC 
offfĳicial communicated in a letter to his superiors (Bantam, 10 November 
1671):
The King with all the aristocrats and wives went today to Pontangh with 50 
to 60 vessels, among which 30 to 35 men of war, manned by 1,200 to 1,300 
peoples, all amphioen users. When one has arrived on open sea, all these 
users are inspected for possession of amphioen. If something is found, the 
person together with his wife and children is sold to Lampon, whereupon 
the men of war are sent to Landack to start a war ... The King has announced 
everywhere ... that it is prohibited further to smoke tobacco: if somebody 
is found who is doing this, he will be punished with the same penalty as 
the amphioen smokers. Eight days later the same VOC offfĳicial reports: ‘Kei 
Aria came home from Pontangh and he has summoned us, Englishmen and 
Frenchmen ..: in the name of the King he ordered us never to smoke amphi-
oen or tobacco mixed with it or to import it or to sell it in the harbor to 
Javanese of the East or to other foreigners on penalty of confĳiscation of the 
ship and all goods. Twenty-fĳive Chinese, amphioen smokers, were sent to 
the King in Pontangh to work as diggers and fĳield laborers like the other 
amphioen smokers. This King intends apparently to eliminate all amphioen 
smokers in his country once and for all.48 
These messages suggest that if foreigners wanted a monopoly on opium 
import, the pressure they exerted to get it must have been tremendous.
Here is one example of how this game was played in the daily practice 
of the VOC’s occupation of the “Dutch” East Indies. The English competi-
tor was successfully expelled from the archipelago around 1635. Depending 
on the periodic English-Dutch wars and treaties in Europe, individual 
ships were allowed to roam around the archipelago or be chased away 
and destroyed. After the middle of the 18th-century, however, the English 
came with many more ships, offfĳicially as a nation, especially in the north-
ern part of the archipelago, intending to stay, building their fortifĳications 
and settlements. That happened also in December 1755 on the Sumatran 
West coast near Padang. The Dutch Governor-General Mossel reported:
48 Quoted from J. K. de Jonge a.o. (ed.), vol. VI, p. 210 fff. If all 1200 sailors were smokers, 
their ships still traveled on the open sea. Whatever exaggeration, it is perfectly clear that 
opium, tobacco and smoking were not the most beloved products and activities. 
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.... triggered by the new inimical invasion and subsequent stay of the English 
on the bay of Tappianuly, our ministers extorted ... a contract with one of 
rulers [regent] there in which the two main rulers [regenten] of that district 
not only transferred their lands in full property to the Company, but also 
their citizens as subjects, if the Company will save them on sea against their 
enemies. Protests were made against this violation .... but the nation did 
not bother about it. That is the reason why the ministers asked for law and 
order to occupy these lands by force to stop its reckless ventures, to sustain 
our contract and to demonstrate our help. .... [We wait] for this and all other 
acts for a conclusive answer, but also for an evacuation of the bay and the 
district of Tappianuly, including reparation of all coastal works in the old 
condition. And if they attack us by force in order to stop us, then the con-
sequences are for them. ... In addition ... we will construct a small fortifĳica-
tion occupied by a militia ..49 
Hundreds of times the Dutch threatened all corners of the archipelago in 
the same way from the beginning until the very end and acted according-
ly.50 The indigenous rulers quickly learned what it meant when Dutch 
offfĳicials offfered them “help”. Indigenous groups, tribes or competitors of 
the rulers repeatedly revolted to try to liberate themselves from the for-
eign occupation.
The direct motives of the foreign assaults can difffer: sometimes pure 
power politics against European competitors and their indigenous allies; 
sometimes direct undermining of foreign or indigenous commercial com-
petitors in a particular product (nutmeg, opium, tin, etc.); sometimes 
threatening a whole population to stick to the rules of The Contract and 
continue producing and delivering the right quality and quantity on time. 
It always concerned the basic violent way of building the Dutch empire. 
49 GM, XIII, p. 3. Already at the end of 1757 a war was waged against the King of Johor 
and Cambodian vassals and the same message reports about the proposal: ‘An order has 
been given to conquer also Battubara, Selangor and Kedah if there is any opportunity to do 
this, in particular because already for many years competitors deal in opium and tin in 
Kedah.’ GM, XIII, p. 256 fff. The King of Johor is threatened enough to give many lands 
north of Malacca into the possession of the Company. This produced an administrative 
problem, because these lands were already the property of the Company thanks to an 
assault of 1680.
50 For comparable monopoly contracts concerning land, opium, tin etc. imposed on 
indigenous people see, for instance, GM, IV, p. 309, 348 (tin), 574 (opium), 592 in Java 
(opium), 724; GM, V, p. 54 (opium), 188 until GM, XIII, p. 38 etc. For examples of the 
accompanying passport activities see GM, IV, p. 348 (not allowed to buy opium from oth-
ers), 418; GM, V, p. 133; GM, XII, p. 256 (opium, tin), etc. 
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Empire Building
Another such network or chain of violence against people is better known. 
It concerns the systematic exploitation of bodies and the labor potential 
of foreign countries, the holding of colonial slaves for permanent settle-
ments or the diffferent imperialistic violence of slave trading. The VOC 
was busy with both within an institutionalized violence-labor network. A 
substantial part of it was recently analyzed by Kerry Ward in an interest-
ing study.51 It is beyond our scope here to provide the details, but the con-
tours should be sketched, because part of the opium infrastructure was 
built in the same way. 
Ward points to the fundamentals of empire building and in particular 
the peopling policy of permanent settlements. Her demonstration con-
cerns the relationship between Batavia, the main VOC center in Asia, and 
the Cape of Good Hope, the main VOC center in Africa. 
By the early 1670s the VOC had fĳinally committed itself to a permanent 
settlement on the Cape. It built extensive fortifĳications and many other 
buildings by means of slave labor. A whole chain of events and activities 
developed gradually and functioned “smoothly” a century later: slave 
labor networks in the southern part of Africa (Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Mozambique) were connected with the Red Sea, India (Coromandal 
coast) and Ceylon. From Southeast Asia came slaves from many island 
polities across the archipelago, especially from Macassar and the Bugis 
region of South Sulawesi, the Moluccas and the extensive local slave trade 
from Bali. 
Next, there were forced migrations of Asians, who were defĳined by the 
Dutch as exiles, criminals, political prisoners and the like. The ethnic ori-
gin of all those transported to the Cape was, therefore, complex. For 
instance, a group of Chinese was transplanted from the East Indies to the 
Cape after the 1740 massacre (see ch. 15), including some high-ranking 
exiles accompanied by their wives and children. 
It was the fĳirst time that this method of colonization was carried out. It 
is well known from the English, who were very active in peopling Australia 
and New Zealand in the 18th and 19th centuries by “cleaning” England of 
51 K. Ward. E. Jacobs mentions the use of slaves several times, but in a rather strange 
context as, for instance: ‘The two largest population groups in the city were the slaves … 
and the Chinese ... The VOC did not regard slaves as a commodity.’ (p. 233). It is not clever 
to follow this example and never mention slaves in the many product and trade tables at 
the end of the book and never discuss the topic in a relevant way. 
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white criminals and the New World of uncivilized, pagan, indigenous 
groups. 
These forced migrations and slavery also presupposed a typical pun-
ishment system with the general characteristic that the VOC
arrested a far higher proportion of their own servants and slaves than any 
other population group and that these ... were punished more harshly than 
high-ranking offfĳicials who committed crimes.52 
It went so far that female criminals were transport from the Amsterdam 
Spinhuis (women’s prison) to the Batavia Spinhuis and later to the Cape.53 
The rather prevalent crime of the high offfĳicials was corruption, so much 
so that upont its demise, the VOC initials were translated as: Vergaan 
Onder Corruptie (‘destroyed through corruption’). However, the elite net-
works mostly saved them from prosecution, while slaves and servants 
were treated most cruelly. Another example: in 1722, some 26 people of 
low standing, including 11 European storekeepers, were executed in 
Batavia for smuggling. These public hangings were not an uncommon 
phenomenon.54 They symbolized the colonizing elite’s existential fear of 
riots, thefts in white compounds or slave risings. 
Another remarkable aspect is also the general behavior against sick 
people of low standing. A travel report from Hofhout (1758) mentioned an 
encounter with ‘a horrible group’ of sick and half-dead people. According 
to one comment, they were accompanied by male nurses with big rattans. 
This was the usual situation in the hospital and outpatient clinic of Batavia 
where ‘the poor patients were robbed and beaten up’.55 The European 
patients received luxurious treatment. 
These elements of the punishment system were directed at individuals 
and the behavior in the direct environment (Batavia). More extensive and 
serious were the punishments meted out when colonial products (cofffee, 
tea, indigo, etc.) were not delivered on time or not under the “right” condi-
tions. De Haan, manager of the colonial archives around 1900, tells in 
some detail about these cases in which ‘a vile cruelty’ was shown by or on 
behalf of the Dutch offfĳicial (resident). For instance, in the VOC period in 
52 Idem, p. 88. For the English way of punishing in the colonial framework, see the 
excellent C. Munn and his analysis of branding, chain gangs, deportation, flogging, hang-
ing, hard labour and so on.
53 Idem, chapter 3 which examines the institutions of law and governance in Batavia.
54 C. Boxer (1965), p. 228.
55 F. de Haan, vol. 2, p. 543. Offfĳicially, sick people received food from the hospital, but 
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the cofffee region of Preanger (South-West Java), leaders of the workforce 
‘who were not industrious enough’ got the ‘blokstraf’ (pillory) for one or 
several days, lashings with rattans or chains, etc. Besides the obvious 
excuse that one has to perceive these punishments from the perspective 
of a much rougher time, De Haan informs us:
In our judgment about this we have to consider also the means used by the 
English in Bencoolen to enforce pepper deliveries from the population 
against prices as high as the Preanger cofffee ... What is the signifĳicance of 
a blokstraf or lashings compared to the burning of villages and the destruc-
tion of the products in the fĳields?’56 
Dutch offfĳicials tended to whitewash their own national performance. It 
also seems that the price of the product was somehow related to the mag-
nitude of the punishment: and the Dutch were much cheaper than the 
English! 
It would be difffĳicult to list all the criminal acts Westerners committed 
daily for centuries in all the countries now known as the “Third World”. 
Historians in those countries should cooperate in documenting those 
acts. I described the Portuguese cruelties above, and below I shall confĳine 
myself to only a few examples of the Dutch in “their” Asian countries.
The Banda Case and all that57
One of the fĳirst and earliest examples has all the elements of the Dutch 
way of dealing with the inhabitants of the East Indies. It is, furthermore, a 
typical example of how Protestant West Europeans conquered “new 
worlds” with their settlers. 
56 Idem, vol. 1, p. 162. De Haan’s four volumes contain many documents about the 17th 
and 18th-century life in Java.
57 The following is based on J. Villiers who reports mainly about the Portuguese rela-
tionship with the nutmeg islands; D. Hall, passim, in particular p. 276-286. Several Dutch 
VOC websites still write 400 years later in the most abstract terms about the Banda geno-
cide, which is the right defĳinition when a whole population is eliminated (see text). One of 
them writes: ‘as a consequence of war acts many thousands of Bandanese died’ (Kunst-en-
Cultuur. inform. nl), another (VOC Kenniscentrum, KITLV in Leiden) pretends the Banda-
nese fell in a normal war. It is strange that the present offfĳicial Dutch historian of the VOC, 
F.Gaastra, in his book for the general public on p. 45 suddenly refrains from describing 
what really happened under the pretext that the consequences of Coen’s action ‘are well 
known’. Other historians like J. de Vries, A. Van der Woude, p. 453 fff even write that Coen 
‘strengthened his position by driving out a large part of the population without mercy …’ 
without even pointing to the strategic importance of demonstrating as much violence as 
possible in establishing a foreign monopoly or to the strategic importance of opium. And, 
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It concerns the Banda archipelago about 140 kilometers south of the 
islands of Ambon and Ceram. This covers about ten small volcanic islands 
with a land mass of nearly 200 square kilometers. Before the Europeans 
came, they were the only source of nutmeg and mace for all neighboring 
countries including Arab, Chinese and Javanese traders. In addition, 
Banda maintained an important entrepot trade for the regional networks. 
The Portuguese were the fĳirst Europeans, and they visited several times 
in the period 1512-1529. The Muslim Bandanese were hostile to Christianity 
and to the Portuguese. The latter were forced to buy their nutmeg in 
Malacca, where it was traded by the Bandanese themselves. 
In the sixteenth-century nutmeg and mace were highly prized every-
where as important ingredients for cooking and medicine. In the early 
seventeenth-century an additional value was mentioned in a contempo-
rary Portuguese source (Manrique): rich Bengal opium consumers mixed 
their dose with nutmeg, mace, cloves, Borneo camphor and other spices 
to increase the narcotic efffect.58 What we guess about Mughal opium con-
sumption suggests that the direct and indirect Banda–India trade rela-
tions were not unimportant.
The Bandanese were very good merchants and large shipbuilders, trad-
ing their products not only with Ambon and neighboring islands, but as 
far as Java and Malacca. A trip like this, for instance, took two or three 
years, and many of their junks were lost.
The reason why the Portuguese did not succeed in obtaining a nutmeg 
monopoly is, according to Villiers, ‘because they were confronted by a 
cohesive and united group of orang kaya, whose authority derived from 
popular consent’. Elsewhere, the chiefs were in a constant state of con-
flict. That was always an advantage for the Europeans, who were experi-
enced in the divide and rule game. These orang kaya, a kind of mercantile 
aristocracy, tried to play this game between the Portuguese, Spanish, 
English and Dutch merchants. That was, apparently, too complicated a 
job for them, because they provoked the strongest party, the Dutch.
When the Dutch arrived for the fĳirst time (1599), the population totalled 
about 13-15,000 and included Malay, Javanese, Chinese and Arab traders. 
of course, without doubting the legitimacy of imperialism and colonialism. For the con-
text see Both, vol. 1, p. 91 fff., vol. 2, p. 237 fff. It is a pity, but quite symptomatic, that
J. Somers, p. 62, does not elaborate on this Banda case. For the Banda case, see also 
M. Ricklefs (1981), passim.
58 J. Villiers, p. 725.
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The Dutch were welcomed, were allowed to establish a small factory, and 
were seen as ‘saviours from the detested Portuguese’.59 
Things soon went wrong: the Dutch occupied the island of Banda and 
imposed a monopoly for the nutmeg trade on the orang kaya. The 
Bandanese wanted to remain independent, however, they did not need 
the items offfered by the Dutch, and the Dutch seriously mistrusted them. 
No Bandanese knew what a monopoly contract implied, but they soon 
learned their fĳirst Dutch lesson: the Dutch threatened them with military 
attacks, if the monopoly agreement was not followed. The Bandanese 
decided to get rid of these Europeans and killed a Dutch captain with 
some companions in an ambush in 1609. 
Contrary to the Portuguese, the Dutch came back.
In the meantime, they were joined by other Europeans, because the 
English had arrived, paid higher prices for the nutmeg and built their own 
fortifĳied factory. Now the Dutch had two enemies; they slaughtered the 
Bandanese people of one island, but lost 200 soldiers in an English attack 
(1619). 
All this gave the Banda case the highest military priority, and Governor-
General Coen himself came two years later with a substantial army and a 
secret weapon, a company of mercenaries, Japanese samurai. In a terrible 
massacre the Dutch killed most of the 15,000 inhabitants. Bandanese sur-
vivors (ca. 600 people) were caught and transferred to Batavia and else-
where as slaves. That this was a real genocide according to all possible 
defĳinitions is proven also by the follow-up.
After Coen prepared this tabula rasa, he completed the “victory” by 
putting his stamp on the empty Banda archipelago: all the available space 
was divided up into a grid of equal spaces (perken) in which nutmeg had 
to be planted. They were farmed out to Dutch settlers (perkeniers) who 
had to sell their yields only to the VOC for a fĳixed price; the manual labor 
was done by slaves imported by the VOC from Batavia. Because the VOC 
preserved its monopoly on nutmeg for several centuries, the perkeniers 
became tremendously rich. 
Of course, this monopoly also had to be sustained by a substantial mil-
itary deployment. One of the largest fortifĳications in the East Indies, 
Nassau Castle, was erected on the main island; smaller fortifĳications were 
established on all the others. To eradicate every form of competition and 
59 Idem, p. 749.
chapter thirteen222
every suggestion of “free trade”, Coen and his successors carried out two 
rather lethal activities.
First they chased their European competitors, the English, out of the 
Moluccas, ignoring the 1619 treaty between the VOC and EIC. Revenge for 
the English role in the Banda case was certainly the main motive. This cul-
minated in the highly debated Amboyna Massacre (1623). It concerned a 
quasi-juridical murder including waterboarding practices: the decapita-
tion of ten Englishmen (EIC offfĳicials), nine Japanese mercenaries and a 
Portuguese servant of the VOC. The English public opinion became 
aroused to such a degree that the massacre was one of the motives for 
the First, Second and Third English-Dutch Wars. In addition, the fully 
 intimidated English disappeared, and their competition in the Moluccas 
came to a bloody end.
The second activity was local in nature. Governor-General Coen and 
his successors repeatedly ordered raids on specifĳic islands. These naval 
patrols, in fact death squads, were regularly sent around the islands to 
destroy and burn “unlicensed” nutmeg trees or other valuable plants and, 
if necessary, their indigenous planters. These so-called hongi raids became 
Map 8. Major Dutch Campaigns in Java, September-December 1678
Source: M. Ricklefs, 1993, p. 51.
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a standard means of repression for most of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
The aim was to keep prices as high as possible and to prevent smuggling 
opportunities.60 They kept the flame of resistance burning against the 
VOC and its successor, the Dutch government. 
Other 17th-century Violence
All this was the most radical form of repression: the total eradication of an 
indigenous society and its replacement by a new foreign one. In the East 
Indies this “signal” was heard and discussed until modern times as the 
clearest example of the implications of Dutch colonialism. Indeed, in the 
Banda islands, a typical Dutch Protestant settler society developed. This 
kind of VOC monopoly game was the ultimate consequence of a model 
for the Protestant way of colonizing foreign countries, as repeated later in 
the USA, Australia or South Africa.
This ultimate aim returns in the literature about the fĳirst years of the 
VOC. A highly artifĳicial antagonism is constructed between the “direction 
Laurens Reaal” (only violence in the last resort) and the “direction Coen” 
(shoot fĳirst, ask questions later). Both were Governor-General of the VOC 
in the Indies, although the former lasted only a few years (1615/16-1617). 
The latter was Reaal’s successor and stayed nearly unto his death in 1629. 
Indeed, Reaal was not a dye-hard Calvinist, military and bookkeeper 
like Coen, but a moderate, intellectual Protestant (Remonstrant). He was 
certainly embarrassed by the horrifĳic behavior of the Dutch settlers. He 
was against the monopoly trade as well and was one of the very few to 
demonstrate what monopoly trade was all about in his correspondence 
with the VOC Directors in Amsterdam (1623):
Do you want to occupy all trade, shipping trafffĳic and all products of the soil 
of the Indies? From what should the indigenous population live? Do you 
want to kill them and let them starve? This cannot help anything, because 
in an empty sea, on empty land and with dead people, you cannot make a 
profĳit. In short: with power and violence one intends to do everything in 
order to provide a monopoly for the VOC, and one is not afraid to use all 
injustices and even barbaric means to achieve this aim.’ And reacting to the 
Dutch settlers, he asked, who likes to go to the Indies ‘to act as hangman 
or guard of a herd of slaves? ... to be governors and predecessors of free 
60 E. Jacobs (p. 18) still thinks that these expeditions were organized ‘to temporarily 
reduce the labor force’.  
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people who in fact are the scum of our nation; they are able to eat the 
Company, and they will disclose in the Indies that the Dutch will conquer, 
mistreat and kill them and that they belong to the most cruel nation of the 
whole world?’61 
It is a remarkable expression from one of the highest VOC offfĳicials at the 
very beginning of the VOC’s occupation of the East Indies. Alas, he was 
the fĳirst and the last VOC employee who wrote anything like this. 
It remained an unusual incident even in his personal history: Reaal 
plotted against his predecessor Governor-General Both; he stimulated 
corruption among soldiers and nurtured a dangerous antagonism 
between soldiers and merchants.62 Reaal himself suggested the butcher 
J. P. Coen as his most able successor. Furthermore, he was responsible for 
all VOC deeds since he remained in the highest VOC position with the 
most attractive remuneration thanks to ‘the herd of slaves’ in the Indies. 
A Reaal–Coen contradiction (if any) had only to do with the question of 
which is the best (= least costly) strategy to squeeze profĳit out of a strange, 
foreign, pagan realm.
The answer was crystal clear. The ink of Reaal’s letter was not yet dry 
before the Banda massacre occurred. Together with Reaal, Coen attacked 
the English in Jakarta (the later Batavia); the important harbor of Jĕpara 
(Middle Java) was totally destroyed in 1618 by Block and again in 1619 by 
Coen himself to avoid English trade or to liberate Dutch people, who mis-
behaved themselves with indigenous girls; he threatened its Chinese mer-
chants with delivering pepper at fĳixed monopoly prices; in 1622 Coen 
attacked Macao; defeated the Chinese a year later in the Pescadores; 
extensive wars with one indigenous ruler after the other raged for the rest 
of the century.63 
Hundreds of thousand of people must have been killed in the East 
Indies and numerous settlements destroyed before the end of this 17th-
century. The sectarian Protestant civilization was notorious for its vio-
lence, greediness, corruption and sexual excesses. This tempest over the 
East Indies had, of course, many consequences for the uprooted indige-
nous societies, shaken also by the rigorous divide and rule games of the 
Westerners, their bribery and opium.
61 Quoted in E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 43.
62 P. Rietbergen in his long introduction to Both, vol. 1, p. 102.
63 M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 75, reports about a similar case fĳifty years later where VOC 
solders misbehaved: now they also smoked opium.











































































































































Gaastra stated that after 1700, the Dutch were less aggressive than in the 
previous century.64 During the 18th-century, however, the rather contin-
uous wars against the indigenous rulers of Bantam (Bantĕn), Mataram, 
Bali, Java’s Eastern Salient (Oosthoek) or Madura can be mentioned.65 
“Banda” massacres also occurred like the so-called Chinese Massacre of 
1740 (see below). The century ended with the lost war against the English 
(a continuation of the war of 1759 against “British” India) and the occupa-
tion of the East Indies by the British. There were as well numerous violent 
attacks on “enemies” in the rest of the archipelago.
As soon as the Dutch returned to power in 1816, a new period started 
full of uprisings, revolutionary movements and wars against the Dutch 
colonial regime. Between 1800 and 1850 there were numerous armed 
rebellions in Bantĕn, with a peak in 1850. In the period 1825-1830 the Java 
War was the most devastating attack against these kingdoms under the 
leadership of one of its aristocrats, the Muslim Dipanagara. This war was 
also an opium war.66 Uprisings were endemic until about the 1870, but 
culminated in the great outburst of 1888 and the thirty years’ war against 
the Sultan of Aceh.67 
The loss of privilege and collective humiliation that inevitably accom-
panied colonial rule generated intense resentment and frustration 
among groups which had lost their traditional position. Protests were 
often expressed in a religious framework, which was Islam in Bantĕn. 
Consequently, leaders stressed the Holy War theme. Triggered by so-
called modernization projects of the colonial regime, mainly in agricul-
tural practice, the revolutionary movements became peasant revolts, 
which were also opposed against the urban secularization.68 The Dutch 
and the British (during their interregnum in 1811-1816) were simply too 
bold and arrogant when attempting to revolutionize both the Javanese 
elite and the peasants. As a result, they joined forces through their com-
mon hate of the foreigners, and this antagonism never disappeared.
Once this 19th-century ended, the new and last “Dutch one” began with 
the serious and devastating wars in Aceh, Bali and Lombok, with a hun-
64 F. S. Gaastra (1991), p. 97. See also M. Ricklefs (1981), p. 91 fff.
65 See W. Remmelink, J. Talens, C. Boxer (1977), S. Margana, D. Hall, etc.
66 See C. Holtzappel in: H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 147 fff.
67 S. Kartodirdjo.
68 M. Adas, p. 3 fff. about the situation in Mataram, p. 93-99 about Dipanagara and pas-
sim for the Java War.
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dred thousand innocent people massacred under the Dutch leadership of 
the pious Calvinists Van Heutz and Colijn, who had to accept serious loss-
es among their own military. Was it coincidental that these regions were 
traditional opium “smuggling nests”, which undermined the Dutch gov-
ernment’s opium profĳits?69 The repression continued thanks to the rise of 
the nationalist movements until the last, unsuccessful, all-out war, euphe-
mistically called the “Police action”, in 1946-1949 with the usual massacres 
of innocent civilians. This time it was also strongly supported by the so-
called Socialists of Willem Drees.70 (A new defeat in a fancy war around 
“the last colony”, New Guinea in 1962, completes this survey.)
It is, indeed, a most tragic period in world history: three hundred years 
of merciless, violent exploitation of the East by the West in which opium 
played a major role as a means of repression. Let’s now return to this cen-
turies-old Dutch opium trade which was so intimately related to the 
excessive violence sketched above. 
Dutch Opium Trade: General Questions
As described in the ‘Pepper for Opium’ chapter, the defeat of the 
Portuguese on the Malabar coast meant the real start of the Western opi-
um trade. The largest portion of the Bengal opium trade was soon direct-
ed to the East Indies. One must realize that the archipelago has the surface 
area of the USA, while the Dutch lived mainly in coastal settlements with-
out forming a true colony. In the 17th and a large part of the 18th-century, 
their presence was also confĳined to the middle of Java and only a few loca-
tions outside this island. This does not seem very impressive, but the 
Dutch fleets ruled the waves.
As Appendix 2 indicates, in these years about 40,000-70,000 pounds 
opium were imported annually from Bengal. It is doubtful that all of it was 
destined for Java. There must have been other distribution channels. One 
possibility, which must be seriously considered, is the re-export to 
Malacca or even China, the land with the most ambiguous opium history 
69 E. Vanvugt (1995-2), p. 12 fff. This author also published a so-called “documentary 
travel novel” The Bloody War on Bali (2007). It is the story about two massacres a century 
earlier in which many thousands of Balinese, including women and children, fully 
unarmed died from the bullets of the Dutch military. This is astonishingly perceived as 
examples of perang puputan, collective suicide. An efffective way to wash away the Dutch 
guilt.
70 See H. Derks in: Idem (ed., 1989), p. 296-303.
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before its “English 19th-century”. Was it easy or possible to sell opium to 
the Chinese long before the English did? The answer must be negative, 
and will be discussed here only in a general way. 
Malacca in the early 17th-century was a most important location in the 
Far East, and handled a substantial amount of re-export trade from India 
to, for instance, China. Large numbers of Chinese junks came to Malacca 
to trade. Many Arabian, Gujarat, etc. merchants traveled the Persian Gulf, 
Indian Ocean and came as far as China long before the Western intruders 
started their violent attacks. The reverse was also true: for centuries 
Chinese merchants came to the ports in the Middle East and India. In 
these busy commercial networks, competitors and partners, producers 
and consumers acted peacefully most of the time and certainly not with 
imperialistic and or colonialist aims.71
Before the Dutch shipped their goods towards China, the Portuguese 
and Spaniards had done the same. They invented a tradition which 
became a classic one in the relations with China: in 1679 the Portuguese 
had conflicts with Chinese offfĳicials, because the latter had discovered and 
discredited Portuguese smuggling. A small quantity of opium was also 
found on the foreign vessels, which was forbidden on penalty of confĳisca-
tion of the ship. 
The Dutch copied this behavior of the Portuguese even though they di 
dnot have the advantage of a Macao settlement. They intended to start 
smuggling with small ships but failed as well and complained about the 
Chinese local authorities, who tried to swindle them.72 These complaints 
would not have been heard if they could have made profĳitable deals with 
the Chinese. 
The violent way the Dutch traded is probably the main reason why 
matters were blocked in China. Prakash states that success was limited
to establishing a trading post, by force if necessary, on the coast of China 
or in its immediate vicinity. The effforts to blockade Chinese trade with 
Manila were followed by an attack on Macao in 1622 and the subsequent 
occupation of the Pescadores. But soon after, in 1624, the Dutch were per-
suaded to move to Taiwan in return for an informal agreement that Chinese 
merchants would be allowed to go there to trade with them.73 
71 For the early history see M. Meilink-Roelofsz, chapter 1; K. Glamann, passim. The 
latter analyzes mainly the East-West trade and not the inter-Asian trade. Therefore, data 
on opium are not given in his book.
72 GM, IV, p. 280; see also Idem, p. 11, it was reported that Dutch small ships were 
smuggling around the Canton islands. See J. Wills, p. 150 fff.
73 For the following O. Prakash (1985), p. 16 fff.
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Still, a small part of the opium the Company auctioned later at Batavia 
found its way to China, thus opening that market to Indian opium for the 
fĳirst time. The main part of the Bengal production remained, however, in 
the archipelago. 
The Governor-General and Minister of the Dutch East Indies, Jean 
Chrétien Baron Baud (1789-1859), is probably the fĳirst opium historian. He 
provided the other side of the Chinese story in 1853:
China, at the moment the country with the most extensive opium consump-
tion, did not produce this remarkable merchandise on a large scale, not-
withstanding the availability of poppy and the Chinese knowledge about 
the characteristics of the moon-juice from their medicine. The import on a 
large scale for the use of smoking came from the West. This follows from a 
Memorandum of an important state bureaucrat, Heu-Naetse, to the em -
peror, who advised allowing the opium import against a tax as was usual 
in earlier times .... “Originally,” Heu-Naetse wrote, “the poppy juice [heulsap] 
was perceived as a medicine; its characteristics are stimulating, stopping 
excessive defecation, mitigating the efffects of bad fumes.” In the materia 
medica of Li-Schi-Tschin, from the Ming dynasty, it is called A-foe-young ... 
During the reign of Kien-Lung (1736 until 1796) and also earlier, opium 
was taxed with the Cantonese tarifff of remedies and with an import duty 
of 3 tael per 100 katti, except an additional duty of 2 tael, 4 mas and 5 
condorijn for each package called package money. After this the import was 
forbidden.74 
He rightly points to the Portuguese as the one who for the fĳirst time “trad-
ed” in opium (better: carried opium with them as a present to rulers) and 
introduced it in the East Indian archipelago through Malacca. Jan Huygen 
van Linschoten is also used as a source of Baud’s knowledge. However, in 
the earliest travel literature of the Dutch merchant-pirates (Houtman and 
others), he could not discover any reference to opium in the archipelago. 
That was already diffferent in Van den Broecke’s reports. Baud is clever 
74 J. C. Baud, p. 84. Jean Chrétien Baud also refers here to the ‘Correspondence relative 
to China, presented to both houses of Parliament, 1840’. Baud is a highly interesting man. 
He was sometimes Governor-General in the colony, sometimes Minister of the Navy or 
Minister of Colonies. In the National Archive (archive no. 2.21.007.58) a substantial archive 
is available from which can be derived the following. In 1818-1821 he is somehow involved 
in the organization of the opium lease in the colony, in the prohibition of the opium sale 
in the Preanger (1824), in the contract with the Bengal opium importer Maclaine Watson 
& Co (1833). Later he deals with the complaints of the Nederlandsche Handelmaatschap-
pij (see ch. 18) about the difffĳiculties in the opium business (1839) and with the always 
returning theme of lowering the opium price relative to the extension of smuggling prac-
tices (1854). His tract ‘Proeve …’ (Essay concerning the Sale and Consumption of Opium in 
Dutch East Indies) is certainly written by a highly authoritative man and an insider. The 
fĳirst part of E. Vanvugt (1985) is a compilation of Baud’s essay.
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enough to point to contradictions between the early Dutch and early 
English adventurers: the latter wrote already in 1605 (erroneously?) that 
people in Bantam (West Java) liked opium very much, whereas the Dutch 
had just started to introduce some opium in the Moluccas. 
The Dutch pirates did not discover opium on the captured Spanish and 
Portuguese ships either, ‘notwithstanding the fact that several of these 
ships were Indian coasters from which the cargo may be considered as 
symptomatic for the dominant needs and customs of the time.’75 The lack 
of some opium trade in the archipelago is due, according to Baud, to the 
war activities of the Dutch during the fĳirst forty years of the 17th-century. 
Baud, furthermore, wrote quite humorously about the VOC:
It is quite right that the Company prohibited the opium trade under severe 
punishments—even the death penalty—but did not include itself in this 
prohibition. It never detested this trade, but detested the smugglers, who 
intended to profĳit from it in the same way. The Company increased the 
consumption of opium on Java twenty-fold, while complaining constantly 
that this was not enough.76 
An important colonial offfĳicial like Baud was constantly busy with fĳigures 
and their interpretations.77 For us, this is a major advantage of his writ-
ings. To start with, his following statement is already important:
From 1640 to 1652 ... the imports averaged 500 pounds. From 1653 to 
1665 ... it was on average 1100 pounds annually. From 1666 to 1677 [when 
the Company was granted the monopoly on the opium trade from the Susu-
hunan of Mataram, H.D.] the import was on average 10,000 pounds.78 
75 J. C. Baud, p. 89. That was a similar conclusion to the one I have drawn from Van den 
Broecke’s reports about the Surat trafffĳic.
76 Idem, p. 116. J. Meiss, p. 56, made of this that the advantages of the opium trade were 
undermined for a small part by the smugglers, but for the largest part by the fraud (mors-
handel) of the VOC bureaucrats themselves. Generally, the profĳit increased because the 
VOC was only interested in this profĳit and not in prohibiting the use. In Meiss’ opinion the 
opium distribution system is the best, which taxes the use as heavily as possible to the 
advantage of the treasury (Idem., p. 57).  
77 Baud’s major reconstruction of the opium distribution system (1842) involved 
dividing Java into distribution districts for the opium farmers. They had to sell from the 
Dutch their largest quantity for a fĳixed price (210 guilders per catty) in a three-year con-
tract. This was called the tiban. If there was a demand for more opium, then the farmer 
could get as much as he liked for the same price. This additional quantity was called siram. 
Later this tiban–siram system was changed several times. For example: in 1848 the fĳixed 
tiban price became 100 guilders per catty and the siram price 35 guilders. See J. Meiss, 
p. 56-66; J. Wiselius (1886), p. 13-19.
78 J. C. Baud, p. 100. This monopoly was reconfĳirmed in a new treaty around 1705. 
M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 142.
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Baud further provides two long tables listing all the Dutch imports from 
Bengal into the archipelago. The fĳirst is more or less in accordance with 
Prakash’s Bengal export data given in the previous chapter (see Appendix 
2). From this table and the last quotation, the whole of the 17th-century 
import in the East Indies from Bengal can be estimated at 2.1 million 
pounds. 
Prakash has given rather precise fĳigures from 1659 onwards. This is the 
case in Baud’s table from 1678 onwards. If we compare the totals from 
1659-1718, both have a weight of 3.6 million pounds. There is a diffference 
of 60,000 pounds, but that must be acceptable over such a long period (it’s 
not more than the export or import of an average year). 
However, if one compares specifĳic years, serious diffferences are noted 
most of the time.79 If there was always less import in Batavia than export 
from Bengal, the conclusion is clear: on the long way from Bengal to 
Batavia, several other customers received opium, which was normally the 
case. Alas, the picture is not that simple, because sometimes the import 
was substantially larger than the export from Bengal. In that case other 
production locations may have been visited, most likely in the Middle 
East. On the way from Europe to the East Indies, one fĳirst passed these 
opium sources (Surat, etc.).80 
Based on the Prakash data, I estimated that about 11 million pounds 
must have been imported from Bengal in the whole of the 18th-century. 
Appendix 2 shows that around the middle of this century, 6 million 
pounds are reached, so a total of 11 million pounds is realistic. The growth 
of the import is exponential, and therefore, it cannot be a surprise that the 
import for the whole 18th-century was 12.6 million pounds. This was the 
import quantity from Bengal only. 
The Indigenous Producers
The VOC produced nothing, but delivered and sold items. It used to nego-
tiate only if the indigenous producer was too powerful or important for 
other aims (help in struggle with others, etc.). Take for instance tin from 
the islands of Bangka and Belitun (Banca and Billiton, south of Malacca) 
79 Reasons for this could be the way of bookkeeping, the interval in time between the 
Bengal and the Dutch notations, the currencies and weights used, the occasional loss of 
ships, etc. Apparently over a long period all these diffferences smooth out statistically. Any-
way, it is too time-consuming and unnecessary for our aims to go into detail at a year level.
80 R. Parthesius, p. 45 and 55.
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and the surroundings; a highly desired product for the Dutch and English. 
Their indigenous “partner” was the very rich and powerful Sultan of 
Palembang. How fĳierce the competition was between these two main 
Western powers is demonstrated in a report by a captain of the VOC 
(1751). He 
had drawn a blank almost everywhere as the tin was being reserved for the 
English, who had paid in advance with opium and linen ... Only in Kedah, 
outside the area the Company regarded as constituting its sphere of influ-
ence, had he been able to buy a few hundred piculs of tin.81 
A few years later the VOC sent a special delegation to the region, but it 
found that not only had the English received a monopoly on tin from a 
local king in the meantime on the condition that they build a stronghold, 
but that even in Kedah (in the North of Malacca) they sold ‘linen and opi-
um at prices with which the Hon. Company cannot possibly compete’.82
This last remark points to a remarkable aspect: the VOC paid the least 
of all foreign competitors (fĳirst and foremost the English, but also all sorts 
of private traders including Chinese), but on time and closely following 
the rules of a contract. Private traders were willing to pay between 11 and 
15 reales for tin; the English were sometimes prepared to pay even 16-17 
reales per picul.83 Yet the Sultan of Palembang, the main ruler in the cen-
tral area of the tin trade and the main receiver of the (silver) reales, the 
most common foreign exchange currency, was not dissatisfĳied with the 
VOC behavior. 
Later the VOC introduced a passport system to enable cruisers to dis-
tinguish “legal” goods from the so-called “smuggled” trade. Every non-
Dutch master of a vessel with ‘monopoly goods’ (spices, pepper, tin, 
opium and cloth) had to legitimate this by means of a passport received 
from the VOC. If this was not available, the Dutch decided to confĳiscate 
the cargo and/or the ship, but also to destroy everything and sometimes 
even everybody. In the trade monopoly region, every private trade was 
forbidden, was smuggling. 
This was not only the case for the VOC. The Sultan of Palembang cop-
ied this rule. He claimed a monopoly on tin production that was detri-
mental to the miners and the traders thanks to the practice of an 
“overweight” system: the miners had to supply the tin for 8 reales per picul 
81 R. Vos, p. 56.
82 Idem, p. 58. D. Hall, p. 277.
83 See Idem. appendices, p. 213-218.
The “Violent Opium Company” (VOC) in the East 233
of 150 catties to managers, who sold it for the same price to the Sultan, but 
using the “light” weight picul of 100 catties. The Sultan in turn received not 
only the tin for the foreign traders, but also all kinds of necessities for his 
court. The Sultan sold his tin to the foreigners for 12 reales with “some” 
weight per picul.84 
The Dutch preferred to pay with hard reales. The English, in contrast, 
purchased reales (with goods like weapons, ammunition and saltpeter) 
and mainly used opium and cloth from India as a means of exchange. The 
other main diffference was that the Dutch preferred to make up contracts 
with the indigenous suppliers or producers, creating for themselves the 
“legitimation” to attack and slaughter most cruelly those who breached 
these contracts. This “Dutch treatment” remained the symbol of its colo-
nial repression until the end.
The aristocratic British imperialists were more flexible since they com-
bined the usual ridiculous “civilizing missions” with a sportsman’s accep-
tance of a lost game. The Calvinist Dutch always had God on their side 
and handled their business without mercy for the other party as sectari-
ans still behave, certainly when deciding that the entire outer world is 
their wicked, pagan enemy asking for a trial by ordeal. But local or indig-
enous people and societies, of course, often act quite diffferently from a 
Dutch or Western perspective. The latter is usually characterized by the 
attitude that the whole area is/was Western property because of its mili-
tary superiority. How opium activities were organized at the local and 
regional levels within the rather complicated trade relations before the 
19th-century can be demonstrated as follows. 
After long and heavy fĳights the VOC succeeded in 1667 in wresting the 
trade monopoly from Makassar (Celebes, Sulawesi), mainly for spices, 
wood and cotton. That one of the largest fortresses in the archipelago, 
Fort Rotterdam, was needed to consolidate this VOC power is symptom-
atic of the seriousness of these conflicts. It was a century later that the 
opium trade also started here with imports and exports of rather small 
quantities, averaging fĳive picul (= about 300 kg) a year. However, twenty 
years later this suddenly increased about ten times in weight.85 Apparently, 
after a long war the elite in Celebes felt the impulse to try the stufff fĳirst, 
leading to some form of addiction and the increase in trade. 
84 Idem, p. 26 fff.
85 G. Knaap, H. Sutherland, table 14, p. 95. For prices see Idem, p. 227, 231.
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Opium Consumption in the East Indies 
It is very difffĳicult to provide any reliable perspective on the opium con-
sumption question in the archipelago. In the Generale Missiven, for 
instance, only import or trade fĳigures can be found, but no estimates or 
evaluations of consumption. De Haan reproduces from his documents 
how ‘the chiefs make much of the smoking of madat, but not of inspiring 
their subjects to cultivate the fĳields’ (1731).86 This must be rather difffĳicult 
since the author subscribed a few sentences earlier to the classic preju-
dice of colonialists that ‘the common Javanese ... are by nature lazy …’ 
A VOC soldier repeated a well-known perception of his opponents in 
his report (1672) about ‘fĳights against the opium-stricken Bantam war-
riors …’87 Admiral Van Goens complained hypocritically about the opium 
consumption of Javanese aristocrats (ca. 1660), and others repeated this.88 
So, were Dutch soldiers and Javanese aristocrats the main opium consum-
ers or only the Chinese, who were always blamed for being opium addicts 
“by nature”?
To answer this question, Baud is not as good a guide as in the produc-
tion and distribution matters. He gives very strange and unreliable fĳig-
ures, but his reasoning is still not uncommon today.89 On several grounds 
he estimates that the population of Java and Madura was about four mil-
lion in 1700 and three million a century earlier. The census from Rafffles in 
1815 counted 4.6 million people on both islands, with about 2% Chinese.90 
In Baud’s own time the latest census indicated that this population had 
increased to 9.5 million. Therefore, there must have been about 5.5 mil-
lion people on Java around 1745. 
Baud assumes next that the opium consumption per head of the popu-
lation in 1600 was 1/750th of a pound relative to a total annual consump-
tion of 4,000 pounds. A few pages earlier, however, he stated that from 
1640 to 1652 the import could not have been more than 500 pounds per 
year. In addition, he started his story by mentioning that none of the fĳirst 
Dutch merchant-adventurers ever reported on opium (amphioen) in the 
East Indies. And before 1640 there was a minimal consumption ‘only 
86 F. de Haan, vol. 2, p. 470. Idem, p. 261 for a similar information (1717) about two 
young princes; Idem, p. 544 about ‘medak’ smoking of Javanese male nurses (1758) in the 
Batavian hospital. 
87 Idem, vol. 2, p. 752.
88 M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 11, 45, 47, etc.
89 J. C. Baud, p. 114 fff., 160 fff.
90 Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 61 fff.
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where those who smoke or eat opium also live’, which is among the 
‘strange Oriental’ peoples living in the seaports and among the rich and 
important people of the indigenous population.91 He should have remem-
bered this remark.
For the later periods Baud is only a bit more reliable: in 1678 a con-
sumption of 1/54th pound per head per year, in 1707 already 1/39th pound 
per head, and in 1745 he estimates 1/36th pound per head per year. 
However, this is rather absurd because this last amount, for instance, is 
equivalent to 15 grams a year: a good business if one can sell this quantity 
to millions of people, but it is simply nonsense from the point of view of 
opium consumption. This should certainly concern people who look at 
smoking opium as an addiction whatever the quantity. The difffĳiculty is 
here, of course, the too suggestive statistical method of the “per head 
accounts”: in this way not only the product disappears, but also the opium 
problem, let alone the logistical problem of providing millions of custom-
ers with 15 grams of opium a year! 
An important source is the reports of Europeans around 1680 who 
 stated 
that opium usage among the Javanese had increased during the war years 
because of an excess of ready cash’ [and also about] ‘people starving along 
the roads of Surabaya and in 1682 identifĳied opium addiction as a cause of 
poverty rather than a sign of wealth’ ... [and] ‘... The VOC opium sales went 
well, but in all other products, notably textiles, trade was at a virtual stand-
still.92
We do not know how representative all this is, but a certain conclusion 
should be drawn to perceive the opium consumption concept in a very 
diffferent way: it is true that raw opium was imported from Bengal or other 
places, the offfĳicial quantities of which are more or less known. It does not 
necessarily follow from this, however, that these quantities must be con-
sumed in the import country. The largest portion of the trade of the VOC 
and other similar companies from the 16th-century onwards to their end 
around the year 1800 consisted of intra-Asian trade. In other words: the 
products imported in Batavia were not all destined for Java but were re-
exported over a huge territory reaching to the Philippines, Formosa and 
Japan.
91 Idem, p. 89. The concept “vreemde Oosterling/ strange Oriental” is synonymous for 
Chinese.
92 M. Ricklefs (1993), p. 70.
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Furthermore, the Dutch created opium as a commercial mass product 
in the Malabar coastal region after 1663. This product was used as equiva-
lent to other trade products, presupposing that opium had an equivalent 
value. Who else could determine this value than big consumer-traders, 
connected to a specifĳic and concentrated clientele? The common Javanese 
in the villages could not be reached and, in most cases, had no money; the 
VOC narco-military could reach only very specifĳic consumers; the smug-
glers (often Europeans!) were able to reach a much more diffferentiated 
network. Thanks to the latter, an opium market could be formed and sup-
ported to swallow a mass product. 
This leads to another important conclusion for the Dutch Indies and a 
further consequence of Baud’s remark about smuggling: there is a strong 
symbiosis between the VOC traders on the one side and the smugglers or 
other rather independent indigenous groups on the other. This symbiosis 
did not exist only relative to the building and further penetration of a spe-
cifĳic market, the greediness of dependent customers for easy money, and 
the lack of every moral restraint to deal in highly controversial products 
prohibited by several rulers in the East Indies like Amangkurat II (1684).93 
This relationship between the VOC and the smuggler-distributors is 
also characterized by its lethal element: the VOC itself is the foreign nar-
co-military force using all means to coerce people into selling their addic-
tive product; the smugglers and the Chinese, those ‘strange Orientals’, 
were not only threatened with death penalties but periodically murdered 
wholesale as well. Much later, in the twentieth-century, even the consum-
ers of this stufff—certainly the addicts among them—became criminal-
ized and prosecuted, but the leadership of the opium police, etc. could be 
accused of stealing and blackmailing on a large scale. This characterizes 
the whole Opium Complex.
In the 17th and 18th centuries the Dutch gradually created most ele-
ments of this complex without any scruples. In the 19th-century the 
English perfected and extended it and imposed its legality by force. The 
Dutch in their colony did not need this anymore: they had to continuous-
ly wage war to consolidate their power, but they determined what was 
legally acceptable in the East Indies or not. 
Baud, as one of the highest offfĳicials, time and again also actively orga-
nizing the opium business in the archipelago bureaucratically, had no 
scruples against this colonial policy nor against opium. On the second 
93 Idem, p. 78.
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page of his essay, he starts with the criminalization of the consumers at 
the very moment he was aware of the English, who were waging the 
Second Opium War against China. He writes:
There are, indeed, many people who ascribe the most serious consequences 
to the custom of opium use; others, however, argue that these results are 
apparent only among the few who degenerate the use into misuse. They 
can be perceived as similar to our drunkards. The majority of users do not 
experience more harmful consequences, like those among us who swallow 
a small quantity of liquor daily. Marsden believes that the campaigners 
against opium [heulsap] are guilty of exaggeration. He acknowledges hav-
ing seen opium smokers with all the external signs of exhaustion. He, how-
ever, adds that these persons were culpable of other excessive behavior ...94 
and so on (italics added by Baud). 
Also for his own period, Baud uses the reasoning involving per head of the 
population. He arrives, for example, for 1755 at a consumption of 1/34th 
pound a year (population six million) or for 1816 at 1/133rd pound per 
head per year (population eight million on Java). In his view, the latter 
estimate is only a quarter of the consumption in 1755, which is again 
equal to 15 grams a year and in 1816 even 4 grams! Let’s go back to the 
realities of the opium business of those who exploited the East Indies for 
their own profĳits. Two groups are always mentioned: the white elite and 
“The Chinese”. Both have the image as the greatest opium profĳiteers. 
What is right or wrong? The former are treated in the following chapter, 
the latter thereafter. 
94 Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 80.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
THE AMPHIOEN SOCIETY AND THE END OF THE VOC 
Until 1745 the usual organization of the opium business in Dutch East 
Indies was that the colonial government/VOC imported the raw opium 
from Bengal (sometimes from Persia or the Levant) and leased or distrib-
uted it for further processing and selling to European, Chinese and indig-
enous ‘farmers’ through public auctions. The chests became labeled with 
all kinds of marks and seals to avoid fraudulent actions. The opium could 
be paid for in cash or on credit. The government’s monopoly position con-
cerned, therefore, the import and distribution of opium, a distribution 
largely confĳined to Batavia. Sales in Java or elsewhere in the archipelago 
were done by the opium farmers.
The gross profĳit for the VOC/government was, of course, the diffference 
between the Bengal purchasing price and the Java auction price. It sus-
tained this monopoly by military force throughout the realm. The costs of 
this had to be calculated into the net profĳit. Thanks to this construction, 
anybody (European or indigenous) trading in opium outside this frame-
work was consequently considered as “smuggling” which “violated” this 
monopoly. So, every time “smuggler”, “smuggling” or “illicit” is used below 
without these inverted commas, please be aware that it is a VOC judg-
ment. Smugglers and other sappers of the monopoly represent the only 
available free opium market. It’s a view seldom supported by the VOC his-
torians even today. 
The VOC morality had another side. From the introduction of opium in 
the 17th-century onwards, it can be assumed that VOC offfĳicials corrupted 
their own system by becoming involved in some private opium selling or 
other business. This continued, as we shall see, until the last years of the 
Dutch presence in the East Indies. The general attitude was this is forbid-
den, but it cannot be avoided; the VOC remunerations are too low, so 
“they” have to make an “additional, private” income. Therefore, the gen-
eral practice became: manipulations of the weights, the quantities and 
quality of the goods, the prices, the bookkeeping, the storage, bribing pro-
ducers, and so on.1 
1 See F. Gaastra (1991), p. 94 fff. The OED indicates that since 1608 “Dutch” was ‘used in 
derision and contempt’, which must have some ground! There is a substantial diffference 
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The severest punishments for European smugglers and cheaters con-
sisted only of monetary fĳines and confĳiscation or a compulsory return 
home. Sharing the ‘silent profĳits’ with the European VOC judges could 
lead to the avoidance of much of this punishment. Anyway, the barbarous 
death penalties sufffered by non-Europeans were seldom executed on 
their “own kind”. This made the notorious Amboyna Massacre (1623) of 
twenty English convicts, who undermined the VOC monopoly, so excep-
tional.
From the middle of the 18th-century, something very diffferent hap-
pened. On top of all this illicit private business conducted by VOC employ-
ees stationed somewhere in the realm, the opium monopoly of the 
colonial state itself was bartered away, and the actors in this game were 
the highest offfĳicials and some ‘free burghers’ in both the Dutch and the 
colonial state. This happened through the invention of the Amphioen or 
Opium Society (AS; 1745-1794). As such, it seems to be the ultimate conse-
quence of the acts of ‘the robber-state along the North Sea’ (Multatuli). 
A contemporary of Multatuli, Governor-General Baud, was certainly 
not of this opinion, but he must have had a personal, bad experience with 
the AS phenomenon. He ironically concluded:
As could be predicted, the Amphioen Society could not fulfĳill its aim to 
bridle the smuggling efffectively and to provide the Company with the 
advantages of a regular yearly turn-over of 1200 chests opium ... it was 
already difffĳicult to arrive at 800 chests ... A remarkable group of citizens, 
earlier involved in the smuggling themselves, was interested in attacking 
the illicit import of opium. However, the number of bureaucrats and citi-
zens, who could not become shareholders, remained large enough to be 
involved in smuggling ...2 
And what did the inventors of the AS tell the public? In a dispatch (March 
1746) to the Directors in Amsterdam, VOC-Batavia described the fĳirst 
experiences of this Opium Society in a frank way never repeated by cur-
rent Dutch historians. This concerns the perpetual debate about the 
efffects of the price level on opium consumption and smuggling, which 
persisted in the colony until 1940. The text also provides a shallow legiti-
mation for establishing this Amphioen Society:
between the colonization and imperialism of the Dutch and the English or French: in the 
last two ventures the aristocratic element was much larger than in the Dutch “petty bour-
geoisie” one. Only after the Netherlands became a kingdom some Dutch aristocrats (if left) 
could participate sometimes in the East Indies (see later NHM and Billiton). See for this 
important aspect J. Nederveen Pieterse, p. 193-223 and passim.  
2 J. C.Baud, p. 124.
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A few merchants received in 1745 a ten-year contract [octroy] for the trade 
in opium, because it is impossible to keep the opium price in Batavia as 
high as during the auctions of the Company in June 1743 and March 1744 
and because it is impossible to sell a large quantity of opium without 
at tracting smugglers thanks to the high price. Smugglers risk their life for 
it, and the indigenous people like to help them if they deliver the opium 
for a hundred rixdollars per chest cheaper. After the arrival of the [ship the] 
Nieuwvliet from Bengal with only 750 chests of opium, the Society had to 
sell the opium for 550 rixdollars per chest, meaning: 100 rixdollars per chest 
lower than the purchasing price from the Company ... If there is a low price, 
the consumption will increase and smugglers will be discouraged, because 
they do not want to risk their lives if the profĳits are too low or have to deliver 
opium of lower quality than that of the Company, and for a lower price 
which is not interesting any more. Although it looks as if the Company 
could get the profĳit of the Society itself, this is not the case, and the Society 
gives the Company the most profĳit. Even if the Society is able to pay 6% 
every six months, no merchant can compete with it: it is too risky an afffair 
for a profĳit of 12% in a year. Too much money must be invested which has 
to be borrowed against a too high interest; therefore, the Society is more 
advantageous for the Company. The interest of the Company and of the 
Society is as large a market as possible for the opium, even for a lower price. 
The price of the shares of the Society is not fĳixed yet. At the moment there 
is already an agio of 15 to 20%. Batavia expects that this can increase unto 
150%. The Society has all the opium which can be imported through the 
Strait of Malacca including that which can be captured as contraband of 
the fĳirst degree east of the meridian of the Prince island ...3 
The relevant Dutch researchers have never reflected enough on Baud’s 
“self-conceit” or the AS initiators’ eulogy. That is a pity because what hap-
pened there foreshadowed the most important 19th-century develop-
ment of the Opium Problem, discussed below in some detail.
To explain the backgrounds of this AS, it is necessary to shed some 
light on the inventor of this innovation. Until now, it was assumed to be 
the acting Governor-General, Count Van Imhofff, who certainly was highly 
positive about the new initiative for obvious reasons. In my reconstruc-
tion of the case, however, another person should be “credited” for it. Who 
is this inventor, who built a remarkable VOC career from humble seaman 
to Governor-General? 
3 GM, XI, p. 332.
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 A Brilliant Economist? 
This new key fĳigure in the VOC opium game was Jacob Mossel (1704-
1761). He must be considered the fĳirst drugs baron, as the fĳirst private 
opium dealer on a large scale.4 Some current historians see him as a very 
capable Governor-General together with people like his colleagues Van 
Hoorn, Van Imhofff and a few others. They all had to do their work among 
the generally corrupt elite.5 The most favorable opinion about the man is 
given by Blussé. According to him, Mossel, the successor of Governor-
General Van Imhofff, this ‘viceroy’, was made a scapegoat since he would 
have represented all evils of the ancien régime. 
He has also been criticized for having made private trade impossible, but 
here the curious problem poses itself that Batavia underwent a period of 
prosperity during his reign … It is striking how historians have parroted 
each other in this case. A century ago … Mossel [was described] as the man 
who only wanted to leave the “trash” ... of the Company’s trade to the bur-
ghers. Everybody has blindly accepted this verdict without checking it 
against the sources. Mossel actually was a brilliant “economist”, as his con-
temporaries called him. He indeed forbade private trading between Batavia 
and the Indian subcontinent, but he was fully in favor of leaving a large 
share of the trade at Batavia to private entrepreneurs. ... Mossel had a good 
understanding of the growing commercial interest of the British ... after 
Mossel’s death his successors again drew all trade to the Company as its 
general condition declined and levied high taxes which totally ruined the 
citizenry.6
4 For the following data see the Wikipedia biography, but also www.antenna.
nl/~fwillems/nl/nest/mossel.html and Siemen Duys extensive story of the most honorable 
citizen in the Enkhuizen history at the occasion of a Mossel exhibition: http://toerisme.
bruist.nu. The most positive, however, is Leonard Blussé in R.Ross, G. Telkamp, ed., p. 81 fff. 
The latter used, among others, also an article of W. Coolhaas about Mossel, who appar-
ently is the source of the revision à la Blussé. Same text is published by B. in his (1986), 
p. 31.
5 F. Gaastra (1991), p. 97 also referred to Van Lier; in the previous and following pages 
he gives many examples of this general corruption. This corruption was a standard char-
acteristic of VOC offfĳicials from the beginning. See, for instance, Both, vol. 1, p. 63. 
6  L. Blussé, in: Idem, p. 81, 82 must have known the earlier C. Boxer (1977), because the 
author thanks Blussé (p. 112) for sending him a photocopy. Well, Boxer, is one of the fĳierc-
est critics of Mossel and Blussé does not discuss the opinion of simply the best scholar at 
issue. The glorifĳication of Van Imhofff and Mossel, of course, continues in the present offfĳi-
cial Dutch VOC propaganda, in which prime ministers urge the Dutch public to demon-
strate again a VOC spirit (Balkenende, 2007)! In this spirit see also H. Stevens a publication 
of the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam: the words “opium” or slavery, for instance, are never 
heard or used, let alone a reference to the continuous wars and massacres, except the 
pictures of the beautiful uniforms VOC soldiers apparently wear during their slaughter 
work. For a quite favorable view on Van Imhofff and Mossel see D. Hall, p. 312 fff.
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Mossel must have been a genius if we believe what Blussé writes from his 
“sources”.7 First, the obvious mistakes in this quotation. That Mossel 
‘made private trade impossible’ is a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of the Amphioen Society.8 This argument will be explained further 
below. 
Mossel should be called a clever self-made man with the rather excep-
tional ability in the VOC of knowing how to write, read and persuade the 
highest persons in favor of a most stupid plan; he is excessively motivated 
to make as much money as possible and to give his own person the glam-
or of a Sun King. 
A qualifĳication as ‘brilliant economist’ can only be invented by people 
who are not acquainted with the texts of economists, let alone the bril-
liant ones like those 18th-century contemporaries of Mossel like Colbert, 
Turgot, Quesnay, Galiani or Adam Smith, David Hume or Adam Ferguson. 
The immanent problem, aggravated by Mossel’s practices, of the contra-
dictions between free trade and the state power was the subject of Pieter 
de la Court’s famous treatise, The Interest of Holland (1662; numerous 
reprints; a new English translation appeared in 1746). It became one of the 
most influential economic textbooks in the 17th and 18th centuries.9 
There is no proof that Mossel or anyone else in Batavia ever read or dis-
cussed this “Dutch” economic treatise.
The very few texts Mossel wrote in his life demonstrate an excessive 
petty bourgeois bookkeeper’s mind like the notorious Reglement ter 
Beteugeling van Pracht en Praal (Ordinance to Bridle Pomp and Splendor, 
1754): more than 120 rules related to the proper design of houses, the use 
and shape of walking sticks, buttonholes and shoe-buckles. It was pub-
lished by a man who loved excessive splendor during his inauguration as 
Governor-General, drink-parties and—without doubt—his own lavish 
funeral. 
His next mistake concerned Mossel’s alleged understanding of the 
British commercial interest. This must be a chutzpah: it is Governor-
7 The only source Blussé mentions to support his opinion is an unsigned manuscript 
from September 1794, which is, therefore, written 33 years after Mossel’s death. At that 
time the VOC had already collapsed, and Mossel’s many heirs and co-profĳiteers had, of 
course, no interest in being blamed for this.   
8 It is a similar opinion to the one made by a well-known judge in 1923, who wrote in 
a handbook about “East Indies Law of the State”: ‘The amphioen society and later the anti-
opium society agitated against the smuggling and against the lease-system.’ J. Slingenberg, 
p. 91.
9 C. Boxer (1977) starts his book with a picture and discussion of De La Court’s ideas.
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General Mossel, who started a war against the English in Bengal and 
Coromandel in 1759 (after Plassey) without even the faintest knowledge 
about warfare on sea and land or the ability to organize it. This war was 
not only a military disaster, it was a serious commercial one as well: from 
this moment on, the English defĳinitely took over the position of leading pow-
er in Asia. The Dutch, largely dependent as they were on Bengal textiles, 
opium and saltpetre, had to pay a dear price as a customer of the British. 
It took the complete destruction of the VOC and the occupation of Java by 
the English before the Dutch realized that they had to change their colo-
nial policy drastically (whether they could or did so will be discussed lat-
er). 
But why do I call Mossel the fĳirst private opium dealer on a large scale? 
Blussé does not write anything about the activity with which Mossel cre-
ated an innovation in world history, the establishment of the Amphioen or 
Opium Society in 1745. In every biography this is rightly stressed as Mossel’s 
most remarkable activity. Let’s fĳirst give a few biographical details. 
Jacob Mossel was born in Enkhuizen to a humble reformed Protestant 
family. In the Dutch Golden Age, Enkhuizen was one of the important sea 
and commercial ports. His poor but rather fanatic father must have taught 
him how to chase after money; his mother, how to read and write, because 
she is apparently of impoverished but better standing. It must have been 
the efffect of this education which Mossel demonstrated so exuberantly 
during the rest of his life: the nouveau riche syndrome of humble people 
becoming rich (he always showed his audience his “family crest”, which 
impressed his colonial entourage, mostly of low descent like himself). 
As was usual for poor boys, 15-year-old Jacob went to the East with a 
VOC ship, as an ordinary seaman for 8 guilders a month (1720). As soon as 
he arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, the young economist wrote his 
mother that
business is bad here, because the Spanish butter and soap are expensive … 
Mutton, usually costing two penny (stuiver) is here 10 to 12 pennies. I do 
not buy it, because in Batavia prices will be lower.10 
It was discovered that young Mossel could write, an exceptional ability in 
the VOC, which gave him a clear advantage. A year later he had a job on 
the Coromandel coast well known for its Dutch slave and textile trade 
where
10 Quoted by S. Duys. When not indicated otherwise, quotations are from this author, 
who had to write the most favorable text about Mossel for tourists!
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he immediately acquainted oneself with the illegal trafffĳic in the VOC’s 
monopoly articles, known as private ... smuggler’s trade ... But while high 
and low smuggled, the big money was only reserved for the elite.11 
Apparently, the boy decided to become part of this elite: four years later 
he already occupied the strategically important position of bookkeeper 
(for 30 guilders a month + bonus of 400-760 guilders a year). Again four 
years later, he married the 14-year-old daughter of the VOC governor of 
the Coromandel coast. This gave him a larger monthly income, a better 
status (main slave trader as ‘senior merchant’ or head of the administra-
tion) and successor to his father-in-law. Boxer informs us how the 
European servants of the EIC and VOC often worked closely together
to cheat their respective employers, often also in cooperation with French, 
Portuguese and Indian accomplices … a cooperation ... in private trade and 
smuggling.12 
Mossel is explicitly mentioned as one of those types. Even for Boxer’s 
sober-minded judgments, he is quite aggressive against those Dutch his-
torians who trumpet the praises of peoples like Mossel, Van der Parra or 
the VOC performance in general. 
When Mossel departed for Batavia, he was already a rich man in VOC 
terms (with 32,200 guilders saved, which is about one million euros in 
present value) ‘which he could not have gained with his offfĳicial salary and 
bonus’. That was not unusual among the elite. A governor of a far-distant 
VOC post like Mossel offfĳicially earned 2,400 guilders a year, but with illic-
it additional income, one could increase this with some luck and brutality 
to 100,000 guilders. It was the “offfĳicial” mentality of the VOC elite to make 
‘silent profĳits’. 
Still, there were always exceptionally greedy persons like, for instance, 
Governor-General Van Hoorn, who left Batavia in 1709 with a fortune of 10 
million guilders, a “Bill Gates Fortune” in present value. Gaastra called 
him capable in the meaning of “not corrupt”! 
Mossel was also brilliant at accumulating capital. Once back in Batavia 
(1742) he soon entered the highest ranks in the VOC and could now easily 
11 The Dutch have more names for illicit trade, very well known to the VOC people like 
‘mors-, sluik-, smokkel- or privé-’ trade. The last word is, of course, strange, but under-
standable within the VOC jargon in which everything outside VOC command was illicit, 
including private trade. Mossel himself wrote that in this VOC trade, people acted ‘too 
extreme and rude beyond any imagination’. As a slave trader he was involved in the most 
inhuman business of the VOC, as people already knew at that time. 
12 C. Boxer (1977), p. 75, see also p. 80.
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see what was the biggest money source in the colony. It was not difffĳicult 
for him with his bookkeeper’s mind and slave trader’s experience to make 
this fĳixed VOC capital current so that he could fĳill his own pocket, once he 
had the key of the treasury. 
In November 1745 a ten-year contract (octroy) was drawn up between 
the Dutch colonial state/VOC and a group of private people gathered in a 
club.13 For the State/VOC the import part of its opium monopoly remained 
as it was, but the distribution part was taken over by this AS. The govern-
ment hoped to stimulate the sale of this already lucrative business and to 
counteract smuggling by VOC offfĳicials, English merchants and others.
It was called a “reorganization of the trade” to produce more profĳit for 
the state: nobody was against this. It was also called “privatization”: 
nobody was against that, because the most important people in the colo-
ny were invited to participate and accepted becoming profĳiteers in the 
game; it was aimed at “avoiding smuggling”: nobody was against it, 
because every participant at this level had the same or similar experienc-
es and wanted to eliminate his competitors. The exclusive object of the 
trade was opium: everybody knew how easy it was to smuggle this prod-
uct and how much profĳit could be gained with it after a century of VOC 
infĳiltration. 
The invited profĳiteers of the new activity were only a few rich and 
influential people, bureaucrats and ‘free burghers’, who could distribute 
among each other only 300 very expensive shares of nearly 5000 guilders 
each (two years of salary for a governor in a VOC region). In their offfĳicial 
functions these persons were the leaders of the VOC, and they agreed to 
offfer themselves the most lucrative opium distribution monopoly. 
The new club was called the Amphioen Society (AS). Of the 300 share-
holders, six did some work as new opium ships arrived from Bengal twice 
a year. In two meetings the few attendants exchanged part of the VOC 
monopoly with the AS for a price; largely a movement from one hand to 
the other. Another two meetings, the auctions, were held between some 
AS members and the former VOC opium farmers: theoretically, they could 
have been attended by about 106 AS persons; practically, it may have been 
a quick meeting between a few representatives of the farmers and a few 
AS members. Later, two AS members did some administrative work: who 
had paid cash, who used credit; the transmission of the interests to the 
13 For the general data of the AS see R. Manurung, F. Gaastra (2006), E. Vanvugt (1995), 
p. 106-116.
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shareholders. All in all, a few days “hard labor” per year for a fantastic sal-
ary. 
The AS was, therefore, nothing but an intermediary or “middleman” 
between the VOC and the opium farmers. It reserved the most promising 
source of money for itself by emancipating it from the rest of the compli-
cated VOC business. In return, the members promised to buy from the 
VOC a fĳixed amount of 1200 chests every year (with some additional con-
ditions). The VOC-colonial state kept the import monopoly and remained 
responsible for the military security in the whole archipelago: it was, 
therefore, a construction which gave only advantages to the participants 
and the costs to the “taxpayer”. That is to say: the navy was instructed to 
chase the “smugglers”, the main competitors of the AS participants.
The fĳirst director of this purely narco-military AS became Jacob Mossel. 
He started out by gaving himself a salary of 7,200 guilders a year, which 
was nearly three times as much as a comparable VOC offfĳicial could earn 
in Amsterdam. This brilliant salary, however, was peanuts compared to 
the forty shares he took for himself. To buy these shares, Mossel must 
have “earned” about 160,000 guilders in two years (since he arrived in 
Batavia). Even from a VOC perspective, this is a most astonishing achieve-
ment.14 The only source of it could have been opium through smuggling 
or administrative corruption. The details are difffĳicult to prove, but the fol-
lowing reconstruction seems to be a reasonable compensation.
Offfĳicially, the plan for the AS came from the ailing Governor-General 
Van Imhofff himself. Of course, a Governor-General in a colony is always 
14 The value of the shares was 192, 000 guilders, and he came to Batavia with 32,000 
guilders in his pockets two years earlier. F. Gaastra (2006), p. 104 for the fĳirst amount. Let 
us look at the usual incomes at the time. Around 1700 the Netherlands had around 10-20% 
unemployed, beggars, etc. Next came the soldiers, sailors, unskilled laborers, etc. with an 
income seldom higher than 200 guilders a year. Then there was the petty bourgeoisie 
(skilled laborers, small shopkeepers, etc.) with a yearly income of between 200 and 400 
guilders; a middle class of lower offfĳicers, clergymen, small entrepreneurs, etc. had an 
income of at most 1200 guilders; the upper bourgeoisie (higher offfĳicers, large merchants, 
rentiers, etc.) were well paid with double that amount; fĳinally, there was the 3-4% of the 
patriarchy (aristocrats, highest government bureaucrats, etc.) with “everything above the 
last amount”. See H. Schipper, p. 110 fff. In the 18th-century the level of the real wages of the 
petty bourgeoisie was about 10% higher until 1730, but after that year it decreased quickly 
and substantially to the lowest level in 200 years. See J. de Vries, A. v.d. Woude, p. 722. 
From the many data mentioned in Idem, p. 647-689, about the 18th-century, one cannot 
see large diffferences from those mentioned above: 75% of the Amsterdam shopkeepers 
had less than 1200; only 2% earned more than 3000 guilders in a year. The largest incomes 
were earned by the highest government bureaucrats: the mayor and aldermen of Amster-
dam with about 7000 guilders per year in 1742. This shows how exceptional the AS opium 
remunerations were! 
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the cleverest person, but he was clearly not the boss. A Jacob Cool (the 
‘Court Jew of Van Imhofff’),who also became a member of the AS board 
and who was originally the proud possessor of thirty shares, was urged to 
leave ten of them to his ‘favorites’. The result of this shufffle was that 
Mossel had twice as many shares as anybody else, including Van Imhofff. 
As compensation, the latter was nominated “president of the AS” 
(opper-directeur). There must have been specifĳic reasons for this remark-
able behavior of Mossel’s colleagues: throwing mud and malice at each 
other was second nature in this rich and corrupt milieu. The most reason-
able explanation was that Jacob Mossel was in a position to bribe them all 
and to buy their silence with the promised profĳits. A basis for this hypoth-
esis would be a specifĳic relationship with the opium producers in Bengal 
(doubtless, he had a profound knowledge about the Bengal opium trade) 
or specifĳic knowledge about smuggling practices, etc.
There is another indirect indication about Mossel’s position: after he 
came from India to Batavia, the opium profĳits suddenly trebled from 
512,000 to 1,415,00 guilders. They remained exceptionally high for the next 
few years, around one million guilders, while the average was not more 
than half of that (see Appendix 3). It must have been this circumstance 
which triggered the establishment of the AS, the position of newcomer 
Mossel as its Director, and Mossel’s remarkable sudden wealth. All this 
made Jacob Mossel the fĳirst opium dealer on the largest possible scale at 
the time. Until his death in 1761, he remained the unchallenged dealer 
with opium revenues on top of his other lucrative functions.
Although this trade was confĳined to the inter-Asian realm, Mossel and 
his AS received fantastic support from the Netherlands as well. Most 
shareholders lived there. A remarkable participant in this opium game 
was the royal family, the stadholder William IV himself. This Prince of 
Orange was invited to became a shareholder with thirty shares in 1748. He 
was promised that in 1755 he would be 200,000 guilders richer, without 
having to do anything, when the octroy of the Amphioen Society expired. 
Every time the octroy was renewed, this “stadholder” and his successor, 
William V, would receive an enormous amount of opium money (e.g. 
1,187,280 guilders in 1795).15 All shareholders together pocketed in total 
about 13 million guilders; at the time it was a fabulous amount of money 
comparable to a present value of about a billion guilders.16 
15 F. Gaastra (2006), p. 105, 106. 
16 The details about these shareholders and most of his text were copied by Gaastra 
from an unpublished script from I. Mens (1987). Gaastra never altered his favorable opin-
ion about Mossel.




















































































































































































Last but not least, Mossel also contributed to the fĳinal decline of the 
VOC by what he did well, in hindsight. In November 1752 he sent a report 
to the VOC Directors in Amsterdam in which he complained about 
the marked decline of the company’s trade with Asia.17 The Dutch had a 
representative in Canton, and enormous profĳits could be made here with 
new attention and investments ... in the tea trade. 
As detailed in section ch. 6, this was the very product “in cooperation” 
with opium which, indeed, brought the British Empire to the summit of 
its power, wealth and extension. Mossel rightly stipulated that the VOC 
had a marked advantage in this Chinese trade, since it had products avail-
able for the Chinese which they liked: tin, pepper, cotton, wax, spices and 
other goods. Their competitors had to pay for tea with precious metals or 
opium.
The Directors reacted, however, with a very stupid plan (in hindsight): 
they decided to bypass Batavia and the VOC, while establishing a com-
pletely new organization only directed to the trade with Canton: they cre-
ated their own competitor and demonstrated, in fact, that for them the 
VOC (including Jacob Mossel) was as dead as a doornail. 
 The AS Performance
 That is the personal side of the AS story.18 A more interesting aspect is the 
opium performance of the AS compared with the normal VOC opium 
business. What people like the “President” of the AS thought of it is given 
in the following symptomatic (and nonsensical) reasoning: 
The Society receives the amphioen [from the VOC] for 450 [rixdollars 
per chest] and sells this for 550 ... It is certain that nobody can sell it 
cheaper ..19; except, of course, the VOC! 
In Appendix 2 we have given the comparative data over a period of 24 
years. This comparison does not fĳit in the sense that the “VOC period” is 
chronologically earlier than the “AS period”; wars or crop failures could 
17 For the following see L. Blussé (2008), p. 58 fff.
18 Appendix 2 to F. Gaastra (2006), p. 113 fff. provides Mens’ list of all shareholders in 
1801 with incorrect sums (not the indicated 300 but about four less). Only 56 of the shares 
remained in Batavia and most of the rest in the Netherlands, dispersed over many places 
and institutions like an orphanage with not fewer than 22 shares and even a pawn-bank 
with 5.
19 GM, XI, p. 635.
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have taken their toll, which makes historical comparison difffĳicult. But the 
periods seem to be long enough to make the statistically viable conclu-
sion that the totals of both performances generally did not difffer much: 
the profĳits per chest were nearly the same (540 and 560 guilders), the 
profĳits per pound weight were nearly the same (3.55 and 3.85 guilders), 
etc. 
The next conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the AS on aver-
age did not fulfĳill its promise always to buy 1200 chests from the VOC. All 
kinds of excuses were given for this (see below), but the table also shows 
how remarkable regularities occur (see period 1755-1761). It seems obvi-
ous that corrupt people like the AS members manipulated the adminis-
tration; in the VOC table this kind of regularity does not appear. 
From other sources comes additional information about those “irregu-
lar years” and complaints. Immediately at the end of 1746, the impatience 
of the greedy is heard in the AS complaints: the profĳit may be 158%, but in 
Bengal the purchasing price must be lowered, so that the profĳit can 
become 450 rixdollars per chest or 200%.20 Ten years later 1200 chests 
were imported from Patna for the price of 1,296,000 guilders (fl. 1080 per 
chest). That was apparently 200 chests too much for the AS. It requested 
the government to be exempt from this obligation, ‘but the Government 
had another view about it, whereupon the AS asked to send 100 chests to 
the West of India, which was agreed with the consent of Bengal’.21 
Three years later there was a problem with the quantity per chest: in 
most of the delivery, this was about 70 kilogram too little. The govern-
ment decided to deliver the shortages to the AS, which was a good sub-
vention.22 In April 1761 four ships had come from Bengal with the usual 
1200 chests of opium. However, the fĳirst three carried not more than 293 
chests and the last another hundred, while the price per chest was 
increased by nearly 400 guilders per chest to about 1500. Reason: the 
indigenous merchant stated that it was impossible to deliver 1200 chests 
because the constant movement of troops had destroyed a large part of 
the poppy fĳields.23
Above it was stated that the AS was an intermediary club: profĳits on 
two sides, without great risks. The efffects of its mere existence were many 
and serious. Contrary to the long quotation at the beginning of this chap-
20 GM, XI, p. 464; same complaint Idem, p. 634.




ter, the VOC lost the AS’s substantial profĳits. Next, this means that the 
price of the product for farmers of the AS was increased by the profĳits and 
costs of the AS members and interests of the shareholders. The VOC 
monopoly price was by defĳinition lower than the AS monopoly price. This 
led to the opium farmers becoming more motivated to increase the num-
ber of their clients; opium being distributed more in society; and more 
addicts.
However, there was another reaction. The AS was established under 
the pretext of avoiding “smuggling”, but the greater the price increase, the 
sooner the opium farmers would look for alternative suppliers, i.e. “smug-
glers”. Instead of preventing smuggling, the AS must actually have 
increased the chances for “smuggling”. The complaint one reads time and 
again in the Generale Missiven is that the English smugglers from 
Bencoolen (west coast of Sumatra) were becoming increasingly more 
active. This “smuggling” represents the workings of a free competitive 
market (to be counteracted by all means). 
Another serious efffect of the AS performance was that VOC offfĳicials 
not involved in the AS or who did not belong to the “AS club” felt free to 
conduct their own opium business. De Haan gives several examples 
including the fancy prices they made per chest of opium.24
These efffects of the monopoly opium trade, as emancipated from the 
rest of the VOC business, contributed to the decline of the VOC. There 
were more factors involved. One of the means to obtain as much profĳit as 
possible was to manipulate the quality of the product. A few examples will 
sufffĳice.
Van Imhofff wrote to Amsterdam (31 December 1746) that private opi-
um dealers are not allowed to trade without a Company pass. And to 
avoid smuggling, ‘one ordered from Bengal 300 chests of amphioen sec-
ond quality, so that indigenous people can get cheap opium not only from 
smugglers but also from the Amphioen Society...’25 
Trouble occurred between the Company and AS as well. At the end of 
1751 it was reported to Amsterdam that business had not been good that 
year due to a lack of pepper and opium. In Hughly 925 chests were pur-
24 F. de Haan, vol. 4, p. 21 fff. the opium business of the “Regentschappen”, persons like 
Nic. Engelhard, etc. with their shameless business morality and exorbitant profĳits. These 
persons continued to serve under the new conditions when the AS and the VOC had per-
ished.
25 GM, XI, p. 396. The AS was even prepared to corrupt its own position to buy opium 
from smugglers. See Idem, p. 333. 
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chased, but 263 of them were considered of bad quality in Batavia and as 
good in India:
... the VOC representative [opperhoofd] in Patna, Drabbe, has now to pay 
a fĳine of fĳifteen rixdollars per chest, but the Amphioen Society has already 
sold them for good quality because of the shortage there was a strong moti-
vation to buy.26 A year later the VOC obtained again a hundred chests of 
‘second quality’ but sold them to the AS for 432 guilders a chest, but the 
AS refuses: ‘we cannot sell them and want to pay next time not more than 
360 ...’ which is the Malacca price. This price is so low, because the English 
are very active in smuggling..27 
In this way the AS introduced the policy of distributing bad quality as 
good, which has the same efffect as in another political economy: bad 
money drives out good money. It is a game which was played on a much 
larger scale a bit later in India by “smugglers in the view of the EIC”, cen-
tered in Malwa (Bombay). They were struggling against the monopoly of 
the Bengal-British opium, until the British also captured this part of India, 
with the efffect that from that moment on, the British themselves traded 
with diffferent qualities. The efffect of doing this was to enlarge the opium 
market because poorer consumers can buy cheaper stufff. This is bad for 
their health, but dealers were never concerned with that, on the contrary. 
For outsiders, the connections between the AS and the VOC were very 
obvious. The practical status of the AS can be indicated by the following 
examples.
To exploit its opium resource to the utmost, the AS introduced a lease 
on smoking prepared opium (madat) in districts outside Batavia at the 
end of 1746. However, this turned out to be a miscalculation: the opium 
income decreased, and corruption increased. Half a year later, this lease 
was cancelled: ‘... the opium leaser has to pay four month lease, half to the 
Company and half to the Amphioen Society’.28 
In 1750 the bosses in Amsterdam were thanked for accepting the con-
tinuation of the AS for another 25 years, because the opium trade wa ‘the 
most important’ for their business: the AS had bought 1300 chests and that 
gave the VOC an ‘income of between eight and nine hundred thousand 
26 GM, XII, p. 174.
27 GM, XII, p. 271, see also Idem, p. 337. The diffferentiation in several qualities (and 
prices) of opium is, for instance in 1752/53: of the 1265 chests 998 were ‘Behaarse’ (617 of 
which were sold in Patna and the rest in Hughly), while 267 chesst were bad quality from 
‘Pourannias and Baggelpourian’. See also Idem, p. 504 and GM, XI, p. 407, 408. 
28 GM, XI, p. 598.
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guilders’. This was about 40% of all trade in that year.29 Nine years later 
(in 1759/60) the delivery of a thousand chests of opium amounted to half 
of the value of the total delivery of goods (2,125,986 guilders).30 As shown 
in Appendix 2 they were exceptionally good years.
The AS status is well circumscribed with a text demonstrating how it 
fĳits into the usual monopoly game. It concerns violent quarrels between 
the VOC and the Sultan of Jambi (east coast of Sumatra) in 1760 and the 
Dutch blockade of all his ports:
If the Sultan responds adequately to the just demand of the Company, then 
the passage of vessels with a pass is freed. Ships which carry spices and 
opium without the mark of the Company or the Amphioen Society, how-
ever, must be confĳiscated and brought to Batavia without damage, whatever 
the Sultan may do with our demand. Captains of ships from foreign nations 
who intend to trade with Djambi must be warned not to do this, empha-
sizing the exclusive rights of the Company. If necessary, this right will 
be defended by force in order to avoid disadvantage for the Company’s 
trade ...31 
In a secret letter accompanying this instruction, the Dutch military are 
warned not to be cheated by ‘those deceitful natives while their own mer-
chants must be saved by threatening the natives with punishments …’ 
The same page of the Generale Missiven reports about the Company’s 
negotiations with a Siamese ruler for the delivery of forty catty of silver. 
The representative of the VOC is urged by Governor-General Mossel to 
threaten this ruler as well. Why?
How reasonable and afffable these people may be treated [by us], it appears 
as crystal clear that this nation abandons itself to unsatiable greed while 
the possession of only a few goods is more important to them than their 
honor and decent name, yes, even more than the need and wealth of their 
countries.32 
It seems a good formulation to demonstrate how the perpetrators, repre-
sented here by the most high-ranked slave and opium trader, are always 
ready to accuse their victims of their own mistakes to legitimate their 
repression. This way of silencing their own conscience had the most far-
reaching and lethal consequences, as the following story reveals. 
29 GM, XII, p. 77.
30 GM, XIII, p. 609.
31 GM, XIII, p. 528.
32 GM, XIII, p. 528.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
THE CHINESE, THE VOC AND THE OPIUM
Currently, about 40 million Chinese live permanently outside China in 
130 countries, most of them in Southeast Asia (Nanyang). This phenom-
enon will be discussed later in more detail (ch. 25). Here some of its early 
characteristics in the East Indies will be highlighted because it was in 
hindsight the “role model” for many later developments of the Western 
Opium Problem in Asia. 
The confrontation between the Chinese and the VOC has so much 
practical and symbolic value for our history that also for the early phase of 
it, a detailed explanation of its role can be fruitful. The Chinese operated 
in the East Indies as traders and peasants before the Dutch came. After 
the arrival of the Dutch, they soon became their main trading partners 
and later also the important opium farmers. It became a 300-year con-
frontation between Western and Eastern foreigners, between masters 
and servants, but also between murderers and victims. 
Two hundred years after the fĳirst Dutch-Chinese meetings in the East 
Indies, the British Empire decided to conquer China through bombard-
ment with opium, followed by gunboats and cannonballs. The Opium 
Problem was transformed into a confrontation between West and East on 
a world scale. One can, therefore, ask whether this was foreshadowed by 
the earlier Dutch-Chinese relationship? Let us examine the characteris-
tics of it in this chapter. 
Certainly, it is not the fĳirst relationship between a Western power and 
Chinese. The Portuguese were allowed to settle in Macao (Macau) in 1557 
with a few people, establishing a few buildings to repair their ships. Slowly 
some trade developed, which was immediately of a peculiar kind: Chinese 
were caught and sold to Lisbon as slaves; they were highly desired in 
Portugal, much more than Arabs or blacks. Although this trade only lasted 
a few decades before it was forbidden by both the Chinese and Portuguese 
authorities (1595), it was a peculiar fĳirst relationship between a Western 
country and China. It is also the only occasion of this kind. That was not 
the case with mass murder in the East Indies.1 
1 Alas, it became a strange habit to compare the hatred and massacres of Chinese with 
the Jewish ones by using words such as “diaspora”, “pogrom”, etc. One has to realize that it 
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Murder in Batavia
 Just before Mossel’s arrival in Batavia, terrible things happened there: the 
Dutch foreigners under the leadership of their highest offfĳicials like Van 
Imhofff and Valckenier massacred the majority of the unarmed Chinese 
foreigners.2 This has been ignored, at least in Southeast Asian history. The 
‘Chinese Massacre of 1740’ with about 20,000 mostly Chinese victims is 
not the only Dutch massacre of this magnitude (see Banda Massacre). It is 
certainly the fĳirst and largest (Dutch) colonial act of Sinophobic violence. 
Before analyzing this question, we need a few facts.
Around 1740 about 25,000 people (including slaves) lived in Batavia 
and the surrounding countryside, with the Dutch forming only a small 
minority (not even 10%) and the Chinese proper (excluding their servants 
and/or illicit emigrants) 50%. In the countryside corrupt Dutch sherifffs 
created a “Wild West” lifestyle for the Chinese peasants. As the Chinese 
domination of the sugar market declined, mass poverty, unemployment 
and ruin followed. The rural Chinese protested and, in the end, revolted in 
1740 under classic banners like “to choose the right day and the right 
moment” or “follow the righteous of olden times”.3 
is a typically Western way of thinking, overloaded as it is by guilt feelings for the murder of 
Jews. See, for instance, L. Pan, p. 128-153 or J. Blussé (1986) who even uses ‘holocaust’ 
(p. 94). Chinese and Jews, however, have nothing to do with each other except some 
“superfĳicial” characteristics: tragic things like the periodical massacres by “white” torturers 
and their helpers or their perception as “non-conformists”, rich and merchants. The classic 
mistake is to introduce here ethnic characteristics, but a few moments of reflection on the 
phenomenon “Chinese Jews/ Jewish Chinese” is enough to cure oneself of it. One can also 
read H. Derks (2004), chapter 6.
2 It is strange that in GM, X there are only a very few indications that a Chinese mas-
sacre ever happened. The last message from Valckenier dates from 31-3-1740 (p. 461-493) 
and than nothing until a few lines on 31-10-1740 about ‘a substantial rebellion and brutal 
venture against the Company’ (p. 494). The next message of half a page dates from the fĳirst 
of December. It is a request from the VOC chief of Onrust (the island offf the coast of Bata-
via, the VOC’s ship-building yard) to his carpenters to return to the island. They appar-
ently assisted the military to combat the Chinese guerrillas. The reason for the silence: the 
clerks, who wrote the GMs, had to fĳight as well!  
3 For the following E. M. Jacobs, passim; W. Remmelink, p. 125 fff.; E. Vanvugt (1985), 
p. 78 fff.; D. Hall, p. 311 fff.; J. Blussé (1986), p. 73-97; N. Randeraad (ed.), p. 23 fff. These rural 
Chinese cannot be qualifĳied as ‘vagabond Chinese’ as Vanvugt writes or ‘bandits’ (Rem-
melink). Apart from several interesting quotations, the latter mitigates in an untenable 
way the whole question of the massacre as something which had already happened in 
Manila six times (Id., p. 96). The relationship Chinese—Spaniards in Manila was much 
more complicated, with three diffferent Chinese parties (the “pirate-king” Lim Hong who 
attacked the Spaniards from the seaside as a kind of liberation guerrilla, the Chinese from 
China who also chased Lim Hong, the Chinese who worked in the city of Manila under bad 
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The fĳirst phase of the massacre was triggered by this revolt of the des-
perate, rural Chinese poor. Their urban masters, Chinese captains and 
offfĳicers and Dutch alike, did not want to improve their situation, but 
killed many and captured others to transport them to Cape of Good Hope 
or Ceylon. The rumor that they would be thrown overboard during the 
trip aggravated their anger. They started to attack the city gates, but again 
many were killed. 
The second phase started not only with the easy defeat of these rural 
poor, but also with the decision of Governor-General Valckenier to attack 
the urban Chinese. The second highest Dutch offfĳicial, Van Imhofff, urged 
the elimination of only the poorly armed urban Chinese. This last plan 
was carried out, but during this action a few buildings were set on fĳire by 
unknown people. This panicked the European population, and assisted 
by sailors, slaves and servants, they started a hysterical massacre that last-
circumstances and revolted three times (1602, 1662, 1686). There was never a massacre of 
the magnitude of “Batavia”, let alone under the same circumstances. See A. McCoy, E. de 
Jesus (ed.).
Ill. 16. The Dutch Massacre of the Chinese, October 8th, 1740 
Source: C. Boxer (1977) p. 71. Some 12,000 – 20,000 Chinese were killed in Batavia alone; all 
the houses and shops of Chinese were looted and mostly burned. In the countryside many 
sufffered the same fate ‘as a matter of precaution’.
chapter fifteen258
ed three days in which Valckenier personally ordered the killing of 
Chinese prisoners, throwing the sick out of the hospitals, etc. Van Imhofff, 
the next Governor-General, contributed to this lethal festival by paying a 
premium to all who could throw a decapitated head of a Chinese person 
out of the city. It ended by setting the whole Chinese quarter on fĳire. 
Defĳinitely 12,000 Chinese were killed; all the houses and shops of Chinese 
were looted and mostly burned. There are several personal testimonies 
(1751) of people who plundered and murdered like the German carpenter 
Georg Schwartz, sent by his boss:
As I knew that my Chinese neighbor had a fat pig, I intended to take it away 
... When my boss … saw this, he slapped me and told me to kill the Chinese 
fĳirst and then to plunder. I, therefore, took a rice-pounder and with it beat 
to death my neighbor with whom I so often had drunk and dined’. That was 
not all; Schwartz discovered a pistol, went outside ‘and killed everybody 
who I met ... I had grown so accustomed to this, that it was the same to me 
whether I killed a dog or a Chinese.4
Outside Batavia, in Semarang, the Dutch leader Visscher considered ‘mas-
sacring all able-bodied Chinese in the district’ as a matter of ‘precaution’. 
In a lethal game of divide and rule, he urged the Susuhunan to fĳix this job.5 
The Protestant clergyman, Wagardus, declared in the commemorating 
service after the massacre that God’s help was necessary ‘to crush this 
Chinese revolt’. This help was not very efffective: what was left over of the 
rural Chinese initiated a kind of guerrilla war which was so successful that 
a Javanese ruler of Mataram publicly supported it. The Dutch took several 
years to suppress this new revolt. In West Java, Bantĕn (Bantam), the 
Dutch faced a new war, and so on.
Not every Dutchman was convinced of the need for all this. They lived 
far away in the Netherlands without much communication. Still, a poet at 
the time expressed his anger in the following lines6:
Look this Chinese, his wife and kin,
humbly kneeled,
a disaster cannot be avoided by him.
Look how they are all killed,
4 Quoted in J. Blussé (1986), p. 95 who suggests the scum of the VOC is guilty, here a 
German carpenter-servant (Holocaust!). He mentions nothing about the behavior of the 
VOC leadership. Not so Remmelink, who later rightly stresses ‘that the massacre in Batavia 
had not been a mob action, but an act of policy’ (W. Remmelink, p. 128).
5 W. Remmelink, p. 127, 128.
6 C. Boxer (1977), p. 96; my translation.
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heart and head peeled,
while nobody knows their guilt.
Birth of a Chinese Hate?
Historians counteracted these cruelties by stating in all seriousness that 
the VOC people ‘after 1700 acted much less aggressively than in the previ-
ous period’, which was ‘not due to their [better] skills..’7 The longest-term 
efffect is, anyway, that even after the decolonization, “Chinese hate” was 
so thoroughly engrained in this ex-colonial society that even after 1949, 
severe anti-Chinese massacres were “successfully” organized several 
times in Indonesia. This serious crime directly contributed to a new war 
with Mataram (1741, etc.), was an impulse stimulating the great revolt of 
Bantĕn against the VOC (1748, etc.), but also the decline of the VOC itself: 
the trade with China became too strongly blocked, while it could not be 
based on such an aggressive distrust and discrimination. 
Without doubt the junk trade to Batavia was dealt a staggering blow by the 
tragic occurrences of 1740. A large part of the infrastructure and the orga-
nization of the trade in Batavia simply disappeared because many of the 
Chinese brokers and key fĳigures had been either killed or banished ... the 
junk trade shrank within a few decades to a shadow of its former self.8
These are the direct efffects of the massacre (see further below), but why 
did it happen at that time? I can fĳind three reasons: the existence of a 
broadly supported anti-Chinese racism, a typical urban-rural antagonism 
in Batavia, and the very limited ability of the VOC leadership to under-
stand and master the situation.
The main sources of sinophobia were mostly hidden in Pandora’s Box: 
Dutch positive racism (“Chinese are a degenerated race”), Dutch negative 
racism (bad conscience about their own murder practice and perpetra-
tor’s behavior standardly followed by a “but” ... “they” provoked “us” in 
some way or other), Dutch xenophobia (“we” do not like strangers), Dutch 
Protestant religious legitimation (“they” are pagans; God is on our side) 
and Dutch economic interest (“they” are “our” competitor; “they” are 
“rich” and occupy key economic positions). 
7 F. Gaastra (1991), p. 97. It is a strange opinion relative to the cruel practices described 
here and wars in the 18th-century. The only relevance one could discover behind it is that 
the personal violence against their own soldiers and sailors seemed to be less in the 18th 
than in the 17th-century. Of course, the regime on the ships was terribly harsh. See, for 
instance, Governor-General Both’s letter 13 in Both, vol. 2, p. 268-271. 
8 J. Blussé (1986), p. 139, 140.
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These sources all claimed that the Dutch leadership thought it neces-
sary from a real-political point of view to teach “them” a lesson “they” will 
never forget. It is a message not so much to the alleged “enemy”, but to a 
substantial proportion of Dutch supporters indoctrinated by the same 
doctrines and willing to react. In this case Valckenier and Van Imhofff had 
opened Pandora’s Box.
The interaction with Europe is obvious. All these sources have a 
European background, and memories were still “fresh” after the terrible 
religious and economic European wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in which sometimes one-third of a population of millions was 
eliminated.9 The application to the Chinese and the combination are, of 
course, a colonial one and unknown in the West (although the returning 
colonialists brought many of these ideas back home). One may suppose 
that once the European leadership ventured abroad, these prejudices 
were activated much more quickly when arriving in a fully unknown, 
strange and tropical world. 
Beginning with the soldier-hirelings from these wars, the scum of the 
European nations formed the large majority of people engaged in the 
colonial ventures.10 The pious Governor-General J. P. Coen is the Dutch 
example par excellence of these terrifying fĳigures or, in this case, 
Valckenier or Van Imhofff11; the Portuguese, Spaniards or English have 
many examples as well. The mediocre leaders of Western colonizers also 
showed an unprecedented cruelty against new environments, people as 
well as nature. 
That cannot be rationalized with an appeal to the primitive peoples, 
who are “by nature” barbarous, or something like “the spirit of the time” 
(not even: ‘the European spirit’). The massacre in question was, of course, 
a direct consequence of the Dutch colonial exploitation in which harsh 
attacks (bullets against knives) alternate with rigorous divide and rule 
games played between the diffferent population groups inside and outside 
9 For detailed analyzes of the forms of racism in Western societies, see H. Derks 
(2004).  
10 F. Gaastra (1991), p. 81 fff. This was a serious problem from the beginning also relative 
to the fĳirst European women who were imported in the Moluccas. There were many com-
plaints about their licentiousness, etc. See Both, vol. 1, p. 103 fff. Already in 1612 the fĳirst 
Governor-General, Both, issued the cruelest sentences to counteract their behavior. It 
helped only for a short while. 
11 The latter is probably even a “better villain” than Valckenier, because he manipu-
lated the VOC Directors in Amsterdam and the lawsuit so long that one started to believe 
that Valckenier was the only one guilty of the murder of innocent Chinese. See C. Boxer 
(1977), p. 96. 
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Batavia and Java. For the Dutch it is a routine case, although the one is 
much better able to play this game than the other. There is the impression 
that VOC employees generally belonged to the scum of the European 
nations and, therefore, relied on violence too quickly, even more than the 
English did. 
This massacre fractured social relations, diminished the workforce and 
many services formerly provided by Chinese, but it also immediately dis-
rupted the junk trade with China. Merchants from China had lost an 
important market, and their trading partners for all kinds of commercial 
ventures elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
When they fĳirst arrived (1619), the Dutch were confronted with 400 
Chinese merchants, but also with the so-called Mardijkers, ex-slaves of 
the Portuguese who had a kind of free status. Under the leadership of 
J. P. Coen, a rigorous population policy was carried out. As given above, he 
asked for as many slaves as he could get. Generally, people did not live 
very long in an unhealthy, marshy place like Batavia; “new blood” had to 
be constantly imported. They also activated the import of new Chinese 
groups and accepted that rich Chinese would also import Chinese from 
China. This created the “coolie problem” in mines and plantations and 
increased the power base of a Chinese elite. 
Under Dutch leadership, multicultural coastal settlements developed 
as islands in indigenous societies which the Chinese dominated, at least 
in numbers. In Batavia around 1699, they formed 39% of the population 
(the Dutch 19%) of nearly ten thousand inhabitants, representatives of all 
sorts of indigenous tribes and parts of Asia. On the eve of the massacre, 
the Chinese were 58% against the Dutch 18% of a total population of 7,233 
(excluding slaves). That fĳigure referred to inside Batavia and not the coun-
tryside.
In addition, the Chinese had trade relations with the Dutch in many 
respects, and the Dutch considered them unarmed competitors as well. 
Because the Chinese were accustomed to the same “maritime business” as 
the Dutch, they were readily seen as partners in fĳinancial and other “mar-
itime business” co-operations. Most indigenous tribes or larger social for-
mations were generally qualifĳied as “lazy” and in a racial sense more 
“degenerated” than the Chinese. 
Even an Englishman of the stature of Rafffles copied these dangerous 
and ridiculous typical Western perceptions when he wrote:
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The Chinese ... are to a high degree more intelligent, more laborious and 
more luxurious. They are the life and soul of the commerce of the country.12
And regarding the Malays, for instance,
that when he has rice, nothing will induce him to work. Accustomed to 
wear arms from his infancy ... he is the most correctly polite of all savages 
... But with all his forbearance, he is feelingly alive to insult; submits with a 
bad grace to the forms to which, in a civilized life, he fĳinds himself obliged 
to conform; and when these are ... numerous or enforced ... he flies to the 
woods, where ... he feels he is free.13 
It looks like a positive discrimination of the Chinese. We become suspi-
cious because this man, who had rather intelligent explanations for all 
and everything in his history of Java, did not comment much on the Dutch 
mass murder of Chinese and the subsequent wars. He only concluded 
that the Chinese ‘are considered to have much decreased’. The Malays 
were degraded thanks to the exploitation of the Dutch, the Chinese or the 
Arabs, as well as their own rulers. The British, however, are the Europeans 
who were best suited to transform Malays into good Englishmen, if that 
suited the British interests. 
Rafffles writes about other foreigners living in the archipelago in his 
History that ‘the natives of the Coromandel and Malabar coast … usually 
termed Moors’ once were numerous, but their number has considerably 
decreased ‘since the establishment of the Dutch monopoly and the abso-
lute extinction of the native trade with India, which ... was once very 
extensive.’ 
In his Memoir, however, he calls the Arabs ‘mere drones, useless and 
idle consumers of the produce of the ground’, inculcating the most intol-
erant bigotry. The Islamic religion was nothing but a ‘robber-religion’ 
against which only the propagation of Christianity could be helpful. He 
expressed in the same wave of anger his astonishment that among all of 
the tribes in the realm (‘slaves into the hands of the English’) not a single 
one could be converted to Christianity; all of them became Muslim, ‘and 
despise and hate their masters as infĳidels.’14 
Indigenous people like the Buginese and other tribes in the East Indies 
archipelago, who were at least as clever and skilled at sea as the Dutch, 
were seen by the Dutch and English only as pirates, to be eliminated 
12 Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 75.
13 Quoted from Rafffles’ Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford 
Rafffles (London 1830, 1835) by S. Alatas, p. 28. 
14 Idem, p. 30. These are still very popular creeds on both sides of the Atlantic.
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wholesale and as soon as possible. When this proved impossible, they 
could always be recruited for the armed forces for ‘good money’, as the 
Dutch used Japanese samurai earlier as killing machines in Banda and 
elsewhere.
When these people directly acted against Rafffles’ or British interests, 
the judgments immediately change into the strongest accusations based 
on “facts” which he knew could not be true. Thus, without any qualifĳica-
tion, he talks about how ‘The’ Chinese were only ‘the agents of the Dutch’ 
from the beginning, acquiring the entire monopoly of opium revenue 
farms and government contracts.15 Therefore, the British government was 
warned against the Chinese:
Although the Chinese, as being the most diligent and industrious settlers, 
should be the most useful, they have, on the contrary, become a very dan-
gerous people, and are to be labelled a pest for the country; and there 
appears to be no radical cure for this evil but their extermination from the 
interior, a measure which cannot now be efffected.16
Here, in a statement of an intelligent, learned, leading Western politi-
cian—a white elephant anyway—the Chinese hate is expressed by using 
the verdict of wholesale extermination in an even more stringent way 
than was the case of the Buginese. 
This must be the reason why Rafffles failed in his job as historian in the 
case of the Massacre of 1740. He also paved the way for further acts of 
lethal violence against “The Chinese”, mobilizing enemies of these ene-
mies according to the classical divide-and-rule maxims. Rafffles continues 
his philippic with, among others:
It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to be on our guard against this 
pernicious and increasing influence, which preys on the very vitals of the 
country, draining and exhausting it for the benefĳit of China. In all the Malay 
states, the Chinese have made every efffort to get the collecting of the 
port duties into their hands, and this has generally proved the ruin of the 
trade ... This ascendancy of the Chinese ... should be cautiously guarded 
against and restrained, and this perhaps cannot be better done than by 
bringing forward the native population of Malays and Javanese ...17 
15 M. Adas writes that the Dutch deprived the inland court centers of their trading 
outlets to the sea and, therefore, of the main sources of revenue. ‘The remaining local and 
inland trade was sizable, but it gradually fell into the hands of the Chinese, who served 
both the Javanese and Dutch as middlemen, tax farmers, and landlords’ (p. 7).
16 Th. Rafffles, Memoir, p. 29.
17 Idem, p. 30. Rafffles should be seen as a true pathological mind; a judgment which 
seems unavoidable after reading the extensive quotation in S. Alatas (p. 32) about Rafffles’ 
description of the cannibalism of the Bataks. It is too obscene to quote here, but after his 
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 Chinese as Victims
Thanks to the occupation and violent repression by the Dutch and 
English, a hierarchy of norms, values and judgments was established 
based, of course, on European arms and cultural traditions. Batavia was a 
copy of a Dutch seventeenth-century city with canals, etc. as was 
Paramaribo in the “West Indies” and all Dutch colonial settlements in 
between. From the start, the foreigners violently impressed their Christian 
culture on the inhabitants of the archipelago, as happened with the Banda 
islands and others.
One consequence of this whole constellation was that the overseas 
Chinese seldom or never became enslaved by the Europeans, as was the 
case with people from India, Java or other East Indies islands, let alone the 
“blacks of Africa”. The Chinese remained “free” but servants, never equals. 
As such, they were still a “good cargo”, notwithstanding the fact that they 
were pagans and very uncivilized, dirty folk to the barbarians and ‘foreign 
devils’ from Europe. 
Small wonder, as they were imported as “coolies” under the dirtiest cir-
cumstances and in order to do the dirtiest work. The most well-known 
example is the miners and railway laborers in 19th-century USA, but they 
were already used in the 17th- and 18th-century Dutch tin mines on Banca 
and Malacca or on plantations, and they were given opium to consume to 
keep them working (see ch. 16). 
The Chinese already had a Southeast Asian history in which they were 
not victims in the given sense.18 They lived in some coastal settlements in 
the East Indies long before the Europeans arrived (1511). They never had 
any imperialistic motives, and no traces of discrimination or lethal actions 
against them are known from that time. Ethnic diffferences and related 
cultural diffferences remained alive. Of course, they were mostly econom-
ically integrated, but in a social or cultural sense, there was apparently not 
much need to become acclimated. 
extermination verdict of the Chinese, etc., this positive perception of this habit should be 
called pathological indeed. 
18 See further ch. 25. There are rather irrelevant theories about some resident group of 
Tang Chinese in Java, but that cannot be our concern here. See C. Menghong, p. 14. See also 
Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 74 fff. It is enough for us to know that as early as the second half of the 
12th-century, a Chinese source mentioned the commercial prosperity of Java and 13th-
century sources talked about the many and diversifĳied merchandise handled in the old 
Buddhist kingdom of Çrivijaya (at the site of the later Palembang). They came from the 
West (Persia, Arabia, etc.), the East (China) and the archipelago itself. There was no opium 
among the goods. See M. Meilink-Roelofsz, chapter 1; J. Wills, chapter 1.
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The Chinese lived in small groups, busy with mining or agriculture, but 
mainly oriented towards the sea. They were accepted as important medi-
ators to the outside world. In trade and related industrial work they also 
maintained the communication with China in several ways and support-
ed the junk trade in all respects, from money exchange to ship repara-
tion.19
Since their emigration from China, they had established settlements 
which could later form a network allowing the exchange of labor, work, 
capital, goods, etc. The Chinese functioned well in a rather vital Asiatic 
commercial world centered around the Malacca (Melaka) peninsula, 
including parts of the East Indies like Bantam in the south or the Moluccas 
in the east. More precisely, in the existing lively trade networks of the 
Javanese or Moluccans, the Chinese helped to extend these networks in 
the direction of China and settlements with overseas Chinese and to acti-
vate the relations between the regions of the Indian Ocean and the China 
Seas. 
Apart from the usual personal daily conflicts, problems with or against 
indigenous folk did not occur on any large scale. None of the parties had 
any intention to overrule the other. Cultural ties in Java remained self-
evidently shallow in this situation: intermarriage existed but was not 
widespread outside the three large settlements of Batavia, Semarang and 
Surabaya. People descending from a mixture of Chinese and indigenous 
folk were so numerous that they received a special name, pernakans. 
This relative mutual “living apart together” was still active when after a 
certain period the the Chinese undertook agricultural work in the sur-
roundings of their settlements. When the Dutch arrived in Java, this was 
more or less the situation they found.20
This relatively peaceful world was aggressively forced into the power 
schemes and trade aims of the Western nations. The VOC played a major 
role. Meilink-Roelofsz was one of the fĳirst to acknowledge this:
19 About the junk trade in the VOC era to Batavia, see in particular the excellent article 
of J. Blussé (1986), p. 97-155. Rafffles stresses the annual return trips to China, but such trips 
from—say—Semarang to Canton and vice versa were difffĳicult or could not be acoc-
mplished within a year at the time. 
20 For many details of the ambiguous Chinese-Dutch relations, see also J. Blussé 
(1986), chapter 5 or Idem (1989), a well-illustrated book without making serious attempts 
to destroy the usual prejudices. The early appearance of the Chinese is already mentioned 
in the remarkable J. Vleming, p. 1 fff. He used as source an article of W.P. Groeneveldt, the 
man responsible for the reconstruction of the opium business in the archipelago. See 
below.
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Naturally in the fĳirst half of the 17th-century, it is still too early to speak of 
the Dutch ... politically dominated East Indies, but nevertheless, economi-
cally, the Company represented a power factor in the Indonesian Archi-
pelago ... which seriously disturbed or even utterly destroyed various aspects 
of the native economy.21 
The Dutch came to rule and exploit everybody else in an economic, social 
and cultural sense. They had a keen interest to exploit social and cultural 
diffferences among the “available populations”. The wars they fought 
against Mataram and Bantĕn also had a negative efffect on the daily life of 
the Chinese who came to live in and around Batavia. Still, for a long time 
indigenous people liked to deal with the Chinese, but not with VOC 
employees. The Banjarese people said that the Chinese “paid much more 
for the pepper and in addition they carry with them always much more 
interesting merchandise.”22
Notwithstanding this, the Chinese now became middlemen and there-
fore distrusted by many, Dutch and indigenous alike. They themselves 
started to demonstrate this behavior as well. For instance, when the sugar 
fĳields of the Chinese were destroyed time and again by Javanese warriors, 
and life became dangerous for them, they fled to the Company. But if the 
repression of the Dutch was too severe, the Chinese moved to Mataram or 
Bantĕn (Bantam) for protection and better living conditions. 
However, things must be seen in perspective. From a Dutch point of 
view, their prejudices about the Chinese are closely related to their preju-
dices about the indigenous people: they were perceived as antagonists, 
but the inherent value judgments were fully Dutch: both the Chinese and 
Javanese had to became inimical to fĳit in the divide and rule game. During 
Vischer’s visit to the Susuhunan (or “Sunan”) in Semarang with his blood-
thirsty request to eliminate all Chinese, he also informed him that in 
Batavia they were prepared somehow to come to terms with the ‘good’ 
Chinese:
In his answer the Sunan expressed his great surprise that the Chinese had 
had the assurance to revolt. For it was widely known by all leeward nations 
that the Chinese were like women, without any power of their own. They 
were only good for trading or managing toll-gates. Wherever they lived, they 
were supported by the Company, which allowed them to trade and become 
rich. Without the support of the Company they would not be able to main-
tain themselves because of their cowardice.23 
21 A. Meilink-Roelofsz, p. 10, see also idem, p. 28 fff, 40, 174. 
22 GM VIII, p. 97 reported 5-12-1726.
23 W. Remmelink, p. 128.
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This Javanese leader apparently was not aware of his prejudice, but he 
and ‘the whole of Java’ was convinced that something miraculous had 
happened, now the Chinese and the Dutch were revolting, ‘who were like 
two sides of the same coin’: it was so inconceivable ‘that this could only be 
a sign of God ... many seemed to believe that it spelled the end of the 
Company’.24 That was not far offf the mark, but this Susuhunan could eas-
ily have found out how the Chinese fought together with the Javanese 
against the foreign intruders time and again. 
The image of the two sides of a coin did have a ring of truth for the 
Chinese-Dutch cohabitation. They became to be more dependent on 
each other, but at the same time they became also more equal: the Chinese 
provided many services relative to the trade with the North, but also the 
daily food for the Dutch came from Chinese agricultural work in the coun-
try. It is, furthermore, a typical characteristic of repressive powers that 
they urge one-person leaderships (captains) of opposing groups. Not only 
as representative of the whole group, but also as an adequate means to 
suppress and control the subjects and antagonists.25 
This kind of representation urged by a perpetrator is never trusted by 
the oppressed and perceived as a puppet of—in this case—the Dutch 
colonial government/VOC. That was also the case with the Chinese cap-
tain and his offfĳicers in Batavia, gathered in a true Chinese Council (Kong 
Koan): it was only accepted as long as the interests of the foreign occupier 
were served. The Chinese captain, killed in 1740, knew in his last moments 
the answer to whether such a representative institution of the weak in an 
aggressive perpetrator’s setting could have any other function than to 
support the perpetrator’s aims. 
The method is: be an adviser to the perpetrators, but exert authoritar-
ian power over the community in order to avoid new protests and revolts.26 
24 Idem, p. 129.
25 One must, again, realize that this is a typically Western legalistic habit. The most 
well-known “institution” is the Judenrat (Jewish Council) installed everywhere by the 
Nazis in the occupied countries and in Germany itself. But see also the captain institutions 
in the Dutch West Indies (Dutch Guyana–Surinam). Blussé is too naive in his description 
of the case. In the Asian colonies the Dutch system of the “Kapitan China” was adopted 
elsewhere as well. See N. Tarling (ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 79.
26 C. Menghong provides much information about the work of this Chinese Council 
(Kong Koan) in the 19th-century, but has not the slightest idea about the meaning of the 
ambiguous political-moral position between a colonial repressive regime (illicit) and 
something like a Chinese community in a Western colony. She reproduces largely the 
Dutch perception and position in her description of the smooth functioning of the Kong 
Koan: ‘As intermediary between the colonial government and the Chinese community … 
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The Dutch were interested only in division to sustain their minority 
rule: between town and country, between Chinese and indigenous, but 
also between the Chinese elite and the majority of Chinese lower class 
people. Therefore, they divided up the diffferent groups into their own 
camps, quarters, housing blocks and so on within the classical grid-iron 
lay-out of all colonial settlements.27 We can be skeptical about the strong 
attempts to conserve traditional values, folklore and so on in such camps 
or quarters, while asking whether it is genuine Chinese, Javanese, etc. cul-
ture or a Pavlovian reaction to Western colonial demands for division and 
isolation, the results of the rigorous divide and rule game. 
It is, therefore, not at all ‘paradoxical’ (Blussé), but quite logical that 
the Chinese in the countryside remained unprotected by their own city-
offfĳicers and were at the mercy of the Dutch sherifffs and commissaries. It 
was this Dutch behavior in creating mutual distrust which triggered a 
Chinese revolt and the massacre. It is not ‘paradoxical’ that the rural 
Chinese protesters in 1740 wrote to their urban colleagues that they were 
going to attack Batavia
in which city so few Dutchmen and so many Chinese live, and where never-
theless [the Dutch] dare to treat the Chinese so harshly and oppress them 
so unjustly, that it can no longer be tolerated. The Chinese nation is forced 
to unite and with all force declare war upon the Dutch.28 
No oppressed people are trusted by the perpetrators: one day they will 
inevitably wreak revenge for their bad life. The Chinese were, of course, 
never trusted by the Dutch, notwithstanding their slow acceptance of the 
“Dutch” captains as even an honorable job for the Chinese elite and the 
substantial mutual advantages. From the quotation below it seems that 
they were mutually divided as well, longing for common action against a 
common enemy. 
A Dutchmen, called an ‘enlightened person’, recalled the Roman 
Empire’s administration as he advised his Governor-General in 1705:
Look at the example of the turbulent Chinese, who have been and remain 
subdued by the Tartars with a small force … The Tartars keep only the army 
to themselves without giving the Chinese a say in these afffairs, so that 
always a tight reign can be held on them during an emergency.29
on the one side.. direct rule over its [the Kong Koan’s] subjects (sic!) and on the other side 
… execution of the colonial instruction as careful as possible.’   
27 For an analysis of these colonial city-systems see my (1986), p. 386-413.
28 Quoted by J. Blussé (1986), p. 94 from J.K.de Jonge a.o. (ed.), vol. 9, p. lvii.
29 Quoted by J. Blussé (1986), p. 88.
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How the Dutch applied quite diffferent norms if Europeans or Chinese vio-
lated their laws is demonstrated in the following examples.30 Three 
Dutchmen were caught because of their violent behavior against Dutch 
citizens, but apparently also because of the discovery of 230 chests of 
smuggled opium, ‘the owners of which could not be found ...’. These 
Dutchmen were punished by sending them back home.31 
The comment on this report is interesting: it is a pity that Dutch ‘false 
wage-earners’ behave as cheaters, but it is shocking that ‘wealthy gentle-
men’ are doing this. Only the latter can affford to buy such an expensive lot 
of opium, which could be sold for 67,056 rixdollars. The rich Dutch owner 
of the contraband was not found in the small Dutch community in which 
everybody knew everybody. From top to bottom of the Dutch communi-
ty, people were involved in some form of corruption. However, there were 
at most twenty people who could pay that amount of twenty times the 
annual salary of a Governor-General!32
In the same report, however, there is a description of a Chinese who 
was caught in the act when forging coins:
… he is sentenced to death on the gallows after his right hand is amputated, 
but in the end this sentence is by us augmented, so that he must die through 
the fĳire in order to make it a deterrent.33 
30 This is not only a Dutch custom but also, for example, a Portuguese one, as M. 
 Meilink-Roelofsz, p. 127 shows. One may perceive this, therefore, in a much more general 
perspective. In the Portuguese-dominated settlements the higher ranks of nobility, civil 
rulers and priests ‘fell outside civil jurisdiction’. The interference of clergymen in secular 
jurisdiction was detrimental as well. This apart from the “strangeness” of the mutual 
(licentiousness) behavior of these foreigners, let alone their criminal behavior as ‘acts of 
violence and piracy against native shipping’. This was too often done by or under protec-
tion of ‘captains of the forts’ who could handle all possible cases largely independently 
of the colonial government or of the government in Portugal. In principle, this was not 
diffferent among the Dutch, although some regulations were introduced gradually. But 
regarding Dutch force exerted against Chinese junks from 1620 onwards, see Idem, p. 238 
or 253-256, 264-268 and so on.   
31 What was to happen with them in Holland is not known: the usual punishment of 
the greedy Dutch authorities was to take all the money these people had saved during 
their stay in the “colony”.
32 In that year, 1728, there were no more than 1300 Dutch people living in Batavia. The 
very rich, who could affford this kind of smuggling, made up certainly less than 2%. It is, 
anyway, the elite from which the members of the Amphioen Society were recruited 
20 years later.
33 GM, VIII, p. 170 reported 31-1-1728. A similar case of smuggling opium from Bengal 
by Dutch people/ships is described Idem, p. 220, reported 8-12-1728. This concerned again 
230 chests of opium; it led to ‘freedom’ for most; in Bengal ‘nothing could be proved’, and 
a few were deported. The same report (p. 221) mentions two Chinese who acted in a 
“ criminal way”. Now their sin was that they smuggled ‘6 picol of cofffee’. They were rela-
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In an earlier situation other contradictory data about the VOC-Chinese 
relationship can be found. In 1708 the VOC had 1159 Chinese servants.34 
A decade earlier there were serious conflicts with a group of 70-80 Chinese 
in Semarang, including women and children. The majority of them were 
poor and newly arrived; there were also four chiefs [hoofden] who had 
lived there for some years as merchants. A Chinese lieutenant from 
Batavia, who was arrested for having debts, fled to this Semarang group. 
They all hoped to support the Susuhunan in his struggle with the VOC. 
This became a tragic failure: the prince delivered them all to the VOC. The 
Dutch broke them upon the wheel and killed 46 men of the group.35 
The “in-between” position of the Chinese also had a quite diffferent 
aspect. Around 1820 the discontent intensifĳied among the Javanese nobil-
ity as well as among their peasants. One of the complaints was that the 
Dutch had taken full control of the many toll stations on central Java, orig-
inally a source of revenue for the indigenous regimes.36 Because they did 
not have the manpower to stafff these stations and they were anxious to 
collect easy money, the Dutch farmed the tolls out to Chinese collectors. 
As long as they paid their agreed-upon quotas, the Chinese could do what 
they pleased. However, the original Chinese lessees in turn parceled out 
their toll stations to relatives or the highest bidder. They were always 
Chinese as well. The result was that the number of tolls was multiplied 
and the rates raised. Apparently after receiving complaints the Dutch 
“proprietors” of the tolls started to limit the contracts to one year. The 
Chinese toll farmers now reacted by squeezing all they could from the 
defenseless population before relinquishing their station to the next bid-
der. This squeezing often afffected the Chinese merchants more than the 
Javanese. It was, of course, a new source of internal trouble among the 
Chinese. The Dutch source of all discontent remained, however, hidden 
behind a Chinese face. 
tively lucky: their cofffee was confĳiscated and they were severely flogged (‘strengelijke 
laarsing’). 
34 GM, VI, p. 570: 952 in Bantam, 69 in Tandjongkait, 97 in Tanara and 41 in Pontang.
35 GM, V, p. 646 reported 8-12-1693. Of course, one can also point to very exceptional 
instances of heavy punishment of Dutchmen by the Dutch authorities. For instance, the 
act of Governor-General Zwaardekroon who in 1721 ‘had no fewer than 26 Company ser-
vants beheaded in one day for theft and smuggling’ (D. Hall. p. 308). 
36 For this example see M. Adas, p. 67.
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The example is not only chosen to demonstrate the possible efffects of 
the middleman position. It also shows the mechanism of other Dutch 
farming systems, of which the opium one was the most important. 
 Chinese and Early Opium Trade
For centuries the Chinese junks traded in many kinds of products. 
Meilink-Roelofsz spotted in 1630 the following imported and exported 
“Chinese products”: Brazil or dye wood, cloth, copper, foodstufffs, forest 
products, gold, handicrafts articles, iron pans, money, much pepper, 
 lacquer, porcelain, salt, silk, spices, sugar, etc. However, no opium is 
 mentioned under whatever name. At the end of the 15th-century, a lively 
trade from Gujarat with China via Malacca was being carried out: 
main product was Gujarati cloth and ‘very small quantities of the luxury 
products ... rosewater, opium, and incense, all typical products of the Near 
East …’37 This opium apparently came from Aden.38 This amount could 
never become a problem worth debating or researching.
There is another early report in 1610 about the opium trade to East Java 
(Grise near Surabaya). It was embedded in the much larger spice trade. 
The king of Surabaya had many junks himself, but the Chinese were inter-
mediaries for the trade with West Java (Bantam) in rice, beans, sugar, fĳish, 
cattle, salt, cotton. From the West came many products like Indian fab-
rics, and opium.39 The Portuguese brought opium into the East Indies 
archipelago around this time. They bartered it for gold dust, gold coins 
and bezoar stones; in Pahang they probably could get rice and dye-woods 
for it.40 In a Dutch document of October 1620, opium is mentioned for the 
fĳirst time as ‘a merchandise reserved for the Company only’ while the 
import by others ‘within the Jacarta jurisdiction’ is prohibited.41
The fĳirst conclusion is again that trade in opium to and in the East 
Indies archipelago is very limited in quantity (if any) until about 1660. It 
was most likely used to smooth trade by presenting it as presents to indig-
enous rulers and their courts. Middle Eastern traders must have done this 
long before the Portuguese followed the trade movements in the 16th-




41 F. de Haan, vol. 4, p. 15. De Haan states that opium is mentioned for the fĳirst time in 
a document from 1667, but that this must be a mistake: October 1620 is the relevant year.
chapter fifteen272
century. The Dutch gradually copied this at the beginning of the 17th-cen-
tury and joined the opium business as well. 
De Haan provides the reports of a certain Olufff Christiaansz (1700) 
about military expeditions into the interior of Java. The food they carried 
with them is largely destined for the VOC offfĳicials in Cheribon. Apart 
from coins they have:
... 12 bottles of sek [a strong sweet Spanish wine. F.d.H.], 4 bottles olive oil 
and 4 Dutch vinegar ... 10 pound Dutch butter ... and 4 pound amphioen 
to distribute here and there among the Javanese chiefs ...’ De Haan adds 
that the VOC representative received opium ‘to sell it during the trip for a 
good price in order to pay part of the cost …’ of the trip.42
Something must have been changed in the opium trade 22 years later. 
Then, according to another report ‘opium appears to be the most impor-
tant import article in Cheribon’.43 Many Dutch foreigners lived there. Did 
they use the drug despite the warnings of their bosses not to use opium? 
From whom did they got the amphioen? From the Chinese, who were the 
main leasers of the VOC opium according to the stories? Were there 
enough alternative distributors after the AS was established? Let’s try to 
answer these difffĳicult questions. 
English and probably other European invaders also continued to com-
pete with the Dutch to get a slice of the spice and other trade in the archi-
pelago. The question is: whoever held the hegemony in the Strait region, 
around Malacca, could dominate the trade movements by means of pass-
ports and naked power. The Dutch won the game around the 1660s, and 
everybody else had to stick to Dutch rules at least until about 1750. This 
was certainly the case for the Chinese junks, which were no match for 
European pirate/traders ships. The former looked for help to save them 
from the latter: The Chinese once complained about a Portuguese captain 
who threatened to destroy Chinese junks. The Dutch arrested this man 
and kept him in custody until a fortnight after the junks had disappeared 
42 F. de Haan, vol. 2, p. 195 and note 4. Later (Idem, p. 470) the Dutch complained 
about the lazy Chiefs who smoked the opium which they had distributed themselves (also 
called madap, madat or medak and afffĳion) instead of delivering cofffee in time. They, fur-
thermore, remarked in 1672 that they had had to fĳight ‘peoples from Bantam mad from 
opium’ (Idem, p. 752). Even a report of 1786 (Rolfff) describes how soldiers had an income 
from amphioen and cofffee (Idem, p. 614 note 5). For opium consumption as a result of 
presents from the Dutch “government” as early as 1636, see F. de Haan, vol. 4, p. 14. The 
efffect is given directly: the ruler of Djambi ‘is stunned from eating amphioen’ (1641). In 
1657 opium is given as a present to the rulers in Mataram, but twenty years later a Gover-
nor-General states that “The Javanese” from Mataram cannot do without opium (Idem.). 
43 F. de Haan, vol. 4, p. 14.  
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from the harbor. Another Chinese trader received an iron canon to defend 
himself against pirates, etc.44
Probably the Chinese bought some opium as medicine in Malacca 
from Arabs and imported it to China, but I can fĳind no proof of this. 
Among the Far Western traders, certainly the Portuguese imported opi-
um for the fĳirst time into China via Macao in the same period; that is to 
say, sometimes they bought opium from the Dutch. In any case, it 
remained a Western product for the Chinese wherever they lived in Asia 
and whoever delivered the stufff. The maximum that could be achieved by 
Chinese merchants was copying the smuggling of the Dutch and 
Portuguese (a bit later also of the English) of goods into China, which was 
strongly opposed by the Chinese government. The Dutch were extradited 
to Formosa and had to leave China; the Portuguese could remain in 
Macao, clearly a matter of better diplomacy. In and around the Formosa 
settlement of the Dutch, which ended soon with their ignominious defeat, 
I could not discover any opium trading. 
This Dutch-Chinese opium relationship (if any) must have changed in 
the 1660s. The Dutch formalized their opium business in Bengal and 
Malabar and made it one of their major products for the fĳirst time. This 
was immediately important for the East Indies. It lead directly to war and 
an opium monopoly in Mataram (1678). 
In his opium story De Haan reminds us that probably the fĳirst revenue 
farming in Batavia was established in January 1661 and concerned the tax 
on carved tobacco ‘which within this city and its jurisdiction is consumed 
by the Chinese.’45 This tobacco was imported from China and later mixed 
with a little opium, which became madat. Apparently because also this 
opium was imported, this madat was prohibited ten years later (the so-
called “Batavia jurisdiction”). This had nothing to do with ‘a hygienic mea-
sure’, as De Haan suggests. More relevant is his remark about the low 
price of madat for the slaves, which irritated their masters. But the main 
reason must have been that the expensive VOC opium was being under-
mined by so-called “smugglers”.
A similar fear was the context for the opium prohibition among fĳisher-
men. However, the fĳishermen disappeared, and the Chinese opium farm-
ers complained that their business was undermined (and could not pay 
taxes). Result: the measure was revoked (1672). The following cases dem-
onstrate other aspects of a Dutch-Chinese opium relationship. 
44 A. Meilink-Roelofsz, p. 150 reported 30-11-1727.
45 Idem, p. 16.
chapter fifteen274
In 1725 the Dutch sold to Chinese traders ‘excluding amphioen and tex-
tiles for only 273,209 rixdollars and bought for 278,604 ... tea and non-
coined gold ...’46 Apparently this concerned a fleet of thirteen Chinese 
junks who came to Batavia, from which four hundred Chinese were 
allowed to stay. A year later the VOC publicly sold two lots of opium unfĳit 
for use with a poor profĳit of 13% and 8%. The Chinese (it is unclear wheth-
er they were from China or Java) offfered to buy 250 chests from these lots 
for 260 rixdollars each. This was refused as too cheap.47 
One must suppose that, as mediators in Asian trafffĳic, an elite among 
these “Overseas Chinese” became involved in this large-scale opium busi-
ness, but only as servants of the Dutch, the opium suppliers. The growth 
of the ports attracted more Chinese junks trade. This happened even after 
the Dutch had consolidated their position in the East Indies archipelago: 
between 1680 and 1740 the arrivals of these junks in Batavia doubled from 
10 to 20 per year.
However, De Haan gave a less optimistic view on the Dutch–Chinese 
opium relation when he described the dominant position of the high VOC 
offfĳicial who covered all relationships with the Javanese in the areas south 
of Batavia, the Gecommitteerde tot en over de Zaken van den Inlander. This 
fully corrupt person
had the complete import of opium into [interior districts] ... sometimes 
including the import of salt. If he was willing he added a cattle business to 
this. He had a monopoly position and ‘in avoiding all competition this must 
have led to an expensive market for the indigenous population ... the cofffee 
[one was obliged to deliver in a near slavery relation] he paid in merchan-
dise instead of cash money ... which was to the disadvantage of the Chinese 
who themselves liked a profĳit ...’ etc.48 
Also, the lower-ranking Dutch offfĳicials asked for bribes. How ambiguous 
the situation was is demonstrated in a report by Rolfff (1786) about a per-
46 GM, VIII, p. 31 (August 1724).
47 Idem, p. 97.
48 F. de Haan, vol. 1, p. 302. See for this also F. Gaastra (2000), p. 14 who, however, did 
not refer to the opium mentioned by De Haan as the fĳirst item. Later (F. de Haan, vol. 4, 
p. 9) there is again a reference to the opium monopoly position of this ‘Gecommitteerde’, 
while apparently the salt-monopoly was exercised by a lower offfĳicial, a Commander, ‘not-
withstanding the taking of a bribe from a Chinese’. Later Daendels was allowed to con-
tinue with the opium policy of this “Gecommitteerde” (see F. de Haan, idem, p. 22 fff.). 
After 1900 the colonial government also kept the opium and salt monopolies in one orga-
nization, the Opium- and Zoutregie (see ch. 19). At that time the same kind of coercion 
appeared as, for instance, a century earlier, as cofffee was paid by the Dutch with salt (F. de 
Haan, idem.), etc. 
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son equivalent to an inspector (with the German name Waltschedel) and 
his helper Weijkert. The former received 105 rixdollars (rixdaalders) from 
Chinese carpenters so that they could stay, but every year they fĳirst paid 
200 rixdollars to Weijkert, who pocketed 95:
.. for this he allowed these Chinese to establish a shop (warong) to sell 
opium (afĳion) and all kinds of merchandise; this is very harmful because 
these Chinese accept from the garden personnel and the slaves stolen gar-
dening tools in exchange for opium.49 
The English or Portuguese never disappeared from the entire realm rang-
ing from China to the Southeast Asian archipelago. The English even had 
a rather strong bridgehead, Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen) in West 
Sumatra, before they captured Singapore or Northern Borneo. From there 
they “smuggled” throughout the archipelago if they did not accept the 
Dutch rules. As the VOC power decreased after 1750, the English influ-
ence increased: now, war and opium were not very far apart. 
The following description is illustrative for the Eastern part of Java and 
Bali (Strait), which was not yet wholly under control of the Dutch. Here 
the English energetically infĳiltrated:
One of the signifĳicant efffects caused by the British presence in the region 
was the escalation in free trade or, as the Dutch preferred to call it, smok-
kelhandel or smuggling. The indigenous merchants from the surrounding 
areas were attracted by the opium and cotton which were distributed by 
the British at quite a low price, and offfered the latter salt, rice and other 
foodstufffs in exchange. In fact, opium and textiles were also distributed by 
the Dutch, but the local traders preferred to buy them from the British 
merchants ... Among these merchants were Buginese and Mandarese who 
were already acquainted with the British merchants ... [in] Bengkulu ... now 
..their voyage was shortened considerably, and they could easily pick up the 
opium with only a minor risk.50 
Around the Bali Strait representatives of the Javanese elite and Chinese 
merchants were also involved in the opium trade. Sometimes they were 
caught by the Dutch, including their opium cargo, which always appeared 
to be of English origin. This “free trade” did not concern large consign-
ments of opium: sometimes one and a half chests, another 200 pounds 
including weapons, or twenty catty of British opium. A Dutch investiga-
49 F. de Haan, vol. 2, p. 614.
50 S. Margana (2007), p. 42 fff.
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tion into this matter revealed even that ‘the “legal” opium was used as 
pretext for the “illegal” one.’51 
Anyway, the Dutch did not hesitate very long before waging a full-
fledged opium war in 1768 in Java’s Oosthoek (Eastern Salient or 
Blambangan), using quarrels with neighboring Bali as a pretext to con-
quer the area. Although quickly won, this war triggered new depopula-
tions, massacres, ethnic cleansings, one revolt after another, religious 
antagonisms until long after Rafffles’ time in Java. In this turmoil Chinese 
merchants also got caught in the cross-fĳire of their former colleagues, the 
Buginese merchants. Other Chinese who happened to become involved 
in the political leadership had to pay with their life. This was the chaos in 
which a fundamental transformation took place, which was character-
ized by the defĳinitive destruction of the VOC and its monopolistic trade 
culture.
51 Idem, p. 45.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
FROM TRADE MONOPOLY INTO NARCO-STATE MONOPOLY
The Javanese are a stupid race and, coveting the wealth 
of Europeans, have gradually fallen into their snare; 
but who could have calculated on the conquerors pro-
ceeding to invent the black fumes of opium, to tempt 
and delude the natives; urging them to consume this 
drug as a luxury, until they became so weak and ema-
ciated, so dispirited and exhausted, that they could no 
longer think of regaining their land, nor conceive the 
idea of revenging their wrongs. The Javanese ... were 
readily overcome by this poison, and lost all care for 
themselves; but we Chinese, of the central flowery 
land, have also been deluded by them; for no sooner 
do we partake of this substance, than we lose all anxi-
eties about our native land, have no further concern 
for father or mother, wife or children, and are plunged 
into unspeakable misery.
Ong-Tae-Hae (1791), p. 18.
Ong-Tae-Hae’s criticism and self-criticism form a worthy conclusion to 
the previous chapter and probably the earliest forecast of what the 
Chinese could expect from the Western opium imperialism. 
Rafffles and his investigator, the famous John Crawfurd, were well 
aware of this fate. In that year, Rafffles explicitly planned an opium-free 
Singapore! However, they could not repair the damage, only make reports 
for the bureaucrats and the later historians. Crawfurd prepared a rather 
hysterical report for Rafffles about the latest revolt in which a Chinese 
landlord and opium farmer of several districts played a major role. 
Arrogant and without reservation about the British role as colonizer, he 
documented at the beginning of the English-Chinese century how the 
Chinese had remained again in an “intermediate position”, leading to 
death and destruction from the end of the former Dutch century. 
The climate was created in which the victims were lumped together 
and accused of being agents of the inimical competitors, the Dutch, of 
possessing all possible wealth, etc. The Chinese—I repeat Rafffles’ 
phrase—
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became a very dangerous people, and are to be remarked as a pest to the 
country; and that there appears to be no radical cure for this evil but their 
extermination from the interior, a measure which cannot now be efffected.1 
This is the irresponsible language of European authorities preparing the 
crowds for pogroms.
 A Transformation from Private into Public Interest
After the internal assault by the Amphioen Society, the loss of the profĳit-
able Dutch opium position in Bengal or the Pyrrhus victory in Eastern 
Java, there followed a failed Dutch–English war (1795, loss of Ceylon) and 
the Napoleonic wars: the VOC broke down, and the Dutch state in Europe 
lost its independence. There was even a large opium debt owed to its 
main competitor, the EIC. In short, it was an easy job for the British to 
conquer Java and, therefore, “inherit” the rest of the East Indian archipel-
ago.
In both the English and the Dutch case, it was not clear whether all this 
concerned a general public or a private interest. Both were on the brink of 
being drastically transformed; a most fundamental change took place 
now in the general opium history as well. Contrary to the Dutch situation, 
there was a flourishing private country trade apart from the EIC which 
formed a substantial ‘Indo-British power at sea’.2 Around 1790 at least 70 
ships from diffferent countries called at Cochin. They were equivalent to 
27,000 tons of shipping manned by 4000 lascars (hired Indian seamen) 
and defended by 564 guns. Their opium trade to China was worth thirty 
lakhs of rupees (3 million rupees) annually around 1800 and the trade in 
other goods, about twenty lakhs.
Certainly, there existed in the 18th-century something like a private 
Dutch “burgher” trade which was active around India and Ceylon or the 
Strait of Melaka. The few data are not very impressive and found in 
obscure literature; this trade does not exist in the offfĳicial historiography, 
let alone it offfers competition with the British trade.3 Although we only 
deal below with the Dutch case (for the English, see ch. 6), both remained 
closely connected at least until 1816 (for details, see Appendix 4).
1 Quoted from Rafffles’ Memoirs by S. Alatas, p. 29.
2 H. Furber, p. 181.
3 In F. Gaastra (1991), for instance, nothing is mentioned.
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To avoid a transfer into British hands, the new Dutch government took 
over all the VOC shares. This was similar to a nationalization of a private 
business. In the same stroke the Dutch state became the holder of an opi-
um monopoly and started to produce and distribute opium itself. What 
does this mean and what are the implications? 
First, that the Dutch government in Holland bluntly claimed herewith 
the “ownership” of the VOC “possessions”. This was generously perceived 
as the entirety of the East Indies archipelago, a territory as large as the 
USA now! The VOC’s personnel was, furthermore, transformed automati-
cally into a state bureaucracy. It was like a Trojan Horse to accept this 
band of fully corrupt foreigners and set them to govern the East Indies 
from now on. 
In hindsight, this was a rather absurd constellation. After creating a 
mess with the VOC or in East Java, some state in Western Europe, smaller 
than West Java alone, and after itself being occupied by a foreign power 
(Napoleonic France), claimed out of the blue the function of feudal over-
lord over all the kingdoms in this realm and was held responsible for law 
and order in this vast realm of a thousand islands. This claim was also 
clearly in variance with new enlightened ideas about colonialism, slavery, 
industrialization and all that, which were established in this period of the 
American and French Revolutions. Indeed, this move resembled a 
Napoleonic Restoration. 
It concerned nearly fĳive million people in Java and Madura alone, of 
which 2% was Chinese. What were called “European capitals” had 60,000 
inhabitants (Batavia and suburbs), Semarang and Surabaya (each about 
20,0004). 
In France or Holland at the time, one could have enlightened ideas 
about, for instance, the abolition of slavery. However, in the East every 
Dutch man and woman had several slaves at their disposal. In Batavia 
19,000 slaves lived, mostly coming from Bali and Celebes; in Semarang, 
about 4000 and in Surabaya, 3600.5 From Bali an estimated 1000 slaves 
(sapangan) were exported each year (from 1650 to 1830 some 150,000 of 
them were taken away from this island alone).6 
There was not only a close connection between Dutch repression and 
indigenous slavery, but also between opium and slavery. The imported 
opium by the Dutch generated a chain of misery. The indigenous nobility 
4 Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 61 fff. 
5 Idem, p. 76.
6 H. Schulte Nordholt, p. 41; see also p. 43-44, p. 96.
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started wars to get prisoners, put their people in debt for the same reason, 
while convicts were mostly sold offf. But the background of this is revealed 
in the following statement of a Balinese nobleman (the patih of 
Karangasem):
We wage war upon the others when we, lords, lack money; at such times 
we swoop down on the weakest of our neighbours, and all prisoners and 
their entire families are sold as slaves so that we … have money to buy 
opium.7 
That is the clearest perversion of life brought by the Dutch exploitation of 
these islands when they addicted the nobility and enslaved the common 
folk. Gradually, the use of opium by other people who had money became 
apparent in the course of the 19th-century as the Dutch pressure to 
increase opium consumption became stronger and more systematic 
thanks to the enlightened Europeans and Daendels’ opium dens.
In other words: from about 1795-1815 the excessive Western private nar-
co-military exploitation of a foreign territory by slavery and opium, sup-
ported by a foreign public institution (the Dutch state), was transformed 
into a foreign public narco-military exploitation of a foreign territory by 
“free slavery” and opium, sometimes mainly exercised through foreign pri-
vate interests. 
A new phase of Western imperialism started: the European Dutch gov-
ernment began to conquer a foreign territory, which was exploited just in 
the previous period. When this foreign power fĳinally had to leave the ter-
ritory forever, through the lost war of 1945-1949, the conquering of this so-
called “colony” remained unfĳinished.8 
7 Idem, p. 41.
8 The newest Dutch political-legal analysis of the Dutch exploitation of the East 
Indies, J. Somers, is still unable to acknowledge the illegal character (in all respects) of the 
Dutch activities in this part of the world, 60 years after the war of liberation of the Indone-
sians. This should be the starting position for this kind of analysis. Then one can provide 
an explanation of why a permanent state of war was necessary from the start until the very 
end, with one massacre after another at regular intervals: in every part of the archipelago 
and in every period of these Dutch exploitative activities, people, tribes, and governments 
of indigenous states revolted against the white intruders. Now, Somers, does not argue 
against the dubious claims of the VOC Directors in the beginning of his history and ulti-
mately supports the view that the present Indonesia was a creation of Dutch imperialism. 
For my view on imperialism, Martin Shipway’s approach is much more interesting, 
although it does not go far enough. Disappointing in these respects is also H. Fischer-Tiné, 
M. Mann (ed.), in particular Mann’s confĳinement to the reproduction only of the “civilized 
ideas” of Hastings and Cornwallis and to British ideas, without any moderation or investi-
gation into the attitudes of the victims of these ideas.   
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 The Four Van Hogendorps as Opium Dealers
What about the implementation of this transformation? In the 
Netherlands the fate of the suspect and influential Van Hogendorp family 
symbolizes this rigorous change in a most perfect way.9 The father, 
William, (1735-1784) lost the largest part of his fortune through invest-
ments in the EIC. He went to the East Indies to become rich again and 
obtained lucrative bureaucratic positions. He had his own ship and “offfĳi-
cially” smuggled opium worth a substantial fortune. On his return trip to 
a fantastic retirement in Holland, he drowned near the Cape of Good 
Hope. People stated: the ship had to sink because W. had too much gold 
on board. On Java, William was not only busy gathering a fortune in vain, 
but for some reason he supported smallpox vaccinations for the indige-
nous people. Furthermore, he was the fĳirst Dutchmen who attacked 
 slavery and proposed to change this into a free labor relationship still 
within a colonial context.
William’s eldest son, Dirk, was fĳirst and foremost a soldier; fĳirst a 
Prussian offfĳicer he ultimately became a Napoleonic general! Before he 
took this step, he went to the East Indies, where he fought in several of the 
many revolts against the Dutch repression in Malakka and the Riouw 
archipelago (1784). In Batavia he tried to re-organize the Dutch army. 
People laughed at him and, fully disappointed, he became one of the 
 fĳiercest critics of the corrupt VOC elite. 
In 1786 Dirk acted, however, as merchant in Bengal (Patna): at that 
time people came here for no other reason than to make a fortune with 
opium. Indeed, Dirk expected to leave the place with at least 100,000 guil-
ders; he was not as greedy as colleagues, who returned home with mil-
lions.10 
Back in Batavia Dirk was appointed commander of the military opera-
tions in eastern Java (Oosthoek; 1794). A highly critical report about the 
VOC Government in Batavia (particularly the main offfĳicial, Nederburgh) 
and about the opium business led to his imprisonment. He could flee, 
however, went to Holland and published his critical report. He formulat-
ed a very liberal program for the “colony”: the indigenous people were not 
lazy, they must be allowed private property (something which was 
unknown anyway), no slavery, no opium, no special emoluments for the 
9 For the following see the biographies in E. Du Perron, p. 284-304; E. Vanvugt (1985), 
chapter 12; F. Gaastra (1991), p. 100 fff.; J. Somers, p. 82 fff.
10 F. Gaastra (1991), p. 100.
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Dutch bureaucrats ... In short, he propagated free labor in order to receive 
the blessings of an enlightened colonial regime; a progressive program 
which was never realized. 
When the Netherlands were fully occupied by Napoleon, Dirk joined 
the army even after the Emperor “came back” to be defeated at Waterloo. 
This rather fanatic collaborator with the French occupier appears in 
Na po leon’s testament! All this made him rightly and offfĳicially a traitor to 
his country. 
William’s second son, Gijsbert Karel (1762-1834), underwent a military 
training in Berlin together with Dirk, but choose to become a lawyer and 
ended up as a gifted organizer of the new Dutch state and colony. Gijsbert 
Karel and two other aristocrats stood at the founding of this state. After 
the disappearance of Napoleon, these three staged a coup (1813) to estab-
lish a Dutch kingdom for the fĳirst time in history, slightly less autocratic 
than the previous regime. This “out of the blue king”, William I, was the 
son of the last stadhouder, William V the Fat, who garnered an opium for-
tune through the Amphioen Society. William I not only inherited this opi-
um money (see ch. 17) but could easily be called the First Opium King, as 
will be revealed below. 
Gijsbert Karel became the prime minister of this autocratic king and 
main supporter of a newly organized opium trade in the East Indies. This 
lead to an unprecedented exploitation of the East Indies, new, devastat-
ing wars and excessive profĳits from the opium business. It was the parallel 
development of what happened with the new opium policy in China exer-
cised by the British Empire. Gijsbert Karel was strongly influenced by the 
British experiences and by Crawfurd’s and Rafffles’ histories of the Indies 
archipelago.11
In the last volume of his famous Contributions, Gijsbert Karel gave a 
long historical analysis of the Dutch assault on the East Indies.12 He 
described how the Portuguese were conquered; how the Dutch skillfully 
applied the European principle of balance of power in the East Indies 
between the diffferent peoples and competitors (the divide and rule prin-
ciple); how the most important task—‘to capture all the costly goods and 
manufactures’- was solved. In particular, he stresses the transformation of 
the private EIC into an activity of the British Crown, which had to stimu-
late the activities of the private merchants. The trade of the latter could 
not be stopped by the EIC: now this “private” trade was much larger than 
that of the EIC. 
11 G. K. van Hogendorp, vol. IV, p. 1-14; VII, 339, 370 fff., 381 fff.
12  Idem, vol. X, p. 1-110.
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The fundamental global changes are indicated by the author as follows 
after concluding that the EIC was left only with an opium monopoly on 
the Chinese trade: 
... it is common knowledge that it compensated the losses in all other 
branches of its trade with the profĳits of this monopoly. One of the most 
remarkable efffects of the free trafffĳic and trade is ... that the cotton wares 
are not going anymore from India to England but the reverse ... In a short 
time the English factories, by means of machines, are able to provide the 
whole world with cotton goods, while the cheap Indian labor has become 
obsolete through the technical innovations. ... England even makes the cot-
ton products for the Indian people ... Through the way of life of the English 
in India ... the English taste in clothing, furniture, ornaments ... is spread 
among the sixty to one hundred million souls of the British Empire in Asia 
... The profĳits and advantages are so enormous ... and the national interest 
is so well served, which could never have been the result of whatever bal-
ance in one’s favor of a commercial company [like the EIC]. At the same 
time that the British Empire developed in this way, the Dutch society grad-
ually declined …13 
According to Van Hogendorp the main reason for this decline was the 
personal interest of governors and offfĳicials which prevailed over the gen-
eral interest of the Company, the VOC-EIC. A second reason was that the 
production and running costs of these companies were much too high in 
comparison to the English and later the American private trade. Also, the 
Dutch could not stand this private competition. In addition, the monopo-
lies of the Dutch had a negative efffect on the ‘civilization of the indige-
nous people, while the new system of free trade, accepted by the English, 
enhanced the civilization of these people, and derives huge profĳits and 
commercial advantages even from this civilization.’14The long war with 
England from 1795-1813 was the death blow for the Dutch ‘possessions’ 
in Asia. 
After this conclusion, Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp provides a key 
confession, because he was personally responsible for staging a coup. The 
“we” in the quotation has, therefore, a special meaning in what follows 
about his own time:
Now everything is quiet in Europe, we got our independence back, and 
England returned our East Indies possessions ... Now we have done what 
England intends to do, but not realized fully at present. We have consigned 
the government of the Dutch Empire in Asia to the care of the Crown, with 
13 Idem, p. 8, 9. See also vol. VII, p. 355 fff.
14 Idem, vol. X, p. 12.
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a specifĳic exclusion of all Companies, and we have freed the travel and 
trade, not only for our own subjects, but also for all foreign people through 
payment of heavier import and export duties. What is left of the monopoly 
consists of the spices and nutmeg from the Moluccan islands and of the 
trade with Japan ...15 
In fact, he is proud to have reorganized the Dutch-Asian “possessions” 
into what could be called for the fĳirst time a “colony”. This was done in 
close collaboration with the British.16 As could be expected of a Van 
Hogendorp, the fĳirst thing he mentions is: 
Our armed forces, at sea as well as on land, are substantially larger than 
they were any time in the past. All the costs of the Government and this 
army and navy are paid from regular taxes in the possessions itself, so that 
they do not bother the State ... Our own [Dutch] surplus population can 
fĳind a way out as soldier or sailor... The more these countries flourish, the 
more they can contribute to this Government and Army.... Our civilized 
Government is able to bring these people into a state of civilization ... our 
armed domination is compensated through civilization.17 
The indigenous population had to pay for its own repression and what 
that meant was very soon crystal clear. He himself ‘has much heard about 
revolts ... in the Moluccas … Java … Cheribon … Sumatra … Palembang … 
Maningkabo … West coast Borneo ... Celebes ... at present, we directly 
govern these countries. This method of conquering is nothing new, not 
for us and not for the English …’18
Indeed, nothing new under the sun, except that this sun burns in Asia 
much harder: in the VOC period, the Dutch lived and acted from some 
bulwarks on the coasts of Java; now a regular conquering of all lands and 
islands was started. The legitimation (these people live under despotism, 
we bring civilization) was quite new: in Van Hogendorp’s time Hegel was 
still alive, who invented the theory (not the word) of Oriental Despotism.19 
15 Idem, p. 12, 13.
16 It was clear that it was “physically impossible” for the English to occupy the East 
Indies archipelago as well. In addition, they needed the support of the Dutch in Europe to 
form a bufffer-state against France; the new King William I also became king of what was 
later called “Belgium”. Result: there was an exchange of British with Dutch “possessions” in 
Asia (for instance, Cape of Good Hope or Singapore became British; Bencoolen on Suma-
tra Dutch, etc.); several treaties between the countries were concluded which, indeed, 
resulted in peace after two centuries of sometimes severe wars. G. K. van Hogendorp was 
the author of these treaties as Minister of Foreign Afffairs and many other functions.  
17 Idem, p. 40, 41.
18 Idem, p. 42, 44.
19 See the really poor treatment of this concept in M. Mann’s contribution to 
H. Fischer-Tiné, M. Mann (ed.), p. 5 fff., 29 fff. See H. Derks, 1978-1+2.
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The colony had to pay for itself; the state in Europe wanted to receive 
only the profĳits. One problem remained for the Western foreigners. This 
did not concern the indigenous people, who could be killed, but the 
English and American merchants. They had already established commer-
cial houses in Batavia and other places. It was not proper to kill colleagues, 
as happened in an earlier period. There was now “free trade” in which the 
Dutch merchants seriously lagged behind. During the Rafffles period the 
English had greatly extended their earlier “smuggling” practices, while the 
Dutch were absent.
In addition to their manufactures the English also imported here amphioen 
from Bengal, which is used and demanded there generally among the peo-
ple like tobacco in Europe ... in particular, the island of Singapore is trans-
formed into a port, roads, market with the best and most spacious buildings 
…’20 These examples are sufffĳicient for Van Hogendorp to realize how the 
English got their profĳits ‘and that we have to learn how the Dutch could get 
their profĳits ... We have everything that the English possess … and we can 
speculate on the needs of the indigenous as the English have done. ... Do 
we need amphioen to add to our manufactures, we can buy it in Bengal, 
and we can buy it also in the Levant, where it seems to be much stronger.’21
The opium history of the Van Hogendorp family did not end with the 
important interventions of Gijsbert Karel. His son, also a William, asked 
his father (November 1826) why it was not possible to grow opium in Java 
itself. He pointed to an earlier Dutch initiative of investigating this possi-
bility in Bengalen through the mission of a Frenchman Maurevert. This 
man had ‘to collect amphioen and other seeds’ in Bengalen and to advise 
about some poppy culture in the Dutch “possessions”.22 Apparently son 
William planned such an activity on Java. Already half a year later (June 
1827) he reported his father how some influential medical doctor had 
condemned it strongly. Apparently William’s initiative fĳizzled out, but his 
obvious idea or initiative had a much longer life. Still an opium expert as 
the later Governor-General and Minister of the Colonies, Jean Chretien 
20 G.K. van Hogendorp, vol. X, p. 50.
21 Idem, p. 52.
22 Told and quoted by P. van der Kemp, p. 92. This M(e)aurevert was a draughtsman 
and botanist originally living in Pondicherry (East India). He was attached to the Dutch 
Natuurkundige Commissie (Commission for Natural Sciences) in the 1820s. M(e)aurevert 
was also known as collector of an orchid discovered on Java. Another Van Hogendorp 
(1812-1891), son of Dirk, was also active as administrator (resident) in several parts of Java. 
It is not known whether or how he supported the opium trade or consumption in the 
regions of his jurisdiction, Amboina, Semarang, Kadoe, Japara, etc. For these districts see 
chapter 20.  
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Baud (1789 – 1859), is confronted time and again with the same advise. 
Another Governor-General, Rochussen, asked, for instance, his colleague 
and friend Baud whether he liked the memorandum of a former Governor-
General Van den Bosch in which the latter proposed to grow poppies on 
Menado (present North Sulawesi):
Before I read about the idea of Van den Bosch I myself studied the poppy 
culture of Bengal. We spend about a million to import the opium and there 
is, furthermore, the opportunity to export the own opium to China. Against 
this idea there are two questions: 1. Can all this succeed? 2. Is it clever to 
inform the population about a product which can be grown so easy and 
cheap, but which is so expensive for them to buy? ...23
Baud answered that his enemy in the colonial bureaucracy, the Director-
General of the Ministry of Finance, proposed already in 1827 to grow 
poppy. There was as well an important advise of the President of the Royal 
Dutch Trading Company (see below), G. Schimmelpenninck: the opium 
culture is risky and we make much profĳit at the moment. In addition, it 
will be difffĳicult to uphold our monopoly position thanks to the scattering 
of poppy seed. This man even argued that in this case the immorality 
among the whole population should increase.24 
The above is enough to learn the mentality, ideology, role model and 
actions taken of/by the highest Dutch offfĳicials. Below, some details will be 
added to this.
 The Birth of a Narco-military State
The Van Hogendorp family symbolized in the most perfect way how the 
excessive Western private narco-military exploitation of a foreign territo-
ry through slavery and opium supported by a state was transformed into a 
public narco-military exploitation through “free slavery” and opium main-
ly exercised by private interests. For the victims of this last new imperial-
ism, the situation was not new, except that they soon learned about a 
much harsher opposition of the foreign military against their attempts to 
liberate oneself of Dutch oppression. Reason: this new state imperialism 
was accompanied by a much stronger Western military involvement in 
the foreign territories. Mainly the English and Dutch demonstrated this 
23 J. Baud, J. Rochussen, vol. II, p. 24 (a letter from July 1845), p. 235 (a letter from April 
1847). Jan Jacob Rochussen (1797-1871) was a Governor General as well.
24 Idem, vol. III, p. 5 and 9.
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policy. In addition, they promised each other in 1816 not to interfere in 
each other’s territories. The French needed at least half a century to recu-
perate from the Napoleonic disaster and—in my view— they never suc-
ceeded (see part 4). 
Stronger measures were also imposed to addict the population to 
amphioen/opium. Already during the “French” period of the East Indies, 
Governor-General Daendels (1808-1811) rationalized the distribution of 
opium and tried to stimulate its consumption.25 He established for the 
fĳirst time many Government opium dens. Furthermore, he ordered every 
local commander, European or indigenous, to buy a sufffĳicient quantity of 
opium for a period of six months on credit against a fĳixed price. The com-
mander was allowed to profĳit as well from these activities. He also had to 
report under oath how the consumption in his district and local den(s) 
was structured. Failure to do so was punished with deportation. Small 
wonder that the opium income of the state multiplied nearly ten times in 
1804 and more than doubled within two years (1809-1810; see appendix 4)!
Daendels’ opium system was embedded in a new, typically French, 
hierarchical organization of the colonial state with the French-Dutch 
King Louis Napoleon at the summit; there was no place for indigenous 
princes anymore. They could become a prefect in this system of prefec-
tures and keep their feudal rights, thus securing their income. 
This new system of foreign exploitation was extended into more or less 
a slave state. The Javanese were obliged under harsh repression to plant 
cofffee trees in every available spot. What Daendels introduced in the opi-
um and cofffee business remained more or less intact throughout the 19th-
century. He is, therefore, the one who established the main features of a 
narco-military regime. For the Javanese it was lucky that Daendels stayed 
only for a short period. Not that their situation improved much after-
wards, but some enlightenment could be registered occasionally. 
After this French-Dutch period, the East Indies fell prey to Rafffles. His 
very English “liberal reform” was introduced, with its stress on private 
instead of public initiatives. Contrary to this English practice, however, 
the Dutch chose later for the combination of harsher military activities, 
stronger government regulations and privileged private entrepreneurship 
25 For Daendels’ opium measures, see Appendix 4; E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 134 fff. For 
his cofffee culture and its efffects, see J. Bastin, p. 62 and passim. Also, the article by M. 
 Fernando and W. O’Mally in: A. Booth et al (ed.), p. 171-186. During the whole of the 19th-
century, nearly 50% of all agricultural households was employed in cofffee cultivation. 
Multatuli’s complaints about the Dutch ‘robber-state’ were based on the practices in this 
sector.
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in every product including opium. This was, in fact, a continuation of the 
Daendels system. How the other Van Hogendorps and their autocratic 
king fĳixed this situation will be the subject of the next two chapters. Here 
we follow in some detail how the transformation took shape in which opi-
um played such a key role. 
The fĳirst three Van Hogendorps, each in his way, were aristocratic chil-
dren of the Enlightenment (like Daendels in fact). They subsequently 
demonstrated the phases which led to the autocratic leadership of 
Napoleon or the introduction of an autocratic kingdom of the House of 
Orange. They all expressed their anger about the highly stubborn, cor-
rupt, selfĳish Dutchmen in the “colonies”. The objects of this criticism were 
slavery and opium. Still, these Hogendorps were at the same time very 
anxious to amass fortunes in the opium business and/or to propagate opi-
um on the largest possible scale as fĳinancial lubricant of the state. This 
points to the highest degree of hypocrisy. Since they all held important 
and leading positions, this hypocrisy immediately had rather severe, 
sometimes lethal consequences, at least for the millions resident in their 
Asian “possessions” and new conquests.
This hypocrisy of the Hogendorps was a general phenomenon from the 
beginning of the transformation period. There was, for instance, a com-
mission installed to organize a new framework for the opium business 
now that the almighty position of the private VOC and its fully corrupt 
product, the Amphioen Society, had perished. Its president, Nederburgh, 
the mightiest colonial bureaucrat to date, was formerly a strong supporter 
of extension of the opium business of the private Amphioen Society. But 
now (1803) he subscribed to the
‘state maxim … it is not at all an injustice that the Colonies exist for the 
Motherland and not the reverse’, and he also condemned the use of opium 
‘as a slow poison that undermines the mind as well as the body, while it 
makes in the end that men are not able to work and transforms them into 
animals.’26 
The second part of the statement was an echo of his most sincere enemy, 
Dirk van Hogendorp. With this change of opinion, Nederburgh repro-
duced the position of the new state, which had to cater for several com-
peting interests in the motherland. This lead to his quasi-above-the-parties 
position: the combination of the divide and rule and/or the enemy of your 
enemy is your friend maxims with the stifff-upper lip rule, what formerly 
26 Quoted in E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 131. See also J. Rush, p. 136.
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were the bare facts can now be acknowledged and vice versa. A long-lasting 
conflict with Van Hogendorp was the result.
A bit later, the confrontation with the Rafffles government and ideology 
had to be mastered. The new Dutch rulers knew Crawfurd’s or Rafffles’ 
History of Java (1817) by heart. Rafffles even went to Europe and dined with 
G. van Hogendorp and King William I in Brussels (1817). He was not 
impressed:
[The] King himself, and his leading minister, seem to mean well, [but] they 
have too great a hankering after profĳit, and immediate profĳit, for any liberal 
system to thrive under them ... The King complained of the cofffee culture 
having been neglected, and expressed anxiety that he should soon have 
consignments; and while he ... assured me that the system introduced under 
my administration should be continued, maintained that it was essential to 
confĳine the trade, and to make such regulations as would secure it and its 
profĳits exclusively to the mother-country. (italics of R.)27 
A matter of greed for money: an English intellectual’s judgment about a 
Dutch intellectual like Gijsbert K. van Hogendorp accentuates quite 
important diffferences.
The opium opinions and policies of King William I or the Van 
Hogendorps are now well-known, but what about Rafffles in this respect? 
In his History of Java, there is a special chapter on opium. It starts as usual 
from the wrong end: it had not been the Dutch and English monopoly and 
“smuggler” trade that had spread opium in the region, the indigenous 
people themselves were addicts by nature. He wrote:
The use of opium, it must be confessed and lamented, has struck deep into 
the habits, and extended its malignant influence to the morals of the people, 
and is likely to perpetuate its power in degrading their character and ener-
vating their energies, as long as the European government, overlooking 
every consideration of policy and humanity, shall allow a paltry addition to 
their fĳinances to outweigh all regard to the ultimate happiness and prosper-
ity of the country.28
Rafffles continued his text with a two-page quotation of Dirk van 
Hogendorp’s anti-opium tract in which sentences appear like:
If a large quantity is taken, it produces a kind of madness, of which the 
efffects are dreadful, especially when the mind is troubled by jealousy, or 
inflamed with a desire of vengeance or other violent passions. At all times 
it leaves a slow poison, which undermines the faculty of the soul and the 
27 Quoted in J. Bastin, p. 66, 67.
28 Th. Rafffles, vol. 1, p. 102, 103.
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constitution of the body, and renders a person unfĳit for all kind of labour 
and an image of the brute creation. ... To satisfy that inclination, he will 
sacrifĳice every thing, his own welfare, the subsistence of his wife and chil-
dren, and neglect his work; so that, at last, he no longer respects either the 
property of life of his fellow creature ... no law, however severe, could be 
contrived … to prevent at least that in the future, no subjects of this Repub-
lic, or of the Asiatic possessions of the state, should be disgraced by trading 
in that abominable poison. ... It is therefore necessary at once, and entirely, 
to abolish the trade and importation of opium, and to prohibit the same, 
under the severest penalties that the law permits, since it is poison. The 
smuggling of it will then become almost impracticable, and the health, and 
even the lives of thousands will be preserved.29 
So, the highest offfĳicials of England and the Netherlands, the countries 
most involved in slavery and the opium trade in the world, knew perfectly 
well the kind of ravaging efffects their activities had in their ‘Asiatic pos-
sessions’. In England, at least, the anti-slavery movement succeeded at 
this time; the Dutch colonies were the very last in the world to prohibit 
slavery. The greed of the English (excessive among the Dutch elite) was 
inflamed to such a degree and the knowledge that opium was the best 
means to sustain the political peace in the ‘possessions’ meant that opium 
was never prohibited. 
Dirk Van Hogendorp, Rafffles and Gijsbert Karel accepted this as the 
most promising guideline to get as much profĳit as possible for both state 
and private merchants:
Opium is one of the most profĳitable articles of eastern commerce: as such 
it is considered by our merchants ... it is impossible to oppose trading in 
the same. In this situation of afffairs, therefore, we would rather advise that 
general leave be given to import opium at Malacca, and to allow the expec-
tation from thence to Borneo and all the eastern parts not in the possession 
of the state’ (Italics of Rafffles/Van Hogendorp).30 
The maxim became, therefore, to direct the opium to those Asiatic regions 
not yet in the “possession” of some Western power: that became, of course, 
the advice to addict China on the largest possible scale. A variant with the 
same background is: the English government’s opium trade would con-
tinue up to the gate to the East Indies, Malacca, where the Dutch would 
pick it up and distribute it themselves in “their” archipelago. That is what 
happened in fact. Anyway, it was the guideline which triggered the most 
29 Idem, p. 104, 105.
30 Idem, p. 104.
from trade monopoly into narco-state monopoly 291
lucrative opium deals in world history for the Dutch as well as for the 
English. 
The target of the English was China rather than its own colony of India, 
the production center. The Dutch government had a quite diffferent inter-
est: it directed the poison to its “own subjects” in Asia who were appar-
ently not yet “pacifĳied” enough. After China the East Indies became the 
largest consumption center thanks to the continuous effforts of the Dutch 
and their supporters. 
The Dutch had nothing to sell in the East Indies except opium. Java and 
the whole archipelago were to become the sole producer of export crops 
and mining resources; the indigenous chiefs had to be bound to deliver 
for the lowest possible prices; from this income they could also buy Dutch 
opium and later “batiks” fabricated by the Dutch industry in Holland.
This transformation of the VOC + informal governmental support into 
formal Dutch government opium business is reproduced in Baud’s table 
of the years 1746-1816 (see Appendix 2). However, the “new” knowledge 
about the poisonous character of opium led to one argument and one 
conclusion: of course, the colonial state must abandon its involvement 
with the opium business, but—alas—the English competition was so 
tough that the compulsory deliveries of the other classical colonial prod-
ucts (cofffee, pepper, rice, wood, etc.) should be retained because ‘they 
belong essentially to the Javanese manners and customs’! In short, the 
opium business had to be continued as usual and extended if possible 
because it was one of the few profĳitable ventures.
What is the reality behind these declarations and plans? The British 
part of this business was characterized in those years by the position of 
Rafffles lying between the interests of the EIC-British government in India 
and his own interests in Java. “India” expected to transform the new 
British ‘possession’ into an easily exploitable producer of agricultural 
products by indigenous producers. Rafffles wanted to go much further: the 
whole feudal structure with its indigenous nobility had to disappear in 
favor of a money economy and a direct relationship between the govern-
ment and peasants in order to make the East Indies also into a market for 
British manufactured products. 
To pay for the occupation of Java, etc. “India” wanted to create a land 
revenue based upon the principles of free cultivation and free trade, 
whereas Rafffles looked fĳirst for commercial and next for territorial reve-
nue.31 He promised “India” (January 1812) much rice and cofffee, Banca tin 
31 J. Bastin, p. 17.
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and spices. He furthermore expected that his opium monopoly would 
yield 700,000 Spanish dollars (= ca. 2 million Dutch guilders). Together 
with revenues from customs and taxes, this could bring the government’s 
income to 5.3 million Spanish dollars (= ca. 15 million Dutch guilders). He 
only arrived at half this target, and his position versus “Calcutta” was 
undermined:
… the severest of all fĳinancial shocks was the abolition of the Java opium 
monopoly in favor of free importations by Calcutta merchants. The Bengal 
Government had taken this action in the belief that ultimately the Company 
would gain more from Calcutta sales by opening markets in the Archipelago 
than from any local monopoly in Java. ... The loss of the opium revenue and 
the failure of external commerce led to a big increase in the export of spe-
cie from Java by the Bengal merchants ... The result was that the continued 
adverse balance of trade led to a spectacular flight of specie from the island 
during the second half of 1812 ...32
The Chinese later experienced exactly the same process for the opium-
silver exchange with the English smugglers from India (see ch. 6).
The consequence was also that Rafffles’ anti-opium and anti-slavery 
policy in Java (whatever its dubious performance) was defĳinitely aban-
doned. In reality, the old VOC practice, renewed by Daendels, was restored 
in a pro-slavery and pro-opium fashion. Anyway, a policy was introduced
thanks to the acceptance of the system ... to make the opium farming as 
profĳitable as possible for the colonial treasury’ and to expand the lease sys-
tem also into the Outer Districts.33
Before 1800 the tendency was to stimulate opium consumption gradually 
and to ask low prices in order not to trigger smuggling. Indeed, this 
approach was defĳinitely abandoned: now, the aim was big money in the 
shortest possible time and with the most efffective methods. At the start, 
the government targeted three million Dutch opium guilders annually for 
itself and envisaged a profĳit of four million for the farmers. 
Why? Its new aim of conquering the whole archipelago and colonizing 
this huge territory on land and at sea had to be paid for by the ‘Asiatic pos-
32 Idem, p. 18, 19. The contradictions in Rafffles’ opium policy are, in fact, more remark-
able. During Daendels’ regime the opium income came to 16% of the total. Offfĳicially (that 
is to say: according to his own statistics) Rafffles diminished this percentage to 12.3 (1812/13), 
to 13.4 (1813/14) and then even to 5.7. However, not only his land rent income doubled dur-
ing his regime and the leases increased in a substantial way, but the opium import 
increased in 1812-1816 from 40,500 chests to 73,250 (see appendix 2). This is clearly in vari-
ance with his own statistics.
33 J. C. Baud, p. 161.
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session’ itself. It was, furthermore, a task which had to be exercised by the 
Dutch state-in-the-new-colony in close cooperation with specifĳic private 
interests. 
How this was done in the 19th-century is recounted here in two stories. 
A fĳirst short story tells about how tin was mined on the island of Billiton, 
in which the private initiative (the Billiton Mining Company) was stressed, 
and the government tin exploitation on the neighboring island of Banca 
remained more or less in the background. The second, longer story dem-
onstrates in a rather spectacular way how the public-private cooperation 
has lead to the activities of a state-within-the-state, the Royal Dutch Trade 
Company. In both stories opium plays an important, but diffferent, role, 
and in both stories the same is true for the new Dutch royalty. 

tin for opium, opium for tin 295
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
TIN FOR OPIUM, OPIUM FOR TIN?
The early history of a Billiton Mining Company (BM) is of interest here for 
two questions: what is the relation between tin production and opium, 
and how does this concern the dependency/independency of the private 
industry on the Dutch colonial state.1 That from this early industrial activ-
ity it ultimately developed into the largest mining company in the world 
today, BHP-Billiton, is another rather complicated story. This is, of course, 
an interesting fact, but irrelevant here.2
Until the middle of the 19th-century, these foreign mining activities 
were only a matter of what was called the “Dutch Government in the East 
Indies” and the “English Government in Malacca”. Tin mining was done at 
least from around 1700 onwards when the Sultan of Palembang, also ruler 
of the islands of Banca (Bangka, etc.) and Billiton (Beilitung, etc.), already 
had serious quarrels about tin with English and Dutch merchants. There 
were some loose contacts between the VOC and the islands: from 1640 
onwards there is some trade between Batavia and Billiton (iron in the 
form of little axes and knifes exchanged for textiles). 
Twenty-fĳive years later, some people asked the VOC to protect them 
against the Sultan, but the islands were soon abandoned to what was 
called “pirates”.3 From 1709 the Sultan delivered sufffĳicient tin to Batavia at 
a fĳixed price in a regular way, apparently to keep the Dutch out of the 
region.
At the beginning of the 19th-century, the English reported that poten-
tially 40-50,000 piculs at a cost price of 10 Spanish dollars per picul could 
be sold in China for 22 to 26 dollars. The EIC could make much more of it, 
‘if the Company were to monopolize the whole supply, the price might be 
raised at whim’.4 At this time the population of Banca was estimated at 
10,000, of which 2,000 were Chinese, who worked the tin mines exclusive-
1 The offfĳicial name in Dutch was: Naamloze Vennootschap Billiton Maatschappij (Bil-
liton Company Ltd.). For the following history, I used M. Gruythuysen —R. Kramer, 
G. A. de Lange, J. Loudon, J. Mollema, F. Stapel, C. Swaving, R. Verbeek.
2 See an interesting article about the present BHP Billiton in The Economist, 21-8-2010.
3 F. Stapel, p. 14-25.
4 Idem, p. 29.
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ly. They were organized in so-called kongsehs or kongsis. If, so expected 
Rafffles, the British took over the management of the island, Chinese 
would ‘flock in great numbers to Banca’. 
After the English disappeared, the Dutch started their conquering pro-
gram. The Sultan of Palembang was defeated by General De Kock (1821). 
The latter bought the support of the “pirates” in the region, nominated 
an indigenous ruler and occupied Billiton as well by forming a military 
establishment of 50 soldiers. Chinese from Banca were imported into 
Billiton to teach the population how to mine tin. 
The Dutch began tin-mining in the “governmental” Banca Tinwinning 
(BTW) from the 1820s onwards; Billiton, still seen as a pirate nest, was too 
wild for them. 
The tin was usually auctioned in Amsterdam. Batavia got its fee for this 
“service” also. Batavia, indeed, earned a great deal of money by doing 
nothing: just in the years 1852-1881 this amounted to nearly 110 million 
guilders from the tin source only! In this period the net profĳit per “gross 
picul” was not 26 dollars, as envisaged by the English, but already 75 guil-
ders.5 
The Chinese captain Tan Hang Kwee, one of the leaders of the Chinese 
tin-miners on Banca, concluded a contract with the Dutch (1827) to start 
tin mining on Billiton as well.6 This Chinese leased a concession ‘at his 
own risk and expense’, starting with 300 laborers. The Dutch guaranteed 
their safety, although everything had to be paid for by the Chinese, who 
had to look for collaboration with the indigenous population. The tin had 
to be sold exclusively to the Dutch government, which paid over four 
years a price of 12 Spanish dollars per picul, assuming that the market 
price was not lower than 20 dollars p.p. The Chinese were obliged to pay 
for housing and food for the 40-50 soldiers stationed on Billiton. Article 16 
says that for the time of the contract, the Dutch shall not introduce ‘the 
amphioen, arak and gambling licenses on Billiton’. Indeed, without the 
Chinese, neither the colonial state on Banca nor later BM could mine tin; 
they both had to buy the tin from kongsis at fĳixed prices. 
The Chinese fĳirst discovered tin ore on Billiton7. They did not ask for 
money in advance, as was usual; everybody was happy, including King 
William I who signed the contract. A Dutch Minister in the Netherlands, 
5 G. de Lange, p. 30 note. To provide an idea of the change in value is not easy, but this 
could be helpful: around 1850 $26 is worth £5.33 and 75 guilders around £7.5. 
6 For this contract see F. Stapel, p. 66-74.
7 See J. Loudon, p. 9.
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however, acted the spoil-sport. He did not understand the way things 
worked on these islands. This man warned that now the Chinese could 
handle the tin-mining business for themselves, ‘the old evil, the piracy 
and smuggling’ will return. This ungrounded suspicion led to new mea-
sures imposed by the Governor-General in Batavia, to a new Dutch inspec-
tor on Billiton and even to the dismissal of Tan Hang Kwee (1829). This 
muddling through continued on for two decades.8
In the meantime the name “Nederlandsch Oost-Indië” (“Dutch East 
Indies”) was invented as a consequence of the wave of conquests in the 
archipelago.9 As Minister of Colonies, Baud started procedures to make it 
possible for European private companies also to start mining activities in 
the archipelago. As a result, BTW remained on Banca running a Dutch 
public mine while on the neighboring island, Billiton, Dutch private inter-
ests could start with a license from the Dutch colonial government. 
The trigger to this activity was His Royal Highness Prince Henry, who 
wanted to invest much money in tin mining on Biliton together with 
another aristocrat.10 The will of a member of the House of Orange could 
not be negated. The clever John Loudon became his representative, who 
was the public enemy of the representative of the Dutch in Batavia, the 
bureaucrat Croockewit. The latter told everybody that there was no tin on 
Billiton, but Loudon easily and quickly proved him wrong. Apparently, 
Batavia feared to lose its lucrative tin-business with the Chinese. 
That was a well-grounded fear: in 1852 the fĳirst 500 picul of tin were 
mined. Eight years later very rich deposits were found along the east coast 
8 Happily for the Chinese, the stupidity on the side of the Dutch was unbelievable 
since there exists as well an accompanying report from the local Dutch offfĳicial about the 
contract with Tan Hong Kwee, which stipulates that the advantage of the contract is 
wholly on the side of the Dutch and that at least a hundred thousand guilders per year can 
be gained from the Chinese labor. See Idem, p. 123.
9 Earlier people used sometimes “Dutch India” (1653), but whether this referred to 
some “imperial drive” remains to be seen. Therefore, it should have been an offfĳicial name 
used by the Directors of the VOC Amsterdam or a Dutch government. This was not the 
case. See F. Gaastra (2000), p. 8. 
10 The initial investment capital was fĳive million guilders. Prince Henry spent 2/5th of 
it, Baron Van Tuyll van Serooskerken another 2/5th and John Loudon 1/5th. These people 
also issued shares of 1000 guilders among 35 mainly aristocratic friends. Prince Henry had 
600 of these shares and apparently he expected to get 124,000 guilders interest per year. 
However, another aristocratic shareholder, Beelaerts van Blokland, earned a profĳit of 
530,000 in 1882 which was increased to 701,000 ten years later. See R. Verbeek, p. 9. This 
must be his personal profĳit since the net profĳit of Batavia in 1882 was 179,130 which is 10% 
of the net profĳit of the company. One may suppose that the “costs” of the shareholders had 
already been deducted from this net profĳit. For the profĳit debate, see also G. de Lange, 
p. 25 fff., and for all the details of the royal contract, Idem, appendix b.
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of the island, which gave BM a bright future as a company and Batavia 
received the crumbs of the cake. Even they were worth a lot of money as 
the table below shows. 
The Dutch “government” license was an expensive one: 10% of the net 
profĳit + export duties, import duties, auction costs, many other taxes and 
... opium costs. The table gives part of the result for the whole district, 
which is similar to the island of Billiton, including the BM. Roughly one-
third of the total payments had to be paid by the indigenous population, 
the rest by BM. This costly license is a reproduction of the permanent ten-
sions between the very greedy Batavia bureaucrats (themselves always in 
conflict with Dutch bureaucrats in Holland) and the private interests, 
whether the so-called smugglers, foreigners or Dutch private interests. 
Table 11. ‘Contributions to the Dutch Indies Government by the Billiton District’ 
(in guilders)11 
Year Government 
















1864 --- 14 500 44 910 12 463 44 910
1870 75 161 32 400 154 913 73 575 230 074
1875 90 598 110 000 303 051 123 882 393 649
1880 164 338 123 600 427 501 169 033 591 839
1885 123 873 247 152 599 718 152 865 723 591
1890 155 153 223 100 679 462 183 977 834 615
1895 360 896 204 000 622 244 166 014 983 140
1900 4 333 615 180 000 527 202 175 000 4 860 817
1905 2 278 259 180 012 516 965 154 000 2 795 224
11 J. Mollema, appendix 4. Only a part of this appendix is reproduced in the text; it, 
furthermore, describes taxes paid by Chinese and Europeans working in BM, the direct tax 
paid by the indigenous people, auction costs, etc. In addition, it provides the data per year. 
Mollema was nearly the Chief Administrator of BM after 1900. Later the Directors of BM 
complained about the ‘weak spots’ in Mollema’s book. See F. Stapel, p. 7. Probably they 
were referring to this table with mistakes: in the 1864 row (c) and (e) are the same, which 
is impossible; all the numbers ending in “000” must be dubious; the comment given on 
column (a) is not very clear: for several years 3% is paid by BM in natura (in tin, one may 
suppose), but are the data given equivalent to the 3%, or the 7% cash or the full 10%? Let’s 
suppose it is the last percentage, because then it is easy to determine the full net profĳit of 
BM: the substantial amount of 620 million guilders or on average 11 million a year split 
among the few shareholders. For other amounts see J. Loudon, p. 111 fff. 
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Year Government 
















1910  1 230 995   275 229   742 673   150 000  1 973 668
1915    881 949   440 000  1 095 954   183 000  1 977 903
1920  2 560 577   634 000  1 209 438   274 000  3 770 015
--- --- --- --- ---
TOTAL 62 793 954 11 709 029 33 515 933 8 570 470 96 309 887
(a) from 1865-1891 BM had to give 10% of the profĳit, of which it gave 3% in natura; 
(b) in 1909 the Opiumregie (see below) became efffective on the island of Billiton; before 
that date the amounts concern the lease payments;
(c) a total of several taxes (income tax; tax on Chinese workers; patent tax, etc.);
(d) paid partly by BM and partly by the tin-buyers in Batavia;
(e) total of (a), the direct contributions, plus (c) the indirect contributions.
Opium, 11% of the total, was the single most important income for 
Batavia after the tin license. How and whether these opium costs were 
divided between BM and the indigenous population remains unknown. 
The following could give us a clue. Without going into great detail, the 
important role of the Chinese laborers must be stressed again. 
From the beginning of tin production, the Chinese played a prominent 
role. They were, in fact, their own boss under the leadership of one or 
more captains. In Banca they did all of the work in a technical, social and 
commercial sense. Twenty years later, however, they were free laborers 
under the amateur leadership of white Batavia bureaucrats on Banca and 
aristocrats imported from Holland on Billiton. The former were appar-
ently too greedy to invest, the latter were only interested in as high a divi-
dend as possible. For the Chinese this did not make much diffference.
On Billiton their housing situation was miserable, as the medical doc-
tor Swaving explained.12 In the months of February and March 1860, some 
700 Chinese miners died, mainly from beriberi (a defĳiciency of thiamine, 
12 C. Swaving, p. 1 fff. In full detail he sketched the building (kongsi house of 30 x 10 x 5 
m) in which 200 Chinese lived, with one entrance and no windows or other ventilation 
possibilities. Per person they had 7.5 meter at their disposal, ‘which is only one-sixth of 
what they deserve’. Every year beriberi decimated the Chinese population. When more 
profĳitable deposits were found, around 1870, this situation was alleviated. For the serious 
labor conditions in the tin mines of Malaya, see C. Trocki (1990), p. 67 fff.; B. Watson 
Andaya, L. Y. Andaya, p. 135 fff.
Table 11. Continued
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vitamin B1, in the diet). Five years later 60 Chinese died in a week or 63% 
of the workforce in a month. 
Swaving also pointed to the very muddy and wet work of tin miners, 
the poisonous miasma and starvation.13 All this together must have debil-
itated their stamina. In the Billiton administration the column next to the 
one giving dividend per share indicates the ‘Mortality Percentage of the 
Miners’.14 
In the initial period of BM, the workers were paid 20 guilders per picul 
of pure tin as the market price was three or four times as much. This 
amount must have taken several days of work for one person. Later they 
were paid much less: around 300 guilders per year (from 1900-1918 even on 
average 280). This is equivalent to less than one guilder per day. BM’s 
notorious administrators had many possibilities to exploit these mostly 
13 C. Swaving, p. 4, 5.
14 J. Mollema, appendix 3. The percentage was 6-23% per year in the 1850s; this 
decreased to around 10% in the 1870s and further to 2-3% per year. That looks benefĳicial, 
but the number of the Chinese miners increased quickly from about 600 in the 1855s to 
about 2,500 in the 1870s, to 8,000 in the 1880s, 11,000 in the 1890s and 28,990 in 1920. In 
these last few years the mortality was 1-2%, which is still about 300 Chinese workers every 
year! At that time, 70 years after the establishment of BM, about 15,000-17,000 Chinese tin 
miners must have perished on this island of Billiton. The rest was exploited to the maxi-
mum. 
Ill. 17. Coolie Labor in the Dutch Tin Mines, 1919 
Source: B. Manders, 2010; Historisch Nieuwsblad, September 2010. Chinese “coolies” had to 
work under “strangle contracts” and severe circumstances in mines, along railways or on 
plantations. The picture shows a tin mine on the island Banca or Billiton. The East Indies 
were also “governed” by racism with the notorious rule: ‘The more pigment, the less pay-
ment.’
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immigrant workers.15 The mentality of the new Dutch management is 
demonstrated as Loudon noted in his diary: 
27th August. ... According to Dekker the Chinese are found and brought by 
Tuyll; bad people; Hokloh Chinese; fĳighting, opium smoking and gambling. 
He says it is difffĳicult to keep discipline among them. In addition, there is 
much too much paid for them ... The Chinese do not want to eat the rice 
bought by Tuyll … this is investigated and indeed confĳirmed. [New rice] is 
procured with a 15% loss; also too expensive.16
This greedy Dutch leadership itself started to crimp immigrating Chinese. 
Another day Loudon brought the following salute to the dying Chinese. 
He discovered on his inspection tour that Chinese were playing the “poh”-
game:
[I] threatened them with strokes by the stick [rotting] if they did it again. 
A few sick Chinese were dying. At Rembing everything looked sad. The 
kongsi-house was full of sick and dying Chinese; most of them had large, 
dirty wounds on their legs; these do not come from the climate ... and cer-
tainly not from the heavy work, because they are too lazy to work; anyway, 
this doing nothing will last some days and then it’s over and out.17 (italics 
by Loudon)
None of this is reported about the situation on Banca for whatever reason. 
In the 1880s a big row in the Dutch parliament was organized about the 
old animosity: BM as a company for the benefĳit of the colony and 
 eventually the Dutch state (say the Batavia–The Hague bureaucrats) or 
15 For these data, see J. Mollema, appendix 3. His explanation of the annual payments 
(Idem, p. 157 fff.) is far from convincing, but it is not my duty to discuss the case. Anyway, 
in his BM memorial book, he still proudly remembers that in 1920/21, 974 miners returned 
to China with savings of 386,388 guilders or about 400 guilders per person after three years 
of hard labor (Idem, p. 156, 157)! A hilarious story describes how once BM had good luck, 
because the rate of the dollar had declined from 2.55 to 1.35 guilders, and the Chinese 
workers were paid in dollars. Happily for them: in inland China they were not aware of 
this, so the miners still got more dollars for their guilders (p. 163). Etc.
16 J. Loudon, p. 45. Dekker and Baron Van Tuyll are Loudon’s Dutch assistant and boss, 
respectively. Later the bookkeeper of BM was sent to Singapore to recruit Chinese: he 
came back on a ship with 150 Chinese sinkehs, 40 miners from Malacca, etc. (Id., p. 58). 
Chinese people came in small boats from Malacca to Billiton (p. 62). Loudon repeated 
here that the Hokloh Chinese ‘were the worst kind of people, terribly lazy, opium addicts 
and thieves who all belong to secret societies ...’ (Idem, p. 62).
17 Idem, p. 67. On the next page L. mentions himself the reason for getting wounds on 
the legs: ‘The most serious sicknesses were wounds on the legs, which usually started with 
very small unimportant sores, mostly got by felling trees in the woods of the [mining] 
areas; soon they are transformed in the most hideous wounds; they end up with cold fĳire 
and death’ (Idem, p. 68, 69). He never thinks about shoes for the workforce or covering 
their legs: that cost money, and apparently Chinese lives were deemed worthless. 
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the “private” interests, in this case the House of Orange and related aristo-
cratic shareholders. The latter were not exactly the best examples of “pri-
vate” interests. This row led to the dismissal of the Minister of Colonies, 
who defended the Royal purse, but BM did not become nationalized.
Indeed, from the beginning this (semi)private character was jeopar-
dized. 
Time and again De Lange argued for the support of BM as a state enter-
prise: from the fĳirst visit of Loudon, he was accompanied by state-mining 
engineers and warships; the contract envisaged that the BM administra-
tors had offfĳicial police authority, etc.18 This was particularly important for 
the virulent opium smuggling: the administrators did not protect the opi-
um leaseholder enough, but argued, ‘the cheaper the opium, the better for 
the Chinese miners’ (‘better’ here means: the more they buy, the more I 
gain). 
Because a prince and important aristocrats were involved in BM, 
supervision by the state was neglected. This happened even in the sense 
that a quarter of the island was given to BM every time; by 1861 the whole 
island was BM property; only the rich deposits were mined; much less 
than 10% of the net profĳit was no longer paid to the state; the King inter-
vened time and again in favour of BM, etc.19 All this was the subject of the 
row in the 1890s. 
 The Opium Business of Billiton 
In the BM memorial book in 1922, it states that BM did everything to 
combat the use of opium among the miners.20 It was the mantra repeated 
by all authorities at the time. What is hidden behind it looks much less 
pious, however. 
It is remarkable that no explanation is given for the 12 million guilders 
paid (see table above) for the opium lease, an amount mentioned in this 
memorial book. The title of this table is misleading (therefore the quota-
tion marks) which tries to suggest that the district was not BM itself from 
1861. Who thon on the island of Billiton paid the Dutch government this 
fabulous amount, and what was the relationship between leaser BM and 
its “customers”? The memorial author involuntary gives us a small clue to 
18 G. de Lange, p. 6, 7.
19 Idem, p. 9 fff., p. 20 fff
20 J. Mollema, p. 167.
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an appropriate answer. He writes about the alleged Chinese inclination to 
gambling and opium smoking:
Well, it is true that even a substantial use of opium is not as morally and 
physically devastating as the alcohol misuse of the Europeans. However, 
the very expensive opium as luxury expense is a too large part of the budget 
of the miner (one hoon, which is one pipe, costs 22 cents). ... The possibil-
ity to save money becomes, therefore, for the weak brothers so difffĳicult that 
the aim of the emigration to a foreign country is missed.21 
Above I mentioned that the miner is paid on average one guilder a day; 
one hoon is, therefore, more than 1/5th of this wage. There is, however, a 
rule that in offfĳicial opium dens (including the one on Banca and why not 
on Billiton), the minimum quantity for consumption was two hoons = 
1/50 tahil. In this case, the BM consumer already smoked away nearly half 
of his daily wage. 
Next, because he is paid once a year, “somebody” gets into debt and 
another claims the annual wage. This must be the mystery behind the dif-
ference between what the miner receives on paper and in reality, both 
documented in the memorial book. That must also be the reason that the 
miner returns to China after three years, having received only 130 guilders 
a year. Even for those days a bare minimum for bad work, acceptable only 
for the migrating destitutes in Southeast Asia.
The receiver of the rest must be the offfĳicial government leaseholder, 
BM on Billiton. This company apparently earned a lot of money to addict 
its own miners, a kind of truck system.22 At the beginning of the 19th-cen-
tury, it was not uncommon in the industrial cities of Europe. For the 
Chinese immigrant miner who wanted to go back to his village in China, 
the reality was given in the popular song “... I can’t go; I owe my soul to the 
company store” (‘Sixteen Tons’).
From the earlier history of BM, the problem was similar. The BM pio-
neer Loudon understood perfectly well the classic Banca situation in 
which the Dutch in Batavia delivered and leased the opium:
The leases of opium, pawnshops and liquor concerned those of Toboalie on 
Banca. The major of the Chinese in Muntok, who is the main leasee, leased 
himself to somebody on Billiton who paid him 1800 guilders per year.23 
21 Idem, p. 167.
22 See Robert Elson’s contribution to N. Tarling (ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 143-144, 148.
23 J. Loudon, p. 18.
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Loudon does not inform the reader who this ‘somebody’ is. He himself 
used laudanum as a medicine on Billiton, which he must have purchased 
elsewhere.24 The highly lethal character of the labor and a corrupting 
influence of the European administrators made opium smoking into a 
necessity. Loudon’s hypocrisy is quite remarkable. That people praise 
themselves in their autobiography later, certainly vain people like Loudon, 
is understandable. The way he is doing this is not. 
In 1852 he knew how the opium business was organized and exploited 
by his own administrators; thirty years later he also knew from experience 
how bad opium was in every respect, and also thanks to several Dutch 
critics. In retrospect, he had to legitimize his behavior and wrote that in 
March 1852 he asked Batavia to prohibit the import and distribution of 
opium on Billiton:
The aim of this was purely philanthropic. What happened, however? We 
did not envisage that one needed the means to realize an aim and to vin-
dicate a prohibition. Those means were not available on Billiton, and this 
open island became poisoned with opium from all sides. Opium became so 
cheap that nearly all Chinese, who never smoked opium ... became addicts 
[opiumschuivers]. Therefore, I was obliged later to ask the Government to 
introduce the opium—lease on Billiton ...25 
Loudon “forgot” not only that the opium lease already existed on Banca 
(and through this somehow on Billiton); he was probably misled by the 
new Batavia plan to introduce an Opiumregie in the 1880s. In this case he 
did not realize what he was talking about: the Opiumregie was worse than 
the evil, as is shown below. 
Loudon, furthermore, “forgot” that his own administrators had police 
authority (which was an illegitimate exercise of authority by a private 
fĳirm, but that is not the problem here); he, Loudon, personally had the 
means to prohibit it, but he did not. A few sentences further, he even 
bluntly denied that his administrators had this police power (it existed, 
according to him, only on Banca), the subject of one of the big controver-
sies in the Dutch Parliament at the time!26 
24 Idem, p. 44.
25 Idem, p. 57.
26 This Loudon must have lost his mind in 1883 since he, fĳirst, mentions (Idem, p. 58) 
that his administrators ‘were no Government offfĳicials!’ (italics and exclamation mark from 
Loudon, H.D.). Exactly fourteen sentences later he wrote: that the Government ‘... decided 
under certain conditions to provide the administrators of the company with the same 
police power ... as on Banca …’ In addition, if he was in need of authority, there were many 
Dutch military on Billiton (as well as on Banca): the army and navy were always mobilized 
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The French medical doctor, Georges Thibout, illustrated the misery of 
the opium addict in 1912:
Many individuals even prefer opium over liberty. The Chinese who work 
on Billiton to harvest pepper or work in the mines are treated in fact as 
slaves during the four or fĳive years of their contract. When they give way to 
the temptation of the small houses along the border of the works where 
they can fĳind opium, they cannot leave and lose all hope of liberation for 
the rest of their life.27 
In short: like dealing in people, like exploiting people for a miserable slav-
ery existence, Loudon and the BM management were also in favor of opi-
um to discipline and silence opposition among the work force, but also to 
recoup part of the wages through their own opium shop.28 
 
against opium smugglers. Loudon himself used the available military to chase Malacca 
Chinese (p. 63).  
27 G. Thibout, p. 91.
28 In the administration of the Opiumregie, this diffference between Banca and Billiton 
is clearly shown through the diffference between the licensed and non-licensed opium 
deliveries on Banca and Billiton. See Commission d’Enquête sur le Contrôle de l’Opium, 
vol. 2, p. 211 fff. for 1928 and below in the section on the Outer Districts–Opiumregie for 
1930.
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
PUBLIC ADVENTURES OF A PRIVATE STATE WITHIN THE STATE
In the beginning of the century, one could not expect that the Dutch opi-
um business would become in absolute terms the most lucrative trade. 
And despite the terrible wars from the beginning (the Java War against 
Diponegoro) to the end (the Aceh War fought by the Dutch butcher Van 
Heutsz). Also, many private (Dutch) opium dealers were very active, and 
they were “big business”as well. The history of these private dealers must 
still be written, partly because it remains difffĳicult to get into their archives; 
partly because their bookkeeping was very dubious, lost or never made. 
“Private” is a flexible concept. As demonstrated, the Billiton Mining 
Company was a private venture of the public House of Orange. As such, it 
also belonged to the second phase of the opium history of the new Dutch 
royalties. This BM construction was paralleled and followed up by anoth-
er and more spectacular “adventure”. 
It concerns the largest and most influential of these “private” Dutch 
opium dealers, who operated alongside the American and British one, the 
Royal Dutch Trading Company (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij, NHM). Private or not, the NHM’s fate was strongly depen-
dent on the government’s behavior. That is to say, as the baby of the fĳirst 
Dutch King William I, it was directed largely against the established colo-
nial administration. That was not the case with the American, British or 
Chinese dealers in the East Indies who, therefore, were so often called 
‘smugglers’. Their fate was still influenced by, in particular, the new high 
price setting of Batavia which made these “smugglers” rich in advance.1
As stated, this was not predicted around 1816 when the British occupa-
tion ended. The government’s opium policy switch was triggered, fĳirst, by 
competition between the Bengal raw opium and the Middle Eastern one. 
Baud tells how the latter was imported by American merchants, and how 
in the beginning the indigenous Chinese dealers did not like this. The 
Americans dumped the prices as low as possible so that these customers 
could not refuse them. 
1 For the following see E. Helffferich; W. Mansvelt; E. Vanvugt, chapter XV.
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More important was that the Netherlands became an autocratic mon-
archy for the fĳirst time in 1815 thanks to, in fact, a coup by some aristo-
crats.2 The fĳirst king, William I, was a private merchant as well and ensured 
that his own pockets were fĳilled with as much money as possible in the 
colony as well. For the colonial exploitation he personally established a 
new company, the NHM, which became a state-within-the-state in the 
colony and had a strong position in Holland as well.
During the highly profĳitable 19th-century with its new drive in opium 
farming, the VOC tradition (and stumbling practice) of private enterprise 
in combination with the military-bureaucratic state involvement devel-
oped into an typical form of oikoidal capitalism. 
The King’s ideology was expressed at the establishment of the NHM: 
… its aim is to integrate all branches of industrious activities into one whole, 
of which the NHM is the nucleus; the Chambers of Commerce, the factories 
and the agricultural committees are the main branches of this whole …’ The 
NHM also had to be ‘the nucleus between the general government and the 
industrious population of the Netherlands, so that the Company becomes 
the adviser of the government and the champion of the interests of the 
civilians in matters of industrious activities’ (italics added by the author).3 
William went so far as to make the NHM responsible for all commercial 
activities once exercised by the colonial state, expecting a serious reduc-
tion in the state expenses, including the import of opium. Even the colo-
nial state bureaucrats had to be transferred to the NHM, which had 
become the very ‘banker, controller and solicitor’ of the colonial state, 
which lagged far behind with its payments to the “motherland”:
Because, the King said, whatever the high position of the government of 
the East Indies ... relative to the indigenous (‘Inlander’) and foreign Asian 
people, above all must reign the great rule that it is subordinated to the 
motherland ... has to follow-up the commands from here and has to serve 
the interests of the motherland.4 
Of course, all this was a nonsensical idea of a dictator, and neither the 
leadership of the NHM nor the King himself had the ability to realize it 
even in a rudimentary way. The impression gained is that William painted 
a grand vista to make money out of it. Mansvelt concluded a century later 
during the NHM commemoration that it remains obscure whether the 
NHM or the State benefĳited from most of these plans. 
2 J. L. van Zanden (2000), p. 137 fff.
3 Quoted by W. Mansvelt, vol. I, p. 87.
4 Idem, p. 88. 
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This overriding aim of Dutch imperialism was expressed time and 
again in Mansvelt’s biography of the Royal NHM, e.g.: 
… one has to realize that the colony in an administrative sense is not con-
sidered as an autonomous part of the Empire, but as a State company ... as 
a municipal tram, gas or water works … (italics by author)5 
This situation was stressed to the utmost in the discussion of the new 
Dutch involvement in its colony, called the Cultuurstelsel (best translated 
as Cultivation System).6 The consequences of this royal idea and system 
for the East Indies people were far-reaching, turning a large majority into 
badly treated “free slaves”. From 1830 onwards, the indigenous cultiva-
tors had to reserve 20% of their best land for the cultivation of “Dutch 
products”, which were gathered, managed and sold by the Royal NHM. 
Later, the Dutch themselves started to cultivate all kinds of tropical 
products in plantations (sugar, cofffee, indigo, tea, rubber, etc.) which 
made life for the population in the colony even harder: the indigenous 
people were simply expelled offf their soils and could become poorly paid 
laborers and were perceived as opium addicts by nature. Mansvelt 
describes this transformation: 
Once fortune is lavished upon them through the famous sugar contracts, 
the Dutch got the appetite to try it for themselves with the help of free 
laborers.7 
The fabulous profĳits with opium in the 19th-century are closely con-
nected to this Cultivation System and its aftermath: “free slavery” and “free 
addiction” were the main advantages of the Dutch East Indies peoples. 
 A Royal Opium Dealer
To enter this colonial paradise, the Dutch had to sin grievously many 
times, and King William did the same, whatever his personal activity in 
monarchical money-making. He and his advisers organized a remarkable 
fĳinancial construction after collecting the enormous amount of 37 mil-
lion guilders through NHM shares, while promising the Dutch public a 
fĳinancial heaven on earth.8 The Dutch taxpayer had to guarantee a net 
5 Idem, p. 212, p. 213.
6 Idem, p. 211.
7 Idem, p. 211.
8 See table 3.5 in J.L. van Zanden (2000), p. 140.
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profĳit to the NHM of 300,000 guilders annually. Protective import duties 
were imposed on foreign traders to counteract competition of the NHM. 
These substantial amounts of money at the time soon paled into insig-
nifĳicance as the millions poured in and out and remained, anyway, invis-
ible for normal people. The King himself bought 4 million shares, but 
was—apart from the NHM leadership—the only one who not only got his 
money back quickly, but earned nearly the same amount again within 
thirteen years.9 Later, the Royal involvement was hidden as much as pos-
sible. Even the NHM commemoration publication frankly writes about 
the usual double-Dutch bookkeeping in favor of the King, always called 
the “Garant”, he who guarantees the profĳits for a happy few: 
This fully diffferent outcome originates in as favorable a method of booking 
as possible for the Garant and in less than clear concepts of capital and 
profĳit ... one did not concern the arrears of the previous fĳiscal year in favor 
of the Garant.10 
Here it is calculated that the King received 1.3 million too much from the 
NHM in 1830. Indeed, the billions of the private fortune of the present 
House of Orange originate partly from this source.11 Another colonial ven-
ture, Royal Shell, established at the end of the century, catered for its com-
pletion and continuation. (Until 1921 the King got a weekly report from 
the President of the NHM informing him/her about his/her and the 
NHM’s fĳinancial position.12)
What did this “Garant” do for his money? King William and his advisers 
told the NHM not to remain in the East Indies alone. Apparently thinking 
of the old VOC glory, they divided the world into fĳive target regions for the 
NHM trade.
He intended to conquer the trade of the East Indies later. The Company 
had to get control fĳirst and foremost of the cotton and opium trade. There-
fore, it had to establish its activities in the Levant, Egypt, China, America 
...’, and so on.13
9 See W. Mansvelt, appendix II in vol. II, which unintentionally demonstrated this 
fabulous game with millions, while denying with a stifff upper lip that he, the King, bene-
fĳited. 
10 Idem, vol. I, p. 233.
11 The NHM was until 1936 the most important fĳinancial power in the colony, owner 
or fĳinancier of many plantations and other ventures. Gradually, it developed bank facili-
ties in the colony as well as in China or Singapore. After World War II it became one of the 
largest Dutch banks, the ABN, and through a fusion with the AMRO bank one of the largest 
banks in the modern world.
12 Idem, p. p. 235.
13 Idem, p. 90.
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The available capital was also divided over these regions and disappeared: 
in a few years’ time only 24 million were left of the original 37 million. In 
the meantime money had to be earned directly with the two government 
monopolies in the East Indies (opium and salt). They provided so much 
revenue that the disappointment with all other ventures was compen-
sated: royal and colonial mismanagement meant that the NHM nearly 
collapsed, and thanks to its opium business, this fate was not fulfĳilled. 
The trade with South America, the Mediterranean or the Black Sea had 
to be abandoned, except for opium trade in the latter two regions. 
To save William’s dream, the Royal NHM had to become the state opi-
um dealer for a lease of 3 million a year and had to concentrate its activi-
ties on the Dutch East Indies specifĳically and on East Asia in general. Here 
one was confronted with the same bullion problem as the British (EIC) 
fĳirst and China later: to pay for the Bengal opium, one needed silver which 
drained Java; Japanese copper could provide a substitute.14 To solve these 
opium problems, the NHM became more involved in the intra-Asian mar-
ket customs and also triggered a kind of currency reform in the East 
Indies. 
The NHM as the main opium farmer of the colonial government ended 
up in a much better position than the Amphioen Society earlier. 
Nevertheless, its offfĳicial announcement stated that opium was
disastrous for the morality, for the zest for work and for the procreation of 
the population.15 
It even used sometimes the very old VOC method to bargain opium for 
other goods and vice versa (opium for cofffee; tin for opium).16 
How can we comprehend this opium and salt monopoly? Mansvelt 
starts his explanation quite symptomatically, as the following reminding 
us of the situation of 25 years earlier:
The opium trade and distribution were at the time of the VOC already a 
monopoly given to a special body: the Amphioen Society, which must have 
done good business as it seems. Later this monopoly was leased to whoever 
offfered the most. This lease was the largest which the Indies Government 
had to offfer: it alone concerned an amount of two to three million guilders 
14 Idem, p. 198. See also Idem, vol. II, p. 23 and note 2 p. 24, which reported how many 
silver coins the NHM bought for the government. For instance, in 1834 it was 1.2 million 
guilders, but fĳive years later this was already 5.7 million.
15 This had already been published in an Annual Account of 1829/30. See Idem, vol. II, 
p. 22; also quoted by E. Vanvugt, p. 199.
16 J. Schmidt, p. 22, notes 119, 120.
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annually. Since there were no fĳinancially strong Dutch people in the colony, 
the main lease (hoofdpacht) was given to English houses. These houses 
made sub-contracts for small European or Chinese houses in the districts 
... The opium contract itself was not made public ..17
It is right to see the NHM as a kind of modern Amphioen Society: it now 
involved not the highest oikoidal offfĳicers, but the primus inter pares, the 
King, himself. The suggestion is made by Mansvelt that the NHM did not 
like the offfer of the opium monopoly, because ‘it was afraid that the Java 
War had had too many negative efffects on the sales’. In addition, it knew 
that its predecessor, the English house, Deans&Co (or Dent&Co?), ‘had 
used the last months to push very large quantities onto the market.’ 
After long negotiations the NHM leased the opium monopoly for 2.6 
million guilders annually and for 2/7th of the net profĳit. However, if it 
could prove that the Java War had had negative efffects, it would receive a 
compensation. In addition, it could terminate the contract after a year, 
although it offfĳicially lasted for three years. The NHM received ‘a not unfa-
vorable profĳit of half a million per year. Instead of being damaging, the 
Java War was highly profĳitable ... because the army was the best customer’!18 
During the negotiations about the renewal of the contract, it was dis-
closed that the government had a spy in the NHM’s opium business, ‘who 
secretly submitted all kinds of information.’19 That is how friendly the 
mutual relations were between the established colonial bureaucracy and 
the new money-making toy of the King.
The relationship with the producers of the raw opium became com-
plicated as well. In the VOC era, nearly all opium was bought in Bengal 
and further processed by the local, mostly Chinese, leasees. Now it was 
reported:
The opium monopoly automatically implied a relationship with Bengal, 
although one satisfĳied its needs for 2/3 with Turkish opium, that—imported 
as raw opium from the Levant—was processed in the Netherlands.20 
It is the fĳirst time in the Dutch opium history that such a relationship with 
the “motherland” was made. 
The NHM leased its opium monopoly out for 3 million to a Chinese 
sub-farmer, which was the same amount the NHM was obliged to pay 
17 W. Mansvelt, vol. I, p. 188.
18  Idem, p. 189.
19  Idem, p. 189.
20  Idem, p. 197.
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back to the colonial state. This Chinese sub-farmer, however, was also 
obliged to 
accept a fĳixed quantity of opium every month (4/5 Levantine and 1/5 Ben-
gal) against prices which greatly exceeded the purchasing prices ... This 
price increase was the source from which the Company derived its own 
profĳit and its annual payments to the government.21 
So, without doing anything, it already cashed a net profĳit of 300,000 
Dutch guilders, some “import profĳit” and some “farm-out profĳit”. These 
amounts do not show up clearly in the NHM balances below. This Royal 
Construction was a worthy continuation of the double-Dutch practices of 
VOC and private Dutch adventurers. 
 The State within the (Colonial) State
Notwithstanding this, the NHM received something of another monopo-
ly. The colonial government needed all kinds of goods from Holland or 
elsewhere for its own needs. This was in fact a continuation of a tradition 
already established in the fĳirst years of the VOC as its Directors made up a 
list of items it needed (the so-called Eis, Demand) with the status of a 
delivery contract.22 The colonial government did the same, and the NHM 
could buy the goods (even including meat, indigenous wheaten flour, etc. 
but not weapons!23) and deliver them for a profĳit of 16%. It was a very 
lucrative contract because the profĳit on this substantial business (see 
table) must have been much higher. In addition, Mansvelt simply reports, 
this delivery contract ‘escaped the control of the Ministry’.24 
21 J.C. Baud, p. 164. Indeed, Baud positioned himself as someone who could give orders 
to the NHM, which was not directly accepted by the NHM. See W. Mansvelt, vol. I, p. 119 fff. 
It was, furthermore, logical that the colonial elite was not happy with a Royal NHM as 
watchdog. See also Idem, p. 127, which mentions the inimical attitude, about place-hunt-
ers, etc.
22 J. de Vries, A. van der Woude, p. 457 fff., 511
23 It must be a slip of the pen, but much later the author reports that weapons were 
also bought for the government already in the 1830s. W. Mansvelt, vol. II, p. 23.
24 Idem, vol. I, p. 189; see also p. 190. Gradually, the NHM also created banking facili-
ties, the Java Bank, for which Baud designed the articles of association, but it succeeded 
also to get the monopoly on all payments of pensions, etc. to the Dutch East-Indian clerks 
of all bureaucracies, including the offfĳicers, their widows, etc. I only mention it here to 
demonstrate how the NHM became not only the spider in the East-Indies web, but a new 
large bureaucracy fueled by private profĳits. Idem, p. 209, 211. For all transactions a provi-
sion of 2% could be collected. The NHM even succeeded in not paying in cash but in 
chapter eighteen314
In the following table the NHM performance in the fĳirst years is given, 
and the items opium, government business and own activity are listed 
separately.
Table 12. Profĳit and Loss Account of the Royal Dutch Trade Company (selected years; 
x 1000 Dutch guilders)25




35.2 367.4 31.5 814.7 530.4 464.4 1303 1659.2 615  303.1
on behalf of 
government
--- 582.5 165.9 317.6 423.6 274.9 14.4 218.1 335.2 1006.5
opium lease 
and trade
--- --- 606.7 345.3 621 484.9 374.3 571.2 185.9   98.8
trade with 
China
--- 908.2 310.5 734.6 43.7 25.9 243 55.4  85.7    8.9
Profĳit or 
Loss
279.3 438.8 1253 615.2 1268 434.8 1404.4 3036.1 1832 2085.6
What about the NHM’s opium record for the following years? The answer 
is given by several authors including Schmidt:
By the 1850s, the opium income constituted 16.8% of the revenue collected 
in the Indies. Between 1860 and 1910 this level was more or less maintained 
at an average of 15%.26
This is a necessary but not the most interesting element of the NHM’s 
performance.
Baud could have asked, for instance, how was it possible that within a 
NHM deal, Levantine opium played such a prominent role? Had NHM 
offfĳicials made a deal with the Americans? Baud knew perfectly well how 
the colonial Dutch had relied on Bengal opium for centuries. As a Minister 
of Colonies, he had to negotiate frequently with the NHM. 
In a rather unnoticed publication, Jan Schmidt disclosed at least part of 
the “mystery”. He assumed that the Dutch participation in the inter-
national opium trade was marginal because it should have been confĳined 
to the East Indies only. The British and Americans had a hegemonic posi-
goods, the transport of which was again paid by the Dutch taxpayer. And so on and so 
forth.
25 W. Mansvelt, vol. I, p. 232 fff or Appendix in vol. II. Quoted in E. Vanvugt (1985; 1995), 
p.410 fff; see also Idem (1988), p. 35-38.
26 J. Schmidt, p. 27. 
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tion outside this realm. Within the archipelago, the latter extended their 
 influence from the moment the fĳirst American ship arrived in Java (1789). 
This lasted, however, only for the period of Rafffles government up to 
1816.27 The new Dutch deal with the British Empire was the end of the 
American penetration and the beginning of a new Dutch start, now more 
profĳitable than ever. 
Whatever one thinks about the performance of the NHM, it succeeded 
in overcoming its serious blunders and losses thanks to the substantial 
and continuous fĳinancial support and guarantees from King and Country, 
while still expanding quickly throughout the whole of Asia. 
Its second large fĳinancial source was its ability to exploit the colonial 
state in a rather absurd way, from weapons to pork-meat and pension 
deals: this parasite could be found everywhere. Only its opium monopoly 
from this colonial government was perceived as ‘nothing but a guaran-
teed income of three tons of gold, while the government was the sufffering 
party’.28 
And its third—in my view main—source was its ability not to show to 
outsiders how the fĳirst and second sources became linked to each other 
only in the pockets of the NHM. In other words: its turnover, profĳits, costs 
or activities could not ultimately be controlled from either Holland (royal 
or not) or Batavia. It is even uncertain whether the NHM bookkeepers 
really could audit what was happening in all the many “departments” in 
so many countries and with so many products (illicit) and customers. The 
exploitation of these three pillars and continuously playing the divide and 
rule game between the fĳirst two made the NHM ‘a robber state’ in the 
“Multatulian sense”, but also towards the two Dutch governments. 
According to the above table, the opium business seems to be only one 
of its activities. Schmidt himself demonstrated in detail how the NHM 
itself was the buyer of Levantine opium in Turkey (Anatolia) or Egypt, 
which was also known to Mansvelt. Secondly, he showed how the NHM 
once bought, for instance, 40 chests of illicit opium offfered by an American 
27 J. Schmidt, p. 20 fff. He largely based this opinion on the study of Owen’s British 
Opium Policy and on studies showing how the economic situation in Europe went from 
bad to worse. His mistake was that he did not acknowledge the dynamic of the Dutch 
intra-Asian trade. From time immemorial this was the greatest support of the Dutch colo-
nial empire. Concluding, for instance, that ‘the number of ships arriving in and departing 
from Holland declined every year ... Amsterdam had ceased to function as one of the most 
important staple ports in Europe’ (p. 20, 21), etc., he thought that the same misery was 
apparent in the East Indies or in East Asia. 
28 Quoted in J. Schmidt, p. 28.
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captain in Java; 30 chests were for the government, 8 went to an opium 
farmer in Padang (north-west coast of Sumatra) and 2 were kept
at the disposition of one of our most important linen buyers, which he needs 
for the undertaking of a small, experimental Expedition to the Peppercoast 
(Sumatra) …29
He also disclosed a constellation in Izmir from before 1800 in which pri-
vate Dutch and other European opium dealers closely collaborated with 
Anatolian producers, shipowners of all nationalities, smugglers and the 
NHM or other private dealers in the East Indies (often Armenians). 
The opium (later also morphine and heroin) dealers in Izmir were, 
therefore, not Turkish but Dutch dealers with names now representative 
of the Dutch Protestant elite: members of the Van Lennep family, the 
Wissing family, the Dutilhs, etc. They also interchanged their commercial 
activities with political jobs as consuls of the Dutch state. The Levantine 
opium, morphine and heroin were also attractive for other nations. A 
symptomatic remark for the situation around 1900:
In the years before the First World War, four major opium dealers were 
active on the Izmir market: the British fĳirm of Barker Brothers, the Austrian 
house of F. Fidao & Co and two Dutch fĳirms: that of A.A. Keun & Co and 
A. Lavino & Co … Both fĳirms indirectly supplied opium to the Colonial 
Minsitry. Keun delivered through the agents G. Briegleb, Van Eeghen & Co 
(both of Amsterdam) and G.W. Koning (Rotterdam) ...30
He made a rather spectacular report about a remarkable criminal case in 
1897 in which a Dutch private detective alarmed the Ministry of Justice in 
The Hague that an Armenian opium dealer, Andreas, from Java
tried to interest the fĳirm of W. Hemsing & Co (Spuistraat 36, Amsterdam) 
“in making a lot of money in the smuggling trade in opium, particularly by 
means of bicycles, whose tubes, frame and tube under the saddle-pillar lend 
themselves excellently to the import of clandestine goods”. Once the trade 
had developed satisfactorily, Holland would also be used as a base. ... A. was 
going to the Indies to act in the interest of the enterprise, using his experi-
ence and acquaintance with offfĳicials of high and low rank, all of them ... 
easy to cheat or bribe. All opium was to be obtained from the Levant ...31
29 Idem, p. 25.
30 J. Schmidt, p. 173. 
31 Idem, p. 31. This case is also “spectacular” for another reason: I lived for a long time 
near this address in the Spuistraat in Amsterdam, where my bicycles were repaired as well, 
but I was never asked to smuggle opium; therefore, I remained poor and could not buy a 
Rolls Royce: the advantage is, I hope, that this book was written!
public adventures of a private state within the state 317
This kind of double-Dutch opium trade continued, in fact, until 1940-41. 
Probably the main relationship could be discovered in the table as well. 
Below the amounts of the opium trade proper (in the end the NHM was 
the offfĳicial opium dealer for the colonial government), the data about its 
China trade are indicated. These are the years of the largest opium-smug-
gling activities of the English and Americans into China. It would be 
strange if the greedy Dutch opium traders did not participate in it. Indeed, 
a Chinese source complains that ‘large quantities’ of opium came from 
the ‘Dutch East Indies’, which was simply similar to the NHM.32 
This outcome must have serious consequences for the assessment of 
the opium trade of the NHM (now almost 50% of its activities) and for the 
Dutch colonial state as well. Is it true that all opium import destined for 
Java, Madura and the rest of the archipelago arrived here and not in 
China? If so, the addiction of the East Indies was much less than always 
suggested, while the smugglers’ activity or collaboration of the Dutch 
colonial bureaucracy or King William I was much larger.
It is impossible to continue this history of the Dutch private opium 
dealers including the NHM story. It gained a bad image world-wide thanks 
to Multatuli’s famous book, Max Havelaar, or the cofffee auctions of the 
Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (1859). From this title it becomes 
clear that Multatuli despised the NHM management of the cofffee planta-
tions. However, as the table shows, the opium business was its most prof-
itable activity originally. Even in the beginning of the 20th-century, the 
NHM belonged to the cartel of importers and producers of coca leaves, 
the Association of Coca Producers.33 As such it had great influence in the 
running of the Dutch Cocaine Factory (see below). 
Last question: within the Dutch East Indies economy the private NHM 
was indeed the state within the state. Was it the ‘robber state’ Multatuli 
condemned? From the above one can already conclude that most or a 
very large part of all opium profĳits went into NHM pockets. Even from 
Mansvelt’s two-volume biography of the NHM (a commission of the 
NHM), it seems certain that the King (and the House of Orange in general 
at least until 1921) benefĳited the most from NHM’s opium deals, when 
William I himself is not the “inventor” of these deals. From other profes-
sional Dutch historians one cannot expect more information in this case 
since they failed to come up with any reasonable economic history of their 
32 Quoted in A. Hosie, vol. 2, p. 203, 204.
33 M. de Kort, in: P. Gootenberg (ed.), p. 131.
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colonies.34 From abroad, as so often, must come the “material of the 
truth”; in this case the study of Helffferich (1914) about the NHM and other 
‘Kulturbanken’ (fĳinanciers of the cultivations/ plantations).
In this period the NHM developed into such a dinosaur that its opium 
(and also including the later cocaine business) not longer had the relative 
weight and basic importance as in its initial period.
The in-depth study of Helffferich on the situation around 1914 comes, 
however, to the same conclusion as Mansvelt for the initial period, name-
ly, that the NHM bookkeeping was a mess. For people like Helffferich or 
any external expert, it is inscrutable; one may add for the largest majority 
of the internal ones as well. A few quotations must sufffĳice about one of 
its most profĳitable, long-lasting and largest activities (sugar plantations 
and factories) which concern a general judgment about all cultivation 
projects as well:
The profĳits are calculated after internal depreciation and payment of 
bonuses from which the amount is unknown … and after [calculating] a 
fĳixed interest for the invested capitals, while on top of this from the net 
profĳit 500,000 guilders are reserved ... It is a pity that there is a lack of 
relevant documents ... thanks to the typical NHM accounting methods ... is 
it impossible to calculate the profĳitability of the present “participations” ... 
Furthermore, there are absent in all Year Accounts from the beginning until 
now the yields and the output of the sugar factories, their production costs 
and the sales prices, the depreciation of newly bought things or bonuses; 
in short, all those data are absent in the Year Accounts which belong to the 
most important economic documents of a fĳirm of the ancestry and impor-
tance of the Dutch Trade Company.35
And so on! It is a litany of sins not known to Multatuli when he directly 
attacked the NHM as the most serious partner in the Dutch ‘robber state’. 
34 A start could have been made by J.L. van Zanden (1996) and better (2000), p. 137-149 
and 220-231, but it received no follow-up, apart from the normal situation among Dutch 
historians that “opium” is not considered at all. Anyway, no progress compared to the fĳirst 
economic history, written by the German E. Baasch, p. 364-384, 569-584, let alone the Ger-
man E. Helffferich, p. 100-120 and passim. Van Zanden is, like Helffferich, happily already 
convinced of the manipulations (p. 222) in the offfĳicial bookkeepers’ information about the 
so-called “Batig Slot”, the balance of profĳits of the colony. 
35 E. Helffferich, p. 116, 117.
the opium regime of the dutch (colonial) state 319
CHAPTER NINETEEN
THE OPIUM REGIME OF THE DUTCH (COLONIAL) STATE, 
1850-1940
Multatuli’s ‘robber state’ was also a state with a state bureaucracy. It was 
a colonial state directed at the exploitation of foreign territories without 
being asked to do so by the indigenous rulers and population, and wheth-
er legally or morally allowed, relevant or desirable. At the beginning of the 
19th-century, this state and its bureaucracy were rather abstract entities; 
thunderclouds in a Western tempest with devastating lightning strikes. 
Of course, the elite had no knowledge of who lived there “far below”and 
under what conditions and, therefore, what efffects this “natural disaster” 
had. And had forgotten how immense the area was in which this Western 
Tempest played havoc. For the new Dutch rulers, the island of Java was 
the only area they ruled for a long time; the enclosed map was not at their 
disposal. 
Therefore, the actual opium distribution in Java had to be done by 
indigenous people who knew the ways to reach the consumers. The colo-
nial state had to use opium farmers, but this changed at the end of the cen-
tury as the Dutch became more accustomed to the East Indies and the 
East Indian people to them.
Then the Opiumregie was introduced, and its grip on the opium market 
became unparalleled compared to the VOC or the previous period. This 
time not only Java and Madura were the center of all activities, but the 
whole of the archipelago became occupied in a new series of devastating 
campaigns. Offfĳicially, however, the Opiumregie was aimed at minimizing 
or even eradicating opium consumption. There was no place for competi-
tion, not even of the NHM: the Opiumregie had a monopoly, not only in 
Java and Madura but also in the rest of the archipelago. Therefore, let us 
start with a few remarks about this “rest”, and later the performance of the 
Opiumregie itself will be scrutinized. 
 The Outer Districts
As stated above, the better penetration of the Dutch opium business into 
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century and a parallel efffect of the protracted conquest of parts of this 
archipelago; conquests which were followed up at the beginning of the 
20th-century a few years before the Dutch were kicked out of the realm. 
Neither the VOC nor the Amphioen Society cared much in this respect for 
other parts of the archipelago than Java and Madura. They certainly had 
their customers on specifĳic islands like Bali, but there was no regular, let 
alone systematic, export from Batavia to elsewhere in the archipelago. 
Many of these Outer Districts were situated on the route from Bengal 
along Sumatra, the Strait of Malacca (Melaka), Singapore, Borneo, etc. 
Along this route they were visited mostly by non-Dutch traders, who were 
immediately called “smugglers” by the Dutch. The English country traders 
and Chinese were the most important ones, but the Buginese traders were 
also rather active. This non-Dutch network was strengthened after 
Singapore became more important as the main port in the trade between 
India–East Indies–China.
Another important reason was that Dutch opium was always cost more 
than the opium from elsewhere. This situation did not change from the 
Napoleonic era, through the British occupation of Java or in the 20th-cen-
tury. On the contrary, British and American opium traders now had the 
best chance to attack their traditional Dutch competitor. Their only limit 
was Rafffles’ strong anti-opium and anti-slavery stand and the military 
protection the high-priced opium got from the Dutch. To avoid consump-
tion, the British only levied an opium tax in the Outer Districts, but it is 
doubtful whether anybody cared to collect it. 
Yet the rationalization of the opium distribution by means of govern-
ment opium dens (Daendels, 1809) was continued after the restoration of 
the Dutch government. Opium dens were also spread over the Outer 
Districts, leading to a more systematic distribution of opium.1 In Ambon, 
Timor, Ban(g)ka–Belitung (Billiton) or Celebes, offfĳicial opium dens were 
established. However, the license-holders often had to collect their opium 
not from the Java-based government but from the “smugglers”! At the end 
of the 19th-century, with the establishment of the Opiumregie, this big 
hole in the government opium network started to close. The closing of it 
required at least one real Opium War (see below). Until this new organi-
zation was functioning, the leasers of the opium dens had to pay for the 
license and taxes relative to the consumption. 
1 J.C. Baud, p. 192 fff.
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The reasoning behind it must have been a pragmatic one for an exploit-
er: what was lost to the smugglers should be shifted towards their “own” 
consumers. It was a system which allowed many possibilities for corrup-
tion on all sides. As long as the government in Batavia could collect its half 
a million guilders annually from the districts, it was not concerned. The 
following table gives examples of how that half million was distributed 
over most districts in the middle of the 19th-century. One must realize 
that it was Baud, one of the highest offfĳicials in the colony, who estimated 
the so-called “smuggling”. 
Table 13. Net Output of Opium Leasing in Outer Districts of the East Indies, 
1847-18492
DISTRICT 1847 (Guilders) 1848 (Guilders) 1849 (Guilders) Estimated 
smuggling 
(chests)
Moluccas 25 767 32 421 32 187 19
Bali, Timor, etc.  2 150  3 120  3 300 10
Macassar 53 037 81 880 34 240 40
Banjarmasin 12 787  4 480 15 482 9
Pontianak 56 900 71 300 59 466 115
Riau 63 000 67 500 55 200 50
Banca 68 482 60 789 63 010 21
Padano +Aceh 200 022 189 640 192 490 160
Bencoolen 19 125 20 810 21 120 80
Palembang 23 460 25 900 29 760 12
TOTAL 509 049 523 407 531 834 516
This table reveals a few remarkable things. When this distribution occurs, 
the total opium income of the Dutch colonial state in these years was 6.7, 
6.5 and 6 million guilders, respectively.3 This means that about six million 
guilders were provided every year by Java and Madura alone. These two 
islands are the most populous ones and the headquarters of the Dutch 
occupation and the NHM, but this is untenable. Also, the weights for Java 
and Madura (Baud: 390-375 chests per year in the period 1845-1849) in 
relation to the earnings are ridiculous. The fĳirst conclusion is, therefore, 
2 Idem, p. 193. Padano (Padang) is situated at the middle West Coast of Sumatra above 
Bencoolen; Banjarmasin is a district in the south of Borneo; Riau is suggested as belonging 
to a group of islands south of Singapore. The sales in these districts are estimated for the 
years 1849-1850 by Baud, p. 180 fff. 
3 Idem, p. 220. See also the article of R. Elson in A. Booth et. al (ed.), p. 41 column 2, 
who does not indicate which factor applies to “guilders”: ×100 or ×1000.
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that the offfĳicial Dutch statistics are quite dubious. This problem is in need 
of further investigation, but that cannot be done here.4
Looking for a further explanation, it could be assumed that the data are 
related to negotiations between the Dutch bureaucracy and the NHM: if 
the former got its money and the NHM its opium, then everybody must 
have been “satisfĳied”; data are only interesting for the motherland. The 
NHM as the main opium farmer “in Batavia” sells the opium to its own 
(unknown) customers somewhere in the whole realm. One must remem-
ber that the NHM trade operations reached even into China, the largest 
market for opium! 
In this perspective, Baud’s estimates of “smuggled” quantities in the 
archipelago receive a specifĳic meaning, although they cannot be seen in 
relation to the other columns in the table. Baud’s reflection on these 
smuggling data is: 
... at the moment only among the leasers one can fĳind the smugglers of 
substantial quantities ... in the VOC period there existed a right which 
every collaborator of the Company expected to have on the yield of so-
called silent profĳits; at the moment the smuggler is confronted everywhere 
with the opinion that these profĳits are not only against the law, but are 
immoral as well ... if there should exist exceptions to this, one can fĳind them 
only among the poorly remunerated personnel of low rank. It may be per-
ceived as certain that the Chinese, who were major collaborators of the 
smugglers in the previous century, are still the same perpetrators …5 (italics 
from Baud)
Therefore, we can also conclude that the NHM, with its extremely close 
relation to the Chinese traders and opium leasers, belongs among the 
main smugglers; we can at least expect that smuggling occurs with the 
silent approval of the NHM and that Baud, not a friend of the NHM, is sug-
gesting this assumption. 
4 More people do have difffĳiculties with the statistics. Take the example of J. Meiss’ 
doctoral dissertation from 1883. J. Meiss, p. 65, reproduces the same table as given in the 
text without the smuggling estimates, while adding the totals of 1844-1846 (respectively 
838,071; 840,031 and 825,089) and of 1850-51 (respectively 561,248 and 496,220). However, it 
is a pity that Meiss did not see a printing error in his table (in Bangka, 1847), but that all his 
totals from 1847-1849 are wrong is a remarkable mistake. The diffferences are between 
250,000 and 300,000 guilders. My only explanation is that Meiss, for whatever strange rea-
son, has taken only the totals from another source like Baud, namely the Koloniaal Verslag. 
In that case, it could be that the large diffferences between Meiss and Baud originate from 
a notation of tiban plus siram, while Baud’s data could be based on the tiban only. But is 
this to be expected of Baud, the inventor of the tiban-siram system?
5 J. C. Baud, p. 182.
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6
All this points to a more profound context, the struggle between the colo-
nial state representatives (like Baud) and the private entrepreneurship 
within their realm: the former do have the prerogative to defĳine what is 
moral or immoral for whatever reason. This resembles the ‘Staatsraison’ 
6 This table is given in the article of C. Steinmetz in: Indie en het Opium, p. 159. From 
the Outer Districts only a selection is given here. Therefore, the given total is not the total 
of the given districts, but of all Outer Districts. The totals of 1928 are derived from a table 
in Commission d’Enquête sur le Contrôle de l’Opium, vol. 1 p. 80 fff., vol. 2, p. 211 fff. 
Table 14. Opium consumption (in thails) of License and Non-License Holders in Java, Madura and 
Outer Districts (Buitengewesten) in the Opiumregie,19306






 Chinese  Indigenous  Chinese  Indigenous
no. thails no. thails no. thails no. thails no. thails
West Java 2 27 1943 36916 626 4258 5093 38731 3036 5570 855
Middle Java 2 59 2702 50241 16184 61947 1874 14514 3193 5384 1321
East Java 1 --- 3469 80108 33269 113677 1463 24106 1306 5226 2231
Djogjakarta --- --- 456 9906 2132 9028 --- – – – 189
Soerakarta --- --- 935 14451 16630 52856 --- – – – 673
total Java + 
Madura
5 86 9496 191622 68841 241767 8430 77351 7535 16180 5270
OUTER DISTRICTS (selection)
W.Sumatra – – 280 5331 44 233 – – – – 55
Palembang – – 217 6176 7 35 1115 22343 20 199 288
E.Sumatra – – 148 2857 117 924 36829 339542 3515 14221 3575
Banca – --- 7205 49862 7 54 – --- – – 499
Billiton – – – – 1 4.23 1319 24810 – – 248
Borneo – – 291 6429 18 134 634 12915 107 277 197
Moluccas – – 275 8748 274 1431 --- – – – 102
Bali, etc. – – 541 9546 1292 7629 – --- – – 172
total Outer 
Dist.
--- --- 10808 124605 3680 20583 52028 575550 6382 28902 7496
Total 1930 5 86 20304 316227 72521 262350 60458 652901 13917 45082 12766
Total 1928 5 100 19552 337012 81491 338628 70266 868348 14805 56879 16010
1 thail = 100 mata = 38.6 gram; 1 ounce = 2.59 thail. 
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of the highest state bureaucrats. In that case, the state knows perfectly 
well what it involves to distribute a substance like opium in a narco-mili-
tary framework: it needs the money for its household and servants, and 
therefore its own activity is defĳined as of a high moral standing and its 
competitors as smugglers, enemies who should be eliminated.
Here we can provide another view on the relationship between the 
Outer Districts and Java plus Madura from several decades later, which 
results in new questions. 
The fĳirst thing to deduce from the table is that in the Outer Districts in 
1930, about 467 chests are consumed and in Java + Madura, about 328. 
This is more or less the same proportion as eighty years earlier (516 to 
380).7 In this period, however, the population on Java increased from 
about ten million (around 1850) to 41 million (1930). In almost all other 
parts of Southeast Asia, there is a similar spectacular growth.8 The given 
data, provided by the Dutch Opiumregie, are therefore not very convinc-
ing, to say the least. 
From this table one can learn many things, more about the Opiumregie 
itself than about—say—the degree of opium addiction in the population. 
In fact, the table contains data about the inhabitants of the districts and 
the average opium use per year of the several groups in those districts. As 
such, it symbolizes an important aspect of the opium monopoly: the abil-
ity to combine (and use) all kinds of information about the exploited sub-
jects and the ability to defĳine problems (dubious or not). The registration 
of fĳive Europeans asking for and obtaining a license to smoke only 86 
thails in a year is not only a demonstration of European “innocence and 
civilization” of the opium importers, but also of absurd state interven-
tionism. 
It is suggested that there were about 80,000 Chinese licensed and non-
licensed opium smokers in 1930 and 90,000 indigenous smokers of the 
stufff provided by the Opiumregie. A holder, however, is not the same as a 
user; he could be a dealer or shopkeeper, a non-smoking buyer or a family 
member. Furthermore, in the explanation one always used the Dutch 
7 The Outer Districts total of 749,600 thails = about 28,942 kg = about 467 chests; the 
Java + Madura total of 527,000 thails = about 20,347 kg = about 328 chests. When compar-
ing the several districts in the two tables, one is confronted with serious diffferences. This 
supposes, of course, that the reasonable guess of Baud about the smuggling in 1850 should 
be the whole consumption. This is certainly not the case, but also during the regime of the 
Opiumregie, statistics must have been used to cover government activities, because there 
was also a substantial amount of smuggling.  
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word ‘schuiver’ for these “smokers”, which was for most readers synony-
mous with addicts (see below). In addition, hardly any reader cared or 
knew something about the important diffference between an opium eater 
and a smoker (the fĳirst consumes oin average much more morphine than 
the latter, etc.). Most commentators think that at least the same number 
of smokers were reached through the smuggling circuit. 
The table gives the consumers of the legal opium (in Dutch: Wettig 
Opium). According to this, on average 1 in every 15 Chinese in the archi-
pelago (7% of all Chinese) and 1 in every 684 indigenous inhabitant (0.2% 
of all indigenous people) were smokers. In the Outer Districts this ratio 
was 1 in 10 Chinese and 1 in 1800 indigenous people.
There are specifĳic districts in which the opium consumption is much 
larger than elsewhere.9 Offfĳicially, there were even districts without any 
smokers. A spectacular aspect invovles the Ban(g)ka district of the tin 
mines where 30% of all Chinese consumption can be noted. Some 30% of 
the Java consumption is concentrated in Eastern Java, etc. 
If we try to defĳine an opium addict in the 1930s, we can derive from the 
table that an average of 12 thail was consumed per Chinese smoker per 
year, while an indigenous man consumed almost 4 thail a year (463.2 g 
and 154.4 g a year, respectively).10 In other words, 1.27 gram and 0.42 gram 
a day, respectively. In terms of money, this consumption is calculated as 
follows:
Per head of the population in 1930, one spends 38 cents on Java and Mad-
ura for Opiumregie opium, in the outer districts 118 and in the whole of 
the archipelago 67 cents per year in a population of about 60 million souls’ 
(italics added, H.D.).11 
With these fĳigures we can make a few interesting calculations to support 
our concept. First, the average of 67 cents paid in 1930 amounts to 40.2 
million Dutch guilders earned by the Opiumregie or the state. The table 
provided by the Director of the Ministry of Finance, one of the most 
important fĳigures in the Opiumregie, indicates the gross income for 1930 
about 5 million less.
A second conclusion is that it is physically impossible to become an 
addict on 1.3 gram a day, let alone from 0.4 gram. To compare this, for 
9 See map in J. Rush, p. 5 for a situation at the end of the 19th-century.
10 Suppose that the numbers in the table represent the consumers, which is suggested 
but not very convincingly. These Opiumregie fĳigures, anyway, represent consumption of 
Opiumregie opium.
11 C. Steinmetz in: Indie en het Opium, p. 157, 158.
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instance, with a present packet of cigarettes of 28.3 gram (20 cigarettes) is 
rather complicated, because one has to compare the morphine with the 
nicotine content and their addictive efffects. However, it is illustrative to 
say that Steinmetz’ opium addicts smoke something similar to about 1/3 
to one cigarette a day. 
And what does it mean that one spends 38, 67 or 118 cents a year on 
opium? The lowest ranks of the police earned at the time a maximum of 
25 Dutch guilders a month; the so-called mantri-politie, specialized in 
attacking opium smugglers, earned double that amount.12 This is thus 
300-600 guilders a year. If one earned the minimum and consumed the 
maximum of 118 cents on opium, this should amount to the negligible 
sum of 0.4% of the total annual budget (for a “coolie” with his yearly bud-
get of about 180 guilders, it is still less than 1%).13 
Caring about these “addicts” seems to be only an artifĳicial case aiming 
at quite diffferent matters than avoiding addiction. Therefore, one can eas-
ily conclude: the only explanation for all the fuss about the Opium 
Problem in the Dutch East Indies then is legitimating and securing a sub-
stantial fĳinancial contribution to the foundations of the colonial state 
through a well-known bad and controversial product. 
This should have negated a major element of this Opium Problem: for 
middle- and upper-class well-fed consumers of opium, these quantities 
are not at all unhealthy for their purse or body. But the above calculations 
are averages of all classes, while we concentrate on specifĳic users, their 
concentrations in the tin mines or their wanderings. 
They are met, for instance, in chapter 8 about the Billiton Mining 
Company, a model for all work sites. Through the whole of the archipela-
go, hundreds of thousands of men and women were wandering between 
the many “white” plantations, mines, factories or cities. Between 1913 and 
1925 about 327,000 contract “coolies” departed from Java alone for planta-
tions and work sites in the outer islands. They were the opium clients and 
victims described as follows:
12 M. Bloembergen, p. 86. Elsewhere (p. 63) she states that household personnel (or 
‘the normal coolie’) got 14-15 guilder a month plus free lodging; top police offfĳicers received 
250-400 guilders a month.
13 The well-known economist J. H. Boeke studied household expenditures in 1886 and 
1888. The lowest income was found in a small mountain desa, and he gave 3844 cents as 
the annual income for a family in which the man had to cultivate cofffee for the govern-
ment (78 times) and village services (72 times). In: Indonesia, p. 54 fff. The other examples 
given are interesting as well in this respect.
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Their wages were low (for women only half to three-quarters those of men), 
and what disposable income remained, men often spent on gambling and 
prostitutes; systematic indebtedness was a useful means for plantation 
managers to maintain their workforces. With appalling living conditions, 
disease was rampant, and death never far away ... To ensure a docile or at 
least compliant workforce, the plantation management could call upon the 
authority of the state, embodied in such legislation as the Netherlands East 
Indies Coolie Ordinances of 1880, 1884 and 1893 which imposed fĳines, 
imprisonment or extra labour obligations ... physical beatings and fĳinancial 
penalties ...14
A million poor people spending a few cents a year on opium will make a 
few people very rich, the statistics impressive, and allow the state to pay 
its police force easily to repress rebelling workers.
 The Bali Case
It is appropriate to sketch the Opium Problem also from the perspective 
of a district instead of through the eyes of “Batavia” (Opiumregie). One 
example from the Outer Districts is Banca, on which were located 70% of 
all Chinese holders of an opium license in 1930, while on Billiton there 
was not a single one. Only Chinese non-license holders lived there, 
because it was at the time practically the private property of the Billiton 
Mining Company, which had its own opium policy.
A diffferent situation existed on the island of Bali. There the Balinese 
nobility and princes dominated the scene rather than a Dutch company. 
As stated above, they had reacted to the Dutch opium import with the 
establishment of a true slave export already in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
In the 19th-century several factors led to important changes.15
Balinese slaves were no longer in demand, which was not due to a sud-
den abolition movement among the Dutch: instead, the Dutch state itself 
had started to colonize through strong military repression, and this pro-
cured cheap local labor. The imported slaves from Bali became too 
 expensive. Rafffles’ anti-slavery and anti-opium ideas remained largely 
pro posals; they had no relevant impact on the archipelago’s economy. 
14 See the contribution of Robert Elson in N. Tarling (ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 156, 157.
15 H. Schulte Nordholt, p. 96 fff. It is not understandable why Cliffford Geertz should be 
‘biased’ in his opinion ‘that opium was the main driving force of Balinese trade’ because he 
referred to the ‘conditions in northern Bali’ only (see, Idem, note 35 p. 96). It can be 
expected that Geertz understood how the importance of opium remained as he indicated 
for at least half of the 19th-century, and changed afterwards as argued in my main text. 
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Quite the reverse. He strongly facilitated the private English country 
 traders who risked dealing with opium through Singapore, energetically 
supported by Chinese and Buginese traders. The Balinese authorities had 
soon discovered that their opium was much cheaper than the Dutch. In 
this way they compensated for the relative losses in the slave trade, but 
this must have given them little comfort. 
A second source for cheap labor was also tapped by probably the same 
English, Portuguese (Macao) and Chinese opium traders: the “coolie” 
trade. And a third reason to gradually abandon the Balinese slaves-for-
opium trade was a natural disaster, the eruption of the Tambora volcano 
on a neighboring island (1815) which caused crop failures, a plague of 
mice and famine in the south of Bali. 
The longer term efffect, however, was that for about two decades fewer 
people could be spared for the slave trade, while in the subsequent period 
Bali became the ‘chief granary for Singapore’. Rice-for-opium could 
replace the slave-for-opium trade, and in this transformation manpower 
in Bali became very important after 1850. In the north of Bali, a cofffee-for-
opium trade gradually developed.16
The relations between Bali and the English Singapore with its many 
Chinese strengthened and, therefore, the influence of the Dutch weak-
ened. Balinese leaders understood the shifting times and the changing 
importance of opium. They were 
aware that the royal center should make an efffort to increase control over 
the changing market, as indicated by … monopolizing of opium imports 
and the additional taxes introduced with an eye to centralization of orga-
nized exports.17 
The consequence of all this was that the use of opium penetrated more 
deeply into Balinese society in the second half of the 19th-century. 
Wiselius documents this as follows.18 From the Calcutta annual opium 
exports, 12,000 picul were destined for Singapore. According to the 
Annual Reports of the Dutch Consul-General in Singapore, the export 
from here to the “Netherlands-Indies” was on average 3,700 picul per year 
in the years 1878-1883. Of this, 25% went to Batavia, 50% to Bali, and the 
rest to other ports. Wiselius stresses how strange it is that a Dutch consul 
knows of these practices and that nobody in Batavia protests against 
16 Idem, p. 126 fff.
17 Idem, p. 102, 108 fff. Rochussen wrote in December 1847 also about opium activities 
of English merchants on Bali. See J. Baud, J. Rochussen, vol. II, p. 320.
18 J. Wiselius (1886), p. 21 note 1.
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them, and the fact that every year about 3,000 piculs of opium are appar-
ently distributed by “smugglers”. That is double what the Dutch colonial 
government distributed to its opium dealers.
But the Dutch became increasingly angry about the more independent 
Bali and its wayward princes’ orientation towards Singapore. As usual, 
they started wars. The fĳirst one (1846) led to the destruction of a palace, 
new contracts on Dutch terms, and quarrels between the Dutch and the 
Balinese decision-makers about what to do next. 
The second war (1848) was a true Opium War, but less successful than 
the fĳirst English one of a few years earlier. It started when one prince ‘put 
up defenses and bought large quantities of weapons and opium in 
Singapore’.19 This operation was an utter failure: the Dutch were heavily 
defeated, and strange Dutch stories were made up to explain this loss of 
prestige away.20 
In the next war of 1849, the Dutch mobilized for their biggest military 
expedition with an army of 12,000 men under the command of an experi-
enced general. Small successes were won for this army in the beginning, 
but it all ended in failure again. The general lost his life, surprise attacks 
by the Balinese cost many lives, ‘unfamiliar conditions’ and dysentery did 
the rest. A peace had to be concluded which the Dutch sold to “Batavia” 
and the homeland as a victory, but their defeat guaranteed an indepen-
dent Bali for many decades to come.
The permanent mutual competition among the Balinese nobles was 
their Achilles heel. Some of them tried to strengthen their own position 
by asking the Dutch to support them (the enemy of my enemy is my friend 
principle). This led to two small military expeditions of the Dutch (1858 
and 1868) against specifĳic nobles, but the Dutch apparently did not dare 
to attack the whole island anew.
Until the end of the century, Bali even became more and more inde-
pendent of “Batavia” in an economic sense. Buleleng, the main harbor 
in north Bali, developed into a prosperous and free port (no import or 
export taxes); non-indigenous merchants (Chinese, Buginese, Arabs, etc.) 
be came more important and active.
19 H. Schulte Nordholt, p. 165.
20 The most ridiculous story was that the Dutch commander did not dare to send rein-
forcements to Bali ‘fearing that the revolution which swept over Europe in 1848 might 
spread to the colony’ (Idem, note 24 p. 166). Another story only mentioned that the Bali-
nese nearly lost this war because of ‘lack of ammunition and opium’ (Idem, p. 166).  
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Particularly signifĳicant was the opium trade. Raw opium was imported in 
large quantities from Singapore, refĳined in Buleleng, and for the most part 
smuggled to Java. This lucrative smuggling ... attracted many Chinese immi-
grants who soon completely controlled the opium processing and trade. 
Part of the opium ... found its way to the Balinese hinterland ... The most 
important Balinese export product was cofffee, the cultivation of which, 
concentrated in the central Balinese mountains, expanded rapidly.21 
The opium trade was really booming. In 1861 opium imports were valued 
at 294,321 Dutch guilders; sixteen years later this had increased to the 
enormous sum of 4.5 million guilders, ten times more than the second 
largest import—textile goods. And so the importance of Buleleng 
increased, along the main trade route to Singapore; southern Bali became 
dominated by the opium-cofffee part in the north.
In the last stage of the Dutch rule in the East Indies, probably the most 
devastating one, Bali also had to bear its share of what was offfĳicially called 
the Dutch ‘Ethical Policy’. Along with Bali, the Dutch military machine 
tried to eradicate resistance in Aceh, Jambi, Southeast Kalimantan, Flores, 
South Sulawesi or Lombok. It did not take long before anti-Dutch revolts 
raged everywhere in the archipelago, and the last fully fledged war ended 
with the elimination of the colonial regime. Before that happened, hun-
dreds of thousands of dead had to be mourned again.
The massacres in Bali (1901-1906) were part of this endgame. Opium 
again played a main role. First in the perception of the Dutch authorities, 
which claimed to have a
 civilizing task which implied that “royal arbitrariness”, slavery, and opium 
smuggling should be done away with. Governor-General W. Rooseboom 
formulated this vision as follows: “We ... shall, wherever there is injustice ... 
not be able to remain inactive in the protection of the weak and the 
oppressed. This is in complete accord with the ethical direction in colonial 
politics.”’22
In several waves the Dutch army conquered Bali; many thousands of 
Balinese lost their lives; princes and nobles lost their influence; direct rule 
from “Batavia” became the punishment. 
In the last military expedition to establish this lethal Pax Neerlandica, 
a royal ‘resistance to the introduction of the colonial opium directive in 
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establish the Opiumregie and its opium dens in Bali and to eliminate the 
so-called “smugglers”; the competition to the Dutch opium dealers had to 
be eradicated, not the Dutch opium business. That was the ‘civilizing 
task’.
The table 14 demonstrates the efffects of these massacres: Bali became 
the Outer District with the most indigenous holders of an opium license 
and nearly 30% of all opium consumption! Apparently, the traditional 
Balinese resistance against the Dutch disappeared in the opium smoke. 
This tactic was known among the many enemies of the Dutch kafĳirs like 
Muslims in Aceh. They told followers there in 1928 that the Dutch tactic to 
disarm their enemies was executing
the following scheme: they introduce gambling and opium-smoking, and 
some set themselves up as toll-collectors as in Java. With great devotion 
they encourage the people to gamble … They make the law, the damned 
kafĳirs, and they rule with new methods.24 
An important instrument to manage this is the subject of the following 
paragraph. 
The Opiumregie25
The man who after much commotion ultimately prepared the decision to 
transform the opium farming26 “system” of the Dutch into a centralized 
state bureaucracy, the Opiumregie, was Willem Pieter Groeneveldt (1841-
1915). At that time his was a rare intellect with a long and interesting 
career in East Asia, starting as interpreter for Dutch embassies in Canton 
and Peking, writer of a scholarly book about the Malay archipelago, and 
ending as vice-president of the Board of Netherlands Indies, one of the 
highest functions in the Dutch colony. This man was sent to the French 
colonies (Cochinchina, Tonkin or Cambodia) to study the French experi-
ence with a similar transformation in the opium management. His clear 
and extensive report with many quantitative data was a long and well 
24 Document from 1928 reproduced in Indonesia, p. 211, 212.
25 For the following, see the 1890 advice of W.P. Groeneveldt, who studied the French 
Opiumregie in Indochina. See also J. Rush, chapter 11 and the “War on Opium” (chapter 10), 
which allegedly triggered the Opiumregie. E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 269-377 gave a very detailed 
and relevant description of the establishment and activities of the Opiumregie. 
M. de Kort, p. 45 fff.
26 For more details about the opium tax farming in the East Indies and Southeast Asia 
(except in this section), see below in ch. 23.
chapter nineteen334
argued plea to take the step to a centralized system (see ch. 23). His 
 arguments in favor of the Opiumregie can be summarized as follows.27
First try out the new system in Java and Madura before introducing it 
elsewhere in the archipelago, but do not establish a pilot project on, for 
instance, the island of Banka. Such a project delivers no other experience, 
as already known in Cochinchina. If one can experiment in a region as 
large as part of Java, then one is surrounded by leasers whose existence is 
threatened. Failure cannot be avoided. Like the French dared to do in 
Cochinchina, the Dutch must act fĳirmly in the East Indies.
An Opiumregie depends fĳirst and foremost on a strong opium police at 
sea and struggling against every form of opium smuggling on land. The 
police cannot handle this task alone, they must be embedded in a net-
work of district police, customs offfĳices and the Ministry of Finance. This 
proposal led to a modern way of fĳighting criminality. These measures 
‘must not have been perceived as favorable to the leasers ... Where the 
monopoly is in the hands of the Government ... it should be an honor for 
everybody to cooperate ...’
Nothing changed regarding the purchasing of the raw opium in Benares 
or elsewhere, except that this could be done much more cheaply, as 
proved in Cochinchina. 
In the technical part of his proposals, Groeneveldt criticized Struick 
(Haak and Wiselius) for not understanding the way raw opium is treated 
to obtain tjandoe (prepared opium). The main suggestion was to establish 
a centralized production in an opium factory in Batavia. This happened 
about ten years later.
Apart from the factory-produced tjandoe, there is an indigenous kind, 
called tiké (tikeh). This is raw opium mixed with pulverized awar-awar 
leaves: 
The minor quality of this second kind of tjandoe derives from the prepara-
tion in which a substantial quantity of sugar is mixed in and during the 
remainder of the cooking is treated with lemon juice to extract all the mor-
phine out of it. In this way ... one gets 12 to 17 thails per catty raw opium, 
whereas with the normal tjandoe one gets only 10 to 11 thails.28 
27 W.P. Groeneveldt, p. 127-139; the quotations come from these pages. See also 
J. Rush, p. 208 fff. although Rush uses the wrong title of G.’s publication. Rush much prefers 
the small pamphlet by N. Struick, published a year before Groeneveldt’s large analysis. For 
the whole discussion for and against the Opiumregie, one has to read Rush’s chapters 10 
and 11.
28 Idem, p. 129. See for the tikeh production Appendix 5.
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If the morphine is gone, opium addiction seems impossible (see Appendix 
5 for morphine content).
Another theme of Groeneveldt’s proposal was the packing policy of the 
opium: one has to exercise “direct mail” as far as possible, avoiding mid-
dlemen who increase the price and reduce the quality. The main argu-
ment against middlemen (and, therefore, against the whole farming 
system) is in fact ‘that through the use of middlemen, a large part of the 
advantages given by the work of the Regie is lost …’29 
To sell directly to the users, one has to provide the smallest quantities. 
In Cochinchina it had been discovered that even deliveries of 20 g (about 
1/2 thail) were too large. Furthermore, the opium dens were gradually 
transformed from locations to consume into places to buy the stufff. 
Consumption took place largely outside the dens, except when smoking 
could be combined with prostitution. Anyway, this led to the conclusion 
that a rather normal consignment of 1200 pikul (= 75,000 kg) raw opium 
bought in Bengal by the government had to be sold to the consumers as 
120 million small boxes of a few grams (mata). Groeneveldt proposed 
making small tubes of tin or copper for these small quantities. (It became 
lead and a battery of fĳilling machines entered the opium factory.) These 
tubes carried specifĳic marks so that the consumer could not be cheated.
The Opiumregie became the bureaucratic machine to execute the gov-
ernment’s opium monopoly. Historically, it is a variant or an extension of 
the monopoly established by the government after it took over the heri-
tage of the VOC, which was already based on a specifĳic monopoly man-
agement. Now the farming system present until 1894 was modernized and 
industrialized: a very modern opium factory was opened in 1902, and the 
opium business became a 100% government task.
In the period that the colonial bureaucracy decided to establish an 
Opiumregie, the Dutch state earned no less than 14 million guilders per 
year (1896 -1898) which was the largest source of income after the land 
rent (ca. 17 million).30 Of course, bureaucrats complained that this was 
too small and claimed out of the blue that this income had to follow the 
population increase: in the last few years the population had increased by 
4% and the opium income by only 0.6%; it doubled every 42 years. 
Production, distribution, administration or anti-smuggling measures, all 
this and more had to be rationalized, automated and so on. 
29 Idem, p. 136.
30 According to a document published in 1901 in Indonesia, p. 59 (‘rents on opium’ and 
‘opium monopoly’).
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Many new laws had to be designed which also transformed life in the 
colony (for the juridical side of the Opiumregie, see below). Retailing was 
forbidden outside the 1100 opium dens managed by the Opiumregie. As 
stated, the tjandoe got a specifĳic and obligatory packing in the opium fac-
tory. Once opened, these tubes were difffĳicult to close; specifĳic marks were 
made on them so that fraud could easily be detected (see for details 
appendix 5).31 
It took about fĳifteen years before this Opiumregie functioned rather 
smoothly throughout the archipelago. The leadership always denied that 
this new institution aimed at increasing opium consumption. But 
Groeneveldt was clear in his secret report:
The Regie with exclusion of everybody else aims to satisfy the opium needs. 
There is no reason to complain about this relative to the sheer extent of 
this task, because it did not create this need ... if it did not fulfĳill this task ... 
important centers of consumption would have to rely on smuggling ... In 
the system of the Opiumregie, there is no place to reduce the quantities 
which could be sold; it is necessary to help every buyer.32 
For the publicity, of course, one cherished the hope that the closest pos-
sible management of all elements of the opium problem, like in a police 
state, would solve this problem in the long run and, therefore, should 
drastically discourage consumption. How long that “run” should be was 
not disclosed, but it was clear to all from the beginning, except these 
bureaucrats’ publicity, that this expectation was pitched too high. “On 
purpose”, argued the opposition. Anyway, the fĳirst more or less indepen-
dent investigation into the matter was crystal clear about the Opiumregie’s 
legitimation to act as it did:
This conclusion [reduction of consumption, H.D.] is not supported by the 
Colonial Reports, which show that the use of opium in Java has increased 
from 735,000 thails in 1904 to 870,000 thails in 1912 in spite the closing-
down of a considerable number of shops and dens ...33
In January 1934 the Opiumregie was extended by the Saltregie (Zoutregie). 
With ‘salt’ was meant not only kitchen salt, but also ‘salts and other deriv-
atives from morphine, diacetylmorphine and cocaine’.34
31 A specifĳic ordinance was issued for the packing of the regie opium: see Opium- en 
Zoutregie, p. 57-64 with a very detailed description of an opium tube in articles 3 and 4.
32 W.P. Groeneveldt, p. 137.
33 Document from 1914 reproduced in Indonesia, p. 88.
34 Opium- en Zoutregie, p. 12. See also Idem, p. 93 fff.
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Ill. 18. Interior of the Opium factory, Batavia ca. 1935 
Source: Collection Royal Tropical Institute. In the fĳirst hall the opium is pressed into small 
metal capsules of several sizes. The second picture shows the hall in which the opium cap-
sules were packed in wooden boxes (for the details see Appendix 5).
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Steinmetz, head of the Opiumregie in the 1930s, wrote:
The existing penal law relative to the import, manufacturing, consumption 
and distribution of opium, morphine, morphine preparations and deriva-
tives, used for other than medicinal purposes, is being tightened up, and 
new rules were announced for cocaine, eucaine and other narcotics.35 
This monopoly combined not only trade, refĳining and distribution using a 
factory and about 1100 distribution centers in the whole archipelago. 
This control system of everything and everybody included a rather sub-
stantial police force to attack “smugglers”, etc. and covered also the pri-
vate lives of the consumers. So, the offfĳicial bookkeeping of 1927 revealed 
that there were 177,122 opium addicts in the archipelago (92,873 indig-
enous people; 83,242 Chinese and only 7 Europeans). For cocaine see 
below.
The Opiumregie became, symptomatic enough, a department of the 
Ministry of Finance. This immediately resulted in the criticism that the 
profĳit of the Opiumregie landed in the state’s cofffer with all its conse-
quences for the eradication of the opium addiction: the more addicts, the 
better for the colonial state fĳinances. As we have seen, that was indeed the 
standard practice, motivation and rationale behind all measures.
The highest bureaucrats of this Ministry were never tired of explaining 
that ‘the Opium monopoly in Dutch East Indies has in principle [in wezen] 
not a fĳiscal but a social aim ... the maximum limitation of the use of opium 
…’ after which another 15 rules follow which contradict this announce-
ment with several “if’s”.36 
Even during the International Conference of Shanghai in 1909, the 
Dutch government had to defend itself with a specifĳic declaration that it 
‘will never refrain from taking measures … to minimize gradually the use 
[of opium] on fĳinancial grounds …’ It had envisaged a period of about fĳif-
teen years before a defĳinite prohibition could be declared. 
However, it then declared that this period cannot start because the 
poppy-producing countries (British India, etc.) were not ready to take this 
step. The British replied, of course, that countries like the Dutch East 
Indies were not ready to start that famous period. As a result, nothing 
changed, although to everybody’s surprise the Chinese government suc-
ceeded in eradicating the opium production in Szechwan or Yunnan to a 
substantial degree; an embarrassment for the British, Dutch, and French 
and their opium production facilities.
35 C. Steinmetz, director of the Opiumregie, in: Indie en het Opium, p. 149.
36 C. Van den Bussche, director of the Ministry of Finance, in: Idem, p. 117.
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Another main criticism of the Dutch concerned the extremely high 
price the government asked for its opium; a price which increased in 1926 
to the highest level in East Asia (and, therefore, in the world) of 30 Dutch 
guilders per thail (=38.6 g). The following table is given to support the gov-
ernment opium policy. It has to prove that there is no fĳiscal aim of the 
opium policy: the opium profĳits never pay for more than 7.3% of the nor-
mal expenditures of the colonial state.
Table 15. Income and Expenditures of the Opiumregie and the Colonial State, 1920-1931 
(x 1000 Dutch guilders)37











Column 3 in 
% of column 
5
2 3 4 5 6
1920 53 640 42 671 --- 672 982 6.3
1921 53 318 43 471 --- 586 740 7.3
1922 44 220 35 098 --- 514 054 6.8
1923 37 583 31 061 --- 440 801 7
1924 35 317 28 494 --- 408 024 6.9
1925 36 640 28 755 --- 421 110 6.8
1926 37 727 29 471 --- 437 860 6.7
1927 41 617 24 955 6 582 472 726 5.2
1928 42 871 25 727 8 828 510 213 5
1929 40 982 26 200 6 939 514 993 5
1930 34 599 26 921   564 523 995 5.1
1931 26 000* 21 000* --- 532 288* 3.9
* Only a half-year estimate 
Government sophistry was extreme: the price increase could be a way to 
avoid smuggling, although the obvious rule was that the higher the offfĳicial 
price, the more smuggling was encouraged. Is it not so that
the geographical position of the archipelago makes it less vulnerable to 
smuggling’38; the smokers are accustomed to this price, so we can keep it 
like this39; if all our anti-smuggling measures are not successful, we still can 
decrease the price; the international situation has been changed in such a 
way ‘that it is not necessary to consider a reduction for the time being’.40 
37 Data provided by the Opiumregie in the article of C. Van den Bussche in: Indie en 





All this was an answer to an increased anti-opium sentiment and 
action in the motherland. That was in fact a reason why the Dutch copied 
the system of a 100% government monopoly of their main competitor in 
the realm, the French. 
Steinmetz himself mentions price increases on Celebes from 3 guilders 
in 1926 to 30 guilders in 1931!41 In short: no reduction of the price following 
the normal fĳiscal aims, increased smuggling, increased corruption among 
the top bureaucrats. As a last defense of its policy, these offfĳicials attacked 
their critics and the public opinion with the “argument”:
... it is also important to realize the correct appreciation [of our opium 
policy], because the wrong understanding of this policy and the specifĳic 
suggestive efffect of the criticism, we should only follow fĳiscal aims, ... only 
supports the wild prohibitionists, ... so that we, in the end, have to abandon 
our careful and efffĳicient anti-opium policy.42 
These “prohibitionists” were several kinds of anti-opium lobbies in and 
outside the Dutch East Indies as, for example, in the USA, including offfĳi-
cially the US government. Happily, the many critics of the government 
policy were not impressed, as will be demonstrated in the next chapater. 
One example comes from Herbert L. May. He conducted a survey of opi-
um smoking in the Far East (report 1927) and became a member of the 
League of Nations Permanent Central Opium Board; in short, an expert in 
the right place. This man concluded:
Existing government prices most everywhere are too high, however, espe-
cially in the Netherlands Indies. Not only do they encourage smuggling, but 
they constitute a high penalty against the man who obeys the law by buying 
government opium and a high reward for the one who buys smuggled 
opium at the much lower price. Divans (public smoking establishments) 
apparently have a social feature which makes smoking more attractive. 
Therefore, since the object is to reduce or stamp out the vice, divans should 
not be permitted.43
This colonial state with its always growing social and political unrest was 
constantly in need of large amounts of money, while the motherland was 
always unwilling to spend more on its colony. To be more specifĳic: the 
motherland expected the colony to pay for itself and provide in addition 
41 C. Steinmetz in: Idem, p. 150.
42 Idem, p. 122. Other “offfĳicial” contributions to this interesting reader come from the 
head of the Opiumregie (Steinmetz), a Director of the Opium Factory (Buck), who explains 
the working of morphine on the mind or from a Chief of the Opium police.
43 Quoted in A. Vandenbosch, p. 283.
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raw material for the home industry, a market for its end-products and a 
place for the recruitment of a rich Dutch bureaucratic and military elite, 
including a substantial fĳinancial contribution to the welfare of the greedy 
motherland. 
This lead to serious competitive pressure among the top bureaucrats 
for personal gains in the intentionally criminalized opium scene. In 1923 
one of the highest police offfĳicers in the colony was arrested because he 
had carried out fraud for the enormous sum of one million guilders; a 
head of the criminal opium investigation department was accused of opi-
um smuggling; another was dismissed for being a morphine addict; others 
blackmailed Chinese brothels, etc. for an amount of 2,000 guilders a 
month, etc.44 
Fabulous amounts of money in the colony circulated “underground”, 
as was usual in the period of the VOC. One can safely conclude that the 
whole opium business of the Dutch during the forty years after 1900 yield-
ed at least a profĳit of close to 1-1.5 billion guilders (current value. This level 
of profĳit was never reached with the other narco-activity. 
44 Idem, p. 227. The offfĳicial monthly salary was about 500 guilders.
Figure 6. Opium Factory, import raw opium, 1900-1940 (x 10,000 kilogram) 
Source: H. Derks based on the Year Accounts of the Opiumfabriek, the Opiumregie and of the 




























 The Dutch Cocaine Industry
The narco-military activities of the Dutch were unprecedented. Apart 
from opium and its whole infrastructure, including an opium factory, the 
Dutch government also strongly facilitated the production of coca leaf 
and co-fĳinanced at least two cocaine factories, one in Amsterdam and 
later another in the colony. These activities started at the same time as 
genocidal wars were waged against people in the Outer Districts, who 
once again were fĳighting for their liberation (Aceh, Bali, Lombok, etc.). 
In the Annual Accounts of the Opiumregie, information about the 
cocaine factory and its activities in Java is given in passing as if it was 
unimportant:
Concerning the cultivation of the coca and the use of coca leaves by the 
population, there exist no other peculiarities than given in the previous 
report … The plant is grown only on Java on a scale of about 1600 hectares. 
Not included are cultivations along roads, in hedges, etc. In 1923 the total 
production of coca leaves was 922,866 kilogram; the exported quantity was 
907,335 kilo. (italics added by me, H.D.)45 
This Annual Account also tells us something about prices and export des-
tinations. The prices of the leaves varied from 60 to 160 Dutch guilders 
per picul (= here 60.5 kg) according to the cocaine content. Although 
most of the export was destined for the cocaine factory in Amsterdam, the 
Japanese were becoming more active buyers. They even bought a whole 
Java harvest for a fĳixed price of 75 guilders per picul without any guaran-
tee of the cocaine content (1923). 
Table 16. Coca Leaves Export from Java, 1904-1940 (selected years)46
Year Coca leaves in kg Year Coca leaves in kg
1904 25 836 1924 1 118 000
1906 122 000 1926 1 043 000
1908 417 000 1928 385 000
1910 430 000 1930 354 000
1912 1 075 000 1932 209 000
1914 1 353 270 1934 105 000
45 Opiumregie (Verslag, 1923), p. 36.
46 From the article of Paul Gootenberg in: S. Topik et al. (ed.), p. 334. Here only a selec-
tion of his data is given. See also L. Lewin, p. 105-109.
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Year Coca leaves in kg Year Coca leaves in kg
1916
407 984 1936 125 000
1918 661 968 1938 50 000
1920 1 676 621 1940 125 000
1922 1 283 503
The total export of coca leaves from Java in these same years was not less 
than 21 million kilograms. The minimum price of 100 kilo was 50 guil-
ders, so that in these 40 years there was a turnover of some 10 million 
guilders in coca leaves only. But apart from leaf production, there was also 
cocaine production. The price of leaves was coupled to the price of 
cocaine: for one kilo of pure cocaine, one needed 123.56 kilo of leaves.47 
This means that not less that 170,000 kg cocaine could be made from the 
total Dutch leave export alone. 
The value of this cocaine can be estimated as follows. In 1884 the Dutch 
journal for the medical profession was very positive about cocaine: the 
only disadvantage was the price of 9,000 Dutch guilders for one kilo.48 
This leads to a turnover of 1.53 billion Dutch guilders! Of course this is the 
theory. It indicates, however, in which level of money market cocaine 
business has been arrived after 1900. It learns, furthermore, that the avail-
able government statistics must be taken with many pinches of salt; they 
all strongly underestimate – on purpose or not—the relevant levels of 
production or profĳit. 
The rapid rise of the Dutch on the world cocaine market took the estab-
lished parties like the Peruvians by surprise. From 26 tons in 1904, produc-
tion immediately soared at a tremendous pace. The reason behind this 
spectacular growth was quite simple. First and foremost, the combination 
of an efffective colonial production of raw material for a cocaine industry 
in the homeland, a willing state bureaucracy and enough private inves-
tors, also partly channeled through state-sponsored banks like the large 
Dutch Colonial Bank. When expansion and success were apparent, the 
Dutch diplomacy in the international negotiations to prohibit the drugs 
47 Quite diffferent fĳigures are mentioned, but the most reliable in this respect seems to 
be the Dutch expert A.W. de Jong, p. 885. After an analysis of the German, British and 
American leave – cocaine ratio De Jong concluded: ‘The quantity of coca leave necessary 
to produce 3,480 kg cocaine is, therefore, about 430 ton.’ 
48 M. de Kort, p. 39.
Table 16. Continued.
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business was very willing to slow down the American anti-drugs policy 
(“prohibitionists”) and the private anti-opium leagues. This game was 
played together with the British, who had similarly large drug interests. 
Ill. 19. Dutch Cocaine Factory, copy of a share, 1942 
Source: www.deresearcher.nl 
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There was no Cocaine–Regie imposed as in the opium case and, there-
fore, no cocaine monopoly system. The formal reason was that this enter-
prise was a private one, established by the Colonial Bank, property partly 
of the Dutch royal house. Therefore, it was not a clearly capitalist private 
business either, let alone a prerogative of some mafĳia, as was clearly the 
case a few years later. In the research, raw material and distribution side 
of this cocaine problem, the Dutch colonial state was dominant or, at 
least, very helpful with its experienced, bureaucratic drugs infrastructure 
and opium money. 
Cocaine production involves a much more sophisticated chemical pro-
cess than opium, and had to be managed by a European and American 
pharmaceutical industry. Famous names such as Boehringer (Germany), 
Hofffman-La Roche (Switzerland), Merck (Germany, USA), BASF 
(Germany), Rhône-Poulenc (France), etc. were all heavily involved in 
cocaine production and distribution. This was because they had in the 
meantime (from about 1870) gained experience with the production of 
the opium derivatives, morphine and heroin. In this cocaine scene the 
Dutch played again a major, sometimes the most important, role. 
The cultivation of coca plantations on Java began around 1885 when 
the relevant botanical experiments spread among several European colo-
nial powers. It was a stroke of luck for the Dutch that their special variety 
of Erythroxylon novogranatense contained twice the cocaine content of 
the usual Peruvian kind. Dutch botanists had done a “good job” in the 
well-furnished gardens of Buitenzorg. 
Parallel to the Opium Factory, a Cocaine Factory was established, fĳirst 
in Amsterdam (1900).49 It used patented German technology (Farbwerke) 
to extract cocaine from coca leaves imported from Java. It furthermore 
enjoyed the advantage of the well-organized plantation systems in the 
Dutch colony: cheap Asian labor, four annual harvests, economies of 
scale, intercropping with colonial rubber and tea. The performance of this 
cocaine industry impressed foreign investors so much that even Merck 
USA started its own coca plantation on Java with great success in the 
1930s.
The Nederlandsche Cocainefabriek (NCF) became the largest in the 
world. It even created a new product, novocaine, a fully synthetic sub-
49 The fate of this factory became recently subject of a highly interesting movie by 
Jeanette Groenendaal, The Dutch Cocaine Factory (2007) and of a novel by Conny Braam 
(2009).  
chapter nineteen346
stitute for cocaine. It was a less poisonous drug than cocaine with more or 
less the same vein-constricting efffects; as such, it was considered more 
suitable for the dental practice. Nowadays, it has been replaced by more 
efffective drugs. This activity in Holland triggered other initiatives there. It 
is not surprising that one of them, the Chemische Fabriek Naarden, soon 
became involved in obvious mafĳia practices of smuggling morphine and 
heroin to China.50
Almost as quickly as it arose, the Dutch position in this market van-
ished. In particular, the decline was very fast after 1925. The reasons for 
this are partly obvious: the international competition strongly increased, 
and governments made agreements like the Geneva Convention (1925) to 
restrict the business to trade for ‘medical and scientifĳic purposes’. Just 
before implementing this system, the Dutch sent a million kilograms of 
leaves out from Amsterdam warehouses.51 
As can be seen in the table, during First World War and the Great 
Depression, the demand for cocaine collapsed. That is contrary to the per-
sistent legend that European soldiers were doped with cocaine to fĳight 
longer and better: cocaine has always been a peacetime product, a luxury 
for those who can affford it.52 There are obvious reasons for this: the deliv-
eries are hindered in wartime, although the demand may increase; the 
price for an individual portion may be sky-high in Europe, but the price 
for a total harvest of leaves dropped sharply. 
In the following table the Dutch disadvantage (?) is shown from a dif-
ferent angle: the geo-political position from its huge stocks of coca leaves. 
Before World War I there were cartel-like arrangements between the 
largest European cocaine manufacturers which guaranteed the highest 
prices. But even in Holland there were three cocaine factories competing 
with each other. After the war each manufacturer had to manage its 
own business, with the result that the competition strongly increased and 
prices fell, despite a growing demand.53
In one of its last massive reports (before the Second World War), 
the Central Opium Board (League of Nations) assessed the drug trafffĳic, 
50 M. de Kort, p. 98-110; M. de Kort in: P. Gootenberg (ed.), p. 140.
51 Idem in: Idem, p. 131.
52 Although not so unequivocal as in the Java statistics, the Peruvian exports with a 
diffferent market show the same trend for the World Economic Crisis of the 1920s and also 
for the whole World War I period of 1911-1919. Remarkable are also the fluctuations in the 
US coca imports during World War II. See S. Topik et al. (ed.), p. 338 and 342.
53 M. de Kort in: P. Gootenberg (ed.), p. 130.
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Table 17. Stocks of Coca Leaves, 1933-1938 (x 1 kilogram)54
Country 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Germany 56 200 50 247 52 250 39 400 45 424 72 862
United KIngdom 17 625 313 9 391 9 909 6 689 11 465
United States 204 191 203 197 197 197
France 32 613 11 781 15 556 31 370 46 446 59 374
Netherlands 577 825 541 120 462 191 391 456 331 357 136 508
Switzerland 21 931 310 10 390 251 2 740 2 619
production and consumption of the new products as follows.55 The grad-
ual decrease in the manufacture of the three main drugs—morphine, her-
oin and cocaine—stopped: the fĳirst increased by 11.5 per cent, the other 
two showed a slight increase. However, as concluded above, the con-
sumption in this time of crisis decreased by 10 per cent for the second 
drug and 4 per cent for the other two.
The increase in morphine production occurred mainly in the UK (from 
1,292 kilo in 1932 to 1,873 kilo one year later); cocaine also increased (from 
238 kilo in 1929 to 427 kilo in 1933). The main producer of morphine was 
the US with 7,459 kilo in 1933, while Japan manufactured most of the 
cocaine (920 kilo). In this last country, the consumption of cocaine was 
also the largest (14 kg per million inhabitants). In Europe, the largest 
cocaine consumer was France (9 kg per million). 
The history of the NCF continued: apart from new products such as 
novocaine, it also started with already well-known products like codeine, 
benzedrine (amphetamine) and efedrine. From 1932 onwards it even 
began processing raw opium into morphine.56
There was, however, no future for Dutch cocaine anymore: in the same 
year the dry coca-leaf production of Peru had already reached the 3,500 
tons with an export of 85 tons; in the other South American production 
country, Bolivia, plantations with a surface of 8,333 hectares produced 
1,735 tons and exported 347 tons of dry leaves.57
54 A.W. de Jong, p. 885. It is nearly for sure, that at least the USA fĳigures are a bit mis-
leading: such small stocks of leaves do not have any value for the preparation of raw 
cocaine. It is not sufffĳicient for Merck alone. This besides the fact that the USA has several 
much more important South American coca leave sources. The value of the table is mainly 
to show the relative importance of the Dutch position. 
55 I used here the summary in the Newcastle School of Medicine Centenary, Oct. 13, 
1934, p. 686.
56 For the following I used information from the National Archive, The Hague, De 
Nederlandsche Cocainefabriek (12-3-2010).
57 A. W. de Jong, p. 870, 871.
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 While the relationship with the Dutch state had mostly been an indi-
rect one, this gradually became a direct one. During the occupation in 
World War II, the NCF was fully incorporated into the German war econ-
omy. Poppies had to be planted in Holland to obtain enough raw opium 
under the direction of a Department of Medicines. The growers were told 
that the morphine extracted from the poppies was only destined for ‘own 
land and Volk’, which was untrue. Only those produced in the province of 
North Holland remained in the Netherlands; the production in all other 
provinces went to Germany.
The profĳit construction of the NCF was unbelievable: it received 165 
tons of raw material for free, and it could charge its processing costs to the 
state. The price to be paid was that end product of raw opium became 
state property. Then the NCF bought the raw opium from the state to pro-
duce pure morphine and other derivatives from it. The transaction price 
of 130 guilders per kilo of raw opium was far below the cost price, so that 
the NCF realized fabulous profĳits on its morphine during the war. Soon 
after the war AKZO Nobel bought the company for an unknown price. 
 Legal Hypocrisy
One may conclude, relative to the East Indies drug position, that there 
was no reason to complain about the substantial and profĳitable opium 
and cocaine business. But Steinmetz, head of the Opiumregie in the 1930s, 
wrote:
The existing penal law relative to the import, manufacturing, consumption 
and distribution of opium, morphine, morphine preparations and deriva-
tives, used for other than medical aims, is tightening up, and new rules are 
being announced for cocaine, eucaine and other narcotics.58 
The latter was never realized, and the penal side of the problem never 
received an adequate treatment. 
Still, with the establishment of the Opiumregie, opium factory or 
cocaine factories, the colonial government had to provide some legal 
framework to regulate the production or distribution of narcotics: the 
government of the homeland urged the colony to pay for itself. It was, 
however, also obliged to minimize the consumption of narcotics or even-
tually to warn and save the citizens from them: the public and religious 
58 C. Steinmetz, director of the Opiumregie, in: Indie en het Opium, p. 149.
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opposition against governmental opium distribution in the homeland 
had to be satisfĳied. In short, in practical and moral terms, these aims were 
conflicting and the involved interests clashing. 
The result is legal hypocrisy: suggest doing one thing, but try to realize 
the other. As all colonial governments were far from democratic, they 
played this hypocritical game only superfĳicially. Even the fear of repercus-
sions in the Dutch homeland was bearable. The representative of the 
mightiest economic power in the colony, Royal Dutch Shell, was Dr. 
Hendrik Colijn, the Calvinist and colonial military butcher, who had been 
a homeland-politician and prime minister until the Second World War. 
It is a major reason why the most remarkable clashing interests were 
all within the colonial government itself: to pay for the costs of the colony 
(to put it as broadly as possible), opium was a most suitable product from 
the very fĳirst time Dutch merchants and the VOC arrived in the archipel-
ago. 
In the twentieth-century the situation was still the same: more con-
sumers, more addicts were needed; the distribution should be better 
organized, and so on. 
As everybody knew at the time, including the members of the many 
International Opium Conferences, this conflicted with the aim to eradi-
cate the opium habit. The word consumption cannot be found in the rel-
evant legal texts, let alone some ordinance devoted to the subject of how 
to diminish opium consumption. Only regulations to better organize the 
production and selling to get as much fĳinancial benefĳit from the invest-
ments as possible.
The clash within the Dutch colonial government was well documented 
by Wim Wertheim. In the 1920s he was a young legal adviser to the Dutch 
colonial government.59 For his own boss, the Minister of Justice, he had to 
design new, severer laws concerning the trade and consumption of opi-
um, while the Ministry of Finance owned and exploited about a thousand 
opium dens through its Opiumregie. He concluded therefore:
... this Department of the Opiumregie had to generate in these years of 
economic crisis a substantial part of the state income through the opium 
trade. Therefore, in the complaints about the dangers of misusing opium 
was hidden a good portion of hypocrisy. The state, in fact, aimed only at 
attacking its own competitors, which also happened in a juridically inap-
propriate way ...60 And about the situation around 1900: ‘Very shortly after 
59 He wrote the preface to E. Vanvugt (1995), p. 7-12.
60 Idem, p. 8.
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a new colonial war was won, the fĳirst building which was erected belonged 
to this Department of the Opiumregie or was an opium den. Even in areas 
like Lombok or Aceh ... the indigenous rulers stuck to their own severe 
punishment of opium consumption …61
The fĳirst law or ordinance concerning opium was issued in 1872, and 
many followed.62 In May 1927 an attempt was made to collate all those 
separate ordinances into a single one, the Regie Opium Ordonnantie. After 
its fĳirst article with the necessary defĳinitions came the following two arti-
cles:
Article 2. It is forbidden to grow poppy and Indian hemp. Article 3. The 
import, the possession and property, the stock and preservation, the trans-
port, the preparation, manufacturing, processing, sale, use and export of 
narcotics, poppy and Indian hemp, including the import of coca leaves, are 
prohibited except as specifĳied below.63 
After learning what we have about the Opiumregie, opium and cocaine 
factories in those same years, we can only repeat the words of Baud, the 
19th-century Governor-General, about the earlier VOC policy:
It is quite right that the Company prohibited the opium trade under severe 
punishments—even the death penalty—but it did not include itself in this 
prohibition. It never detested this trade, but detested the smugglers, who 
intended to profĳit from the same advantages. The Company increased the 
consumption of opium on Java twenty-fold, while complaining constantly 
that this was not enough.64 
This remarkable continuation reproduces the immanent contradictions 
of every foreign colonial occupation. 
The fĳirst modernization which took place was in 1927. Baud’s remark is, 
in fact, explicitly mentioned in article 28: the prescriptions and decisions 
of this law ‘do not concern the import ... manufacturing ... distribution ...
[etc.] … of the Government’. In addition, we have shown that the opium 
consumption not only did not decline up to the Great Depression, but 
that it was facilitated with new products like cocaine and that the govern-
ment’s profĳits increased tremendously. True, it is now difffĳicult to prove 
that the consumption of opium on Java increased twenty-fold as Baud 
mentioned, but its price certainly did!
61 Idem, p. 11, 12.
62 Opium- en Zoutregie, p. 6-9, mentioned all 44 of them until the ordinance of 1927, a 
separate one for every part of the archipelago.  
63 Idem, p. 12.
64 Idem, p. 116.
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The second modernization concerned the punishments. No longer the 
death penalty for the slightest infringement but, on the contrary, small 
fĳines for serious offfences: 100 guilders for the druggist who sticks his nar-
cotics in an unlocked drawer; somebody who plants large fĳields with pop-
py or Indian hemp (hashish) can get a maximum fĳine of 1000 guilders; a 
1000 guilder fĳine can be imposed on a captain if his ship transports narcot-
ics without the necessary papers and licenses (no quantities are men-
tioned); if this captain declares that he knew nothing about all those 
strange chests in his hold, he certainly pays less; if he is stupid enough to 
admit that he deliberately transported all these chests, he can get the 
maximum fĳine of 10,000 guilders, but he earns at least twenty times that 
amount from the cargo.65 
Another modifĳication was that the Opiumregie was established as a 
monopoly for the sale and manufacturing of tjandoe. As stated earlier, this 
must have been the result of a serious internal clash in the colonial 
bureaucracy. Even the fĳirst law of May 1927 provided the Opiumregie and 
its factory with an important position, but not the leading role. Given the 
overwhelming attention to medicinal matters, the responsible party must 
have been the Ministry of Health.66 This changed already in July 1927, 
while its power was extended by January 1934 into an Opium–en Zoutregie 
(Opium–and Saltregie) and the leading party was the Ministry of Finance, 
which did not care about the health of the people, but only about its bal-
ance sheet. 
The self-conceited perception of Opiumregie preceded this legal fĳixa-
tion: a multicolored map of the whole archipelago, always enclosed in its 
Annual Accounts from at least 1916 onwards (the fĳirst I could consult), is 
proudly announced as a ‘General Map ... of the Area of the Opiumregie’ 
while its ‘Explanation’ starts with ‘The Property, etc. of the Opiumregie 
are ...’ (see map 10 p. 326).
65 Idem, p. 28 fff the long article 25.
66 The Opium- en Zoutregie publication reproduces a chaotic situation from the point 
of view of law making. First, in this offfĳicial publication of 1937, texts of—say—1927 are 
published time and again in the corrections of a later date. In this way it is difffĳicult to 
reconstruct the bureaucratic struggles underlying these corrections. The fĳirst long ordi-
nance (called the ‘Narcotics Ordinance’) is dated 12 May 1927 (p. 5-34). At the same day the 
equally long ‘Regie-Opium Ordinance’ was issued about the same subject (p. 45-55). In 
between a very short one (p. 35, 36) was published apparently only to fĳix the decision-
making power among the various departments: for the import of raw opium, the head of 
the Opiumregie was responsible; for all opium business (from import to export) concern-
ing medicinal aims, two other top bureaucrats (army and Ministry of Health); for coca 
leaves, the Ministry of Agriculture, etc. They all have the power to issue specifĳic licenses. 
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Notwithstanding this attitude of a monopoly, the Opiumregie’s juris-
diction had its limits or, better, the consumption of its products (tjandoe, 
djitjing, tikee, raw opium) was limited. If you cannot pay with cash, you 
cannot buy the stufff. It was Queen Wilhelmina herself who “rightly” gave 
this order by Royal Decision (Koninklijk Besluit), apparently because a 
substantial percentage of it still arrived in her pocket through her share-
holding of the Royal Dutch Trading Company (NHM). Furthermore, the 
Queen insisted that you had to be at least 21 years of age before starting to 
smoke opium.67 
Other limitations of the Opiumregie were more serious. They were 
derived from a ‘Circle Theory’ and, in particular, a Circle practice.68 The 
archipelago was subdivided in ‘open circles’, ‘mixed circles’, ‘license cir-
cles’ and ‘closed circles’. Within these areas, including the adjacent terri-
torial waters, diffferent rules apply for who was allowed to use the 
regie-opium (not its derivatives or even cocaine). A few remarks will suf-
fĳice here.
Throughout the whole archipelago, it was forbidden for all military and 
police to use regie-opium, but this concerned all Europeans, in fact. In the 
few ‘closed circles’, specifĳic areas where local leaders had forbidden nar-
cotics for some reason, nobody was allowed to use government opium 
(and had to rely—if necessary—on smuggled narcotics); in ‘license cir-
cles’ nobody could use it without a license, a rule mostly in favor of 
Chinese license-holders (about 75%); in ‘mixed circles’ license-holders 
and specifĳic non-license-holders were both allowed to use the stufff; in the 
few ‘open circles’ there were no limitations, which concerned cities like 
Batavia or Surabaja and specifĳic regions like one in East Sumatra or the 
Riouw archipelago. In the latter cases it was, apparently, too difffĳicult for 
the Opiumregie inspectors to control matters.
The theory involved must concern some rather complicated knowl-
edge about the ethnic composition of the archipelago’s population and 
many regions. In the two appendices of this ordinance, all these locations 
are mentioned and who is allowed (or not) to accept the blessings of the 
bureaucrats of the Opiumregie. 
67 For this very short text of 29-11-1932 see Idem, p. 55, 56.
68 In a law of 3 February 1934, this is legally fĳixed. See Idem, p. 64-89.
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A Double Dutch End
At the beginning of the Second World War, it must have been clear for 
every undergraduate analyst that the position of Dutch colonialism was 
untenable: the world had turned upside down, and nationalism destroyed 
the colonial basis internally. This happened everywhere in Asian colo-
nies. Clever people realised this from 1900 onwards as a storm developed 
into a devastating tempest. First result: 1914-1918. For the second phase 
the Dutch government (in and outside Indonesia) apparently followed 
the French example of ignoring this weather forecast. It intended to fĳight 
against the hurricane to secure its “own property” and not to follow the 
English example of hiding since 1920 under an umbrella like the British 
Commonwealth. 
The last Dutch colonial war became another disaster, whether the 
“enemy” was destroyed or not. As before, the Dutch were fĳighting in a 
country in which they were foreign exploiters. Neither the Calvinists nor 
the Catholics nor the Social Democrats showed any relevant understand-
ing of this situation or of the legitimacy of repressing foreign people. The 
bill they had to pay now was again a huge one. 
First, they had to fĳight three wars in a short period: against the Germans 
‘at home’, the Japanese ‘abroad’, and now it invaded a sovereign and inde-
pendent Indonesia. This under loud and continuous complaint of having 
lost a beautiful tropical milking cow called Tempo Doeloe, while blaming 
it on the victims. Next, the Dutch inevitably lost all “their” property, indus-
trial enterprises, plantations, trade relations for decades, their goodwill 
with the USA and Asia, and so on. However, there was one advantage: the 
Dutch also lost the basis of their opium and coca image as—without any 
doubt—the fĳirst and largest drugs dealer in world history. Until now, 
Dutch historiography has tended to display blaming the victims attitudes, 
while generally unable to describe their past behavior and experiences in 
Indonesia in a realistic and down-to-earth fashion. Even this farewell to 
an opium dealership was celebrated by means of a very loud silence.
After its Declaration of Independence (17th of August 1945), the new, 
inexperienced and poor Indonesian Republic had to consider distributing 
opium in its fĳirst years also. Together with salt, forest products and petrol/
oil, opium belonged to the products with which it could gain some profĳit 
and pay for the costs of the new beginning and, in particular, a new army.69 
69 B. Bouman, p. 102, 108 fff. It is important to say that the author is an historian, but 
also a Dutch general, who was a Dutch military and no deserter during the invasion of 
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This was necessary because the Dutch had announced their intention to 
invade Indonesia, and they came back, armed to the teeth, to teach ‘the 
rebels’ a good lesson. This invasion started on the 20th of July 1947. The 
Indonesians experienced how fragile their liberty was. Two and a half 
years after the return of the Dutch, the invaders defĳinitely lost (27th of 
December 1949).
The Japanese had handed over the opium factory to Indonesia in 
September 1945, whereupon an Indonesian copy of the Opium- en 
Zoutregie was established as the Djawatan Tjandoe dan Garan. The new 
head was an experienced man, Raden Mukarto Notowidigdo, who had 
earlier served both the Dutch and Japanese management of the factory. 
At that time there was a stock of 24 tons of raw opium and one ton of pre-
pared opium.70 Prices were announced in the press and 
... in the period 1st of October to 31st of March 1946 the Djawatan Tjandoe 
contributed 8.1 million guilders to the revenues of the state ... this was about 
four times the revenues of the Dutch in 1938, notwithstanding the loss of 
the markets of Sumatra, Banka and Billiton.71
As shown in Appendix 5 this conclusion is far from correct: the Dutch had 
a net opium profĳit of about 9 million guilders in 1938!72 In addition, the 
triumphalism of Bouman is quite symptomatic.
The most serious mistake, however, is that the General simply changed 
rupiahs into guilders, apparently to support the comparison made with 
the pre-war Dutch situation and to demonstrate how “good” Dutch peo-
ple were compared to these rebels. Only a few pages earlier, the fĳirst bud-
get was reproduced in rupiahs, including the addition: ‘All fĳigures are in 
Japanese occupation currency.’73 This money is, in fact, worthless inter-
Indonesia. For this episode see my article in H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 296 fff. See also a main 
source of Bouman, R. Cribb, who wrote a highly ambiguous—to say the least—analysis of 
the Indonesian use of opium directly after Independence Day.
70 R. Cribb, p. 703 writes about 22 tons of raw and 3 tons of refĳined opium, which 
makes a substantial diffference in value also. I have to reproduce simply what is told by 
Cribb and Bouman, who derived their data largely of suspected Dutch police, military and 
secret service sources. 
71 B. Bouman, p. 108.
72 What makes the diffference between before and after the war is demonstrated by 
the Dutch Central Offfĳice of Statistics (CBS): if the 1900 guilder = 100, the 1940 guilder = 152.9 
and the 1950 guilder = 312.4.  
73 This last quotation comes from R. Cribb, p. 705, note 5, in all probability Bouman’s 
source. But this Cribb made similar mistakes in his attempt to morally condemn the Indo-
nesians of trading in opium. Once he wrote about the earliest provision of opium from the 
Indonesian government to the armed forces; it concerns a ‘consignment of ninety kilos of 
raw opium ... therefore ... some 158,900 tubes of refĳined opium were provided ...’ (Idem, 
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nationally. In addition, immediately after the war at least four currencies 
circulated: Japanese, Dutch, “guerrilla-money” and the new rupiah! 
The story continues: when the Dutch appeared on the horizon again, 
the Indonesians planned to transport the opium factory and a factory for 
medicines into Middle Java.
Between the end of November and the beginning of December 1945 the 
largest part of the opium stock—22 tons of raw opium—... was transported 
to Djokja and Klaten by a group of medical students.74
After this, nobody knows where the opium went: some say that 80 drums 
with raw opium went to East Sumatra from whence they were transport-
ed to Singapore. Anyway: the general report states that until May 1947, 
‘nearly no opium was sold’.
In that month (eight weeks before the Dutch invasion), there was no 
money left in the Indonesian Ministry of Finance (the manager of the opi-
um during the Dutch regime), and it was decided to sell raw opium gradu-
ally in portions of 80 kilos. Again a month later, a Chinese merchant in 
Singapore paid 282,000 Straits dollars for 1,500 tons of maize and opium, 
whereupon the cabinet decided to sell all opium abroad. This opened 
new inroads into the Singapore connection, but we cannot follow that 
further.75 
Apart from all the quantitative mistakes, which only prove that they 
are not very familiar with the subject they describe, it is more important 
that Bouman and Cribb exploited a perspective on this opium history 
p. 718). Appendix 5 clearly explains how in the opium factory from about 200,000 kilo of 
raw opium, about 110,000 kilo prepared in tubes can be derived (including the weight of 
the leaden tubes). Thus, the 90 kilos of Cribb can never provide 158,900 tubes refĳined 
opium, but at most 99,000 tubes. 
74 R. Bouman, p. 109.
75 If one follows the chronology mentioned by the General and calculates the quanti-
ties of opium involved, then this story becomes quite ambiguous. Take, for instance, the 
use of 80 drums with raw opium: suppose it concerns the standard oil drums of 55 USgal = 
200 liter, then we are confronted here with 16 tons of raw opium. Earlier he writes about 
1 ton prepared opium in ‘two drums of 500 liter’: each drum holds 500 liters? two drums 
hold 250 liters each? Eighty drums of 500 liter gives 40 tons of opium (raw? prepared?), 
which were not available. In terms of chronology, the problem is not clear either. From 
October 1945 to the 1st of April 1946, apparently 8.1 million guilders was earned, but on 
November 1945 the whole stock had already been transported to a safe place, and until 
May 1947 no opium was actually sold. Or on the price side: is it possible in a rather chaotic 
Indonesia to sell raw opium within half a year for 8.1 million guilders (whatever the defĳini-
tion)? Or: per thail (= 0.04 kg) the price of opium is on average 25 to 30 guilders in 1938; 8.1 
million guilders would be equivalent to 270,000 to 324,000 thails or 11-13 tons of raw opium. 
This is far from the 22 tons which was left or the original stock of 24 tons. And so on. 
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which must be perceived as distorted after so many decades: for them the 
Dutch rightly returned to invade a then sovereign country and, anyway, 
foreign territory; the Dutch also rightly chased after the Indonesian opi-
um traders, etc. Both write extensively about the opium (and rubber) 
‘smuggling’ activities of the Indonesians, but they have “forgotten” that 
the latter were simply trading in their own country, which only the Dutch 
considered smuggling. It is a point of view with far-reaching consequenc-
es dating from the VOC time. And if the authors had had a genuine aver-
sion against opium, they would have complained fĳirst against the Dutch 
Opiumregie which the Indonesians, compelled by necessity, had to copy 
for a limited time.
General Bouman dedicates his study ‘to my Indonesian friends, former 
antagonists’. He and Cribb still wrote as enemies, probably overwhelmed 
by the data mostly provided by Dutch police, Dutch military and bureau-




76 And not only this. As recently as 2010 the Dutch government refused any form of 
ideal or fĳinancial compensation for the slaughtering of Indonesian villages (several “My 




At the end of this long part about the Dutch East Indies, we have to settle 
the bill. Which bill? In the opium business profĳits are made on diffferent 
levels, wages or bribes paid and received, revenues gained. The levels con-
cerned are not only local, provincial or state ones, but also the classes in 
society and the time when the profĳits were received (accidental, during 
contract years or permanently) and the location within the whole pro-
duction and consumption chain. 
It is nearly impossible to demonstrate the opium profĳits and losses for 
all possibilities and levels. Nevertheless, in Appendix 1 an attempt is made 
to provide an example of such a chain. Because there was no poppy pro-
duction in the East Indies, a chain had to start from the imported govern-
ment opium. The one given in the appendix concerns the largest possible 
route, that between Bengal–India and Shanghai–China. 
Here we shall assess the profĳits/revenues in the East Indies on two lev-
els: for the opium farmer, relevant only until the start of the Opiumregie, 
and for the colonial state until its collapse. A feeling for proportion can be 
gained, when confronted with the large capital sums in the opium busi-
ness, if one realizes that around 1870 the lowest payments on the planta-
tions were 4-5 cents a day. Often 8 guilders per year was paid (indigo 
cultures) or even 4.5 guilders per year (cofffee cultures).1 This apart from 
the large portions of daily beatings. They did not have any possibility to 
pay for any addiction for long.2
One of the most eloquent Dutch supporters of opium distribution, 
Jacob Wiselius, bases his case on the following quasi-logical calculations:
The government provides the farmers with ca. 1600 pikul, and the import 
of illegal opium should be calculated at about double that, so that the num-
ber of users in the archipelago is about 16% of the 25 million … who use 
together 4,000 pikuls of opium. Every pikul contains 125,000 gram (= 1,600 
thail = 160,000 mata) and, therefore, every smoker uses one and a half thail 
1 E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 211 fff.
2 This is seriously doubted by J. Meiss, p. 63 note 2: ‘... because I was never confronted 
with the proper fĳigures proving that a population which pauperize looks for savings by 
reducing its consumption ... of alcohol or opium.’
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per year or 1/2 mata opium per day. Suppose that the average price of one 
mata, bought from the farmer, is 8 cents, then it follows that on average 
every smoker’s expense per day is 4-5 cents.3
He adds in a note that the price depends on the quantity of smuggled 
opium in circulation. Often a mata costs 10, sometimes even 15 cents. 
However, if the user buys the opium per thail, Wiselius thinks, it may be 
cheaper. Of course, wholesale prices were always cheaper, but wage earn-
ers could never affford that sum. According to Wiselius the consumption 
of ‘every smoker’ was 1½ thail per year, which is worth 15-22 guilders, 
equivalent to a slave’s existence for 3-5 years and saving all the money 
one has earned, while not paying for food, drink, and housing. 
The irrational aspect of this calculation starts with the assumption 
(which can never be proved) that smuggling amounted to twice what the 
Dutch imported. In addition, this smuggling is styled as a nightmare of the 
honest Dutch colonial exploiter: it is a function of the Dutch greed. Later 
we shall return to this element of the story. Perhaps the opium farmer can 
provide us with a solution in this typical colonial problem. 
 The Opium Farmer 4
A quotation like the following about rich Chinese families appeals to the 
imagination and prejudices:
The wealth of the Cabang Atas was conspicuous. Aside from endowing 
charitable institutions and temples, the great opium farmer–Chinese offfĳi-
cers of Semarang built luxurious family compounds nestled in gardens laid 
out in the Chinese style, with fĳish ponds and ornamental mountains and 
caves made of coral. The Be family compound was known as … the Eastern 
Garden ... the Western Garden, home of the Tans ... the peranakan elite … 
great feasts and parties ... The most striking was the gleaming, palatial villa 
of an immensely wealthy retired opium farmer ... And so on.5
Around 1890 three of these rich Chinese families dominated thirteen of 
Java’s twenty opium farms. The Be-Tan group owned four farms: Batavia, 
3 J. Wiselius (1886), p. 6. Indeed in 1881 there were 1667.38 pikul available for the 
farmers, in 1882 there was one hundred less, while in 1883 only 1390.19 pikul were placed at 
the disposal of the farmers. Idem, note 1. 
4 For the background of the revenue farming in Southeast Asia and the East Indies in 
particular, see J. Bucher, H. Dick (ed.) in which an excellent contribution by F.W. Diehl 
(p. 196-232) deals with the East Indies in the long 19th-century.
5 J. Rush, p. 95.
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Krawang, Bantam and Bagelen. A rival, Ho Yam Lo, from a Semarang-
based group, ran ‘three lucrative farms in central Java’: Semarang, 
Djokjakarta and Kedu. The third group, headed by Han Liong Ing (the 
‘Kediri kongsi’) managed the farms in Cheribon, Tegal, Pekalongan, 
Rembang and Japara with familial ties to two others.6 
It was Struick, an inspector of the Dutch Finances in the East Indies, 
who investigated the profĳit and loss structures of the twenty farms around 
1890 (a few years before the Opiumregie started). His results more or less 
destroy the relationship ‘immense wealth’ and ‘opium farm’. 
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Bantam* 137.63 177.69 16.69 0.24  7860  40
Batavia    ---    --- 16.8 0.2   ---   ---
Krawang    ---    --- 18 0.27   ---   ---
Lampong
 districts
   ---    --- 22.9 0.32   ---   ---
Cheribon 135.08 143.34 15 0.25  1625  11
Tegal 187.56 244.51 12 0.15  2300  21
Pekalongan 174.48 180.81 12.24 0.16  2500  33
Semarang 168.8 186 16 0.17 13400  61
Japara 125.08 164.3 15 0.18  5683 1/4  47
Rembang 132.05 167.34 14.04 0.17  6350  42
Surabaya 131.54 156.37 14.4 0.14 14300  48
Pasuruan 185.58 178.64 13.15 0.17  3740  20
Probolinggo 122.73 156 12 0.18  2680  14
Bezuki 107.83 130.43 13.6 0.14  1830  21
Banjumas  80.23 156 14 0.25  3600  10
Bagelen 123.05 151.34 13.5 0.18  2400  28
Kedu 156.2 178.9 15.5 0.2  2900  31
Djokjakarta 120.54 155.14 15 0.16  5500  93
6 Idem, p. 95, 96. For the Chinese kongsis in the East Indies see J. Vleming, p. 57-71. In 
this very positive and detailed, juridical analysis about all possible commercial deals with 
Chinese (1925), one cannot fĳind the word opium or a reference to Chinese opium business.
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Surakarta 160.77 183.25 12.33 0.15  7800 146
Madiun 165.37 158 11.7 0.18  8425  57
Kediri 197.82 206.69 14 0.25 13300 100
Madura 112.07 121.48 14.25 0.13  1901 1/2  32
* The fĳirst four districts belong to one opium farm with the same prices for raw opium 
as indicated.
** This average sales price is an estimate of N. Struick. The diffference with the previous 
column is, therefore, the profĳit or loss per catty for the farmer.
It is clear from the table that, for instance in Pasuruan and Madiun, one 
has to accept a loss directly at the start of the process. A more spectacular 
example is Surakarta with the largest number of offfĳicial opium dens 
(secret dens seem to be more numerous). 
Financial inspector Struick comes up with a calculation of the manage-
ment costs (one person earning 80 guilders a month, 30 guilders for rent 
and other expenses) of 1320 guilders per den per year. For all dens, there-
fore, a total of 192,720 guilders per year. As the table reveals, the gross 
profĳit per catty is 22.48 (183.25 minus 160.77) which makes for the 7,800 
catty requested from the colonial government a total of 174,344 guilders. 
Conclusion: only the management of the dens in Surakarta costs 18,000 
guilders more per year than the gross profĳit. Similar calculations for Kediri 
reveal a loss of 14,000 a year, for Cheribon 1,100, Pekalongan 30,000 and 
Madura 25,000 guilders. 
In addition, these amounts must certainly be too low, because only the 
management cost of the dens are considered, not the expenses of the 
farm administration, the preparation of the opium, payments for book-
keepers, transport, interest on capital loaned, expenses for food and 
drinks, and so on. In short, it is difffĳicult to fĳind an opium farmer who 
earned a big profĳit from his farm.8 
8 In the correspondence J. Baud, J. Rochussen, vol. II, p. 174 is mentioned by Rochus-
sen that the chief farmer of Samarang had a loss of 600,000.– guilders in 1842, a fortune. 
Reason: the too heavy competition among the Chinese. In September 1847 is reported: 
‘The chief farmers lost fortunes and are more or less ruined ...’ (Idem, p. 292). Reason: the 
Table 18. Continued
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According to Struick it is, in fact, only the opium farmer of Banjumas, 
an ‘industrial entrepreneur’ (in fact, the indigenous resident of the district 
itself), who is happy with his opium farm. Reason: he paid the lowest gov-
ernment rent (pachtschat), nearly three times less than the Chinese boss 
of Pasuruan, half of the Chinese boss of Pekalongan, etc. Moreover, 
Banjumas seems to be the only farm which requested the maximum 
quantity of opium available for his location. The rest of the farms asked 
only 50% or 30% of the opium which they could have gotten. 
Why did the Banjumas resident have such an advantage? He paid the 
lowest rent thanks to the absence of ‘free competition’ in Banjumas: for 
many years he was the only one dealing in opium and related products. 
He, furthermore, can rely ‘on an army of obedient bureaucrats’, while no 
Chinese dared to compete with him. Thus, the resident of Banjumas was 
in the position to deal with the Dutch colonial government in the sense 
of: I demand this price, otherwise no opium in my district!
The question remains, therefore, why were the Chinese in the fĳirst quo-
tation so rich? Not from the opium bought from the Dutch. According to 
Struick and many others, they were all heavily involved in opium smug-
gling as well, which was facilitated by their farm and its relation to the 
Dutch opium monopoly: this relationship meant that the farmer was 
allowed to possess large quantities of opium; it was his guarantee that he 
could smuggle!
However, it seems to me an excessively clever reasoning for Dutch 
colonialists, who were always very jealous of the profĳits of others. Also, 
Struick had to acknowledge that there was no proof of Chinese opium 
farmers’ smuggling. It is, therefore, more logical to suppose that the opi-
um farms, through which enormous capital sums circulated, provided the 
proprietors with highly lucrative economic power positions throughout the 
economic infrastructure, the credit market and merchandise trade. The 
only position which was economically and politically strong in the colony 
was the narco-military Dutch one. 
 The Colonial State as Farmer
The question seems simple: what was the net profĳit gained by the Dutch 
since the 16th-century by making the people of the Dutch East Indies into 
new distribution system. Two years later: most sub-farmers are ruined and the consump-
tion decreases (Idem, p. 379). Reason: the opium leases are too expensive.  
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opium addicts. It was difffĳicult to answer such a simple question. Let’s give 
here, fĳirst, the simplest and certainly an incorrect answer. The table pro-
vides the summary of the data so abundantly published by a superb Dutch 
colonial bureaucrat, J. C. Baud.
Table 19. Dutch Government Net Opium Profĳits in the East Indies (1678-1815)9 
Periods Current Dutch Guilders
1678-1700  6 872 555
1701-1723  8 876 947
1724-1746 14 772 415
1747-1769 15 060 792
1770-1792  9 336 758
1793-1800 12 629 414
1801-1815  9 607 822
TOTAL 77 156 703
More revealing is what the VOC Directors in Amsterdam wrote in 1686 to 
VOC Batavia:
It is truly not a small profĳit which is gained with the amphioen according 
to your last letter: in Patna you bought it for 64 rupees [about 80 guilders] 
per maund [40 kg] and on the east coast of Java it is sold for 320-340 rix-
daalders [about 825 guilders] per pikul [62 kg]. Therefore, it is urgent … to 
keep this business for the Company as best as possible.10
This resulted in a profĳit per kilo of opium of 11.3 guilders. The VOC sold 
about one million kilo of opium in the period 1678-1700 for a profĳit of 
nearly 7 million guilders. Still, a fabulous sum for that period.
After the turn of the century, prices in Bengal increased from two to 
four guilders a kilo (g/k) in 1730. Later, the fraudulent mechanism of deals 
between VOC offfĳicials, Bengal producers and English EIC offfĳicials appar-
ently worked very efffĳiciently (see discussion of Amphioen Society): around 
1760 the Bengal price had soared to six g/k, and in 1764 it increased even 
to ten g/k. As we have seen in Appendix 3 every fĳigure decreased from 
1760 onwards. This, however, does not mean that the personal profĳits of 
the dealers involved decreased, but that the VOC received much less opi-
um and got much less total profĳit. 
9 Calculation based on J. C. Baud, p. 216 fff.
10 Quoted in E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 108, although his source is not well indicated. See 
this page also for the following fĳigures.
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The following table and fĳigure concerning the 19th-century are much 
more complicated. There is a specifĳic meaning behind tables like these in 
which a comparison with national accounts is implied. This is discovered 
in the usual comment accompanying them: if only a low percentage of 
opium contributes to the national or colonial wealth, then the Opium 
Problem cannot be as serious or large as the anti-opium propaganda 
claimed. It is a tricky reasoning. 
Only by using the most abstract defĳinitions, like ‘the contribution of 
agriculture’ to the national income instead of something like ‘the usual 
contribution of opium is mostly 10%’ can the bad conscience be eased. 
We have to compare specifĳic items like rice or oil to a product like opium 
to discover its relative value for the “Wealth of the Dutch Nation”. In that 
case, certainly during the 17th until the end of the 19th-century, opium 
scores among the top three products. Before taking the discussion further, 
let’s look at the fĳigures resulting from all the above calculations and delib-
erations. 
Table 20. Dutch Government Opium and Colonial Profĳits in the East Indies,1816-
191511






Profĳit Balance in 
Million Guilders
Loss Balance in 
Million 
Guilders
1816-1822 8.1 129.4 9.2 ---
1823-1833 30.3 284.3 --- 51
1834-1847 88 887.9 118 ---
1848-1865 145.1 1 779.1 503.9 ---
1866-1875 103.8 1 290.5 199.6 ---
1876-1885 157.6 1 416.4 --- 73.9
1886-1895 180.7 1 298.5 --- 5.6
1896-1905 153.1 1 426.4 --- 100.6
1906-1915 211.9 2 251.6 --- 115.2
TOTAL 1 078.6 100 764.1 830.7 346.3
It is not an easy matter to assess this table. It remains problematic which 
method is used in the national accounts and which aim must be served 
with a calculation: to convince the homeland state bureaucrats of some-
thing or its politicians, the king or the taxpayers. Apart from this, one 
11  J.-W. Gerritsen, p. 62. See also E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 414; A. Booth in: A. Booth et al 
(ed.), p. 210 fff. and other computations (Frits Diehl).
chapter twenty364
must realize that most colonial profĳits are not made in the colony but in 
the homeland. 
For example: in the 1848-1865 period the total income from the colony 
for the Dutch was nearly 2 billion guilders, of which about 45% was earned 
in the East Indies itself. From this last amount (928 million), about 20% 
(180 million) resulted from the opium sold by the government.12 
As shown in the table, the fĳirst years after the English occupation were 
difffĳicult (Java War, introduction of losses of the Royal Dutch Trading 
Company, NHM). This makes the average opium income over the whole 
century about 10%. 
Calculations were made to compare the profĳit rates for the main colo-
nial products in the middle of the 19th-century. This coincided more or 
less with the 1848-1865 opium period in the previous table. The result of 
this comparison is given in the following table, which does not need any 
comment.
Table 21. Profĳits from Colonial Products, 1848-1866 ( x 1 million guilders)13
Product Cost Price Selling Price Profĳit Profĳit %
cofffee 215.8 637 421.1 195
sugar 176.6 254.9 78.3 44
indigo 22.3 45.5 23.2 104
tin 25.1 103.8 78.7 313
other 38.1 69.4 31.3 82
Monopolies
salt 34.5 100.3 65.8 190
opium 21 176.9 155.9 742
There are, of course, several methods for calculating opium profĳits. Struick 
gave a good example of it for the year 1887 and the islands Java and 
Madura alone. It is interesting because it highlights the cost, income and 
profĳit sides of the state opium business. Not all details can be mentioned 
but the following are informative enough.14
In this year 150,000 catties of Bengal and Levantine raw opium were 
bought for 1.4 million guilders. Strange enough, this is not the largest 
expense. The Dutch colonial state had to pay 2,500 opium sellers in its 
opium-den network for 3.5 million, while the same amount was spend by 
12 See the calculations of Diehl given in E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 413.
13 Quoted from F. Diehl by E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 393 note 33.
14 N. Struick, p. 58-62.
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the opium police fĳighting in vain against the “smugglers”. There are, fur-
thermore, some small costs for preparing the raw opium, the payment of 
agents, bookkeepers, inspectors or chemists. Nearly 10 million guilders 
were spend to meet all these expenses in 1887.15 
Struick supposed that the prepared opium is sold for 15 guilders per 
thail and 20 cents per mata. In total the state could earn 24 million guil-
ders gross which was in his calculation 14 million guilders net, if all the 
opium farmers should pay their duties. Struick suggests that this was not 
the case; the opium was sold by the state at a small loss. In the mean time 
an army of Dutch bureaucrats earned a living in this opium business. So, 
what is a loss? 
In the following fĳigure the 19th-century opium ups and downs are well 
illustrated. It concerns only Java and Madura and not the Outer Districts, 
but covers the bulk of the profĳits. The revenue obtained each year was 
‘determined by the amount of licence fees paid by the opium revenue 
farmers and by the amount of profĳit made by the government on its sale 
of opium, for which it held a monopoly’.16 It is, however, not true what 
Diehl states after this: ‘Each component was afffected by general market 
fluctuations ...’ etc. They had little influence in fact: there was not a proper 
market in the East Indies, which presupposes rather autonomous partici-
pants playing in a peaceful supply and demand constellation. 
Here a Dutch narco-military power fĳixed monopoly prices and 
squeezed the buyers of the stufff as long as a profĳit could be got which it 
deemed sufffĳicient. That is to say: at least ten times the purchase price in 
India (see below).
One has to realize that when monopoly prices are used, any market is 
negated (except the fluctuations the monopoly holder accepts for person-
al motives). This means in narco-military terms: for strategic reasons rela-
tive to the degree of repression of the indigenous populations, including 
those who distribute the opium among the indigenous consumers. One 
must not forget when examining all these tables and fĳigures that from the 
beginning to the end of the 19th-century, the Dutch waged one devastat-
ing and bloody war after another against the East Indies populations. 
It would also not be wise to defend the position of the Dutch, who con-
stantly complained about “smugglers” undermining their profĳits or intim-
15 Struick did not mention in his cost analysis the transport costs in Bengal and from 
Bengal to Batavia, the loss of 45% when raw opium is made into prepared one, etc. This 
last loss is mentioned at the wrong place.
16 F. Diehl, p. 209.
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idating the opium farmers not to buy the Dutch opium. This blurs the fact 
that the Dutch asked usury prices for their product, which only tremen-
dous rich farmers could affford. In addition, the smugglers were rarely or 
never caught, except ‘the arrest of the usual suspects’. The existence of the 
“smugglers” (if they were not created to support the highest possible pric-
es) is the only feature which resembles a free market! 
This fĳigure concerns, thus, the period of the revenue farm opium. The 
steep fall at the end does not mean that the profĳits disappear. On the con-
trary, the Opiumregie takes over the “sqeezing job” with much greater suc-
cess.
Figure 7. Revenue from opium tax farms in Java and Madura, 1816-1905
Sources: Embrechts, 1848; Baud, 1853; de Waal, 1864; Koloniaal Verslag and Bijlagen, annu-
ally from 1849 to 1915 used by F. W. Diehl, p. 210 .
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Another perception of profĳits lists them per century of the VOC and 
Dutch government. Including the results of our analysis of the Opiumregie, 
the totals over the centuries are:
17th-century:     6,872,555  (is in today’s currency  0.518 billion euros) 
18th-century:     60,676,326  (   “  5.185 billion)
19th-century:    799,704,716 (   “ 45.240 billion)
20th-century:  1,064,150,000 (   “ 35.112 billion)
 40 years.
The easiest conclusions from all these fĳigures are: there is no single item in 
the Eastern colonial history of the Dutch which constantly caters through 
the centuries for such a substantial income; there is no single product 
which increases in revenue so quickly (ten times every century). 
Considering that the result for the 20th-century was gained over only 
forty years and that the government swore by all Christian saints that it 
would eradicate the narcotics, it seems to be the best proof of the unten-
ability of that promise.
Only a few observations are left to make here. First, we must stress 
again that these amounts only concern government revenues. In the litera-
ture, it was accepted that the smuggling practices of opium (defĳined as 
non-Dutch trade) were responsible for half of the opium business and 
profĳit. Although the Chinese were accused of it, many Europeans were 
also smugglers; for a long time Americans were certainly in the majority. 
Also, the substantial narco-profĳits of companies like the Royal NHM or 
Cocaine Factory are not included in the above fĳigures. 
The qualifĳication of opium as the most profĳitable product for a very 
long period should be qualifĳied by three remarks. In the 17th and 18th cen-
turies, pepper or textiles were certainly more profĳitable, but they lost 
their lead to cofffee or rubber in the 19th and 20th centuries; in turn, oil 
took over. 
The status of this opium, furthermore, was achieved in the Asian pro-
duction and trade, because it was not produced for the European market. 
(From about 1850 onwards Levant opium gradually penetrated the East 
Asian markets through, for instance, NHM activities). All this drastically 
changed after World War II. 
Finally, the chapter on the introduction of opium as a mass product 
(pepper for opium; ch. 11) after 1663 demonstrated the real value and prof-
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it of opium: it became the Asian means to gain a Western profĳit for the 
West. 
There are diffferent ways to put these opium profĳits in fĳigures. In a puz-
zling way some economists say this about the 19th-century Dutch perfor-
mance:
Over the whole of the period 1816-1915 the accumulated colonial surplus 
was 485 million guilders. But absent the opium revenues ... there would 
have been a defĳicit of 600 million guilders.17
To make this less abstract, one could quote Ewald Vanvugt. He arrives at 
the following result for just the thirty years before 1913:
From 1884 to 1892 one got from the opium farming a profĳit of 110 million 
guilders; in the years 1893 to 1899 this was 137 million; and from 1900 to 
1906 it amounted to 120 million. After establishing the Opium Regie the 
profĳits increased in the years 1907 to 1913 to about 135 million. So in these 
thirty years the profĳit was about 500 million.18
Based on the tables of Appendix 2 of the imports (and Baud’s tables) and 
compared with the above, it can be calculated that the Dutch government 
alone earned a net profĳit for the fĳirst period of 14.26 guilders; for the sec-
ond period 48.28 guilders; and for the third period 116.83 guilders for 
every imported pound of opium. 
For the last period before the establishment of the Opiumregie, the fol-
lowing table is revealing:



















770 1845.39 826 1316.49 615 1332.5
Bengal 
opium
900 1545.74 800 1460.89 950.5 1380.41
The Dutch bought their opium in Calcutta or in the Levant. The auction 
in Calcutta gave as a normal auction price 1225 guilders per pikul—chest. 
On top of this 10% could be added for all sorts of costs (freight, insurance, 
17 E. van Luĳk, J. van Ours, p. 4 note 7.  
18 E. Vanvugt (1995), p. 394; in Idem (1985), p. 360 there is a quite diffferent text. 
19 J. Wiselius (1886), p. 144. The average price of a chest between 1873 and 1883 was 
£125 14 sh. This equaled more or less 1225 Dutch guilders (Idem, note 1).
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etc.) which makes a price per chest in Batavia of nearly 1350 guilders. In 
a previous table I indicated the prices the opium farmers had to pay: on 
average 140 guilders per catty. Since one chest—pikul contains 100 catty, 
the Dutch received on average 14,000 guilders. This is nine to ten times 
the amount they had paid in Calcutta! There was no other product which 
gave this kind of profĳit margin. Wiselius, one of the most astute defenders 
of the opium trade, is not satisfĳied even with this result. He proposed 
depressing the Calcutta price by at least 50 guilders per chest, so that 
Batavia could cash at least 50,000 guilders more.20
For the period 1900 to 1940 we are also able to provide an assessment. 
This period is characterized by modernization in all respects: industrial-
ization in factories, the full application of chemical-pharmaceutical 
knowledge, and rigorous distribution methods. To meet the needs of a 
modernized opium business, the Dutch government took a progressive 
step by establishing the Opiumregie. The following table provides the opi-
um profĳits in a diffferent way than in a previous chapter.
Table 23. Contribution of the Opiumregie to the Government Budget in the East Indies, 













1914 35.0 281.7 13.5 26.7 76
1915 32.6 309.7 11.2 25.2 77
1916 35.3 343.1 10.8 28.4 80
1917 38.2 360.1 11.4 30.4 80
1918 38.8 399.7 10.2 30.1 78
1919 42.5 543.1  8.2 33.2 78
1920 53.6 756.4  7.5 41.6 78
1921 53.3 791.8  7.1 42.1 79
1922 44.2 752.6  6.2 34.5 78
1923 37.6 650.4  6.1 30.1 80
1924 35.3 717.9  5.1 28.1 80
1925 36.6 753.8  5.2 28.7 78
1926 37.7 807.9  5.2 29.1 77
1927 40.6 779.1  5.7 31.4 77
1928 42.8 835.9  5.7 34.6 81
20 Idem, p. 145.
21 S. Chandra (2010). The fĳigures for 1934-1940 are derived from the combined accounts 















1929 40.9 848.5  5.3 32.7 80
1930 34.5 755.6  5.3 27.1 79
1931 25.3 652.0  4.6 19.0 75
1932 17.3 501.8  4.5 12.3 71
1933 12.7 460.6  3.7  8.6 68
1934 11.1 455.2  3.2  7.2 65
1935  9.5 466.7  2.6  6.1 64
1936  8.9 537.8  2.2  5.7 64
1937 11.5 575.4  2.5  7.7 67
1938 11.9 597.1  2.6 8 67
1939 11.5 663.4 1.7  8.6 75
1940 11.7 N.A  N.A  8.5 72
In an older encyclopedia the Dutch still accused the British in the 20th-
century for all their own opium misery. This was largely motivated by jeal-
ousy that they themselves could not trade twenty million kilo of opium a 
year. This was quite hypocritical because the Dutch government distrib-
uted at least 150,000 kilo a year at that time, which increased to 200,000 
in 1920.22 
In addition, several reports state the substantial consumption in Java 
and Madura alone: in 1909 there were already 146,723 native opium buy-
ers, of which about 80,000 were regular ones.23 With this business the gov-
ernment earned no less than 45 million guilders gross. Later it increased 
the price and lowered the production so that it still earned 35 million guil-
ders net in 1929 with only 57,000 kilo. And it could tell the motherland and 
the anti-opium lobby that it had decreased production. In addition, the 
Dutch bureaucrats made their usual deals with the opium “smugglers”, 
who managed a substantial “illicit” opium trade without much interfer-
ence from the authorities.
Other interesting aspects can be derived from the 1816-1915 table above: 
for instance, that the Java War occurred in the period 1825-1830. This war 
was also an opium war.24 During these years the opium profĳit did not 
22 Encyclopaedie, 1934 edition, p. 1255. 
23 T. Addens, p. 84.
24 See NHM story above; also C. Holtzappel in: H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 147 fff.
Table 23. Continued
profits 371
decrease, and directly after its ending, it increased quickly to pay for the 
devastation and to renew the colonial profĳitability. 
Half a century later the democratic government in the Netherlands 
introduced the Opiumregie in the colony to prevent smuggling. As usual, 
all possible rationalizations were given to cloak the profĳit motive, includ-
ing the medical and religious arguments—“we can help the addicts better 
now”—that went down well in the motherland. But the “smuggling” also 
continued, not the least because it became dominated by American and 
British traders, and the system itself was as fraudulent as possible. This 
monopoly position allowed the prices to be manipulated as Wertheim 
already concluded in his autobiographical remarks:
Was the price decreased, the aim was trying to avoid the use of smuggled 
opium among ordinary folk. If increased, than the aim was quite the same!’25 
In addition, the colonial government had to cope with an increased anti-
opium sentiment and action in the motherland. That was in fact a reason 
why the Dutch copied the system of 100% government monopoly from 
their main competitor in the realm, the French. Now it was easier to 
announce to the motherland that the production had decreased “again”. 
One of its main efffects is given in the following table of data for selected 
years.
Table 24. Dutch trade and Yield in Opium in the East Indies, 1914-193226 
Year Opium sold in kg Yield in millions of 
guilders
Yield per kg in guilders
1914 98 810 35 354
1919 91 714 42 458
1924 50 342 35 695
1929 58 806 41 697
1932 24 427 17 696
 
A conservative estimate about the opium turnover and profĳits in the years 
1914-1940 states that the Dutch government made a net opium profĳit of 
625.7 million current guilders in a turnover of 810.9 million; for every 
guilder of cost, there was nearly three guilders in profĳit! And these costs 
included, for instance, the lucrative salaries of many Dutch offfĳicials.
25 In his preface to E. Vanvugt (1985; 1995), p. 11.
26 Adjusted from the table in J.W. Gerritsen, p. 65.
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Notwithstanding the strongly increased price per kilo (and, therefore, 
greatly increased smuggling), the overall yield for the state decreased. 
This occurred in the years of the Great Depression (1930-1936), but the 
sales increased again to 1940. Offfĳicially, the government sold at least 
12,000 kilo in 1935 and 20,000 kilo in 1940. 
The last remark about opium profĳits brings the above data into the 
right perspective: they concern only the initial analysis of three hundred 
years of opium revenues of some Dutch government agencies (and its pre-
decessors) in the East Indies archipelago (ca. 1650 to 1940). What are not 
mentioned yet are the profĳits of private individuals as seen, for instance, in 
the Amphioen Society, which concern multi-million amounts. The third 
kind of opium profĳits are related to private companies. The best example 
is the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (NHM). Here, again, 
the opium profĳits can only be estimated at “several hundred million guil-
ders”. In NHM-related publications one cannot fĳind a proper analysis nor 
an assessment of the opium trade between the East Indies and China. It 
was the Chinese government which in 1906 complained about the sub-
stantial opium imports from the ‘Dutch East-Indies’!27 One could also 
refer to private companies like the Dutch cocaine and heroin factories in 
the years after 1900.
Therefore, in addition to the assessment of the government profĳits or 
revenues over ca. 350 years (in total nearly 86 billion in today’s euros), one 
could estimate the opium profĳits from the two other sources at 0.5-0.75 
billion or 20-30 billion guilders, respectively. Certainly until about 1950 
this makes the Dutch, without any doubt, the largest opium dealers in 
world history: not only Shanghai or Hong Kong weare built on opium, 
Amsterdam and The Hague were as well. 





At the end of this History of the Dutch Opium Problem, it is good to realize 
that there were also Dutch people who criticized the imperial and colo-
nial projects of the Dutch. In the 17th-century one of the very few VOC 
intellectuals, Reaal, tried to change the dominant drive of his organiza-
tion. Above, the famous dictum of Multatuli is quoted as one of the harsh-
est judgments of the colonial regime. He was certainly not alone, but the 
criticism was often rather ambiguous. 
Take the following quotation relative to the Dutch “public opinion” in 
Holland in the 19th and early 20th-century. People who all were highly 
responsible for the colonial regime and its narco-military policy acted like 
they were characters from Multatuli:
The arguments of Dirk van Hogendorp [1761-1822], who called the opium 
monopoly one of the most hurtful and injurious features that dishonor the 
administration of the Dutch East Indies; of Minister of the Colonies Rochus-
sen [1832-1912], who put opium on a line with the plague; of Minister of 
the Colonies Loudon [1824-1900], who classed it with poison; of Minister 
of the Colonies Sprenger Van Eyck [1842-1907], who spoke of its use as a 
great evil; of Minister of Colonies Keuchenius [1822-1893], who character-
ized it as a means to debauch and ruin the population—all these arguments 
could not prevail, even with those who brought them forward when their 
colonial politics needed some moral leavening, against the consideration 
that there is money in opium.1 
This is an efffective demonstration of the immanent hypocrisy of the 
Dutch colonial elite vis-à-vis opium. Scheltema from Yale University, 
who wrote this in 1907, concluded from this ambivalent behavior that 
the Dutch colonial spirit ‘is the spirit of trade’ and in italics: ‘Trade 
before everything! ... at present no less than in the time of the East India 
Company ... a rather flimsy foundation … not developed into something of 
broader conception, more in keeping with the great movement of expan-
sion on principles ... a very limited circle of thought ...’, and so on. 
1 J. Scheltema, p. 248; the life data in the quotation are given by me.
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As alternatives and worthy successors, attention turned to the Ameri-
cans in the Philippines or the Japanese in Formosa. Part 5 is devoted to 
both “New Imperialists”. Here it can be said that if they are the alternative 
to those old Dutch colonial rulers, we should not be surprised to be con-
fronted with exaggerated arguments, concerning a change from bad to 
worse.
Scheltema sufffered from a symptomatic ideological blindness.2 He 
really thought that only the money-making of criminal individuals was 
the motor behind all the opium trafffĳic and that the government only had 
to eliminate them to solve the opium problem. Notwithstanding his 
severe and honest criticism of the Dutch colonial leadership, it is remark-
able that he did not conclude from this that colonialism or the colonial 
government was a main part of The Opium Problem. Therefore, he expect-
ed the solution to lie in new-style colonial governments.
It is, furthermore, untenable to accuse trade as such for creating “evil” 
(at present, similar critics use ‘the market’). This resembles the medieval 
accusations of mainstream theologians. It avoids seeing another serious 
problem in the undermining of all trade through the widespread monopo-
lization of trade (nearly a contradiction in terms). This made free trade 
impossible and, therefore, trade on an equal and normal basis of supply 
and demand with indigenous people. 
Scheltema’s main target was the Opiumregie. This was a monopoly 
institution par excellence. In his daily newspaper, the Bataviaansch 
Nieuwsblad (September 1902), he criticized the government for its ‘hypo-
critical’ and ‘immoral’ behavior.3 This led to his imprisonment for three 
months. He took revenge in his AJS article, which had a great impact in 
the international press at the time. It had repercussions in the Dutch 
Parliament in Holland as well. The colonial bureaucrats reacted, however, 
in the obvious way: those members of Parliament had no knowledge of 
the Indies and knew nothing about opium. A reduction of the opium con-
2 Idem, note p. 250, 251. J. Scheltema was born in 1855 in Macassar (Celebes) where 
his father was “president” of the local Court of Justice. He served the Dutch government in 
Singapore and elsewhere; became a journalist in 1883; editor of several papers in Java; in 
1903 ‘imprisoned for the publication of some observations on the opium policy of the 
Dutch government, too true to be tolerated in a Dutch dependency’. After his release, he 
settled for a year at Yale University, and succeeded in publishing there a long article in a 
scholarly journal without any relevant academic background. Anyway, his article was 
apparently accepted in the AJS, because it aims to provide the American government with 
advice on how (not) to handle the opium problem in the Philippines.  
3 J. Rush, p. 237.
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sumption or production of opium (heroin, morphine) and cocaine were 
not envisaged. 
Not only in Scheltema’s writings, but generally, the criticism was not 
directed at the monopoly position of state institutions: if there had been 
free trade in opium in the East Indies, the price of opium would have col-
lapsed; the widespread knowledge of the connotation “opium = colonial 
repression” had seriously undermined this market thanks to the anti-
Dutch sentiments.
 2.
For a world history of opium, nothing is so important as the Dutch assault 
on the East. In hindsight, it remains, possibly, the only fact of world his-
torical importance concerning the Dutch colonization of the East, as the 
Dutch slave trade was for the colonization of the Americas and Africa. 
Apart from some architectural locations of memory, nothing is left of the 
realm once proudly called the Dutch Empire. 
There never was such a “thing”: from the beginning to the end (1600-
1949), the leading concept and practice of this venture was, indeed, exploi-
tation in horror scenarios. The silences in between two events were only 
recuperation time. 
The VOC was satisfĳied with a network of coastal settlements that inter-
fered in the afffairs of the indigenous powers in order to exploit the avail-
able worthwhile agricultural and mining products in exchange for opium 
and fear. A fleet efffectively connected these settlements. The many mas-
sacres permanently created the fear on which the exploitation was based. 
The unexpected hongi trips to destroy agricultural products, in order to 
keep the monopoly price as high as possible and competitors at home, are 
the most symptomatic methods of the general exploitation; they were 
guerrillas against the indigenous peasants.
This imperial or hegemonic construction was the VOC’s strength and 
weakness: it had no friends, and its enemies were weak. It perished large-
ly through its own incompetence, internal corruption, antagonism 




The substantial investments in capital and manpower the Dutch used in 
the East were only directed to the creation of “monopoly profĳits”: quite 
symbolic for this was the highest possible price-setting of a worthless 
product like opium. 
Profĳit-making (whatever its defĳinition) was and is still inherent in 
every supply and demand situation in product exchange. Profĳit was also 
the aim of the VOC, EIC and all other European colonial ventures. 
However, they mostly had no products which were of interest to the 
 indigenous Asian people: thus, there could be no normal trade, supply 
and demand. Only demand was left, with an iron fĳist.
To use this last instrument was “easy” because all of them nurtured the 
astonishing arrogance and dangerous presumption of having the right 
and ability to claim large parts of a foreign world as their own property. 
And all of them used the scum of the European nations to do their dirty 
work in the tropical environments. And all of them were harassed by seri-
ous internal corruption and criminality even from the point of view of 
current value systems like Protestantism and Catholicism.
There were, however, marked diffferences between VOC and EIC. First, 
there was a very short period of free (pirate) trade, symptomatically called 
“pre”-companies, in the VOC case. This lasted about a century and a half 
for the EIC, only about a decade of two for the VOC.
In the EIC case the whole project was organized in a dominant way by 
the British aristocratic elite; in the Dutch case mostly by petty bourgeois 
bookkeepers. A European so-called “civilizing mission”—whatever its 
meaning nowadays—was a leading British activity much earlier and lon-
ger, and rescued the English language from oblivion. The more “Catholic” 
Anglicanism was practically more tolerant than the fanatic Dutch 
Calvinists or die-hard Catholic Portuguese and Spaniards. 
There was also the following main diffference . Already in 1602 the pow-
erful Calvinist VOC arrived on the imperialist scene. This was from the 
beginning a military-, state- and God-supported attempt to create lucra-
tive opportunities for monopoly profĳit-making. It took more than a cen-
tury before the English state started a relevant strong support of the EIC 
after which, indeed, colonization could begin. 
Contrary to the EIC, the VOC had from the beginning all the traits of a 
national project with a strong military-royal influence to destroy The 
Enemy (= the rest of the world). Fanatically, it traded only according the 
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principle “deliver your products, or I shoot” and the principle “I must have 
the monopoly position”. The basic octroy (1602) fĳixed this position, which 
was confĳirmed time and again. The VOC, indeed, ‘acted the part of the 
Prince’ as a contemporary commentator remarked. In a memorandum of 
1741 a future Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, Imhofff, told his 
readers that the VOC was 
no mere Merchant, but also represents the Power of the Dutch Nation, and 
that whereas it journeys and trades in the former capacity, it is in the latter 
capacity that it is established there; to achieve its true goals the Company 
must assure its existence in both capacities and on the strength of both 
capacities, so tightly is the political interwoven with the mercantile, and 
vice versa.4 
This resulted in a continuous war against all European competitors and 
indigenous producers.
 4.
The above formed the breeding ground for producing, trading and dis-
tributing on a large scale a product which was known to be bad for the 
health and mind of the users: opium. Before this, opium was either used 
only in medicine in Europe or medicine plus luxury in a very limited 
 number of Middle Eastern or other Asian scenes (royal). The Portuguese 
 used it as a present in order to smooth their trade. The Dutch continued 
with this but made something like a cash crop of opium (amphioen), with 
which they created The Opium Problem in world history. Opium was, 
however, much more than this. 
Slavery and opium deliveries were the methods to keep a willing labor 
force available to do the heavy work in the fĳields and mines until far into 
the 20th-century. Opium also had the “function”: to keep the indigenous 
elite dependent. From the 1660s until about 1950 Asian opium was seldom 
shipped to Europe, but remained the most profĳitable Asian product and 
trade. The third function was: opium as a substitute for money and as 
product for barter (opium for pepper, etc.). 
4 Quoted in R. Vos, p. 1.  
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 5.
The Dutch were the fĳirst to discover all these advantages of opium, and 
they were the fĳirst to push opium into Asian countries on a massive scale. 
It was the model for the British Empire in its treatment of China. By doing 
this, the VOC became the unbeatable and fĳirst international narco-mili-
tary power from about 1660 onwards, as it conquered the Portuguese 
along the Malabar Coast. This remained the case until 1800 when the 
English took over this “honorable job” and the Dutch had to accept a very 
profĳitable secondary position. They proved that the mutual opium com-
petition of the European imperialists (mainly Dutch, English and French) 
formed the “engine” by which this could proliferate into the present world 
Opium Problem. 
 6.
Not only the external competition is important, but for the VOC so is the 
internal one. It concerns the internal mutual competition between 
Holland and the East Indies. The VOC and later the “state” elite in Holland 
were jealous of the VOC and “state” elite in the East Indies for the enor-
mous capital one could accumulate there personally. This antagonism 
formed a strong internal dynamic for the Dutch leadership in this imperi-
alist and colonialist venture. The latter, however, had a rather autono-
mous fĳield of operation and profĳit, the inter-Asian trade. This was difffĳicult 
to control by VOC Holland, which was concerned only with the voyages 
outward and home-bound.
The most pernicious project “to make peace” between both groups was 
the Amphioen-Opium Society. This brought both factions of the Dutch 
leadership and shareholders multi-million profĳits in the 18th-century, 
sanctioned by the House of Orange, one of its largest profĳiteers. 
This constellation remained fully intact, was even perfected and more 
strongly legitimated, after the VOC perished through internal and exter-
nal circumstances, and a new Dutch Colonial State was invented and 
established. Narco-military exploitation remained the leading practice 
and principle. This was immediately apparent in the House of Orange 
constructions and participation in the Royal Dutch Trading Society (in fact 
a much extended Amphioen Society) or (Royal) Billiton Mining Company 
and later in (Royal) Unilever and Shell. 
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 7.
The post-VOC regime was in fact a construction of the Dutch, French 
(Napoleonic Holland, Daendels) and English (Rafffles’ occupation of Java). 
The result was a continuation of the VOC regime as occupier of the East 
Indies, but now aimed at a full occupation and colonization of the whole 
archipelago. The Dutch state itself became responsible and acted more 
extensively as narco-military occupier of the East Indies. The penetration 
with opium was now systematized and extended to all corners of this 
archipelago. 
Around 1900 it was again extended by the world’s largest coca leaf and 
cocaine production and trade and a state monopoly on the industrial pro-
duction and distribution of opium (Opiumregie). Without doubt, there 
was no other product in the Dutch Asian history from 1600-1949 which 
can compete with this lucrative drug business. The end of this Dutch opi-
um history was also the end of the Dutch influence in the world. 
8.
“How the snake could bite in its own tail” is perfectly demonstrated in the 
Dutch opium history after 1950. This cannot be discussed here, but a pro-
vocative view on the future could be the following.
Without its lucrative colonies, the Netherlands could continue its eco-
nomic life largely as a harbor region of Germany. In the 1960s, a kind of 
cultural revolution took place in the Netherlands more than elsewhere, in 
the heavy smoke and smell of marihuana, hashish, opium, cocaine, LSD, 
mescaline and many other aphrodisiacs. They all were (and are, more or 
less) publicly available.5 And since the 1980s the Netherlands has become 
known in Europe for a new market concept to provide consumers in spe-
cial shops with nearly everything they need to forget the serious dullness, 
etc. of Dutch culture. 
In the meantime the old rice, rubber and coca plantations in Tempo 
Doeloe were replaced by extensive hashish plantations inside Holland 
itself, and the original Dutch cocaine production is now replaced by 
extensive ecstacy (MDMA) and other chemical drug laboratories. 
 
5 See H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 215-225.





* The name Indochina is used as a general name for the large southern “peninsula” 
between China and Indonesia with the present countries Vietnam, Laos, Kampucheia 
(Cambodia), Thailand (Siam), Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia and the Republic of Singa-
pore. Because the French assault on this part of Asia dates offfĳicially from 1867, this date is 
also the beginning of the opium history in this part of the study. French Indochina is, of 
course, much smaller. In 1887 it was formed by Annam, Tonkin and Cochinchina (together 
the present Vietnam), the kingdom of Cambodia and Laos. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
OPIUM IN AND FOR LA DOUCE FRANCE
It is well-known that the Western methods to rule their so-called colonies 
difffered between a direct and an indirect form.1 The fĳirst resulted mostly 
in the construction making the colony part of the motherland (metro-
polis), like La France d’outre-mer in which all inhabitants became French-
men. In practical terms, they were second-class citizens, but formally 
French men. The Portuguese went even further and strongly advocated a 
racial mixture (luso-tropicalism).2 This kind of political and racial integra-
tion nearly never happened in the Anglo-Saxon, Dutch or American colo-
nies. In them, a rather large cultural and political gap remained and was 
cultivated between the rulers-perpetrators, the indigenous rulers and 
conquered-victims (racial segregation). This is the background to why the 
Opium Problem also took a diffferent course in the various Western colo-
nies.
Next, there is the not unimportant fact that the French colonized 
Southeast Asia–the main opium source or location after the 1950s–rela-
tively late. They started after the middle of the 19th-century when the 
colonial exploitation was already in full swing elsewhere in the realm. The 
integrative moment is probably the reason why, more than other “whites”, 
the French expatriates popularized East-Asian opium consumption in its 
own European capital as an oriental luxury. In many illegal ways they 
extended the colonial markets by making opium smoking socially accept-
able in France and Europe.3 In the USA opium was popularized fĳirst as a 
medicine in local “pills and powders markets”, but remained inimical to 
“The East”. In France it became a “tool” in the elite communication, an 
obvious element of the orientalism and chinoiserie hype. There are more 
1 C. Trocki (1999b), p. 90 fff. uses a clever study of Furnivall (my edition is from 1948) to 
demonstrate the diffferences. Indeed, in daily practice ‘there was no sharp line between 
direct and indirect rule’. This is not the place to discuss or criticize Furnivall’s approach. In 
my view, Furnivall does not understand the legal status with its serious consequences. To 
this aspect I refer only in the main text. 
2 See my analysis of the Portuguese–Mozambique relations around 1800 in: H. Derks 
(ed., 1989), p. 63 fff.
3 See, for instance, ch. 8 the export from France into England during the 19th-century.
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diffferences, how the “bite of the snake” was given and received, but these 
are the most noteworthy.
To show the main elements of this boomerang efffect there is no better 
way than to describe in this fĳirst chapter the French opium landscape 
from around 1900. 
Parisian Fumes
In the 1901 issue of a Journal of Mental Science a review under the heading 
‘Opium-smokers’ runs as follows:
Opium smoking seems to be on the increase in Paris; and, as the smoking 
is carried on in private apartments, those who reside in them become intox-
icated by the fumes. This occurred in the case of a young woman, who 
prepared her husband’s pipes, so that a craving was induced. To obtain sleep 
she became dependent upon opium-smoking and the atmosphere created 
by another smoker. Very soon symptoms of intoxication appeared-hysteri-
cal convulsions, neurasthenic anxiety, paralysis of will, excessive timidity, 
etc. Treated by hypnotic suggestion, she gave up opium-smoking and got 
well. Bérillon observes incidentally that the cat of the house and a servant 
who lived in the room exhibited signs of craving after the opium-smoking 
had ceased there.4 
The inhabitants on the other side of the Channel must be lucky, since 
being near or handing a bottle to a laudanum drinker did not addict 
bystanders like the Parisian fumes apparently did. But if at that time a 
Parisienne had to prepare her husband’s opium pipes, it can be assumed 
that this is a custom in a wealthy family. And we can be assured that sev-
eral oriental paraphernalia were present in the “opium room”, creating an 
addictive, oriental atmosphere.
Of course, laudanum drinkers or opium (heroin) syringe users like De 
Quincey, Coleridge, Oscar Wilde and Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes 
gave opium its relative status among the cultural elite in the Anglo-Saxon 
world as well. Their opium must have been largely imported from Turkey 
and processed in England into laudanum and heroin. Is that why De 
Quincey or Wilde so often expressed their anti-orientalism? Romantic 
exaggerations were everywhere, but there must have been a strong rela-
tion between these negative feelings and the rather aggressive and popu-
4 Found on http://bjp.rcpsych.org/cgi/pdf.
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lar oriental horror and murder thrillers with sinister Chinese mandarins 
(Fu-Manchu novels of Sax Rohmer).5 
The Japanese mostly received better treatment among the Dutch, 
Americans and English (see ch. 27). This continued even after World War 
II with highlights like James Bond fĳilms (1967, You only live twice) or the 
Hollywood one in which the ideal-typical American hero, Robert 
Mitchum, even offfered a fĳinger to a mafĳia boss in a Japanese ritual as com-
pensation for American guilt (The Yakuza, 1975). 
In France, however, smokers like Baudelaire (1821-1867), Rimbaud, le 
Club des Haschischins with its famous writers Hugo and Balzac, nearly all 
authors from Mallarmé through Cocteau (1889-1963), the Surrealists or 
Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), all made la France ‘douce’ from the opium 
fumes. They all nurtured a rather positive, romantic orientalism. More 
revealing: laudanum drinking was known, but most of them smoked opi-
um or hashish, a custom which came from the Far East, in this case the 
French Indochina or the French concession in Shanghai. Probably, as in 
England, the French opium for the daily use of the common folk, lauda-
num, originated from the Levant, but this is not well documented. 
From Paris, the cultural capital of the Western world, the seduction 
was irresistible for many who wanted to belong to the ‘scene’. Early French 
fĳilms like Dandy-Pacha (1908) or Le rêve d’un fumeur d’opium (1908) were 
made; numerous novels like Les Fumeurs d’Opium or Lélie, fumeuse 
d’opium (1911) mythologized the drug, while composers like Berlioz com-
posed a ‘symphonie fantastique’ on the psychedelic adventures of French 
opium users.6 
Indeed, the orientalism and exoticism surrounding opium were soon 
mixed up with many kinds of sexual connotations and practices. Opium 
dens in, for instance, Montmartre were mostly exotically furnished and 
expensive meeting points for the cultural elite. France in particular was 
known to harbor a great number of opium users.7 Reports at the time 
claimed that in 1901 Paris had up to 1200 opium-smoking establishments. 
5 G. Lee, p. 4 fff..
6 Many relevant French titles are mentioned in B. Hodgson, p. 87 -101; M. de Kort, 
p. 120. On the highly interesting website http://jclandry.free.fr many documents from the 
French opium scene are collected. Many examples refer directly to the French Asian colo-
nies. At the moment I am correcting this text the ‘symphony fantastique’ is performed in 
a concert hall of drugs capital Amsterdam (October 2011).
7 For the following, including the quotation, see www.salon.com/archives/welcome/
history2.html.
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A cosmopolitan atmosphere of the big city, still undisturbed by rumors of 
revolt, helped increase interest in the new aphrodisiacs. 
Most famous was the Moulin Rouge in Montmartre, already decorated 
in glittering lights in the 1890s. Visitors had to pass through scarlet-col-
ored halls and enter into an aromatic garden with a giant-sized, mock ele-
phant. This was the ultimate opium den where visitors could indulge in 
their opium-smoking habit. Cabarets and salons like the Cabaret Voltaire 
(Zürich) or the Bohemian Salons existed in most big cities in Europe and 
the United States. Those for the poorer representatives of the cultural 
elite were characterized ‘by lack of money … long hair, loud ranting 
against the bourgeoisie, unruly sexual behavior and copious consumption 
of wine, absinth, opium, hashish and other substances d’abus’. 
The scandals followed on soon afterwards, but they only added to the 
creation of the nimbus. This seduction is still being exported today and 
not only by fashion moguls such as Yves Saint-Laurent, who launched his 
OPIUM perfume recently.8 
“Opium in Europe” was not only an interest of the “seduction industry” 
(from copywriters, movie-makers to Freudianists). Arts and literature 
were important as well. It is not my job to consider the pros and cons of 
addicted poets or fĳiction writers: It is up to literary critics or psychoana-
lysts to decide whether Baudelaire, De Quincey, Poe, etc. became good, 
better or bad writers thanks to opium or another narcotic.9 
One thing is clear: these famous writers made narcotics interesting for 
the elite in Europe and the USA as aphrodisiacs or stimulators of creativ-
ity. Addicted scientists or non-fĳiction writers never received a nimbus as 
in literature or art: Freud, who experimented with cocaine in this period, 
8 A new TV-program on art entertainment in the Netherlands is called “Opium”; a new 
band is called “Opium”, etc.; Jean Cocteau is still mentioned in most opium publications, 
for instance, K. McMahon, X. Paulès, etc. A specifĳic luxury yacht model built in Marseille 
is named “Opium”; the “best” aphrodisiac drink “Sex Opium”; MP3 albums by “Opium 
Jukebox” (Amazon. com) and so on. For the efffects on consumers one can consult “Somni 
Forum”, subtitled with ‘The continuing adventures of the world’s most controversial 
flower, poppies.org.’.
9 The poet Georg Trakl (1887-1914) is apparently the fĳirst well-known modern poet-
addict. The “Opiomaniacs” of the 19th-century smoked the soft opium or took laudanum 
(opium mixed with alcohol; mostly freely available), Trakl started with the heavy opium 
derivatives heroin and morphine, added later cocaine. It may be true that alcoholics do 
live a much shorter life, but it seems to be exceptional for a heroin addict to make it to the 
age of 50. Hayter’s conclusions from her interesting literary comparisons of eight famous 
authors is illuminating: “No clear pattern of opium’s influence on creative writing … has 
emerged from this survey ... They had nothing in common except that they lived in the 
same century, were imaginative writers, and took opium’ (A. Hayter, p. 331).   
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is only of interest to a small coterie of adepts. That was not the case with 
the drugs as such: they became an aim in themselves, of interest later to 
the pharmaceutical industry, psychologists and even secret services.10 
The question here is how did this Parisian environment at the end of 
the 19th-century become “addicted” by opium which could not be har-
vested from the Champs d’Elysées, while referring to the easy life lived by 
the gods. 
The French Pharmaceutical Scene
Around 1900 the rather new pharmaceutical and chemical industry 
already worked in close collaboration with medical scientists, apothecar-
ies, state bureaucrats, and so on in a “health complex”, which had serious 
consequences for other corners of society. Famous names like Merck or 
Bayer industries are mentioned not for their discovery of heroin (1874), 
but for its exploitation.11 The French competition and jealousy were 
fĳierce.
The most important French industrial region became Rhône–Poulenc.12 
It is part of a new, specifĳic, modern and Western scene developed from 
the middle of the 19th-century in West Europe, later in the USA: its young 
European and American history explains how medical products search 
for markets, patients and diseases with all possible consequences.
10 For the 20th-century development after 1945 in this fĳield, see C. van Campen, who 
started with the analysis of the French writers and poets like Baudelaire (Les paradis arti-
fĳiciel, 1860), Gauthier, the Club de Hachichin or the remarkable study of Jean Moreau 
(1845): Du hachisch et de l’aliénation mentale, études psychologiques. The climax of this 
development was the highly controversial LSD experiment with Dutch Holocaust victims 
and the CIA’s MKULTRA project. See http://www.angelfĳire.com/ar2/Handleidingen/
MKULTRA.html.
11 What the relationship was between Freud and the notorious opium and heroin fac-
tory E. Merck (now one of the largest multinationals in the pharmaceutical industry) is 
apparently given in an article by A. Hirschmuller titled “E.Merck and cocaine. On Sigmund 
Freud’s cocaine studies and their relation to the Darmstadt industry”. See: www.cocaine.
org/history/merck.html.  
12 The history of the pharmaceutical industry is of the utmost importance to highlight 
the backgrounds of the drug problem in Europe, the USA and the world. Rhône-Poulenc is 
a combination of 19th-century initiatives in the fĳield: the Poulenc apothecaries from Paris 
with similar entrepreneurs from Lyon. In 1928 they merged, the fĳirst of a long series of 
merges. In 1999 Rhône-Poulenc merged with the German Hoechst AG to form Aventis. 
This in its turn merged in 2004 with Sanofĳi, making Sanofĳi-Aventis at the moment the 
third largest pharmaceutical industry in the world. It must be clear that in this volume this 
side of the history cannot be dealt with. E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 286-294, 322 fff.  
chapter twenty-two388
To create patients and diseases in response to the need for multina-
tionals to survive and expand was not understood in the 19th-century, 
and probably not before 1945.13 As in other countries at the beginning of 
that century, it was the individual performance and leadership which pre-
vailed. After the Second World War, however, social and economic insti-
tutionalization led to increased centralization and monopolization of 
markets. A few remarks and details about this development in France will 
sufffĳice. 
The French Enlightenment must have had many efffects in its country 
of origin because French chemists, apothecaries or medical scientists dis-
covered one useful drug and pain-killer after another: in 1804 morphine 
(Séguin and others), in 1809 nicotine (Posselt a.o.), in 1819 cafffeine; codeine 
was directly “isolated” from opium and atropine from belladonna (ca. 
1832). A related compound was chloroform (1831), its use doubled from 
1855 to 1875; ether trebled in the same period; chloral, introduced in 1869, 
was consumed more than chloroform six years later. The consumption of 
morphine increased from 250 grams in 1855 to ten kilo in twenty years’ 
time. Opium was the most popular among the traditional pain-killers. It 
continued to be employed in quantities of 150 kilo per year.14 
Remarkable fĳigures, because—as discussed in ch. 8—the French opi-
um export to England was, for instance, already about 11,000 lbs in 1833. 
This strongly decreased, but in 1870 there was again a French export of 
that magnitude. After this year this import exploded, with even several 
years of about 60,000 pounds.15 
13 Of course, it is not appropriate to discuss here modern developments in the phar-
maceutical (and related chemical) industry, but the present scandals involving these 
industries are rather alarming: through the well-known international channels one is able 
to create unnecessary mass vaccinations against rather innocent flues, etc.; forbidden 
tests of new products are carried out in Third World countries; very expensive HIV medi-
cines are distributed in a monopolized relationship, while very cheap medicines are avail-
able; and so on. In the UK the activities and many publications of Charles Medawar and 
the Social Audit organization give very detailed information. Not by accident is the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust sponsor. The history of this trust is strongly connected to the 
anti-opium struggle from the end of the 19th-century. See C. Medawar, B. Freese and 
J. Rowntree. 
14 Th. Zeldin, vol. 2, p. 784 fff.; P. Boussel, H. Bonnemain, p. 206 fff., E. Kremers, 
G. Urdang, p. 318 fff. Normally only the German inventors are named, like Gaedeke, 
Sertürner, Niemann, Losen and many others (M. de Kort, p. 33 fff.), but the French were as 
important as the English or Americans. They all belonged to an initial phase of a new 
industrialization which expanded globally from the 1880s onwards. 
15 V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. 272. Zeldin should have mentioned whether everything 
was re-exported (except 300 lbs). Probably there is a misunderstanding in how “opium” is 
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Zeldin is more reliable in fĳinding a connection between ‘an enormous 
increase in drug-taking’ in the Second Empire and ‘a recourse to the asy-
lums’. Indeed, the number of ‘madmen’ in asylums increased from about 
8,000 (1838) to 88,000 (1900). The French professionalization of medical 
practitioners resulted not so much in better health (environment) for the 
common people, as in new and more profĳitable defĳinitions and institu-
tions. As elsewhere, this professionalization of the medical fĳield was not 
only the result of a fĳight for a higher status and remuneration, but also of 
an extension of the “sphere of influence”: the expulsion of the lay healers 
and the gradual monopolization of the health system.16 This included a 
monopoly on the prescription of opiates, cocaine and other poisons. 
The asylums were one of the bulwarks in this system: state and medical 
interests merged here. Mostly old people were transported to them, who 
could not obtain a place in the quickly overcrowded old people’s home in 
their villages and regions, if they were available at all. According to the 
medical personnel, old people are only in need of tranquilizers, for which 
hashish was mostly chosen. The doctor-patient relation in the northern 
villages is brilliantly described in Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. I do not 
remember whether any form of drug use was known in her village: Emily 
took arsenic and not opium to kill herself.
Cannabis (hashish) was chosen by Jean Moreau of a Parisian hospital 
in his publication Du haschish et de l’aliénation mentale (1845).17 Moreau 
could rely on a certain tradition, because during the Napoleonic occupa-
tion of Egypt, the intoxicating property of cannabis was discovered. Back 
in France, authorities were quick to impose heavy penalties on selling, 
using or trafffĳicking in cannabis. For Moreau, these rules did not apply.
The “doctors” in the villages were not familiar with it, however, and 
their urban colleagues were probably still afraid of the authorities, 
because in the urban hospitals alcohol is used excessively:
... in 1855-1875 the consumption of alcohol in Paris hospitals rose from 
1,270 to 37,578 litres and that of red wine from 17,000 to 163,000 litres-
though the number of their patients remained the same.18
The “doctors” and their helpers became very thirsty with all those “insane” 
peoples or the patients instead of restoring them to health. This excessive 
defĳined here. Is Z. referring to 150 liter of laudanum? And does this require 11,000 lbs 
“opium”?
16 M. de Kort, p. 37, 43.
17 V. Berridge, G. Edwards, p. 212.
18 Th. Zeldin, idem, p. 785.
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alcohol consumption apparently was the result of the warnings of other 
scholars who stated that cannabis was the cause of insanity. 
To understand what happens in France one can depart from two 
important phenomena: the widespread distribution of drugs for recre-
ational purposes, and the emancipation or “isolation” of a health complex 
as a monopoly.
The fĳirst leads nearly automatically to a consumer, addict and patient 
orientation. In practice, this is followed by the establishment of a whole 
gamut of assistance and healer institutions, let alone criminal investiga-
tors, drug departments of the police and entertainment industry (see 
above). 
As told, opium and hashish gradually became popular for recreational 
purposes among the elite already at the beginning of the 19th-century. 
This development quickened after the 1840s. With the introduction of the 
hypodermic syringe (ca. 1850), morphine became the painkiller of choice 
for civilian and military doctors, but also the drug of choice for the bour-
geoisie. Twenty years later everybody talked about the morphinomanie, 
morphine addiction. The doctors, who were largely responsible for this, 
had created new patients by curing the morphine addiction with cocaine 
and heroin.19 Is this introduction of stronger and more dangerous drugs 
done on purpose or simply through ignorance? The latter is difffĳicult to 
believe, and the former an unbelievable assault on humanity. The only 
innocent efffect was the proliferation of a whole lexicon of addictive 
manies. 
The second development is much less spectacular but, in my view, 
more important because it concerns the origins or roots of the Opium 
Problem. A new phenomenon is hidden behind what has been discussed 
so far: the legal power of “people in a white coat” to negate the freedom of 
individuals and to lock up people for short or long periods without any 
form of lawsuit, trial or even obligatory consultations. Just the judgment 
of some medical man with a limited knowledge about the victim and his/
her “disease” was enough for this far-reaching execution. Many scandals 
and accusations of trade with “lunatics” for asylums were unavoidable. 
However, the new drug scene and the manies in addition threatened the 
whole of La Douce France with much more spectacular cases. 
As in England, this “white coat” power developed into a monopoly for 
the whole “professional health complex”. To strengthen this position, the 
19 H. Padwa, p. 341.
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same policy was used as all power groups aspiring to a monopoly, like 
churches, state bureaucrats or the military: to produce fear in order to 
advertise oneself as the savior of the nation; once this is acknowledged, 
the bill must be paid:
By the 1880s doctors were beginning to condemn these drugs as agents of 
degeneration, capable of wreaking chaos on both the individual and social 
bodies if allowed to spread. Both a sign and a catalyst of medical and social 
decay, drug abuse needed to be stopped before it, like a variety of other 
degenerative behaviors and conditions, spread and facilitated the physical 
and moral decline of the nation.20 
The most positive thing one can say about this is that the doctors who 
opened Pandora’s Box did warn us that it was opened. The practical con-
sequence was that the consequent health complex, facilitating both the 
perpetrators and their victims’ helpers, became strongly economically 
interested in the continuation and expansion of the “scene”: morphine, 
heroin, cocaine ‘broke out of the doctor’s offfĳice’ and took hold as a recre-
ational drug in select Paris salons and brasseries by the late 1880s. Once 
the fĳirst reliable statistics about addiction were available, the situation 
became clear:
In the 1920s there was a great increase in it: Paris is said to have had 80,000 
cocaine addicts in 1924, but they were not otherwise criminals. The con-
sumption of drugs fell drastically after that (80 kilogrammes of heroin was 
the offfĳicial estimate in 1939, 12 kg in 1950) without obvious results [on 
criminality].21 
Another consequence was that in France the medical profession never 
abandoned its most prestigious, old-fashioned, absolute power. There 
was apparently no need for improvements, authority was enough: the 
opium preparation belladonna was still prescribed as a cure for colds in 
the 1960s.22 
20 H. Padwa, p. 342.
21 Th. Zeldin, Idem, p. 911.
22 Certainly not for the health of the French population as Zeldin’s analysis shows, in 
which the French remained far below the health levels in other Western countries. See 
Th. Zeldin, vol. 2, p. 630-636. In nearly every respect France lagged behind: it was in the 
1960s ‘that medication was drastically revised and put on a more scientifĳic basis’ (Idem, 
p. 636), but not for belladonna. 
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Drugs from abroad
The dimensions of the French Opium Problem at the time must have 
made many authorities quite uneasy. One main source of unease was the 
troubles between the Treasury and the Colonial Offfĳices. They were wor-
ried not only about the growing anti-opium movement in Europe, but 
much more the growing costs of the colonial administrations, which were 
urged to become self-sufffĳicient, to keep their opium for themselves and to 
stop making trouble. A few French examples will sufffĳice.
In 1907/08 a scandal arose when a navy ship, La Nive, was involved in a 
serious accident because its offfĳicers were opium addicts. At the same time 
the Ullmo opium scandal reached the world press.23 
This naval offfĳicer smoked 37 pipes a day! According to ‘a well-known 
French admiral’:
Ullmo certainly smoked opium, but no more than his fellow-offfĳicers. Only 
one remedy is possible in the existing state of afffairs. The habit is contracted 
in Indochina by offfĳicers, both old and young, who are assigned to that sta-
tion. The French government has a monopoly on opium there, and draws 
from it a rich source of revenue. If the government is willing to renounce 
its profĳits in this nefarious trade and suppress it altogether, the victims of 
it will be bound to disappear, not only in Indochina, but also in France. This 
is the sole means of rescuing the navy from its present grave menace.24
Neither the government in France nor that in its Asian colonies listened 
to the admiral. The only efffect the Ullmo afffair had was a decree issued in 
1908, which instituted strict controls on the commerce and consumption 
of opium. It did not became an antisemitic row either, because Ullmo 
confĳirmed the accusations. The afffair led to the fĳirst step France took 
against recreational drugs.
Five years later, a report by a French journalist about opium consump-
tion in the French Navy in southern seaports triggered a larger scandal 
(1913). In Toulon, the chief naval port, there were no fewer than 163 opium 
dens which ‘menaced ... the efffectiveness of the Navy as a national 
defense’.25 The author of these words also wrote for an international 
forum:
23 See also G. Thibout, p. 144-149 including the scandal story of the naval offfĳicer Ullmo, 
who was spying to get money and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The scandal was 
compared to the Dreyfus afffair (because Ullmo was an ‘Israelite’) and even with the Mata 
Hari afffair (because in his villa he had to care for a costly prostitute, “la belle Lison”).
24 The New York Times, March 1, 1908. See also Idem, October 26, 1907
25 www. druglibrary.org. An article in The New York Times, April 27, 1913, cabled to New 
York by Mr. Dorcieres, a journalist of Le Matin. It stated that the police and civic authori-
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that this terrible scourge is actually one of the principal State manufactures 
in France’s greatest colony, Indochina, where it is sold under a State guar-
antee as freely as tobacco is here and contributes more than one-sixth of 
the entire revenue of the country ... the annual production of opium in that 
colony is over 260,000 pounds, bringing an average revenue of $2,102,000. 
Through smuggling, however, the consumption is at least double that 
shown by the offfĳicial fĳigures.
They are not very encouraging messages one year before the outbreak of 
the First World War. They would become worse. In the war, suspicions 
and accusations around drugs reproduced the war-psychosis clearly. The 
French deputy, Charles Bernard, declared in 1916:
It seems that the Germans can’t beat us with their fĳire or their asphyxiating 
gas, so now ... they’re using cocaine and morphine to wear us down.26 
Also after the war there was no evidence for such a Teutonic plot. There 
was a simple reason for this. The majority of the drugs in French criminal 
hands came from colonies in North Africa and Indochina. They reached 
France through neutral Switzerland or England. Still, the anti-German 
suspicion about the drug assault on France was wide spread with excla-
mations as:
Given that German pharmaceutical companies like Merck and Bayer were 
among Europe’s leading producers of these substances, why would the Ger-
mans not use their pharmacological capacities to wage a more covert form 
of “chemical warfare”? ... ‘Let’s not forget that factories on the other side of 
the Rhine sent us ... their morphine and cocaine’ ... ‘the extermination of 
the French race by all means is the ultimate goal of the German plan’ ... ‘The 
spread of addiction since the start of hostilities is both disturbing and mys-
terious … if we think about it, it’s easy to see that Germany is behind this.27
The most remarkable thing is that this kind of Germanophobic and 
nationalistic drug discourses remained intact after the war. As late as 
1922 they could be found in French ministerial messages. However, after 
the war it was revealed that the German chemical fĳirms BASF, Bayer and 
Hoechst developed poison gas to be used deliberately for the fĳirst time. A 
researcher and fanatic propagandist of this gas was the Jewish chemist 
Fritz Haber, who came in uniform to test his weapon himself in the 
ties can do nothing: ‘Under the present laws only dealing in opium is a penal offfense. To 
smoke it, to induce others to smoke privately or for money or to possess a large stock of the 
drug is perfectly legal.’
26 Quoted in H. Padwa, p. 340.
27 Idem, p. 347, 348.
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trenches and instructed his generals on how to use it profĳitably. After 
World War II Haber certainly would have been hanged as a war criminal.28
From a French point of view, therefore, such an evil as opium and the 
many other drugs could only have come from abroad, from “The East”, 
whether Germany or the Far East, easily substituting the French colonists 
for “racially degenerated Chinese”.
28 Illustrative enough his wife (1914) and son (1946) both committed suicide thanks to 
his behavior. As a reaction British and French chemists started to develop the same chem-
ical weapons. For Nobel prize winner Haber (1868-1934) see D. Kaufmann (ed.), passim. 
Remarkably enough one can still fĳind rather perverse defenders of Haber (also inventor of 
Zyklon B but, of course, not responsible for its use in Auschwitz, etc.) even in present-day 
Israel, which has still several “Fritz Haber” institutions! Institutions named after Haber’s 
colleague, the Nobel prize winner Debye, were renamed after it was recently discovered 
how he had cooperated with the Nazis to a less serious degree than Haber instructed the 
military in WW-1. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE
THE FRENCH COLONIAL SCENE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Les Français sont incapables de créer des colonies 
prospères.
Quoted from critical Frenchmen 
by J. Wiselius (1878), p. 277
At the end of the 19th-century, the New Imperialists, USA and Japan, 
requested their share, and in Europe the recently formed German Empire 
aspired to have a colonial branch as well, while the Russian Empire tried 
to expand in the Far East. In the end the British Empire had to pay the 
largest price, the French a lesser one, but it played the game less well. The 
USA claimed the Philippines and, in fact, the whole of Central and South 
America as their hunting grounds; Japan claimed large parts of coastal 
China including Korea and Formosa; the European «scramble for Africa» 
divided up this continent, but was too expensive, came too late and did 
not provide a satisfying basis for the usual exploitation. The legitimation 
for these conquests was absent. The consequences of all this was a perma-
nent threat of war in the world culminating in the First World War, 
exhausting all the classical European imperialists.1
Indeed, world imperialism at the end of the 19th-century also deter-
mined the fate of the exploitation of the colonies by means of opium. The 
new fundamental creed was: private profĳits had to be transformed into 
European state bureaucratic monopoly profĳits. The old opium import 
monopolies of most colonial governments (except for the English in 
India) combined with a private farming system were replaced by a “regie-
method”. This made the state monopoly position complete. The only free 
trade in opium was called smuggling. This was paralleled by the warring 
states which now took the lead over private capital; that is to say, only 
1 S. Halperin, p. 7, thirteen large wars were fought between and by colonial powers 
from 1870-1912 just in East Asia, as many as in the previous 70 years. I think that several 
French and Dutch conflicts in Southeast Asia are not considered. Still, they cannot alter 
the impression of the incredible aggressiveness of the Western powers also in this part of 
the world.
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 private monopoly capital like the NHM in the Dutch East Indies could 
accommodate to this new situation. 
This state had an image formed of European political thoughts, revived 
from the bourgeois onslaught on ‘feudal’ (aristocratic, monarchical and 
religious) aspirations and claims. The playground for these new aspira-
tions became the colonies: the military repression and exploitation 
increased there tremendously.2 
However, all this led to a very bloody flight and to a miserable end for 
the European powers. Within half a century the indigenous contra-pow-
ers like China, India or Indonesia were mobilized to such a degree that 
they could not be destroyed, and the “whites” had to flee. A few years lat-
er, around 1945, the game was in fact over. 
Some could not believe or accept it, like the French and the Dutch. The 
total destruction of their colonial empires was necessary to teach them 
the new realities. In particular, the French were clearly the most stubborn 
colonizers of all. It took two long and devastating wars and the help of the 
USA before both defĳinitely lost their position not only in Asia, but in the 
world at large. From triumphant winners in a long 19th-century, they 
transformed into “eternal losers” doped by what they fĳirst had sown in the 
colonies: the snake had bitten its own tail hard. 
The French drug scene with its connections deep into the French navy 
reproduces most features of this decline-and-fall process: the Asian coun-
tries as resources for the foreign colonial government, which is the 
“source” of the military users and addicts, who brought “it” back to the 
homeland; there, the rich expatriates could be found in Le Moulin Rouge; 
the homeland in which the problem was settled through the opium den 
infrastructure and its deliverers; a new, politically compromised and 
socially criminal Western drug scene could develop in La Douce France; 
the colony itself stumbled into its last colonial drama performed in the 
mud of Dien Bien Phu (1954).
Because of its spectacular character and its most serious consequences 
for the world at large, a rich literature exists on this part of the opium his-
tory. First and foremost, there are the “bibles” of modern drug historiogra-
phy, Alfred McCoy’s The politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia or Carl Trocki’s 
study about the Singapore scene, Opium and Empire.3 I have to confĳine 
2 For this transformation see H. Derks (2008).
3 McCoy’s study is now fully available on-line: see www.drugtext.org/library/books/
McCoy/default.htm.
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myself here to adding newer data here and there to try to give a sketch of 
the “French scene” in Southeast Asia, in Indochina and its wider context.
The Beginning of a Disaster 
In 1800 the British and the French had already nearly two centuries of 
lethal Asian conflicts and mutual wars behind them. They were largely 
located in and around the Indian subcontinent. After they had recovered 
from the devastating Napoleonic European wars, they both started to 
move eastwards, gradually infĳiltrating Indochina and China. Not only in a 
military sense, but also in a cultural-religious way by sending missionaries 
who preached a strange, militant belief and sometimes the use of opium. 
In part 2 this kind of British (and American) assault on China was given 
globally.
On their way to the Chinese opium-Walhalla, the EIC’s Bengal opium 
transports, those of the private “country traders” and many other trans-
ports of Arabs or Chinese had to pass the Straits. Some bridgeheads in 
Arakan (the later Burma) and coastal settlements were quickly construct-
ed by the British. They, furthermore, had to deliver opium to their main 
client in the East Indies. 
To ease this venture, Rafffles occupied Singapore, which soon became 
the main naval and merchant base in Southeast Asia. After Napoleon’s 
defeat, he could occupy the Dutch “possessions” in the East Indies as well. 
It could be used to negotiate with the Dutch, making them more or less 
loyal allies once the East Indies were returned to the Dutch with their new 
conquering plans.
For the French, from their point of view, there was not much territory 
left in Indochina. As losers of the large European wars, they were also 
much slower to take their share of this Indochina cake, although they 
started early enough. This was a remarkable and symptomatic beginning, 
and not only in hindsight.4 
Here they had already relations with local rulers, while French mis-
sionaries spread the Catholic civilization française in the usual arrogant 
and aggressive way. It is one of the rare examples of Western missionaries 
arriving before the military occupation. 
4 For the following see D. Hall, p. 461 fff., 608 fff.; N. Tarling in: Idem (ed.), vol. 2-1, 
p. 30-48. For the French in Laos I used M. Stuart-Fox.
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The military now could come, for example, in Vietnam to “protect” the 
Paris Foreign Missions Society. The Vietnamese elite saw these Catholic 
priests, obviously, as a cultural and political threat. King Minh-Mang, who 
succeeded to the throne in 1820, hated these ‘barbarians from the West’. 
Also, a most influential faction in the dynastic system, the courtesans, 
detested the priests as well because they preached monogamy.
Even after three French attempts, Minh-Mang remained unwilling to 
conclude a commercial treaty or even to receive a letter from the French 
king. He broke offf all offfĳicial relations with France. As a strict Confucian 
and admirer of the Chinese culture, he even started to persecute 
Christianity as had happened in an earlier period as well. The First Opium 
War of the British against China changed his mind, but he died soon 
thereafter, and his successor revived the policy of persecution with even 
greater vigour. 
This Opium War was also a reason for France to change its Southeast 
Asian policies. Now it became as brutal as the British and sent a warship 
to Hué, which was coincidentally called the Héroine (1843). Next, they 
looked for some modus vivendi with the English and even battled in the 
Second Opium War alongside their greatest enemy. In this way, opium 
brought military peace and a peaceful competition between the Dutch, 
British and French only. Even with the fĳirst Western power in East Asia, 
Spain, the British made peace because they needed the Spanish silver to 
buy the Chinese products.5 Only the Americans had difffĳiculties in partici-
pating in this Western concert (see ch. 28).
However, like the Dutch, the French were also left alone in their mili-
tary adventures in Southeast Asia: they seized Saigon (Cochinchina) in 
1862; a year later a protectorate over Cambodia was established, which 
gave them control of the lower Mekong. The expectation was that this 
river should bring the French right into the south of China, Yunnan. This 
was not confĳirmed by expeditions to the sources of the Mekong, and the 
interest shifted to the Red River. Hanoi was seized in 1873, Lao territory 
east of the Mekong followed, and ca. 1885 the whole of Vietnam including 
Tonkin was in their hands. The rest of Laos west of the Mekong and the 
western provinces of Cambodia surrendered to the French in the fĳirst 
years of the 20th-century. Their main imperial challenge remained the 
largest country, Siam (the later Thailand). To achieve its goal, France used 
5 For Anglo-Spanish projects at the time see N. Tarling in: Idem (ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 21 fff.
The French Colonial Scene in Southeast Asia 399
Map 11. Mainland Southeast Asia, 1880-1930
Source: N. Tarling, vol. 2-1, p. 78. 
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old and flimsy Vietnamese claims to an Indochinese empire to ultimately 
create a casus belli for an intervention in Siam. 
These military expeditions did not result in a reasonable basis for mak-
ing colonies profĳitable from a Western point of view. Jacob Wiselius, a 
clever analyst of the Asian Western imperialism, gave a devastating view 
on the French inability to colonize wherever they landed in the world 
with their navies and military. In hindsight, he made a sound prediction. 
Wiselius asked himself whether the admiral who captured Saigon ‘with 
exceptional good luck’ in 1862 had the faintest idea that it meant a breach 
of peace among Annam, Siam and Cambodia and that ‘in the near future 
the French weapons should be confronted with the whole of the militant 
Indochina’.6 
After this quick overview we have to go back to basics: the opium busi-
ness, established to pay for the French occupation of Indochina. 
The French Opium Performance 
Among the classical Western colonialists the French were the last to set-
tle in this part of the world. Their opium performance was as dramatic as 
their political and military one. In our history the French must be held 
responsible for one of the most powerful and criminal drugs scenes in the 
present world. Let’s start with a turning point in the whole development.
Their important and peaceful innovation in the opium scene is 
described as follows:
Of major importance were the gradual restriction and then rapid termina-
tion of revenue farming, especially the lucrative opium farms … In Indo-
china between 1897 and 1904, the French established state monopolies on 
the sale of opium, alcohol and salt; this confĳirmed and at the same time 
centralized earlier and generally unsuccessful local French initiatives to 
abolish revenue farming, and greatly increased the weight of these con-
sumption taxes so that they formed the major revenue item for the French 
colonial state.7
This transformation from revenue farming to centralized government 
monopoly in 1882, became the model for all colonial powers. The “French 
general change” took place around 1900 everywhere in Southeast Asia. 
The legitimation was similar among all Europeans: we have to reorganize 
6 J. Wiselius (1878), p. 285.
7 The contribution of Robert Elson to N.Tarling in: Idem (ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 153.
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(= in this case: centralize) the whole opium production and distribution 
to minimize opium consumption as a concession to the many criticisms 
at home against the governments’s opium business. And the factual 
motives everywhere for this transformation were, fĳirst and foremost, that 
the bureaucrats of the colonial state wanted the private profĳits of the 
mostly Chinese opium farmers for themselves. This was consequently 
accompanied by a general racism directed, this time, against the Chinese.
The motherlands (“metropolis”), furthermore, urged the colonies to 
look after themselves, but it also asked for an increased exploitation in 
order to pay for its own military expenses, which were incurred in the Far 
East as well. It this contradictory struggle of interests, the colonial bureau-
crats normally won. Whatever was claimed about the dangers of opium, 
the immorality of this business, and so on, no influential offfĳicials with any 
authority cared much about the opium consumers, nor about the opin-
ions in the motherlands. The best proof of this was the remarkable jump 
opium consumption made when the Opiumregies were installed.
Revenue Farming8
In the 19th-century all Western colonies in Asia (as well as the indepen-
dent kingdom of Siam) regulated their opium, as their single most impor-
tant source of revenue, through a farm system:
The entire colonial enterprise in Southeast Asia was fĳinanced by revenue 
farms. Every colony, every state farmed out the bulk of its revenues to Chi-
nese tax farmers. ... We cannot understand the nature of European colonial-
ism in Southeast Asia without acknowledging the role of opium.9 
States, colonies or state-private institutions like the VOC or EIC used the 
means of the highly lucrative revenue farming as explained in ch. 19. The 
alternative was a separate, substantial and expensive tax organization. In 
the case of the foreign occupiers, an additional disadvantage of this alter-
native was the provocative measures of the unpopular tax collectors 
among an indigenous population. Farms did not bear too close an exami-
nation. The European authorities, furthermore, could easily blame the 
Chinese for spreading and extending the opium vice against the many 
complaints from indigenous and later Western sides.
8 For the following see the contributions of Carl Trocki and Robert Elson in: N.  Tarling 
(ed.), vol. 2-1, p. 85 fff., 147 fff. and in particular several contributions to J. Butcher, H. Dick 
(ed.). See also C. Trocki (2006), p. 28 fff.
9 C. Trocki (2006), p. 28.
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Revenues were drawn from many products and regulations, but every-
where the opium revenues were the most profĳitable ones for the states or 
colonies. The method used involved taxing exports of tin or rice, head tax 
on Chinese. In the Straits Settlements there were farms for alcohol, gam-
bling, betel-nut, pork, pawnbroking and even markets.10 
A well-known example: the opium and spirit farms for Singapore Island 
were the largest and most lucrative in British Malaya.11 They were led by 
the wealthiest and most powerful Chinese businessmen and regularly 
constituted between 40 and 60% of the entire state revenue. This was pos-
sible because in Singapore much more than elsewhere there was a com-
mitment to free trade and a lack of taxable exports (see below).
The French understood the strategic importance of revenue farms as 
well. They started on a small scale collecting the money in Cochinchina. 
This was extended later to Cambodia and Annam-Tonkin but failed. 
Crawfurd wrote in 1820:
The smallness of their numbers does not admit of the employment of instru-
ments either sufffĳiciently cheap, or sufffĳiciently expert. They are but unwill-
ing for and unequal to the task of bestowing the necessary attention to the 
minute details of a laborious business.12
They were largely unable to control their subordinates, who kept most of 
what they collected for themselves. 
Crawfurd’s opinion is that of the colonial administrator, of the foreign 
occupier, who ultimately had to rely (to his regret) on foreign help to col-
lect money. The fact that they as European powers had to rely on Chinese 
help to get the “fruits of their repression” proved how weak their power 
was. It was the acknowledgment of this fundamental weakness which 
underlay the so-called indirect rule system of the English or the Dutch in 
the VOC period.
The institute of revenue farming was also well known in Europe. The 
reason for using these collectors was because the rulers who installed the 
people endowed with these “functions” trusted them. In Europe very 
often Jews were used as tax collectors, which realistically explained their 
unpopularity and their large capital sums. In this way a Jewish elite 
formed a tiny minority heavily dependent on the rulers who could also 
easily dismiss or eliminate them without much protest. Not for anti-
10 A. Foster (2000), p. 255.
11 C. Trocki (1990), p. 96 fff. offfers an overview of the opium farm annual rent from 
1820-1882 with astonishing fĳigures.
12 Quoted by J. Butcher, in: J. Butcher, H. Dick (ed.), p. 22.
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semitic, probably xenophobic reasons, but mainly due to jealousy of their 
accumulated wealth gained from the very unpopular dirty work for the 
“boss”.13 
In Asia there were in fact not enough Jews available to do this kind of 
work. They had other things to do like the Sassoons: opium smuggling, 
banking, shipping between India and China. In Southeast Asia, however, 
there was a tiny Chinese elite available to do this job. 
It is, in my view, not so much that ‘European or Southeast Asian [polit-
ical leaders] relied on revenue farming mainly because they could gain 
more income’, as Butcher thinks, but to receive a regular income through 
taxing people instead of the normal colonial robbery by foreigners.14 
Taxing is, furthermore, a prerogative of an accepted government. Like all 
colonizers, the French acted as if this was the case, but foreign colonial 
regimes were only feared and hated. The natives only collaborated within 
a socially or economically artifĳicial framework. 
How artifĳicial it was becomes apparent from the fallacies French occu-
piers used to defend their distribution of the opium everybody knew to be 
pernicious. Even in this early phase of their Southeast Asian activities, 
complaints were made several times that they poisoned the indigenous 
people with their opium. The important offfĳicial, Dussutour, replied:
A government which is ahead of the European civilization and which has 
a true providential mission in these countries cannot be itself the treacher-
ous executioner (le bourreau empoisonné) of these peoples ... [it] is able to 
sell this task to others ... and close their eyes waiting for the period in which 
one could say: “it is enough” and put this announcement on all the borders 
of Cochinchina ...15
Along with this most cynical form of hypocrisy, there were also childish 
reactions to the complaints, claiming that distribution could not be 
stopped abruptly because of the health hazards like withdrawal symp-
toms. This moment occurred anyway in the next century when the French 
had to leave after the disaster of 1954. Others pointed to the high price of 
the opium and concluded that opium was only fĳit for the rich people of 
Amman and the Chinese. As elsewhere, the argument was also heard that 
only an overdose was bad, and the misery which followed was sketched in 
colorful details: but ... you had to be stupid to take an overdose.
13 H. Derks (2004), p. 160 fff.
14 J. Butcher in: J. Butcher, H. Dick (ed.), p. 23 (my italics. H.D.).
15  Quoted by C. Descours-Gatin, p. 39.
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The journal Le Courrier de Saigon (10th of March 1864), offfĳicial publica-
tion of the French administration, was also quite original when writing 
about the current annual budget: the morality of the French administra-
tion was proved beyond doubt since from the total of 3,012,000 French 
francs, 10% was spent to propagate the Christian faith and education 
among those poor opium addicts. 
Despite these “arguments”, there was almost no French supervision of 
the revenue farms, which were established around 1862. Therefore, the 
available data are not reliable, while the Chinese farmers’ testimonies in 
the French part of their bookkeeping are described as outright falsifĳica-
tion.16 Later Groeneveldt wrote how also the French bureaucrats were 
fraudulent.17
For about two decades the French were satisfĳied with their opium 
income. This was derived from several sources: from the tjandoe which 
was sold for about $1.8 per thail; next, from the petals of the poppy flow-
ers, called écorces. It had nearly no opium residue and was chewed by the 
poor people as a kind of sirih. Still in 1880 and 1881 a quantity of it of 
176,683 and 104,346 thails was sold for $50,000 and $30,000, respectively. 
One bought, furthermore, the dross from the pipes (tai amfĳioen) which 
was mixed with the tjandoe. The licenses to open an opium den produced 
another income of about $20,000 a year. Finally, opium was exported to 
neighboring countries, but Groeneveldt could not discover how much. 
In 1862 the revenue of the French colonial state was $61,334, which 
increased four years later to $210,182 and further to $465,000 in 1873. For 
the following years Groeneveldt summarized his fĳindings in the next 
table.
This opium income in this period was always about 20% of the export 
earnings of rice, the main source of income. In 1874 an opium factory 
(bouillerie) had already been established in Cholon near Saigon.
However, Wiselius reproduces in his analysis of the French budgets in 
Cochinchina, etc. the 1877 budget of Cochinchina in full detail. The 
 landrent brought in 3.5 million French francs (25% of the budget income) 
and as second main source was mentioned the 3.1 million francs (22%) 
from the opium revenue farms.18 Why his contemporary, Groeneveldt, 
16 W. Groeneveldt, p. 26 fff. It is a pity that Descours-Gatin did not know this detailed 
and reliable source about the opium economy and management in Cochinchina, Tonkin, 
Cambodia or Amman in the years to 1890.
17 Idem, p. 30.
18 J. Wiselius (1878), p. 74. There are as well 1.5 million francs in revenues from other 
farmings as there are arak, fĳisheries, birds’ nests or the slaughtering of animals.
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Table 25. Opium sold to and Income from Revenue Farms in Cochinchina, 1874-188119
Year Opium sold in thails    Gross income from opium farms 
in $-piaster in French francs
1874 429 320   972 438 5 348 409
1875 486 953   949 470 5 222 085
1876 601 975 1 169 772 6 433 746
1877 699 647 1 337 490 7 356 195
1878 851 080 1 717 603 9 446 817
1879 837 906 1 603 531 8 819 421
1880 763 605 1 472 093 8 096 512
1881 710 875 1 332 185 7 327 018
came to a substantially diffferent result only a few years later is not known: 
some diffference between gross and net seems to be much too high; prob-
ably, it is a matter of fraudulent bureaucrats, about which he complained.20 
Wiselius, a strong supporter of Western colonization, was rather criti-
cal about several French thoughts and practices experienced during his 
stay and travels in the colonies.21 First, he did not agree with the typical 
French direct rule through which all inhabitants are administratively 
transformed into ‘Asian Frenchmen’ with all the advantages of liberté, 
égalité et fraternité, of which they did not understand a syllable. 
It would have been better, according to Wiselius, if the indigenous peo-
ple were ‘slowly prepared for freedom’ ! He displayed the most ideal-typi-
cal expression of the oikoidal principle when he proposes that, if a 
government of a state is formed in accordance with a people’s need, one 
has to look at the organization of its households. In addition, he criticizes 
the enormous quantity of rules, regulations and standing orders issued: 
the indigenous people did not understand the need for this and did every-
thing they could to negate them. He continues with:
It is not so much that we perceive it as a mistake of the state to subordinate 
the passions of the people to the treasury, but it is utterly wrong if the rules 
of the state do have a paradoxical character ... gambling is prohibited except 
on New Year’s Day in Annam, and the sale of opium is forbidden as well. 
A few years ago—or probably still today—in Siam opium smokers had to 
have a Chinese tail and to pay six dollars a year for it. Whoever did not 
accept this was killed. The French government in Cochinchina, however, 
makes it easy for everybody to smoke opium for the annual price of 3.25 
19 Idem, p. 27. The $ = piaster = 5.5 French francs.
20 C. Descours-Gatin, p. 27 fff. does not allow a solution in this matter. 
21 J. Wiselius (1878), p. 108 fff.
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million francs, and through the establishment of numerous opium dens, it 
brings the habit even into the village households ... (the only efffect of it is) 
… that the savings of the indigenous people are spent on opium ... so that 
he has to build his hut even more primitively than his Javanese colleagues 
or his hut becomes more humid and unhealthy ...22 
Those were the methods to force the Chinese to smoke opium.
The Opiumregie
The French invented this tradition, including its ambiguous background. 
The Dutch soon followed it in the East Indies, as was described in the 
previous part. Whatever the motives of the colonizers, an important 
aspect in all motherlands was that the colonies had to pay for themselves, 
and thus their exploitation had to be stepped up. This had to be realized 
in addition to the money, which had to be transmitted in standard form 
to the metropolis. 
This also explains why the opium revenues strongly increased instead 
of diminishing through the Opiumregie, the military involvement of most 
colonial powers increased at the end of the 19th-century again, and an 
industrialization of the opium production was realized in many new opi-
um factories. It is the period in which the euphemism “pacifĳication” was 
used everywhere: in fact this word covered one of the most bloody peri-
ods in colonial history.23 
The International Opium Commission (Shanghai, 1909) reported the fol-
lowing data in its typical way, as if all countries had fabulous statistical 
offfĳices:
In 1906 ... opium provided 16.25% of the revenue in French Indochina, 
29.02% in Hong Kong, 53.3% in the Straits Settlements, 10.8% in the Fed-
erated Malay States, 14.91% in the Netherlands East Indies, 14.3% in For-
mosa, 25.7% in Macao ..., and 15.55% in Siam. Burma, as a province of the 
Indian Empire, did not report separate fĳigures.24
Still, they are impressive enough, in particular by suggesting how wide-
spread opium use was in all those countries. The farmers had to pay more 
money in order to win the franchise, and they were eager to create as 
many consumers as possible, preferably addicts. The still well-known 
tricks among drug dealers were also used by them: selling cheaply or
22 Idem, p. 109.
23 See for the detailed overviews S. Halperin, p. 136 fff, appendices 2 and 3, p. 299-445; 
H. Derks (ed. 1989), passim. 
24 A. Foster (2000), p. 256.
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Figure 8. Percentage Gross and Net Opium Revenue in the French Colonial Budget of 
Cochinchina, 1864-1895.
Source: C. Descours-Gatin, p. 100, based on Budgets et comptes administratifs de Cochin-
chine, 1864-1895.
giving away opium to lure people into addiction. Critics in the West were 
also impressed by the fĳigures quoted, knowing that without these reve-
nues the colonies were difffĳicult to fĳinance, including the projects in the 
framework of the “mission civilisatrice”. Reform of the farm system was, 
therefore, necessary, but not discontinuation.
There came, however, an end to this farming system, not so much out 
of compassion for the victims or international criticism, but for greed: it 
was decided that it would be better to collect the profĳits the farmers 
made.25 The colonial decision-makers had to fĳinance the increasing mili-
tary, administrative and luxury costs of the foreign settlers and their expa-
triates, i.e. their personal wealth: from the end of the 19th-century, one 
costly building after another arose everywhere for Western hotels, banks 
or government palaces; the whites built themselves large villa quarters 
with excessive gardens on the best spots. 
The French were the fĳirst to transform the farm system into a central-
ized Opiumregie in 1882. That was a profĳitable move as the following table 
demonstrates.
25 C. Descours-Gatin. p. 90 fff.
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Table 26. Rentability of the Opiumregie compared to the Farm-system in Cochinchina, 
1882-1885 (in piaster)26
Year Gross income 
Opiumregie






1882 1 355 657 605 674 + 12 034  734 949 - 52 705
1883 1 627 736 622 315 + 28 719  976 701 + 186 047
1884 2 105 704 780 234 - 16 730 1 342 200 + 551 546
1885 1 868 222 730 375 + 19 508 1 118 338 + 327 684


















in % of 
gross 
income
1882  1 356    328  6 27 13    605   751 55
1884  2 106    537  8 19  4    780  1 326 63
1886  2 015    553  8 22  4    836  1 179 59
1888  1 855    412 10 28  4    704  1 151 62
1890  1 653    344  8 34  2    606  1 046 63
1892  1 815    814  8 19  2  1 157   658 36
1894  2 686  1 524  5 19  3  2 098   588 22
1896  2 981  1 218  4 28  2  1 869  1 112 37




37 915 12 420  7 26  4 19 165 18 750 50
–   –   ---  ---  – --- – --- –
1919 17 981   ---  –  – –  5 133 12 848 71
1920 13 321   ---  –  --- –  2 947 10 374 78
1921 15 099   ---  –  – –  4 717 10 382 69
1922 17 862   ---  –  – ---  6 190 11 672 65
1923 18 332   –  –  – –  6 730 11 602 63
1924 14 912   –  –  – –  6 429  8 483 57
* The Southeast Asian piaster refers to the Mexican dollar. Therefore, the indication is 
often with a $ sign. One piaster is in this period valued at 5.55 French francs; until 1913 
this is nearly equal to 1 US$. 
26 Idem, p. 110.
27 C. Descours-Gatin, p. 108; the fĳigures for the years 1919-1924 are from T. Tong Joe, 
p. 92. The latter only gave gross and net income. For additional data on this period 
see Appendix 5.
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Map 12. Indochinese Zones with diffferent prices of the French Opiumregie, ca. 1930
Source: Commission d’Enquête sur le Contrôle de l’Opium. League of Nations. In the East 
Indies the diffferences concern the bureaucratic measures, here they are related to prices.
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Added to this limited comparison, an overview of the opium purchases is 
given. From 1862 to 1882 they remained between 20,000 and 40,000 kg, 
but from 1882 they immediately doubled, tripled and soared sometimes 
to 170,000 kg around 1900. Without any doubt: the Opiumregie was big 
business for the French compared with the farming system. Moreover, the 
quantities of opium started to flood Cochinchina in their search for new 
customers.
The French introduced the Opiumregie in Indochina in the early 1880s, 
which was copied by the Dutch in “their” East Indies twenty years later as 
discussed above (ch. 19). The centralization of all parts of the process was 
fĳinished when one opium factory for the whole of the French colonies was 
established in Saigon (1900). This modern factory was an extension of a 
previous plant, one which was operational already in the last years of the 
farm period (see Appendix 5).
In 1929 the opium revenue in French Indochina increased to nearly $8 
million for a much smaller quantity than earlier, i.e. 140,000 pounds.28 
Immediately after the Second World War, the US pushed France to end 
its drug trafffĳicking. In 1946 it looked as if the French were willing to take 
this hint. It took another fĳive years, however, because the French dragged 
their feet on the issue. What followed is described thus:
In 1951 the Opium Purchasing Board ceased operations. Two years later 
France signed a United Nation protocol agreeing to end all state-sponsored 
trade in the drug. Though France was offfĳicially out of the opium business, 
unofffĳicially it continued to trade in the drug. Two years before the Opium 
Purchasing Board offfĳicially closed its doors, the French Expeditionary Corps 
began buying opium from hill tribes throughout Indochina … For a time 
(between 1949 and 1951) the Expeditionary Corps purchased only a frac-
tion of the opium harvested by the Hmong. But the trade picked up sub-
stantially in 1951, when France’s intelligence community took over the 
28 Encyclopaedie, 1934 edition, p. 1258. T.Addens, p. 26 reproduces all sorts of League of 
Nations fĳigures for the 1930s, but does not mention any production fĳigures for French 
Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, where the cultivation and production of raw opium 
were largely confĳined to respectively Laos, the Meos countries and Java. He acknowledges 
that his fĳigures for China are ‘extremely inaccurate’ and ‘without doubt erroneous’ (p. 28); 
the largest production of raw opium comes from India, Iran and other countries in ‘Asia 
Minor’ (mainly Turkey). T. Addens’s doctoral dissertation is probably the most detailed 
exposé of the ecology, production, consumption and trade of raw and processed opium 
before 1940 (mainly the 1930s). About the health efffects of smoking or eating prepared 
opium Addens supports Lyall’s conclusion ‘that a license to smoke opium is in truth a war-
rant authorizing a man to cut offf a third of his life’ (p. 83). At the same time he doubts this 
conclusion and also makes a case of proving that opium leads to less criminality than 
alcohol. This judgment must be based on a very narrow defĳinition of criminality. 
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operation and greatly expanded purchases of Hmong opium. The motive 
was not only to make money, but to deny the opium to the communists.29 
Indeed, the French High Command fĳinanced its war against Ho Chi 
Minh’s Viet Minh also through an extensive opium business. Thanks to 
this, the Hmong tribe, which delivered the stufff, became directly of strate-
gic importance with all the consequences for its own later development 
(see below). 
The French Concession in Shanghai
Thanks to their military cooperation with the English enemy in the 
Second Opium War, the French received a large part of the International 
Settlement in Shanghai in return. The growth of this city was fabulous 
after World War I. Between 1910 and 1930 the population almost tripled 
to three million.30 One-third of them lived in the International Settlement 
(nearly one million Chinese and 36,471 foreigners). In the French 
Concession (FC) there were 434,885 Chinese and 12,335 foreigners.
In particular, the FC was well-known for its exclusive and elaborate 
entertainment business which was mixed up with the narcotic scene in 
many ways. This life exploded after World War I. Overnight Shanghai 
became a cabaret town, a city of expensive nightclubs, brothels and the 
like. In 1915 in the International Settlement, there were offfĳicially about ten 
thousand prostitutes of all classes and nationalities with American and 
Russian ladies “at the top”. Five years later the municipal authorities esti-
mated this fĳigure at 70,000 in the foreign concessions only. In the FC 
alone, there were 40,000 prostitutes.
Nearly all Chinese of any political creed believed that the enormous 
narcotic, gambling and prostitution industries of Shanghai
depended upon the protection of the consular system of extraterritoriality 
set up under the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth-century … even the 
most jaded urbanite had to be dismayed by the underworld’s more violent 
manifestations in the form of kidnapping, robbery, and homicide commit-
ted by criminals who based themselves in the French Concession or Inter-
national Settlement.31
29 K. Quincy, p. 85.
30 For the following see F. Wakeman, p. 9 fff.
31 Idem, p. 13 also for the following quotations.
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Observers stated that if anything socially unsound was discovered in the 
International Settlement ‘it is immediately removed to the French 
Concession, where it comfortably settle down.’ The FC became known as 
‘the dirtiest spot in the Orient’. Indeed, it had the largest opium dens, the 
biggest brothels, the fanciest casino’s and the most brazen prostitutes and 
in the FC the police was ‘doing nothing to stop this immoral trafffĳic in con-
trast to other parts of the International Settlement’. The reason for this 
typical character of the FC is indicated by Chinese contemporaries as the 
consequence of the French laxity towards all their colonies: ‘... let the 
“natives” go to degradation and demoralization; their fate is no concern of 
the French nation.’ 
The corruption in the FC was endemic, also among French offfĳicials. Du 
Yuesheng, boss of the Green Gang, not only the main drugs-criminal that 
time in Shanghai but creator of one of the world’s largest illicit cartels, was 
always intimately connected with “high politics” (see mainly ch. 31): 
[He] ... was holding a series of conferences with the French authorities over 
gambling and opium ... had come to dominate the gambling and narcotics 
rackets in the French Concession under the protection of Chief Etienne 
Fiori and Consul General Koechlin ... the Green Gang boss had gotten the 
help of certain Cantonese investors and opened four gambling houses in 
the French Concession. ... Each gambling house quietly paid a daily protec-
tion bribe of $2,500, which was discretely passed on to the highest author-
ities by Du Yuesheng himself.32 
Du became a real Godfather. He was frequently requested by the rich of 
the FC to settle disputes arising over the division of inherited property, 
divorce and other personal problems; this gave him more reasons to 
enrich himself. More importantly, he was also the mediator in labor con-
flicts. This provided Du with the strike weapon in several labor unions of 
the FC.
“Paris” became embarrassed now the entire FC seemed to have been 
turned over to Chinese gangsters.33 From the French colonial govern-
ment in Hanoi came the fĳirst complaints; press voices in the FC followed, 
and the FC police authorities answered fĳirst with “rounding up the usual 
suspects”. That was not the end of this story: hostilities with Japan started 
in January 1932. A straightforward French admiral declared martial law in 
Shanghai and immediately prohibited gambling and drugs. 
32 Idem, p. 201.
33 Idem, p. 202 fff.
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Du Yuesheng mobilized a thousand armed gangsters with tricolored 
armbands supplied by the French police, while rallying in support of the 
French Consul General Koechlin. The French navy cleared the streets in 
the FC of those dubious supporters of the French police: Du Yuesheng, 
Koechlin and Fiori had to resign. 
The revenge of the fĳirst did not take long. A month later during a lun-
cheon organized by Du, fĳive high French offfĳicials were poisoned, of whom 
four died, including Koechlin. Fiori survived, though extremely ill, and 
left the FC to spend the rest of his lucrative opium life in a villa at Cagnes-
sur-Mer. Large numbers of corrupt policemen in the FC were dismissed 
and replaced by disciplined people. The drug-related crimes now soared 
sky-high: they had increased in 1933 to six thousand, a year later the rate 
of eleven thousand was reached. 
Probably because the poisoning “could not be proved”, the new French 
leadership of the FC tried to negotiate with the Godfather: they were 
bribed or threatened with murder. Only one possibility to get rid of him 
remained: to provide him with attractive facilities outside the FC. Thus, 
negotiations were started with the Chinese municipality about what 
could be offfered to Du.
There were a number of small factories—often only a single room just large 
enough to contain a laboratory—scattered around the French Concession 
where crude morphine manufactured in eastern Sichuan was refĳined into 
morphia and heroin by Chinese, Japanese, German and Russian chemists. 
If the Nationalist authorities, who had been trying once again in 1931 to 
establish a legal opium monopoly, could be persuaded to come to an agree-
ment with Du Yuesheng, then these refĳineries might be relocated outside 
the French Concession in Greater Shanghai.34 
So, the new French offfĳicials also played the game with the Godfather in 
exchange for Du’s ability to prevent a strike of the French Tramway Union. 
How the Chiang Kai-shek part of the opium story developed will be dealt 
with in ch. 31. All this showed how deeply the French offfĳicials remained 
involved in criminal practices: sometimes as initiator, sometimes as prof-
iteer, sometimes sufffering from their own machinations.
During the Sun Yat-sen government the relationship with the Western 
occupation was already critical but generally of a polite character. That 
situation changed with his death in March 1925. Chinese opposition from 
all corners protested publicly against the foreign occupation in the 
International Settlement, against the centers of narcotics and Western 
34 Idem, p. 205.
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decadence, or against the Western or foreign labor exploitation. Strikes in 
foreign—owned industries became regular and time and again British, 
French marines or Japanese guards machine-gunned ‘thousands of riot-
ing coolies’35
After 1930 the influence of France and Britain in China faded away 
quickly, and the USA and Japan replaced them.
The End of a Disaster
Between June, 1940, and March 9, 1945, Japan enjoyed full control of Indo-
china with the compliance and assistance of the French colonial authorities. 
The colony was the main base for Japan’s southward push against the Phil-
ippines and Southeast Asia after the attack on Pearl Harbor.36 
This sentence contains the most serious allegation against the French 
possible: it is the betrayal of the Indochinese people, of their Western col-
leagues and their civilization. The latter fought the Japanese in the Pacifĳic, 
Burma or the East Indies and succumbed to superior numbers. The 
betrayal of the Indochinese people was more direct: it concerned not only 
the collaboration with the enemy, but during the Japanese occupation, 
the French troops fought and suppressed the Indochinese resistance 
against the Japanese! 
It is often shown that resistance movements against unpleasant 
regimes joined the new powers as liberators, the Germans in Europe or 
Japanese in Asia, hoping to obtain help in toppling that regime. The 
Flemish in Belgium; the Ukrainians in Russia; the Croatians in the Balkans; 
in India as well as in the Dutch West Indies, there was a pro-German 
movement; etc. They all supported the Germans or Japanese because they 
helped to expel the French, Soviets, Serbs, British or Dutch, respectively. 
Examples in Asia include the nationalists of Sukarno in Indonesia, certain 
Chinese warlords in China, or an Annamite monarchist movement in 
Indochina. This is rather understandable, although politically not very 
clever to collaborate with a much stronger warring party, and risking the 
exchange of one occupation for another.
However, I do not know of another example in which a former occu-
pier collaborated with a new one. Certainly, also in Indochina there were 
individuals like General Catroux who rallied for De Gaulle and against the 
35 J. Taylor, p. 49 fff.
36 H. Isaacs, p.156.
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dominant Vichy Fascists, but they were exceptions without an army or 
other support.37
This all ended in many actions by parties trying to save their skins or to 
take advantage of the existing chaos. For example: in the permanent pow-
er competition throughout Southeast Asia between the British and 
French, Siam remained largely unoccupied as a kind of bufffer between 
the “European possessions”. In 1939 it was renamed Thailand, and after 
1945 it recaptured lost territory. 
This was about three years before the English had to flee the realm and 
a decade before the French lost their last battle in Dien Bien Phu (1954). 
The Americans took over the colonial heritage, learned next to nothing 
from it, and had to leave Vietnam again two decades later in a chaotic 
flight with their tail between their legs. The result: a disillusioned 
American citizenship and dishonored military defeated by a small, self-
conscious, poorly armed and rather weak, developing country. 
Ho Chi Minh, the gravedigger of French and American imperialism in 
Asia, also destroyed their opium and heroin activities (see below). He had 
earlier singled out the French opium and alcohol monopolies as two of 
the defĳinitive outrages of French colonialism. The Declaration of 
Independence of the First Vietnamese Republic (1945) accused the French 
of trying to ‘enfeeble a Vietnamese race’ through opium. The French must 
have perceived this as communist propaganda. However, Chantal 
Descours-Gatin confĳirmed this.38 Time and again this was repeated about 
the Dutch and British as well. 
The French imperialism and colonialism were probably the most dis-
honorable and humiliating type from a Western point of view. After col-
laborating with the Japanese during World War II, France tried to restore 
its corrupt colonial power in a most provocative way (by breaking one 
promise after another) and in a highly cruel war against the Vietnamese 
resistance. This was formed in a struggle against the Japanese (and 
French) occupation and as the legitimate republican representative of the 
Vietnamese people. A lost afffair practically by defĳinition. 
In Indochina the end came as the brilliant General Giap’s forces were 
trained and ready, Mao Zedong had won in China (December 1949), and 
the American-guided Cold War had been initiated. Pierre Mendès-France 
told the French parliament that things had gone too far not to negotiate 




with Ho Chi Minh. For, he argued (October 1950) in a most remarkably 
dubious reasoning (and overdue):
It is the overall conception of our policy in Indochina which is wrong ... It 
is a fact that our forces … are unable to bring about a military resolution, 
especially since the evolution of the Chinese situation, and it is a fact that 
our policy of making feeble concessions, and then withdrawing or denying 
them, has failed, and now, alas, will increasingly fail, to rally the mass of the 
Vietnamese people to our side.39
Their defeat in Vietnam was not the end of their controversial role in 
world politics as they continued their bloody repression in Africa (Algeria) 
and interventions in West African afffairs or their dubious role in the 
Rwandan genocide (1990s). 
39 Quoted in M. Shipway, p. 108.
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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT
Introduction
Southeast Asia is, of course, much larger than Indochina as defĳined above 
and incorporates also the Philippines and all the islands in the East Indies 
archipelago, now known as Indonesia. New Guinea is on the border, not-
withstanding the fact that half its territory is now Indonesia. This is not 
very relevant for our history of the opium problem. Many countries are 
located in this huge part of the globe (the East Indies archipelago is 
already as large as the United States).
In 1600 its population was estimated at just over 22 million. Vietnam, 
the largest country at the time, had nearly fĳive million, Java four million, 
Burma three, etc.1 Two hundred years later the entire region had 
increased by about 50%. Compared with most other large units (Europe, 
China, India, etc.) it had still a very low density of 5.5 persons per square 
kilometer (China had about 37). The endless wars and religious conflicts 
among the many kingdoms were the main reasons for this low population 
level.
The primary characteristic of Southeast Asia is the dominant islands 
populated with very diffferent tribal people with many languages, and 
large stretches of sea separating them. Nearly all people, except a few on 
the large land masses, were more or less strongly oriented to the sea: 
ports, trade, pirates, merchants, foreigners, and many other mercantile 
features including shipbuilding, money-dealers, etc. belong to the stan-
dard “outfĳit” of Southeast Asia from its earliest history onwards. 
The permanent labor shortages made “manpower” into a highly 
esteemed product and the target of the numerous pirate groups. They had 
the clear function of bringing people from areas with a “supply” to those 
with a “demand”. Consequently, slavery had quite diffferent characteris-
tics under the indigenous peoples than under Western colonial masters. 
Apparently, warfare among the former had largely the function of “getting 
1 C. Trocki (2006), p. 3 fff.
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people” more than killing, and never had the genocidal nature of the 
European assaults. Still, they were men-consuming ventures:
The larger states mobilized a substantial proportion of their male popula-
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Consumption per Head per year, 1906-07
Figure 9. Total Opium Consumption in Indochina, 1905-1910 and the Consumption per 
Head, 1906-07
Source: C. Descours-Gatin, p. 211 according to Inspection Meray, rapport no.61; Memorandum 
Lauret, 1911. Also the Laos fĳigures represent the results of the Opiumregie. It is too difffĳicult 
to evaluate the results of the smuggling activities as well. For the consumption per user 
per year see table 29.
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either for the soldiers or for their families left behind. Thousands of captives 
were marched back home by the victorious armies of Burma and Siam, or 
shipped home by Aceh and Makassar [pirates], with incalculable losses on 
the voyage. Perhaps an even more important factor demographically was 
the need to be constantly ready for flight in troubled times. This probably 
meant avoiding births at least until the older children were able to run by 
themselves.2 
Colonization by Western powers was started fĳirst by the Spaniards in the 
Philippines; the Portuguese formed several settlements together into a 
rather busy trade network, but conquests of large tracks of land had no 
priority. The Dutch VOC conquered large parts of Java in order to consoli-
date its military and economic position, but the new Dutch regime in the 
East Indies in the 19th-century started with a rather systematic conquest 
of the whole archipelago. 
At the same time the British and the French divided the heartland of 
Southeast Asia between themselves: the British conquered the Western, 
the French the Eastern part, and in between remained a large country, 
Siam, left colonized as a kind of bufffer between the two foreign powers.
It cannot be a coincidence that the opium history was confronted here 
in the British and French colonies with most dramatic developments: the 
narco-military Western regimes changed into very powerful narco-mili-
tary Southeast Asian regimes. The latter dominate today’s opium and her-
oin production like the British did in the 19th-century. 
The combination of the following table and fĳigure 9 present the whole 
perspective for the next chapter.
Table 28. Southeast Asian Opium Cultivation and Heroin Production, 1992-1996 3
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Net poppy cultivation in hectares
Myanmar (Burma) 153 700 165 800 146 600 154 070 163 100
Laos 25 610 26 040 18 520 19 650 25 250
Thailand 2 050 2 880 2 110 1 750 2 170
Total 181 360 194 720 167 230 175 470 190 520
Potential opium production in metric tons
Myanmar (Burma) 2 280 2 575 2 030 2 340 2 560
Laos 230 180 85 180 200
Thailand 24 42 17 25 30
Total 2 534 2 797 2 132 2 545 2 790
2 Quoted from Anthony Reid by C. Trocki, idem, p. 5, 6.  
3 UNODC fĳigures quoted from the Frontline website www.pbs.org.
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Potential opium-heroin in metric tons
Myanmar (Burma) 190 215 169 195 213
Laos 19 15 7 15 17
Thailand 2 4 1 2 2
Total 211 234 177 212 232
The head of the United Nations Offfĳice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for 
East Asia, Gary Lewis, reported in December 2010 that the Burmese out-
put had soared over the past four years to 95% of Southeast Asian pro-
duction.4 Of this most is produced in Shan State, the large eastern part of 
Myanmar (Burma). In this “state” of military and criminals, there is a 
struggle for mastery over the opium-heroin-amphetamine, etc. resources. 
The last sentence of his article says:
‘Most experts agree that as long as there is conflict in ethnic Burma, 
drugs production will follow as a means to fund it.’ According to the 
UNODC Myanmar is pouring, probably the largest opium-heroin produc-
tion over the Western world. And The Economist reports not only that the 
cultivation has increased by nearly 50% since 2006, but also that now 
‘more than one million people in Myanmar are involved in producing 
opium, up 27% from the year before.’5 
In this chapter we follow the history of this future until about 1950. We 
shall try to discover why this area became what it is now, described as 
‘Poisoned Hills’ by the local, highly courageous Palaung Women’s 
Organization in Burma. It recently accused the military and militias of 
many criminal deeds and atrocities against women, children and inno-
cent people; in the end all opium-induced crimes. 
From “Golden Triangle” to “Bloody Quadrangle” 6
Even when describing the creation of the Golden Triangle, the ultimate 
opium logo of this part of Southeast Asia, historians cannot refrain from 
4 Dan Withers on the website of Democratic Voice of Burma, 20 December 2010.
5 The Economist, 16th of March, 2010: ‘Myanmar’s opium crop. Steady hand on the till. 
But who is to blame for the spike in cultivation?’
6 Apart from the McCoy and Trocki studies, are used UN Special no. 626 (February 
2004) written by Evelina Rioukhina (UNECE) on www.unspecial.org/UNS626/UNS_626_
T07.html and M. Jelsma, T. Kramer, D&C, no. 16, August 2008. C. Lamour, M. Lamberti, 
part 2.
Table 28. Continued. 
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pointing to ‘ancient Greek fertility cults’ as the ‘fĳirst references to opium 
use’ as if this should be relevant, although it is incorrect.7 B. Renard knows 
that the fĳirst references to opium use in Southeast Asia date back ‘to 1366 
(Thailand) and 1519 (Burma)’. The obvious conclusion is not drawn that 
Arab and Portuguese traders, respectively, must have brought some as a 
present to native rulers. Nowhere in those years did any form of large-
scale opium business in Asia exist, and there was no opium problem 
whatsoever. 
Next, the information that in neighboring Yunnan (China) opium cul-
tivation was introduced in the 18th-century ‘from which it spread to 
northern Burma (Kachin State and Shan State) and Laos’ is unreliable as 
well. In that century no opium was cultivated in China or Yunnan, and 
certainly there was no one who could expand into such a large area. More 
precisely: 
In Southeast Asia the use of opium does not play an important role before 
the 19th-century. ... Generally it is true that opium consumption … was 
initiated and stimulated by European merchants ... for profĳit. In Thailand, 
at that time still called Siam, the use of opium was introduced by the Eng-
lish, who discovered how they could smuggle opium under the British flag.8 
The Yunnan invasion referred to above must be the one between 1870 
and 1880: Hmong tribal people, who now knew how to grow poppies, 
were expelled by the Chinese military. They apparently taught other hill 
tribes how to grow this useful plant for their own consumption. 
Early in the 19th-century indigenous rulers in Siam and Burma, like the 
Chinese emperors, strongly opposed the smuggling activities of the 
English and other Westerners (including Americans). Outside the tribal 
areas these rulers could prohibit the import and use of opium or tried to 
regulate them before they were overruled by the French or English.
In Siam there ‘... is a strong anti-opium movement ... resulting in the prohi-
bition of selling and consuming opium of 1811 by King Rama II. Nearly ten 
years later, in 1829, his son, Rama III, even ordered the death penalty for 
the opium trade ... Also in Burma, the kings prohibited the use of opium 
until 1852. When the English conquered parts of the south, the opium com-
merce started there. This happened in the form of a controlled monopoly 
by the occupying forces … This expansion of the British continued, and in 
1886 the Shan state of Burma was occupied as well. ... In Vietnam … Cochin-
china … the government was also against opium use. Opium is prohibited 
7 M. Jelsma, T. Kramer, D&C, no. 16, p. 4.
8 D. Duco, p. 55.
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by the court, while breakers of the rules were punished severely ... In 
the end opium use was accepted from 1857 onwards by the French colo-
nists ...9 
The opium is largely imported from Benares (India), and it is only in the 
period after 1880 that a change occurred from Benares import to Yunnan 
import, and the English started to complain about “Chinese competition”.10 
In short, the opium image still given in the usual touristic information: 
‘For centuries, these countries have produced the opium that has attract-
ed traders from Europe and elsewhere’11 must be utter nonsense. It only 
fĳits the widespread “blaming the victims” stories (see ch. 29).
There is nothing romantic about this best-known Asian drug (opium, 
heroin, amphetamine) region. Its name is derived from the location where 
three countries, three nations and cultures come together: now the bor-
der zone of Thailand (Siam), Myanmar (Burma) and Laos with the river 
Salween in the middle. It forms a really symbolic triangle, each side 
belonging to another country. The triangle is a geographical mistake with 
several serious consequences. The fact is that it does not concern a bor-
derland region of three countries, but of four. 
Yunnan (China) is of strategic importance for the functioning of this 
“triangle” as opium center. Long after the British introduced opium as a 
mass product in China, that country developed the fĳirst counterattack 
through its own Chinese production (from around 1870 onwards). Yunnan 
became a center of Chinese opium cultivation (see ch. 31). We should 
therefore speak of the Golden Quadrangle. In reality, however, all the bor-
der regions together make up the center of the Burmese drugs business as 
quantifĳied above and, therefore, one of the most criminal regions in the 
world.
Recently, The Economist published a news analysis about this same 
area, looking around in Meng’a, one of China’s main points of entry into 
Myanmar.12 In quiet days Chinese from Yunnan arrive here on a day trip 
‘to escape their country’s ban on gambling by visiting Bangkang’s casino’. 
It is not quiet any more, however, because the usual mutual conflicts 
between the several militia—all very busy with the production and trade 
9 Idem, p. 56, 57.
10 C. Descours-Gatin, p. 209, 210.
11 E. Rioukhina, p. 3.
12 The Economist, 27th of November 2010, ‘Myanmar’s border with China. Good 
Fences.’.
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of opium, heroin or amphetamine—have started again, together with 
those against the junta in Rangoon.13 
China faces a remarkable and complicated dilemma: it supports the 
junta because a new pipeline (gas and oil) from the Bay of Bengal had to 
cross Myanmar’s territory. China also supported the militias because of 
their traditional ties with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), from 
which some militias evolved many years ago. The junta also plays difffer-
ent games: it relishes China’s backing in the UN, but it also courts China’s 
rival, India. Last but not least, China is doing everything to fĳight drugs traf-
fĳicking through its offfĳicials in Yunnan, and it has a keen interest in keep-
ing the border areas calm because of its substantial investments in mining, 
rubber and other industries. If successful, the opium-stricken region 
would certainly be renamed a “Golden Quadrangle”. But not yet: narco-
militarism can still be studied here fĳirst hand!
It must be clear now that neighboring China is historically and cur-
rently of the utmost importance for the fate of this whole Bloody 
Quadrangle.
Still, there are some grounds for optimism. In 1989 the US State 
Department, not the best source of information about drugs, told the 
world that the Golden Triangle ‘produced a total of 3,050 metric tons of 
raw opium, equivalent to 73 percent of the world’s total illicit supply … 
America’s leading single source of heroin’.14 This production has de-
creased as shown in table 28, but it is practically impossible for it to 
increase again. However, McCoy points to the reality that ‘the globe’s 
great opium reserve in northern Burma had merged with the world’s pre-
mier heroin market in the United States’. This foreshadows one of my 
main conclusions.
In his many famous studies, Alfred McCoy made crystal clear how
all Western attempts at interdiction ... have not only failed to eradicate this 
resilient global commodity, they have contributed, quite directly, to an 
expansion of both production and consumption. ... During the 40 years of 
the Cold War, moreover, government intelligence services, particularly 
13 The ethnic militias in the border areas between Myanmar and China are: in the 
northern so-called Kachin State operates now the Kachin Independence Army (KIA); more 
to the south in the Kokang region and the “Special Region no. 2” (with cities like Meng’a 
and Bangkang) the largest army of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) with 20,000 well-
armed soldiers; along the border of China, Laos and Myanmar the National Democratic 
Alliance Army (NDAAD) is active. In addition, in the so-called Shan State, a large potential 
of junta enemies are concentrated with a highly militant tradition. 
14 A. McCoy in A. McCoy, A. Block (ed.), p. 237.
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the … CIA … served as protectors of Southeast Asia’s key opium trafffĳickers 
... contributing to an initial expansion of production and the failure of later 
interdiction effforts.15
Therefore, what is it about this area? This question should be answered 
from the perspective of the French colonization and not so much from its 
“use” after 1950 by the CIA or any other power. McCoy has great merits in 
uncovering the Cold War’s strategic use of opium; its pre-history is high-
lighted below in which none of the opium parties in Southeast Asia even 
dreamed of the production fĳigures and position in the world’s drug scene 
today. 
The Tribal Scene
Traditionally, opium has been used in the many tribal regions of Southeast 
Asia for a variety of purposes. We still do not know whether it originated 
as a custom brought centuries ago by Arab, Portuguese or Dutch mer-
chants or colonizers. Anyway, for the 18th, 19th and a large part of the 
20th centuries, tribal people in Southeast Asia (not the urban population) 
must have perceived opium use as a genuine indigenous custom. 
It is used medicinally to cure diarrhea, to lessen the efffects of malaria, 
to reduce heart palpitations and as a painkiller and tranquilizer. It was 
also employed in veterinary medicine. A village custom in parts of 
Southeast Asia used it to cure animal diseases, but most importantly it 
could be applied to tame and train elephants for all forms of heavy work 
and transport. Furthermore, poppy seeds (graine de pavot) were used to 
give flavor to bread or other culinary products and to made oil (l’huile 
d’oeillette). Last but not least, there was a specifĳic recreational use of opi-
um smoked mixed with tobacco or drunk in tea.
This means that the poppy plant was a rather elementary part of the 
daily life of indigenous people in the villages. A substantial part or all of 
this consumption could be grown locally. It was perfectly relevant, efffec-
tive, good, legitimate and so on and was derived (sometimes still is) from 
old tribal wisdom and knowledge. 
A comparison with the European situation from before 1800 is quite 
revealing.16 The main diffference is that the Southeast Asian tribes could 
grow poppies for themselves and, therefore, could discover many more 
15 Idem, p. 238.
16 See ch. 8 for England, ch. 10 for Portugal, ch. 13 for the Netherlands and ch. 22 for 
France.
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applications than just medicinal ones over the course of time. In both cas-
es the use of opium was for a long time an intimate part of their daily life, 
without all kinds of legal or criminal obstructions. And in both cases this 
situation came to an end and was transformed into an external matter of 
fear and repression.
In the European case a combination of external factors (state repres-
sion, diffferentiation of class interests, religious-moral repression, 
Enlightenment, development of specifĳic modern health infrastructure) 
also put an end to the home-oriented use of opium embedded within a 
mixture of social and cultural customs and related knowledge. Here in 
Southeast Asia the foreign colonial regime and its rigorous settler’s activi-
ties insisted on destroying the indigenous belief systems and customs. 
Also here, the relationship between Enlightenment and modernized 
imperialism is important to consider (see ch. 28 the Philippines case). 
What may be left of it today should be good for tourism only. 
All this is symbolized in the orders of the French and English colonial 
states: indigenous opium is forbidden, and only the French and British 
opium regimes are allowed. This is accompanied by the French and 
English defĳinition of power for their religious representatives: opium is a 
social evil that needs to be banned. Modern, imported knowledge (medi-
cal, pharmaceutical, chemical and the like) of an “isolated” kind must 
replace the comprehensive and socially embedded knowledge of the trib-
al people. 
In the meantime there was a traditional need for opium which could 
only be satisfĳied by external economic interests: locally grown poppies 
were forbidden in favor of European-owned or -guided interests based on 
strong state support. The criminalized villagers suddenly became depen-
dent on external powers (state bureaucrats, military, missionaries) and 
their criminal supporters (tax farmers, for instance): the only thing which 
was left for them was to revolt or resign, to defend their traditions or 
remain isolated in a new urban society with a foreign character.
Long after this, the drama enrolled as reported:
Those that relapsed became seen as failures holding the village back from 
the fruits of modernization that development agencies and government 
offfĳicials are promising to the “model” villages that are relatively successful 
in removing opium addiction ... This adds to the sense of shame and hope-
lessness that many opium smokers feel and only increases their dependence 
on opium ... Regardless of the fact that the pervasive presence of opium and 
its practical and symbolic value in specifĳic medical or social contexts makes 
abstinence a difffĳicult and at times impossible task, addicts are increasingly 
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marginalized because of their imputed personal responsibility for their 
addiction and its implications for the village’s material development. This 
kind of punitive atmosphere began creating a sub-population of “degener-
ate addicts”.17 
This statement concerns village life in Laos. After many interventions by 
the state, military or “modernizing” expatriate developers, the old bonds 
were fully destroyed. Too many people became defenseless individuals. 
After the colonial wars were over and a new power vacuum was fĳilled, 
opium consumption rates in the rural areas soared to the highest in the 
region. Many people were unable to stand the alienation and to fulfĳill the 
expectations of a strange, modern, urban world; they fell victim to the 
urban opium criminals. This pushed them into a fully hopeless situation 
of dependence on heroin. Opium use was decreasing, but opiate depen-
dence increased. 
That was the situation in village life in this part of Asia from around 
1980 onwards. But let’s return to the 1940s and 1950s, and provide more 
details about this tribal scene in Southeast Asia, because there are many 
misunderstandings circulating about it. 
The third Western colonial government involved in large-scale opium 
production and trade, the French, had a monopoly for its own Southeast 
Asian colonies. Not only did its colonial activities have widespread efffects 
in the whole of Southeast Asia, but the same efffect was gained as in the 
British-Chinese relation (see part two and ch. 30): in the propaganda, the 
victims were transformed into the perpetrators as a whitewashing cam-
paign of the white colonizers. By the end of this “game”, some victims 
indeed acted as perpetrators and acknowledged the prejudice. In 
Southeast Asia some tribes underwent this fate. 
The peculiar characteristic of Southeast Asia is that without a substan-
tial and, in fact, powerful tribal scene, opium production or distribution 
or trade was very difffĳicult. This is true not only for the period after the end 
of the long 19th-century. Tribes have been settled in the hills of the Chiang 
Rai area for centuries (the Akha, Lahu, Lisu, Mien, Hmong, Shan or Thai-
yai, Mon and Karen). A certain symbiosis between these areas with their 
wild nature, colorful tribes, rather militant tribal life and opium produc-
tion and trade easily leads to exaggeration. One always hears, “Opium has 
been here already for centuries” which is a quasi-truth never properly 
substantiated.
17 Quoted by M. Jelsma, T. Kramer, D&C, no. 16, p. 22.
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The Akha are very tradition-bound and well-known for their attractive 
dresses, wearing skilfully embroidered silken jackets in their everyday life. 
The small group of the Lahu live in villages located above 1,000 meters. 
They farm poppies, dry rice and corn as cash crops. Many of them have 
been converted to Christianity. The Lisu form the smallest tribal group in 
Thailand. They arrived from Burma in 1920, live at a very high altitude, 
and are well-known for their hard work and competitiveness. They are 
considered the most successful of all Thailand’s tribal people. The small 
tribe of the Mien are in all respects the most Chinese oriented. They prac-
tice rotational agriculture, depending more on rice and corn rather than 
poppies. 
More to the east, in Vietnam the ethnic situation is possibly even more 
complicated, although most people are not aware of it. They think of 
Vietnam only in terms of its lowlands and the Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese), 
which is understandable because the Kinh (literally: ‘people of the capi-
tal’) form the majority (85%). However, Vietnam is three-quarters moun-
tainous and hilly, in which about 20% or 14 million of the inhabitants 
live.18 There are seventeen ethnic groups. In Vietnam at the moment, opi-
um does not play a signifĳicant role among these ethnic groups. We have to 
turn, therefore, to the three most important tribes in the Southeast Asian 
opium story: the Shan, Hmong and Karen (or Red Karena). 
They are border tribes connecting Burma, Thailand, Laos and China, 
countries which share over 1,000 miles of border. Historically, they sufffer 
and benefĳit from their bufffer position between often warring countries. 
The border tribes constantly have to choose, switch and deal in order to 
survive. After about 1960 the direction of their choice was clear: most 
tribes were against the Burmese military regime and pro-Thai. A few 
remarks about the Shan and Hmong can clarify the previous picture.
The Shan State
For the Shan there are specifĳic reasons for maintaining a peaceful rela-
tionship with Thailand and hostility against Burma. The former serves as 
the transit and refĳining area for the annual 400-700 tons (1980) of opium 
from the Shan, while Thailand’s main cities (Bangkok, Pang, Mae Hongson, 
etc.) are centers from which heroin trafffĳicking is fĳinanced and controlled. 
The Burmese military regime, however, is very eager to control the Shan 
18 For the following see the article of A.T. Rambo and N. Jamieson, in: H.V. Luong (ed.), 
p. 139-171.
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State itself so that the opium, heroin or morphine revenues can support 
its despotic regime. 
In 1956 the CIA concluded that ‘the majority of opium exported from 
Burma originates in the Shan State’ and ‘that the annual production of 
opium in Burma is at least 150 tons’.19 This is an estimate for the whole of 
Burma and still very far from the 400-700 tons estimated 30 years later just 
for the Shan State. Estimates in these cases, however, remain guesses, too 
often “political guesses”.
So, fĳirst, who are these Shan? A short “opium answer” must sufffĳice here. 
Immediately after the end of World War II, Burma became independent 
of the British colonizers. The British Empire withdrew in disgrace, leaving 
a social, cultural and economic mess behind, as it did in Palestine, India, 
and so on. We may consider what was “better” measured by the quantities 
of blood shed: a direct liberation war against the British or the prolonged 
massacres which still continue today in Palestine, Kashmir and Burma. As 
usual, the British took the cheapest option, although they must have 
known what would happen later. 
In Burma, for instance, representatives of the Shan together with the 
Kachin and Chin tribes (the United Hills Peoples, SCOUHP) met in 
February 1947 in Panglong to conclude agreements with representatives 
of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma. A few days earlier the 
SCOUHP had already concluded a mutual agreement supporting each 
other’s right to form an independent state and ‘to secede after attainment 
of freedom from Confederation with Burma if and when we choose’.20 
The representative of “Rangoon”, Aung San, accepted an agreement in 
which, for instance, ‘a separate Kachin State’ was envisaged, the citizens 
of the ‘Frontier Areas shall enjoy [democratic] rights and privileges’ or 
that they were ‘entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma ... similar to 
those between Burma and the Federated Shan States’. Aung San, howev-
er, was killed soon afterwards in a military coup. 
The Shan exile, Chao Tzang Yawnghwe (alias Eugene Thaike), is an elo-
quent supporter of the Shan case. He was chief-of-stafff in the Shan State 
Army (SSA) until 1976 and one of the very few people who can explain the 
local opium situation well. He is very critical of the frenzied effforts by gov-
ernments and international agencies to eradicate opium in Burma 
19 Central Intelligence Agency, p. 8.
20 In the appendices of C. Yawnghwe, p. 253 fff. the relevant documents are given. 
“Rangoon” was also defĳined as ‘Interim Burmese Government’.
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through Thailand, ‘which is like trying to pull out a tooth in order to cure 
a stomach-ache’.21
What is the independent opium view of this Shan nationalist, who 
seems to be a monarchist as well? Yawnghwe: 
Why is opium extensively cultivated in Shan State? Is it, as alleged by Ran-
goon, because the Shan and tribal peasants are forced by Shan rebels and 
the CPB [Communist Party of Birma] to do so? It is not easy to force peas-
ants to grow anything since there are many ways to get around such com-
21 Idem, p. 268.
Map 13. Opium Cultivation in Shan State before and after 1963 
Source: C. T. Yawnghwe, p. 56. Compiled from “Situation Reports and Intelligence Data’, 
Shan State Army GHQ Offfĳice, 1963.
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pulsion. For forced cultivation of opium to succeed, it must be run 
plantation-style with peasants forced into barracks under guard, among 
other things, which implies that rebel armies must hold secure areas, and 
this has never been the case.22
The next question he tries to answer is whether the peasants grow opium 
for profĳit. The obvious afffĳirmative answer is not given; Yawnghwe fĳirst 
points to many other things. A peasant rarely makes substantial profĳit 
from what he grows. In addition, he states that a peasant family growing 
opium under the best weather, soil and social conditions ‘will produce at 
most about 12 kg a year’. He continues with a realistic economic analysis:
The fĳield price of one kg of opium is as follows: 300 kyat in the mid-1960s; 
600 kyat in the early 1970s and 1000 kyat in the early 1980s (kyat and baht 
are about equal, unofffĳicially). It is indeed rare for a family to be able to 
produce the maximum amount. However, let us say that a certain peasant 
family did produce 12 kg of opium in 1980. Its annual income would be 
12,000 kyat or baht ... In terms of purchasing power, the family’s maximum 
income would ... be only 4,000 baht (less than $250) a year . The vast major-
ity earned far less. … Most opium cultivators, moreover, like most peasants 
of Southeast Asia, are indebted to buying agents or local moneylenders 
before planting and have to hock the yield, or borrow usually at 30 to 50 
per cent interest per season. It is thus amply clear that Shan and other tribal 
peasants are not growing opium for profĳit.23 
Yawnghwe agrees with comments that opium cultivation is widespread 
in the Shan state, but this would have amounted at most to 60-80 tons in 
1958. The government in Rangoon made of this 400-600 tons in 1970; 
Washington and the United Nations repeated this without any form of 
investigation. This is unbelievable, ‘a revolutionary leap never seen before 
in agricultural history ...’ Rangoon made a mess of its statistics, while it 
‘does not control the rural areas’.
The true cause of the Shan opium and heroin trafffĳicking is ‘a deep eco-
nomic, social, and political malaise arising from Rangoon’s harsh rule, 
economic foolhardiness, and arrogant defĳiance of socio-economic and 
political realities’.24 In addition, in all their proposals to end the opium 
problem, the Shan always welcomed foreign observers. Rangoon, howev-
er, always told the international community that the opium and heroin 
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Rangoon’s solution to the Opium Problem is: “Eliminate Shan rebels!” 
It immediately received international military aid. This is comparable to 
the century-old creed in the “Dutch” East Indies or in “British” India when 
the British stopped their own activities: “The Smuggling” prevents us from 
eradicating the Opium Problem consistently and gradually. The true rea-
son for this was that the “government” wanted to have the monopoly 
without any form of opposition or ‘free trade’ (see Opiumregie policy).
In addition, the international military and/or economic aid was given 
wholeheartedly in the framework of some “domino theory” to encircle 
Chinese Communism. But Rangoon’s problem lies elsewhere: its nation-
alism is an ethnic nationalism 
trying to impose its concept of nationhood on the other by force … to sub-
jugate them or destroy their ethnic identity. Rangoon’s attempts to gain 
control over the various homelands is, therefore, linked to the problem of 
narcotics only because of negative and short-sighted policies. A solution lies 
… in … what is known as “good government”, a relevant and rational point 
which international policy-makers, bureaucrats, and scholars gloss over 
when discussing the problem of drug trafffĳicking in Burma.25
Yawnghwe adds to this argument a clear threat: in 1961 the Shan rebels 
totaled not more than 1,500 men, but twenty years later they are a well-
armed army of 7,000 to 9,000 men, which is fĳighting in its own familiar 
territory. He suggests that even with Western military assistance, there is 
no chance of an easy victory, while in the end only the CPB will come out 
as the winner, ‘through its ability to provide arms, be able to take over the 
various nationalist movements and armies’.26
Nationalists fĳighting nationalists while both have “foreigners” as ene-
mies, the Communists, and both have an ambiguous relationship with 
Westerners. 
The Hmong tribe
The Hmong or Meo became notorious by collaborating with the USA 
 during the Vietnam War. Earlier they also had a remarkable history:
Between 1898 and 1922 Hmong rebelled against colonial rule; however, 
relations improved in the 1940s once the French used Hmong opium to 




Hmong guerillas to resist Viet Minh (Vietnamese communist) effforts to 
establish a bridgehead in northern Laos.27 
Thanks to their assistance given to the American forces, many Hmong 
were allowed to come to the USA.28 
The Hmong number about 65,000 in Thailand (in 2000). Paul Hillmer, 
their most recent historian, perfectly demonstrated the ambiguous efffects 
of prejudice. To undermine them, he states that among the Hmong, opi-
um has only a ‘limited use as a folk remedy, stimulant, and pain reliever... 
while opium addiction exists, it was rare and socially stigmatizing ...’29 
However, only a few lines further on, we can read that opium is primarily 
used
as a cash crop—both to pay taxes, a practice encouraged by the Lao govern-
ment and the French colonizers, and to trade in exchange for other neces-
sities. Opium netted a family more wealth per acre than the other crops 
they grew.
Here the mechanism is indicated thorugh which regular opium produc-
tion as a cash crop is provoked. In the meantime the Hmong sometimes 
played an important role in the whole “triangle-quadrangle game” in 
Southeast Asia, in war and peace. In the highly complex situation of 
Southeast Asia it is often difffĳicult to discover who was fĳirst and who has to 
follow along as a mere act of survival or out of existential fear for reper-
cussions. Whoever is prepared to take a more independent stand will cer-
tainly point to the devastating role of the former colonizers the Meo were 
familiar with, notwithstanding their bad press as collaborators of the 
French and Americans. 
During World War II the French offfĳicials exploited the tribal opium 
sources in “good collaboration” with the Japanese occupation. The most 
important opium-growing provinces were Xieng Khouang Province in 
northeastern Laos and the Thai country of northeastern Tonkin. Both 
regions had a high concentration of Meo (Hmong) tribesmen. The French 
rigorously intervened in the tribal relations and conflicts by choosing 
Touby Lyfoung as their opium broker in Laos and Deo Van Long in the 
27 K. Quincy, p. 1.
28 It is a similar fate to the Ambonese and Moluccan collaborators of the Dutch colo-
nial regime: after the lost Dutch war of 1945-1949, they could stay in the Netherlands as a 
discriminated minority, which they expressed time and again in a violent way and in the 
establishment of a “return-to-Indonesia” movement. 
29 P. Hillmer, p. 28.
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Thai country. These choices had remarkable consequences for the French 
colonial future. 
Consumption Pattern
In the following table a comparison is made between most regions of 
Southeast Asia. The data must have been received from the Dutch 
Opiumregie. It is not easy to make such a comparison, let alone to check 
its fĳigures for the simple reason that, in fact, there are no proper sources 
(the International Opium Commission?). Indochina, here the French colo-
nies only, has the highest sale in kilograms, followed by Siam and the 
Dutch East Indies. All three had an efffective Opiumregie. However, the 
Indochinese fĳigures can be checked thanks to the excellent study of 
Descours-Gatin.30
She used diffferent kinds of fĳigures so that it is also possible to discover 
some pattern in the opium consumption of Indochina.
For all regions, one of the most important practical changes was the 
gradual replacement of the Indian import by the Yunnan import after 
1880. For example: of a total import in 1904 of 113 536 kg, about 40% came 
from Benares and 60% from Yunnan. Three years later Yunnan imported 
already 70% (76 317 kg of 108 005 kg.).31 
But consumers retained their preference for a special taste. Rich 
Chinese in Cochinchina preferred the Benares opium with a special soft 
flavor and a low morphine content (4-5%). In Tonkin, they liked the 
rougher, stronger taste of the Yunnan opium with its morphine content of 
7- 8%.
Cochinchina (the southern part of the present Vietnam with Saigon) 
has the highest consumption per head. In 1907 about 50,000 kg was con-
sumed by 90,000 smokers. The Chinese here smoke about 1.5 kg per 
annum, while the Vietnamese use only 300 g on average. 
Tonkin is the second largest opium region. In 1907 about 36,000 kg were 
sold by the Opiumregie (nearly all from Benares). This amount is, howev-
er, far from realistic: ‘ … according to Inspector Meray the quantities avail-
able through fraud equal half the total consumption’ (1908).32 Meray 
thinks that about 40% of adult male Chinese are smokers, whereas this 
30 In particular C. Descours-Gatin, p. 209-222.
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percentage is only 2.5% among the Vietnamese. Others are of the opinion 
that indigenous people do not smoke at all: only the Chinese are opium 
consumers. The representatives of the tribes all react diffferently: among 
the Chams, Khas and Mois minorities, the “opiomanie” is ‘quasi unknown’. 
Among the mountain tribes, Meos and Mans, in Tonkin, who have a pop-
py culture, there should be a very limited number of smokers. 33
Amman and Cambodia consumed more or less the same quantity of 
opium in 1907 according to the Opiumregie administration, 10,124 kg and 
13,560 kg, respectively. They have, however, diffferent characteristics: the 
fĳirst has nearly double the number of smokers, and in Cambodia 60% of 
them are Chinese, smoking about 1.4 kg per year, whereas in Annam the 
Chinese smoke on average 1.7 kg. In Annam, furthermore, they smokes 
almost only Yunnan opium, while in Cambodia they have just the Benares 
form; in the latter there are 572 opium dens, but in the former not one. 
And so on.
Laos is a diffferent case, although this could be the result of contradic-
tory fĳigures. First, the opium comes exclusively from Yunnan. In 1907 the 
Opiumregie sold 4,716 kilo of opium there. They say that this assumes a 
consumption of 10 gram per year, a quantity by which nobody can become 
an addict, not even a regular smoker. This would give, however, an unreli-
able smokers population of 471,600 people. And with a factual population 





















































Figure 10. Opium Consumption in Indochina, 1899-1920 
Source: C. Descours-Gatin, p. 218. For the years 1899 to 1907 the data are according to the 
Inspection Meray, appendix to report 61; for the years 1908 to 1920 is used Inspection Merat, 
appendix II.
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smokers population of 75%. In addition, according to specifĳic reports 
there are serious regional discrepancies, with some having only 2-3% of 
the adult men smoking, whereas along the Mekong river this rose to 
30-35%.34 The “smuggling” is here also widespread and very easy to do. 
For Laos there were no data given, so I estimated some in line with other 
parts of the French colonies. 
The above is more or less summarized in the following table.


















Cochinchina  3 000 000 4,7  90 000 20 000  70 000 22
Annam  5 000 000 0,12  23 000  2 500  20 500 11
Tonkin  6 000 000 0,7 132 000  9 000 123 000 7
Cambodia  1 600 000 7,16  12 000  7 200  4 800 60
Laos  630 000 0,08  18 000 *  1 000*  17 000* 6*
Total 16 230 000 1,9 275 000 39 700 235 300 14
* Laotian smokers are “real” estimates and, therefore, the totals as well
A comparison with the Burmese consumption is revealing. The fĳigures 
used by the CIA in the 1950s must be derived from the estimated annual 
production of 150 tons, of which 120 tons were exported: 
It is estimated that 60,000 opium addicts, concentrated principally in the 
producing areas and in the Bhamo and Myitkyna districts, consume 30 tons 
of opium a year ... This estimate is derived by assuming that the annual 
consumption of a Burmese addict is similar to that of a Thai addict: 500 
grams a year.36 
The consumption fĳigures of so-called addicts given here are fully in vari-
ance with those revealed above with diffferences ranging between 10 
grams, 500 grams and 1.5 kilo a year. These diffferences result not only 
from ignorance and inaccurate reporting, but to a large extent from wrong 
defĳinitions: a smoker is not necessarily an addict, while an addict is always 
a smoker in these regions; it is, furthermore, utter nonsense to call a 500 
gram smoker a year an addict; in an earlier table, in which a comparison 
is made between several Southeast Asian countries in 1930, some 54,000 
‘opium users’ are mentioned, the most vague defĳinition possible. 
34 Idem, p. 213 and note 45.
35 Idem, p. 214 rounded fĳigures.
36 Central Intelligence Agency, p. 8.
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After World War II and the Japanese occupation the situation in 
Southeast Asia became quite chaotic with a war of liberation against the 
French or several military coups and assassinations with an ethnic back-
ground. The reports of the CIA are one of the few sources available and 
they are used with caution.
Table 31. Estimated Number of Opium Addicts and Consumption of Illicit Raw Opium 
in Indochina and Singapore-Malaya, 195537
Province Number of Addicts Illicit consumption in metric 
tons
South Vietnam  55 000a  30
North Vietnam  60 000  45
Laos  10 000   8
Cambodia  20 000  15
Total Indochina 145 000  98
Singapore + Malaya 115 000 100
a ‘Approximately 15,000 of these addicts receive legal opium “detoxifĳication” doses from 
governments stocks rather than illicit opium.’
This table covers the same realm as in the previous one. The largest difffer-
ences concern “North Vietnam” which is the earlier Annam + Tonkin. This 
cannot be explained only by the use of diffferent defĳinitions (addicts ver-
sus smokers). For South Vietnam (former Cochinchina), a source is acci-
dentally mentioned: ‘Mr. Tran Van, a Deputy Director of the South 
Vietnamese Police and Sûreté’. This man estimated the annual consump-
tion in his province at about 36 to 48 tons, of which about 30 tons arrived 
through the illicit circuit. 
As a rule of thumb it is estimated that about half the opium produced 
is consumed locally in these provinces (except South Vietnam). In Laos 
(now estimated at a population of 1.3 million) there is a slightly diffferent 
regime. Consumption does mean here probably ‘the amount retained by 
the Lao after the offfĳicial collection’. The largest part of the opium retained 
after the offfĳicial collection ‘was purchased by private opium dealers and 
resold in Indochina, Thailand, Burma and Communist China’. The small-
est part is estimated ‘at about 68 tons’.38 
In particular, the strategically important Laotian production-con-
sumption is treated in a bewildering way as follows. It is already difffĳicult 
37 Idem, p. 13. The data for Singapore are added from Idem p. 15. The report used ‘dis-
intoxication’ in stead of ‘detoxifĳication’.
38 Idem, p. 14.
chapter twenty-four438
to make a connection to the 8 tons in the table and the 68 tons of what is 
called ‘personal consumption by the Lao’. However, the following rather 
spectacular description can be partly an explanation for the bewildering 
fĳigures:
Thus, total consumption in Indochina could amount to approximately 100 
tons a year. As approximately 125 tons of opium are produced annually in 
Laos, approximately 25 tons of Laotian opium are available for hoarding 
and for export to other countries. Opium is sold quite openly in Laos. 
[X] recently reported: “Opium can be purchased in village markets in Sam 
Neua … Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces, as well as in the 
northwest. It can be bought right in the town of Xieng Khouang.” With a 
readily available source of supply at competitive prices, opium smuggling 
from Laos is a relatively large-scale operation. Airplanes and trucks, both 
civilian and military, are used extensively for the clandestine movement of 
opium from the Laos collection centers to the markets.39
I can only point to this situation as a demonstration of what can be done 
with statistics, while I am not in a position to do new research on this mat-
ter. And that is necessary, not only for the Burmese case, but for the whole 
of the Opium Problem. Since the Myanmar narco-military regime belongs 
today to the largest opium and or heroin producers in the world, it is 
worthwhile to re-examine this country for the period up to the 1950s. 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Quite at the beginning of his interesting study, Ronald Renard provides us 
with a most relevant opening sentence:
Involved parties ... agree that it was the British who were mainly responsible 
for introducing opium to Burma proper on a large-scale basis. Although ... 
the British were not directly involved in developing the cultivation of opium 
as a major cash crop in the Shan areas of Upper Burma, the role of the East 
India Company in spreading opium to Burman areas and popularizing it 
there is undisputed.40 
39 Idem, p. 14. If 68 tons is the consumption in Laos only and its production 125, than 
57 tons remain for export. Apart from this, 100 tons are mentioned as consumption for the 
whole of Indochina including the Laotian 68: this leaves 32 tons for all the other Indochi-
nese countries or provinces. According to the table 145,000 minus 10,000 (=Laos) addicts 
must be served with 90 tons. From where do the missing 58 tons come? This apart from 25 
tons mentioned for hoarding, etc.
40 R. Renard (1996), p. 2, 3.
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Once told this, it is senseless and a-historical to start a new chapter about 
early drug use with an unproved and unprovable story about 1000 BC or 
800 AD in which it seems as if cannabis or opiates are used: by whom? 
how much? how? imported? grown oneself? If one cannot answer ques-
tions like these with some kind of certainty, then it is much better not to 
speculate. That is, besides, an art in itself.41 
The year 1519 in which the ruler of Martaban made an agreement with 
the Portuguese to bring opium has parallels elsewhere (China). But it still 
does not provide any relevant information. 
The further historical information is mostly useless. A son of a king at 
the end of the 16th-century died from opium, whereupon the sentence 
follows:
 However, there is virtually no mention of opium or alcohol in the Burmese 
chronicles until the nineteenth-century. By this time, usage was more wide-
spread, although the elite still shunned it. A 19th-century observer noted 
that “a respectable Burman would hesitate to be seen around a Govern-
ment-licensed [liquor] shop” and that opium use among the “better classes 
of Burmese is extremely rare. ... Burmans have no taste for ganja”.42 
The British penetrated China not only from the sea, they tried later to 
enter it through Tibet. During the British conquest of Burma from 1885 
onwards, exploratory expeditions were sent particularly to the border 
regions with China (Third Anglo-Burmese War). Here one expected trade 
routes into China, the “Golden Road to Cathay”, among others for their 
opium. It is perfectly possible that the tribal poppy cultures on the other 
side of the practically non-existent border, in Yunnan or Szechwan, were 
an offf-shoot of this Burmese conquest. The fact is that poppy cultures 
among the hill tribes started to flourish only after the Opium Wars with 
China (see ch. 30). 
The story goes that an early James Bond, the bagpiper Sir James Scott, 
discovered many hectares with poppies in the 1890s in the Shan state that 
resembled rice fĳields. Other discoverers soon arrived here in Kokang and 
gave their own, very difffering estimates of the availability of opium. They 
vary from 4,000 to 30,000 hectares !43 
41 If I see on the kind of sources on which this “ancient old” information is based (a 
Police Journal from the year 1941; an obscure magazine like the Burmese Mooyit), I have to 
question the procedure followed even more.
42 Idem, p. 16.
43 Idem, p. 28. 
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As a good bookkeeper Scott estimated a yield of 2.6 kg per hectare with 
a market price of 6-7 rupees (= about £1 at the time) per kilo just after the 
harvest and 10 rupees during the offf-season. Whatever the estimates, this 
price leads to a substantial income for the region. Its popularity was great-
ly increased during a convention of the League of Nations (1930), when it 
was declared that Kokang opium was ‘the best in the world’, thanks to its 
high morphine content!
By 1900 opium was, anyway, the dominant crop in the Kokang region. 
From here the cultivation spread to other areas, while cultivators came 
from several directions. We could expect to fĳind reports of how the prac-
tice of opium smoking, trade and smuggling increased rapidly. Scott’s 
assessment of the use in 1900 is expressed as follows:
It is to be noted that there are no victims of opium in these opium-produc-
ing districts, any more than there are in Ssu-ch’uan, where the people are 
the wealthiest in China and half the crops are poppy. It is only in places 
where opium is prohibitive in price that there are victims to opium. There 
to buy his opium, the poor man must starve himself. He dies of want and 
opium is blamed. Where opium is cheap, the people are healthy and stal-
wart. East of the Salween, the universal opinion of opium is that of the Turk, 
who stamps on his opium lozenges Mash Allah, the gift of God.44 
To underline his view, Scott refers to opinions among hill-tribes like the 
Lahu or Akha who ‘smoke opium because [they claim] it is the best thing 
for their health they know of’. In other tribes, like the Shan, Kachin or 
Palaung, however, who had already copied the European cant about opi-
um, they started to lie, acted defĳiantly or responded hypocritically when 
questioned about opium use. In his time, according to Scott, in Kokang 
everybody was smoking opium ‘and at all hours’. The rulers of Kokang 
governed an area so remote and earned profĳits so large that they did not 
control anything until the 1960s. That was not the case for the rulers of 
the southern part of Burma, where one had far greater opium problems. 
And the British occupiers?
It was to opium revenue that many British colonial offfĳicials became 
addicted. Not only did this diffferentiate them from the Burman rulers in 
the past, who had little if any use for opium or its revenue, this addiction 
also kept the British from ever taking serious actions to fĳinally eliminate 
opium.45 
44 Quoted in Idem, p. 29. Apparently “Ssu-chʾuan” is the same as the Chinese province, 
Szechwan. The Salween is a river originating in Tibet and ending after nearly 3,000 kilome-
ter in the sea near Rangoon in the south of Burma.
45 Idem, p. 30.
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The latter is a euphemism, since following the British takeover the opium 
consumption immediately grew rapidly thanks to the promotion cam-
paigns of the EIC and the British colonial government in India. It was the 
Burmese authorities and the Mon Buddhists who strongly opposed the 
spread of opium use. Anti-opium tracts soon appeared, and demonstra-
tions were held of hundreds of elders who went down on their bended 
knees with their head on the ground to implore that ‘the opium plague 
should be removed …’ These elders were even willing to pay to compen-
sate a loss of the Government’s opium revenue. 
And indeed, King Bodawpaya prohibited opium consumption in 1826, 
making it a capital offfense in the Burmese state. After fĳierce British pres-
sure a commercial treaty between the king and the viceroy of India was 
concluded in which, of course, trade in opium was permitted (1862). But 
sixteen years later there came a real Opium Act for Lower Burma (in 1888 
also for Upper Burma) with royal sanctions against opium use. A remark-
able aspect was that this act was not restricted as elsewhere to Chinese 
only or to any registered opium user in Lower Burma. Opium shops were 
closed down throughout Burma except in Rangoon, and so a whole net-
work of anti-opium rules and laws gradually came into being.46 
Widespread actions against cannabis were launched as well.
Not many fĳigures can be found about later years, but Balfour writes 
that in Burma the import ‘has greatly increased, even more rapidly than 
the population’.47 The consumption of 1869 had doubled ten years later; 
one reason for this was the continuous flow of Chinese immigrants 
and their use of the opium pipe is without any bad results. Amongst the 
Burmese, however, the demoralization, misery, and ruin produced by 
opium-smoking presents a painful picture.
But Chinese traders also played a role, as a Norwegian explorer remarked 
in 1881:
Occasionally a caravan of Haw or Yunnan traders brings a fresh supply of 
merchandise into the city, principally wax ... [and] opium, a great quantity 
of which they smuggle under their wide coats and trousers ..48
The Burmese elite, under the influence of all kinds of modernisms brought 
by the English, started to develop a nationalist creed from the 1920s 
onwards. A historical theory was adapted in which the Burmese tribe was 
46 In a useful appendix (Idem, p. 115-123) Renard has listed all measures from 1782-1991.
47 E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 37.
48 A. Maxwell Hill, p. 8, 9.
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perceived as a nation, whose kings had by feats of valor created a Burmese 
kingdom (Golden Peacock throne) subordinating most tribal lands, 
dynasties or people like the Shan, Arakan, Karen, Chin and so forth. ‘This 
unity was shattered by Britain, the kingdom dismembered, and separat-
ism encouraged in keeping with the divide and rule strategem of foreign 
imperialists.’49 
The British left in 1948. It is the year in which one of the few indigenous 
politicians who could keep Burma united, Aung San, was assassinated 
with his whole cabinet by Burmese coup-plotters. This was the beginning 
of a new wave of bloodshed and wars among “Rangoon” and nearly all 
tribal states. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of persons, mainly of 
Indian descent, emigrated. The Burmese middle class “disappeared”, 
 leaving the economy in shock, from which it still has not recovered. The 
consequence was that the remaining people had to rely on an active black 
market fostered through a strong exchange of goods between Burma and 
Thailand. 
This situation was highly favorable to the opium business and the rise 
of Burma as one of the main narco-countries. The CIA assessed this as fol-
lows: 
Opium is exported from Burma to overseas markets by sea from Rangoon 
and, after traveling through Thailand, from Bangkok. It is estimated that 30 
tons were exported from Rangoon in 1955. This estimate is based on the 
following considerations: (a) it is estimated that 12 tons were exported to 
Singapore and Malaysia in 1955 from Burma [see table 35, p. 467 H.D.], 
and (b) Rangoon is one of the two principal supply ports for the Hong Kong 
and Macao markets. The opium trafffĳic from Burma to Thailand is much 
larger than the shipments from Rangoon and is estimated to amount to 
approximately 90 tons.50
It is interesting how this report continues with a table in which the accel-
erated increase of opium prices is given relative to the distance the opium 
had to travel. The transport concerns 90 metric tons and about 1,500 km:
49 C. T. Yawnghwe, p. 51. The author, himself a Shan nationalist, immediately added 
that this perception ‘does not quite fĳit the facts’, pointing to the language policy of the 
British to make English the national language. This must be a proof that one state was 
desired over separatism. He forgot that every European colonizer wanted its language to 
become the dominant one, but that politically the indigenous opposition was fought in 
endless battles and that it was a standard policy to prevent by all means a united front 
arising against the foreign rulers. Divide and rule by force or by bribes, and therefore, 
being friendly to one group (like the Shan nationalists!) and angry against another, and so 
on. 
50 Central Intelligence Agency, p. 8.
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Table 32. Value of Estimated Exports of Opium from Burma to Thailand at Various Stages 
of Transport, 195551
Stage of Transport Value in wholesale prices x $1000.-
Producers location 1 350
Kentung, Burma 3 970
Thai–Burmese border 5 310
Chieng Mai, Thailand 6 840
Bangkok, Thailand 9 540
In 1988 the World Bank estimated that 40% of Burma’s gross national 
product (US$3,000 million) changed hands on the black market annually. 
This has been immensely profĳitable for the Karens and other rebels 
since the start of their rebellion in 1948. The Burmese government 
 controlled only a few isolated points on its eastern border, so that the 
 rebels could easily conduct big business to fĳinance their military activi-
ties.52
Thailand (Siam)
Shallow historical evidence reveals that opium (or something which was 
designated as such) played some role in early Thai history. There is a law 
from 1350 pertaining to banditry stipulating that the public was pro-
hibited from smoking, eating or selling opium. This cannot be considered 
reliable information.53 The next mention of opium apparently concerns a 
late 18th-century source from the Bangkok Period. In the 19th-century 
Kings Rama I to IV decreed that those caught with opium must be pun-
ished, apparently an offfense of the elite: confĳiscation of property; the 
defendant’s families and slaves would become property of the realm; the 
opium was to be destroyed or publicly burned by monks. These perfor-
mances received a specifĳic name, kratham chapanakit phao fĳin, opium 
cremations. One of these kings undermined his own anti-opium regime in 
the 1840s:
51 Idem, p. 9.
52 R. Renard (1996), p. 47.
53 T. Chaloemtiarana, p. 125. If this concerned opium, business on a rather large scale 
must have been carried out for some time. I know at the time no poppy growing, process-
ing or exporting took place in the Far or Middle East with trade relations to this region. See 
also D. Duco, p. 55 fff.
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Rama III’s attempts to control trafffĳicking in the drug were unsuccessful, 
however, because of the great profĳits to be had from the illegal opium trade. 
Accordingly, the government of Rama III began importing opium from 
India and selling it by auction to the highest bidders, who were called nai 
akon, or tax offfĳicials.54 
Whether this happened on his own initiative or a foreign one is not 
known. Anyway, the next king, Mongkut (1804-1868), returned only 
partly to the old prohibition policy by restricting the opium use to the 
Chinese community. Thais were prohibited again and from that time on 
opium became associated with the rise of Chinese secret societies. It was 
an attempt to corner the opium market, as if Chinese needed secret soci-
eties to get free opium. This approach, in the framework of the so-called 
‘bamboo policy’, was certainly fĳixed under the pressure of the English-
Chinese Opium War and the American threatening of Japan (1854). 55
Chinese secret societies did not have much to do with this, but they 
feared being the next target of the Western assaults. Therefore, Mongkut 
quickly made a deal with the English through the governor of Hong Kong, 
Sir John Bowring, as offfĳicial representative of Queen Victoria. Sir John 
arrived with his personal steamship in Bangkok (1855). The result of this 
very British demonstration was a costly treaty for both parties: Mongkut 
had to abandon the traditional system of princely monopolies and 
 farmings, the main income of his household, in favor of a simple import-
export system which allowed the British to import, for instance, opium 
when and how much they liked. The prince was left with 3% import duty.
That the British were also allowed to rent or buy land and houses near 
Bangkok gave them the opportunity to establish an English settlement to 
control the implementation of the new treaty and to organize the selling 
of British opium in Siam. 
That was not all: within a few years time Mongkut was forced to con-
clude similar treaties with France and the United States (1856), Denmark 
and Portugal (1858), the Netherlands (1860) and several other Western 
countries which smelled profĳits. Although they had never read the Illias, 
Mongkut and his successor Rama IV experienced the efffects not of one 
but of many Trojan horses: in 1867 Siam lost its power over Cambodia to 
the French, and so on. Envy arose among Westerners regarding the fĳine 
position Bowring had obtained for the English.56
54 T. Chaloemtiarana, p. 125.
55 See the article of Henk Zoomers in R. Feddema (ed.), p. 42 fff.
56 Explicitly mentioned by a Dutch negotiator with the Siamese authorities. See Idem, 
p. 57. This negotiator, Loudon, is highly arrogant and discriminating vis-à-vis the Siamese 
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rulers: it is a shame that Bowring had given these childish simple ‘Toeans’ a prince-like 
status, who did nothing but established a harem and smoked too much opium (L. writes 
remarkably enough about ‘belladonna’; idem, p. 59). 
Map 14. Prices of Monopoly Opium in force in various Siamese Districts, ca. 1930 
Source: Commission d’Enquête sur le Contrôle de l’Opium. League of Nations.
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Although all powerful families in Siam lost thanks to the “Bowring trea-
ty”, the influential Bunnag family could compensate for this by strength-
ening its already strong position in the opium, alcohol and gambling 
business by increasing the prices.57 The specifĳic relation it had developed 
with its main consumer group, the Chinese, must have made the Bunnag 
family enemies. It is probably in this inimical atmosphere that the idea 
and probably the practice of Chinese secret societies arose.
Still, secret societies exist and certainly in the fully corrupt scene of 
Thailand’s elite, where until long after the Second World War ‘opium 
remained an offfĳicial source of government revenue in Thailand, becom-
ing a major source of corruption and power’. 
This power became gradually divided between the police and the 
army, police general Phao Siyanon and army general Sarit, respectively. 
The former controlled the local opium trade and used it to fĳinance his 
police machine; the latter became the leader of the country, a despotic 
paternalist, through a coup in 1958. Sarit’s power base was strong military 
support of the USA’s anti-communist policy. 
Sarit hated hoodlums, opium, uncleanliness and social impropriety. 
Therefore, no long hair, rock-and-roll music, modern dancing, tight pants, 
and so on, but also no dirty roads, littering, stray dogs or beggars. 
Urbanized youngsters from the villages driving ‘pedicabs’ and using opi-
um were the main target of Sarit’s arrests. In a few years time nearly 8,000 
were caught, sentenced for a month and mostly sent to reform institu-
tions to be “re-educated”.58 
One personal hobby was to fĳight arson and fĳires, which often occurred 
in times of depression and sometimes with devastating efffects. Sarit used 
these events to blame unpopular groups, e.g. Chinese or communists. 
They “confessed”—before they themselves were executed—to setting 
fĳires in the framework of a larger plan to create chaos. 
After his coup Marshal Sarit announced his 37th proclamation with the 
words:
Now, the designated time has arrived. The fĳirst minute after midnight on 
July 1, 1959 marks the ultimate termination of opium consumption in Thai-
land ... The sale and use of opium are illegal … Alien offfenders will be 
deported, and Thais will be marked as traitors who refuse to make sacrifĳices 
for the nation, which is equivalent to not cooperating with me personally 
57 Idem, p. 52.
58 T. Chaloemtiarana, p.121 fff.
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... I can sacrifĳice even my life. I consider that opium is a national menace, 
and I will do anything to save the nation.59
Opium dens were meant to be closed within six months, treatment cen-
ters were established to help addicts, 43,000 opium pipes were publicly 
and ceremoniously ‘cremated’, heroin producers in Bangkok arrested. 
The decision to wage all-out war on opium and heroin brought fame to 
Sarit and earned him the respect of the public.
This act of moral purity was counteracted, however, by Sarit’s substan-
tial cruelty and corruption to enrich himself, his family, eighty mistresses 
and friends. Upon his death (1968) they all quarrelled over about approxi-
mately US$140 million. Not opium but women, gambling (lottery) and 
excessive drinking appeared to be his weak spots. The Thai opium dossier 
will have to be explored in another publication.60 
Malaysia (Melaka, Malacca) and Singapore
From the middle of the 18th-century, the Malays and other inhabitants of 
Melaka had many reasons to question the VOC’s military preparedness.61 
For at least a century the Dutch were the dominant power. However, the 
serious conflicts between the commercial Bugis of Sulawesi and the 
Malays from around 1750, in which the latter asked for the protection of 
the Dutch, showed an unexpected weakness of the VOC. 
In exchange for their help, the Malays Sultan Sulaiman promised the 
Dutch toll-free trade and other privileges. The lethal attack on the Bugis 
was planned by both. They did not wait, however, but took the initiative 
and laid siege to Melaka, burned houses in the suburbs and even raided 
the town itself. It was a shocking experience for the Malays, and in the fol-
lowing decades these events only strengthened the position of the Bugis.
The Dutch were not able to retaliate until 1761, but it was the last active 
Dutch campaign. Once they discovered that the cost of their presence in 
the region was becoming prohibitive, all parties realized what a contem-
porary observer expressed. He compared the VOC ‘to a man infected with 
a creeping disease which, if not cured in time, would prove fatal’. A few 
years later it was over and out for the VOC.
59 Quoted in Idem, p. 126.
60 The start of it is described in C. Lamour, M. Lamberti, passim.
61 For the following see B. Watson-Andaya, L. Andaya, p. 97 fff.
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Its main competitor, the EIC, became gradually more important 
because the English controlled the cloth-producing and poppy growing 
areas in India after “Plassey”.
Malays had been smoking opium mixed with tobacco since the seven-
teenth-century, when the Dutch began importing the drug into the area. A 
hundred years later their consumption had reached such heights that the 
Governor of Melaka could tell his superiors that “the people of Rembau, 
Selangor and Perak, like other natives, cannot live without opium”, while 
Chinese accounts show that east coast Malays were equally addicted. No 
entrepot could compete in this new economic environment unless it had 
ready supplies of opium, and in 1786 Francis Light was to recommend the 
import of large quantities of the drug to Penang specifĳically to attract mer-
chants.62 
In particular, the English country traders, speaking fluent Malay, were 
highly successful thanks to their smuggling of weapons and opium, which 
were forbidden by the VOC. It was around 1800 that the region defĳinitely 
became an important trading center on the road between India and 
China. 
The main benefĳiciary on the indigenous side was the Bugis-controlled 
Riau archipelago, the ‘key to the Straits’. Here vessels from all over the 
region flocked to trade: Riau became the principal point of exchange for 
smuggled spices, opium and other products like tin or cloth.
Instead of the Dutch, the British took over in the region. Singapore 
strengthened its position as holder of the “(military) key of Asian trade” 
and as center of tin mining, rubber plantations or shipbuilding. The whole 
peninsula and the opposite Sarawak (North Borneo) became a most 
 strategic position. As explained in ch. 2, the relationship Rafffles-Far quhar-
opium tycoon Matheson resulted a century earlier in the (re)establish-
ment of Singapore and surroundings as the internationally well-known 
pleasure center and “one big opium den” with all possible nasty conse-
quences. 
Newbold reported about ‘that pernicious drug, opium’ as the second 
main article and nearly equal in value with the fĳirst, Indian and other 
piece-goods (the third is tin):
The total value of this article imported in the year 1835-6 amounted to the 
enormous sum of upwards of a million of dollars. Two hundred and fĳifty 
two thousand of which was the value of the quantity exported to China, 
most part of the remainder went to the east coast of the peninsula, to Java, 
62 Idem, p. 100.
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Borneo, Celebes, Cochinchina, and Siam, and a considerable quantity to 
America. The opium trade with China is contraband. The total value 
exported annually from Calcutta and Bombay to the East is supposed to 
amount to about 3,000,000 lbs. The Patna opium is the most prized ... and 
sells from 710 to 720 Sp. drs [per chest]. Benares sells from 645 to 650 
Sp.drs, and Malwa from 580 to 600 Sp. drs. Turkish opium, though disliked 
at fĳirst, has latterly come into greater demand.63
Here is demonstrated how Singapore was in the earliest phase already a 
world distribution center of opium; the “brand new” United States were 
not free from this ‘pernicious drug’.64
There was, however, another side to this medal. In the period that the 
English had to earn their fortunes as owners of mines, plantations or 
banks, and as narcotic dealers or smugglers, they detested the Malays as 
too lazy to do the dirty work in the tin mines or on the rubber plantations. 
The British opium smugglers-investors used their lively trade with China 
to bring back a substantial Chinese labor force for the tin mines, planta-
tions and, later, as operators of the tax farms. 
Around 1835 the best paid Chinese hand-laborer got from 4-6 Spanish 
dollars a month and a Malay only $2.5-4.5. A skilled Chinese man like a 
carpenter got about 15 dollars, whereas a skilled Malay carpenter received 
only 5 dollars per month. Adult Malay women employed in weeding and 
similar work got 3-8 cents a day.65
As a rule of thumb the British believed that this import of Chinese 
workers was a reliable index of economic progress. They were right. The 
global framework changed drastically between the beginning of the 19th-
century and the end of the Opium Wars. It is well described by Trocki:
Most important was the expansion of the global market communicated to 
Singapore through the major trades: opium, capital, and manufactures from 
India and the West. Pepper, gambier, tin, and the other major commodity 
flows generated in Southeast Asia originally moved with the Western trade 
to China. ... In addition to redirecting the commodity flows to the West, the 
63 Th. Newbold, vol. 1, p. 363. Also elsewhere (Id., p. 57) he writes about ‘that most 
debasing and pernicious drug, opium’ in combination with the Chinese secret societies ‘of 
which spring many of those daring outrages and robberies that disgrace our settlements.’ 
See the article of B. ter Haar about ‘secret societies’ in D. Leese (ed.), p. 883-885.
64 See Th. Newbold, Idem, p. 20, which reported that there was a commercial conven-
tion between Great Britain and the United States (1815), which restricted the American 
privilege of trade to Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Prince of Wales’ Island. Singapore was 
not mentioned because it did not yet exist (1818). An American tried to enter Singapore in 
1825, but was “arrested”. But ‘an inconvenient and clandestine sort of trafffĳic was still main-
tained’ (Id., p. 21), until the matter was solved. 
65 Th. Newbold, vol. 1, p. 14, 15.
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shift created a vast demographic eruption. It was as if the current of wealth 
flowing out of China began to pull with it the Chinese peoples themselves. 
Singapore came into being as a result of these global forces ...66 
Opium played in this global shift the most crucial role. Singapore’s opium 
scene in the 19th-century is, therefore, much more important than only 
in a local or regional context. It can be summarized in a table in which the 
whole constellation is symbolized. Trocki’s central thesis that the British 
Empire in Asia was built on opium is certainly supported by the fate of 
Singapore. Together with Hong Kong, Singapore represents the fate of 
this empire. Offfĳicially, nearly half of all revenues of the British was earned 
here by opium, as the next table shows. This concerns, of course, only the 
colonial profĳit for the British. It cannot demonstrate how much private or 
individual British offfĳicials, military men or bankers earned. Indirectly, it 
also suggests how much a very few super-wealthy people (Chinese) pock-
eted as their share of the opium rents in this century.
Table 33. Singapore Opium Farm Annual Rent, 1820-1882 (selected years; in Spanish 
$)67




1820 7 16 46
1825 24 76 32
1830 39 96 41
1835 58 119 48
1840 65 143 46
1845 108 232 47
1850 88 --- ---
1855 148 288 51
1860 267 493 54
1865 270 671 40
1870 361 876 41
1875 398 967 41
1880 600 1 277 47
Total all years 
1820-’82
11 551 25 669 Average: 45 %
66 C. Trocki (1990), p. 220, 221.
67 Idem, p. 96-97. Instead of the used indication 1820-21 I prefer 1820 etc. All fĳigures are 
rounded.
the southeast asian context 451
Ellen La Motte added to this table the revenues of the years 1898-1906 as 
found in a report of the Straits Settlements Opium Commission (February 
1909).This report gives all possible details about all possible aspects of 
the Opium Problem in the Straits Settlements. Among its members the 
opinions were divided about the harmfulness of opium, but 
as a means of raising revenue, the trafffĳic was certainly justifĳiable. It was 
proven that about fĳifty per cent of the revenues of the Straits Settlements 
and the Federated Malay States came from opium trade and, as was naïvely 
pointed out, to hazard the prosperity of the Colony by lopping offf half its 
revenues was an unthinkable proceeding.68 
The table proves probably much better than others how dependent 
Western colonizers were on the opium business they themselves initiated 
or—in a positive perception—how successful their invention or colonial 
exploitation was. 
Certainly it is important that Singapore is an axis in the colonial mili-
tary and trade web of the Western powers. Let us also recall what Crawfurd 
and Rafffles said about “their city” (ch. 2) and how the latter’s mission was 
to make Singapore opium-free! Rafffles got a beautiful statue in innocent 
white marble for it in Singapore.
Little is known about the early opium farms in this port. The British 
records say almost nothing about their identity or their organization. The 
British occupiers of the place, like Crawfurd, were only interested in max-
imizing their profĳits. They were successful: in the fĳirst decade the total 
revenue increased by a factor of six, while the opium rent in it increased 
by a factor of 5-6. The second decade presented only a slight increase for 
both, which was also the case for the period 1840-1850, apparently as a 
side efffect of the Opium War with China. 
Spectacular, however, was the growth in the opium business during 
the following period, the start of the booming years for the British opium 
dealers, traders, bankers or shippers and, therefore, also for Singapore, 
although the competition with Hong Kong wais fĳierce. The end of the 
Second Opium War was, of course, the defĳinite turning point for the 
whole opium business. The British had taken control of the commerce of 
India, China and Southeast Asia in less than fĳifty years.
68 E. La Motte, p. 24. For 1898 the opium revenue was 46%, in 1901 it had increased to 
53% and in 1904 even to 59.1%.
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It is difffĳicult to see how the British succeeded in doing this without opium. 
It was the major form of economic leverage.69
The table of Singapore’s opium export in Appendix 1 complicates this pic-
ture for, at least, the period 1830 to 1870.
We could have expected that when such enormous amounts of money 
are earned in a very cheap way by relatively few people, they would make 
a deal in order to divide the profĳits fairly. Instead, the reverse occurred: 
the parties involved became greedier and the mutual struggles increased. 
One thing remained relatively quiet after the Second Opium War: the opi-
um prices. In the preceding period the competition was fĳierce, the politi-
cal and economic situations unstable, the fate of the individual dealers 
uncertain. 
For Singapore, Trocki identifĳied and described in detail the fate of 
four “parties” involved in the 19th-century opium business: the British 
merchants and offfĳicials; Malay chiefs; Chinese merchants and revenue 
 farmers; Chinese kongsis or brotherhoods.70 For the Chinese side of this 
constellation, see next chapter. They were involved or had an interest in a 
specifĳic side of the Opium Problem: consumption, trade, speculation, 
control, taxation, etc. Their local games were played in a new world 
69 C. Trocki (1990), p. 221.
70 Idem, p. 220 fff.
Figure 11. Average annual opium price in Singapore, 1820-1901 (Spanish dollars per chest). 
Source: C. Trocki, 1990, p. 59. Compiled from various issues of SFP and ST.
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 economic constellation, which became much more important thanks to 
the core opium function of Singapore in it. 
Singapore as British “Cape of Good Hope” also meant recuperation for 
everything (ships, etc.) and everybody (leisure, entertainment and retire-
ment home for white, rich colonialists). Quite diffferent images of the 
Malays were created along with these diffferent functions. The “leisure” 
image is reproduced, for instance, by a naive expatriate, Frank Swettenham 
(1913):
The real Malay is courageous ... but he is extravagant, fond of borrowing 
money and slow in repaying it … He quotes proverbs … never drinks intox-
icants, he is rarely an opium smoker … he is by nature a sportsman … proud 
of his country and his people, venerates his ancient customs and traditions 
and has a proper respect for constituted authority ... lazy to a degree ... and 
considers time of no importance.71 
Ideal people for those who belong to the ‘constituted authority’ as the 
dominant minority of those “English at ease”. One may ask where this 
Swettenham resided. If he had walked along the sandy beach of Pasir 
Panjang, in the southwestern part of Singapore, he could have visited the 
House of Tiny Tin Tubes. This was the state-owned opium factory. 
In 1910 in Singapore, the development from opium farming to 
Opiumregie, like elsewhere, was completed by the opening of a modern 
opium factory. Once the mechanization of opium production and distri-
bution was a fact, mass addiction could be realized. Of course, the usual 
nursery tales of diminishing opium consumption are told, but the fact is 
that their factory could produce a million tahils of opium a year or some 
450,000 two-hoon tin tubes of chandu daily. A Mr. Walling wrote enthusi-
astically:
The machines which do this are beautiful, highly technical and impossible 
for me as a layman to describe. After sealing, they [the tubes] are weighed 
by delicate, automatic, weighing machines, and packed in small boxes, two 
hundred at a time. They rest there like miniature Sainsbury’s cooking eggs!’72 
However, Swettenham was not a simple English expatriate and was not 
really naive, because he was the governor of the Straits Settlements. He 
must have known perfectly well what was going on in his area of “opium 
jurisdiction”, because he personally ran the periodic opium auctions. 
Furthermore, he was the one who organized the basic transformation 
71 Quoted in B. Watson-Andaya, L. Andaya, p. 175, 176.
72 Quoted by C. Trocki (1990), p. 224.
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from opium farm system into Opiumregie. The following table provides 
the details, although it suggests that only the Chinese in Malaysia and 
Singapore used opium. In an ethnically diverse landscape, many groups 
were available.73 Swettenham’s opinion about Malays quoted above 
should be seen as a typical Pavlovian reaction of all foreign Western colo-
nizers to divide and rule the available ethnic groups immediately upon 
arrival.
Table 34. Estimated monthly costs and sales of selected Malayan opium farms, 190374
Singapore Pinang Melaka Johor Kedah
Estimated Chinese 
population
164 000  98 000 19 000 150 000* 39 000
Estimated chandu sales 
in tahils
140 000  74 337 11 000  80 000 28 000
Gross chandu sales in $ 433 740 230 432 33 000 140 000 76 000
Estimated costs in $ 138 540  66 749  9 150  58 600 30 200
Opium farm rent in $ 215 000 172 000 26 000  80 000 43 000**
Spirit farm rent in $  50 000  45 000  5 000  10 000
Net profĳit or loss in $  30 200 - 53 317 - 7 150  - 9 000  2 800
*  This fĳigure was thought to be ‘greatly overestimated’
** This fĳigure is the combined opium and spirit farm rent
The table gives an overly pessimistic picture, because the spirit sales are 
not included, although its rent is. Even in present terms a pure profĳit of 
$30-35,000 per month (360,000 to 420,000 per year) is substantial for 
people in the street business. A century ago this was an enormous profĳit 
in Malaysia or Singapore. Apart from this, the money capitals which circu-
lated every month among tax farmers or consumers in the opium busi-
ness (half of the bureaucratic machine of the British) were unbelievable 
for a region in which wages were counted in cents per day.
Ellen La Motte visited Singapore in January 1917 and stayed in the fĳirst-
class Hotel de l’Europe. The fĳirst morning at breakfast, she was already 
confronted with an opium-addicted waiter, ‘a handsome young Malay’, 
who was in such a state that it was impossible for him to handle the nor-
73 In 1970 the Malays numbered 47%, Chinese 34%, Indians 9% and among the rest 
one could fĳind Arabs, Filipinos, Dayaks or Thais. In the Borneo part, the Chinese were 
between 20-30%.
74 C. Trocki (1990), p. 201. Johor is the fĳirst region on the peninsula past Singapore; 
Kedah is the most northern region on the border with Thailand about 800 kilometer north 
of Singapore.
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mal breakfast orders.75 In her tours through the streets, she was confront-
ed time and again with opium dens selling always the same 
little, triangular packets, each containing enough for about six smokes. Each 
packet bears a label, red letters on a white ground, “Monopoly Opium” … 
House after house of feeble, emaciated, ill wrecks, all smoking Monopoly 
Opium, all contributing, by their shame and degradation, to the revenues 
of the mighty British Empire.76 
That evening after dinner she read an article in a copy of the Straits Times 
(a Reuter’s Telegram, 17th January 1917). It concerned a row involving 
the Chinese in Liverpool: the previous night 31 Chinese were arrested 
during police raids on opium dens; great quantities of opium were seized; 
the police were attacked in one place by the Chinese, who threw boots 
and other articles from the roof. La Motte reflected:
It must be very perplexing to a Chinese sailor, who arrives from Singapore, 
to fĳind such a variation in customs. To come from a part of the British 
Empire where opium smoking is freely encouraged, to Great Britain itself 
where such practices are not tolerated. He must ask himself, why it is that 
the white race is so sedulously protected from such vices, while the subject 
races are so eagerly encouraged. It may occur to him that the white race is 
valuable and must be preserved, and that subject races are not worth pro-
tecting ... as if subject races were fair game—if there is money in it ... Is this 
... what we mean when we speak of “our responsibility to backward nations” 
or of “the sacred trust of civilization” or still again when we refer to “the 
White Man’s burden”?’77 
Still, this Malaya including Singapore was also perceived as a model colo-
ny for the whole of Southeast Asia in the Interbellum. For the British expa-
triates this country was most attractive as ‘a Tory Eden in which each man 
is contented with his station’, because they were in full control of the local 
elites through a variety of administrative systems. The three “races” were 
kept in balance: Malays in the paddy fĳields, “British Indians” on the 
immense rubber plantations and the Chinese in the shops and tin mines. 
Indeed, Malaya was the largest producer of tin and rubber, but thanks to 
the government monopoly in the manufacture and sale of opium half of 
the country’s income still came from this source. The colonial Governor 
was already familiar with the rationalizations in 1924:
75 E. La Motte, p. 18-22.
76 Idem, p. 20, 21.
77 Idem, p. 22. In 1917 in the offfĳicial Blue Book was published that the total revenue of 
the ‘Colony of the Straits Settlements’ is $19,672,104.- and that $9,182,000.- came from 
opium (47%). (Idem, p. 25).
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Opium smoking in Malaya is not the awful scourge believed in by western 
sentimentalists ... [it] is not doing as much harm as drink in England. It can 
never be stopped in Malaya ... Smuggling is impossible to prevent, and the 
money now coming into revenue would go to the smugglers. Any attempt 
to earmark our opium revenue ... to humanitarian works ... would play the 
devil with our fĳinances.78 
This tells us as much about the position of the immigrant Chinese as 
about opium and their British “masters”. The latter acted also in a spec-
tacular way during the Japanese occupation by suddenly issuing a total 
prohibition of all opium activities immediately after the war (for the peri-
od of the Japanese occupation, see ch. 27). However, after the war nothing 
happened in this direction. 
After the war, London still believed: if India was the jewel in the impe-
rial crown, Malaya was the industrial diamond.79 Sixteen years later the 
new Governor estimated (same as his predecessor) that Malaya 
(Singapore) was ‘worth’ about £227.5 million to the British Empire; about 
50% must derive from opium. Most of this disappeared mainly to the City 
of London. Its status as most profĳitable British colony was achieved, of 
course, not only by its resources (tin, etc.):
The key to the great public works and civic conceits of the Strait Settlements 
was opium. Duty on opium accounted for between 40 and 60 per cent of 
its annual revenue. Its production was monopolized by the government 
“Chandu factory” on Pepys Road in Singapore which turned out 100 million 
tubes a year. Much of the revenue burden of Malaya therefore fell upon the 
Asian, particularly Chinese, labourers who were the greatest consumers of 
opium. The British crescent in Asia was supported by narco-colonialism on 
a colossal scale.80
This remained at least until the 1960s. A change of opium provider took 
place: instead of the British Empire opium from India, it came from the 
Middle East. At the end of the history in this book, Singapore was still 
considered the primary opium port in the Far East by the CIA. An impres-
sion of its importance can be given through the perception of this secret 
service. 
78 Quoted by P. Brendon, p. 338.
79 See for the following Ch. Bayly, T. Harper, p. 33.
80 Idem, p. 33.
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Percent of Total 
Seizures
Estimated Value of 
I m p o r t s  o f  R a w 
Opium in US$ b/
1954 1955 1954 1955 1955
Iran 1 834 2 333 46,5 50 19 849 750
“Yunnan”a 914 965 23 20  5 440 060
India 546 552 14 12  5 513 892
Burma 656 547 16,5 12  3 705 132
Unknown 9 498 --- 6  2 140 800
Total 3 959 4 695 100 100 36 649 634
a ‘This term is used by local trafffĳickers to indicate opium received through Thailand and 
probably consists of illicit supplies originating in the adjoining areas of the Wa States and 
Kentung State in Burma, Laos, and North Thailand as well as in Yunnan.’
b CIF values (Cost, Insurance, Freight) 
The fĳirst fĳive columns of this table do not tell us much about the normal 
imported quantities of opium, but fĳirst and foremost about the ability of 
the Singapore customs organization. And this ‘ability’ could also refer to: 
either the stupidity of the Iranian smugglers or the change they left for the 
custom offfĳicials, but also to the corruption of the Singapore custom offfĳi-
cials not to seize the competing opium from “neighboring” Thailand, Laos 
and Burma. 
The Singapore Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau estimates that the 
markets in Singapore and Malaya distribute 100 tons of illicit opium annu-
ally. The total number of opium addicts in Singapore and Malaya is esti-
mated to be 115,000. Since neither country has any domestic production, 
the opium must be imported from elsewhere.
It remains remarkable that, notwithstanding the relative proximity of 
opium, the Iranian form was preferred. We can assume that this prefer-
ence was based on ease of import and availability. Furthermore, the high 
morphine content (9-11 per cent, compared with 6-9 for the “Yunnan” 
type) seems to have been attractive.82 
It is more interesting to note how soon close opium relations between 
the two most important opium-producing regions were realized after the 
Second World War. CIA reports state that 
81 Central Intelligence Agency, p. 16. and 19. In tables on page 17 and 19 the same fĳig-
ures are used as in the %-columns of table p. 16, but now they have to refer to ‘Amount 
(Metric Tons)’!
82 Idem, p. 16 fff.
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a small syndicate of Bahreini Arabs trades in opium on a very large scale 
from Dubai to Aden, East Africa and Singapore. The opium is procured from 
Iran and shipped to Aden concealed in cargo where it is transferred to 
oceangoing vessels ... The town of Qasbat, Iran, is the center for smuggling 
opium into Kuwait ... Opium smugglers have also used commercial aircraft 
to move opium from Iran to the Malayan area.83 Regarding the second des-
tination in the table, it was reported that nearly every ship or commercial 
airplane arriving from Bangkok carried illicit narcotics, usually opium. 
Smuggling by airplane concerned a small-scale and intermittently used 
means. Furthermore, there must have been considerable transports over 
land and by rail from northern Thailand to Haadyai, apparently the smug-
gling center of South south Thailand, but also directly across the Malaysian 
border.
The estimated values of the transports into Malaysia and Singapore reveal 
that opium was the sixth largest import into both countries. The cost of 
importing into Malaysia was very high. Apparently, an artifĳicial measure: 
Bribes alone are reported to account for almost half of the delivered costs. 
In 1955, opium could be purchased in Bangkok at $105,831 a ton, or 
approximately 39 percent of the price in Malaysia.84 
It is a conclusion symptomatic for the general (opium) corruption in the 
whole of the Southeast Asian realm.
83 Idem, p. 17, 18.
84 Idem, p. 19.
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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE
THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The emigrating portions of the Chinese people come 
from a relatively minute area in the provinces of 
Kuangtung and Fukien, but wherever they go ... their 
adaptation is so quick and so perfect, their industry 
and their economy so in excess of those of the natives 
of these lands, their solidarity and their power of 
mutual cohesion so phenomenal, that it is necessary 
for the security of the remainder of the human race 
that “the Chinese must go!’’
Rev. Arthur Smith (1894)1
About an “Identity” of Chinese Migrants
Smith’s exclamation reverberates in the many present discussions about 
the identities of foreigners in most Western countries. And remind us of 
old-fashioned discourses about racism and nationalism, although they 
are now often clothed in highly abstract and rather meaningless words, 
not even concepts. To reflect on something like “the identity of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese” must lead to questions of who defĳined “The 
Southeast Asian Chinese “ and under which circumstances? Almost cer-
tainly, we would arrive at British or French colonial sources of around 
1850 qualifĳied by a large degree of ignorance, prejudice and fear of “the 
other” of the “white” settlers, missionaries, administrators and military. It 
is not surprising that recently it was still argued ‘that the Chinese nation-
alist movements in colonial Malaya’, including those in which prominent 
Straits Chinese fĳigures participated, were China-oriented and uninterest-
ed in developing ‘a separate overseas Chinese identity’ or in getting 
involved in local ‘indigenous nationalism’.2 
1 A. Smith (1894), p. 146, 147. See also A. Smith (1907) chapter two for many details on 
‘A Great Race’ and about the opium question p. 73-80.
2 D. Goh, p. 484. Important is the article of Wang Gungwu about the overseas Chinese 
(huaqiao) in D. Leese (ed.), p. 123-128 .
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Of course, Chinese have migrated away from China for centuries, origi-
nally did not belong to the indigenous population, and had no other alter-
native than to do what the American Reverend Smith demonstrates: 
therefore, they were attractive for the other “white” foreigners; sometimes 
also for the indigenous population, in which case they were promoted to 
peranakans. These are locally born “indigenous foreigners”, who could 
marry the indigenous daughters. In contrast to the peranakans, the 
Westerners were brutal and war-like from the very beginning, always 
focused on fĳinding enemies. 
At the start of the confrontations between the British and the Chinese, 
the former had difffĳiculties with xenophobic opinions, which were not yet 
accompanied by racism and aggressiveness à la Reverend Smith. One of 
the few available examples of this early perception comes from Newbold, 
who wrote his extensive books in the time the British opium smuggling 
was about three decades old and already highly profĳitable. 
The Englishman Thomas Newbold (1806-1850; soldier, administrator, 
traveler, writer) reproduced the classical English-colonial way of reason-
ing in his British Settlements (1839). Immigrant Chinese from Canton, 
Fukien or Macao had the following characteristics: 
They are active, industrious, persevering, intelligent, educated sufffĳiciently 
to read, write, and to use the swampan or reckoning board. They are entirely 
free from prejudices of caste and superstition, which are grand stumbling 
blocks to the natives of India. On the other hand, they are selfĳish, sensual, 
ardent lovers of money, though not misers; inveterate gamblers, and often 
addicted to smoking opium. The Chinese will expose himself to all dangers 
for the sake of gain, though he would not stir a fĳinger to save a drowning 
comrade. They make bad soldiers, it is said; but the experiment has not … 
been yet properly tried under British authority. They are capable of any 
crime, provided they run no direct personal risk ... ruled by the strong hand 
of power, they form an excellent class of subjects; but where the reins of 
government are slack, they are apt to turn refractory and rebellious.3
Newbold also created the highly dangerous fear of the ‘secret fraternities’ 
with which the Dutch in Java had such a ‘bad experiences’ and which in 
China ‘are deemed so dangerous to the government, as to be interdicted 
under penalty of death’. Chinese perjury, bribery and sometimes open 
violence was also well known in Singapore, according to him.4 (He could 
3 Th. Newbold, vol. 1, p. 13. He gathered the information for his 1000-page book in the 
years preceding 1835.
4 Newbold later contributed to the anti-Chinese sentiments. C. Trocki (1990), p. 20.
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demonstrate how the giving of bribes was criminal, and not demanding or 
receiving them).
Remarkably enough, the British Singaporeans reacted to this and other 
remarks about Chinese immigrants by not selling Newbold’s book. They 
objected strongly and publicly in newspapers against the denunciation of 
the ‘greedy Chinese’ since ‘they regarded the pursuit of material gain as 
one of the main virtues of Chinese settlers’.5 The book was, furthermore, 
discredited because of other ‘unfashionable opinions’ (his proposal to tax 
the remittances exported by the Chinese settlers or to abolish a part of the 
British bureaucracy in Singapore). Turnbull does not mention Newbold’s 
anti-opium stand in the spirit of Rafffles, which must have been the main 
source of criticism: half of the Malaysian and Singaporean budgets came 
from opium; the turnover of the annual trade was already at that time a 
million Sp. dollar.
In present Europe and the USA, migrants are feared by the settled, 
while there are many reasons for the migrants to fear the settled: the for-
mer may work for a trifle, and then be forced to return to where they came 
from. How one defĳines an identity is never discovered in these migrants, 
because only their labor is interesting, not their minds. Some very basic 
facts are forgotten.
The largest minority, if not a substantial majority, of all people in the 
world leave their birthplace sooner or later for many other environments; 
they undoubtedly develop several kinds of quite diffferent allegiances 
with other men and women than their family; most of them use or have to 
learn more than one language or dialect. Many kinds of other mobilities 
are familiar as well. 
Once turned around, the problem looks diffferent: the political and reli-
gious choices are basically intolerant, they destroy “identities” more than 
they create them; patriots, seen as identity-supporting, are without doubt 
waning in increasingly larger political constellations. Small pockets of 
them radicalize quickly; and so on and so forth. 
The influential Reverend Arthur Smith demonstrates aberrations of 
the identity discourse perfectly, concerning “Chinese who left their birth-
place to fĳind a future outside China”. Later, the reverend was thankful that 
the present Chinese did not migrate wholesale, like their ancestors at the 
time of Djenghis Khan: ‘it is hard to see what would become either of us, 
or of our doctrine that only the fĳittest survive’! 
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It is remarkable that in his social-Darwinist perspective, he forgot the 
already invented tradition of “Chinese isolation” and the “Chinese aver-
sion against an Open Door”. Apparently, the newer racist discourse has 
replaced it and now supports notions like: Chinese do not want contact 
with us, hate us, do not acknowledge the benefĳits of a Western civiliza-
tion; they, therefore, are primitive and will be strangers whom you must 
fear and attack if possible. The other side of the old coin? 
It should be investigated further whether the extended colonial prac-
tices of the West have proven a fundamental and basic inability of the 
Western elite to communicate with the outer world in other than a war-
like manner. This was apparently the case when they felt guilty about 
their own opium production and distribution in these Asian countries. It 
seems as if the highly mobile life inside and outside of the many Chinese 
regions (border or coastal) or ethnic groups was never acknowledged, nor 
were the often dramatic fate and extreme poverty of Chinese in Western 
countries working in mines, plantations, on railways and so on. 
It is disappointing that, even today, most acclaimed studies place the 
problem with this Chinese emigration in an ambiguous context. Take 
Philip Kuhn’s recent study with its substantial merits.6 To explain the 
background of the Chinese emigrations in the past, he starts to look into 
China’s internal agricultural situation and problems like land shortage. 
That is not unimportant, although one has to make a more complicated 
“push” story, considering that land shortage can be solved inside the enor-
mous Chinese territory rather than by migrating overseas. 
There are, furthermore, very diffferent regions and circumstances lead-
ing to emigrations: natural disasters like floods or famines in China, 
bloody revolts or the collapse of local industry by cheap foreign imports 
and extreme exploitation. Why peasants migrate from the interior and 
why fĳishermen, traders or sailors along the coasts migrate are diffferent 
stories. It seems reasonable to expect that people acquainted with the 
seas will and can migrate sooner to foreign countries (the straight dis-
tance between Canton and Batavia was 3,000 km and along the coasts 
about 4,000 km; a trip of one or two years!).
Still, the reasons given apparently do not cover the most relevant 
issues. Diffferences between permanent and temporary leaves should be 
considered as well. For instance, homesickness was very widespread 
under the coolies and Chinese literati alike. The return movements are 
considerable, which result in something other than “overseas Chinese”. 
6 Ph. Kuhn.
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No, the real problem with these emigrations is situated in the “host” 
countries. There is a considerable “pull” movement, trade in Chinese 
labor for Western colonial enterprises (see ch. 17 about the tin mines). A 
part of this coolie force remains in the foreign country. Chinese migrants 
are flexible and rather romantic people; they are prepared to give their 
labor for low wages, but mainly because they expect to get some “Golden 
Future” in return. In particular, later emigrations and the reuniting with 
already “arrived” family. This perspective will not only lead to quite difffer-
ent investigations, but also to other proposals for eventual solutions. The 
approaches are as varied as “blaming the Chinese” versus “blaming the 
Western assault on China”. 
More to the point is, therefore, Daniel Goh’s study of the so-called 
Straits Chinese. The richer strata among them repeatedly show a conser-
vative loyalty to the British Empire, which secured their safety only as 
long as the British patience lasted, their labor remained cheap, and some 
Chinese purses were so abundantly fĳilled that the British always could 
“borrow” them.7 In a more extreme way this kind of loyalty is shown, for 
instance, by the Parsis and Jews of Bombay.8 
It concerns the producers of the opium, the product with which the 
largest and most long-lasting profĳits could be gained. For the Opium 
Problem, it seems inappropriate to study the migrations; only the context 
in which the “Chinese overseas” had to operate until the 1950s is relevant. 
The Chinese Settle(ment) Strategy
The fĳirst features Western observers associated with this subject are 
“secret societies”, triads or kongsis, which were well-known after the 
1860s.9 It became a hype comparable to what we have to swallow every 
day about a nearly mythical al-Quaeda. After the British stopped their 
Opium Wars, the European creators of the Opium Problem simply disap-
7 D. Goh mentions relevant examples of this from a British Governor, Swettenham 
(1901), who knew perfectly well about the real relationship between the British Empire 
and “their” Chinese (p. 497 fff.) compared to Lim Boon Keng’s speech from 1917 (p. 499). 
8 N. Randeraaad (ed.), p. 33 fff. which has all the traits of a fanatic collaborating with 
the foreign occupier, which inevitably leads to great suspicion and inimical reactions 
among nationalist Indian groups (Id. p. 39). 
9 In Vietnam there were Chinese organizations called bangs based on language and 
geographic origin (so Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka, etc. bangs). They organized all things 
relevant to Chinese culture from schools to hospitals. Therefore, they cannot be compared 
to kongsis.
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peared behind the widely publicized, alleged criminal activities of these 
Chinese kongsis. 
As Trocki recently described them for the fĳirst time, the kongsis repre-
sent an efffective strategy to settle in a foreign, often inimical, environ-
ment. This refers to both environment (of the mines and plantations) and 
settlement (town and city). Social, economic and cultural similarities and 
contradictions between town and country are covered by this. Socio-
logically, it concerns quite normal group formations for people of more or 
less the same background and everyday experience who do not yet know 
the new language, customs, etc. In the economic perspective of the 19th-
century world, there is a close relationship between the Chinese kongsis 
and the provision of Asian resources to the European “industrial revolu-
tion” as demonstrated in ch. 17. This concerns thus both the resources and 
the labour necessary to obtain them.
It is similar to the situation in Western Europe, where hundreds of 
thousands of Wanderarbeiter (migrant laborers) came from Germany or 
East European countries to work in the Belgian, French and Dutch mines 
and factories. They were housed in very overcrowded conditions, exploit-
ed by ruthless proprietors and mostly spoke unintelligible dialects; they 
drank too much, and in exceptional cases they chose a criminal way of 
life. If they joined established trade unions, they protested within the nor-
mal channels for protesting; if they started their own strikes for obvious 
reasons, the trade unions were their fĳiercest enemies, and the mining or 
factory management could play an easy divide and rule game. 
Many returned back to the homeland after a few years with some sav-
ings; a substantial number remained in Belgium, etc. and became more or 
less reasonably acclimated (very recently one of them became even prime 
minister in Belgium). For the latter their original isolation was a tempo-
rary disadvantage, for the former a temporary advantage, making their 
estrangement of the homeland less severe.
Compared to this Western mobile labor force, the Chinese one in 
Southeast Asian mines, plantations and other locations had to work under 
much more severe circumstances: many of them soon perished due to 
their poor treatment. Those who survived and stayed in Malaysia or the 
East Indies must have been mostly addicts. They were defĳinitely in need 
of much support, which could be received from missionaries (if they 
accepted some Western belief) or Chinese “rescue” organizations. 
The Western occupiers remained suspicious of the latter normal (tem-
porary) support: “unknown activities” of 19th-century proletarian groups 
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in Europe or here in Southeast Asia transformed them automatically into 
dangerous, criminal and secret groups. 
In both areas the defĳinitions and laws are made by the British, French 
or Dutch bosses. They were themselves foreign in Southeast Asia and 
were now confronted with other foreign “guests”. In addition, these 
Western occupiers were not the most generous people in Europe; they 
preferred not to invest capital to alleviate the life of the destitute migrant 
workers. 
While Southeast Asians were willing or obliged to offfer their labor and 
inventiveness, they largely had to depend on the Western foreigners. In 
this triangle game between Westerners, Chinese and indigenous people, 
the Chinese immigrants were the weakest party for a long time: labor 
competitors of the indigenous, labor dependents of the Westerners and, 
therefore, exploited to the utmost. 
Indeed, the kongsis provided some safety and shelter for its Chinese 
members or supporters. They made them stronger in the daily fĳights and 
made it more difffĳicult for the Westerners to exploit them. They, further-
more, became more competitive towards the indigenous interests: irrita-
tion about this competition, suspicion, jealousy, ignorance form the best 
combination to make others dangerous and even criminal, if the social 
barriers become too high for them to surmount within a reasonable time.
Trocki formulates this as follows for Singapore kongsis around the time 
Reverend Smith wrote his bestseller:
The failure of British observers to dwell on economic factors when dealing 
with the Chinese kongsis appears linked to the general tendency of the 
Europeans to criminalize kongsi activities. If the kongsis were essentially 
illegal organizations, then the possibility of their playing a necessary eco-
nomic function in the British settlements was not at issue. If the cause of 
strife could be located in China or in some deviant characteristic of Chinese 
culture, rather than in the immediate economic environment of the colony, 
the British could easily deny the possibility that they themselves should 
bear responsibility for being a partial cause of the strife.10
The negative perception of these Chinese groups was specifĳically appar-
ent after 1850 when many more Chinese “coolies” appeared in the streets, 
mines, railways and plantations. At that time many impatient Western 
adventurers of the types described in chapters 17 and 18 arrived to estab-
lish mines, plantations and factories. It is also the era that opium started 
to influence all relationships in a large part of the world where Chinese 
10 C. Trocki (1990), p. 37.
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migrants appeared. That cannot be a coincidence, and it is not difffĳicult to 
decide now which is cause and efffect.
Tens of thousands of Chinese migrated to North America, Australia or 
New Zealand in the 19th-century (see ch. 28). Rice, silk and tea already 
belonged in a flourishing world market. These immigrants created a new 
world market for all Chinese products and activities; not only the chinoi-
serie hype at the end of the 19th-century, but also other features ranging 
from Chinese restaurants to the cheap, colorful playthings and nightclub 
accessories (see further ch. 22). 
Markets are communication systems in which producers and consum-
ers are connected in many ways, of which the exchange in goods and 
money is the most important one. Chinese emigrants connected their 
new locations with their Chinese homes by transmitting money back to 
their families left in China and receiving all kinds of products from China. 
Opium forms the leading commodity in the old and the new markets, 
with all possible consequences. 
The (pre-)History of the Chinese Opium Performance 
In the reconstruction of the Dutch opium history, we were confronted 
several times with the role Chinese immigrants played. It is important to 
note that the Chinese had a long history in the East Indies. It extends back 
at least to 1400 when trade developed between Banten and China, and 
the Chinese started to settle on Java and probably elsewhere in the archi-
pelago. They slowly mixed with the Javanese population and established 
an original part of the Javanese population.
Asian Trade 
Ong-Tae-Hae wrote already in 1791:
The virtuous influence of our government extending far, all the foreigners 
have submitted, and thus mercantile intercourse is not prohibited. Those 
who ply the oar and spread the sail, to go abroad, are principally the inhab-
itants of the Fokien and Canton provinces, who have been in the habit of 
emigrating, for the space of 400 years; from then early part of the Bêng 
dynasty (AD 1400) up to the present day ...11
11 Ong-Tae-Hae, p. 2.
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Therefore, long before the White Man looked for a new burden and cre-
ated his Chinese isolation myth, the Chinese had an extensive maritime 
and land trade system and migrated over huge distances.12 Their migra-
tions were not confĳined to that enormous country of China itself, but 
encompassed the whole of Asia from at least the thirteenth-century 
onwards. Apart from and together with a lively trade, there were small 
groups settling all along the trade routes of the caravans or ships. This not 
only concerns the famous Silk Route, which still connects the Far East 
with the Middle East and has hundreds of settlements along it. There is 
also the old caravan trade route with Southeast Asian countries and, in 
particular, the extensive trade by junks deep into the Indonesian archi-
pelago long before Western powers came to dominate the markets in the 
East. 
12 See even H. Gelber and J. Spence (1998) for many examples of this European and 
American myth. A main source of them is, indeed, the Macartney opium mission of 1793 
which was accompanied by the most stupid anti-Chinese propaganda, including the myth 
about the two cardinal vices of Chinese men: ‘their passion for gambling and their appe-
tite for opium’ (Spence, p. 102). D. Willmott, one of the few who studied the internal struc-
ture of Chinese enterprises, was confronted with Chinese business failures ascribed to the 
‘speculative nature’ of the Chinese (p. 52). Acknowledging that speculation is a character-
istic of Chinese business, he concludes anyway: ‘But it is doubtful whether Chinese entre-
preneurs are any more speculative in business than their counterparts in other ethnic 
groups.’ (Id.) He should have added: and than Western capitalist entrepreneurs.
Ill. 20. A Chinese junk amidst Southeast Asian and European vessels, ca. 1820
Source: J. Blussé, 1986, p. 152. Note the passenger cabins at the stern of the junk.
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The best-known voyager was Zheng He (or Cheng Ho, 1371-1435).13 He 
was made an admiral of a fleet of 200-300 large, 6-9 masted junks (these 
ships were four times larger than the ship Columbus used). During seven 
trips Zheng He visited Arabia (Aden or Hormuz), East Africa (Mogadishu, 
Malindi), West India (Calicut, Cochin), Ceylon, Southeast Asia (Malacca, 
Siam), South Asia (the Indonesian archipelago). Some say that this fleet or 
ships of it also traveled the Atlantic Ocean. 
Trade was the fĳirst aim, but some suppose that also imperialistic 
motives played a role since a substantial army always accompanied the 
fleet. However, no colonies or even strongholds were established. The aim 
of these voyages was to gather as much knowledge as possible about all 
the countries visited, from which detailed maps and chronicles were pre-
pared (Ma Huan, 1416). 
The military power must have had a defensive purpose, but Zheng He 
used it ruthlessly to suppress the many pirates in the Chinese and 
Southeast Asian waters. Pirates had plagued the lively Chinese or Arabian 
trade and fĳishery in these waters for a long time. Furthermore, these sub-
stantial fleet movements were used to relocate large numbers of Chinese 
Muslims to the nascent Malacca and other places. From that time Malacca 
became one of the most important international trade centers. In addi-
tion, in many countries small settlements of Chinese (mostly Muslims) 
were established along the coasts as trading and industrial centers, or 
Chinese lived in a quarter of an indigenous settlement. 
... their industry and economy …
At the time the Portuguese or Dutch entered the East Indies, every impor-
tant town had such a “colony” of Chinese merchants and shopkeepers. 
From China they imported household pottery and porcelain, cotton 
goods, silk and paper, while they exported to China pepper, nutmeg and 
cinnamon. Junks came and went regularly and in large numbers. It did 
not take long before the Chinese established sugarcane mills; they were 
involved in wine, candle and peanut oil production. The Chinese elite 
from Batavia, Banten or Semarang, who had strong relations with the 
Southeast Asian and Chinese junk trade, also traded in the 18th-century 
in large quantities of opium imported by the VOC from Bengal. Early in 
the 17th-century local Indonesian rulers had already established some 
13 See J. Roberts, p. 172 fff., H. Gelber, p. 88 fff.; D. Willmott, p. 3 fff. and the relevant Wiki-
pedia articles.
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system of farming out monopoly tax rights, including import and export 
duties, the head tax or market fees. 
So the wealth accumulated from several sources and the population 
increased: steadily new immigrants arrived, not the least attracted by the 
lively junk trade or revolts in China (for instance around 1644 when the 
Manchus overthrew the Ming), while there was a growing number of 
Indonesian-born Chinese. In every respect, this was a really free trade and 
not an “ideological one”, including all possibilities for the Chinese to accu-
mulate substantial capitals.
The Dutch, always very busy with war-mongering in the 17th-century, 
needed these Chinese to consolidate their positions. In turn, these 
Western newcomers became another source of wealth for the Chinese. 
This dependence of the mighty Dutch Calvinists created the other side of 
the coin: this Chinese industrial and economical behavior and activity led 
to the “Reverend Arthur Smith reaction” among the Dutch. “The Chinese 
Must Go!” could have been the main drive behind the terrible massacres 
of the Chinese by the Dutch around 1740.14
Rural Chinese groups (not yet defĳined as but practically organized as 
kongsis) protested against their exploitation by Dutch VOC offfĳicials. 
Notwithstanding contradictions between the urban Chinese elite includ-
ing their urban support groups and these rural groups, both sufffered from 
the lethal Dutch repression. The consequence was that other Chinese 
groups tried to join the Javanese indigenous protests against the Dutch 
occupiers. However, they were betrayed by the indigenous ruler, extra-
dited to the Dutch and massacred. This is a typical example of how the 
triangle game between Western foreigners, Chinese foreigners and the 
indigenous elite could be played.
This game remained one-sided as long as the Chinese could only efffec-
tively function as middlemen between the Dutch and the indigenous rul-
ers, merchants or common people. It became a “normal” triangle-game 
when local East Indies rulers and aristocrats started to farm out monopo-
ly taxes and duties, market rights or gambling concessions to wealthy 
Chinese merchants. Until the end of the Rafffles government, the fate of 
the Chinese on this level was not further afffected than in the 1740s. In the 
fully corrupt VOC culture, clever and rich Chinese could gain large advan-
tages. 
14 N. Randeraad (ed.), p. 23-25.
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However, poor Chinese could also benefĳit from a certain trickle-down 
efffect and slowly developed the stratum of Chinese shopkeepers. As usu-
al, the local population did not like to pay taxes and certainly not to 
repressive rulers, as most of them were. Those Chinese who were rich sup-
porters and instruments of those rulers or of Dutch occupiers became 
representative of and scapegoats for the overlords, while all resentments 
could easily be directed against an influential Chinese middle class. This 
could eventually be compared with the basis of the Western antipathy of 
the Jews. The framework is the same at least: the combination of state and 
private capital in privileged positions or even monopolies.15
This picture is not complete without the remark that among the always 
small minority of the Chinese (except in cities as Singapore), there existed 
at least two and mostly three options in the strategy of collaboration 
between the Chinese and others: with the dominant Western colonizers, 
with the indigenous authorities or with nobody. This last option was fol-
lowed, for instance, for a long time after the massacres and wars of the 
1740s. In the 17th and part of the 18th-century, with the extensive junk 
trade between the East Indies, Southeast Asia and China, this option was 
in principal always open to every Chinese.
The 19th-century
The grip of Western foreigners on “their colonies” was strongly intensifĳied 
in the 19th-century, and much changed in a fundamental way on the 
Chinese side as well. As indicated already, the very diffferent 19th-century 
migrations from China happened in several large waves. In the USA, 
Chinese are found from about 1850 onwards participating in the gold 
rushes and the construction of the railway network in very inhospitable 
regions. From Yunnan or several coastal provinces, numerous people fled 
south, establishing permanent Chinese settlements in the cities and 
regions of Thailand, Burma, Malaysia or the East Indies, now called “Dutch 
East India”. Soon they were involved in all kinds of trades in their new 
homes, but sustained relations with China itself. 
After Rafffles and the English occupation disappeared, the Dutch start-
ed a general repressive regime in 1820-1850 by introducing a pass-system 
and travel restrictions for the Chinese; specifĳic Chinese quarters were 
formed, and Chinese living elsewhere were required to move their 
15 See for the well comparable European situation H. Derks (2004), p. 149-187.  
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 residences into these “ghettos”.16 In this well-known, racialist-induced 
segregation of a military-bureaucratic regime, the mask of colonial pater-
nalism was thrown offf in an attempt to regain some “former prestige”. The 
foreign occupiers and their state companies like the NHM took most of 
the opium profĳits, not the well-to-do Chinese middlemen and opium 
farmers, while the Dutch soldiers were among the best opium customers: 
they had to do the dirty work (Java War, etc.). 
But after 1850, Chinese middlemen were soon back in their lucrative 
and dangerous position. The reason for this was that the Westerners could 
not communicate efffectively with the indigenous majority without the 
Chinese networks. In addition, they needed a new kind of Chinese laborer 
to make the “Industrial Revolution” in the homelands complete. The mid-
dlemen were the best at labor acquisition among a new Chinese work-
force.
We already described the example of the exploitation of the tin 
resources on Banka by the Dutch colonial administration and on Belitung 
(Billiton) by Dutch private entrepreneurs. Here and in the Malaysian tin 
mines, the exploitation of a new kind of Chinese worker, the imported 
coolies, took on a grim character like never before: slavery went here hand 
in hand with opium addiction.
As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the kongsi constellation was adopted 
on several levels and for several purposes, which must be kept clearly sep-
arated. First, they were organized for labor solidarity among people suf-
fering the same fate, including induced opium consumption as part of 
their exploitation. It concerned a new phenomenon, Chinese proletari-
ans, who immigrated massively from China, with Singapore acting as a 
central distribution point. For these miners/coolies, indeed, as Trocki for-
mulated: opium was both the worst thing and the best thing available to 
them. 
Of the three options mentioned above, the last one was standard 
among many Chinese coolie immigrants. They remained somehow in 
permanent contact with the homeland, so that they could return to China 
without much difffĳiculty. 
There was also a very diffferent kongsi, however, described by Rush in 
the 1870s when the Chinese opium farming had its heyday. It concerned 
the already long established procedure at the opium auctions of the Dutch 
administration:
16 D. Willmott, p. 6.
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For the Chinese [opium farmers], forming partnerships was among the 
most important aspects of preparing for the auctions. The Dutch required 
prospective farmers to have two formal guarantors who, along with the 
farmer, signed the farm contract and bound themselves to its obligations. 
In most cases these three men ... represented a much larger association of 
backers—the opium farm kongsi—who actually fĳinanced the farms.17 
Only kongsi leaders became wealthy as Chinese opium and tin farmers on 
Banca. On Billiton the private Dutch fĳirm acted, in fact, as the opium 
farmer of the Dutch administration in Batavia and sold opium directly to 
the kongsi people and were paid by their labor; a lethal form of labor last-
ing only a limited number of years and a lethal kind of narcotic compen-
sation. 
On the other end of the Chinese spectrum stood the wealthy and super- 
wealthy. They were the opium kings.
The Rich “Overseas Chinese” and Opium Criminality
If the populations of Hong Kong (before the transformation) and Taiwan 
are included, the total number of “Overseas Chinese” in East and Southeast 
Asia (excluding North and South Korea and Japan) amounts to some-
where between 17 and 23 million in the 1990s, although higher estimates 
exist. Who are the rich huaqiao among them? Certainly a very small 
minority; if we estimate 1% rich people among them (the large majority 
of “Overseas Chinese” now belongs to the shopkeeper category) than we 
are talking about 200,000 people. Opium or drug tycoons, so well known 
today in Colombia or Mexico, were not so prevalent in Asia or Southeast 
Asia in the period until 1950. In this time the trade was largely conducted 
by Europeans (including Jews) and some Parsis from India with Chinese 
support. We now want to deal only with the problem of the latter, who 
operated in organizations conducting numerous kinds of trade, distribu-
tions and so on. 
The Rich
For the present situation Hodder assesses the economic performance of 
this small minority in Southeast Asia only in superlatives.18 They control 
a larger share of regional trade than do other ethnic groups, generating 
17 J. Rush, p. 46. Rush did not write about the Banca or Billiton kongsis.
18 R. Hodder, p. 3, 4.
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the equivalent of a GNP two-thirds the size of China’s. The three countries 
which are populated largely by these Chinese (Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore) possess larger foreign reserves than either Japan or the United 
States. Excluding the fĳirst two, the “funds” of the Overseas Chinese in the 
region are conservatively estimated at $ 400 billion. 
In Indonesia the small Chinese minority controls half the country’s 
trade and about three-quarters of private domestic capital. In Thailand 
the majority of the corporate assets, nine-tenths of investment in com-
merce and manufacturing, and half the fĳinancial resources of Thai banks 
are owned by Chinese. In the Philippines 40% of the assets of private 
domestic banks are Chinese property. And so on and so forth.
Many and varied reasons are given to explain this formidable position 
apart from the broader macro-economic policies or international trading 
strategies pursued by governments. The usual suggestions are that the 
Chinese happened to be in the right place at the right time; that they had 
the skills, drive and commercial experience in urban networks already 
during the period of European imperialism and colonialism; that they 
were patient, hard-working, frugal and possessed sharp business acumen. 
There is much which can serve as a warning against these easy explana-
tions; in particular, the analysis so far.
Hodder’s conclusion is certainly right:
... in reality there is no group, no “Chineseness”: there is only the idea of a 
group, culture or society, and the limited, unidimensional and static pre-
sentation of changing and multidimensional contexts.19 (italics from R.H.)
They do not form a homogeneous group; they originate from many parts 
of China, though mostly from southeastern China; they speak diffferent 
dialects, posses diffferent beliefs and values; they often do not difffer much 
from indigenous people like the babas in Malaysia or peranakan in 
Indonesia; they often adopted indigenous names or foreign religions like 
Catholicism and Protestantism; most of them are nationals. Since the 
dubious racial and racist judgments persist, the “racial purity” (whatever 
that may mean) is very difffĳicult to fĳind since they mixed with indigenous 
peoples from the beginning. “Ethnicity” is mainly conjured up by outsid-
ers and is in this case nearly meaningless.
In short, sweeping generalizations about “Overseas Chinese” or similar 
concepts cannot be accepted. There is simply no monolithic bloc called 
“Overseas Chinese”. The economic success of some of them is to be under-
19 Idem, p. 8. See for the alternative view F. Dikötter, B. Sautman (ed.).
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stood partly by European colonialism, the Communist revolution of 1949, 
Japan’s economic growth (itself built upon American strategic concerns). 
Most crucial in Hodder’s perception
is the desire of many Chinese to achieve material progress or, more accu-
rately, the desire of many Chinese to “turn” institutions towards the exten-
sion, safeguarding, legitimization and institutionalization of trade and its 
associated wealth values.20 
In a less abstract way characteristics of the Overseas Chinese super rich 
can be given as follows. Indeed, one generalization is probably appropri-
ate: one is confronted here with real capitalists operating in a real free 
market: free for them (and monopolies for others). Two controversial 
things often form the lucrative, starting activities to make the jump to the 
top: opium and local politics; once on the road to the top, it is necessary 
to free oneself of both. 
“Free” is related to an overriding characteristic of their capitalist activi-
ties: free from active involvement in politics, and free from the bureau-
crats by bribing them. Besides these “apolitical” elements, crucial 
economic elements should be added that were derived from their loca-
tion: only these “Chinese Overseas” had a threefold advantage by remain-
ing strongly in touch with the motherland, whatever the political regime 
in China or in their own settlement. 
First, the profuse selling of many cheap gadgets, small and bulk prod-
ucts in the immense Chinese open internal market. The conglomerate is, 
therefore, the most beloved company model. Second, the efffective use 
of the internal Chinese mega-sized industrial capacities, which were 
established very quickly after 1900. They can potentially outdo every kind 
of competition in their branches. The third advantage concerns the inter-
action between the previous two and fĳinancial and investment programs. 
Such a large internal open market for the Chinese, and a large competing 
open market outside China, is not available anywhere for others.21 
For those who could profĳitably exploit these opportunities, there was 
only a limited need to deal in opium and a limited willingness to take the 
risks of losing the opportunity to exploit the indicated threefold advan-
tages. In economic terms: the chance that a management of risks in deal-
ing with very large money capitals will lead to a zero-solution is high, and 
20 R. Hodder, p. 22.
21 See for modern data the articles ‘Industrial Policy’, ‘Industrialization’ and ‘Informa-
tion Technology’ in D. Leese (ed.), p. 486-492.
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certainly much higher than those super-rich who remain involved in poli-
tics as well. In other words: dealing with many large countries, with many 
products, with many branches outside the political conflicts carries a very 
low risk and the strongest possible basis for accumulation of capital. 
There are rather interesting biographies of the (super)rich and power-
ful Chinese in Southeast Asia.22 One example will sufffĳice here, and it con-
cerns the Semarang-born Oei Tiong Ham (ca. 1866-1924).23 
Oei was the last of Java’s nineteenth-century Chinese “kings” and the 
fĳirst of the 20th-century corporate businessmen and modern community 
leaders. Of course, he was ‘opium monopoly holder for Semarang and 
three other residencies, had made a profĳit of 18,000,000 guilders’.24 His 
father, Oei Tjie Sien, arrived in Semarang in 1858, having fled China during 
the Taiping chaos, married into a locally established family, and made a 
successful and traditional career of peranakan: fĳirst, a small shop (his 
‘Kian Gwan kongsi’); next, a bigger one; savings enough to take advantage 
of an economic crisis and to buy an opium farm for a bargain, which was 
lost by another; once economically established, he also became socio-
politically involved by his nomination as Chinese lieutenant of Semarang. 
This combination was the basis for a quick accumulation of capital: after 
the fĳirst opium farm, he acquired four others. The basis he laid for the 
career of his son Oei Tiong Ham was, in all respects, solid. 
Although Oei Tiong Ham never learned Dutch, kept Semarang as his 
hometown and always spoke Amoy-Chinese or Malay, he was one of the 
fĳirst to wear European dress in public, cut offf his Manchu queue, which 
was followed by many other radical changes. Around 1900 the Kian Gwan 
kongsi was extended into a Kian Gwan Handelsmaatschappij with still the 
largest opium monopoly and sugar monopoly in Java.
In the meantime, however, a shipping company was added. Soon his 
company became one of the largest exporters of all kinds of products, 
moved to Singapore, abandoned Chinese bookkeeping practices, hired 
teams of Western-trained accountants, and so on:
22 See part III in J. Butcher, H. Dick (ed.), p. 249 -281 with fĳive biographies.
23 For the following see Idem, p. 272-281; D. Willmott, p. 24 fff. and J. Rush, p. 248-252.
24 D. Willmott, p. 24. On Idem, p. 149 we learn that Oei Tiong Ham netted this sum 
only with opium in the years 1890-1903. Also at that time an extraordinary amount of 
money. Compare this with the Singapore table 34 p. 454 in which a monthly net profĳit of 
$30,000 per month is given; over 13 years this is about $5 million. 
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Oei’s true competitors were not his fellow Chinese merchants, but large 
European trading fĳirms ... such fĳirms as the Nederlandse Handelsmaatschap-
pij [NHM] and the Internationale en Handelsvereeniging Rotterdam ...25
As described in ch. 18 the NHM became not only the largest industrial 
and commercial Dutch conglomerate, but laid the basis for its Dutch 
monopoly position through an original and solid opium position. In 1924, 
therefore, Oei’s fortune and commercial “empire” can be measured in val-
ues amounting to hundreds of millions. 
Criminality 
In ch. 31 the item of “Chinese opium criminality” is discussed in detail, 
but this concerns the situation inside China from about 1900 to the estab-
lishment of Communist China. There is less information about Chinese 
opium criminality in Southeast Asia.
The logo of the Southeast Asian opium problem, the Golden Triangle, is 
at the moment directly connected to narco-criminality on a world scale. 
This phenomenon started not earlier than World War II. It is perfectly 
possible that the leaders in Burma, Thailand, Laos, Singapore, etc. used 
local Chinese. It seems to me the most insignifĳicant feature of the drugs 
criminality in Southeast Asia whether or not local Chinese were available 
in those functions. Of course, it does not make any diffference in the pres-
ent Opium (and its derivatives) Problem. 
Is that true? Not entirely: if that kind of ethnicity could be attested, it 
could be used in Western anti-Chinese propaganda in many kinds of rac-
ist discourses and publicity campaigns. Secondly, there is the reasoning: 
since “Overseas Chinese” became fabulously rich, they stand, “therefore”, 
at the basis of this Golden Triangle story. Take Ronald Renard’s remarks in 
his opium history about new banks established in Thailand after 1960:
These fĳirms were generally dominated by fĳirst- or second-generation immi-
grants from southern China. Their emigration ... had been taking place since 
the mid-nineteenth-century ... many stayed in Thailand, others returned, 
out of which emerged a network linking the Overseas Chinese with those 
in China ... these Chinese controlled the conglomerates … By the 1960s, 
most of the country’s [Thailand’s] major commercial banks and principal 
trading houses were run by these families. Rags to riches stories abound. 
To mention just ... a family in the pawnshop business expanded in real 
25 J. Rush, p. 250. 
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estate, establishing the Land and House real estate company capitalized at 
62 billion bath in 1995 ...26 And so on.
This, however, is calling a Chinese connection “fundamental”. In this way, 
decades ago, every flu in Europe was called “Mao flu” (Mao exists, flu 
exists, but the combination is pure propaganda); today it is “Mexican flu” 
and that is “also” a major drugs paradise! 
As indicated above, even the CIA was aware of the fact that the Chinese 
were not involved in poppy production around 1950. This concerned, 
however, only, the Chinese inside China and the CIA of about 1950, which 
rapidly changed colors. And today these Chinese play at best a small role 
(if any) in this area, but historically and thanks to Yunnan production, we 
have to talk about a Golden Quadrangle until the new Communist regime 
terminated the connections with the Golden Triangle (see further ch. 31).
Daniel Goh’s clear analysis of the political factions and ideological 
stands of “Overseas Chinese” before 1942 and the large contradictions 
between the several new China-oriented groups (from Nationalists to 
Communists) is not very helpful. It is certainly too adventurous to move 
from this to linking an opium banking network between “Overseas 
Chinese” and Communist Chinese at the time. 
Anyway, Renard provides only loose threads in a highly complicated 
history. These arouse suspicions, but have limited value in a proper 
research study with proper questions. For instance: How to defĳine or 
understand a criminal relationship between Chinese-outside-China and 
opium in the pre-1950 period? Trocki sketches the problem at stake in the 
following way:
Opium, the preparation, distribution, and consumption of which was the 
other integral part of the Chinese economy of Singapore, was not only part 
of the system of labor exploitation but actually made the system work to 
the profĳit of the shopkeepers, the secret societies, the revenue farmers, and 
the colonial government. Opium was the grand “common interest” of the 
Anglo-Chinese elite of Singapore. For the laborers, it was both the worst 
thing and the best thing available to them … the worst because it was addic-
tive, and habituated consumers were ready to sacrifĳice fĳirst their profĳits, 
then their labor, and fĳinally their lives and futures to obtain it … the best 
because, in an environment so deprived, it was virtually the laborers’ only 
source of pleasure. Not only did it substitute for women and banish loneli-
ness, but it may have been more than a luxury when the workday was long 
and the toil strenuous.27
26 R. Renard (2001), p. 23, 24. If I have counted well this is still US$ 1.8 billion at a rate 
of 100 baht = US$ 3!
27 C. Trocki (1990), p. 67.
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This concerns largely the consumer side of the problem, and since all or 
most of the involved parties in Singapore had a keen interest in opium, 
including the addicts, criminality or perpetrators were difffĳicult to identi-
fy.
On the production side of the Opium Problem, the connection is also 
difffĳicult to fĳind: the production was in the hands of non-Chinese tribal 
groups or concentrated in non-Chinese countries in Indian and European 
hands. Therefore, one has to look for them in the trade, distribution and 
fĳinancial sectors. New research has to uncover the relevant data. We need, 
however, to obtain some indication about what was meant by “criminali-
ty” in earlier periods.
The historical record provides some examples of this last problem. 
Around 1800 the Chinese traveler, Ong-Tae-Hae, keenly observed, for 
instance, the customs under a corrupt VOC regime and how “Overseas 
Chinese” merchants reacted to it. About these Java-Chinese he wrote:
Our rich merchants and great traders amass inexhaustible wealth, where-
upon they give bribes to the Hollanders and are elevated to the ranks of 
great Captain, Lieutenant, Commissioner of insolvent and intestate estates 
… but all of them take the title of Captain ... When the Chinese quarrel or 
fĳight, they present their cause to the Captain ... The rights and wrongs, with 
the crookeds and straights of the matter, are all immediately settled, either 
by imprisonment or flogging, without giving the afffair a second thought. 
With respect to flagrant breaches of the law and great crimes ... reference 
must invariably be made to the Hollanders. Those who journey by water 
and land must all be provided with passports, to prevent their going and 
coming in an improper way; from this may be inferred how strict the Hol-
landers are in the execution of the laws, and how minute in the levying of 
duties.
 The life of man, however, is not required at the hand of his next neigh -
bor.28 … when men are killed, they are either thrown out into the streets, 
or sufffered to float downstream, every one being silent without inquiry, and 
nobody daring to stand forward as a witness. Alas! alas! that the important 
afffair of human life should after all be treated so lightly. With respect to the 
Dutch, they are very much like the man who stopped his ears while stealing 
a bell. Measuring them by the rules of reason, they scarcely possess one of 
the fĳive cardinal virtues …29
28 The 1850 editor adds: ‘In China, if a dead body is found, the nearest inhabitants are 
taken up and required to discover the culprit; the Chinese writer laments that it is not so 
in Batavia.’  
29 Ong-Tae-Hae, p. 4; see also D. Willmott, p. 148, 149.
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As if the above is not enough, there follows a long, harsh and impressive 
criticism of the Dutch that I had never encountered before or since: the 
Dutch do not score satisfactorily on any single feature of these fĳive cardi-
nal virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety,wisdom and truth): ‘it 
is scarcely worthwhile wasting one’s breath upon them’!30 But Dutch gar-
dens south of Batavia are beautiful and in their manners Europeans aim 
to be polite against the rich and powerful “other”.
Again, who was wrong and/or a criminal? The answer is clear: the 
Dutch had stringent laws with heavy penalties to prevent, for instance, 
bribery in any form, and that was not the case among “Overseas Chinese”, 
wealthy or not. In addition, the Chinese were apparently not instructed 
about these Dutch laws, which were for them anyway laws of foreign bar-
barians with red hair, long noses, grey eyes.
However, this example already provides a main criterion, a legal one: if 
a law is violated, it is a criminal act, which can and has to be punished. 
Indeed, no laws, no crimes? The historian and sociologist will point to 
other circumstances and, at least practically, to diffferent criteria. Take 
already an obvious extension to the argument given: no state, no laws, no 
crimes? This refers to a rather famous discussion about the so-called 
‘primitive law’, which will not be repeated here, at very least because 
“primitives” do not create an Opium Problem. 
However, in that discussion the moral value of a law which is imposed 
on the “primitives” by a foreign state was not a theme, while at the 
same time it was a law exclusively aimed at these “primitives”. The highly 
ambiguous nature of this was also known among “primitives” 200 years 
ago and relative to opium. Ong-Tae-Hae wrote in 1791:
In every case it is the same. At the same time Europeans forbid their people 
the use of this drug, and severely punish those who trespass; how is it then 
30 See also Ong-Tae-Hae, p. 14, 15 where he severely criticizes the Javanese from Ban-
tam, because they are so afraid of the ‘Hollanders’, building them even a fort which has the 
sole aim to control them, erroneously thinking that the Dutch respect them; etc. The 
Dutch only ‘form plans for entrapping the people … till they have sufffĳiciently subdued 
their minds ..’. Ong-Tae-Hae forgets or does not know how the people from Bantam in a 
decades-long struggle against the Dutch were repressed in a genocidal way from the harsh 
reign of Governor-General J. P. Coen onwards. So, their fear is well grounded and perhaps 
became a basic element in their collective memory. There is a Dutch translation of Ong-
Tae-Hae’s booklet: ‘Chineesche aanteekeningen omtrent Nederlandsch-Indie’ (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhofff, 1858). However, it has only 48 pages of the 80 + xv in the English 
translation of W. Medhurst. I could not fĳind a copy of it to check whether the fĳierce criti-
cism of the Dutch had been censored or not.   
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that we Chinese, together with the Javanese, are so thoughtless as to fall 
into the snare!’31 
Without any doubt this is a strong legal argument: the Dutch VOC-State 
used its excessive violence and the fear of it to impose their Western mar-
tial law, which had nothing to do with the laws and customs of indigenous 
Javanese or “Overseas Chinese”. Furthermore, they created a habit of opi-
um smoking among a mass of Javanese based on this basic fear, in order 
to tame those “primitives”. This law was exclusively issued for the sake of 
a profĳit for the foreign VOC-State.
Many questions arise now: was this allowed according to the prevailing 
international law (Grotius, etc.)? Was opposing this law a criminal act? 
The dominant Calvinist Dutch must have afffĳirmed these questions, 
because they formed the government imposed upon the pagans thanks to 
God’s will and by virtue of their Christian civilizing mission. Anyway, they 
sometimes punished violations severely, as mentioned earlier (ch. 13 and 
15). But, even today, these Calvinists and their Christian enemies have 
never succeeded in convincing Asian people of their West European and 
Christian truth. They yielded fear, but not respect. 
Speculating about Ong-Tae-Hae’s answer and assuming that he experi-
enced the opium smuggling practices of the British and Americans back 
in China, he must have known which scenario would follow. The next 
step could be to protest publicly (which was done by the Chinese govern-
ment, in vain); to take prohibitive actions (which was done by the Chinese 
government, in vain) and to start a defensive war (which was done by the 
Chinese government, but it lost). What next? There was not yet an 
International Criminal Court. In fact, it was Mao Zedong in the 1950s who 
introduced the fĳirst efffective systematic anti-opium measures in history—
whatever one thinks about it. 
Back to Ong-Tae-Hae’s Java and the bribery example. This shows that 
what was a criminal act in Holland or in the VOC was not the case in 
China or among “Overseas Chinese”. It must have been around 1725 that a 
Dutch Governor-General punished bribery in a draconian fashion for the 
last time; after that date, this never happened again. The social and eco-
nomic practice apparently undermined the validity of this Dutch law, 
although it formally did not disappear (nor did bribery: in the 1930s high 
Dutch police offfĳicials in Java demanded bribes from Chinese opium 
 dealers; ch. 19). 
31 Idem, p. 19.
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During the VOC era offfĳicials should be judged in a diffferent way than 
for the period after 1820 when the Dutch attempted to establish a state in 
the East Indies. The VOC bosses in Amsterdam wanted to prevent their 
employees conducting all kinds of business for themselves; in the state 
period, the state-bureaucratic offfĳicials should not be bribed, because they 
had to stand above all parties and interests to safeguard the common 
good, or to judge sine ira et studio. In the VOC period a practical argument 
was dominant, and in the state period, an ideological one.
It is certain that Oei Tiong Ham bribed a Dutch offfĳicial to get his title of 
lieutenant (later major). In many cases, this illegal practice should be a 
reason to change the law. In addition, there were no offfĳicial or legal crite-
ria for becoming a captain. The practice in the East Indies was, fĳirst and 
foremost, to promote a person who could be a good “tool of the Dutch”, in 
Singapore a “tool of the British Empire”, etc.32 
After 1865 the criteria for the nomination of Chinese offfĳicials in 
Singapore were stated by the British Governors as ‘details of Chinese 
racial character, such as natural corruptibility, criminality and clannish-
ness …’33 Stronger even than the Dutch, the British were willing to change 
the basis under the law to declare the giver of a bribe as a criminal rather 
than the British receiver of the bribe.34 This was not a “normal” criminal, 
but somebody who had a racial inclination to bribe people, who was a 
natural criminal. 
Again, many Chinese being a “natural trading folk” had no law against 
bribery; they felt that nearly all acts in life were a matter of supply and 
demand; they were the real “free traders”. However, there must have been 
exceptions, otherwise all moral criteria (and there were many of them, for 
instance, in Confucian value schemes) would be invalid. Opium was such 
a subject, which was prohibited time and again not only by Chinese 
32 D. Willmott, p. 151.
33 D. Goh, p. 490. His article is one long discussion about the criteria of Chinese “unof-
fĳicials” as ‘loyal colonial subjects’ or not and how these changed in the course of time until 
1942.
34 Now many Western companies are competing heavily to get a Chinese profĳitable 
relationship, they bribe Chinese offfĳicials on a large scale. The Los Angeles Times (August 
10, 2007) reports that Zheng Xiaoyu, head of China’s food and drug agency, was executed 
because he accepted a bribe of $850,000 from Western pharmaceutical industries. The 
title of the article is: ‘Chinese bribes: Better to give than to receive’ and inside it reads 
‘Bribe-givers tend to get offf relatively easy in China, according to legal experts, govern-
ment statistics and media accounts.’ The same procedure was demonstrated in the recent, 
well publicized Rio Tinto (Australia) afffair in which the four receivers of bribes got draco-
nian sentences. See The New York Times, March 29, 2010.  
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emperors (law), but also in moral codes and public opinions (Confucianism 
or Taiping ideology). 
Gambling was another vice defĳined by Ong-Tae-Hae as a ‘perversion’. 
With special dances and songs the Chinese in Batavia were enticed by the 
Chinese gambling farmer (who paid 10% of the stakes annually as tribute 
to the Dutch).35 Earlier I quoted extensively about how he castigated the 
use of opium by “Overseas Chinese” and Javanese as well as the conquer-
or’s invention of ‘the black fumes of opium’. 
How strong Ong-Tae-Hae condemned the opium “invention” or gam-
bling and the perversion of Chinese farming these activities, he had no 
“crime defĳinition” for it as Westerners had. The authorities in China at the 
time used criteria like “bad for the health and the mind”, “bad for society” 
as this “perversion” was the subject of business in the streets, “depen-
dence on uncivilized barbarians”, apart from macro-economic complaints 
about the loss of silver, etc. In China he could have referred to verdicts 
(“laws”) of the Emperor, which was not the case in overseas territories, 
which at that time had been conquered by the Dutch more often than 
not.36 
One may suppose that the rich “Overseas Chinese”, who were also opi-
um farmers, had no scruples about earning money in the opium business 
because their activities were extensions of foreign-induced trade, of the 
law-makers themselves and, therefore, legal (= without danger). What 
Hodder stated above seems applicable here as well, that there is ‘no 
“Chineseness”, there is only the idea of a group, culture or society’: as per-
anakans they lived outside China in a fully diffferent world in between a 
dominant small minority of heavily armed Western people and a large 
majority of non-Chinese: materially on the side of the British, French or 
Dutch; culturally on the side of the Malayasians, Javanese, etc. 
As in between people, however, there are again several modes of 
 behavior, which are very diffferent for the rich and for the large majority of 
the “Overseas Chinese”: in the process of accumulating wealth, they lost 
every trace of an in-between position and became “Western” (see rich 
Singapore and Hong Kong Chinese) and freed themselves of dependence 
and of such things as opium. 
If “Overseas Chinese” operate as opium (heroin, etc.) criminals, then it 
must be in a Western environment, Western gangster methods, etc. and 
35 Ong–Tae–Hae, p. 61, 62.
36 Idem in his Section III he describes most islands in the whole archipelago and 
always mentions whether they are subjected to the Dutch.
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in all probability in combination with other Western criminal activities 
like gambling or prostitution. “Ethnic Chinese” are no longer seen as 
Chinese, but as other Western citizens who can be cheated, exploited, etc. 
But even in this milieu one may expect the development that as someone 
becomes richer, he moves away from the bad activities and looks for a 
more “honest” fĳield. A remarkable example of this is given by Sinn. 
She describes how a notice in a San Francisco Chinese newspaper 
warned consumers against fake opium (14-1-1906).37 Two fĳirms, claiming 
they were renowned and registered in Hong Kong and Macau, announced 
that they sold opium from old raw Patna (India). In support, they also 
state that their brands are patronized by rich merchants in the USA. Their 
warning concerned the activities of criminals using their names to sell 
cheap and low-grade opium under false pretexts. Only one person, Mr. 
H. G. Playfair, was authorized to import their product. 
This is a good example to introduce the following section in which the 
“New Imperialists”, Japan and the USA, write their part in the History of 
the Opium Problem and implement the most extensive criminal laws 
against opium production and consumption.




It is important to stress again that this part of the History of the Opium 
Problem refers to the opium history up to the 1950s (1954 Dien Bien Phu). 
However, this history has the most serious consequences for its future up 
to the present, much more than the other parts. Therefore, these reflec-
tions are devoted to one question: why did such consequences follow 
from the history as described? It is clear that an answer cannot be given in 
a systematic way. That must be reserved for another study, but these 
reflections show that such a study could have several advantages.
1.
The Southeast Asian opium economy was relatively unchanged at the end 
of the Second World War and ready to play its role in the new era of the 
Cold War. Before Afghanistan took over the lead, the Golden Triangle 
region of Burma, Thailand and Laos was the largest producer in the world. 
“They” increased the total production from about 80 tons a year to 1,000-
1,200 tons by the end of the Second Vietnam War.1 
However, that was not yet apparent directly after World War II. Foreign 
opium supplies (Iran, India, etc.) were imported again legally, and the 
overland smuggling from Yunnan flourished also. The number of 
Indochinese addicts had grown as well, which was estimated at 250,000 
around 1970. 
Singapore and Malaysia formed exceptions as the number of addicts 
dropped sharply from about 186,000 in 1945 to 40,000 just 25 years later. 
 2.
Three main features of the Southeast Asian opium constellation should 
be highlighted: apart from their mutual competition (with Siam-Thailand 
as a bufffer state) there were the continuous attempts of the British and 
1 A. McCoy et al. p. 87.
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French to use all the northern and northeastern borderlands as potential 
inroads into China. The conquest of this huge country, using ‘the Golden 
Road to Cathay’, was the long-term goal. The short-term goal with the 
highest priority was to establish an opium infrastructure; not for long, 
because the white Christian civilization at home was against opium 
addiction and—as a French offfĳicial wrote—he and his fellow colonists 
‘cannot be the treacherous executioner (le bourreau empoisonné) of these 
peoples’.
This leads directly to the second main feature. The mutual competition 
of the French and British facilitated in all possible ways the trade position 
of the tribal regions in Southeast Asia, and on top of this, the China con-
quest option had the same efffect. Together they made the position of all 
the regions of the so-called Golden Triangle nearly unassailable and 
extremely desirable. Since the borderland with China was geopolitically 
the most important one, I propose talking about the Golden Quadrangle.
Both features are directly connected with the third one, which is relat-
ed to the tools to achieve the indicated goals: whoever was in power in the 
Golden Quadrangle always used the tribal narco-military regimes. They 
were armed by foreign narco-military powers, whether offfĳicial ones and/
or political-criminal ones like uncontrolled secret services with their 
“licenses to kill”. 
3.
Indeed, French involvement in highly war-stricken Southeast Asia was 
strongly intertwined with the British before 1900 and with American opi-
um policies after 1945. The opium production areas in the north or north-
eastern parts of Burma, Thailand and Laos became the practical centre of 
interaction between the Western opium policies and their militant ethnic 
producers; the main cities in the realm (Bangkok, Rangoon and Singapore) 
became the distribution and money centers, delivering the opium and its 
derivatives to all corners of the world.
These remote regions could expand and become institutionalized in 
world-economic and world-political schemes because the Western mili-
tary and political powers, including their local allies, gathered here to 
fĳight nationalism and communism. “Vietnam”, the former French 
Indochina, was the country in which these fĳights were repeatedly decided 
in favor of anti-Western policies and could not be connected any longer 
to opium as under the French and American regimes.
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4.
Opium policies became the most beloved tools in the harsh ideological 
and political struggles of the Cold War. The reverse is also true: opium 
production, consumption, distribution and criminality took on world 
dimensions because opium became the main tool in the anti-China poli-
cy. That became clear around 1950 for the insiders and during the Second 
Vietnam War for everybody.
Before that period, the USA’s criticism of classical colonialism and 
imperialism was still strong enough to avoid “classical imperial actions”. 
This was probably the background to the CIA report of 1956, which was 
certainly not welcome to the Harry Anslinger crusaders in the USA (see 
ch. 28 below), the Taiwan Nationalists and anti-Communists or 
Nationalists in Southeast Asia. Still, the Cold War had already left serious 
impacts on this report, starting with the formulation of the task the CIA 
had to fulfĳill: ‘to obtain sufffĳicient reliable information to characterize the 
possible involvement of Communist China in the opium situation in 
Southeast Asia and in other markets.’2 
The conclusions of the CIA at this juncture are remarkable, and show a 
quite diffferent perception to a decade later in the midst of their strong 
illegal involvement in Laos, Burma and South Vietnam. Therefore, they 
are worth summarizing in the following section.3 
5.
A small amount of raw opium produced by minority tribes in Yunnan is 
exported to Burma, the value of which does not exceed $500,000 annu-
ally. Any Communist Chinese involvement could not be more than toler-
ating ‘unruly tribal producers’ busy with their ‘traditional economic and 
social pursuit’. 
The ‘major opium producers in Southeast Asia are Burma and Laos’, 
not China. Coupled with Thai production facilities, they supply a large 
domestic market and provide a sizable export potential. Bangkok is the 
main export center from Southeast Asia, supplying signifĳicant quantities 
of opium to Malaysia, Hong Kong, Macao and Indonesia. ‘Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Macao are important intermediate transit points for the supply 
2 Central Intelligence Agency, p. 24.
3 Idem, quotations come from p. 24-26.
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of opium to other world markets.’ Refĳinery facilities to service the markets 
for morphine, heroin, etc. are established mainly in Thailand, Hong Kong 
and Macao: ‘There is no evidence that Communist China exports opium 
derivatives.’
Southeast Asian producers receive only a very small return for their 
opium crop. Opium produced for the illicit trade is apparently in surplus 
supply. ‘This surplus may be the result of the virtual disappearance of the 
former large Chinese market since the generally successful opium-addic-
tion-suppression campaign of the Chinese government on the Chinese 
mainland.’ The middlemen and government offfĳicials get the lucrative 
profĳits, and do this job purely ‘for personal gain’. Members of local 
Communist parties may be involved in order to fĳinance their activities, 
‘but there is no available evidence indicating that such involvement is 
substantial or that it is systematically directed by the Chinese Communists. 
The trade appears to be dominated by non-Communists … There does not 
appear to be any evidence of Chinese Communist influence in this trade 
[of opium derivatives. H.D.]’. ‘One US seizure report indicates that 
Communist China was the suspected origin of a shipment of contraband 
heroin which was transshipped from Hong Kong. Hong Kong authorities 
and US Treasury representatives in Hong Kong state, however, that they 
have no evidence that opium or derivatives from Communist China enter 
Hong Kong.’ These are the CIA conclusions so far.
6. 
Foreign opium was always imported to French and British Southeast Asia 
from India and the Middle East. After the British left the realm, it seemed 
as if Southeast Asia was totally cut offf from all foreign opium. On top of 
the British disappearance came the collapse of the French colony. In the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954) the Vietnamese people demonstrated 
again that they wanted to be liberated from Western occupation, includ-
ing its opium regime.
At the same time other major developments had created drastic chang-
es in the international opium trade:
a. In 1953 the major opium-producing countries in Europe, the Middle 
East and Southeast Asia signed the United Nations protocol: no selling of 
opium for legalized smoking or eating. One consequence was that the 
Golden Quadrangle became again a Triangle:
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Although this international accord ended large shipments of Iranian opium 
to the Thai and French opium monopolies, international smugglers simply 
took over the Iranian government’s role.4 
b. Much more serious was the victory of Mao over the nationalists of 
Chiang Kai-shek. The last supporters of the latter (a Kuomintang militia) 
were driven out of Yunnan. Consequence:
... the People’s Liberation Army began patrolling the border in the early 
1950s ... most opium caravans were halted. By the mid-1950s People’s 
Republic agriculturalists and party workers had introduced substitute 
crops, and any possible opium seepage into Southeast Asia ceased.5 
c. The changes in the international opium trade thanks to the earlier 
decisions and developments favored Iran. This country became the major 
supplier of Southeast Asia. In 1953 it provided nearly half of all opium 
smuggled through routes via Lebanon, Arab states and Europe. This gave 
Iran substantial revenues but also a bad reputation in Asia, which was not 
in the interest of the Shah’s foreign policy. Consequence:
... in 1950 Iran began to reduce production sharply; exports declined from 
246 tons in 1950 to 41 tons in 1954. The fĳinal blow came in 1955, when 
the Iranian government announced the complete abolition of opium grow-
ing ... Turkey fĳilled the void in the west, but Southeast Asia was now at a 
crossroads.6
d. There was, however, a strong force counteracting all previous favor-
able developments. The USA did not wanted to accept the loss of this 
French colonial bulwark against the “Commies”and jumped into this 
position. 
7.
Before he started speculating in 1972 about “What Can Be Done?” to end 
‘America’s heroin plague’ (see part 7), Alfred McCoy described a kind of 
fĳilm scene symbolic of the international entanglement of several nations 
in one area and in one product, opium and its main derivatives, heroin 
and morphine.7 
4 A. McCoy et al, p. 88 referring to the reports of the Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs, “The World Opium Situation” (Washington, DC, 1970).
5 Idem, p. 88. 
6 Idem, p. 89.
7 Idem, p. 352 fff.
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A crude opium den in a corner of a Yao village general store is occupied 
24 hours a day. It is located not far from the Kuomintang (KMT) head-
quarters, whose soldiers frequent the den. Near to it lies the rest of a road-
building works started by a US combat engineering unit. It concerns a 
road built under the auspices of USAID’s “Accelerated Rural Development 
Program”. The false impression is given that while development aid 
arrived, it only helped the counterinsurgency: the road is meant to give 
easy access to rugged mountain areas in times of insurgency. What is cer-
tain is that the KMT’s involvement in the international narcotics trafffĳic is 
strongly facilitated by this road.
Before the KMT caravans leave for Burma, arms, mules, and supplies are 
shipped up this road. And after they return, opium, morphine base, and 
no.4 heroin come down the road on their way to the international drug 
markets. The road has reduced the KMT’s transportation costs, increased 
its profĳit margin, and improved its competitive position in the international 
heroin trade. 
It is a typical example of the way the American secret services worked 
(and work), how the US allies against the “Commies” were supported, and 
how these allies received “additional income” in the narcotics business, in 
particular by doping the generous USA! 
8.
The opium potentials of Southeast Asia were not exhausted with the 
destruction of the French opium colony. Earlier, the USA-CIA started to 
develop the former British colony, Burma, into Myanmar and one of the 
largest narco-military powers in the world. This happened with remark-
able success. Although its opium production had decreased since 1996, 
the UNODC Report 2009 on Southeast Asia states in the preface:
Worrisome is the situation in Myanmar where cultivation is up for the third 
year in row—an 11% increase from 28,500 ha in 2008 to 31,700 in 2009. 
Most of this increase came in the Shan State where 95% of Myanmar’s 
poppy is grown. More than a million people … are now involved in opium 
cultivation in Myanmar, an increase of more than a quarter over 2008.8 








Compared to all previous imperialist powers, Japan was formally the last 
nation which started imperialist adventures by waging war with Russia 
and China and occupying and exploiting foreign countries (parts of them) 
like Formosa, Korea and North China from 1897 onwards. 
The deliberations of the International Opium Commission in Shanghai 
(February 1909) revealed many tensions between the imperial powers. In 
the US delegation, missionaries like Tenney and Brent exerted great influ-
ence. They could not understand the British reluctance to move rapidly 
toward comprehensive opium controls. Their intellectual and political 
level is best characterized by their report to the US Government which 
states:
That part of the convention having to do with central governmental control 
of the drugs is based on the best European and Japanese practice, which on 
the whole is far in advance of the practice of our Federal Government.2
The European practice has been described in detail in the previous chap-
ters and the American one will follow in the next. So, how far in advance 
was Japan? 
Commenting on the results of the next international conference on 
opium (Geneva, 1924-’25), the British ambassador to Japan, Charles Eliot, 
could not answer this question. He informed his London base:
I do not understand very clearly what has happened at the Opium Confer-
ence except that Japan is taking sides with America against us. This no 
doubt means that Japan is glad to show America that in spite of the exclu-
sion clause she has no objection to friendly cooperation on occasion. It is 
also a hint to us ... Japan also sometimes feels it prudent to defer to this 
1 For the general background of this chapter I relied much on W. Walker III. Only 
quotations from it will be indicated. It is, furthermore, advisable to study B. Wakabayashi 
to discover specifĳic backgrounds (ethnic diffferences involved, post-war Japanese political 
correctness or ideological constraints on historical scholarship) relative to the ‘imperial 
Japanese opium operations ‘ in China and elsewhere. The following chapter is, in fact, a 
quick overview of these operations. 
2 Quoted in C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 637. Bishop Brent and Dr. Tenney were the lead-
ing fĳigures of the Philippine Opium Commission (1906), see below, and Brent was again 
the main voice in this Shanghai commission. For Brent see D. Musto, passim.
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same powerful country though in so doing she may to her great regret 
inconvenience her former ally.3
The British, let alone their diplomats, did not understand that the end of 
the British Empire was a fact after World War I. Japan and the USA had 
taken over; they supported each other in many fĳields as “New Imperialists”, 
although they were also competitors. Mutual praise and criticism could 
be noted. 
Probably this British ambassador read in the then famous American 
Terry’s Guide to the Japanese Empire the abundant praise for Japan which 
gave Manchuria (not yet conquered!) ‘a promising future’ while it is ‘being 
developed and modernized by the capable and progressive Japanese’.4 
Notwithstanding the Chinese initiative to build the link to the Trans-
Siberian Railways, the Guide continues, it is thanks to the ‘present able 
Japanese management [that] the rapidly spreading system has become 
one of the great highways of the world, and it is as modern, as safe, and as 
dependable as the best American railway’. The ‘order-loving, thoughtful 
Japanese are of imperishable interest to the average traveler’. The Japanese 
victories at Port Arthur (1894 and 1904) ‘have made of the region one of 
the most interesting and instructive battle-fĳields.’ And so on. Other 
remarkable examples of American “Japanophile” behavior are given 
below.
However, it is almost certain that this British ambassador did not have 
the information discovered by a journalist of the New York Times fĳive 
years earlier. This journalist reported in a very long and detailed article 
(February 1919) that the Japanese government ‘secretly fosters the mor-
phia trafffĳic in China and other countries in the Far East …’ He further 
informed his readership that ‘morphia’ can no longer be purchased in 
Europe, but that the seat of industry 
has been transferred to Japan, and morphia is now manufactured by the 
Japanese themselves. Literally, tens of millions of yen are transferred annu-
ally from China to Japan for the payment of Japanese morphia ...”5Before 
discussing the serious contradictions at issue, fĳirst, a brief sketch of the 
Japanese background is necessary. 
3 Quoted by H. Goto-Shibata, p. 97.
4 Terry’s Guide, p. 756.
5 Quoted in E. La Motte, p. 11.
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A Domestic Opium Problem
After the Meiji revolution (ca. 1867-1877), a radical oikoidal political 
economy developed in Japan.6 From the start of industrialization, a close 
cooperation was established between the state (including the emperor) 
and economic family trusts (Mitsui, Yasuda or Sumimoto). As pure oikoi, 
like that of the Western Rothschild, they controlled banks, industries or 
trade. They urged control of foreign resources (coal, etc.) and markets for 
their end-products, which became the basic motive for Japanese imperi-
alism and the military build-up. The military state power and its monop-
oly of coercion also became subject to competition between oikoi, the 
clans of the Choshu (army) and the Satsuma (marine). 
Whatever their mutual diffferences, the main targets of all interests 
were Formosa (Taiwan), Korea and, in particular, China. What all other 
imperialist powers did (army to conquer, opium to addict China) was 
copied by this newcomer in the usual excessively violent way. It arrived at 
its targets much more quickly, however: apparently, it had no time to lose 
to become a “honorable member of the imperial (opium) club”. 
Also in this Japanese variable of the well-known story, the attackers 
cannot claim that they did not know what opium was all about. In the 
midst of the Meiji Revolt or “Restoration”, the very fĳirst statement of the 
new government, issued in June 1868, with orders to post it throughout 
the country, was:
Opium is a product that decreases a person’s energy and shortens life. For-
eigners are forbidden by treaty from bringing it in[to Japan], but recently 
[the government] has found out that it is being smuggled in, which will lead 
to disaster if it spreads among the public. Buying and selling are of course 
prohibited, as is smoking. Violations of the prohibition policy will be 
severely punished. This [policy] will be strictly observed in perpetuity.7
Selling drugs for profĳit was punishable by beheading, and the maximum 
penalty for enticing people into smoking opium was death by strangula-
tion; for consuming it, one could be banished or imprisoned. Knowing 
how corrupt bureaucrats are, the Japanese anti-opium law did not forget 
the offfĳicials who had to uphold the law: if they failed, they were liable to 
the same penalties.
6 For the Meiji revolution see my contribution to H. Derks (ed., 1989), p. 164 fff.  
7 Quoted in J. Jennings (1997), p. 8.; also for the following Idem, chapter 1.
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Before this Meiji Revolt, the Japanese elite knew enough of the political 
troubles surrounding the introduction of opium. The humiliating assault 
on China by the British and French in order to spread opium was fraught 
with unpleasant possibilities for Japan. 
Both the Western aggressiveness and the devastating efffects of opium 
were heightened by the Americans. They wanted to be in the Shogun’s 
good graces after their own assault on Japan (Perry’s squadron, 1853) and 
outdo their British competitors. The fĳirst American consul-general in 
Japan, Townsend Harris, played upon those fears four years later. He 
described the trouble opium had brought to China: millions of Chinese 
were addicts; the yearly opium import cost $25 million; etc. Harris paint-
ed the potential future of Japan:
Opium is the one great enemy of China. If it is used, it weakens the body 
and injures it like the most deadly poison; it makes the rich poor and the 
wise foolish; it unmans all that use it, and by reason of the misery it brings 
robbers, and acts of violence increase and … England will not prohibit it, 
because the trade is profĳitable ... China has prohibited the importation of 
opium, but the English bring it in armed vessels and smuggle it in. ... It 
appears that the English think the Japanese, too, are fond of opium, and 
they want to bring it here also ... the English want to introduce it into Japan.8 
Of course, Harris did not mention that American clippers were found 
among the main opium smuggling ships and American fĳirms among the 
main providers, and of course, he told his Japanese diplomatic partners: 
‘If you make a treaty with the United States and settle the matter of the 
opium trade, England cannot change this, though she should desire to do 
so.’ This message must have had the envisaged efffect, because a year later 
Japan signed a treaty with the Americans, which was a clear break with 
the past since Japan only traded with the Dutch and Chinese until that 
date.
There was, however, a remarkable provision in the commercial treaty 
between the USA and Japan (1858): American ships could import opium, 
but not more than three catties (four pounds) per ship. This treaty became 
the model for similar treaties with the Netherlands, Russia, England and 
France. I do not know how many Western ships arrived each year, but the 
total import must have been far from full prohibition. The acceptance of 
opium import by foreigners, and therefore domestic consumption, meant 
that Japan became “a little bit pregnant” with an opium problem.
8 Quoted in Idem, p. 7.
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In the following years they were confronted with British smuggling 
practices, other attempts of Western powers to force opium trade on 
them and, in particular, the smoking attitudes of Chinese sailors and resi-
dents. Observations like the following about their habits say something 
about the panic-stricken reactions of Japanese authorities:
In the Chinese merchant ships ... they smoke something called opium-
tobacco. This is a paste stufffed into the bowl of an opium pipe, lighted and 
smoked. One of the qualities of opium is that one never feels sleepy; con-
sequently, the pilots use it in order not to fall asleep at sea ... However, this 
opium is smoked in doses, and if the dose is exceeded, it becomes a poison. 
Moreover, many pilots die after three or four years. Everyone says that the 
poison of opium brings on other sicknesses.9
Later (1868), a Nagasaki newspaper reported about the death of four 
prostitutes allegedly because they got opium from Chinese residents. 
Apparently, it concerned an anti-Chinese racist action, but the authori-
ties reacted by publicly posting a proclamation with the warnings:
Opium smoking scorches the lungs and deranges the mind, and fĳinally it 
causes addiction and is a threat to life ... Now [the government] ... discov-
ered that the vice is being gradually spread from the Chinese to our own 
people. Therefore, from now on it is forbidden to land [opium] ...10
It was the beginning of a national anti-Chinese campaign after the Japan-
China negotiations (1871) remained ambiguous: Japan decided unilater-
ally to inspect all Chinese ships for opium and all houses of the Chinese 
community in Japan. This led to serious incidents. The Sino-Japanese War 
was then not very far offf. 
These far-reaching anti-opium actions were counteracted by a gradual 
development into an opium monopoly of the government. First, the gov-
ernment tried to control the local distribution of foreign opium, but 
accepted more responsibilities and took steps to improve and regulate 
production for medical use only. That did not remain confĳined to medical 
use, but another market was provoked; smuggling and smoking increased; 
more control and bureaucratization were the answer. In 1876 the next 
step was taken to a full-fledged opium monopoly of the government. One 
reasoned:
9 Quoted by J. Jennings (1997), p. 13. About the earlier Chinese-Japanese relations, 
see J. Murdoch, vol. III, chapter 3 and p. 272 fff. 
10 Idem, p. 13.
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that if the government directly imported the drug to make up for shortfalls 
in domestic production, smuggling and opium smoking could be more eas-
ily suppressed.11 
This monopoly was still confĳined to medical production and consump-
tion with the necessary import. The morphine content was important for 
the Japanese physicians. In 1880 the production was not more than 262 
kilo raw opium, which increased six years later to 975 kilo annually. The 
cultivators received ‘6.3 yen per 375 grams of opium with a morphine 
content of 6 percent, and a bonus of 0.7 yen per additional percentage 
point of morphine content’.12 
These rather contradictory domestic experiences led to a rather conse-
quent approach of “victims of opium” in conquered territories (advertised 
as “soft”) and a quick and more extensive establishment and management 
of an Opium Monopoly. Japan with its image as the modernizing Asian 
power par excellence was at that time also an example for Chinese stu-
dents. Returning from Japan they ‘agitated for opium control after seeing 
a government monopoly there and on the island of Formosa apparently 
reduce the incidence of smoking’.13
Were these students victims of efffective propaganda? Japanese imperi-
alism can easily be judged as one of the harshest forms of a narco-military 
regimes. Even this is a “profession” which must be learned, and in Formosa 
a certain “soft” approach was practised. Wasn’t it? 
The Annexation of Formosa /Taiwan
When Japan occupied Formosa as the outcome of the Chinese–Japanese 
war (1895), it received public approval from the American government 
and public opinion. That was three years before the USA followed this 
example and occupied the Philippines (see next chapter). The two new-
comers on the international scene created for each other the “right” to 
follow the old colonial and imperialist practices. As the old ones had done 
so successfully, both newcomers were willing to exploit the immanent 
weaknesses of the beleaguered Ch’ing dynasty.14 
11 Idem, p. 9.
12 Idem, p. 10.
13 W. Walker III, p. 14.
14 An interesting reflection (1919) on the new ascendancy of Japan in the Far East is 
S.G. Chen, p. 278-289.
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Most symbolic for this constellation was a long and unbelievably posi-
tive article in The New York Times (25 September 1904) about the Japanese 
occupation and colonization of Formosa, in particular about its opium 
policy. It is titled: ‘Savage Island of Formosa Transformed by Japanese. 
Wonders Worked in a Few Years With a People That Others Had Failed to 
Subdue—A Lesson for Other Colonizing Nations’. The message: the Chinese 
were ‘glad’ that Japan ‘demanded’ such a wild, primitive, opium smug-
gler’s nest to civilize. The Spanish or Dutch colonizers ‘gave it up in 
despair’; the French and English preferred ‘not to put their foot’ on such a 
savage island, while for the Chinese government it was an outlet for its 
own outlaws, pirates, robbers and similar individuals or bands. Before dis-
cussing this article, it is good to comment fĳirst on the allegedly savage 
character of Formosa, a main “argument” to capture it “rightly”.
A Former Formosa15
It was the Portuguese who gave this island offf the Chinese coast its best-
known name Ihla Formosa (Beautiful Island) in 1544. Spanish traders 
from the Philippines followed, but both refrained from colonizing it for 
some reason or other. The Dutch, eager to trade with China, decided to 
occupy the island (1624) and largely used it as a service station for the 
ships sailing to China and Japan.16 A story about the ‘original sin’ is con-
nected to this Dutch stay in Formosa: the Dutch brought opium to the 
East Indies and then to Formosa. Owen, reproducing Engelbert Kaempfer, 
states: 
Here the malaria-tainted jungle made opium an esteemed addition to the 
rudimentary materia medica. Opium divans soon appeared and with them 
confĳirmed addicts, who, in the words of a Chinese writer, unless they “be 
killed will not cease smoking”. Once in Formosa the new vice easily found 
its way to the mainland.17 
This is simplifĳied historiography. The Chinese, however, did not accept 
this occupation and defeated the Dutch through the mediation of a kind 
of pirate king, Zheng Chenggong (“Koxinga” ). He transformed Formosa 
15 See for the following www.howardscott.net; www.maritimeheritage.org/ports/tai-
wan.html; 
16 One of the best descriptions of the Dutch trade in Japan is still J. Murdoch, vol. III, 
chapter VIII; about Formosa, p. 276 -281. F. Gaastra has next to nothing of interest and 
mentions Engelbert Kaempfer as the main source of Murdoch’s story only once in passing 
(p. 106).  
17 D. Owen, p. 15. See also H. Morse (1926), vol. I, p. 5, 44.
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into a Chinese trading center for the Portuguese, British, French or Dutch 
and integrated the island better into the extensive Chinese trade net-
works. Remarkably enough, this Koxinga was also made a Japanese hero.18
Until the Chinese prohibition laws of 1729, opium smoking was con-
fĳined to Formosa and Fukien (Owen). Indeed, Formosa was always inti-
mately connected in the Western perception with the opposite islands 
and cities of the mainland, Amoy (now Xiamen) and Ku Lang Hsu (now 
Gulangyu), about 150 miles from Formosa. Everywhere in the realm lived 
pirate-fĳishermen of Japanese and Chinese origin, who regularly raided the 
Fujian coastal settlements and captured foreign ships, smuggled salt and 
opium in the 19th-century. 
They must have learned about that profĳitable product from pirate-
smugglers of European origin, who settled in this region as well, and 
undertook opium smuggling as the most lucrative contraband. It seems 
appropriate to identify the latter with the heavily armed American opium 
clippers who could sail through the Formosan Channel against the north-
east monsoon. They were often the property of the British opium dealers 
Jardine-Matheson & Co. or the American Dent &Co. Owen talks about the 
glorious reception of one of these clippers, the Eamont, by the Formosan 
“natives” and “whites”: 
On one occasion she was sent to open Formosa as an opium market, and 
in the course of her visit, had to repel the assault of hundreds of natives as 
well as to ride out a typhoon. Everything was shipshape aboard the better 
clippers, the crew well paid and well fed. One of the Eamont’s company has 
testifĳied that “The offfĳicers of Her Britannic Majesty’s ships on the station 
were very often delighted to come on board these opium-clippers and spend 
a pleasant evening, the more so that the table was much better than any of 
the hotels that were then in existence in the far-offf Eastern land”. Service 
on a clipper was regarded as a desirable appointment ...19 
If a Western opium dealer’s representative has to “open” Formosa for the 
opium market around 1830-40, it must be clear that before that time 
Formosa was “closed”. Apart from this, the quotation shows how the nar-
co-military relationship was celebrated in luxury in its earliest phase.
After the First Opium War the Ch’ing government was obliged to des-
ignate Amoy as one of the fĳive Treaty Ports (1842), after which Ku Lang 
Hsu became the internationally notorious center of excessive gambling, 
drinking, prostitution and opium trade. Most of the wealth on display on 
18 J. Murdock, vol. III, p. 275.
19 D. Owen, p. 201.
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Ku Lang Hsu is to be seen in the still present colonial architecture repro-
ducing the opium profĳits of the former owners. 
In the 1870s the export of sugar brought riches to the Takow traders, 
but according to the well established colonial system, the British tried to 
“balance” their sugar trade with opium; if necessary, opium of the lower 
Persian quality.20 Soon sugar made up fully 90% of the export and opium 
90% of the import. 
At that time (ca. 1865) the Dutch physician, Jos Bechtinger, needed 
twelve days to travel in a Chinese junk and in bad weather from Amoy to 
Formosa’s Tamsui, near the present Taipei.21 During his stay, Bechtinger 
met Odd, a British opium dealer from Dent & Co. in Hong Kong who was 
stationed there. This man had his opium store in a ‘customs offfĳice’ run by 
an American, John Dodd. Bechtinger experienced the lawless life there, 
when the British opium dealer cut the queue of a Chinese worker, whom 
he had caught stealing. A German opium dealer, Mellet, described how he 
had chased away Chinese employees, who had removed the gunpowder 
from his canons, and so on. They became Bechtinger’s friends. 
These opium dealers traveled the islands to sell opium to Chinese and 
tribal people, who lived a quite separate life. Other Westerners from 
Poland or Spain visited Formosa at the same time. All were attacked by 
the Chinese and/or “savages”, of which there were many tribes. 
Bechtinger’s story gives the impression that Formosa was divided between 
Chinese villages or small towns with a Chinese population on the coasts 
and several tribes in the interior. The latter are painted as savages, some-
times cannibals; the former as inimical to the white foreigners. All inhab-
itants are described in a rather denigrating way.
Other Western travelers reported in 1888 how the original population 
mixed with Chinese in East Formosa. About the last of the indigenous, 
daughter of a king, he said:
One daughter remained; she married a Chinaman, took to opium and sold 
the crown to some Chinese virtuoso. By the way, the aboriginal women, 
who marry Chinese, nearly all become confĳirmed opium-smokers. Their 
husbands are chiefly to blame, by enticing them to try just one smoke, as 
they clean and light the pipes.22
20 Idem, p. 287, 288.
21 J. Bechtinger, p. 3 fff.
22 Quoted from an interesting series of old articles reproduced on the website http://
academic.reed.edu/formosa/intro.html. Parts of Bechtinger’s story can be found there as 
well. The quotation is from G. Taylor’s article in The China Review, 16 (1888). The next one 
is from J. Thomson’s article in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 53 (1873). The 
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An earlier (1873) report of a British geographer-discoverer tells:
The imports of Takow consist of opium, cotton and woolen piece-goods, 
raw cotton, hemp bags, nankeens and prepared tobacco; and the chief 
exports, of brown and white sugar, sesamum-seeds, rice, sweet potatoes 
(extensively used as food by the natives) ... The enormous increase in trade 
and the corresponding revenue is mainly due to the energy of the foreign 
traders, although partly to the slightly more liberal policy of the Chinese 
Government and to the rapidly developing resources of the island … 
This optimism soon faded away because the arrival of the steamers made 
it necessary to improve harbor facilities, but the local Ch’ing leadership 
failed to do this, and the trade shifted from Takow to Anping. This is prob-
ably one reason why the Ch’ing lost confĳidence in Formosa and were will-
ing to accept the Japanese demands in the Sino-Japanese war. 
Another reason, or indication of this, could be the desolate condition 
of the Chinese soldiers on Formosa, who could not match the vigilant 
Japanese army. A Presbyterian missionary, George Ede, visited the camps 
of Chinese soldiers in Eastern Formosa which were ‘anything but clean’ 
(1891). He also saw:
Of the sixty soldiers at this camp only three did not smoke opium. The 
whole set of them were in a most plighty condition. Many were in rags, and 
not a few had their bodies covered with most offfensive sores. On asking if 
the soldiers had not regular drill, I was told by a fellow-traveler that the only 
exercise they went through was with the “big gun”, which is a name jocularly 
given to the opium-pipe … In place of money, the soldiers receive a large 
share of their wages in opium. Most of the men say that they began taking 
this … “dirt” … to alleviate the pain of their body ailments, for they have no 
means of obtaining medical treatment in times of trouble.23 
When the Japanese army entered Formosa a short time later, they did not 
fĳight these poor soldiers alone. The New York Times provides the details.
A “New Formosa”
Japan took until 1901 before the ‘last revolutionary elements’ were killed.24 
The country enjoyed ‘only a few years of complete peace’. Indeed, these 
six years of war must have been a very bloody and costly afffair. It was the 
same kind of information about the opium import-export of Formosa (Takow) was given 
in 1867 by N.B. Dennys.
23 The quotation is from George Ede’s article in the Presbyterian Messenger (1890-
1891) given on website in the previous note.
24 For the resistance of the Formosans see C.-M. Ka, p. 83 note 1.
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fĳirst assault of the Japanese army on Chinese soil. But the journalist 
reports simply that already in 1901, ‘the natives begin to understand the 
blessings of Japanese rule and to praise it’! The ‘enlightened laws of Japan’ 
were introduced and applied in full measure for the Japanese colonizers, 
but not for the uncivilized aboriginal inhabitants, who were unable to 
appreciate civilization without training. 
Every new colonizing regime is eager to improve the infrastructure 
(roads, railway and telecommunication) in order to make the repressive 
military more mobile. For the homeland the resources of the colony are 
exploited (here: forests and mining). For their own colonizing settlers, 
health and medical provisions must be made similar to the standards of 
the homeland. They become show places for foreign visitors, seldom plac-
es where indigenous people were cured in a relevant way. The same is 
true for the educational facilities. Japan did or intended to do all this in 
Formosa and later in Korea. The unnamed reporter of The New York Times 
noted everything.
However, he spends the fĳirst half of the article blessing the Japanese 
rule, the new and soft opium policy:
Even the opium habit has in so far been respected that the natives are not 
punished for consuming opium, though opium smoking and dealing in 
opium is a crime for which Japanese citizens in Japan and in Formosa as 
well are punished with penal servitude of varying degrees. 
The Japanese government has adopted a policy of making ‘the opium 
trade a monopoly, which it judiciously uses for at the same time permit-
ting and discouraging opium smoking’. Full control is organized around 
consumption, addicted persons (clearly defĳined as ‘opium smokers’), dis-
tribution by means of opium dens, import, and so on. 
Also statistics are included. According to The New York Times there 
were about three million inhabitants on Formosa in 1900, of whom 
exactly
169,064 were opium smokers. By the end of March 1902, only 152,044 were 
registered and licensed as opium smokers, the decrease of 17,020 having 
been caused by death or by the discontinuance of the opium habit, and this 
number will no doubt rapidly be further reduced by the wise policy that is 
being pursued. The value of the opium imported was fĳixed in 1900 at an 
amount of 3,392,602 yen. The obvious result three years later was ‘1,121,455 
yen only’. 
It is, of course, doubtful whether one could have statistics, let alone reli-





































































should have been very suspicious when hearing that 17,020 people died 
from opium smoking in a short time. This is impossible. These fĳigures 
must be seen, therefore, as advertisements of the good, wise, Japanese 
colonization.25 
The following table demonstrates this again.







% of total 
revenue
Opium 






Smokers as % 
of population
1897 1 640 210 30.9 100 50 597 2.1
1899 4 249 577 41.8 124.6 130 962 5
1901 2 804 894 23.9 35.4 157 619 5.7
1905 4 205 830 19.4 33.2 130 476 4.2
1909 4 667 399 15.2 21 109 995 3.5
1915 5 870 408 15.3 50 71 715 2.1
1920 7 847 739 9.5 --- 48 012 1.3
1930 4 349 818 4.4 --- 23 237 0.5
1935 2 567 588 2.1 --- 14 644 0.3
1940 2 278 542 0.9 --- 8 594 0.14
The New York Times reports that the general revenue in 1896 is 2,711,822 
yen; in that case the opium revenue must be about 60 per cent of the 
total revenue. The efffects of an opium monopoly are seen, for instance, in 
the fĳigures of 1909 and 1915: while the number of licensed smokers 
decreases by about 40%, the revenue increases by 30%: the prices of 
the opium for the consumers are strongly increased by “the dealer”.27 
25 In the most positive assessment one can imagine that the Japanese fĳixed a certain 
number of smokers in say 1903 or 1905. To show for the outside world how “good and wise” 
their treatments were, one has to fĳix a much higher fĳigure earlier in time, etc. Again it must 
be remembered here that smokers are not identical with addicts.
26 A combination of the tables 2.1 and 2.2. in J. Jennings (1997), p. 24 and 29. These 
fĳigures are in variance with those mentioned in T. Tong Joe, p. 70. The latter are based on 
a Japanese article (1924) and a speech of the Japanese representative, Sugimura, in the fĳirst 
International Opium Conference. The fourth column is derived from C-m. Ka table 2.2 and 
2.3, p. 55, 56.
27 T. Tong Joe, p. 69 fff. accepts everything that the Japanese propaganda states: there 
is no opium smuggling in Formosa, not only because of an efffective police force but also 
thanks to the very low prices asked of the addicts, so that smuggling is not lucrative. The 
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What cannot be shown is whether there was the usual corruption of the 
monopoly offfĳicials in Formosa. In most other cases (the VOC and EIC cor-
ruption with their government backing were notorious), it remains 
impossible to trust the cat to stay away from the cream. The price manip-
ulations clearly point to an afffĳirmative conclusion. 
In Japan the colonization of Formosa was not popular, because it was 
too costly due to the underestimated resistance and, therefore, long mili-
tary involvement. It was even proposed to sell Formosa to a Western 
country.28 The fourth governor-general, Kodama Gentaro, and his civil 
afffairs bureau chief, Gotō Shimpei, came up with a new approach: in 
short, Formosa had to pay for itself, but this deserved an initial invest-
ment for roads, railroads, harbors and, of course, prisons. Gotō had made 
a master plan to develop the infrastructure of Formosa (1898). Earlier 
Japanese investments were only directed at colonial government build-
ings and military expenditures. The new master plan focussed on eco-
nomic growth and exploitation of the island; the fĳinancing involved, 
therefore, a government loan of 35 million yen to the Japanese Formosa 
administration that should be repaid with interest. Land tax reform was 
one source of revenue.
As a means of repaying public debts and reducing Japan’s fĳiscal burden in 
a period of public disapproval of the colonial adventure ... Gotō explored 
another important source of revenue: government takeover of the monop-
oly benefĳits held by foreign traders on opium and camphor [sixty per cent 
of the import was opium]. An opium bureau was set up in 1897 to monop-
olize the production and sale of opium. According to Gotō’s plan, opium 
prices would be marked up to obtain an annual income of 1.6 million 
yen. Combined with the customs on opium imports, this revenue would 
allow the government to gross at least 2.4 million yen annually, about 
as much as the tax revenues of the Offfĳice of the Governor-General in 
1897.29
It is like reading a report of a Dutch, British or French colonial Governor-
General. Indeed, whatever the diffferences in the details, once again the 
twofold function of opium in the exploitation of a conquered foreign land 
is documented here: to pay the cost of the military conquest and occupa-
tion, and to keep the opposition in the population under control; a third 
price is only a quarter of the Hong Kong price: 117 Yen per kilo for fĳirst-class opium and 
87.6 Yen per kilo for second-class.
28 See C-M. Ka, p. 50 fff.
29 Idem, p. 53, 54.
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and fourth function could be developed only on top of these two: to 
 conduct a profĳitable international business for members of the occupying 
power elite and to make a sound basis for further conquests. 
The main efffect of the narco-military monopoly also here in Formosa 
was that the government had to become the dealer in all respects and 
chased away all foreign competitors. It also had to look overseas for 
resources and to become a player in the international opium game, 
including smuggling practices. 
The opium monopoly triggered others: in camphor, tobacco, salt and 
alcohol. Indirect taxes could be kept as high as 50-60% of the tax revenue 
at the expense of the consumers. 
The Japanese knew perfectly well that
the measures employed to achieve fĳinancial independence were expedients 
that could cause embarrassment if discovered by foreigners or the newly 
colonized people and could never be relied on permanently.30 
Gotō stated this later in a lecture to the Yuki club. A clever remark 
showing understanding for the fact that you cannot continue to turn on 
the tax screw, but he did not mention the opportunities given: being so 
experienced, the same tactic could be repeated after a new conquest. 
That is what Japan did. and the fear of foreigners could be sublimated as 
well. 
New imperialists are, indeed, modernized. Not only occupation and 
exploitation of foreign territory are saved, also modern public relations in 
attracting tourists. This documents the rather rare American Terry’s Guide 
to the Japanese Empire.31 In it, Formosa is ‘a bizarre blend of civilization 
and savagery’, and it offfers ‘the blasé traveler an unusual thrill—that of 
hobnobbing with savage head-hunters who secretly covet the visitor’s 
head but are prevented by Japanese law and watchfulness from taking it 
unless the traveler is willing!’ The tourist can watch savage dances under 
the secure protection of ‘their Japanese masters’. Their aim was to make 
of Formosa an exceptionally attractive tourist resort with its mixture of 
savagery and modern hotels and comfort.
There is praise in this Guide of 1930 for the 
advanced educational ideals of the Japanese as colonizers’ while rescuing 
‘a savage race from moral, commercial, and intellectual oblivion’ in a ‘war 
30 Idem, p. 54, 55. See also Idem, p. 61
31 Terry’s Guide, p. 761-791.
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of regeneration or extermination … being conducted with characteristic 
Japanese vigor’. These savages ‘die in defense of their wretched huts … 32 
The Japanese guards of the tribes live in bamboo houses along a broad road 
cut through the cleared jungle ‘surrounded by barbed-wire fences, and sup-
plied with fĳirearms, grenades, fĳield-guns, telephones, etc. ... entanglements 
are electrically charged and sunken mines are laid for the savages.33 
In short: highly attractive for American tourists who can play the hunting-
savages game here and attend the show because ‘sometimes whole par-
ties are ambushed and massacred’.
Elsewhere on the island one could enjoy other spectacular things:
The Monopoly Bureau where the bulk of the world’s supply of camphor is 
refĳined, and where all the opium smoked on the island is elaborated, is 
highly interesting. ... The visitor is shown the complicated process of ... treat-
ing the crude opium. The hotel manager will plan a visit ...34
The tourist information about opium (in Japanese ahen, afuyō) is quite 
precise and allows us to cross-check the offfĳicial data given in the table. 
There are also marked diffferences with the Dutch East Indies practices. 
After some remarks about the origin of opium and the information that it 
is forbidden for Japanese to smoke it, the description of their opium fac-
tory is as follows:
The process of crushing it [the imported raw opium from India, China or 
Turkey. H.D.], then steaming it in huge vats, and adding wine and other 
relishes to impart a piquant taste, is interesting. The rooms are fĳilled with 
the disagreeable odor of burning medicine. None of the 300 or more 
employees smoke. The fĳinished product is packed in 1-lb tins in three 
grades; the best quality retailing for about ¥21, the 2d at ¥17, and the 3d 
at ¥13. The Bureau pays out about 5 million yen a year for materials and 
for expenses, and nets about 1 million yen—a considerable item of the 
island revenue. There are upward of 100,000 smokers in Formosa, each of 
whom uses about 37 grains a day, for which 6 sen are paid. The death-rate 
among them is high.35 
There are in 1930 apparently four times as many smokers as given in the 
table. However, if all these 100,000 smokers have to pay 6 sen a day for 
32 Idem, p. 763 and 769.
33 Idem, p. 770. The description continues with many kinds of morbid details.
34 Idem, p. 781.
35 Idem, p. 782. In 1930 a yen equals about half an American dollar; one sen equals 
1/100 of a yen (Idem, p. xix). The purchasing power of a dollar was large: from Seattle to 
Japan a fĳirst-class cabin on a luxury steamer cost about $200, to Hong Kong $290, etc.; a 
‘Round the World Tours’ (from Seattle via Shanghai, Singapore, Suez to London and back 
to New York) for $910. 
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their dose, the total annual income is about ¥ 219 million, which is fĳifty 
times more than the income given in the table ! If one, furthermore, thinks 
about opium as a ‘considerable item of the island revenue’, it concerns a 
statement ‘considerably’ beyond the aim of the Japanese colonizers that 
this opium contribution should be as greatly diminished as possible. With 
this outcome all other fĳigures become suspicious, and specifĳic questions 
(like: who has pocketed all this non-registered money?) demand new 
investigations. 
Another rather unknown aspect of the Japanese occupation of Formosa 
concerns the Japanese cocaine production. De Jong mentions that 
Japan and Formosa use nearly all their leaves to produce cocaine. They use 
themselves the largest part of it and export the rest. Formosa exports most 
leaves to Japan.36
Their cocaine production is as follows:
Table 37. Japanese Cocaine Production, 1934-1939 (x 1kg)37
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Japan 910 900 900 896 900 900
Formosa  40  84  75  90  85  80
Total 950 984 975 986 985 980
The conclusion seems to be that one attempts to hide the reality behind 
the announcement of the outstanding colonial performance of the 
Japanese apostles of civilization, and has to tame the brutal and system-
atic elimination of defenseless indigenous peoples by means of cocaine, 
opium and its derivatives. 
The Korean Case
Opium smoking in Korea was a late 19th-century phenomenon. It arrived 
in all probability from neighboring Manchuria around 1880 when the 
British import into China had reached its highest levels. Like all other gov-
ernments, the Korean one prohibited the use, cultivation and import of 
opium and even of opium pipes (in vain). In 1910 the Japanese took over 
control, and they repeated the prohibition according to the strict Japanese 
law. Everywhere in the spheres of Japanese influence, however, the con-
36 A. W. de Jong, p. 884.
37 Idem, p. 884.
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tradiction between law and practice was dangerously large. That was well 
known internationally but was not always opportune in the diplomatic 
discourse.
The New York Times (March 30, 1919) published a long letter presented 
to the American minister in Peking written by the representatives of the 
Korean people living in China. It is one long complaint about the Japanese 
colonizers, their economic, religious, ethnic and cultural exploitation. 
They also wrote:
The Japanese Government has established a bureau for the sale of opium 
and under the pretext that opium was to be used for medicinal purposes 
has caused Koreans and Formosans to engage in poppy cultivation. The 
opium is secretly shipped into China. Because of the Japanese encourage-
ment of this trafffĳic, many Koreans have become users of drugs.
This cannot be very far from the truth. First, opium addiction was offfĳi-
cially eradicated thanks to severe punishments, but morphine and heroin 
addiction was introduced and encouraged without any form of efffective 
control and with very low fĳines. In 1924 ‘there were four thousand addicts 
in Keijo (Seoul) alone, creating “enormous havoc”. Nor was the problem 
confĳined to the cities’.38 Six years later, there was a thousand more, repre-
senting only a fraction of the total.
Furthermore, Japanese Korea emerged as a major exporter of raw opi-
um, because the Japanese pharmaceutical industry used the colony as 
resource production in North Korea. It established a branch offfĳice and 
morphine factory in Keijo as well. The colonial government apparently 
created the demand through its soft morphine policy. 
It was still not large enough. Along the border with China, illicit pro-
duction and smuggling developed during World War I. This created a dis-
parity between an offfĳicial anti-narcotics policy and an attractive extension 
of a profĳitable market in Korea and abroad (mainly China). 
An opium monopoly was established in 1919, which was inefffective, if 
one expected to eradicate the opium and its derivatives problem. Under 
this monopoly, production, distribution and consumption increased dra-
matically, and the relations with the Japanese-controlled parts of North 
China, the Kwantung Leased Territory and Manchukuo, intensifĳied year 
after year. The following table provides the details. 
38 J. Jennings (1997), p. 31.
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Table 38. Opium and Narcotics production in Korea, 1930-194139














1930 1 400 736 35 572 195.58 103.1 10.93
1931 5 654 1 054 166 051 272 155 12.49
1932 7 634 1 087 235 153 274.93 135.79 10.35
1933 14 059 2 241 401 149 267.01 156.76 ---
1934 11 339 2 178 343 028 310.32 100.81 9.9
1935 18 348 2 481 565 922 84.25 --- 5.03
1936 27 305 2 385 796 776 --- --- 11.9
1937 28 848 2 557 792 618 --- --- 59.71
1938 27 712 5 004 718 914 87.05 --- 22.4
1939 27 702 6 597 724 245 141.57 4.1 45.38
1940 32 929 7 295 1 348 821 239.03 2.7 25.01
1941 50 725 8 462 2 592 661 --- --- ---
It may be true that the rapid emergence of Japan as a major producer of 
narcotics was ‘a response to the international shortage of medicinal drugs 
during World War I’ (Jennings), but the nationalism in Japan with its 
strong imperialistic drive and immanent racism vis-à-vis the Chinese and 
Korean “races” created that dangerous combination between military and 
industrial interests, the narco-military state. In one international confer-
ence after the other, Japan erected a smoke-screen to hide vigorous activ-
ities on the military and opium fronts. 
The Japanese colonies of Korea and Formosa were used as the basis for 
the opium assault on China. ‘At Harbin and Mukden, the drug trade was 
in the hands of Koreans who seemed to local offfĳicials to have no other 
way of making a living.’40 The open hostilities in China began in 1937, but 
their previous history must be elucidated as well.
39 J. Jennings (1997), p. 36 and 37 adjusted by Idem (1995), p. 814, 815; why Jennings 
added the fĳigures for 1938-1940 in his table 2 and not in the more recent publication is 
unclear. They are reproduced here as well.  
40 W. Walker III, p. 90. The ‘North China Imbroglio’ is covered by Idem p. 90-96.
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 The Opium attack on China
The “Roaring Twenties”
Neither its victory over China in 1894-1895 nor its defeat of Russia in 
1904-1905 lead to the acknowledgment of Japan as world power. This 
acceptance had to come, fĳirst, from the almighty British Empire. Several 
agreements with the British (1902, 1905 and 1911) gave their relation-
ship the status of an alliance. For Japan there were two main aims: protec-
tion of its naval-building program and of its opium policy, i.e. its prominent 
role in the lucrative morphine trade. Japan and the British Empire both 
had strong interests in blocking the proposed anti-opium reforms as long 
as possible, and for both, China remained the largest market of their 
addictive products. 
The astonishment of the British ambassador Eliot (1925) quoted in the 
beginning of this chapter had, indeed, some reasonable grounds. Still, 
between the last agreement and 1925, a world war had happened and 
Japan’s opium interest in Asia was about to replace the British. The British 
opium policy was attacked not only by the new imperialists, America and 
Japan, but also from within, a rather powerful British and European anti-
opium lobby. 
Japan’s Chinese opium interest tried to infĳiltrate Manchuria steadily. 
In the Japanese perception, opium and its derivatives were major tools to 
conquer larger parts of China, exploiting the one revolutionary upheaval 
in China after the other. The main motives to attack China militarily and 
with opium addiction programs originated ultimately from Japanese rac-
ism: Chinese were “by nature” inveterate opium consumers because they 
were culturally and racially inferior to the Japanese race and culture. 
As a general statement, here is one example of this Japanese opinion: 
Despite its disastrous aftermath, the Chinese believe in the medicinal qual-
ities of the drug, and they blow smoke in the faces of new-born children to 
make them utter the fĳirst cry. Smokers are in misery until they procure 
opium, and if thwarted will become frantic and commit excesses.41 
The long Chinese tradition of anti-opium measures could scarcely result 
in Japan’s sympathy. Thanks to the active pro-opium policy of the Chinese 
warlords, Japan was constantly re-afffĳirmed in its racial thinking and anti-
Chinese attitudes and practices. 
41 Terry’s Guide, p. 783.
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In the period 1910-1920 Japan became the largest opium buyer in 
Calcutta.42 It apparently tried to copy the earlier British Empire policy in 
China. Members of a White Cross association from Seattle, connected to a 
China Club, disclosed a more complicated relationship in 1920:
that foreign morphine was being shipped across the United States to Japan 
to be smuggled into China and also that some American narcotic drugs were 
going to Japan for eventual use in China.43
Many people cried shame about this afffair. It urged new US legislation 
after commercial interests from Seattle convinced members of Congress 
that the US was ‘poisoning’ its relation with China, a ‘customer … able to 
take more American goods than any other nation’. In addition, an inter-
national conference immediately noted that Japan promised ‘the strictest 
possible investigation into the illicit trafffĳic in morphine’, whereupon it 
advised the Japanese government to clear up the discrepancies between 
the Japanese import and export statistics.44 It is the diplomatic language 
customary in an abstract world which starts bothering about their mutual 
relations only after crimes against humanity are committed in the real 
world.
That was also the case now, as the New York Times (February 14, 1919) 
reported in full detail:
In South China, morphia is sold by Chinese peddlers, each of whom carries 
a passport certifying that he is a native of Formosa, and therefore entitled 
to Japanese protection. Japanese drug stores throughout China carry large 
stocks of morphia. Japanese medicine vendors look to morphia for their 
largest profĳits. Wherever Japanese are predominant, there the trade flour-
ishes. Through Dairen, morphia circulates throughout Manchuria and the 
adjoining province; through Tsingtao, morphia is distributed over Shantung 
province, Anhui, and Kiangsu, while from Formosa morphia is carried with 
opium and other contraband by motor-driven fĳishing boats to some point 
on the mainland, from which it is distributed throughout the province of 
Fukien and the north of Kuangtung. Everywhere it is sold by Japanese under 
extra-territorial protection.45
La Motte did not like this article: it is ‘more anti-Japanese than anti-opi-
um’. Another commentator, the Englishman and well-known China-
42 See Appendix 1 table 60; L. Lewin, p. 65.
43 D. Musto, p. 192, 194; see also E. La Motte, p. 46.
44 C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 667 seventh recommendation.
45 Quoted by E. La Motte, p. 11, 12. T. Tong Joe, p. 72 does not make any critical remark 
in dealing with the Japanese occupation of Kwantung: it is the same optimistic story as 
told about Japan’s opium policy in Formosa.
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watcher Putnam Weale, attacked the Japanese assault on China at the 
same time. All Chinese ports with Japanese commissioners of Maritime 
Customs were also centers of contraband trade. Opium and its derivatives 
were smuggled so openly ‘that the annual net import of Japanese morphia 
(although this trade is forbidden by International Convention) is now 
said to be something like 20 tons a year—sufffĳicient to poison a whole 
nation’.46 Again, La Motte did not like this Englishman either, because he 
was too anti-Japanese and not enough anti-opium. 
In her opinion, A.J. Macdonald, a Cambridge scholar or English mis-
sionary, presented the facts in a ‘more balanced’ manner (1916) and, there-
fore, more anti-opium. Macdonald wrote: 
In the North of China another evil is springing up. The eradication of the 
opium habit is being followed by the development of the morphia trafffĳic … 
by the action of [Japanese] traders ... China is being drenched with morphia 
... It is said that in certain areas coolies are to be seen “covered all over with 
needle punctures”. An injection of the drug can be obtained for three or 
four cents. In Newchang 2,000 victims of the morphia habit died in the 
winter of 1914-15. Morphia carries offf its victims far more rapidly than 
opium.47 
At this time morphine was not produced in Asia. The bulk of the manu-
facturing took place in England (in Edinburgh and London), in Germany 
and Austria. In total, 5½ tons were produced in 1911, according to 
Macdonald, which increased to 14 tons in 1914. After the war it increased 
again to 20 tons in 1919. Japanese agents traded it, but the fact that three 
British fĳirms supplied ‘China with morphia for illicit purposes is a con-
demnation of English Christianity’. 
The New York Times article triggered a strong response in the US. The 
Japanese, growing impatient with all the blamed although they were only 
the distributors, reacted with remarkable background information. 
Putnam Weale was attacked directly because he did not accuse the British 
producers. Large quantities of morphine were shipped from Edinburgh to 
Japan. The Japanese stated, however:
... the shipments to Japan dropped from 600,220 ounces in 1917 to one-
fourth that amount in 1918 ... 113,000 ounces of morphia arrived in Kobe 
46 Idem, p. 14. B.L. Putnam Weale (pseudonym for Bertram Lenox, 1877-1930) lived in 
and was a strong supporter of Republican China. From his many China books and articles 
most can be read on-line today (see, for instance, the fabulous Project Gutenberg). For the 
political Chinese “Roaring Twenties”, they are important sources. E. La Motte (p. 13, 14) 
quotes an article from him in the journal Asia (1919).  
47 Quoted by E. La Motte, p. 14, 15.
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from the United States in the fĳirst fĳive months of 1919 ... this morphia is 
being transhipped in Kobe harbor to vessels bound for China. Dr. Paul S. 
Reinsch, who has resigned his post as Minister to China, has stated that he 
will use every resource in his power to stop the shipment from America of 
morphia intended for distribution in China, in defĳiance of the international 
convention which prohibits the sale of the drug in that country.48
The message of this statement is clear, namely, to demonstrate that in 
opium matters the British producer, the American and Japanese distribu-
tors had a common interest and that China was the common target. 
It is understandable that Ellen La Motte in her powerful attack on the 
British Opium Monopoly tried to mobilize all opposition against its 
manipulations: ‘America to the rescue! It must have been a close squeak 
for poor old China.’49 She witnessed how the Chinese President Hsu Shih-
ch’ang decided to destroy nearly eighty tons (!) of opium in a costly public 
burning at Shanghai. Specially constructed furnaces burned the stufff from 
1200 confĳiscated chests in eight days (17-25 January 1919). It was a spec-
tacular apotheosis of the large anti-opium campaigns several Chinese 
governments carried out at the beginning of the 20th-century.50 Publically, 
the British, Americans and Japanese applauded this and the activities of 
the Peking-based International Anti-Opium Association. Meanwhile, a 
completely new era in narco-militarism had been started based on the 
chemical manufacturing of the opium derivatives morphine and heroin. 
The opium burning was the last all anti-opium act of the Chinese gov-
ernment in its revolt against Western and foreign aggression. It was also 
the beginning of the opium nightmare of Republican and Japanese China, 
which ended with the establishment of a unifĳied Chinese government in 
1949. The two new imperialists, Japan and the United States, played the 
key roles.
48 Idem, p. 16, 17. The source of the quotation is The Japan Society Bulletin (1919/1920), 
which quotes other Japanese sources. The reference to the well-known professor of politi-
cal science Reinsch, a China expert and writer of several books about China (1869-1923), is 
remarkable. As American Minister to China he had to resign after the American govern-
ment assigned German rights in the Shantung Peninsula to Japan during the Peace Con-
ference in Versailles, while Reinsch had told the Chinese government that the Americans 
would support Chinese interests. See an article in The New York Times, August 28, 1919. 
Later Reinsch criticized the Chinese government several times (see The New York Times 
September 6, 1920 and September 13, 1921). The Japanese government could see in him a 
friend of Japan. 
49 W. Walker III, p. 29.
50 Idem, p. 28. Reinsch was closely involved in the discussions. See Idem, notes p. 231. 
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From World Economic Crisis to World War II
The economic world crisis did not stop the opium business, it only slowed 
it down for a while due to stagnation on the production side. It was quite 
logical that the “old days” should return once the combination of army-
violence plus drugs trade was restored. Indeed, it was soon unavoidable 
that as the Japanese military activities extended, the Japanese addiction 
activities in China did, too. 
The Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek started to work against the 
Japanese activities and published alarming data about the annual import 
of opium into the Japanese foreign concession in Tianjin, home of the 
illicit trade in opium and narcotic drugs in North China.
Table 39. Annual Import of Opium into Tianjin around 193651
District of Production Quantity in Ounces Number of Importers
Ganzhou 2 600 000 over 20
Liangzhou 9 100 000 50
Ninxia 2 600 000 20
Chahar  100 000 7
Suiyuan  200 000 10
Shaanxi  700 000 6
Jehol  600 000 1
The quality of this opium was low. The Japanese concession contained 42 
illicit opium fĳirms and 160 opium dens. Chinese authorities were power-
less in dealing with this foreign concession. The only thing they could do 
was to catch the drug smugglers who went in and out of the concessions. 
This smuggling was done not only by Chinese subjects, but also by 
Japanese and Koreans. They often sold heroin and morphine to foreigners 
in the other concessions, in particular the French one. 
Now both England and the USA were prepared to bring pressure to 
bear against these activities, although this was done half-heartedly: the 
British still had ‘vital commercial interests’ in the realm, and Roosevelt 
was not prepared to abandon his rather hypocritical ‘restrictive neutrali-
ty’. That was even the case after the genocidal activities of the Japanese 
army, including the Nanking Massacre (December 1937) with its criminal 
bombardments of civilian targets, its 300,000 murders and about 25,000 
rapes. What was the diffference with the German policy of Chamberlain 
on the other side of the globe, which got all the publicity? 
51 Quoted in A. Baumler (ed.), reading 17, p. 158.
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Roosevelt’s advisers did not fail to inform him quite clearly
that Tokyo intended to use narcotics as a weapon of war against a defense-
less people’ or ‘that the Japanese intended to establish an opium monopoly 
in North China under the North China Army and in Central China under 
the army based in Shanghai.52 
Also Time (December 5, 1938) reported about the narco-military activi-
ties of Japan. Earlier, Time had provided the information that under the 
supervision of the Japanese army, Iranian opium was being imported into 
China. Now, six months later, this situation had changed drastically:
The bustling Japanese now produce most of China’s narcotics in Japanese 
factories in Manchukuo, transport the supply down from Dairen to Shang-
hai and Nanking. ... [A report from Dr. Miner Searle Bates, vice-president of 
the US-supported University of Nanking, declares] ... In Nanking 50,000 
persons, one-eighth of the population, are being slowly poisoned by heroin 
… sold by Japanese-directed rings. At least 5,000,000 Chinese dollars are 
made every month in the Nanking area by dealers belonging to or allied 
with the Japanese Army. Out of this, Japan’s puppet Chinese 
“Reformed”Government gets a sizable cut. Japanese and Korean prostitutes 
“attached” to the Japanese Army brought into Nanking 80 cases of opium 
a fortnight ago. Japanese agents three weeks ago delivered 400 cases of 
Iranian opium to Nanking’s Opium Suppression Bureau, which ostensibly 
was set up to curb the trafffĳic but which actually distributes opium through 
its own sales agencies.53
The opium business was so lucrative that the Japanese army and navy 
were caught in intense wrangling over the control of the profĳits, while 
Japanese in the municipality of Shanghai also demanded their share. The 
Japanese authorities acted in the same way as the previous warlords and 
the Kuomintang: war, army and the support of puppet governments 
should be paid by the opium victims. 
However, the income from opium and its derivatives was insufffĳicient 
and could not compensate the multi-million flight of labor from China’s 
cities and the destruction of urban industries.54 
Every opportunity to gain opium money was seized: in North China 
and Manchuria the puppet-government abolished all anti-narcotics 
and anti-opium laws (24-2-1938); from each opium den, an impost of one 
52 W. Walker III, p. 119.
53 Find this article at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,760383,00.html.
54 For the dubious and lethal relationship between the Japanese and the gangs in 
Shanghai, in particular to Du Yue-sheng, see J. Marshall, p. 39 fff.
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percent was imposed on its gross intake; insiders even feared that Tientsin 
was going to serve as ‘the supplying center of heroin for Europe’. 
Of course, notwithstanding the available information a British under-
secretary of state expressed that there was ‘no evidence that the increased 
drug trafffĳic ... is aimed at the systematic demoralization of the Chinese 
people’. US offfĳicials were less “reluctant”, but they had not had a colonial 
career in India as this undersecretary had. 
The US vice consul in Manchukuo informed the British and American 
governments continuously in 1938 and 1939 of the activities at the opium 
front and ‘the protection of [offfĳicial] revenue’, the curbing of competing, 
illicit trafffĳic in drugs. Coincidentally, he lived next to a small heroin fac-
tory and was confronted once with the corpses of drug addicts ‘dumped 
naked into the slime’. He reacted:
It was difffĳicult not to conclude that the Kwantung Army was satisfĳied that 
the Chinese of Manchuria should be debauched. Dope addicts do not over-
throw governments.55
The Manchukuo govermment attempted to do something against the 
opium addiction. The US consul at the time was rather positive about it, 
but others condemned Manchukuo ‘for exacerbating China’s opium 
problems’ and ‘intentional narcotization’.
The attempts were not very successful in any case. Drug smuggling 
from Chosen (Korea) increased; authorities found it difffĳicult to give up 
the lure of opium revenues; the monopolization of the opium business 
was, as elsewhere, only a means to increase the revenues. Opium peddlers 
around Nanking sold drugs in relief camps, supplied by Japanese rōnin or 
gangsters. Some believed that this was part of the policy of drugging the 
Chinese people.
In addition, George Morlock, a well-informed American working for 
the Division of Far Eastern Afffairs of the US government, learned that 428 
cases of Iranian opium had reached Tientsin in mid-April 1938; three hun-
dred of them were in Japanese hands at Shanghai. Another 1000 cases 
were being held in Macao, where the Special Service Agency of the 
Japanese army was trying to set up a heroin factory.56 




Notwithstanding all these activities at the opium front, no ‘party’ in the 
game could gain control over the market since there were too many com-
petitors for the profĳits.
World War II and after
The historiography of the Japanese in World War II remains a superfĳicial 
afffair.57 It seems as if the dramatic fate of the ‘comfort women’ got most of 
the publicity, after the usual period of total silence about the war period 
by victims as well as perpetrators. The certainly exaggerated victor’s his-
toriography glorifĳied the few heroic deeds, which was not pleasant for 
perpetrator countries like Japan. However, contrary to the Germans, the 
Japanese have had great difffĳiculty to develop a critical way of writing 
about their own war crimes and war ideology (racism, biological experi-
ments, concentration camps or emperor adoration), about the pre-war 
years performance in Asia (Nanking, opium policy), etc. 
Last but not least, the data about Japanese policies in the occupied ter-
ritories, in particular the important opium policy, are even scantier. John 
Jennings’s and Bob Wakabayashi’s writings belong among the fĳirst to doc-
ument this. Their research has revealed a more detailed insight into the 
development of the Japanese war opium policy. 
North China
Mengjiang (literally: Mongolian Territories) was a puppet state of Japan 
more or less corresponding to the southern part of the present Mongolia 
including border provinces of China (1936-1945). In 1939 it received its 
fĳinal shape, but at the end of the war, it was abolished thanks to the inva-
sion of the Soviet Red Army. Now the area is called Inner Mongolia, the 
northern part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), populated by a 
large majority of Han Chinese. 
For Japan, this area was important for its mineral resources (iron, coal). 
Its establishment as a national state may have intended to provide a buf-
fer against China with its own army, a section of the Japanese Kwantung 
Army. As the table shows, the Japanese used Mengjiang also as a safe pro-
duction location for opium exported to China.
57 One of the better examples in this genre is the long article of Hatano Sumio in 
I.C. Dear, M. Foot (ed.), p. 476-501.
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Table 40. Mengjiang Opium Export, 1939-1942 (volumes in 1000 taels = 36 kg)58
destination 1939 % 1940 % 1941 % 1942 % totals %
Internal 141.4 16.3 252.3  6.2 144.1  2.6 166.3  1.8 704.1 3.6
Shanghai 100 11.5 2005  49.2 3848  70.1 5027  53.5 10 980 55.4
Beijing 300 34.6 1205  29.6 1200  21.9 1300  13.8 4 005 20.2
Tianjin 100 11.5  520  12.8  ---   –  –  – 620 ---
Jinan 100 11.5  ---  ---  ---   –  –  – 100 –
Tangshan 100 11.5  ---  ---  ---   –  –  – 100 ---
Manchuria  –  –  ---  ---  ---   – 2000  21.3 2000 –
Guandong  –  –    ---  300   5.5  –  – 300 ---
Elsewhere  27.31  3.1  90  2.2  –   –  58.4   0.6 175.4 0.5
Japan  –  –  –  –  –   –  841.6   9 841.6 4.2
Totals 868.4 100 4072.3 100 5492.1 100 9393.3 100 19826.1 100
58 B. Wakabayashi, p. 19.
It seems as if the Japanese had a kind of domino theory about opium. As 
such, this Mengjiang production potential formed the most northern link 
of a chain, which involved fĳields and factories for opium, heroin and mor-
phine in Manchukuo, perhaps Japan, Korea, Formosa, Hong Kong and the 
southern occupied countries. To uncover this whole chain will take con-
siderably more research, but the following is a small compensation.
Nanjing China
There was a most remarkable efffect of the Japanese opium activities in 
the occupied territory: Japanese soldiers themselves had to pay ‘extor-
tionate amounts for supplies in the bazaars, especially for the opium on 
which many of them had become dependent’.59 This conflicted with the 
Japanese racist idea that only the Chinese were so degenerate that they 
needed opium.
The reason this was possible was probably disclosed in 2007 by Reiji 
Yoshida, stafff-writer of The Japan Times. He wrote an interesting series of 
articles on the relationship between World War II and opium from which 
the following is derived.
A newly found 1942 document showed that opium dealer Hung Chi 
Shan Tang sold as much as 300 million yuan worth of opium in 1941. At 
that time, the annual budget of the Nanjing government was 370 million 
yuan. The dealer belonged to a Shanghai-based company headed by the 
59 B. Wakabayashi, p. 19.
59 H. Sumio, p. 404.
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Japanese Hajime Satomi. This was the dominant opium trader in Japanese-
controlled central China until early 1944. Satomi had to testify before the 
International War Crimes Tribunal (Tokyo, 1946), but his opium business 
was apparently ignored. 
Jennnings could not have known about this new document. It remains 
remarkable that he mentioned Satomi only once in passing without real-
izing that he was the spider in the Japanese opium web in China.60 
During World War II, from December 1941 to August 1945, the Japanese 
Army established a military administration in Hong Kong and issued mil-
itary bills called gunpyo as a currency. Hong Kong residents were forced to 
exchange Hong Kong dollars for gunpyo, and the use of Hong Kong dollars 
was subsequently banned completely. On the back of each gunpyo there 
was a note stating: “This bill may always be exchanged for Japanese yen of 
equal value”. Opium was used to support this military money with which 
Chinese materials were procured. This means
that to buy opium, locals would need to buy gunpyo fĳirst by selling their 
legal tender … This would push up the value of gunpyo. In short: a rather 
complicated way of stealing on a large scale. In 1942, for instance, the 
opium exchanged for gunpyo was valued at nearly 100 million yuan. 
These dealings were kept secret for a remarkable reason: ‘Opium was too 
dirty, and it has been kept secret until now,’ said Yoshida’s spokesman.
The new Satomi document reveals how profĳitable this gunpyo was rel-
ative to the operating costs, the wholesale prices of the opium, local cur-
rencies, Hung Chi Shan Tang’s commission (8%) on top of insurance fees 
and tax; the air transport cost in one year rose up to three million yuan, 
and so on.
Hung Chi Shan Tang was, in fact, a private opium farmer of the Japanese 
puppet government in Nanjing. In practice, he was the farmer of Hajime 
Satomi, who was the middleman between the Japanese occupation force 
and Japan’s wartime ministry in Tokyo. The opium farmer, in his turn, 
sold six million “liang” or 222 tons of opium to local-level Chinese dealers 
alone in 1941. The earlier North Chinese governments under Japanese 
control (Inner Mongolia, Manchuria) systematically grew poppies to raise 
revenues: in 1942 opium accounted for as much as 28% of their annual 
budgets. Satomi further declared that opium was the only product with 
which foreign currency could be earned. In addition to Mongolian opium, 
60 J. Jennings (1997), p. 94.
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Satomi’s company imported the product from Iran as well as from the 
state monopoly of the Manchukuo regime. 
Apart from raw or prepared opium, these Japanese-Chinese dealers 
sold morphine and heroin as well. The document reveals that Hung Chi 
Shan Tang had 999 kg of morphine made in Manchukuo and even ‘277 kg 
of cocaine processed by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan as of 
June 1, 1942’. Morphine and cocaine, Satomi reported, could be sold imme-
diately on the Chinese market at street prices, which were twice the book 
value. 
The narcotics were originally prepared for the wartime Southeast 
Asian market. Satomi states that Chinese residents were his main clients. 
However, the relationship with the opium-consuming Japanese soldiers is 
also clarifĳied with this information. 
A remarkable relationship could have been uncovered: the later Prime 
Minister Kishi, a wartime Prime Minister, General Tojo, and many other 
politicians were, in fact, on his payroll. This ‘Opium King’ died in 1965 at 
the age of 69. Kishi rendered him the last honors. 
Hong Kong
This Crown colony was explicitly a target of a Japanese invasion plan in 
1936.61 The Japanese Chief of Stafff was reacting to a re-fortifĳication of 
Hong Kong and Singapore by the British. It took another four years before 
this plan was realized, because Japan was so frustrated with the colossal 
and endless China war. But the Hong Kong authorities did not confĳine 
themselves to a re-fortifĳication.
 The military manpower had to be strengthened, which for the British 
overlords was always a subtle matter of divide and rule in which racist 
and cultural prejudices played an important role. First, a Portuguese unit 
was formed, which was ultimately trusted the most, notwithstanding the 
fact that they were historically the main competitor in the opium trade of 
neighboring Macao (were not the mixed Portuguese-Chinese nearly the 
same as the mixed British-Chinese?). 
Next came a police or army unit formed by Indian sepoy troops (had 
not Hong Kong ‘flourished for decades as a receiving station for Indian 
opium’? And could they not be better trusted than the Chinese police 
forces, who could have inherited something of the Chinese Revolution of 
1911?). European expatriates, the most powerful group in Hong Kong after 
61 P. Snow, p. 34. Also for the following Snow’s very detailed study is mainly used.
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the British military, were against an emancipation of the Chinese, includ-
ing opportunities for Chinese in the police departments. Therefore, 
Indian sepoy were used to break up strikes of Chinese laborers, when they 
could not be silenced enough through opium deliveries.
Notwithstanding the English, international or Chinese Nationalist’s 
pressures, the ‘Colonial Offfĳice had dragged its feet’ in reforming the opi-
um business. In 1914 it had replaced the old system of farming out the 
opium stocks to private companies by a government monopoly. As men-
tioned above, this monopoly acted only as a ‘tidy revenue earner’ and nev-
er reduced the number of drug users: it provided 50% of the government’s 
total income. Later this decreased, at least offfĳicially, to about 10% around 
the time Japan made its fĳirst invasion plan. The result can be assessed as 
follows.
A few months before the Japanese take-over, there were reportedly 
5,577 rationed and non-rationed opium smokers. More revealing are fĳig-
ures like the existence of 2,500 opium divans used by 20 smokers a day, 
which makes 50,000 users every day. In addition, there were 30,000 heroin 
pill addicts.62
Of course, the Japanese succeeded in toppling the old British colonial 
hierarchy by setting up the usual New Order for the New Men of all 
authoritarian regimes. This time a pan-Asiatic ideal defĳined by Japan and 
realized by Japan was the guiding principle. A fundamental part of this 
was to abandon every Western influence:
On his arrival in February [1942] Governor Isogai proclaimed the replace-
ment of selfĳish Western materialism by the ‘spiritual values’ of the Orient 
... on “traditional Asian morality” ... the authorities publicized their resolve 
to wipe out that great evil which had underpinned Hong Kong’s founding 
and rise to prosperity and which the British had been so slow to eradicate—
the consumption of opium. In late March Isogai announced the introduc-
tion of an Opium Suppression Policy. All secret opium divans were to be 
“cleaned up” and steps taken to control the opium trafffĳic ... a register was 
compiled of the colony’s opium addicts, with a view to ensuring that these 
addicts should receive their fĳix only through designated sales outlets, at a 
high price and in quantities that were to be reduced year by year.63 
These are plans already familiar to readers when confronted with the 
French colonial opium monopoly or the Dutch Opiumregie. Also in the 
follow-up, the parallels are striking. 
62 See the article of Harold Traver in: H. Traver, J. Vagg (ed.), p. 44.
63 P. Snow, p. 99.
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The Japanese occupiers had started to squeeze all wealth out of the 
Hong Kong citizens by introducing worthless ‘military yens’ (M¥) at a 
greedy rate of HK$2: M¥1, later even HK$4: M¥1. They, furthermore, 
imposed a whole series of steep taxes not only on business profĳits, but on 
many other things. The announcement regarding the Opium Problem in 
January 1943 was remarkable: the number of addicts in the colony is so 
large that an abrupt suppression of opium smoking would be ‘difffĳicult to 
carry out’ after all. Instead, the authorities decided to ‘suppress opium by 
taxing it’. 
Like the British, they planned to create an offfĳicial monopoly by estab-
lishing an Opium Sale Syndicate. This was meant to manage the trafffĳic, to 
take charge of retailing the drug, to register smokers at a suitable prohibi-
tive price, and so on. In short: as usual, this government also milked the 
craving for opium to its own profĳit. To create a smooth business and, 
therefore, as much profĳit as possible, the Japanese were even able to bring 
large consignments of the drug ... into Hong Kong by the Army from regions 
of north China such as Chahar and Jehol.64 
In a much more profound way, the Japanese occupier was involved in the 
Hong Kong opium business. Isogai had promised to eradicate the city’s 
substantial gangsterism (the Triads). That did not occur, but his succes-
sor, General Tanaka, incorporated the gangsters Street Guards into his 
repression machine from late 1943 onwards. The Street Guards in each 
district elected a Protective Guards Body which cooperated and dined 
with the chairman of the Police Bureau and the Police Committee, which 
should have arrested them. Through the black market, which was already 
a Triads business, the Protective Guards allegedly took over the distribu-
tion of food to the populace during the last part of the occupation.
In addition, Tanaka made some deal with a Triad chieftain, a certain 
Wan Yuk-ming, concerning the ‘Western amusements’ which were con-
demned by Isogai:
During the following months gambling joints multiplied once again. The 
red light districts boomed, and the colony became dotted with an estimated 
8,000 opium dens, many of them large-scale and operating in full public 
view.65 
64 Idem, p. 153, 154.
65 Idem, p. 218, 263. See also note 59 p. 409.
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Through investigations conducted directly after the war, Isogai could 
have been accused of participation in an opium racket. Because that 
information led the authorities to a Chinese warlord, Xu Chongzhi who 
cooperated with Isogai, this aspect of his government was silenced. 
Reason: this Xu was formerly a commanding offfĳicer of Chiang Kai-shek.66 
The last element of the Japanese treatment of the Opium Problem, this 
time in Hong Kong and during the reign of Governor Isogai, is:
Disregarding the pious noises put out by the Governor’s Offfĳice, which 
warned of “severe treatment” for anyone caught taking heroin pills, the 
Kempetai also set up their own depot for the sale of heroin—with fairly 
striking results. A report which leaked out of the colony in June 1942 
observed that this new drug “was much cheaper than tobacco and was 
becoming popular” …67 
There follows a list of names and objects of the worst kind of corruption 
among the Japanese military bureaucrats. 
Southeast Asia 
The Japanese active opium policy towards Southeast Asia dates from 
1902 when the Japanese navy established undisputed mastery of the 
South China Sea. All sea trafffĳic between Indochina and the West became 
difffĳicult. This gradually brought an end to the steady supply of opium 
from Turkey and Iran, a substantial source for the French narcotic busi-
ness. 
Japan practised a treacherous policy in this part of its “eternal empire”: 
profĳiteering as much as possible from the opium, while at the same time 
condemning the Western colonialists of having exploited the opium 
resources to repress the indigenous people. But the French were no less 
corrupt and collaborated with the Japanese for profĳit, while claiming 
Indochina again after the war as if nothing had happened. The French 
stakes were high: 
At the beginning of World War II Indochina’s 2,500 opium dens and retail 
shops were still maintaining more than 100,000 addicts and providing 15 
percent of all tax revenues. The French imported almost sixty tons of opium 
annually from Iran and Turkey to supply this vast enterprise.68
66 Idem, p. 306.
67 Idem, p. 162.
68 A. McCoy et al, p. 76.
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However, when the war blocked most trade routes Indochina was also cut 
offf from the poppy fĳields in the Middle East. Most French offfĳicials collabo-
rated easily during the Japanese occupation, but those who had to man-
age their Opium Monopoly were faced with a major fĳiscal crisis. Smuggling 
from Yunnan could have fĳilled their pockets again and eventually solved 
the addicts problem. A better solution was found to inducing the Meo 
(Hmong) of Laos and northwest Tonkin to expand their opium produc-
tion. The transformation of the tribal opium economy succeeded in 1939-
40 under the fĳierce surveillance of the French offfĳicials.
Indochina’s opium production jumped from 7.5 tons in 1940 to 60.6 
tons in 1944, an 800 percent increase in just four years! This was enough 
for the French and the more than 100,000 addicts, and yielded an increase 
of government revenues from 15 million piasters in 1939 to 24 million in 
1943. 
The Japanese propaganda exploited the widespread hate and animos-
ity against the British, French and Dutch colonialism, which had an insid-
ious efffect: it was too easy to accept half the truth of this propaganda. 
During and after the war most nationalist movements in Southeast Asia 
received their anti-imperialist lessons from the Japanese occupiers. If one 
promised to become part of a Great Japanese Empire “later”, requests for 
independence “later” received a willing Japanese ear.
Both the traditional colonialists and the many Communist liberation 
movements had to cope with this nationalism, for instance, in the con-
frontation with Buddhist–Nationalism and new military regimes in many 
Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia. Many of the complica-
tions of the Vietnam Wars, arrogantly waged and dramatically misunder-
stood by the colonialist and the Americans, had their origin in the 
Japanese occupation. The same was true for the Dutch colonialism and its 
lost war after the Japanese occupation. 
In their turn, the foreign powers in the realm accused the indigenous 
liberation movements of collaborating with the Japanese, which was one 
of their main enemies at least during World War II (but not before the war 
and not after it). So, for instance, Sukarno in Indonesia or Aung San in 
Burma looked fĳirst for help from the Japanese to get rid of the Western 
powers and they were given this help until both discovered that the 
Western repression was being exchanged for an Asian one. As such these 
were obvious moves, demonstrated elsewhere in the world as well (see, 
for instance, the Flemish resistance movement against the French, which 
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welcomed the German occupiers; etc.). The Western accusations were 
rather hypocritical.
In Singapore, occupied by Japan in February 1942, ‘the Japanese took 
advantage of the huge stocks of opium left behind by the British as a 
source of immediate revenue. They carried on sales in the Government 
Retail Shops.’69 Because the import duties fell rapidly increasing depen-
dence was placed on, among others, the opium revenues. Typical war 
measures were taken:
In November 1943, the British Government announced total prohibition of 
opium (import, export, possession, sale or purchase) would replace its 
policy of gradual suppression of opium in enemy occupied territories in the 
Far East after the War. The Opium and Chandu Proclamation, enacted on 
1 February 1946 called on those in possession of opium, chandu, pipes, 
lamps or utensils to surrender them. This prohibition could not stop the 
craving of those pre-war registered addicts and those who had acquired the 
habit during the Japanese Occupation. Trafffĳickers quickly saw a golden 
opportunity to make fortunes when the addicts went underground. Com-
munications were reestablished with sources of supply and the highly prof-
itable of the smuggling of the drug was resuscitated.70 
In the Dutch colonies the Opium Factory and the whole Opiumregie infra-
structure were simply handed over to Japan (see ch. 19).
The Opium-Regie’s distribution network on Java ... appears to have survived 
the war largely intact, and there remained some twenty-two tonnes of raw 
opium and three tonnes of refĳined opium in the factory at Salemba, as well 
as unspecifĳied quantities of refĳined opium in Central Java, when the Japa-
nese surrendered in August 1945.71
Cribb concludes from this that, compared to pre-war consumption of 
refĳined opium, it ‘declined during the three and a half years of occupa-
tion.’ A reason for this could be that the Japanese policy of regional eco-
nomic autarchy, which prohibited trade between occupied regions, 
deprived the regime of its most lucrative markets, the islands of Banka 
and Belitung (Billiton). 
If, however, the Japanese did in their vivid opium (heroin and mor-
phine) business what they did elsewhere, then there were no barriers 
erected in the opium trade. Therefore, there is another more relevant rea-
son for a possible decline: until 1940 the opium for the East Indies had to 
69 See the Singapore government website www.ica.gov.sg about the ICA history.
70 Idem.
71 R. Cribb, p. 703.
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come largely from Bengal-India and a small portion from the Middle East. 
Both regions were closed to Japan for obvious reasons. The Burmese and 
Thai resources were large enough to fĳill this gap: the newly opened 
Indonesian market could be reason why the production and opium trade 
flourished as never before. Because of this central position of the 
Indochinese opium sources and the French collaboration with the 
Japanese, a few more details of the situation will sufffĳice.72 
After 6000 Japanese invaded the north of Vietnam (September 1940) 
and, later, many more appeared on bicycle in the streets of Saigon, the 
French colonial government surrendered. They made a corrupt deal with 
the new occupiers: they would remain and administer “their” Indochina 
under the umbrella of the Japanese. The gist of this deal was: full autono-
my for the French bureaucracy as long as Japan received favorable terms 
of trade for Indochinese rice, cofffee, rubber and opium. In addition, they 
had to pay for the cost of the Japanese occupation (200 million piaster per 
year).
During the Second World War the French Opiumregie (Opium 
Purchasing Board) could continue to manage the opium business. This 
implied that the contracts with the Hmong opium producers were made 
more lucrative for the Hmong (schools built in their territory in return). 
Gestures were made by them as well to accord the Hmong a signifĳicant 
role in the political future of Laos.
Their opium production increased and by 1943 the lion’s share of the 
opium needed, sixty tons, came from North Laos to replace the lost opium 
imports from elsewhere. The greater part of the large payments in silver 
piasters for this flowed into the pockets of private opium brokers. They 
invested this again in the general economy to such an efffect that the infla-
tion ‘soared into the stratosphere’. For ordinary people the necessary 
commodities were priced beyond their reach and many could no longer 
affford to feed themselves, let alone smoke opium. 
Only the Hmong were often rich, at least by their own standards (see 
further ch. 24). Although they had mixed feelings about the Japanese, the 
Hmong opium business was also business. A Japanese trading company, 
Shiowa, with offfĳices in Luang Prabang, regularly sent agents to Xieng 
Khouang Province to purchase Hmong opium.73 The transactions drove 
up local prices, ‘which greatly pleased Hmong farmers.’ Another Japanese 
72 See for the following K. Quincy, p. 54 fff.
73 Idem, p. 62 fff.
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fĳirm exploited an old silver mine in the region where hundreds of people 
were used as forced laborers until a shaft collapsed killing 200 miners.
In December 1944 British commandos74 were parachuted from India 
into Laos, but the Japanese responded with a very quick buildup of their 
presence. This was fĳinanced ‘with the sale of a truckload of Hmong opium 
confĳiscated from Chinese drug merchants.’ It did not help Japan: a few 
months later this war was over. 
 A Reflection
Wakabayashi estimates that the Japanese opium operations (1933-1944) 
comprise already the enormous amount of 13,000 tons opium or an aver-
age of 1.25 kg per capita year consumption in the occupied territories 
leading to an average number of 9,059,112 addicts supplied/year.75 In my 
view, further research will lead to an increase of, at least, the consumption 
estimates. 
There were three motives leading to these opium operations: the need 
to fĳinance collaborator states (similar to the old imperialistic aim that col-
onies had to pay for themselves) and to fund undercover operations that 
facilitated Japanese aggression. Opium profĳits, furthermore, went to right-
wing societies in Japan (there is even evidence ‘to link laundered wartime 
opium monies with early postwar conservative parties’).76 As shown, 
there was since the middle of the 19th-century until shortly before World 
War II and afterwards, a remarkable “community of interests” between 
Imperial Japan and the USA. 
In North American foreign policy research there is the widespread 
view that Japan should be treated as an ‘independent’ and ‘mysterious 
entity, to be loved or reviled’. Cumings, one of the main US experts on 
Asian foreign policy argues rightly, however, that Japan, like Taiwan or 
South Korea
have nested for most of this [the 20th] century in a Western hegemonic 
regime and are nowhere near the self-defĳinition and comprehensive auton-
omy that local nationalists have long sought’ (and feared by many Western 
hegemonic observers!).77 
74 A few French accompanied them, which later became the pretext to occupy Indo-
china anew by De Gaulle.
75 B. Wakabayashi, p. 19.
76 Idem, p. 5.
77 B. Cumings, p. 23, 225.
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It is an outcome of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War 
that Japan became a partner of “The Western Bloc”. Geopolitically—
another way of thinking is not available in the Pentagon or the State 
Department: Japan, Taiwan and so on adequately “encircled” the Enemy 
(Soviet Union and China).78 Altering this position in an independent set-
ting would mean an unacceptable “Gap in the Wall”: Japan has to remain 
a subordinate partner of the US, the self-styled policeman of the “West”. 
Therefore, after the Soviet Union disappeared as Enemy No. 1, the US 
even deepened its containment grip: apparently Enemy No. 2 has had to 
be treated in the same way as No. 1. In addition, the US and Japan clearly 
feared, partly for diffferent reasons, that Enemy No. 2 would not only 
replace Enemy 1 in a political-ideological sense, but also override any eco-
nomic importance of the former Enemy 1.79 
In this perspective, it seems to be a bold conclusion of Cumings that 
since the late nineteenth-century Japan ‘usually’ thrived within such a 
network of politico-economic subordination: the only exception was the 
period between “Pearl Harbour” (7-12-1941) and “Midway” (June 1942), the 
decisive battle in the Pacifĳic against Japan. This simply means that Japan 
was liberated from the US for half a year.
For our opium history this bold conclusion has far-reaching signifĳi-
cance and leads to other bold conclusions as well. 
As sketched above, from its fĳirst assaults against Russia and China, 
Japan developed an aggressive narco-military policy as a fundamental 
part of its Eastern conquests. This narco-military policy must, therefore, 
be part and parcel of Japan’s subordinate partnership with the United 
States! Will China remain deeply suspicious of some “tandem US-Japan” 
including a re-start of the narco-military assault? 
This is not an optimistic suggestion, but one which should be com-
bined with Rashid’s prediction given in the Preface. It is, anyway, the best 
transition to the next chapter about the other new imperialist in East 
Asia.
78 In I.C. Dear, M. Foot (ed.), p. 307 under “Formosa” one can read the remarkable 
sentence: ‘At the Cairo conference in November 1943 … it was pronounced that the island 
had been stolen from China and would be returned to it, which it was.’ Interesting for the 
reconstruction of the USA–Japanese post war relations is H. Moulton, L. Marlio (1944), p. 
54-93; included is a remarkable assessment of Japan’s pre-war colonialism in which any 
reference to opium is avoided.
79 Cumings could have added that the Pentagon/ State Department not only deep-
ened its containment policy as indicated, but took the opportunity to aggravate it even by 
attacking Russia with a missile shield at its West border and urging Japan to start new 
quarrels about the property of a few rocks opposite the Siberian coast.  
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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
In dealing with the opium history of the United States of America until 
about 1950 under the heading of the “New Imperialism”, one has to stress 
more the “new” than “imperialism”. For most present commentators, all 
of the “real” imperialist adventures of this country (from Chile to Nicaragua 
and Grenada, from Israel, Iraq to Vietnam and Afghanistan) started later. 
Indeed, the earlier ones from the end of the 19th-century are nearly for-
gotten. This period followed soon after a genocidal war on the indigenous 
population at home and a very bloody war among the white settlers-con-
querors themselves. 
Below, some details of this mixture of early imperialism with domestic 
opium problems come to the fore in Philippines or Mexican policies. The 
complexity is obvious, not least because this history precedes the global 
War On Drugs, offfĳicially launched twenty years after 1950. The question is 
whether the earlier “Philippines” and the present “Afghanistan” have 
something in common, apart from being both “opium wars”. 
The period with which we have to deal ended in a rather spectacular 
anti-climax: instead of the USA succeeding, like Japan and Germany or 
the older imperialists, in “conquering the world”, it was itself conquered 
by the Opium Problem. In a way, the USA became the most tragic victim 
land in the West and the best example of how the snake has bitten in its 
own tail. How paradoxical: it happened in exactly the same period that 
China successfully jumped over its own shadow in its own civil war, the 
bloody competition between Nationalists and Communists. 
Let’s start with the end: the domestic opium problems. Then we shall 
consider in detail the American version of imperialism. 
 A Domestic Opium Problem from the early 19th-century?
From the Singapore statistics of 1835 we learned that opium was shipped 
in a ‘considerable quantity to America’ (p. 448f.). Nothing more is known, 
so we can easily take this as a mythical opium year and try to discover the 
American consumers.
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It probably only concerned raw opium, since Courtwright states that 
‘smoking opium began to be imported in signifĳicant quantities in the mid-
1850s, when the fĳirst wave of Chinese immigrants arrived in California’.1 In 
the Jacksonian era (1820-1850) cotton was frequently imported from India, 
which easily could have been accompanied by opium (and opium was 
probably “needed” given the panics and bankruptcies happening around 
this cotton import).
So, who are the potential white opium consumers? People familiar 
with American history always point to aggressive religious sectarian set-
tlers. These Calvinist Puritans believed they were predestined from the 
time of setting foot ashore to win against all “foreign” elements in the 
“New Jerusalem” they had captured from the original inhabitants. They 
became the new bosses and had to become very practical: profĳit must be 
made under all circumstances. They started a double-entry bookkeeping 
of their victims, making a good business from killing, using the following 
market prices: 
Those hard-headed virtuosi of Protestantism, the Puritans of New England, 
in 1703, by decrees of their assembly set a premium of £40 on every Indian 
scalp and every captured redskin: in 1720 a premium of £100 on every 
scalp; in 1744, after Massachusetts Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as 
rebels, the following prices: for a male scalp of 12 years and upwards £100 
(new currency), for a male prisoner £105, for women and children prison-
ers £50, for scalps of women and children £50 ... The British Parliament 
declared bloodhounds and scalping for “God-given and natural means”.2
1 D. Courtwright, p. 21 and note 45 p. 156. For the announced ‘objections’ see below.
2 Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz, 1971), vol. 1, 
p. 781. A famous German Lutheran theologian, Helmut Gollwitzer (1908-1993), who was 
Marxist oriented and prominently involved in the political debates ensuing in the late 
1960s and 1970s (e.g. pastor to the RAF-terrorist Ulrike Meinhof), referred to this same 
period and location. He, however, wanted to prove that ‘the church had with the gospel 
the weapon at hand against class society, which those discovered who wanted to avoid 
that the slaves and the subjected by colonial powers could receive the Christian message 
and education’. Gollwitzer added in a note: ‘This was forbidden in several North American 
states until the end of the 18th-century. In 1708 the missionary … Ziegenbalg was impris-
oned for several month by the commander of the Danish East Indian Company ... Also the 
English in India were as inimical ...’. See H. Gollwitzer, Die kapitalistische Revolution 
(Munich: Kaiser, 1974), p. 117, 118 and 131. It is a pity that this pastor did not read his Karl 
Marx. To get the whole picture clear, it almost sufffĳices to read a review about present-day 
Indian problems in the USA and the reasons why the reviewer is disappointed:  Christopher 
Vecsey. “Review of Huston Smith, A Seat at the Table: Huston Smith in Conversation with 
Native Americans on Religious Freedom,” H-AmIndian, H-Net Reviews, March, 2007. 
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This is quoted by Karl Marx in his famous analysis of the Christian charac-
ter of the so-called ‘original accumulation’ in which he tells one terrible 
story after another about Dutch or English colonization and conversion 
practices. 
The Dutch Calvinists had already ruthlessly decimated the populations 
of East Indian islands in a nearly genocidal way; their American fellow-
believers made a profĳitable business out of it. The English Anglican 
Protestants demonstrated several times how to organize mass-deaths by 
causing and/or exploiting severe famines. They forcefully requisitioned 
all of the rice several times in order to sell it for fabulous prices, a practice 
which cost the lives of a million Hindus in the Indian province Orissa in 
1866 alone.3 A typical example of monopoly trade, which was only possi-
ble in Western colonies.
Apparently, they did not regret the nearly total elimination of the 
indigenous population of the Caribbean islands and adjacent territories 
in the 16th and 17th centuries, forcing them to re-populate the islands 
with black people from Africa and colored ones from Asia. Did all these 
slaves consume opium to forget their misery like the coolies in the Asian 
mines?
What was the United States like around “opium year” 1835? It was a 
result of irrational claims of Western conquerors from Spanish, French, 
British, Dutch and even Russian origin (the latter claimed Alaska): the 
indigenous people were destined, of course, to be eliminated as had 
already happened in the Caribbean. 
The victorious British could write a most heroic history, certainly after 
their settlers did what European settlers always dreamed of: deciding to 
govern the colony without interference from the mother country. A few 
“states” in the East formed a federation, and from old England came the 
farewell greeting of Dr. Johnson to the rebel Americans: ‘They are a race of 
convicts, and ought to be thankful for any thing we allow them short of 
3 See the still prudent formulations in the history of these disasters in David 
Northrup, Migration from Africa, Asia and the South Pacifĳic, in: Andrew Porter et al. (ed.), 
The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: OUP, 1999), vol. III, p. 93; see also, 
p. 406  fff. For another interpretation of Marx’s Orissa story see Vincent A. Smith, The 
Oxford History of India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), p. 740 fff. and Dharma Kumar (ed.), 
The Cambridge Economic History of India (Hyderabad: CUP, 1984), vol. II, p. 528 fff. ‘The 
Orissa Famine of 1866’ and ‘Famine in India’, in Wikipedia. Prabhat Mukherjee, The Orissa 
famine of 1866, in: Orissa Historical Research Journal, 6:1 (1958 for 1957), p. 69-95; David 
Hall-Matthews, Inaccurate Conceptions: Disputed Measures of Nutritional needs and 
Famine Deaths in Colonial India, in: Modern Asian Studies (2007).  
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hanging.’4 Indeed, this became a normal activity for the decades to come 
as the white settlers performed the drama called “Winning of the Far 
West” with all the nasty and lethal consequences for millions of the 
in digenous peoples, their animals and territories. Was their collective bad 
 conscience silenced by the strongest possible antidotes: opium and/or 
reli gion ?
Around 1835 in the east of the territory, there lived an imported, 
English-speaking population of about 13 million ex-Europeans and new 
Americans, still a rural farm life with a few towns like Boston, New York or 
Philadelphia. In a large part of the west and south, Spanish imperialism 
ruled until 1845 -1848. Here, too, there were a few small settlements under 
the guidance of fanatic friars of San Francisco, thinking of themselves as 
Los Angelos. The population was much smaller (probably half a million 
including the indigenous one). Outside these settlements indigenous 
people often dwelt in pueblos, while hacienda or rancho life was reserved 
for the conquerors. In between, in the remaining third of the territory, a 
few French-speaking settlements existed along the Mississippi River, 
including New Orleans. This “French” territory had probably a half million 
people in total around 1835. 
Again: who needed so much opium from Asia, while it is unclear 
whether it arrived in San Francisco or New York? Courtwright produced a 
statistical analysis for the earliest possible period he imagined, in 1827.5 
He fĳixed the average dollar value of opium imports from this year until 
1842 at $75,000. This is equivalent to an average consumption of 27,000 
pounds per year. In this period there was no duty on opium: ‘No duty 
means no smuggling …’6 In short: there was no opium problem at all, and 
many people could get their daily dose (27,000 or 63,000 pounds). To indi-
cate some proportionality, one can suppose a “normal” consumption of 2 
to 3 grams a day. In this case one has to reckon with 12,000 to 19,000 con-
4 Quoted in V. Kiernan, p. 27, a most stimulating book by a typical imperialism histo-
rian.
5 D. Courtwright, chapter 1. A rather curious defĳinition of foreign trade (‘imports 
minus exports without real exports’) was used at the time (or by C.?), which is not dis-
cussed here. Exactly around 1835 his difffĳicult fĳigure 1 (p. 20) indicates that the “imports” are 
valued at about $450,000 and the “exports” at $280,000. Well, “imports” minus “exports” of 
$170,000 must be similar to a consumption of 63,000 pounds (according to C.’s value of 
$2.77 per pound). However, based on the opium export price in Singapore (C. Trocki) of 
$480 per chest in 1835, a pound of opium had to cost $3.69. This export price to America is 
still excluding the transport cost, but probably the Spanish $ is at the time not equal to an 
American $.   
6 Idem, p. 20.
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sumers, respectively, or 29,000 to 43,000.7 Whether this is a large propor-
tion, relative to the population, is difffĳicult to say.
The fĳirst potential users of opium must have been settled pharmacists 
or traveling salesmen, who could transform the raw opium into their lau-
danum tinctures and pills. They relied upon English knowledge. In 1820 
the fĳirst American pharmacopoeia was published, and in 1833 the author-
itative Dispensatory of the United States of America was written by the 
learned men, George Wood and Franklin Bache. Philadelphia was the 
place of publication, and it cannot be a coincidence that later a flourish-
ing pharmaceutical industry was established there. How “wild” the USA 
remained may be proven by the appendix of the edition consulted (18th 
from 1899): it had a long list of medicinal herbs used by the indigenous 
people, the so-called Indians.8 At that time they were already non-exis-
tent for most Americans until revived a decade later through Hollywood. 
Whatever the texts in the period of the fĳirst editions, the practice of 
apothecaries was still not very diffferent from the one in colonial times: an 
experienced and learned apothecary had to act as surgeon, provide medi-
cal treatment, deliver babies and prepare prescriptions. The largest major-
ity, however, as in England or France, was more of a traditional rural 
healer or medical handyman; his income extended as far as people could 
trust him. His practice was often not diffferent from the one of Dr. Samuel 
Doxey. Apparently, he is a “good” representative of the profession until far 
into the 19th-century in the largest part of the USA, but not in the cities.
Around 1800 in the USA, alcohol use was already endemic as was tobac-
co smoking, but a poppy culture existed only in the gardens of nostalgic 
European settlers. Attempts are always being made to subsume all drugs 
under one umbrella, which is a bad custom for the historical “treatment”, 
comparable to a standard reference to “ancient Greeks” or “archeology”. 
The drugs difffer, in particular because of individual socio-economic pre-
conditions and environment. It does not even make much sense to talk 
about “drugs”, let alone a War on Drugs if normal daily life cannot do with-
out medicines, cofffee, sugar or tobacco.9 It also seems obvious not to use 
7 Because in all probability the import concerns raw opium only, the lowest esti-
mates are the most realistic, because the transformation into prepared opium cost much 
of the weight.
8 See also E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 377.
9 S. Tracy, C. Acker (ed.), p. 2 rightly made a similar remark and pointed to a possible 
relation between the use of a drug and another. “The “War on drugs’ has given many a 
sense that the nation has enjoyed a drug-free past ... and that there may be a drug-free 
future. Such thinking is naive and historically myopic.” (Id.) This argument has its limited 
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unsubstantiated suggestions like opium as ‘an Eastern vice’ or exaggera-
tions about the ‘unmatched analgesic power’ of opium.10 
Relative to this period: the 1835 Singaporean opium export to America 
was certainly not a Chinese export. To my knowledge, Chinese junks nev-
er reached any American harbor. The British, American and Indian opi-
um smugglers never had any idea about their opium as the new universal 
Chinese painkiller. It is difffĳicult to fĳind something other than “naked prof-
value thanks to the abstract use of general concepts as “drugs”: there was an American past 
without settler’s alcohol (say: before 1585), without opium (say: before 1800) and without 
heroin (say: before 1880) and certainly without an Opium Problem (say: before 1860). And 
for a massive number of people, who stopped smoking cigarettes, there is a future without 
this “as device”. It is very important to be precise and concrete as possible, apart from not 
denying the historical certainty that people can change their bad conduct (mostly very 
slowly—see religion—sometimes very quickly—see eating habits) or that bad conduct 
must fĳirst become a social problem before it can be considered bad. In addition, the med-
icalization of the present American society has reached an unprecedented level compared 
to that of probably all European countries, and certainly all other societies in the world. 
That is the reason why Tracy and Acker lightly speak of a ‘commanding presence of 
socially acceptable psychoactive drugs such as alcohol (not, for instance, in Islamic coun-
tries) ... antidepressants, estrogen and testosterone in our daily lives’ (Idem). 
10 E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 120.
Ill. 22. Dr. Doxey’s Elixir 
Source: Morris, Lucky Luke nr. 7, 1955. Dr. Doxey tells his audience: ‘ ... after 30 years of con-
tinuous research, I have the pleasure, the duty and the honor to demonstrate the public 
the most stunning discovery the world has ever seen ...’ Only one page further this audi-
ence was seized with cramp and more serious pains; dogs which licked it up, died imme-
diately … and Dr. Doxey was glad that none of the bullets this audience sent after him hit 
home. 
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it” as a reason for introducing opium in a foreign non-opium country, 
including the new American states. 
In addition, in an early American practice, opium could never compete 
with alcohol as a painkiller. Around 1800 this was consumed in approxi-
mately twice the rate prevalent in 2000 (four to six gallons per capita per 
year): 
The efffĳiciency and profĳitability of turning corn into whiskey, heavy frontier 
drinking, the spread of urban saloons, and the arrival of beer-drinking Ger-
mans and whiskey-swilling Irish encouraged the nation’s bibulous tenden-
cies.11 
Later there were better opportunities for opium:
In the Jacksonian era, many Americans not only brewed, fermented, and 
distilled their own alcohol, they treated their own ills. On farms and in vil-
lages and towns, women used herbs and tonics to maintain their families’ 
health and care for them in times of illness. In this system of healing, med-
icines were expected to restore the body’s balance and to relieve symptoms: 
to revive, to calm, to brace, in short, to make one feel better.12
Whatever the serious problems the settlers had to solve, here is, therefore, 
the same conclusion as for the English or French situation: until the Civil 
War, there does not seem to have been an opium problem in the United 
States. It is, therefore, time to look at whether an American opium perfor-
mance abroad is as unproblematic. 
Rise and Direct Decline of “Free Trade”
By the time the US is able to expand abroad as a nation, about seventy 
years have gone by, and the world is still in the stranglehold of classical 
imperialism. In the largest part of the 19th-century, expansion abroad 
was a matter of individual trade activities and many individual trade con-
nections. Both the individual and the national opium business are 
“defĳined” by the relation with China, although the opium relation with 
Europe cannot be neglected as will be demonstrated below. And both are 
subsumed under the heading “free trade”: at fĳirst a reality, later only an 
ideology.
The following anecdotal start of the US in the Western imperialist con-
cert of the 19th and 20th-century seems perfectly suitable as an introduc-
11 S. Tracy, C. Acker (ed.), p. 4.
12 Idem.
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tion. It concerns the arrival in the Philippines of a US governor-general, 
Francis Burton Harrison (6 October 1913). It is, formally, one of the fĳirst 
offfĳicial appearances of a civil US offfĳicial on the scene. We will deal with 
the context in which he has to operate later.
Two days after his arrival, Harrison was already confronted with head-
lines in The Manila Times of ‘Two Trunks of Opium in Harrison Baggage’: 
how “clever” the smugglers were because they “took advantage of the fore-
knowledge that the courtesies of the port would be extended” to Harrison’s 
party to try to smuggle in two trunks containing “440 tins of the highest 
Ill. 23. Happy New Year, 1899 !
Source: A. McCoy, F. Scarano. ed., p. 36. This is a cartoon published in Judge, January 7, 1899 
(US Library of Congress). It says: ‘It ought to be a happy new year: Uncle Sam and his 
English cousin have the world between them.’ Both fĳigures showed no trade but war ships 
on their breasts, because both had a canal near Suez or Panama to their disposal to wage 
war as quickly as necessary or as possible.
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grade opium” by labeling them as the property of Manuel Earnshaw, resi-
dent commissioner from the Philippines to Congress.13 
Although in the following days “the usual suspects” were rounded up, not 
only Harrison was mortifĳied (and his friends, accusing him ‘for having 
become the arch opium smuggler of the Far East’) and the inefffectiveness 
of the US opium policy demonstrated, the immanent hypocrisy of colo-
nialism was laid bare as well. In the Philippines, still strongly upset about 
the harsh USA colonialism which replaced the Spanish (see below), the 
Harrison afffair could only confĳirm this aversion. And, indeed, it is difffĳicult 
to deny this.
Twenty years later in his published memoirs, Harrison criticized 
Britain’s opium policy of cynical exploitation, contrasting this with the US 
respect for indigenous traditions. He dared to continue rightly with:
The White Man’s Burden has been materially lightened by the money thus 
derived, and by the state of physical and moral ruin to which the people 
have been reduced. If they are thoroughly doped, they are more willing 
slaves. 
This afffair, this combination of controversial behavior and high moral 
judgment, is the attitude continuously demonstrated in the Dutch, French 
or British propaganda, nurtured by the colonial elite defending their lux-
ury lives and standing against the jealous home-front, which has to satisfy 
itself with thoughts about some civilizing mission and inefffective moral 
exclamations about those poor and destitute opium victims far away. The 
new imperialists in East and West had quickly learned this cheap policy, 
as was demonstrated by Harrison or the “innocent” behavior of the 
Japanese in international conferences at the time. 
The USA opium policy as presented here is largely devoted to the opi-
um or drugs elements of the Asian “adventures” of the USA. As is well-
known, there is also a South and Central American drugs foreign policy of 
the US (“Colombia”, “Mexico”, etc.), but its strongest activity occurs out-
side the scope of this book. Still some elements of this will be discussed 
later as a consequence of the dominant Dutch cocaine position between 
1900 and 1925. 
The fĳirst necessary remark concerns the obvious need to diffferentiate 
between the activities of individual Americans and the “nation USA”. This 
is more appropriate than expressed in recent literature because it actually 
concerns two diffferent and often antagonistic worlds: the one of the 
13 This story is told by A. Foster (2000), p. 253 fff. including the following quote.
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Federal government with its State Department and Ministry of Defense/
Attack; the other is of the entrepreneurs, of the scientists or other private 
actors, who are often strongly hindered by the public tax claims, control 
measures or imperial aspirations. These diffferences are certainly devel-
oped more strongly on the European continent, with England in between. 
As a nation the USA came late on the international scene, but rather 
rapidly took on an overwhelming role. After the previous chapter it is not 
difffĳicult to assess the fĳirst performance of this nation “in the fĳield”. That 
was not so much the Japan adventure of Commander Perry (1853), which 
only showed that the USA had aspirations. Their realization followed 
nearly half a century later around a then rather unimportant archipelago 
in the Pacifĳic. Here Harrison’s diplomatic and military predecessors acted 
quite diffferently (see below).
In the opium minefĳield the American nation acted for the fĳirst time 
through the Philippine Commission, appointed in 1903. Its members also 
visited Japan. It was one of its ‘most illuminating experiences’. After the 
previous chapter it must be highly “illuminating” to read about 
the one oriental country whose attitude towards the drug habit was indu-
bitable and whose law was enforced with an efffectiveness unknown else-
where in the Far East. From Japanese authorities, who pointed out that 
“China’s curse has been Japan’s warning”, the committee learned of the 
horror with which the vice was regarded. The Philippine report ... led not 
only to the prohibition of opium in the Philippine Islands but also to the 
fĳirst attempt to deal internationally with the problem.14 
Anyway, the performance of this Philippine Commission, combining the 
utmost misunderstanding about the Opium Problem with ignorance 
about, for example, the Japanese opium policy, is indeed a beginning of 
the offfĳicial USA involvement in the international drug scene. 
What about individual Americans? For a long time they were already 
active as captains, sailors, bullion traders, opium dealers or ship builders, 
starting soon after the British colonies in North America gained indepen-
dence (1783). The British did everything to counteract the new American 
competition, as Harrison’s anger still showed. In reality, the “New 
American” clippers cooperated with the British in smuggling and com-
peted with everybody in trading. 
Notwithstanding this, the “Old China Trade”, the early commerce 
between China and the US until the First Opium War, was lucrative for 
both parties and, therefore, not combined with American imperialist 
14 D. Owen, p. 327, 328.
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motives or activities. It became real free trade since the Chinese could sell 
Americans many kinds of Chinese products for a willing American mar-
ket: from tea, cotton and silks to lacquer-ware, porcelains and floor-mat-
ting, all available even for poorer people. In every American household at 
the time, some Chinese product could be found. The main thing Chinese 
bought from the Americans was bullion, silver Mexican dollars ($62 mil-
lion between 1805 and 1825), followed by the much appreciated ginseng 
from the Appalachian Mountains and furs.
This American “Old China Trade” was rather unique because the other 
Westerners were not only representatives of colonial or imperialistic 
powers but were also strongly involved in the intra-Asian trade including 
opium trafffĳicking. 
The Americans, however, gradually slipped into these older “not free” 
trade networks. They were attractive because of their use of quick clip-
pers, but the consequences were far-reaching: it brought them into direct 
competition with the “older” British, French or Dutch traders and in direct 
involvement in the opium trade. Until then, the Chinese had perceived of 
them simply as one of those ‘foreign devils’. In addition, it brought these 
American traders their fĳirst confrontation with America as a nation, with 
state bureaucracies and foreign policy with increasingly more military 
and imperialistic overtones and activities.
The foreign competition with these American “older traders” was 
accomplished through technical superiority (clippers) and the strategi-
cally important bullion trade. Both aspects soon lost their importance: 
the clippers were replaced by steamers, and the Chinese had to swallow 
opium instead of buying bullion. The Americans lost their exclusive posi-
tion and became just one of the many who had to stick to the British nar-
co-military activities. 
Indeed, thanks to the First Opium War, the ‘Old China Trade’ defĳinitely 
came to an end, the fĳirst and last example of free trade of a Western nation 
with Asian countries. Now the Americans had to follow the British 
Imperial Flag, for the fĳirst time as a nation (see John Adams in ch. 2). 
A new period of emancipation from British domination was initiated 
until the USA became a full-time imperialist nation of its own with repre-
sentatives like Mr. Harrison. 
Because of the importance of this period in hindsight, it seems appro-
priate to specify the above by assessing the question of whether this 
“Chinese” was only related to a geographical location, to an “object” for 
profĳit, or to a problem with ethnic or cultural connotations.
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American–Chinese Opium Relations, 1800-ca. 186515
As indicated, private Americans, shippers and merchants, arrived for the 
fĳirst time in Canton around 1800 to establish a trading center of their 
own. With their quick and well-armed clippers, they were among the 
most fanatic opium smugglers. They often cooperated with Chinese com-
pradores, a school for a new kind of opium criminal. 
The famous American businessman who started a regular opium trade 
with China was the already very rich John Jacob Astor (1763-1848), born 
German with a Waldensian or Jewish background.16 In 1784 the fĳirst 
American trading vessel to China, The Empress of China, departed from 
New York. Later that year fourteen more American ships sailed for the 
Indian Ocean and beyond. Reason: their favorite area for trade, the West 
Indies, was closed offf by the British, and they had to look for diffferent des-
tinations. They brought back a good profĳit, which inspired people like 
Astor to extend his trade with fur, sandalwood and tea. 
It came abruptly to an end due to the inactive and unpopular US 
Embargo Act (1807) invented by Jeffferson. Nine years later, however, Astor 
joined the opium smuggling trade camouflaged by his American Fur 
Company. He could not get his cargo in India and purchased ten tons of 
Turkish opium and shipped this contraband to Canton. To confĳirm this 
once again: this was offfĳicially smuggling for Britain and illicit for the 
Chinese government.
Astor was preceded by a smuggler from Boston, Charles Cabot, who 
attempted to purchase opium from the British and smuggled it into China 
under the auspices of British smugglers (1805). Another American, John 
Cushing, employed in his uncles’ business, James and Thomas H. Perkins 
Company of Boston, acquired his wealth from smuggling Turkish opium 
to Canton (1812). Many other Americans established this illicit trade to 
China. 
After the opium clippers were exchanged for steamers, the American 
fĳirm Russell and Co (= Delano, great-grandfather of President Roosevelt) 
was apparently ‘the third-largest opium dealer on the China coast’.17 It is 
this fĳirm which introduced opium into the Americas and not the Chinese, 
15 See for this C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 630 fff.
16 See for this Astor A. Madsen and Wikipedia. This Astor was the fĳirst “richest man of 
the US” and he is subject of many stories and legends triggering that special hobby of sec-
tarian Americans, knowing the tricks of the conspiracy trade, like the highly controversial 
L. Larouche, etc. See for normal science L. Blussé (2008), p. 60 fff.  
17 H. Gelber, p. 166.
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who did not have the right ships for crossing the Pacifĳic. And Russell went 
so far as to make people think of it as trade by the Chinese. 
The combination of illicit trade, smuggling, camouflaging controver-
sial products behind innocent names, hiding a whole “White Race” behind 
a “Yellow Race”, the ambiguous support of the authorities if provided with 
enough “licenses”, the intentional creation of addicted “clients” etc.; all 
these acts created the corrupting secrecy and conspiracies long before a 
so-called ‘organized crime’ was established. 
Soon Americans were also well known along the China coasts for other 
things: insulting and quarreling with the British sailors as their mutual 
War of Independence had to be continued and fought abroad. There are 
also remarkable legends claiming that the habit of smoking opium via a 
pipe-smoking merchantman was spread in the 17th-century ‘from 
America’!18 Apparently, some Sioux or Comanche chief came to smoke 
the “peace pipe”.
Priscilla Napier, who told this story, is not very fond of Americans since 
Americans competed with the English from the end of the 18th-century by 
selling ‘Indian and Turkish opium along the China coasts’.19 The English 
Bengal opium monopoly was defĳinitely undermined (a little). 
The later legends about “the bad opium and the good Americans” 
weare established soon after the First Opium War when gold was found in 
California and thousands of Chinese emigrated to this “paradise”. This 
Gold Rush was soon accompanied by, of course, the ‘Gold Mountain opi-
um’. During and after the Second Opium War, it was an American adven-
turer, Frederic Ward, who helped the Chinese imperial army to struggle 
successfully against the Taiping. That is probably the reason why Priscilla 
mixed up many things by stating:
The Chinese empire had already been badly weakened by the Taiping 
Rebellion ... led by a communist rebel from the south preaching Marxism 
before Marx was, laced by draconian notions of equality picked up from 
American missionaries, and causing more deaths than those sufffered by 
everybody on both sides in the First World War.20
Later, at the moment of the highest opium profĳits of competitor England 
(around 1880), the to-and-fro trafffĳic between Hong Kong and San 
Francisco grew exponentially into thick and multilevel networks. 




At home Americans had already developed a habit of opium eating or 
smoking in the form of pills, drinks and powders. Probably as an impact of 
the American Civil War, one report about opium consumption in 1867 
stated:
The habit is gaining fearful ground among our professional men, the oper-
atives in our mills, our weary serving women, our fagged clerks, our former 
liquor drunkards, our very day laborers, who took gin a generation ago. All 
our classes from the highest to the lowest are yearly increasing their con-
sumption of the drug.21
It is remarkable enough that reports like this could already be made at 
this junction. But the following is quite wonderful in light of the above 
quotation: in 1882 some Citizen Kane reports that 
a sporting character by the name of Clendenyn was the fĳirst white man to 
smoke opium in San Francisco in 1868. The second … induced to try it by 
the fĳirst, smoked in 1871’!22 
Kane continues with the more reliable story of how smoking led to new 
city ordinances, many arrests of young girls and men of respectable fami-
lies and heavy punishments: opium eating was allowed in pills and pow-
ders for everybody with a doctor’s prescription and smoking also, but then 
only for the Chinese in US Chinatowns. 
At this time there was also the division of labor between prepared opi-
um and the raw form. Preparing opium for export became a monopoly of 
the Hong Kong (and Macao) British (Portuguese) opium farms. Their rev-
enue made up a quarter of the Hong Kong government’s income from 
1860 to 1890.23 After that date Hong Kong was often called the “Drugs 
Capital of the World” and similar expressions, while still the main direc-
tion of this trade was the United States.
As will be shown below: three years after the “fĳirst American white 
smoker” made his discovery, already 30,000 lbs of smokers-opium was 
being imported! This was certainly not only for the Chinese immigrants 
working in gold mines and on the railway projects. And it was deemed a 
bad habit out of racist motives, anyway, whatever the legality of the 
import. The main sources for the knowledge of this early opium use were 
the physicians and druggists, who were ‘alarmed’ that year after year, they 
had to sell more opium, morphine and laudanum. 
21 C. Terry, M.Pellens, p. 5.
22 Idem, p. 73.
23 E. Sinn, p. 19.
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Against the background of these lively opium relations, the flirtation 
between American governments and successive Chinese leaderships can 
only be perceived as ambiguous.24 It started in 1844 and lasted to about 
1949. In 1844 the Treaty of Wang Hea forbade American citizens from trad-
ing in opium in that country. Violators were dealt with by the Chinese 
government, which at that time beheaded opium smugglers and traders. 
Immediately after the Opium War, the US government changed its 
opinion drastically and repeated the same language as the English con-
querors: in the Tientsin Treaty (1858) Americans had “negotiated” to 
become ‘free to engage in the opium trafffĳic’.25 In the same year, however, 
a commercial treaty with Japan prohibited opium import by Americans. 
To apply such a double standard would remain the most solid element in 
the foreign policy of the Americans, a cynical attitude copied from their 
old colonial masters.
They were soon dissatisfĳied with their tiny piece of the opium pie. 
Along with a fear of losing a reasonable commercial future in China, the 
Americans again changed colors drastically in a new commercial treaty 
with China (1880). This again ‘forbade American citizens from engaging in 
the import of opium into any of the open ports of China’, while Chinese 
subjects were also prohibited from importing opium into the USA. This 
was afffĳirmed in the next Treaty of Commercial Relations (1903). 
The “Mystery” of the Chinese Opium Import
The fĳirst table below, however, shows that after 1880, the opium import 
mainly from Hong Kong into the ports on the USA Pacifĳic coast increased 
instead of the reverse. Cynical conclusion or a genuine mystery? Cynical 
in every respect, because this government policy became the “argument” 
used to repress the Chinese as being the Yellow Peril and as opium Smokers 
who Poison the Nation. Serious pogroms were organized against the 
Chinatowns in the US at the same time as pogroms in Russia occurred 
against another minority, the Jews. This serious repression culminated in 
the extradition of the Chinese from this hospitable country for immi-
grants (Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882; even extended as the Geary Act, 1892 
which was extended again in 1924).26 
24 See also S.G. Chen, p. 278, 290 fff.
25 For the negotiations around this treaty see J. Beeching, p. 260 fff.
26 The Statistical Abstracts of the US (1880) state that the immigration ‘from Asia’ 
(95% Chinese) was in 1871 already 7,236, three years later 20,326 and again three years later 
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The mix of the usual Christian racism (developed as a strategy against 
the American Indians) with “scientifĳic” racist theories27 and the demoni-
22,943. But under the influence of all anti-Chinese measures and actions, it decreased to 
5,879 in 1880. See further Wikipedia article ‘Chinese American History’. The interrelations 
between the immigration of Chinese and import of opium (in whatever form) should be 
scrutinized anew: T. Tong Joe, p. 72 fff. states that the Chinese population in the USA dou-
bled in the period 1860-1870 but the opium import only increased by 88%.; from 1870-1890, 
however, the Chinese population doubled again, but the import of prepared opium 
increased ten times, apart from smuggled and raw opium. Although these fĳigures are dif-
fĳicult to check, his conclusion is right: there is no clear correlation between the existence 
of the Chinese in the USA and the consumption of opium. Or: “white consumption” 
increased much quicker, which made the anti-Chinese measures even more dubious.
27 In 1849 American scholars like Morton published as result of his craniology (skull 
measurement) that English had 96 cubic inches of brains, Americans 90, Negroes 83 and 
Chinese 82. Indians lagged behind with 79 cubic inches. T. Gosset, p. 74. Twenty years later 
another urged putting all Negroes and Chinese in reservations (Id. p. 262). Especially in 
California the Chinese were repressed from 1854 onwards as they were described as ‘mor-
ally, the most debased people on the face of the earth’ and a Supreme Court decided that 
Chinese were barred from giving testimony in cases involving whites (Idem, p. 290). In the 
Ill. 24. A Skeleton in his Closet 
Source: Puck, magazine 3-1-1912 by L.M. Glackens.
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zation of opium smoking by the American missionaries must have con-
tributed strongly to these extraordinary actions.28 It was a bizarre fact 
that when the import of Chinese cheap labor strongly decreased from 
around 1880, the opium import increased greatly! The American-Chinese 
relations were seriously afffected by these unprecedented actions: during 
the Boxer rebellion, revenge on the fanatic American missionaries in par-
ticular was carried out. And this gave a legitimation for the previous 
repression in the USA, in hindsight, and a legitimation to extend the 
Western extraterritoriality claims in China, and so on. 
The increase in the opium import is not a mystery, however. We must 
realize that after the Opium Wars it was legal trade from a Western point 
of view. It concerns largely British trade carried out mostly by British or 
American ships, exported by a British colony (Hong Kong) and distribut-
ed in America mainly by American wholesalers (later called ‘the orga-
nized crime’ or mafĳia) and by American pharmacists with their ‘Overseas 
Chinese’ shopkeepers as middlemen. In addition, many American busi-
nessmen were settled in the new foreign concessions of Shanghai or in 
Canton and Hong Kong under the British umbrella.
For American consumers, taxpayers and uninformed authorities inside 
the USA, all this was “Chinese business”, a highly symbolic transformation 
of a “white” trade. The same authorities gratefully accepted the substan-
tial import duties. The mix of this added an institutionalized hypocrisy to 
the already existing secrecy around the real dealers, profĳiteers, etc. 
Furthermore, a new source of opium was found; this time a true 
American one. The Civil War (1861-1865) and the Opium Wars in China 
had brought marked initiatives among entrepreneurs. The Civil War led 
to an army of addicts since the main painkillers were opium and mor-
phine: nearly 10,000,000 opium pills and over 2,841,000 ounces of other 
1870s and 1880s the Californian trade unions including Jews like Samuel Gompers were the 
most active in the anti-Chinese activities. In his opinion Chinese were people ‘without 
morals’, ‘without nerves and without digestion’ and he sinisterly predicted that they shall 
‘overwhelm the world’ (Idem, 291 fff.). It is a good example of the classical antisemitic dis-
course by an important Jewish leader, which puts this discourse in a quite diffferent light. 
28 E. Sinn, p. 36 note 9. See further ch. 29. Sinn further writes (Idem, note 17): ‘Later on 
white Americans also smoked opium, but interestingly, when the import of prepared 
opium was banned in 1909, they were the fĳirst to switch to the syringe.’ As a thesis should 
be perceived: the anti-Chinese activities which are completely out of all proportion must 
have connotations with the guilt of the Americans towards the genocide on “Indians”, 
who—according to a popular theory—descended from “Mongols”. See the Philippine 
adventure.
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opium powders and tinctures were issued to Union forces alone.29 We 
can guess that the new American pharmaceutical industry based in 
Philadelphia had done well. New promising market opportunities were 
seen as well by many people. 
In 1865 Mr. Robertson in Virginia started to produce opium, which 
yielded 4% of morphine along with narcotine. Dr. Black in Tennessee pro-
duced an opium with a 10.2% morphine content (1868). In North Carolina 
as late as 1894, opium production was initiated. The learned pharmacists 
announce:
Very fĳine opium has been produced by Mr. J.H. Flint of California ... 1874 
... also in Minnesota by Mr. E Weschke … 1886 …; but in the opinion both 
of Mr. Flint and of Mr. Weschke the high price of labor forbids the profĳitable 
production of opium in the United States …30 
This seems not to be the main reason to me. The Civil War was fought 
among other reasons to keep cheap plantation labor in the country for the 
northern industry, while very cheap Chinese labour poured in through 
the ports of the West coast. Probably the main reason was that the stufff 
imported from Singapore or Hong Kong by the British or American mer-
chants was too cheap. The following two tables make additional remarks 
possible.
From this table one can learn that in the last quarter of the 19th-centu-
ry a minimum of 2 million pounds of opium were imported into North 
America just through the Pacifĳic ports. This gave the state and its bureau-
crats an additional advantage of at least $15 million. It can be expected 
that the distributors in the USA and Canada calculated this amount in the 
consumer prices of the opium.
There is a mysterious aspect to this “Chinese import”. Wood and 
Bache’s Dispensatory, the source of the experts par excellence, states about 
this “Chinese opium”:
Chinese opium probably never reaches the European market. It is imported 
to some extent into the United States through San Francisco, but appears 
not to fĳind its way into the ordinary channels of trade, and is probably used 
exclusively by resident Chinese for smoking purposes. The U.S. duty upon 
opium is one dollar a pound, but the custom-house authorities view the 
Chinese variety as an extract, and levy six dollars a pound; hence, probably, 
the ever-recurring attempts at its smuggling. It occurs in flat, oval cakes, 
wrapped fĳirst in white tissue, then in thin brown paper, labeled in Chinese 
29 D. Courtwright, p. 55. 
30 G. Wood, F. Bache, p. 981 note also for the following production data.
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Table 41. Pacifĳic opium import and duties paid in USA and Canada, 1871 – 1899 
(selected years)31
Year Quantity in lbs USA Duties in $ Canadian Duties in $
1871  37 825   265 259      ---
1874     ---       ---   2 493
1875  62 775   376 648   4 836
1876  53 189   319 137  15 331
1880  77 196   463 176  13 668 [1881]
1882 141 476   848 836      ---
1883 220 867 1 325 202      ---
1885  54 434   554 340      ---
1887  65 397   653 970  53 172
1889  44 674   446 740 101 244
1890  77 578   818 912 137 050
1895 116 354   698 124  36 056
1896  43 692 [4 months]   261 852      ---
1897     ---       ---  51 580
1899     ---       ---  39 705
characters with the name of the province and the seller …32 We must real-
ize, however, that notwithstanding the offfĳicial declarations of governments, 
the many critics of the opium trade targeted the smoking of opium only. 
Opium was legally used in many medicines and concoctions under diffferent 
names (laudanum, etc.), in many households and available through most 
medical doctors from about 1860 onwards.
There was, indeed, a quite diffferent source for the very lucrative pharma-
ceutical business which was established mainly in Philadelphia, the basis 
for the largest modern multinationals in the fĳield like Merck or Glaxo-
Smith-Kline: this was a British-Turkish variety imported mainly into New 
York. As described in section 2.4, the British “household opium” came 
from Turkey, and it was this traditional link which was extended to the 
former British colony, the USA.33
31 E. Sinn, p. 34 and 35 quoted from Kane (1882) and Masters (1896). Data from three 
diffferent sources are combined by me (not by Sinn). For 1871 two diffferent fĳigures are men-
tioned in two Sinn tables, which I have added. I suppose that both tables concern, in fact, 
San Francisco Customs statistics. One may suppose, furthermore, that the San Franscisco 
import arrived mainly from Hong Kong. The Canadian data come from the interesting site 
web.uvic.ca/vv/student/chinatown/ opium/p3.html and they concern the duty on imported 
opium in British Colombia. 
32 G. Wood, F. Bache, p. 986.
33 It remains symptomatic that the American Lyndon LaRouche sect published in 
1978 a report “Dope: Britain’s Opium War against the US” constructing a British and Jewish 
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Table 42. Atlantic Opium Imports and Duties Paid, 1871 – 1899 (selected years)34
Year Quantity in lbs USA Duties in $ 
in New York
USA Duties in $ 




1871 265 416 1 511 474 415 441 1 926 915
1874 250 604 1 470 099 1 070 129 2 540 223
1875 171 582 1 170 985 866 808 2 037 793
1876 183 243 707 413 1 098 492 1 805 906
1880 326 352 1 427 687 1 358 919 2 786 606
1882 158 127 481 959 1 345 089 1 826 998
1883 99 552 328 894 2 809 245 3 138 159
1885 152 703 426 173 892 098 1 318 271
1887 355 348 764 341 568 424 1 332 765
1889 202 741 369 289 1 084 808 1 454 097
1890 204 268 486 341 966 957 1 453 298
1895 191 447 388 981 1 261 694 1 650 675
1896 … … 735 134 735 134
1897 542 132 1 108 100 2 209 488 3 317 588
1899 364 915 866 390 1 185 764 2 052 154
It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the price efffects about which 
Mr. Flint or Weschke (see above) complained were the result of the com-
petition between the European-New York and Asian-San Francisco opi-
um dealers. This antagonism probably formed the basis of the drugs gangs 
which started to operate after the economic interests involved were 
forced to go underground by social agitation and new legislation. Around 
1900, however, it was still rather quiet on all these “opium fronts”.
Whether the white Christian immigrant society of Canada demonstrat-
ed the same traits is not very clear. The communication between the two 
coasts was very limited at the time. The role of San Francisco was played 
for a long time by Victoria until Vancouver took over all activities around 
1900. It is said that trade between Hong Kong and these Canadian ports 
was ‘practicable’ since the former was a British colony and the latter a 
British Confederate. Opium sellers in Canada needed a license. In 1865 
conspiracy to rape the US innocence. This in fact patriotic pamphlet combines, as usual in 
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this cost $100; a year later it was $250, and about twenty years later one 
had to pay nearly $500. 
Among the Chinese, mostly working for the Canadian Pacifĳic Railway, 
a lethal competition raged between the six opium factories until one of 
them decreased its price so far that most competitors perished. Still a few 
years later there were new ones, and thirteen factories with a annual turn-
over of 90,000 lbs at $15 a pound, realising a gross income of $10 a pound 
on these deals. That was not much, and additional sources of income 
were needed like prostitution and trade in human beings. Smuggling was 
also common, because the duty in Canada was $5 a pound and in the USA 
$10. Nothing was done against it by authorities, ‘simply because the trade 
helped to promote opium manufacturing and thus generating revenue for 
the government.’35
The Creation of a Chinese Threat after 1911 
Kremers and Urdang still write in 1963:
Nevertheless, it was in the second half of the 19th-century before the great 
European trading nations and the United States of America became aware 
of the threat to themselves of what originally was considered to be pecu-
liarly an Eastern vice.36
It concerns here, of course, not a ‘Chinese vice’ but a British product 
imported into China and elsewhere resulting in the addiction of numer-
ous Chinese. Yet they mention in passing that the English government 
overcame the attempts of the Chinese government to stop the opium 
import, but that it was ‘an irony of history’ that the poppy cultivation of 
the Chinese themselves made opium into a Chinese export article. 
In the meantime serious scientifĳic research has gradually formed a 
common view on China after 1911, the end of the Chinese empire. A period 
started of widespread renewal of opium cultivation resulting from politi-
cal chaos, provincial or “national” warlords and the chance for high profĳits 
and army revenues. The criminal activities of these generals (including 
Chiang Kai-shek) in conjunction with gangster organizations (foreign) 
and dubious speculators (foreign), periodically antagonized many observ-
ers (foreign). To discover something of the reality behind the prejudices 
and propaganda took much time.
35 web.uvic.ca/vv/student/chinatown/ opium/p3.html.
36 E. Kremers, G. Urdang, p. 119.
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Marshall about 1934 states:
American offfĳicials, concerned that over 90 percent of the world’s opium 
grew in China, were particularly critical of Nationalist policies. Some State 
Department offfĳicials were less concerned that the drugs were entering the 
United States than that the opium trade was diminishing China’s potential 
to absorb American goods.37 
Even on the top of this Chinese production, most opium was produced in 
India, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the League of Nations reports 
on opium, certainly those from the 1930s, China is mentioned as the 
main consumption country.38 Its production diminished strongly during 
World War I in the framework of an international deal and was later large-
ly confĳined to Chinese consumption only.39 In addition, substantial for-
eign, mainly Western, interests in Chinese opium production and 
consumption always remained.
American offfĳicials reacted ambiguously. One of them objected to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s use of opium ‘to further his designs for a “Nazi” style 
dictatorship’; a colleague emphasized the enormously corrupting influ-
ence and charged that Chiang broke the anti-opium laws for personal 
enrichment. Diametrically opposed to this was the policy of offfĳicials close 
to the Rockefeller Foundation (the “Oil Group”), which supported 
Chiang’s minister T.V. Soong establishment of a national opium monopo-
ly, as was done earlier in French Indochina or the Dutch East Indies. It 
had become clear in the meantime that this kind of monopoly never 
stamped out the use of opium, but only worked to provide the state with 
regular and generous opium revenues. This implied, of course, price as 
well as consumption increases and further state involvement. The 
American Ambassador, Nelson Johnson, called the Soong move, there-
fore, ‘pathetically naive and a little ridiculous’ (1932).
The still obscure Joseph Stilwell (the later controversial—“Vinegar 
Joe”—general in World War II) was military attaché in China specialized 
in the opium business (1935). He had a keen eye on Chiang Kai-shek’s 
maneuvers to monopolize opium as a means to monopolize the political 
power in China. Stilwell wrote:
By means of secure domination of the opium trafffĳic [Chiang hoped] to 
increase the political power of the National Government over provinces 
whose allegiance is doubtful ... opium is the chief prop of all power in China, 
37 J. Marshall, p. 22.
38 See Commission d’enquête.
39 T. Tong Joe, p. 25 fff., 102 fff. and below part 6-2.
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both civil and military. No local government can exist without a share of 
the opium revenues. If the central government can control the opium sup-
ply of a province, that province can never hope to revolt successfully.40 
Later (ch. 31) will be discussed whether and how Stilwell exaggerated 
(which he did). 
There were also people who acted as fear-mongers warning of an opi-
um assault on the USA by Chinese or “China”! An US consul reported (April 
1934):
One of the results of the development of an organized drug trafffĳic in China 
is the increasing export of opium and its derivatives (morphine and heroin) 
from China to foreign countries, including the United States. It is reported 
that important members of the international drug ring now reside in Shang-
hai to control this trafffĳic.41 
Anslinger’s US Bureau of Narcotics reported a few years earlier (1931) that 
most of the opium smuggled into the US came via Seattle and San 
Francisco. One wonders why such an offfĳice needed to circulate informa-
tion that was nearly half a century old (see above); an offfĳice which dares 
to report next that the exact sources were still unknown, but that the 
‘greater bulk’ was ‘manufactured and packed somewhere in the Far East 
...’! Of course, such mysterious people or organizations were ‘impossible 
to stop because ... the smuggling of opium into the United States is con-
ducted on a huge scale by well organized highly fĳinancial gangs’.42 
It was never investigated whether “Chinese export” really was Chinese 
export or only export from elsewhere or by non-Chinese interests choos-
ing some Chinese address or from a Western nation operating from Hong 
Kong, Macao or other “international settlement”. The most remarkable 
aspect was that they apparently did not know anything about the lively 
export to the USA by the Jardine-Matheson company, the largest opium 
dealer. Their USA export around 1850 from Amoy or Hong Kong to Havana 
(Cuba) concerned coolies for the US mines and railways, who were erro-
neously deemed all opium addicts.43 Easy business: you deliver the work-
force (nominally illegal!) and the means to keep them quiet in one deal.
40 Quoted by J. Marshall, p. 25.
41 Idem, p. 27. The consular mentions a name of an old friend of Chiang Kai-shek 
which sounds very Chinese for some bureaucrats in Washington, but who cannot be 
found in Chiang’s best biography from J. Taylor or other relevant literature.
42 Idem, p. 27.
43 D. Meyer, p. 69; G. Endacott, p. 127 fff. The opium-missionary Gutzlafff was even 
involved in this trade. This coolie-opium combination was certainly still standard after 
1900. See D. Meyer, 115 fff.; G. Endacott, p. 275 fff.
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The great Harry Anslinger himself repeated in 1934 the message of his 
“man in China”, now adding several times that it was ‘confĳidential police 
information’: it must have been a tradition invented to mask ignorance, 
amateurism or propaganda behind so-called “security” or “national inter-
est” announcements. He also mentioned that several from the ‘notorious 
international narcotics trafffĳickers’ now also had offfĳices in Europe, with-
out mentioning relevant information. Of course, they ‘were known to 
continue to be immune from prosecution …’ 
This is not to suggest that this smuggling of heroin and other narcotics 
did not take place. But it took decades of operating rather publicly before 
parts of the international “ring” of the aristocratic Jardine’s and Sassoons 
or of the Ezra Brothers (including their many political connections) were 
“discovered” (see further ch. 31). Indeed, some had their base in Shanghai 
(in the foreign concession), but operated world-wide after World War I. 
Mostly Western smuggling “rings” with foreign collaborators exported 
opium, heroin or morphine from many places in the world on Western 
ships.
Anslinger’s crusade, developed in these years, continued after World 
War II and was the proper preparation for the “War on Drugs”, which was 
formally announced by President Nixon (17 June 1971).44 Anslinger’s out-
right anti-Chinese racism, his ideological and practical mixture of foreign 
and domestic drug policies, became the most controversial aspect of the 
US War on Drugs. That is not the subject of our History of the Opium 
Problem, but the following preparation of the domestic part of this “war” 
could easily form part of the controversy.
A fĳirst “War on Drugs” and its Limitations
The moral criticism of many 19th-century religious pressure groups in the 
USA was not bothered about foreign policy and macro-economic trends. 
The efffect of this criticism was to denigrate the image of opium and give 
it immoral or criminal connotations. It was the necessary prerequisite for 
action and legislation.
It is estimated that by 1895, around 3% of the population (65 million) 
was addicted to morphine, which is equivalent to 2 million people. The 
44 President Roosevelt publicly supported a uniform drug act (1935). The New York 
Times came with the headline: ‘Roosevelt Asks Narcotic War Aid.’ It sounds like Ansling-
er’s cowboy-language. See Wikipedia’s article ‘War On Drugs’. 
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majority of them was classifĳied as ‘high-income women’, known as habi-
tués.45 This must be a gross exaggeration, despite morphine’s popularity 
after the invention of the hypodermic needle: it would suggest that all 
high-income women in the USA were addicted.46 Whether serious or not, 
this situation became the source of one scandal after the other, and all 
kinds of Christian women’s organizations (apparently not addicted) start-
ed campaigns which were supported by missionaries, anti-alcohol lobbies 
and many other agitation groups. The targets were local, state and federal 
politicians and bureaucrats. The honorables of San Francisco (with at that 
time about 200,000 inhabitants) reacted adequately.
This Pacifĳic coastal city, the main port for the opium trade and busi-
ness, had numerous opium dens and very few wholesalers. An article of 
1892, an interview with the opium authority Dr. Masters, sketches a 
remarkable situation in this city, criticizes the anti-democratic behavior 
of a double-dealing government, and presents a Chinese solution:
In San Francisco a city ordinance attempts to regulate the selling of smok-
ing opium by a high license proportional to the gross business done, and in 
1889 another ordinance made it “illegal to sell any extract of opium except 
on a written order of a practicing physician, and requiring that the amounts 
sold, with the name, sex, color and residence of the purchaser, and the name 
of the prescribing physician, be entered in a book. The City Council thus 
passes an ordinance practically declaring a business illegal which it has 
already legalized, and from which it is not ashamed to draw a revenue.” The 
right way to deal with the problem, Dr Masters thinks, is to follow the advice 
of the better class of Chinese, and remove prepared opium from the tarifff 
list, declare it contraband, and confĳiscate it wherever found.47
Police state practices and solutions already surrounded the San Francisco 
opium problem, at that time a rather liberal city. It is the fĳirst time that 
these consequences of the Opium Problem can be demonstrated in any 
Western country. The most serious attacks from a Moralistic State were 
still to come. But could it be worse than reported in the same 1892 arti-
cle? 
45 G. Recio, p. 23.
46 In a population of 65 million there were at the time about 13 million adult women, 
from which around 5% or 650,000 could belong to the high-income class. See for these 
women, D. Courtwright, p. 36 fff. The syringe needle was invented in 1857, and Merck had 
distributed the stufff in 1827 fĳirst when he was still a pharmacist shop-owner.
47 This article is published on the site of the excellent Schafffer Library of Drug Policy 
and quoted from The Review of Reviews (5 June, 1892), titled ‘San Francisco Opium Joints’.
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Complaints that the ‘opium vice’ demoralized not only the Chinese but 
also white Americans made the latter afraid to go to the joints to purchase 
their own imported doses. Dr. Masters advised, therefore, as follows:
If done at all ... it must be very secretly. The movements of white people 
about Chinatown are so carefully watched, and the diffferent hells under 
almost half-hourly surveillance, that it would be impossible for them to 
frequent these places without soon attracting the attention of the police. 
There is plenty of smoking done by American people, but it is carried on in 
private houses or in rooms secretly kept by white people.48 
Not in the Philippines, as McCoy thinks, but here in the United States 
itself, the police state was invented with all possible practical and theo-
retical consequences. 
On the federal level this example of San Francisco was not followed, 
despite what the willing and powerful anti- or pro-opium federal institu-
tions or private organizations could generate in terms of repressive mea-
sures. The box of Pandora was opened, however, and remained so.
In 1909 the New York Times published a long article about the attempts 
‘to stamp out the use of opium and many other drugs’.49 It reported, fĳirst, 
about the Shanghai conference of that year in which Great Britain 
announced a reduction to $35 million a year. Elsewhere in the article the 
real meaning of this promise is given: Britain ‘was making $35 million a 
year from her opium in India’. And it agreed ‘to reduce the exports of opi-
um from India 10 per cent a year for ten years, and China agreed to reduce 
the production of the drug within her boundaries at an equal rate’. 
The journal was not suspicious about the British proposals: if Chinese 
production was dismantled from where the Chinese addicts should get 
their stufff ? There was only one provider left at the time: British India. The 
journal did not mention that Britain was cheating the international com-
munity also by bringing in the value of a certain quantity, while the price 
per unit would increase. In this way the envisaged reduction in income 
was not achieved. It is the same trick the Dutch government employed in 
the East Indies. If reductions followed, it was not due to positive actions of 
the imperial powers. That other countries represented in the Shanghai 
conference did not promise the same, notwithstanding an opium monop-
oly in its colony or country, should have been a warning for analysts. 
48 Idem.
49 The New York Times, July 25, 1909 reprinted on www.druglibrary.org. The quota-
tions come from this article.
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The British and the Dutch governments were the largest opium provid-
ers or distributors. The only country without such a monopoly was China, 
the country which always had to pay the bill. There was, however, one 
spoil-sport in this game: against all expectations only the Chinese govern-
ment realistically reduced the Chinese opium production by rigorously 
suppressing the opium peasants, traders and fĳields (see ch. 30 and 31). 
However, The New York Times reported other quite interesting matters. 
First, that the governments in the Shanghai conference understood that 
after solving the Opium Problem they, including the United States, 
will take just as resolute steps to abolish in every civilized land the growing 
trafffĳic in cocaine, hasheesh, absinthe, chloral, and other drugs that fasten 
themselves upon mankind. 
This points to the very new development that opium became the world-
wide raw material for specifĳic bulk chemical products like heroin or 
codeine from the 1885s onwards, as it was already for morphine. 
Furthermore, the excessive profĳits of the poppy exploitation stimulated 
the search for other similar plants suitable for large-scale cash cropping: 
that became Erythroxylum coca from which the coca leaves produced 
cocaine or Cannabis sativa, which provided hashish or marihuana (bhang, 
ganja, etc.). As shown above, the Dutch government was not only one of 
the main opium distributors, it also started cultivating coca leaves at the 
end of the 19th-century and the production of cocaine. In this fĳield it 
became a world leader (see ch. 19). The quick spread of these new drugs 
was made possible by the well developed infrastructure for the opium 
trade, smuggling, and production for mass addiction. The New York Times 
specifĳied:
The tremendous increase in the use of cocaine that followed the passage of 
the restrictive laws against opium may be gathered when it is known that 
in 1904—before the United States took up the cudgel against the Oriental 
habit—the importation of cocaine was only 58,000 ounces, and of coca 
leaves ... was 53,000 pounds. In 1905 300,000 pounds of coca leaves were 
imported ... because rather than pay a duty of 25 per cent, ad valorem, the 
chemists had started the manufacture of the drug in this country on a large 
scale. In 1906 the importation of coca leaves was 2,600,000 pounds. … No 
drug on the market seems to have anywhere near such a demoralizing efffect 
on the human system.
According to this paper the prohibitory laws against smoking opium in 
the US had such an efffect that only ten days after their announcement, 
the Portuguese ‘opium farm’ in Macao closed its business. The crude opi-
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um was imported into Macao, prepared for smoking and exported nearly 
entirely to the US. The paper was in all probability too optimistic.
In the opium business, a serious transformation took place. Not only 
from “Yellow” customers into “Whites”, but also from the importing of 
smoking and crude opium, so that further manufacturing could take place 
into heroin and morphine in the US itself. In 1907 a total of 160,397 pounds 
of smoking opium were imported, which decreased to about 40,000 
pounds two years later. However, just New York imported 123,427 pounds 
in 1908, and nearly 300,000 pounds of crude opium was imported through 
all US ports together. And the rise in the price of smoking opium was from 
$1.50 a pound to $50 a pound in the big cities!50 
All this points to the basic transformation of the “natural” production 
into the industrial, pharmaceutical, one. This was also the start of the 
transformation from a more or less legal into a criminal business, from the 
rise of the drug mafĳia divided over the tremendously rich, white, Westerner 
and international dealers-transporters, the local producers (poor peas-
ants) with their rich and criminalized local clients. The fĳirst two could be 
assured of political protection in most cases, the last one never, if only to 
keep the prices as high as possible and the medical, police and social ser-
vices going. 
In short: in these years, particularly in the USA, one is confronted with 
the transformation of the Opium Problem from an assault on the East into 
an assault on the West. From the point of view of the big drug dealers and 
their political and military friends, their fĳinest hours were still to come. 
The citizens of the USA, however, could now add a new item to their 
superlative language: we are the fĳirst in history to initiate in response to 
the self-created Opium Problem a War on Drugs on the local level and 
serious pogroms against an ethnic minority throughout the country, 
which led to a police state and an assault on the intimate private life of the 
citizens of San Francisco. Was this the model for a similar project with the 
same name after 1950: a federal and/or a global police state?
50 The journal also talks about the spreading of the crude opium over the USA. So in 
1908 New York imported 123,427 pounds, Philadelphia imported 153,081, St. Louis 6,885 
pounds and Detroit only 430. The crude opium together is valued at $1,151,207, while the 
prices of the rather small amount of smoking opium increased so much that its total value 
became $1,336,703. This smoking opium, however, had quite a diffferent distribution. In 
1908, the last year of a substantial import of about 150,000 pounds, about 90% entered in 
San Francisco, Hawaii got 1,400 pounds, Puget Sound 156, Willamette (Wash.) 119 ‘and the 
district of Montana and Idaho combined, just one pound’.   
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The Philippine Case51
Before the internal American developments are discussed further, we 
have to continue with the external (colonial) activities which Americans 
developed under the same circumstances as any other Western colonizer. 
To have some political weight in the Eastern (opium) power game, one 
needed an Eastern power base. The Philippines became this stepping 
stone to reach to the bigger prey, China and Japan, a venture which came 
too late and failed from the beginning: the actions of Commodore Perry in 
the Japanese waters, who was trying to copy the successful assault of the 
British opium assault on China, ‘ironically dubbed the Open Door policy’.52
Because of this late arrival as a nation—and like Japan or Germany—
its main antagonist was the dominant imperialist, the British Empire: 
from about 1870 onwards competition with England became the leading 
maxim of American foreign policy and its architect, the bureaucracy of 
the State Department. And for similar reasons—and again like Japan and 
Germany—it tried to form an empire of its own in the East (Alaska, 1867; 
Hawaii, 1897; Philippines and Guam, 1898) or in Central America (Puerto 
Rico and Cuba, 1898; later followed by Panama, Haiti, etc.). 
For both policies, it could certainly rely on a not unimportant, tradi-
tional anti-Anglicanism among the American population, part of an 
always remarkable nationalism or patriotism of a settler’s society. In the 
many American cartoons illustrating “Uncle Sam’s” entrance in world pol-
itics, “his” position was seriously exaggerated, as if it really could compete 
with the British Empire.
During the 19th-century the American elite expressed two diffferent, 
but not original, ideas about how to cope with foreign countries. That is to 
say, those countries that were interesting as markets for American prod-
ucts or as sources of raw materials and other foreign products or as both 
import and export destinations. The earliest US traders decided to stay for 
a relevant, rather short period in an existing coastal settlement rather 
than conquer a substantial territory with its own settlers. The reason for 
this is not an enlightened idea about the ridiculous claim to grab a foreign 
country as one’s own property. No, it was already very busy conquering 
70% of the American territory and colonizing it and, therefore, there was 
51 For the following see Idem and A. McCoy, F. Scarano (ed.), in which at least twelve 
of the ca. 40 articles concern the Philippines. For the colonial history of the Philippines see 
in particular H. Kamen.
52 A. McCoy, E. Jesus (ed.), p. 66.
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simply no American manpower available to conquer territory at the other 
end of the world as well. US traders are, furthermore, not very willing to 
cooperate with US military and a federal government by which their own 
freedom to trade will be directly limited: traditionally, one has to act on 
one’s own behalf.
Around 1800 the very racist American settler’s society was still invent-
ing itself as a “white nation” and faced a very bloody civil war among its 
own tribe. At the same time it was organizing a genocide of the original 
population, the “Red Race”, and the “liberation” of the imported “Black 
Race” in order to get cheap labor for the new industries in the North 
instead of the plantations in the South. In such a rigorous situation, 
dreaming of a Greater America and nurturing imperialist activities in 
Ill. 25. “The Harvest in the Philippines”, 1899
Source: These words were below the cartoon published by Life, July 6, 1899 (Wisconsin 
State Historical Society). See also A. McCoy, F. Scarano, ed., p. 399.
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Central and South America (Monroe Doctrine) or making America the 
dominant power in the Pacifĳic Basin demonstrated an unbelievable lack 
of realism and an excess of naïveté.53
This changed a few decades after the Civil War. There was no lack of 
warnings against an imperialist adventure. A New England Anti-Imperialist 
League reminded the public that ‘when we undertake to govern subject 
peoples separated from us by half the world, let us remember how we 
despoiled the Indian’.54 Time and again this comparison was made 
between local tribal heathens and those far away; the massacres in the 
Philippines were immediately compared with “Wounded Knee”. What 
happened on those far-away islands in view of the reactions at home is 
symptomatic for all US foreign “projects”.
The Philippine Revolution (1896-1898) resulted in a liberation of the 
archipelago from the Spanish occupation. There had already been spo-
radic uprisings against the Spaniards before, so that in 1872 a “national” 
liberation movement could be established. The Filipinos defĳinitely oust-
ed the Spaniards with the help of the Americans. As such, it was the fĳirst 
of a long chain of similar 20th-century liberation movements in Asia and 
elsewhere. 
However, no politicians or military and spiritual leaders in the West 
were prepared to perceive this as the beginning of the end of their impe-
rialist fĳixation. Certainly not the lately arrived New Imperialists, all of 
whom became involved in genocidal actions against indigenous people: 
the Americans in the Philippines, the Japanese in China, and the Germans 
against the Herreros in Southwest Africa. It looks as if the achieved death 
rates made them “adult imperialists”. 
Not that the Old Imperialists stopped with similar practices, as the 
Dutch proved in their very bloody campaigns against largely unarmed 
indigenous peoples of North Sumatra, Bali or Lombok. These “Old 
Butchers” heralded that Americans had joined the slaughterers’ club, 
while the Americans taught them the new technique of “water-boarding 
torture against Muslim people” or concentration camps, immediately 
copied by the British in their South African struggle against Zulus and the 
fĳirst colonizers, the Calvinist Dutch Boers.55 
53 A. McCoy, F. Scarano (ed.), p. 66 fff.
54 Idem, p. 401.
55 It is symptomatic for the Pavlov reaction to burden The Enemy with all the crimi-
nal acts oneself is committing. Notwithstanding the widespread publicity concerning the 
“waterboarding” practices of American torturers in Guantanamo Bay at present, an intel-
ligent American, the Poet Laureate of the USA, Charles Simic, still writes in the New York 
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The Americans did more. As soon as they landed in the Philippines as 
liberators, they betrayed the indigenous people and started their fĳirst 
Asian colony with probably the First Genocide of the White Race in the 
20th-century. Under the leadership of generals like Pershing, Wood or 
Smith, they did their dirty job while executing infamous orders such as: 
‘Kill every one over ten!’56 
When the main killings stopped (guerrilla fĳighting continued until 
1913), between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Filippinos had lost their lives from a 
population of nine million. Concentration camps were established, and 
waterboarding became a routine method of torture. At that time, 
American generals in the Philippines referred explicitly to their cam-
paigns against the Indians in the Far West.
After the gunpowder smoke had cleared and at least in the main settle-
ments something like a normal life resumed, the new colonial USA gov-
ernment discovered that it had also inherited a serious opium problem 
from Spain. A few remarks about the preceding opium history will do.
The fĳirst Spanish conquerors arrived in the Philippines in 1565. Though 
few in number they, like their predecessors the Portuguese, were able to 
capitalize on the possession of fĳirearms and especially of ship’s cannon. 
Gradually, all of the islands were captured but this remained confĳined 
practically to coastal areas; the natives simply vanished into the bush. 
Guerrilla fĳights and revolts were a regular phenomenon from that time 
onwards. 
But Spain ruled here until 1898: the offfĳicial language became Spanish; 
the religion Roman Catholicism of a primitive kind nurtured by the rather 
dictatorial rules of the friars (Franciscans and Dominicans); a complicat-
ed racism supported the social hierarchy (the percentage of Spanish 
blood influenced one’s social or economic possibilities), even the indige-
nous peoples were caught in a system of racist categories.
In the middle of the 18th-century, this Western colony became part of 
the mutual wars between the Western competitors: the EIC captured 
Review of Books (February 11, 2010, p. 9): ‘Borrowed from Soviet and Chinese Communists 
and other repressive regimes ... these “techniques” were fĳine-tuned with ... the Department 
of Justice ... CIA offfĳicials ...’, etc. 
56 Idem, p. 401- 409; see also the Wikipedia article ‘Philippine Revolution’. It was the 
same brand of American generals who at the very end of World War 1 wanted to continue 
with the very bloody fĳighting, despite the fact that the surrender of the Germans was 
known and signed. This stubborness cost a few thousand American and German soldiers 
their lives. General Pershing was a commander in the Philippines as well as in World 
War I. 
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Manila (1762), but lost it again a few years later.57 Still, this year is seen as 
the beginning of the end of the Asian Spanish colonial rule: the English 
and Dutch infĳiltrated further every time, pirates of all sorts had their 
undisturbed playground, and the Islamic Sulu Sultanate was established 
in the south and feared for its extensive and long-standing slave raids and 
trade. It occupied mainly the island of Mindanao and the adjacent islands 
in the Sulu Sea, located between the Chinese mainland and the islands of 
Borneo and Celebes. 
The opium history of the Spanish Asian colonies started in fact as a 
modernization project.58 Based on Enlightenment ideas, a radical cri-
tique of Spanish imperialism was made by Spanish administrators, intel-
lectuals pointing to the huge profĳits the Dutch and English received from 
their ventures. Everywhere in Spain as well as in its colonies, “Economic 
Societies of Friends of the Country” (Sociedad Económica de los Amigos del 
País) were established in the 1780s-1810s, which proposed all sorts of mod-
ernization projects. 
Instead of the strict oikoidal system, they supported a system of “free 
trade” (especially with America) as the only way in which Spain’s hidden 
potential might be developed. Silver from America remained the fuel of 
the Spanish empire also, notwithstanding the fact that the Spanish trade 
was largely in the hands of foreign merchants (British, French and Dutch). 
They were eager enough to upheld the Spanish imperial illusions. The 
most lucrative product of the strict oikoidal “Spanish” trade (largely trade 
with Spanish destinations) remained slaves to North, Central and South 
America, while a large proportion of goods were transported through 
extensive smuggling practices, the free trade. 
In East Asia there was just as much smuggling, but the slave trade was 
confĳined to specifĳic “addresses” like the Sulu Sultanate on Mindanao. 
Opium was much more profĳitable, as the Spanish authorities learned 
mainly from the Dutch, but served the smugglers’ free trade. In the 
Philippines the new governor, Basco y Vargas, not only established a 
Society of Friends of the Country, but encouraged the growth of new crops 
for export such as indigo, tea, silk, tobacco, abaca (a kind of hemp suitable 
for ropes, etc.) and opium. Foreign merchants came to dominate this 
trade (of the thirteen trading houses, seven were British and two 
American) so that the Philippines could not lose in a competition with, 
57 H. Kamen, p. 482 fff.
58 For the following Idem, p. 458 fff.
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for instance, the same British fĳirms trading in Chinese tea and silk or 
Indian opium. 
As elsewhere in the Far East under Spanish rule, an opium monopoly 
of the government had existed since 1843 and opium tax farming was 
farmed out to Chinese. Only 70,000 Chinese lived here, most of them in 
the capital Manila.59 
After its annexation by the USA, this monopoly was abolished and 
replaced by an American one. This was, in fact, an Opiumregie system, 
including heavy taxation plus free opium trade. Considerable public rev-
enue was obtained now along with a marked increase in consumption, 
especially among the Filipinos, so that opium became the main govern-
ment income. ‘This was partly the result of a cholera epidemic in 1902, 
partly of the looser nature of the American system, which did not forbid 
the non-medicinal use of opiates by native Filipinos.’60 
Later, after a shift in its China policy and criticism of American mis-
sionaries, the new colonizers started a prohibition campaign. If it should 
be true that ‘the United States was the only power to give up the lucrative 
opium revenue voluntarily’ (A. Foster),61 it is strange that the US has 
remained ever since the most lucrative market for drugs in the world. 
Apart from this, the New York Times (August 6, 1904) reported more cor-
rectly about the Opium Committee appointed by Governor Taft, includ-
ing the immanent contradiction:
The committee recommends that the opium trafffĳic be made a Government 
monopoly at once so that at the end of three years the importation of opium 
may be absolutely prohibited, with the exception of medical requirements; 
that only confĳirmed habitués of the drug who are over twenty-one years of 
age be granted smokers’ license; ... that the punishment of Chinese found 
guilty of importing opium be deportation.62 
As elsewhere in East Asia, the colonial government monopolized trade or 
distribution in order to get more profĳit and control; they decreased the 
59 T. Tong Joe, p. 73 fff; D. Courtwright, p. 80 fff.
60 D. Courtwright, p. 80.
61 Quoted in a review of F. Schumacher in: H-Soz-u-Kult, 26-04-2006 of a reader 
about the Americans in the Philippines by Julian Go and Anne Foster, which I could not 
consult. Probably it is the same as Foster’s short and naive contribution to A. McCoy, F. 
Scarano (ed.), p. 95-105. She writes (Id., p. 95) about something most ambiguous as the 
‘American leadership of the anti-opium movement.’ More support could be found for the 
reverse hypothesis that the US became the most serious victim of the same movement! 
That, however, is not the aim of my writing. 
62 The New York Times archive article ‘Federal Opium Monopoly’.
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quantities but increased the prices in the colonies, stimulating not only 
serious bureaucratic corruption but also smuggling. Also here the Chinese 
always got the blame; the “white” British and American importers or the 
main smugglers were largely spared.
Main customers at the end of the 19th-century belonged to the Chinese 
emigrant population, which became directly dependent on the govern-
ment deliveries. But other consumers were also spotted by, for instance, 
the American Pharmaceutical Association in 1903:
While it has not been practicable to obtain exact fĳigures, it can be stated 
that the drug habit is alarmingly increasing among the men of our army 
and navy. The number of men using opium in the army has greatly increased 
since the occupation of the Philippines, many “opium smokers” acquiring 
the habit there from Chinese or natives ... Quite a number of enlisted men 
have been discharged from both army and navy during the last year because 
Ill. 26. “Those pious Yankees ...”, 1902
Source: Life, May 22, 1902 (Wisconsin State Historical Society) published this cartoon as 
probably the fĳirst warning about the US waterboarding practices. All Old Imperialists – 
Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Holland – sang a chorus in the background: ‘Those 
pious Yankees can’t throw stones at us anymore”. See also A.McCoy, F.Scarano, ed., p. 405.
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of their being detected as habitual users of opium or morphine ... Not a 
single case of drug habit coming from the prescribing of an opiate by a 
medical offfĳicer can be recalled ...63
The Anglican bishop Brent was the most influential member of the 
Philippine Opium Commission. In his view the consumption of opium was 
not merely a matter of personal weakness, but a social vice and a crime. At 
that moment, for church people, there was no alternative after the foreign 
missionaries in China had changed colors in order to save their business 
of converting Chinese. The commission members accepted their opinion 
that Chinese of all classes used opium,
the poor inevitably sufffered most from the high prices. Missionaries reported 
that men sold their businesses and families to satisfy their habits. Appar-
ently, the missionaries did not perceive an appropriate solution in making 
opium available at lower prices ... Missionaries thus perceived opium use 
as frustrating their own ambition.64 
In doing so, they contributed strongly to the habit of blaming the victims 
(see further ch. 29).
As usual in other colonies, the commission recommended a govern-
ment monopoly to efffectively control the use of opium, aiming at the 
repression and abolition of use and trafffĳic, but in fact leaving the huge 
profĳits not only to the large “white” opium dealers like—in this case—the 
Dent & Co fĳirm.
However, the results from Brent’s proposals were conspicuous by their 
absence. The US government did not accept the proposed opium monop-
oly and its rather complicated management. In a new law (3 March 1905) 
it stated that in three years’ time, every opium import in the Philippines 
should be illegal, except for medical purposes. Also, all opium selling and 
consumption should be prohibited.
It is not very understandable that, according to Tong Joe, much later 
Bishop Brent acknowledged that this was the only right decision. 
63 C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 23, 24. Why the non-activity of the medical offfĳicers is men-
tioned here so explicitly must have a specifĳic reason: not much later C. Terry discovered 
from empirical studies that indeed half of the addicts picked up their habit from treat-
ments by physicians and the activities of druggists! That gives a specifĳic background to the 
last sentences in the quoted report: ‘At the present, it is calculated that there are over a 
million opium smokers in the United States, the importation of opium smoking purposes 
being double that for medicinal uses, amounting to more than 500,000 pounds last year, 
valued at $3,500,000!’ . See also D. Courtwright, p. 100 fff. 
64 D. Richards, p. 162.
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When it is discovered how lucrative a method it is for purposes of revenue, 
Governments easily dissemble with themselves and postpone reform indef-
initely.65 
The Philippine reality was that ‘anyone who wishes to buy prepared opi-
um can buy it at a moderate price.’66 
A rather offfĳicial investigation from the New York-based Opium Research 
Committee of the Foreign Policy Association concluded diplomatically in 
1927:
It is not difffĳicult after an unofffĳicial investigation of opium and smuggling 
in the Philippine Islands to understand why the United States is somewhat 
under suspicion internationally for failing to produce Philippine opium sta-
tistics. Illegal opium is coming into the islands in such quantities as to make 
smoking opium procurable freely at very low prices, but lack of reliable 
fĳigures on the number of Chinese in the Islands makes any estimate of the 
extent of opium smoking difffĳicult.67
Smugglers are normally not impressed by the availability or not of fĳigures. 
They act when the profĳit is reasonable compared to the risks and costs. In 
the Philippines smuggling opium remained an intensive activity, and in 
particular from Amoy, Hong Kong, Macao, Kwang Chow Wan, British 
North Borneo and Formosa. This opium trade network operated smooth-
ly until World War II when the Philippines arrived near the eye of the 
storm.
The result of all the Philippine mess is a highly repressed population 
robbed of its dignity of having fought for its own liberation and addicted 
to Eastern opium probably more seriously than before, falsifĳied statistics 
or not.
Early 20th-century Opium / Cocaine Consumption
A Basic Drink
In the USA an original home-bred way of addicting many people was 
invented. In 1865 the pharmacist John Pemberton was wounded in the 
Civil War, and like many wounded veterans he became addicted to mor-
phine. Searching for a cure, he began experimenting with coca and coca 
wines, comparable to a diluted form of laudanum. He called the result 
65 Quoted by T. Tong Joe, p. 74 note 1.
66 Idem, p. 75 quoting a report of May about the Philippines.
67 Quoted in A. Vandenbosch, p. 283 note 34.
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Pemberton’s French Wine Coca. His medicinal concoction was advertised 
as being particularly benefĳicial for 
ladies, and all those whose sedentary employment causes nervous prostra-
tion, irregularities of the stomach, bowels and kidneys, who require a nerve 
tonic and a pure, delightful difffusable stimulant.68 When drinking a Coca 
Cola nowadays, only a few people know that it has this medical background. 
68 Article ‘John Pemberton’, in: Wikipedia.
Ill. 27. Coca Cola: old and new claims, ca. 1902
Source: Many marvelous mental medicines circulated around 1900 in the USA including 
the wonderful Coca Cola. See www.bonkersinstitute.org/medshow/cola.html. This adver-
tisement of 1902 urges people ‘when the Brain is running under full pressure’ to drink a 
glass of Coca-Cola: it ‘enables the entire system to readily cope with the strain of any 
excessive demands made upon it.’ At that time the drink still contained cocaine. Later it 
contained only(!) an extract of coca leaves. 
united states of america 569
The company does not promote the historical knowledge of its product, 
consumers cannot be stimulated by it to ‘have their Coke’! Without any 
doubt, however, Coca Cola is the top addiction product of American citi-
zens in the 20th-century.
The original formula allegedly called for 8.46 mg of cocaine, while an 
average dose of the street drug is between 15 and 35 mg. As Pemberton’s 
business partner invented the name Coca Cola (1885), the company 
claimed that it was a medicine to cure morphine and opium addictions, 
among a multitude of other health benefĳits. An advertisement of 1886 
stated about this ‘intellectual beverage’ (!) that it was not only a delicious 
etc. drink but that it was a cure ‘for all nervous afffections – sick, headache, 
neuralgia, hysteria, melancholy’, etc.
Neither Pemberton nor anybody else until today has proven whether 
these claims are true or that it is just a new product in the overstocked US 
quack’s market (see Dr. Doxey’s Elixir above). 
Notwithstanding all anti-narcotic campaigns after the 1880s, the claim 
in the advertisement campaigns was sufffĳicient to seduce enough 
Americans to make the drink relatively popular. It wasn’t until the Second 
World War that Coca Cola became the multinational company with bot-
tling plants all over the world, including the Philippines.
Basic Knowledge
In the 1899 copy of the authoritative Dispensatory of the United States of 
America written by learned men like George Wood and Franklin Bache, 
Coca Cola was not mentioned. It had become the handbook for many 
generations of American pharmacists and apothecaries (24th edition in 
1947, etc.). One of the longest articles in it concerns opium.69 Its sources 
are British, French and US pharmacopoeia.
Its opium article starts with details about the Papaver somniferum 
Linné plant, its capsules and juice; its preparation had a content of 
between 9½% and 10½% morphine (‘not more’). Then it continues with 
a ‘Commercial History’, containing some loose remarks about the opium 
imported and its destination: ‘For various reasons India opium no longer 
enters Western commerce to any extent’. Following the European pat-
tern, the USA apparently received opium mainly from Turkey directly or 
through diffferent European ports. In 1897 a total of 1,072,914 lbs was 
imported from that source, valued at $2,184,727, which makes $2.03 per lb. 
69 G. Wood, F. Bache, p. 980-1005 very dense printed texts. Quotations come from 
these pages.
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In addition, 157,061 lbs of ‘prepared opium for smoking’ was imported, val-
ued at $1,132,861, which makes $7.21 per lb.
The French port of Marseilles was the main transit harbor and the loca-
tion of extensive frauds:
The opium taken thither from the Levant is fĳirst softened, and then adulter-
ated with various matters which are incorporated in its substance. To use 
a strong expression of Guibourt, they make the opium over again at Mar-
seilles. Our traders to the Mediterranean would do well to bear this asser-
tion in mind. … Sand, ashes, the seeds of diffferent plants ... gum arabic ... 
aloes, even small stones and minute pieces of lead and iron, are mentioned 
among the substances employed in the sophistication of the drug.70 
There follows a long list with sometimes extensive comments on the 
available kinds of opium and researchers who tested them: Turkey with 
export ports Smyrna and Constantinople (12 kinds); Egypt; India (3); 
Persia (3) and even Mozambique before the Chinese market. 
Regarding China it states that its opium never reaches the European 
market, but enters the United States through San Francisco. There it is 
mainly consumed by the resident Chinese for smoking purposes. The San 
Francisco custom house apparently wanted to make a big business out of 
this import. As told earlier, it did not asked the normal US$1 duty a pound, 
but $6 by inventing a new defĳinition: this imported opium is ‘an extract’! 
The pharmacists conclude: ‘... hence, probably, the ever-recurring 
attempts at its smuggling’.71
This list of kinds of opium is followed by a review of all alkaloids, which 
are usually the ‘active principles of the plants in which they are found ... 
and been applied so advantageously to the treatment of disease’; in short, 
a review of morphine, codeine, thebaine, laudanine and more than twenty 
other alkaloids, all with the ability to transform people into addicts 
instead of curing diseases, with which “too little money” can be earned.72 
70 Idem, p. 982. This must be the real background for the movie The French Connec-
tion (1971) in which a New York policemen arrived in Marseilles and another civilization to 
fĳight the French drug mafĳia in the American cowboy way; a brilliant role of Gene Hack-
man. See C. Lamour, M. Lamberti, p. 29 fff. for the situation in the 1970s.
71 There is also mentioned a second “Chinese” opium with the mysterious name Bos-
ton Opium (elsewhere called “pudding opium”). Without lifting the veil about this name, 
we can say that it concerns a ‘sophisticated article, skilfully adulterated so as to reduce the 
percentage of morphine to the lowest point compatible with getting through the United 
States Custom-House and yet to get the physical appearance of a high-grade opium.’ Idem, 
p. 986. 
72 They all have the chemical combination of C, H and NO elements as, for instance, 
morphine C17 H19 NO3 or codeine with C18 H21 NO3, etc.
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This Dispensatory provides so many rules and recipes about how to 
treat opium that any layman can make his own opium preparation; the 
greatest difffĳiculty is the sheer volume of this extremely large book.
This copy from 1899 also details what a consumer can expect of his/her 
opium. When a healthy person takes a moderate dose, it increases the fre-
quency and force of the pulse, invigorates the muscular system, etc.
and gives new energy to the intellectual faculties. Its operation ... is directed 
with peculiar force to the brain, the functions of which it excites sometimes 
even to intoxication or delirium. However, ‘in a short time’ this excitation 
subsides and ‘a calmness of the corporal actions, and a delightful placidity 
of mind, succeed ... forgetting all sources of care and anxiety … pleasing 
fantasies … a quiet and vague enjoyment. At the end of half an hour or an 
hour ... all consciousness is lost in sleep. ... All the secretions ... are in general 
either suspended or diminished ... pain and inordinate muscular contrac-
tion ... are allayed and general nervous irritation is composed.73 
Unfortunately, the quantity of a normal dose in the relevant cases was not 
mentioned.74 Therefore, the explanations of what happens if the doses 
are ‘insufffĳicient’ or ‘large’ result only in the obvious remarks that the reac-
tions are slower or more intense, respectively, as described. The details of 
what happens after swallowing ‘quantities sufffĳicient to destroy life’ con-
clude with the obvious: ‘Death soon follows, unless relief be affforded.’ It is, 
however, not very reassuring to learn that after consuming ‘very small 
quantities’, this occasionally gives ‘rise to excessive sickness and vomiting 
and even spasm of the stomach ... restlessness, headache and delirium ...’!75
It is remarkable that after this more or less technical information, it 
starts recounting fairy tales about other people: that in ‘all parts of the 
world opium is habitually employed’, which is happily not the case, and 
that Mohammedans and Hindus use opium as ‘the most pleasing substi-
tute for alcoholic drinks’. This is logically and factually incorrect. 
Where alcohol is unknown, something else cannot be a substitute for 
it. Throughout most of history and the largest part of the globe, alcohol 
and opium were absent among the majority of the population before the 
73 Idem, p. 1001.
74 Later (p. 1003) one mentions what the authors prescribe in catarrh and diarrhoea: 
not more than one-fourth or one-third of a grain (0.016 or 0.02 gram); in acute peritonitis 
one jumps even to ‘the equivalent of seventy-fĳive grains (5 gram)’ ! Is this the dose after 
which the relatives must be told: ‘Death soon follows, unless relief be affforded’? Anyway, 




Dutch or English pressed native inhabitants to swallow the stufff. In addi-
tion, Mohammedans (see ch. 30), Hindus or Buddhists are in general not 
opium users, excluding some Mughal elites. In Islam (Qur’an) there is 
even a formal prohibition against using any alcohol and drugs, when not 
medically prescribed. In Hinduism some gurus consume only cannabis, 
and some opium is used in Ayurveda medicine. The same is applicable to 
Confucianism or Taoism. Only in specifĳic local rituals are substances with 
opium-like qualities used, like peyote by specifĳic shamans. Only Christians 
and Jews are well-known users of all forbidden products. 
The Dispensatory states: ‘In India, Persia and Turkey it is consumed in 
immense quantities, and many nations of the East smoke opium as those 
of the West smoke tobacco’, but this is far beyond the credibility of the 
explanations given above: ‘Death soon follows, unless relief be affforded’! 
In India, Persia and Turkey this relief is not affforded, so there should have 
been many reports of deaths! Therefore, all this looks like a legitimation of 
the American behavior and the saving of the bestselling product of phar-
macists. And, indeed, this behavior demands a strong legitimation; an 
impression confĳirmed by the next section, in which the old stories about 
the ancients (Diagoras, Hippocrates) are told.
Indeed, seven kinds of useful applications of opium to cure something 
are mentioned; this time without the double-blind proofs of the results, 
let alone the provision of alternatives.76 After this short digression, the 
text continues again with discussing contra-indications. 
No single remark is given about the social, political or economic aspects 
or efffects of opium (or morphine, etc.) use. There is, probably, shame 
about doing so because a few years later it is crystal clear that a serious 
anti-opium opposition has developed. It still remains incomprehensible 
that in the 1918 edition of the Dispensatory, no article appeared on opium, 
morphine or heroin.77 That was when the consumption of these drugs 
rocketed sky-high in the United States.
A Mega Consumption
The Americans are the ones who have to pay the largest bill for the deeds 
of their 19th-century ancestors and their Western colleagues. Against 
76 Idem, p. 1002, 1003.
77 This 20th edition with its 1576 pp. can be studied on-line: www.swsbm.com/Dis 
pensatory/USD-1918-complete.pdf. It is edited by Joseph Remington, Horace Wood and 
others. There was only a short article on “poppy capsules”, p. 1143-1145, not even one on 
‘papaver’.  
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their enormous profĳits with the opium trade, the chief medical offfĳicer of 
the City of New York reported already as early as 1921 that
Americans consume twelve times more opium than any other people in the 
world. More than 750,000 pound are imported every year in the USA, which 
equals around 2.5 gram per person. The legally allowed opium consumption 
is not less than 70,000 pound a year.78 
It is in particular after 1918 that people caught by the police as opium 
addicts increased by nearly 800%. These fĳigures must be exaggerated 
compared to data given below, but the question is whether it is possible to 
come up with more reliable fĳigures. 
It was something like common wisdom that a relatively high level of 
opium consumption was established in the United States. From all 
sides—Europe, the Far East, Mexico or Canada—large consignments of 
opium could be imported (legally and smuggled) and consumed. 
A fĳirst attempt to uncover opium addiction comes from O. Marshall 
(1878), who interviewed 200 key fĳigures in about 100 townships and vil-
lages all over Michigan. Based on these results, he estimated that of the 1.3 
million people in the whole state, ‘the total number of opium eaters … 
would be 7,763’. There were also many more female ‘eaters’ than males.79 
These fĳigures do not tell us about addiction, the quantities involved, and 
so on; they only claim that the druggist could sell substances freely to 
mainly female customers, people with sleeping problems, pain or what-
ever.
A government report of 1919 concerning addiction in the country 
guessed ‘that the total number of addicts in this country probably exceeds 
1,000,000 at the present time’.80 A 1924 estimate starts in a more realistic 
way by stating that it is impossible to make a reliable account of the 
addicted persons ‘because of the social and legal factors tending to make 
addiction a secret practice’.81 After scrutinizing all kinds of studies and 
fĳigures, the highest estimate for the period 1915 to 1922 is likely to be 
269,000 for the whole country, with a minimum of 104,300 addicts 
(Lawrence Kolb).
The fĳirst sound evaluation of the opium problem in the USA was car-
ried out by the Committee on Drug Addictions in collaboration with the 
78 L. Lewin, p. 77.





Bureau of Social Hygiene, Inc. The results were published in 1928; with 
over one thousand pages, it was one of the most extensive reports at the 
time.82 
The study starts with an assessment of the extent of the opium prob-
lem which resulted in the table below. Nearly half of it is occupied by the 
very detailed discussion of the medical side of the problem; a quarter of it 
concerns the control measures to be taken at international, national and 
municipal levels; about 10% is fĳilled with texts of some international trea-
ties and most US states measures. Only 0.5% is devoted to the opium 
problem. For a History of the Opium Problem they are the most interesting 
chapters, and include some background. 
One of the authors, Charles E. Terry, a dedicated health offfĳicer in 
Florida, initiated a most controversial medical approach.83 He estab-
lished a city drug clinic to provide the habitués with free narcotic pre-
scriptions. With this, he became the forerunner of the methadone 
maintenance clinics which now exist in most large Western cities. The 
municipal law to do this was passed in Jacksonville (Florida) in 1912. 
After a year Terry had registered 646 habitual users, 1% of the 
Jacksonville population. Among them, the white habitués outnumbered 
82 C. Terry, M. Pellens.
83 For the following see D. Musto, p. 97 fff.
Ill. 28. How to dope US. babies ca. 1870.
Source: D. Duco, p. 107. This soothing syrup for babies was one of the best known laudanum 
products.
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the blacks by almost two to one; women outnumbered men by about 
three to two, and the latter preferred opiates to cocaine. He, furthermore, 
came to the conclusion that 55 percent of the habits had been acquired 
through treatment by physicians, 20 percent from advice of acquaintances, 
and 20 percent through dissipation. Only 2 percent arose from chronic and 
incurable disease treated with narcotics.84 
Terry also chastised the druggists, who reaped an extravagant profĳit from 
their narcotic sales, and strongly emphasized that addiction problems 
should be left to health departments and not to the police. Consequently, 
Terry had confĳidence only in “public physicians”.
In an atmosphere of USA “cocainomania”, Terry’s results were an 
assault on the general racist anti-black and anti-foreigner attitudes of gov-
ernment institutions or private and religious associations and on the gen-
eral adoration of “people in the white coats”, the medical professionals.
They also did not support the anti-feminist belief in the general sinfulness 
of women as “based” on the Genesis story. And they contradicted the 
widespread political belief that ‘perfĳidious foreign nations’ were usually 
responsible for American drug taking.85 
The widespread xenophobia is, for instance, expressed by the influen-
tial Philippines Opium Commission of Bishop Brent and others. The three 
members represented the USA in the international opium conference in 
Shanghai (1909). Their attitude and probably their strategy were to blame 
the Chinese and the Chinese government as much as possible, which they 
expressed, for instance, as follows:
The original idea was that the opium trafffĳic and habit as it existed in the 
Far East was to be investigated. But during the passage of the diplomatic 
correspondence it developed that the opium habit was no longer confĳined 
to Far Eastern countries, and that the United States especially had become 
contaminated through the presence of a large Chinese population.86 
In this catalogue of participants, together responsible for the opium prob-
lem, Terry’s characterization of the non-institutionalized institution, the 
underworld, or of the general opium business, must be added:
It is not unnatural ... for the head of a penal institution in which cases of 
chronic opium intoxication are treated to come to the conclusion that the 
underworld and criminal classes are especially prone to this condition; for 
84 Idem, p. 98.
85 Idem, p. 279 note 3.
86 Quoted in C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 632.
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the head of a state hospital to conclude that the mentally unstable form a 
considerable majority of these patients, and for the proprietor of a private 
institution, where the cost of treatment is within the means of only a 
favored few, to claim that fĳinanciers, individuals highly successful in the 
business world, and professional groups able to pay the highest prices to a 
large extent are susceptible to opiumism.87
In Terry’s study is given also the following table:
Table 43. Total Import of Opium and Opium Preparations to the USA, 1850-1924 
(selected years)88

















its salts entered 
for consump-
tion in oz
1 2 3 4 5 6
1850 130 349 --- --- --- ---
1855 111 229 --- 107 632 --- ---
1860 119 525 --- 116 686 --- ---
1865 110 470   13 703   92 099 31 918    172
1870 254 609  [34 000] 121 185 12 603  3 187
1875 305 136  [53 000] 188 239 62 775  4 252
1880 533 451  [60 000] 243 211 77 196 19 386
1885 351 609  37 475 351 609 37 475 20 710
1890 473 095  34 465 380 621 58 982 19 954
1895 358 455 139 765 357 981 115 709 16 029
1900 544 938 142 479 537 004 129 335 26 208
1905 594 680 159 380 456 563 144 997 21 396
1910 449 239 [100 000] 439 379 [118 500] 13 085
1915 484 027 --- 391 938 ---  8 676
1920 211 277 --- 225 528 --- 31 909
1925  96 848 ---   96 848 --- [65 000]
 
This table should be given to students to teach them the pitfalls of making 
statistics: is the title of column 3 similar to that of column 5 as only the 
1885 data suggest? Column 2 + 3 is only in one case, 1865, similar to 4+5: 
where have all the diffferences between ‘general imports’ and ‘entered for 
consumption’ gone? Generally, the transformation from crude into pre-
87 Idem, p. 513, 514.
88 Idem, p. 50-51 from offfĳicial sources. 
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pared opium reduced its weight by 50%: how is this to be seen in the 
table? Is column 3, therefore, to be added or subtracted from column 2 
(and 5 from 4)? 
In addition, it is an interesting exercise to compare this table to the two 
given earlier about the Pacifĳic and the Atlantic opium import. For exam-
ple, in 1870/71 the addition of these two gives an import of 303,231 lbs, 
while the entirety for the USA gives about 50,000 lbs less! Ten years later 
the same procedure leads to a weight of 129,905 lbs, which derives from 
other ports than San Francisco and New York. For 1890 this amount is 
even 191,249 lbs. 
The import quoted earlier from Wood and Bache’s Dispensatory is a 
multiple of what is mentioned here as the import for 1895. A new study of 
these fĳigures is welcome to clarify whether the diffferences result from 
imports in other ports, from smuggling, from “secret” imports needed in 
the pharmaceutical industry, from corruption in the custom offfĳices, and 
so on.89 Whatever its value, the table indicates clearly the kind of quanti-
ties of opium swallowed by American consumers. 
Cocaine Connections
Above is quoted an alarming article from The New York Times (1909) 
which informed the reader that fĳive years earlier only 53,000 pounds of 
coca leaves were imported, but that this had jumped to 2,600,000 pounds 
within two years. This last fĳigure is approached only in 1943; it only nur-
tures my suspicion about offfĳicial US statistics.
As remarked in ch. 19 for the export of Javanese cocaine, the drug con-
sumption of the soldiers in World Wars I and II and during the world eco-
nomic crisis strongly decreased instead of the expected increase. The 
fĳigures in the table also suggest the same development. Smuggling cannot 
be represented in reliable numbers or in estimates of a non-reliable drugs 
police. Even if one supposes that the consumption of soldiers is hidden in 
the medicinal data (and, therefore, that non-medicinal fĳigures are con-
fĳined to the civilian consumption at home), the given downward trend in 
times of crisis can be supported. Still how can we explain the remarkable 
jump of consumption in the non-medicinal realm after the world crisis or 
at the beginning of World War II: are they only “home front data”?
89 It seems as if people busy with narcotic statistics are themselves seriously addicted. 
The many reports about the number of addicts in the USA are notorious, which often lead 
to big rows because of the bad image the USA could get abroad if they were too high. See 
D. Courtwright (p. 121 fff.) about the Harry Anslinger period and his surveys.
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Table 44. U.S. coca imports: medicinal (cocaine) and non-medicinal (cola), 1925-1959 
(x kilograms)90
Year  Coca Leaves
Total Imports Medicinal Nonmedicinal
1925 72 255 72 255 ---
1930 89 699 89 699 ---
1931 221 236 122 748 98 487
1933 81 699 81 699 ---
1934 85 551 81 070 4 481
1935 110 331 94 469 15 862
1940 352 201 146 189 206 011
1941 420 389 127 484 292 905
1942 360 656 80 849 270 806
1943 447 396 207 409 239 987
1944 202 057 67 555 134 502
1945 316 224 45 359 270 865
1950 112 743 112 743 ---
1955 141 290 141 290 ---
1956 184 096 184 096 ---
1958 112 501 112 501 ---
1959 135 223 135 223 ---
Furthermore, what does “medicinal” means? Resources for the pharma-
ceutical industry? Let’s take the example of Merck. At least until 1933, 
this company was a world leader in legal drug production and even a 
monopolist for cocaine, heroin and morphine. Like Bayer and others, it 
stufffed its painkillers and many other products with these components. 
Concerning the consumer side of the Opium Problem, it seriously con-
tributed in this way to the collective addiction or dependence on medici-
nal products in general instead of good and diffferentiated food, better 
collective hygiene or better information about health and related sub-
jects. 
 Firms like Merck, Boehringer or Bayer exported tons of these drugs 
annually over the whole world without any form of external control. In 
1922, for instance, the production fĳigures were: 1.2 tons of cocaine, 2.5 tons 
of morphine and 4.2 tons of heroin. The demand by the «international 
90 Quoted in the article of P. Gootenberg in: S. Topik et al. (ed.), p. 342. The source is 
the notorious US Department of Treasury, Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1960). Only 
selected years are given. Before 1930 coca leaf is not clearly separated; separate reporting 
(but not imports) ceases after 1947. The fĳigures are rounded.
united states of america 579
community» to control this kind of production was not in the interest of 
the German pharmaceutical industry and, therefore, not of the German 
government. 
«Darmstadt», the German base of Merck, became one of the three pro-
duction centers in the world for cocaine: the Dutch Cocaine Factory was 
the largest, and the American New Jersey Merck the second.91 Thanks to 
this concerted competition, the values of Peruvian coca and crude cocaine 
dropped by some 95% in the 1920s. 
As a main offfshoot of their prominent position, the pharmaceutical 
industry pursued patent rights on its products.92 In most countries it was 
not possible to patent vital necessities of daily life, as it is a form of monop-
oly. New defĳinitions are easy to fĳind. In the USA in 1870, the patent law 
was revised to make even that possible. Anyway, drugs and their method 
of production can be patented. This had far-reaching consequences: 
The extensive development of large pharmaceutical fĳirms, based on re -
search, could not have occurred in the same way without patent laws. The 
fact that the industry, the ingenuity and the money invested in the dis covery 
of new drugs and processes have been rewarded by a temporary 
91 Apparently, private individuals could get their dose from Merck. ‘Freud obtained 
some cocaine from the pharmaceutical fĳirm of Merck &Co of Darmstadt and started to 
take doses of 50 milligrams dissolved in water.’ Th. Dormandy, p. 369 and that was the 
beginning of an addiction and supporter so that friends were addicted as well. 
92 For the following see E. Kremers, G. Urdangs, p. 113 fff.
Ill. 29. Bayer Pharmaceutical Products, 1898 
Source: A. McCoy et al., 1972, p. 4.
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Table 45. Merck Production and its German Import of Cocaine and Coca, 1880-1915 
(x kilogram)93
Year Merck production  Coca imported Crude cocaine 
imported from Java
from Peru from Java
1880 0.05 25 --- ---
1885 70 18 396 --- ---
1890 557 --- --- ---
1895 791 --- --- ---
1900 1 418 --- --- ---
1905 2 146 ---  58 967 919
1910 5 241 --- 186 127 3 183
1915 265 --- 203 972 2 966
monopoly has helped to stimulate the startling advances since the last quar-
ter of the 19th-century.94 
An application of this patent right is the monopoly on trademarks, which 
even makes it possible to acquire ‘unlimited exclusive rights to the brand 
name’ and ‘to enjoy a virtual monopoly on a given product’. This led to 
many excesses, but the patent + trademark “principle” remained intact. 
For the whole drug scene, it had the practical efffect that the industry’s 
trade in cocaine, heroin, morphine or any other “trademark” was invented 
by the advertisement people, could be defĳined as “legal”and remained 
unchecked. Competitors had to pay big fĳines, prison or worse, if confront-
ed with an Italian mafĳia or the Mexican police. 
The largest cocaine imports into the USA were organized from Mexico. 
Not without difffĳiculty as experienced, for instance, by the Zionist David 
Goldbaum around 1916.95 This man occupied a remarkable position as a 
93 From the article of Paul Gootenberg in: S. Topik et al (ed.), p. 326. Only a selection 
of his data is given.
94 Idem, p. 114. See also Th. Dormandy, p. 413, 414 for Merck patents. As one of the few, 
the founder of the present Eli Lilly concern still had, anyway, the right idea to commit 
‘himself to producing only high-quality prescription drugs, in contrast to the common and 
often inefffective patent medicines of the day’ (Wikipedia, ‘Eli Lilly). At the moment it 
 produces world-wide products like the controversial Prosac. Things can change also in 
other directions: In January 2009, the largest criminal fĳine in U.S. history was imposed on 
Lilly for illegal marketing of its best-selling product, the antipsychotic medication, 
Zyprexa.
95 G. Recio, p. 34. This David Goldbaum was a Zionist, suspicious of the plans to settle 
in Palestine and, therefore, member of the so-called Territorialist Faction (start in 1905) of 
the Zionist movement. He and other Zionist settlers in Baja California arrived there in the 
1880s, and they planned to buy a large part of the peninsula to establish there the “New 
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representative of Chinese opium dealers! He got a concession for the han-
dling of smoking opium from Esteban Cantú, governor of Baja California. 
This Cantú, however, charged a fĳixed fee of $45,000 and monthly instal-
ments of $10,000. It was a deal he had made not only with Goldbaum. The 
US Treasury Department caught this clever opium trafffĳicker, but most of 
his colleagues had more luck. 
For cocaine Mexico provided the only trade route. In the 1920s Mexico 
instituted more rigorous laws on trafffĳicking, but the smugglers responded 
by planting opium in several border states in Mexico and extended and 
refĳined the distribution network within the USA. From this labor they are 
still profĳiting today.
 Basic Instincts
A notorious report from Hamilton Wright (1910) argued that ‘the general 
criminal population’ was addicted, at a rate more than 250 times that of 
the general adult population.96 In many pressure groups, whose activities 
led to the Harrison Narcotic Act (1914), similar sounds were heard. The 
question of who belonged to the opium or drug mafĳia was easy to answer: 
the mafĳia were criminals; addicts were criminals, too; therefore, all addicts 
belonged to the mafĳia. This false assumption became canonized as the 
highest form of wisdom about addiction by Congressman Porter or the US 
surgeon general, Rupert Blue. 
In the latter’s view, addicts should be divided into two classes: the legal 
or medical class with a few members with some disease, injury or pain 
requiring relief and those who habitually used narcotics for other than 
medical reasons, who are the real addicts similar to ‘psychopaths, neurot-
ics and criminals’.97 The fĳirst class should be cared for by medical doctors, 
pharmacists and the pharmaceutical industry, the three sources of their 
addiction. The second class consisted of clients of the police, prisons, and, 
of course, the pharmaceutical industry as well, which had to provide the 
means to cure the craving. High-ranking police offfĳicers (1924) used ready-
made arguments like, for instance:
World Israel”, an autonomous Jewish state. Certainly a better plan than what happened in 
Palestine. Goldbaum also wrote a booklet to support this plan: ‘Towns of Baja California.
A 1918 Report. ed. by W. Hendricks (Glendale, Cal.: La Siesta Press, 1971). 
96 D. Courtwright, p. 145.
97 Quoted by D. Courtwright, p. 142.
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Whether an addict becomes a criminal or a criminal becomes an addict, 
the fact remains that they spring from the same soil—namely from the 
group of mental, moral and psychological inferiors.98
People acquainted with the basic addiction problems protested against 
these discriminatory platitudes. They pointed to the efffects of legislation 
(even possession of drugs became a crime in itself) making a user a crimi-
nal by defĳinition and not by act. They, furthermore, argued: when a user 
does commit a crime like theft, it is solely to obtain cash to pay for his 
drug. The reason why was not discussed: because the law has driven the 
price of the drug to excessive heights.99 To the known criticism at the 
time, Courtwright adds that the use of police records in these addiction-
criminality cases is fraught with peril. So, the prohibition policy exercised 
by the authorities with their typical supporters only increased the reve-
nues of the pharmaceutical industry, its pharmacists, doctors and the 
underworld and aggravated The Problem. 
The question of who belongs to the Opium Mafĳia leads, therefore, to 
complicated answers. It would be better to talk about a Mafĳia Complex in 
order to cover both causes and efffects and a large grey zone in which all 
kinds of ideologues, decision makers, executioners and distributors oper-
ate, as do the mafĳia members. An example: in the Harrison Act the bureau-
cratic rule was set that addicts, as unregistered persons, had to obtain a 
prescription for their drugs. “Dope doctors” provided them for a fee:
During a single month one New York City doctor “wrote scrip” for 68,282 
grains of heroin, 54,097 grains of morphine, and 30,280 grains of cocaine.100 
The alternative for the addicts was (and often is) the so-called black mar-
ket, which is in the hands of the “real” underground. That inroad was, 
however, forbidden by the authorities through stifff penalties so that the 
“white market” of the doctors and pharmacists could keep their business; 
the industry, producer for everybody, could earn from both the under-
world and upperworld. 
98 Quoted by Idem, p. 145.
99 D. Courtwright, p. 144 mentions many proponents of this criticism in his note 123. 
See also W. Eldridge, p. 24 fff. and p. 116 fff.  
100 D. Courtwright, p. 107. If around 1920 the average price per ounce of morphine is 
$100, of cocaine $50 and heroin $53, then this prescription trade has a value of nearly 
$8,000. If the ‘dope doctor’ got a fee per grain, he could have earned 152,000 x $0.5 per 
month, a multitude of what the President of the United States cashed every month. What 
inflation means in the drug business can be ascertained from the present price of heroin, 
which is $59-$88 per gram or $22 for 1/3 gram. If an American ounce = ca. 29 gram, its price 
today is $1,711-2,552 . See www.thegooddrugsguide.com. 
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For heroin, which came on the white and black markets around 1910-
20, Courtwright concludes:
... addiction was moving from the upperworld to the underworld, and the 
principal forces behind that shift were medical and demographic, rather 
than legal ... the background of the typical addict in 1940 ... would have 
been a lower-class white male, living in a decaying urban area. He would 
have had a history of what contemporaries called vice (gambling, excessive 
drinking, or consorting with prostitutes), and perhaps would have commit-
ted more serious criminal acts ... The law did not create the underworld 
addict, but it did aggravate his behavior.101
Heroin was the illicit opiate par excellence. For the dealers it had the prin-
cipal advantage that it could be adulterated easily. Profĳits could be dou-
bled or quadrupled by cutting heroin with milk sugar or a similar 
substance. Around 1940 the heroin was one-third pure, very potent for 
present standards. Heroin was also an ideal substance for smuggling and, 
in this period, much cheaper than morphine and ‘cheaper for the amount 
of kick in it’.102 
Once the police seizures of heroin were mapped, the difffusion could be 
followed easily: radiating outward from New York City by the mid-1920s, 
it had reached coastal cities north and south of New York. Then it spread 
westward. This process continued until around 1932 when heroin had 
supplanted morphine to a considerable degree as the drug of addiction in 
nearly every part of the United States. 
This map indicates the failure of the law which prohibited the produc-
tion and import of heroin (1925). It, furthermore, shows how the mafĳia 
(here a general concept for the underworld) took possession of the United 
States. Of course, not only drugs (from alcohol to heroin and cocaine) 
were their source of revenue, although there was always a specifĳic inter-
nal division of labor, so that gambling or prostitution were covered as 
well.
The entry into the underworld, heroin department, was also stimulat-
ed by the way one took it. Around 1910 heroin was mostly snifffed, a decade 
later the hypodermic technique was widely difffused among addicts. Again 
later, addicts started to appreciate a subcutaneous, intramuscular or 
intravenous injection. In these acts the social (criminal) environment 
became lethal thanks to the following circumstances.103
101 Idem, p. 146, 147.
102 Idem, p. 108.
103 For the following see Idem, p. 110-111.
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In the 1930s there was a steadily declining purity of street heroin. It was 
the time when an aggressive new generation of Italian gangsters infĳiltrat-
ed the business, replacing the Jews in particular. The Italians increased 
the prices and lowered the level of adulteration. The Jewish dealers, 
apparently, got the image of the “good gangster”, who traded a ‘decent 
product’ making ‘a high but not exorbitant profĳit’ by exploiting ‘their’ 
addicts. Both had only a diffferent way of looking at this macabre market: 
you can treat addicts ‘decently’ to exploit him/her longer (Jewish way) or 
you can squeeze the money quickly out him/her, because you never knew 
how long this looser had to live (Italian way).
This American Mafĳia Complex had, of course, an international element 
as Trocki indicated when he described that in these years drug transfor-
mations occurred in China also:
In fact, the production levels of opiates now gave China a surplus that made 
it possible for China to turn the tables on the western powers and begin 
exporting drugs to the United States and Europe. American gangsters begin-
ning with Arnold Rothstein and going on to Meyer Lansky, Charles “Lucky” 
Luciano, Louis “Lepke” Buchalter and Jasha Katsenberg, forged links with 
Chinese drug lords, both in Shanghai and California, to obtain supplies for 
the growing American narcotics market.104
104 C. Trocki (1999), p. 133.
1+ounce seized







Map 16. Heroin seizures in the United States, 1927-1928
Source: D. Courtwright, p. 109 from Extracts from the Report of the Commissioner of 
Prohibition, 1928.
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A remarkable number of Jews (or people who were called as such105) and 
people with a Jewish background were busy in this drug scene and not 
only in America (see ch. 31). They are part and parcel of the Mafĳia 
Complex, which deserves to be entangled better than in the Hollywood 
glamour productions.106
105 A Jew is only somebody who accepts the Jewish religion as his/her creed, whatever 
part or sect of it. If only one or two parents believe(d), than one can only speak of some-
body ‘with a Jewish background’. See further H. Derks (2004), chapter 7. One is too often 
confronted with highly exaggerated expressions, which also people with a Jewish back-
ground copied from Americans with an inferiority complex. In the mafĳia history this habit 
is demonstrated in the most ridiculous fashion in, for instance, Arnold Rothstein’s biogra-
phy in the Jewish Virtual Library (American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise) or on websites 
in which this gangster, murdered like many others of his kind, is called even ‘the spiritual 
father of American organized crime’ (www.carpenoctem.tv/mafĳia/rothstein.html). Nick 
Tosches’s King of the Jews. The Arnold Rothstein Story (2005) supplied a religious hagiogra-
phy of this very mediocre fĳigure.   







During the one and a half centuries from 1800 to 1950, the Opium 
Problem underwent several transformations within the territory that 
became later the USA. First, of course, the fact that in 1800 the USA occu-
pied about 30% of its current territory and acquired the rest within fĳifty 
years. The Opium Problem existed only outside this territory in East Asia 
where American clippers aggravated the Chinese opium problems. 
Internal problems only arose locally and through individual actions (“Dr. 
Doxey”). 
This was comparable to the “household situation” in England before 
about the 1850s. An American Opium Problem was created around the 
period of the Civil War. Opium and its derivatives were abundantly pro-
duced and consumed. A combination of factors was necessary for this cre-
ation. 
First, the rise of an American pharmaceutical industry and further pro-
fessionalization in the health sector as was seen in Europe as well. Second, 
the increasing opium import divided over two separate streams: one for 
the Chinese inhabitants from the East imported through San Francisco 
and one for the “whites” from the West (Turkey and Europe) imported 
through New York or Philadelphia. The former was only crude or pre-
pared opium; the second more sophisticated, crude opium as resource for 
the pharmaceutical industry and morphine, codeine or products like lau-
danum, opium syrups for babies or adults. Third, a much larger market of 
clients: the soldiers in the Civil War, the army of its addicts thereafter; 
Chinese inhabitants; the hype of lady-morphine addicts; and, generally, a 
huge collection of opium pills and powder swallowers. As a crown on this 
booming US narco-consumer complex came Coca Cola in the 1880s.
From about 1885 onwards a new period started in which all features of 
the Opium Problem became aggravated in a way that no one knew how to 
handle. This was already sufffĳicient reason for why the Opium Problem got 
completely out of hand. First, the widespread sectarian and religious cam-
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paigns of moral lobbies created a highly exaggerated moral problem for 
which they did not give an adequate solution except praying, abstinence 
and paying on God’s own accounts. 
Second, from the local to the federal level, laws were invented by 
authorities which criminalized the use of opium, leaving the producers 
largely undisturbed. In some cities even a full-fledged police-state was 
created against the behavior of the normal citizens. 
The excessive urbanization and foreign immigration, furthermore, led 
to a radically new kind of client: urban low-class men became notable 
consumers instead of higher-class women. The urban and migrant drop-
outs could easily organize in gangs, and what was criminalized by the 
“aboveground” was the obvious fĳield of activities for the newly created 
“underground”: fĳirst and foremost, all kinds of prohibited stufff and drinks 
(not Coca Cola).
Fourth. The excessive stress on the consumer side of the Opium 
Problem (using as disease, as health hazard, as criminal act, and so on) 
concentrated all theoretical (scientifĳic) and practical attention on the 
person and personalized the Opium (Drug) Problem. This resulted in 
numerous “psychoactive” studies and rules, new defĳinitions, new medical 
procedures, new professionals and new drugs (‘to attack drugs with drugs’ 
like opium with cocaine). No relevant comprehensive explanation(s) of 
the whole Opium Problem were produced.1 
Next, in the 1890s the American pharmaceutical industry started devel-
oping into a multinational industry and consequently its lobby and price-
setting potentials grew. Like every other industry, it sufffered a certain 
set-back in the economic slump period, but the World War II period was 
detrimental for its global extension. After 1950 they often rose into the 
category: “Too Big to Topple” with all the nasty consequences. 
2.
The American foreign policy aspects of the Opium Problem seldom inter-
ested people outside academic circles, secret services and the army. The 
1 That was not only the case in the period 1880-1950, but it is difffĳicult to fĳind such a 
study nowadays. Take for example the contribution of one of the most successful Ameri-
can social scientifĳic drug experts, Erich Goode, in the excellent The Social Science Encyclo-
pedia (ed. Adam Kuper and Jessica Kuper), 1999, p. 197-200. Despite the advice to follow 
the Dutch policy of flexible enforcement. The author even deemed it necessary to start 
with so-called examples to prove that throughout human history people have evidenced 
drug (ab)use. 
a reflection 589
many practical conflicts between England and the USA concerning opi-
um from 1800 onwards resulted in a loss of a serious world problem for 
England, whereas the USA inherited one. This developed far beyond its 
power, its understanding and—for some analysts—its ability and even 
willingness to solve it. The beginning of this drama until about 1950 was 
a main subject of this chapter. 
It should certainly contribute to the lively debates about “formal US 
imperialism” which rage among US academics. The most logical way of 
dealing with this imperialism is to study not only its actions (attacks on 
foreign countries, exploitation of them, their religious or cultural conver-
sion, etc.), but also the reactions of the victims. Recently, this approach 
received the name of ‘imperial reciprocities’.2 
This is defĳined using the very ambiguous center (metropolis)-periph-
ery model. In the 1970s it was used for the fĳirst time (from Galtung to 
Gunder Frank or Wallerstein) to explain the efffects of Western capitalism 
in the Third World. This largely uni-directional and soon outdated theory 
is not interesting for us, but some practical results of it as used by Alfred 
McCoy are.
According to him and his colleagues, the opium activities of American 
imperialism in, for instance, the Philippines were the start of the world’s 
fĳirst “surveillance state”.3 This was imported during and after the First 
World War into the USA. The prohibition of opium in the Philippines 
became, therefore, the root of the American drug legislation and even of 
the modern War On Drugs. For him it is a good example of how a colony 
(= periphery) can function as a kind of testing ground for social and polit-
ical reforms implemented at home (= center). As shown, however, the 
fĳirst example of a police state as a consequence of the Opium Problem 
was San Francisco in the 1880s. Therefore, the internal situation of the 
USA should be researched more carefully when looking for reasons lead-
ing to a War on Drugs after 1950. 
Another crucial problem in American’s foreign policy and its Asian 
opium policy as indicated by Bruce Cumings. He emphasized in 1999 that 
with the return of Hong Kong to China and the growing investment and 
trade ties with Taiwan and people of Chinese descent in Southeast Asia, a 
2 D. Owen, p. 10.
3 Idem, p. 107 fff. He rightly criticized Max Weber for his one-sided defĳinition of a 
state by its monopoly of legitimate use of physical power in a given territory. Weber did 
not understand that the modern state uses violence to penetrate into the privacy of its 
citizens.
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development had been started comparable to that of Korea and Taiwan 
since the 1970s. 
His advice was not to look for an aggressive US policy versus a new 
China like the Korea or Vietnam Wars. He argues that a ‘wise policy begins 
with China’s long-term humiliation at the hands of the West, and there-
fore Western humility’.4 Herewith an alternative way of looking at new 
or old US-Chinese relations is given. 
It is no luxury to view problems also from this angle, where even today 
voices and publications are asking for war with China: even by its very 
performance this country, apparently, threatens the political domination 
and economic hegemony of a troubled America.5 Secret services, mostly 
highly involved in drugs policies, play(ed) a crucial role in Asian politics, 
but never in stimulating peaceful developments. The close relationship 
between imperialism and opium is modernized into opium policy as part 
of aggressive foreign policy. This should be discussed and not denied. 
4 B. Cumings, p. 170.
5 See an article of Charles R. Smith (China and War, August 14, 2001) on archive.
newsmax.com or the contribution of Dr.Jefffrey Record (Thinking about China and War, 
December 6, 2001) on www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html 
which is particularly important since his institute at the Johns Hopkins University often 
did simulation war-games. In March 2009 some of them were leaked. Their conclusion: 
War-games against China had bad results for the USA!  
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CHAPTER THIRTY
BLAMING THE CHINESE VICTIMS
‘ ... the use of opium is not a curse, but a comfort and 
benefĳit to the hardworking Chinese; that to many 
scores of thousands it has been productive of healthful 
sustentation and enjoyment.’
Messrs Jardine, Matheson & Co, opium dealers (1858).1
‘We forced the Chinese Government to enter into a 
treaty to allow their subjects to take opium.’
Sir Rutherford Alcock (1871)2
Introduction
To introduce this last part, it is necessary to explain in a few words why 
and how victims have played an important role in this History of the 
Opium Problem. The obvious answer almost sufffĳices: because the many-
sided historical description of it above highlighted the kinds of institu-
tionalized perpetrators who cannot act normally without making opium 
victims. They are mutually dependent on each other; they constitute a 
relationship. Thus, a description of the victims’ positions must follow to 
create a comprehensive story and make a complicated defĳinition of an 
Opium Problem possible (see part 7). Although this history could be called 
“perpetrator oriented”, one may hope that this more or less abstract intro-
duction and the following chapters provide enough compensation to give 
the alternative a reasonable profĳile. 
As announced, in this book a “productive approach” of the Opium 
Problem in history was chosen: in short, for describing and analyzing the 
political economy of the problem mainly in the framework of Western 
imperialism and colonialism. Therefore, the relations between perpetra-
tors and victims are perceived in this same framework. They difffer greatly, 
1 J. Beeching, p. 263 combined with the slightly diffferent wording in J. Spencer Hill, 
p. 31.
2 Quoted by W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1094.
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of course, in the development of the Opium Problem in European coun-
tries from which these perpetrators came. The relationship changes dras-
tically in both histories but remains intact as indicated, for instance, in 
the image: the snake which bites in its own tail. 
In this “productive approach” victims cannot be perceived as such, nor 
their sufffering, while certainly solutions for their sorrows cannot be given 
without referring to the reasons for their addiction. Analyses, descriptions 
or explanations in a “productive approach” inevitably point to the role of 
the state and its bureaucracy, military and police; large economic inter-
ests; opium production, trade or marketing; legitimising thoughts and so 
on. We only arrive at the victims and their personal and dramatic stories 
as derived from these “acts”.
The opposite is much better known in narco-literature. It can be called 
the “consumptive approach”, which starts with the personal suffferings of 
addicts and proceeds with the success or failures of their cure by religious, 
medical, social or bureaucratic (police) workers; the success or failure of 
the state to protect society from this drug menace which costs the taxpay-
er astronomical amounts of money. The bad guys, the mafĳiosi, are pro-
moted as the most “beloved” targets in fĳilms, books or theater. This 
approach is, as a rule, much more personal and emotional. In my view, it 
is the main reason why a comprehensive picture of the social, economic 
or political backgrounds of these dramas is seldom arrived at (or not). 
It is logical that in this part Chinese victims, as the most spectacular of 
all opium victims of the West, receive special attention within the frame-
work of a “productive approach”. Therefore, no pictures of emaciated 
Chinese addicts sucking on their pipes in opium dens managed by other 
mysterious Chinese, which were spread after 1850 through all Western 
dailies and books for ambiguous reasons. Indian, Southeast Asian or 
Indonesian addicts do not show up often. What will be discussed is, I 
hope, appropriate also for these victim countries: China represents here 
an “Oriental model”, an image which was (and often still is) not at vari-
ance with the existing “Orientalism” in the minds of many or most 
Western observers.
To choose the example of China as a victim country (Chinese victims 
are derived from it, therefore) was not difffĳicult since no other country 
was attacked from all sides and by all Western countries including Japan: 
all expected to fĳind there the most abundant sources of wealth. The 
attacks involving opium and weapons were as long-lasting and heavy as 
the expectations were great and the disappointments severe: there were 
many reasons to blame Chinese victims!
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Understanding the victims’ positions on this level, however, is not easy. 
How tricky a victim-perpetrator connection can be is demonstrated in the 
ongoing discussions concerning the most “spectacular” modern example, 
the ambiguous relation between Israel and Holocaust victims.3 Through a 
notorious decision of the United Nations (1947), the pre-war Zionist and 
Jewish settlers of the British were allowed to establish a new state in 
Palestine and expelled nearly a million persons of the indigenous popula-
tion and exploit and repress the remainder of these Palestinians on a mas-
sive scale. In the end the only legitimation or pretext was that some of its 
newly imported Europeans with a Jewish or Zionist background were vic-
tims of the Nazi regime (never more than 8% of the new Israeli popula-
tion). One of the most unfortunate efffects was that the Holocaust victims’ 
position was immediately degraded through its use as a tool in an interna-
tionally criticized foreign and internal policy or, worst, as revengeful new 
perpetrators.
Many other examples can be given (Balkans, Kashmir, Rwanda, etc.) in 
which victims later became stupid perpetrators as well, forgetting which 
kind of injustice was done to themselves. Revenge at this level always 
means a bloody, long-lasting and difffĳicult to pardon collective afffair. In 
looking for solutions, one can never forget the reasons for all this blood-
shed before blaming the original victims. 
A victims discussion should be concentrated on the case at issue and 
on the right level. In this book, therefore, this is something like “massive 
addiction through opium by external (military) powers from the West 
during one and a half or three centuries”. The roles of perpetrators, 
European and Chinese criminals and authorities alike should be high-
lighted as well on the same general level. Objections could be raised and 
criticized.
Under the influence of present positions or developments (from after 
1950, the last year of this History of the Opium Problem), some scholars pro-
duce rather harsh judgments about a pre-1950 history. It is too easy to 
transform this into a demagogic trick. A scholarly discussion has to remain 
as “clean” as possible: we should, at least, diffferentiate between occasion-
al expressions of someone’s emotions and structural elements of a phe-
nomenon; it seems obvious not to blame a whole society for the misdeeds 
3 H. Derks (2004), chapter 6 and 7. How ambiguous this relation is follows from the 
writings of Israeli historians like Tom Segev (The Seventh Million) and Idith Zertal (Catas-
trophe to Power) or, more recently, from Hajo Meijer (The End of Jewishness).
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of one inhabitant or of a specifĳic (criminal) coterie, and it is less obvious, 
but very understandable, not to blame earlier “good behavior” under the 
influence of later “bad behavior”. 
In blaming people, pejorative language is often used, while discrimina-
tion is normal. Here are two examples of how not to discuss our case 
(‘blaming Chinese victims’): the fĳirst concerns my own writings below and 
the other is related to the highly interesting scholar Frank Dikötter, who 
seems to point to “Chinese racism” as a kind of excuse for Western racism. 
Below we shall discuss the main elements of this Western racism vis-à-vis 
China and the Chinese to show how untenable this position is.
An enthusiastic peer reviewer of this History of the Opium Problem also 
remarked in passing that I should avoid ‘subjective comments’ like ‘mafĳia’ 
when referring to the Jardines and Sassoons: ‘they were simply doing 
what they knew how to do best, trade by all means, just like their Chinese 
counterparts’. Still, I decided in ch. 31 below not to alter this ‘mafĳia’ 
because of the many similarities to the classical and original mafĳia and to 
stress the remarkable position of these and similar gentlemen. 
For decades both the Jardines and Sassoons were involved in the illegal 
drugs trade, smuggling, probably piracy. Later, when the former left the 
opium business, the Sassoons became increasingly involved in pure mod-
ern gangsterism (see below). Indeed, this was ‘trade by all means’ and on 
purpose, but normal trade is by defĳinition peaceful and legal and not 
involved in illegal products which are seen offfĳicially and by Jardine him-
self as immoral—also in the beginning of the 19th-century. The many 
Chinese prohibitions, the debates in the English Parliament at the time or 
the discussion with Gutzlafff (ch. 6) are illuminating in this respect. 
The Sassoon family, even more than the Jardines, Mathesons or Dents, 
was indeed a family (the classical meaning of ‘mafĳia’) which cooperated 
with similar criminal ‘families’ like The Ezra gang. Last but not least, all of 
them were knighted and arrived in the position of all later drugs-barons. 
Altogether, there are quite objective reasons to use a label like ‘mafĳia’. 
The Dikötter example is more important as an excellent representative 
of the “consumer approach” as defĳined above. Here it concerned his use of 
“racism”, a qualifĳication often used when blaming victims. Dikötter tries 
to prove his case by extensively quoting some journalists and an “Overseas 
Chinese”, Su Xiaokang (1991). This person, living in the USA, sees 
“Chineseness” primarily as a matter of biological descent, physical appear-
ance and congenital inheritance: one is Chinese ‘by virtue of one’s blood’, 
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whatever his/her social background, birthplace in this immense country, 
profession, ethnic allegiance, language, etc.4 
It is already remarkable that Dikötter pays attention to this fully out-
dated and controversial opinion, knowing its consequences when used at 
state levels and in state propaganda. He also quotes two other examples: 
a very primitive form of racism relative to black people in the writings of 
Kang Youwei (1858-1927)5 and a pure reproduction of anti-Chinese racism 
transformed into a positive exclamation about his China (‘The greatest 
force is common blood’, etc.) of Sun Yatsen (1866-1925). 
The former is perceived as a monarchist or a reactionary virtuosi but, 
in my view, he is a perfect example of a national-socialist ideologue. 
Anyway, in China he is also considered a highly controversial political 
thinker. It is not necessary to criticize Sun Yatsen, father of the Chinese 
Republic, for his occasional statement. In a European racist discourse, 
however, his dictum that ‘the Chinese belong to the yellow race’ can only 
be supported by radical racists (see below).
Dikötter’s aim with this discussion remains unclear and is based on 
very shallow grounds. Youwei’s and Sun Yatsen’s opinions reproduce the 
modernized Western ideological choice in China around 1910. I cannot 
discover more than a concern about present African students, who are 
‘periodically’ subjected to racial attacks at some Chinese university, or 
about Tibetans and Uighurs who are offfĳicially discriminated also on racial 
grounds. To relate Sun Yatsen and the other to African students or Muslim 
Uighurs is a “mission impossible”. 
No context or proportionality of the case is given. Racism in a country 
with hundreds of ethnic minorities certainly exists locally, but it must be 
underdeveloped in all respects and cannot be equated with “Chinese 
Racism”. For instance, tensions between local Han versus other tribal peo-
ples are expressed high in the north in Chinese Mongolia but also in the 
deep south (see Yunnan below): they are fully unrelated and not compa-
rable since the local circumstances are very diffferent for all parties 
involved. Only outsiders can construct some commonalities. 
Compared to what the enlightened societies in Europe, the United 
States or Australia demonstrate at present in this respect (“gypsies” are 
still killed in several East European countries like the Mexicans along the 
border with the USA; people with an Islamic belief are seriously discrimi-
nated against in nearly all Western Christian countries, and so on); com-
4 F. Dikötter, B. Sautman (ed..), p. 1.
5 See D. Leese (ed.), p. 118-121 and passim.
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pared to all this, “racism of some Chinese” must be seen as insignifĳicant.6 
This, however, can never be an excuse for acting in a racist way or being 
silent about it.
Concerning the opium use itself is Newman’s and his pupil Dikötter’s 
argument of interest
 that nineteenth century opium use was a pleasurable and largely harmless 
aspect of popular sociability and that relatively few users were addicted.7
Newman’s remarkable view is discussed below. Here I refer only to the 
relevant criticism of Harrison who points to the untenable downplaying 
of the socio-economic efffects of drug use. Her research in the Shanxi vil-
lages reveals how the efffect of drug taking on rural family fĳinances was 
often devastating. It is also important that she considered the transition 
from opium to refĳined narcotics like morphine and heroin as a problem in 
its own right. 
The last thing one should say about the drug-scene in post-1911 China, 
as described below, is that it concerns ‘a pleasurable and largely harmless’ 
constellation! Anyway, in this way the case of the opium victims was 
blurred by unnecessary “noise”. The obvious question is now how and 
why are the Chinese opium victims blamed for “their” sins? 
An original Image8 
There is the indestructible image of “the Chinese” as both opium producer 
and addict formed from about 1870 onwards. Pictures of Chinese smok-
ing pipes in an opium den were an absolute hype in all dailies and illus-
trated journals. In the 1960s every flu was called a Mao-flu. Even in the 
1970s in the Netherlands and elsewhere, using heroin—a typical 
6 Dikötter should listen to F. Dikötter (1995), p. 6, where this author warns: ‘It is dan-
gerous to reduce the cultural categories of a period to the expressions of a dozen authors, 
and the hagiographic conventions which endlessly parade fĳigures …’ All this cannot have 
the aim to disqualify Frank Dikötter (and his co-authors). Below, many excellent publica-
tions by him are used, and F. Dikötter, L. Laamann, Z. Xun is a highly informative tome 
concerning the “consumptive approach”, the alternative of the “productive approach” 
adhered to in this History of the Opium Problem. 
7 H. Harrison, p. 154. It is a pity that I came across Harrison’s long article too late to 
use it in a proper way below. I am anyway glad that she can support my rather positive 
conclusion about the role of the Communist Party in eradicating the drug culture in the 
1950s (see p. 176). 
8 See for more background the article of Andreas Pigulla in: D. Leese (ed.), p. 110-113.
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European chemical product—was called ‘chase the dragon’ and even ‘to 
chinese’. Heroin itself is also named ‘Chinese White’, notwithstanding its 
invention and exploitation by German-American pharmaceutical fĳirms 
like Merck or Bayer. 
An older and well-known characteristic is of the Chinese or China as 
Weltfremd, isolated from the rest of the world. We have already met this 
time and time again. It was evident in the English offfensive which already 
started at the end of the 18th-century in McCartney’s opium mission. Not 
much later seducers like the opium dealers Jardine, Matheson & Co, 
Sassoon, Dent and politicians from Palmerston to John Adams attacked 
the Chinese reluctance to accept opium as dangerous isolationism, xeno-
phobia, anti-Western and anti-free trade enmity and so on. Old and new 
prejudices and half-truisms were mixed up to win a propaganda battle in 
which the real victims became transformed into the offfenders. Present 
historians continue too often in this mood, as quoted in the Preface, or by 
declaring out of the blue that opium
was … an essential part of the lifestyle of millions of Chinese, for whom 
opium smoking was a social relaxation, a release from pain or a temporary 
escape from a miserable existence. With such an insistent demand for the 
drug ... the opium trade was able to continue into the twentieth-century 
despite offfĳicial disapproval in China …9
However, from about 1900 onwards, not only Chinese governments but 
all kinds of Chinese victims from Nationalists and Communists to 
Republicans started to organize all forms of protest against opium-impe-
rialism: it was foreign to Chinese traditions and cultures, as well as being 
an economic assault destabilizing society. It is the time when industrial-
ization and urbanization created a large Chinese audience for these com-
plaints. 
Foreigners reacted with a virulent racism. This was widespread in the 
United States, Europe or Australia and not confĳined to foreigners in 
China. It made serious victims among the overseas Chinese as well. It is 
from this time that China defĳinitely took another direction of develop-
ment and very quickly became a highly distinctive society. And ‘never the 
twain shall meet’, Kipling’s famous dictum, was repeated time and again, 
as if there existed a necessity to do this.10 
9 R. K. Newman (1989), p. 525, 526.
10 See an interesting discussion around this subject in M. Jacques.  
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Something of these images was true for the simple reason that the 
Chinese territory was as large as Europe, and they never could “handle” 
more. We do not accuse the ancient Romans of conquering only half of 
Europe or of knowing nothing of the Chinese. They were contemporaries 
of the Qin and Han dynasties, the Great Walls of which attract more tour-
ists than the Colosseum in Rome, let alone the Hadrian’s Wall in Britain. 
Like the Romans, the Qin and Han were always busy with border conflicts 
as a routine matter, so why not perceive the attack of the ‘foreign white 
devils’ as just the next border conflict?
This kind of reasoning is largely nonsense; underestimating its propa-
gandistic “value” in the intolerant Christian societies is unwise as well. A 
remarkable example of its impact can be found early in the quite learned, 
liberal and Lutheran Staatswörterbuch (1857) in which one can read a the-
ory about “the” Chinese: they are not the original people, but invaded the 
present area thousands of years ago from the Northwest, ousting the orig-
inal people to the periphery before they themselves arrived at last at the 
coast:
Because they were from time immemorial an agricultural people from the 
interior and surrounded by uncivilized tribes, the Chinese only could 
develop themselves without any impulse from outside. Thanks to this situ-
ation the Chinese people became one-sided, limited, extreme conceited 
[dünkelhaft eingebildet] and remained so after arriving at the coast of the 
wide ocean: still they communicated insufffĳiciently with other less culti-
vated peoples like themselves ...11 
And when “the” Chinese started such a distorted communication, they 
could not learn anything from the other, ‘not in agriculture, industry or 
trade and not in religion, art or science’. This is, of course, incompatible 
with modern science from the beginning to the end, but still a substantial 
part of the discriminating “yellow race theory”. 
It is only possible to come up with general characteristics of “the” 
Chinese if one takes the impossible bird’s eye view in which all Chinese 
are treated alike. Even after the long-lasting, unifying influences of the 
CCP—rather unique in Chinese history—there are currently hundreds of 
diffferent ethnic groups with rather contradictory characteristics (from 
language to lifestyle or economic performance) and remarkable difffer-
ences between hundreds of regions of this immense country. 
Let’s fĳirst take opium as “typically Chinese” to demonstrate the unten-
ability of this generalization.
11 J. Bluntschli (ed.), vol. 2, p. 440. 
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The Addict “by nature”
Long before the British, French, Dutch and other traders and smugglers 
did their rather nasty work in the Chinese realm against the will of Chinese 
governments and laws of the country, opium was used in China as medi-
cine. We can safely conclude that until the arrival of the ‘foreign devils’, a 
select group of Chinese (in a select part of this vast country) used opium 
in very small quantities among the hundreds of other vegetable medi-
cines. And probably, who knows, a few became addicts. They could buy it 
and learned how to handle it from Arab caravan traders or from the many 
visits of Chinese fleets to the lands in the Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea.
Another use of opium in China was in some religious rituals like those 
concerning the Tsao Wang or Kitchen God in North China. He is one of 
the oldest household deities who ‘looks after the hearth’ and ‘has consti-
tuted himself the censor of morals of the family’. As such, he is perceived 
as ‘the connecting link between God and Man’ who makes an annual 
report about the family to be laid before the All Highest.12 To make this 
report as favorable as possible and to ensure that he will say only kind 
things or even to silence him altogether, the mouth of his picture or sculp-
ture is smeared with something like opium (in other cases one used wine) 
to render him drowsy at the time of making his report. 
During the Manchu era there existed a sect of girls in some secret guilds 
like the ‘Golden Orchid Society’ who vowed never to marry. Breaking 
their celibacy by enforced marriage regularly led to suicide by using white 
arsenic or opium.13 
A rather famous historian of Chinese history, Wolfgang Eberhard, 
wrote: ‘The Chinese were familiar with opium under its Near-Eastern 
name, afyûn (a-fu-yung) probably since Sung times.’14 He, fĳirst, cannot 
provide any proof for this and uses ‘the’ and ‘familiar’ as if all Chinese at 
the time knew about all forms of the drug. For a period of at least four 
hundred and at most seven hundred years later, Eberhard continues the 
former quote with the fĳirst concrete and very symptomatic information:
In the Ming era, the emperor received 200 pounds for himself and 100 for 
the empress from Thailand, but from the eighteenth-century on, opium 
arrived in China from the coast. At the time of Ch’ien-lung [1711-1799; 
H.D.], the court received between 200 and 1,000 crates from the Portu-
12 V. R. Burkhardt, vol 1, p. 76, 77.
13 Idem, p. 108.
14 W. Eberhard, p. 298 also for the following quotation.
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guese. In 1729, the government confĳiscated 34 pounds in the storeroom of 
a merchant in Chang-chou (Fukien). Thus, opium is not a drug, recently 
imported into China, but has a long history in China.
The opium presents for some Ming emperor and his wife were apparently 
nothing but an accident in a period of three hundred years and did not 
afffect the 200 million Chinese inhabitants at the time. The information 
tells us also about who gave the opium: indeed, ‘foreign devils’. Their big 
opium present was enough to addict the whole court and, anyway, aimed 
at provoking an opium market. We do not know whether it was repeated, 
but it was confĳined to the court only and had exactly the “wrong” efffect: 
the emperor started a new offfensive against opium from 1729 onwards! 
And that for a ridiculous quantity of 34 pounds in the house of a coastal 
merchant several thousand miles from the court? Perhaps this was not as 
ridiculous as it seems, because the next information is about the other 
classical phenomenon around opium trade: smuggling of the now prohib-
ited substance and illicit distribution from the coast to some interior. 
During the Yongzheng reign in four coastal prefectures, sworn brother-
hoods started their organized criminal work in the use and distribution of 
opium around 1755.15 As usual, their work also led to fĳierce village con-
flicts in those prefectures, reason enough for a government to interfere. At 
this time the only sources of the opium were Bengal and some Middle 
Eastern locations, while the trade was largely a monopoly of ‘foreign dev-
ils’: Dutch, English or Portuguese traders from Macao. In a mild form 
(compared to what happened in the next century16), all the ingredients of 
the Opium Problem were available: foreign opium assaults versus govern-
ment defence and in between, the market battle of smugglers and crimi-
nals concerning a very small and illicit market.
Until about 1750 it cannot be true that Chinese other than courtiers 
and the well-to-do used opium sometimes as a luxury or that some physi-
cians knew how to use it as a medicine if it was available to them. The oth-
er ritual uses of opium mentioned are confĳined to very specifĳic occasions 
or locations from which it is uncertain whether it was really opium of the 
many available herbal remedies (raw, prepared?) which was used.
Indeed, from about 1790 when the British and other opium traders 
arrived for the fĳirst time in Canton, everything changed in a fundamental 
way: the new era of mass-produced and mass-imported illicit opium had 
15 J. Lipman, S. Harrell (ed.), p. 43.
16 See also idem, p. 52.
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arrived, the smokers followed. Not only governments but also the Chinese 
opposition, the most spectacular being the Taiping, were against opium 
production and consumption:
Although opium had been smoked in China for many years, it became a 
serious problem after the beginning of opium importation from India. Taip-
ing leaders had witnessed the smuggling of opium and the resulting Opium 
War as well as the demoralizing efffect the smoking produced among the 
people. China’s defeat in the Opium War must have given them an added 
cause for wanting to eliminate all opium smoking.17 
So, telling an uninformed Western audience that the “Chinese knew 
about opium already for centuries before we arrived” as an obvious 
defense of their own criminal activities is one of those examples of the 
political use of generalizing statements and of a bad Western conscious-
ness.
Next, we fĳix the beginning of the Opium Problem in China during the 
British and other Westerners’ gradual organization of the assault in the 
First and Second Opium Wars. The details are discussed in part 2. 
Palmerston’s operations, the failed opposition of Gladstone and others, 
and the hypocritical way treaties were made with China and immediately 
broken are sketched. The follow-up is also completely under the constant 
pressure of the English. An example from an insider:
During the years immediately following the Opium War, the British Govern-
ment made repeated effforts to induce the Chinese authorities to legitimize 
the importation of opium into its borders. Lord Palmerston, in 1843, 
instructed the British representative in China “to endeavor to make some 
arrangement with the Chinese Government for the admission of opium into 
China as an article of lawful commerce”; and advised Sir Henry Pottinger 
that he should “avail himself of every possible opportunity strongly to 
impress upon the Chinese plenipotentiary ... how much it would be for the 
interest of that Government to legalize the trade.18
Pottinger started his networking through private conversations with the 
Chinese anti-opium commissioners. The latter asked the Englishman why 
the foreigners would not act fairly towards them by prohibiting the 
growth of the poppy in India and thus efffectually stopping ‘a trafffĳic so 
pernicious to the human race’. Pottinger’s answer is worth recalling:
17 V. Shih, p. 226. Poems were made to express the hatred for opium and opium-
smokers (id., p. 228); the Taiping social policy was wholly directed toward the prohibition 
of opium (id., p. 443); opium smokers were simply threatened with execution (id., p. 70).
18 W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1092; J. Rowntree, p. 68-73 about the “negotiations” of Sir 
Henri Pottinger.
chapter thirty604
This, he said, in constituency with our constitutional law, could not be done; 
and, he added, that even if England chose to exercise so arbitrary power 
over her tillers of the soil, it would not check the evil, so far as the Chinese 
were concerned, while the cancer remained uneradicated among them-
selves, but that it would merely throw the market into other hands. It, in 
fact, ... rests entirely with yourselves. If your people are virtuous, they will 
desist from the evil practice; and if your offfĳicers are incorruptible and obey 
your rulers, no opium can enter your country. The discouragement of the 
growth of the poppy in our territories rests principally with you, for nearly 
the entire produce cultivated in India travels east to China. If, however, the 
habit has become a confĳirmed vice, and you feel that your power is at pres-
ent inadequate to stay its indulgence, you may rest assured your people will 
procure the drug in spite of every enactment.19 
It is an answer worth of a diplomat of “Perfĳide Albion”: blaming the vic-
tims for everything at the end of the First Opium War, while negotiating 
the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the most humiliating treaty the Chinese 
had to sign. As a reward for his service, Pottinger became the fĳirst gover-
nor of Hong Kong, from then on the center of the opium trade. 
Notwithstanding the fĳinancial temptation to follow this diplomatic 
language of a narco-military order, the Chinese emperor refused to take 
the step to legalize opium. He even replied:
It is true that I cannot prevent the introduction of the poison; gain-seeking 
and corrupt men will, for profĳit and sensuality, defeat my wishes; but noth-
ing will induce me to derive a revenue from a vice and the misery of my 
people.
A new Opium War and new humiliations further, the Chinese still retained 
their objections.20 The possibility to connect practical consequences to 
19 Quoted in J. Rowntree, p. 72, 73 from the diary of a Captain Loch, author of Cam-
paign in China (ca. 1860). Rowntree adds that he hoped the Chinese had insufffĳicient 
knowledge of “our constitutional law”, so that they were debarred ‘from following the 
extraordinary propositions’ of Pottinger.
20 It remains an incredible coincidence that the English commander responsible for 
the Second Opium War and the most serious devastation, Lord Elgin (the son of the Elgin 
who had stolen the Karyathides from the Parthenon in Athens, whereupon they were 
called the “Elgin Marbles”), later showed strong disapproval of the opium trafffĳic and of the 
two wars which were unjustifĳiable upon the part of the British Empire (quoted in Idem, 
vol. 2, p. 1094). He wrote in his memories: ‘I have hardly alluded in my ultimatum to that 
wretched question of the Arrow which is a scandal to us, and is so considered, I have rea-
son to know, by all except the few who are personally compromised.’ And elsewhere: ‘I 
thought bitterly of those who for the most selfĳish objects are trampling under foot this 
ancient civilization.’ Etc. See J. Beeching, p. 318 about the destructive plundering of Peking 
by the English and French. The disgust of Lord Elgin is worthless since he was responsible 
for the conduct of his soldiers.
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this moral appeal, however, was bombed out of their hands. Forty years 
later as the agitation in England against the constant opium imports from 
India reached considerable proportions, the absurd attempt was made to 
blame the Chinese themselves: ‘to show that the legalization of the impor-
tation of opium had been freely assented to by China’.21 
Half a century after the last war China could repeat its criticism with 
some initial success. It defĳinitely succeeded in solving its Opium Problem 
after 1949. It is, therefore, worth considering the following question.
Who and How in the Chinese Opium Scene
After the opium wars, the important territorial losses, the huge payments 
and so on, the anti-opium campaigner Joshua Rowntree (1906) conclud-
ed nearly correctly:
Great Britain had at last accomplished its desire, so long worked for, so 
little avowed. The Government of India was no longer to be the chief accom-
plice, the unsleeping partner of Chinese smugglers. The great drug trade 
was regularized by law. China had yielded to steady, continuous pressure, 
which it had not the strength to resist.22
This is nearly correct since these “Chinese smugglers” were the small fĳish 
in the English and American business of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co, 
of the Sassoons or the Russells.
It is also obvious that once the foreigners imported opium into the 
coastal ports, there was a need for some Chinese merchants to bring it 
into the interior, if they were convinced that it was profĳitable to do this. 
Here the foreigners practically created a new opium market and found 
willing customers. The means to do this involved corrupting key-persons 
in bureaucracy or trade (direct contempt of law), smuggling and keeping 
every phase of the process in their foreign hands, (in)directly threatening 
foreign revenge.
Take the example of the coastal port of Tianjin in the north directly on 
the road to Beijing which received (in)directly foreign import in the 19th-
century: 
21 W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1094. A most important contribution to this problem is G. 
Lee, who started from the pioneering Berridge-Edwards study used above at the end of 
part 2. 
22 J. Rowntree, p. 93.
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… foreign goods and foreign opium. Merchants from the interior sold their 
products in Tianjin and bought opium with the proceeds; just before the 
Opium War, Tianjin was the central point for drug shipments into North 
China.23 ‘In the fĳirst years of the treaty port ... opium and cotton cloth dom-
inated the import trade. From the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) to 
World War I, the scope of foreign activity in China greatly expanded. In 
Tianjin the net volume of foreign trade increased, in spite of reduced activ-
ity during the Boxer Rebellion and the last few years of the Qing dynasty. 
Cotton yarn, cloth, sugar, kerosene, dyes, and opium were the major imports. 
During and after World War I, many foreign fĳirms began to import military 
hardware for warlord customers.24 
This shows the diffferences between the beginning of the 19th-century 
and the end. But it is too easy to think that the Chinese merchants simply 
bought the stufff at the quay or embankment and departed for the interior 
as missionaries suggested (see below): 
From 1860 until 1949, foreigners controlled every stage of the passage of 
goods into and out of the port of Tianjin.25 
Here “every” must be stressed because their control covered the customs 
service, foreign loans and money, ships (mostly owned by the British and 
later by the Japanese), shipyards, the business of unloading ships, trans-
ferring the cargoes to barges destined for the interior, and so on. 
Actual trading was carried on by the foreign-owned yanghang, which usu-
ally hired a Chinese comprador to act as agent with native merchants.26 
An insider, an important civil servant of the British Empire, Maurice Collis 
(1889-1973), reminds us about the early 19th-century start of this busi-
ness in his history of the opium trade and opium wars:
The Company [the EIC] controlled the cultivation of opium in India, having 
in fact almost a world monopoly of the drug. The eleven million dollars sold 
by the country fĳirms in China was procured at Company auctions held 
annually at Calcutta. Thus, the Company was the source of the opium traf-
fĳic.27 
Again foreigners controlled the proliferation of the drug from the earliest 
stage, not only the foreign merchants and their factory helpers in Canton, 
but also missionaries were ‘attractive potential allies for merchants while 




27 M. Collis, p. 71.
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also giving accounts of their mission a literary appeal’ and by influencing 
‘the crafting of foreign policy for the Opium War as the political situation 
in China intensifĳied due to opium trafffĳicking’.28
A century passed between this start and the situation in Tianjin. Yet 
present historians still blame the Chinese. For example, the simple com-
ment made by amateur historian Priscilla Napier. She excuses, fĳirst, the 
EIC’s opium monopoly as ‘a necessity’ thanks to the Napoleonic wars, and 
she continues with:
At the other side of the world, thousands of South Chinese seemed unwill-
ing to endure the continuous toil, poverty and hardship of their lives with-
out opium’s instant but fatal alleviation.29
The following reasoning of a professional historian about the situation at 
the end of the 19th-century is already more sophisticated:
Western liberals and missionaries argued with growing passion that the 
West was guilty of corrupting China. The Chinese said Western opium was 
deeply responsible for China’s weakness and decline. None of it was true. 
What was keeping Chinese from Christianity was Christianity, which was 
deeply subversive of China’s social order, while the people preaching it were 
of course foreign agents. The truth was that no one, Chinese or foreigners, 
knew how to persuade Chinese not to grow or use opium. Still less could 
anyone prevent foreign merchants from shipping it into a very willing mar-
ket. In any case, the great majority of China’s opium supply was by the 
1860s and ’70s being grown at home. One guesstimate is that by 1900 there 
were about 40 million consumers of opium in China, about 13.5-15 million 
of them addicts.30
Let’s say it again: from early on, opium was imported into China; it was 
not home grown. That was the case in the 16th and 17th-centuries when 
opium was imported from the Middle East as medicine. This is fully irrel-
evant for Gelber’s reasoning, however. Opium as a result of “legal” Chinese 
poppy growing started after the two Opium Wars. 
Before those events Chinese who tried to produce opium or to grow 
poppies risked being killed because it was not only forbidden by Chinese 
law, but there was also an active prosecution and repression from, at least, 
28 B.L. Fischer, abstract.
29 P. Napier, p. 65. Elsewhere (p. 91) she gave another classical “argument” in the 
framework of “blaming the victims”: ‘Although the Chinese had been growing and eating 
opium on a minor scale since the 700s, the habit of smoking it on a considerable scale did 
not begin till the 17th-century.’ No source is mentioned for this wisdom.
30 H. Gelber, p. 223, 224. For alternative consumption fĳigures see Idem, p. 451, 452 
note 8. 
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around 1800 onwards. Foreign merchants were prevented offfĳicially from 
importing opium, whereupon the ‘foreign devils’ (mainly English, English-
backed Indians and Americans) organized extensive smuggling activities. 
As this illicit trade became efffectively blocked by the Chinese authori-
ties, the English (supported by the French) opened up the opium market 
by the use of substantial military violence. That is the truth which is not 
only neglected by Gelber and others, but actively denied since he also 
claimed that the Chinese ‘emperor decided to make war on the laws of 
supply and demand’31 or that the Chinese ‘did want to buy more … opium 
from India’32 instead of pointing to the cutthroat consumption to which 
they were destined by the English in the 19th-century. 
Whether, furthermore, Chinese opium was home-grown during most 
of this century cannot be concluded from the previous analyses. In the 
next chapter the Chinese consumption pattern will be discussed in all 
possible detail with nearly the same result. Still, a major question remains 
unanswered: who owned, initiated or fĳinanced this poppy cultivation in 
China? This would be a good research project for Chinese scholars. 
Thus, many “foreign devils” knew perfectly well how to make some 
Chinese into opium addicts: by military violence, by importing mass-pro-
duced opium and by organizing the supply far into the interior by various 
means (see the Tianjin example). Of course, it is self-evident that after 
1860 producers started to grow poppies in Chinese regions where this was 
possible like Yunnan. 
However, it is easily forgotten that prolonged military violence was 
needed in one way or another: not only the Opium Wars or the rather 
continuous fĳights against smugglers of all sorts, but the very rebellious 
period also caused warlords to stimulate or organize opium production 
and trade to pay for their weapons and keep their soldiers satisfĳied. That 
started during the Taiping and other revolts and continued after 1900 to 
1945 (see ch. 31).33 
31 Idem, p. 186 which contains also a nearly explicit defense of the British assault: the 
smuggling of opium (by the British, etc.) is ‘China’s problem, no one else’s’, etc.
32 Idem, p. 173.
33 Regarding the warlord practice, Gelber reports only one case (p. 275), the alleged 
Mao’s opium trade, without mentioning any source. He not only neglects the overwhelm-
ing practice of trade in opium and other narcotics of Chiang Kai-shek and other warlords, 
he also neglects the professional literature of—say—a profound drugs and Chinese histo-
rian like W.O. Walker III, chapter 4 and 5. If Mao dealt in opium, Walker should have 
mentioned this immediately (with sources!). See also C.Trocki (1999a), p. 134 who men-
tions for this one source, but of a suspect kind, a young American author, E. Devido, with-
out further experience except in Taiwanese and Buddhist relations.  
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In short, it is purely blaming the victims to suggest that “the Chinese” 
formed a ‘very willing market’ or that ‘nobody knew’ how to stop this mass 
addiction. It was nearly stopped between 1908 and 1918,34 and it certainly 
was stopped after 1945 by the Maoist regime: by ending foreign opium 
import; by harsh measures against the Chinese producers and traders; by 
mild but fĳirm procedures for the addicts. In a few years time the opium 
problem belonged to the past in China! In the century before this remark-
able date, it seemed as if the whole world was attacking and addicting 
China from all sides and with all possible weapons, as will be demonstrat-
ed below. 
The Religious Assault
Blaming the Chinese opium victims was also a result of Western religious 
activities.35 It was remarkable that clergymen like the Reverend Charles 
Gutzlafff were highly active in spreading opium by means of the Holy 
Cross. This is documented also in Maurice Collis’s report about the rela-
tionship between Gutzlafff and the opium tycoon Jardine.36 The aim of the 
priest was so high,
to convert to Protestantism at last the teeming millions of a country, which 
for millenniums had been plunged in darkness, and bring to it not only light 
and truth but the uncounted blessings of free commercial intercourse with 
those chosen nations to which God had revealed Himself. As Mr. Jardine 
had so truly said, the exchange of commodities more respectable than 
34 As is apparently proved by J. Madancy, but see R.K. Newman (1989) and next chap-
ter.
35 That is not new information: an unexpected announcement comes from the Ger-
man race theoretician W. Schallmayer, p. 283 fff. who provides numerous examples of the 
low intellectual level of missionaries, their irritating behavior always under the umbrella 
of foreign arms, the many unfounded prejudices and disdain for the Chinese culture. His 
main target is the famous American missionary and author A.H. Smith, and his main sup-
port is apparently the one-liner of Prince Kung (ca. 1870): ‘Do away with missionaries and 
opium, and our mutual troubles are gone as well!’ In addition, Schallmayer criticizes the 
very superfĳicial knowledge about China among the German population.
36 M. Collis, p. 82 fff. For Gutzlafff see also C. Carr, p. 47 fff. and Th. Klein, R. Zöllner (ed.). 
This last reader shows that it is easy for Gutzlafff to substitute the qualifĳications “stubborn 
colonial bureaucrat”, “fundamentalist missionary”, “non-scrupulous merchant in East 
Asia” or “marketing genius”. Indeed, these qualifĳications concentrated in one person, 
named Gutzlafff, deliver the appropriate range of attitudes demonstrated by the foreign 
missionaries in China or other parts of East Asia. It is far from a ‘natural inclination’ of 
missionaries to condemn opium consumption as R. Newman, p. 768 thinks. See recently 
B.L Fischer, chapter IV, p. 245-355 about Gutzlafff, in particular ‘Gutzlafff, Opium Merchant’, 
p. 261 fff., 322 fff.
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opium was impossible unless funds were provided by sale of the latter. And 
there must be commerce if there was to be evangelization; the two were 
indissolubly bound together.37
Collis stresses that we must not forget that the ‘rubbish’ this reverend and 
his tycoon communicated was the opinion of the largest majority of the 
English and far beyond: the EIC, the Parliament, all Europeans held the 
conversion of the Chinese to Christianity ‘to be highly desirable’. 
Notwithstanding our knowledge about this religious adventurer with his 
extensive opium network, it is still a remarkable surprise for present-day 
Christian historians when one discovers: 
Westerners and opium were associated in the minds of the Chinese, who 
blamed the foreigners for bringing opium to China and addicting the Chi-
nese to it in an efffort to weaken them so that Westerners could gain more 
privileges from the Chinese government.38
Immediately after this correct conclusion Lodwick, who aims at describ-
ing the heroic fĳight of American Protestant missionaries in China against 
opium, neutralizes this statement in the classical Christian way by insist-
ing that 
smuggling opium into China in the early years of the nineteenth-century 
could never have taken place if Chinese themselves had not been the for-
eigners’ accomplices who transported the drug into the interior for sale to 
other Chinese.
This almost incorrect conclusion (see previous section) leads directly to 
the old game of blaming the victims, who must anyway be converted to a 
foreign belief system: they are sinners, and if they could be converted to 
this Christianity (a project that was too difffĳicult and unsuccessful, as was 
generally the case throughout Asia), they remained an inferior kind of 
Christian because the so-called “yellow race” was “racially impure” for too 
many Europeans and Americans. 
This ends also in the classical mistake of substituting the behavior of 
some individual Chinese for that of the whole nation, culture, etc. and the 
reverse. Basic to these mistakes are the attempts (often deliberate) to 
37 M. Collis, p. 84.
38 K. Lodwick, p. 2. In fact, the same opinion as Gelber as quoted above. The very 
American Protestant B. Fischer, who has many interesting things to say about Gutzlafff’s 
opium gospel + bible books business, also demonstrates why historical understanding 
must fail here: he remains preaching against the sinner Gutzlafff. The latter did not under-
stand that ‘the good news that Christ’s atoning sacrifĳice was available to save all people’ 
(p. 267) independent of material objects like a Bible (‘part of Western intellectual prop-
erty’) and opium from the West.
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avoid discussing the context or proportions of the behavior, thought or 
action: how many people in a given time or place can be “blamed”? And 
why is this relevant? Are they public or private persons? And so on. 
An defender of the missionary position at the time, Spencer Hill, tried 
to be as concrete as possible in his research and concluded, therefore:
... the alleged insincerity of the Chinese proved on investigation to be due, 
partly to administrative impotence, partly and chiefly to violent action on 
our part and our practical encouragement of the unlawful trade.39
39 J. Spencer Hill, p. 92.
Ill. 30. Open Air Preaching. China Inland Mission, 1892 
Source: en.Wikipedia.org: ‘Open Air Preaching’ by a China Inland Mission, London.
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Lodwick also points to a specifĳic kind of hypocrisy within the Christian 
circles. For the missionaries
opium addicts were untrustworthy and hence banned from church mem-
bership. With so many Chinese automatically excluded from the possibility 
of conversion, missionaries began to campaign against the drug.40
Although these missionaries acknowledged the disadvantage of the for-
eigner-opium association and although they must have had knowledge 
about the recent opium propaganda of colleagues and countrymen, they 
paradoxically identifĳied the opium evils of Chinese social and political life 
with its non-Christian religion and morality. It was a consequence of their 
dominant position, spatially as well as culturally, as described clearly by 
Paul Cohen:
The missionaries lived and worked in the highly organized structure of the 
mission compound, which resulted in their efffective segregation ... The mis-
sionaries really did not want to enter the Chinese world any more than they 
had to. Their whole purpose was to get the Chinese to enter theirs.41
In addition, Lodwick does not make obvious remarks about the era, the 
19th-century, in which one revolutionary movement after the other 
developed and criminals—always in need of money—were found “all 
over the place”.42 No obvious remarks were made either about the many 
underpaid corrupt bureaucrats, who were very helpful in spreading opi-
um. Let us not forget either that the enormous extent of China does not 
allow for abstract generalizations.
Of course, Lodwick also “forgets” that in a rebellious and hunger-strick-
en China, it was very difffĳicult for the provincial or imperial authorities 
(who nearly all forbade opium consumption as a luxury, not as a drug in 
medical treatment) to control the thousands of kilometers of coastlines or 
the criminal helpers of the foreign smugglers.43 Aside from the possibility 
that the Royal Navy was aiding these British and American smugglers. The 
existence of these categories and circumstances cannot be an excuse for 
foreigners to deliberately dope parts of a population.44 Ultimately, the 
40 K. Lodwick, p. 181.
41 Quoted in Albert Feuerwerker’s contribution to J. Fairbank (ed.), p. 172. Here also 
useful data about the many kinds of missionaries (Idem, p. 165-177).
42 D. Richards, p. 162.
43 A contemporary like J. Spencer Hill, p. 93, mentioned the difffĳiculties that the cen-
tral Chinese government was unable to control the provinces (Taiping, etc.) and that the 
English should help the central government. This was not done, and one gets the strong 
impression that the English did the reverse.
44 See C.Trocki (1999a), p. 124, about the exaggerations of the missionary Edkins. 
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largest mistake of the foreign missionaries and their present historians 
was that only a very few individuals among them were brave enough to 
blame the foreign assault as such and blame the introduction of opium as 
a foreign assault on the minds of the Chinese. 
What stopped them from doing this was their racist attitude. A few 
examples sufffĳice here before I elaborate on this theme in the following 
section. In the swelling choir of moral anti-opium critics in the 1880s, 
Spencer Hill can be viewed as an honest man with a profound knowledge 
of the history and even economics of the opium trafffĳic. But even he 
accepts highly dubious opinions as if ‘the sentiments of morality and the 
powers of self-control are the weakest and most uncertain’ among the 
Chinese:
In them the animal and sensuous elements of their nature are most fully 
developed, while their relish of momentary and immediate pleasures is par-
ticularly keen and regardless of the consequences, a combination of char-
acteristics which renders them specially liable to, and unable to resist, any 
temptation that may be presented to them.45
This, however, was the reason for him to accuse the British (‘a nation 
great and powerful’, etc.) ‘to take advantage of the weakness or the vice’ of 
the Chinese instead of caring, protecting and helping these poor creatures 
to overcome their mental backwardness. (And to act like this, one is, of 
course, in need of an army of missionaries as, later, development workers 
in Western aid programs.) 
Everywhere in the world opium or its derivatives have been prescribed 
for many ailments: in Western wars it is popular among soldiers as pain-
killer, etc. As a luxury, Westerners drank or injected the stufff; in India it 
was eaten:
The Chinese alone chose to consume the drug by smoking, and apparently 
this diffference made the Westerners view the Chinese addicts with 
disgust. ... opium was smoked in public dens. This visible use conflicted with 
Western standards of propriety and added to the foreigners’ contempt for 
the Chinese.46
J. Spencer Hill, chapter 2 is probably the exception to the rule. He rightly bases his analysis 
of the “morality of the opium trafffĳic” on: ‘The history of the trade in Opium ... was carried 
on mainly by British subjects with the support and protection of their government, in 
open defĳiance of the rulers of China and in direct contravention of the laws of that empire’ 
(Idem, p. 29).  
45 J. Spencer Hill, p. 56.
46 K. Lodwick, p. 4. This smoking story is a very strange one, because from the produc-
tion side (the whole rather complicated treatment of poppy into consumable opium), 
chapter thirty614
Lodwick provides other astonishing examples of missionary tactics like 
the one of an archdeacon who told the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade: when preaching to the Chinese, ‘when someone shouts out, 
“Who sells Opium?”, my answer is, “Who smokes the Opium?” I have thus 
silenced them hundreds of times’.47 A classical demagogic trick by equat-
ing producers with consumers.
This had apparently insufffĳicient efffect because in the 1890s there was 
‘the almost universal Chinese idea’ that the missionaries themselves were 
strongly involved in the opium business, so much so that the term ‘Jesus 
opium’ was in use everywhere. Small wonder that many missionaries 
found the opium question so embarrassing that they were reluctant to 
admit they were citizens of the British Empire or the USA and trans-
formed themselves into Chinese, including a queue. Remember there was 
a treaty between the USA and China (1881), which prohibited Americans 
from engaging in the opium trade. The immediate response to the treaty 
was the racist Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a signifĳicant move in identify-
ing a group seen as non-assimilable and threatening.48 No single American 
missionary organization protested against this law.
The position of the missionaries was not only determined by their per-
ception of China and the Chinese or their intolerant behavior. According 
to many analysts one has to see their position within the imperialist 
exploitation system. America’s ad hoc 
colonial administration was often held together not by a strong civil service 
but by the army and the navy ... aided in considerable measure by a strong 
voluntarist ethic in the nongovernmental sector in which services were 
contracted out to missionaries, the YMCA, and other nongovernmental 
organizations. 49
The American empire had 900 missionaries in China in 1890, while 30 
years later there were 14,000 which largely argued that the ‘American 
smoking is not the most obvious method, to say the least. Smoking in a pipe must have 
quite a diffferent history in the Western world where the Portuguese and, in particular, the 
Dutch colonizers, who were the fĳirst to deal with opium as a luxury, were classical tobacco 
and pipe-smokers. Hashish as a luxury was smoked long before the East Asians knew of 
the stufff around the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Both backgrounds should be 
combined in explaining why not only in China, but also in the whole of Southeast Asia the 
opium pipe was preferred and not eating it as in India. See D. Duco, passim.
47 Idem, p. 33, which is still a main “argument” of people like Harry Gelber (see previ-
ous chapter).
48 E. Cashmore (ed.), in the informative article ‘Law: Immigration USA’, p. 189.
49 A. McCoy, F. Scarano (ed.), p. 30 also for the following two quotations.
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empire should be moralized and turned into a moral state’. The meaning 
of this was crystal clear once an alternative opium policy was adopted, 
namely ‘to assert American hegemony in East Asia to undermine the mor-
al authority of the British and to aid the process of modernization in 
China’. As shown above, the Spaniards and Portuguese in the 16th and 
17th centuries had already introduced fanatic conversion policies, and 
the Dutch and English Protestant colonizers did the same after they had 
conquered their Catholic predecessors. The New Imperialists USA, 
Germany and Japan again introduced a religious assault along with the 
military and opium one. 
There remained diffferences between the nations in this respect. The 
British and American missionaries largely remained in the “opium-strick-
en” Chinese cities. The many strongly anti-foreigner resistance move-
ments, including the Boxer Rising, encouraged them to do this. The 
Japanese tried to conquer whole provinces, as was shown above, and also 
produced propaganda for their national religion. The Germans, more 
heroic, tried to convert the peasants in the countryside.50 After 1933 their 
motivation to do this was clear and should be read in German: 
Dem Deutschen liegt es im Blut, nicht auf die Verfeinerung des Volkes den 
größten Wert zu legen, sondern auf die Volkskraft. Er hat ein klares Auge 
dafür, daß in den Städten die Volkskraft verdorben und verbraucht wird, daß 
das Land die Städte überhaupt nur am Leben erhält. (‘It runs in the Germans’ 
blood not to insist so much on the cultivation of the people but on strength-
ening its immanent power. The Germans perceive it quite clearly that this 
Power of the people is spoiled and wasted in the cities, while the country-
side is the force which nourishes the cities.) 51
This application of the Blood & Soil doctrine for Chinese aims suggests 
that in the countryside the peasant customs are still prevalent and the 
people control each other much more; somebody who aspires to become 
a Chinese Christian has a much higher “value” in the countryside than in 
the cities. There were complaints about how difffĳicult it was to convert 
these peasants: apart from the obvious problems of poverty and lack of 
education, there were specifĳically the Communist attacks, who turned 
the mission into a hazardous venture. 
Thanks to the studies of Wolfgang Eckart, realistic backgrounds are 
now known for these German missions. His detailed description of the 
50 J. Müller’s contribution to J. Richter (ed.), p. 94 fff.
51 Idem, p. 95. The Japanese “soul” was perceived as similar to the German ‘Blut und 
Boden’ (p. 101). 
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Deutsches Schutzgebiet Kiautschou around the city of Tsingtao (Quingdao) 
on the coast of the Yellow Sea shows the sharp distinctions and mutual 
aversions between the poor Chinese and rich German military, bureau-
crats and missionaries.52 This part of coastal China was “freely occupied” 
by and under the command of the German navy.53 The Europeans and 
Chinese lived quite isolated from each other. The former planned a kind 
of garden city with all possible luxury; it was even announced as a seaside 
resort. For the Chinese, the European contractors planned and built some-
thing very diffferent. ‘The development of the Chinatown Tapautau, how-
ever, ... was [around 1900] characterized by a government-inspired ghetto, 
an always increasing influx of indigenous laborers in far too few houses ... 
a continuous danger for the health of the inhabitants ... houses for more 
than 500 Chinese laborers ... new suburbs …’ which formed with the older 
buildings a hierarchy of poverty, dirt and misery.54 In the Germans own 
words, it was a ‘Drecknest’ with health conditions of an ‘epidemic charac-
ter’, while in garden city Tsingtao, sicknesses decreased annually. Eckart 
continues with:
That the Chinese population was accused of being guilty itself for this may 
sound today as cynical, but was understandable in the colonial mentality 
of the European Herren of Kiautschou.55 
This still sounds very cynical today, since the Chinese had to sufffer health 
hazards, etc. thanks to the European actions, which were done on pur-
pose. This went to further extremes: for example, the German marines 
nearly all had venereal diseases, but continued to infect Chinese women 
in remote villages. Willingly and knowingly, the German occupiers also 
organized an opium regime for the Chinese population:
Contrary to the directions of the International Opium Commission ... the 
opium consumption was not prohibited and even taxed. Also after 1909 
every inhabitant of Kiautschou could get an Opiumschein [opium permit] 
for 1 dollar ... other revenues were gained by opening, controlling and tax-
ing of opium dens. Between 1904 and 1907 the opium consumption in 
52 W. Eckart, p. 458-505. In particular, he describes the health infrastructure in the 
“Europäerstadt Tsingtau” in contrast to the planning of the “Chinesenstadt Tapautau”. 
This part of the coast was occupied by the German navy as revenge for the murder of two 
German missionaries (November 1897).
53 See S.G. Chen, p. 280 fff., 291 fff. about the remarkable move of the German to give 
their Schutzgebiet to Japan with far-reaching consequences also for the opium policy of 
this country (see chapter 27).
54 Idem, p. 462.
55 Idem, p. 464.
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Kiautschou increased from 6,575.47 kg to 8,697.97 kg. In 1908 there were 
3,150 addicted opium smokers registered. The Opium Law of 1912 did not 
alter this situation, but stabilized it.56 
The large concentration of missionaries in Kiautschou stabilized this situ-
ation as well.
From Chinese sources there are only a few testimonies of the mission-
aries’ personal activities. Sun Shuyun discovered the fate of a few of these 
German missionaries in the 1930s and described them as sellers of ‘the 
other opium’, religion, ‘the poison of the mind’.57 In the fĳirst thirty years of 
their stay in China, missionaries apparently converted fewer than 100 
Chinese:
The Chinese were frightened of them, thinking the missionaries were dev-
ils, and their grey and blue eyes were due to their lack of nourishment, 
which they made up by eating the eyes of Chinese children. They stoned 
the missionaries, set fĳire to their houses, and petitioned local offfĳicials to 
throw them out.58 German missionaries achieved some success with the 
Miao tribe in Yunnan and Guizhou in the early 1910s. This mountain peo-
ple was active in opium smoking and trade (see next chapter). The dis-
crimination of the Miaos in Yunnan brought them together with the German 
‘foreign devils’. When the Red Army on its Long March arrived in a small 
country town, Shiqian, the settlement was thrown into panic. Soldiers 
found three German priests and some nuns. Two of them escaped, and the 
third died of hunger in captivity. 
Another German priest, Rudolf Bosshardt, of the London-based China 
Inland Mission, was caught by a part of the 2nd Red Army and helped it to 
join with another part. He was released in 1935 after a long imprisonment 
and payment of $20,000 silver dollars. Bosshardt’s day-by-day account of 
his captivity is one of the most complete reports of the Long March, dis-
playing the cruel reality of the Red Army’s methods of supplying itself. 
After about 1935 there were almost no Western missionaries left in this 
“mutually inimical” China in which they had become “foreign mud” for 
nearly all Chinese, Nationalists as well as Communists. They never 
returned. It has not been forgotten, however, how all these representa-
tives of the Christian West perceived the Chinese as a detestable Yellow 
Race. The Reverend Arthur Smith provides the best introduction to the 
next paragraph with his elaborations on the Chinese ‘physical vitality’. 
56 Idem, p. 464 note 34.
57 S. Shuyun, p. 103.
58 Idem, p. 104.
chapter thirty618
This vitality is for him excellent: A Chinese person recuperates very quick-
ly from all the serious disasters in his time, which costs millions of people 
their life. However:
The only permanent and efffective check upon the rapid increase of the 
Chinese population appears to be the confĳirmed use of opium, a foe to the 
Chinese race as deadly as war, famine, or pestilence.59 
Herewith a new argument of doping Chinese is given, and the reverend’s 
advice as panacea to ‘the terrible vis inertia of Oriental apathy and fatal-
ism—that dumb stupidity’ is the action of ‘some force from without’. As 
such, this influential religious offfĳicial does not point to diplomacy. No, 
what is
needed by China ... is unrestricted intercourse, free trade, and the brother-
hood of man. The gospel of commerce is the panacea for China’s needs; 
more ports, more imports, a lower tarifff and no transit taxes.60 
Smith’s bestseller The Uplift of China provides the outlines of an ‘American 
Moral Empire’ with the aim to ‘lay deep the foundations of an Oriental 
Christian civilization’.61 This “empire” seems to be equivalent to America 
exploiting opium-stricken, pagan Chinese. At the end of the 19th-centu-
ry, new imperialists still advertised the same ideas and practices as at the 
start, including the “free” and massive import of opium in exchange for 
silk, porcelain and tea, supported by a royal and republican navy (no 
diplomacy, but military power). The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) covers 
both aspects: they are so inferior thanks to their opium smoking that they 
all must be returned to their own opium country. The victims are not only 
blamed, but also punished.
59 A. Smith (1894), p. 145.
60 Idem, p. 325, 326.
61 A. Smith (1907), p. X. I could not consult Ian Tyrrell’s book with the efffective title: 
Reforming the World. The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (2010) but only a highly 
favorable review of Barbara Reeves-Ellington (H-Soz-u-Kult 03.06.2011). It is an up-to-date 
analysis of all possible American religious reform movements and organizations of the 
second half of the 19th-century. Their interconnectedness created the networks of empire 
that for Tyrell lie at the heart of American imperialism, even if reformers did not always 
meet their goals. Some are liberal (in the US sense), most fundamentalist sectarian. They 
all intersected with the state to promote the gospel of some American Dream which, there-
fore, always has to remain a dream. In Tyrrell’s words it concerns ‘the exercise of power 
under a shared moral and political order in which that power is the subject of multilateral 
contestation among nations and classes’.
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Racism
A major source of blaming victims was and, indeed, still is racism as devel-
oped in the wake of colonialism and imperialism of mainly the 19th-cen-
tury.62 It is too popular a means to disqualify “The Enemy”. No serious 
people today use “race” as a concept providing any knowledge about large 
groups of people, let alone individuals. Also with the new DNA knowledge 
and hype, most biologists—the traditional 19th-century and early 20th-
century sources of erroneous and dangerous race theories—rightly accept 
their own layman’s knowledge of social, economic or cultural develop-
ments in societies. Nevertheless, it is, alas, appropriate to elucidate the 
pitfalls of racism as a function of nationalist enmity. This was the racism 
endemic from the middle of the European and American 19th-century. In 
hindsight, it was not surprising that it was exactly in new imperialist 
nations like the USA and Germany, who arrived too late for a profĳitable 
piece of the Eastern pie, that this imperialist racism had so much sup-
port.63 
At the beginning of the 19th-century, the Chinese were seen as people 
who stupidly resisted “free trade”, the mutual exchange of tea for opium 
or their conversion to Christianity. At the end of the century once their 
exploitation by the West had reached its peak, they were seen as the most 
terrible enemies of mankind, who contaminated the human race with 
their opium, who were ready to conquer and enslave the rest of the world 
and had already sent thousands of emigrants to the USA, other Western 
countries and their colonies in order to steal “well” paid jobs, forming at 
the same time a secret army preparing to conquer the West, and so on. 
This perception was accompanied everywhere in the West and their 
colonies (Australia, New Zealand, etc.) by the slogans of the Yellow Danger, 
La Race Jaune, the Yellow Specter, het Gele Gevaar, the Gelbe Gefahr, or the 
Yellow Terror and the Yellow Race. They were conjured up in the same way 
as antisemitism was spread, namely, by means of terrifying anti-Chinese 
cartoons, writings, pogroms or movies. Most of the pictures were of 
addicts sucking on their pipes in opium dens. In particular, union leaders 
62 See E. Cashmore (ed.), p. 264-279 as a reasonable but outdated analysis of race and 
racism. Racism was also a main motive in 16th-century colonialism and missionary activi-
ties (the Roman Catholic Spain and Portugal), but it was not yet combined with national-
ism and state-capitalist monopolies as in the 19th-century dominated by Protestant/
Calvinist countries like the English, Dutch and Americans.
63 For the following see U. Mehnert, the detailed Wikipedia article “Yellow Peril” with 
many present-day examples.
chapter thirty620
feared that the Chinese would undermine American or British labor (the 
Chinese population reached a peak of 2,419 in 1931 in the whole of Britain!). 
The Chinese were also accused of introducing iniquitous practices such as 
gambling and opium smoking. Sex was added in the classical manner to 
these fear elements by pointing to miscegenation. This was considered 
immoral, unnatural and endangering The Empire.64
64 For this kind of racist problems in Britain, see the interesting Sascha Auerbach. See 
also the review of this book by David Lloyd Smith (who does not know that Sascha is a 
well-known Jewish female name) in: H-Net Reviews (Jan. 2010). He made the remark that 
a highly influential racist book of Sax Rohmer, Dope: A Story of Chinatown and the Drug 
Trafffĳic (1919) ‘is a repellent novel-racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic, and mired in reac-
tionary politics’, but not a sinophobic work. Jews are described by Rohmer ‘as the primary 
threat to the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race’. To substantiate this, he quotes from 
another Rohmer book describing a positive element of the ‘Chinese heart’, i.e. a deep dis-
trust of the police. This is not convincing, when no further qualifĳication is given. In addi-
tion, one can ask which police is distrusted: if it is Chinese police, it is difffĳicult to suppose 
sinophobia. If it is the white police of the International Settlements (which must be the 
case here), then the quotation points to remarkable practices of sinophobia: considering 
Ill. 31. The Yellow Terror ca. 1900
Source: en.Wikipedia.org ‘Yellow Terror in All his Glory’
blaming the chinese victims  621
Germany and the USA were the main sources of this racism, and it is 
highly symbolic that the German Emperor Wilhelm II could write to the 
President of the USA at the time, Theodore Roosevelt (September 1905):
I foresee in the future a fĳight for life & death between the “White” and the 
“Yellow” for their sheer existence. The sooner therefore the Nations belong-
ing to the “White Race” understand this & join in common defense against 
the coming danger, the better.65 Roosevelt was, indeed, the right address. 
Reflecting on what might cause ‘new nations of an old stock to spring up 
in new countries’ like Australia and the United States, he expressed the 
opinion: 
 ‘the peopling of the great island-continent with men of the English stock 
is a thousand-fold more important than the holding of Hindoostan for a few 
centuries.’ [It was the] ‘ethnic conquest’ of a territory ... The presence of the 
‘Chinaman’ [whether in Australia or the United States would be] ‘ruinous 
to the white race’ [but these democracies] ‘with the clear instinct of race 
selfĳishness, saw the race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien.’66 
A large part of Australia has a tropical climate, and at the time it was dif-
fĳicult to get a “white” labor force for the plantations and similar work. 
These entrepreneurs hired Chinese and other Asians. As soon as these 
newcomers were noticed, they became competitors of the whites, and 
like in the US, the Australian trade unions initiated strong racist actions: 
for them the Chinese were of a ‘depraved and dissolute’ race; or ‘The risks 
to white male health were alcohol, opium and Asian prostitutes’, and so 
on.67 The liberal (Australian defĳinition) president, Samuel Grifffĳith, imme-
diately changed laws so that Asians could be extradited (1892).
Particularly in the USA, these images and opinions were combined 
with the slave-like situation of most Chinese immigrants working in the 
mines or on the railway projects. Since that time, opium addiction has 
been described in the United States as ‘un-American’ and ‘non-Western’.68 
Chinese as pariahs ‘who may therefore be robbed, beaten and even murdered by his white 
neighbours with impunity.’   
65 Quoted by U. Mehnert, p. 9.
66 Quoted by W. Anderson, p. 254. 
67 Idem, p. 88. See also p. 90: A Watson told: ‘The yellow, the brown, and the copper-
coloured are to be forbidden to land anywhere.’; the chief objection to Chinese immigra-
tion was ‘entirely racial’ (Senator Pearce); the Chinese ‘cannot mix with us. We know from 
the teachings of science that they cannot’ (Senator Smith), etc. 
68 D. Musto, p. 2; U. Mehnert, p. 49 fff. points to the fact that Chinese in the USA of the 
1870s concern about 4% of the total, mainly European immigrants of 2.8 million people. 
The always highly racist trade unions in the USA (led by Jews like Samuel Gomperz) were 
the source of the anti-Chinese (later anti-Japanese) actions. Japanese were attacked from 
the 1890s onwards, but their immigration was much lower than the Chinese: 0.001% of the 
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It led to a heavy repression of Chinese in this country and even their extra-
dition around 1910. In the end an “explanation” for all this was found in 
the doctrine of the “Yellow Race”, a non-doctrine reproduced in all sorts of 
pejorative slogans, rationalizations and chimeras. 
In 1868 the racist Henri George (later famous for his Progress and 
Poverty, 1879) published his reasons why ‘pagan, untrustworthy, volup-
tuous, cowardly and cruel’ Chinese should be excluded in order to save 
‘the racial homogeneity’ of the Americans.69 Another provocative book 
was The Chinese Invasion (H. West, 1873) in which the Chinese were com-
pared to the ‘great plagues [which] overran Egypt’; pogroms against the 
Chinese were regular events like the one in Tacoma, Washington (1877) in 
which a whole Chinese quarter was burned to the ground, etc. A few years 
later the Chinese Exclusion Act appeared. Around 1895 the anti-Chinese 
and anti-Japanese propaganda everywhere reached its high point. 
After the turn of the century, the phrase “Yellow Peril” was daily food for 
the readers of the Hearst newspapers in the USA. An influential US evan-
gelist, G. Rupert, preached about the same peril and warned in 1911 of the 
assault on the West by China (“ … only Jesus Christ can stop these attacks”). 
In 1914 the famous author Jack London wrote about the coming world 
hegemony of China, as did the novelist Nowlan with his novel Armageddon 
(1928) at the moment China was close to a total collapse! 
In Europe the situation was not very diffferent. Thanks to their continu-
ous resistance against British, French, etc. assaults, the Chinese were 
characterized in the 19th-century publicity as unreliable, cruel and sly; 
their nation as reactionary and despotic. And nearly always these qualifĳi-
cations were followed by references to their gambling and opium addic-
tion.70 The German Emperor Wilhelm II promised his nation that he 
would eradicate this gelbe Gefahr (Die Hunnenrede, July 1900)71; in 
whole US population. From then on the Chinese stereotypes became similar to the Japa-
nese ones. They also became ‘inferior, unreliable and tricky’ (Idem, p. 55). Japan, however, 
received many more comments because a political-military development of becoming a 
world power accompanied the racist discourse. 
69 U. Mehnert, p. 52.
70 A well-known German commentator on world politics, Paul Dehn, used these 
qualifĳications (1905) referring to western ‘experts of the Far East’. U. Mehnert, note 7 p. 22.
71 In this notorious speech to a German expedition army to the Far East, aimed at 
crushing the Boxer Rebellion, the German Kaiser compared this ‘Prussian Christian army’ 
with the revenging Huns of Atilla. He ordered them not to take prisoners and behave as 
ruthlessly as possible, ‘so that the name of Germany in China is feared in a way that never 
again a Chinese tries to squint at a German’. A classical example of how racist remarks 
were transformed in disqualifĳications of The Enemy is that “Huns” became since this 
speech the name for barbarous Germans during World War I.  
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England, M. Shiel published the bestseller The Yellow Danger (1897) about 
the murder of two missionaries by Chinese. 
There are remarkable parallels with present publicity because, for 
instance, Rupert preached what he called ‘British Israelism’, while now 
Zionist writers like Margalit or Morris and Samuel Huntington and other 
Occidentalism writers warn about global attacks by Islam and China on 
the West; new US evangelists preach war against the modern China. 
Mehnert also points to the strong parallels between the Yellow Race slo-
gans and the present concepts like “the Asian Challenge” or “Japanese 
Challenge” which ask for “Our” response or directly for a new war against 
Islam or whatever enemy is needed to assuage the “Western” bad con-
science.72 
The excuse that the ‘Yellow Race’ was specifĳically attracted or suited to 
opium possibly cancelled Western guilt. It was soon mixed up with all 
kinds of Orientalisms. Here are two examples. An interesting detailed arti-
cle in a famous (pre-war) encyclopedia states
that behind the opium problem there is a fundamental divergence of atti-
tude between East and West. The custom of eating and smoking opium has 
by this time become deeply ingrained in the social fabric of the eastern 
countries—so deeply ingrained in fact that it cannot readily be eradicated 
without the full cooperation of the western powers.73
The misleading reference to the “age-old use of opium” in China accom-
panies the accusation that ‘colonial interests’ exploited these ‘eastern 
habits’!
A variant on what the opium dealers like the Jardines, Mathesons or 
Sassoons told the world as quoted at the start of this chapter provides the 
next example:
It is true that opium is not likely to become popular among an active and 
industrious race like the Anglo-Saxon, whose preference must always be for 
the more potent, though less permanent stimulus, of ardent spirits, the 
“gross and mortal enjoyments” of which are far more suitable to the char-
acter of that race than the “divine luxuries” of opium ... Orientals ... will 
choose the stimulant which multiplies and gives a livelier coloring to … 
72 The present Samuel Huntington crusade is an old one. Already, Hugh Lusk pub-
lished in the North American Review (1907) an article titled ‘The Real Yellow Peril’ in which 
he states that the thread of the Asian people is not so much a military or economic thread: 
‘The real peril is to be found … in the collision and competition of civilizations’. Quoted in 
U. Mehnert, p. 53.
73 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. XI, p. 472 (1949) clearly written around 
1935 by H.H. Moorhead and H. Tobin.
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ideas, rather than that which ... excites to muscular exertion and boisterous 
mirth.74
Of course this is phraseology and has nothing to do with the practice phy-
sicians experienced in their therapeutic observations and written down 
20 years earlier, let alone what numerous observers have reported since 
the 16th-century: 
The greatest suffferings ... are those which attend the state of depression, 
always existing when its direct influence is no longer felt. There are exces-
sive restlessness, a universal and indescribable uneasiness, feelings of intol-
erable distress, especially in the epigastrium and lower extremities, an 
irksome sense ... of incapacity both for intellectual exertion and for mental 
or emotional enjoyments …75 and so on.
Indeed, the “Anglo-Saxon Race” was vulnerable to ‘more potent’ drugs 
which became the derivatives of opium like heroin and morphine.
The intellectual level of discourses about race and drugs in the United 
States, which had such far-reaching efffects, displayed strange mixtures of 
negative and positive elements. For example, certain drugs were dreaded 
because they seemed to undermine specifĳic restrictions keeping groups 
and races under control:
cocaine was supposed to enable blacks to withstand bullets which would 
kill normal persons and to stimulate sexual assault. Fear that smoking 
opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese and white Americans 
was also a factor in its total prohibition.76 
Every racial group received so its “prescription” largely adjusted to the 
political demands of the day.
After about 1890 it was clear enough that Japan, contrary to China, was 
achieving a prominent role in world politics and becoming an imperialis-
tic competitor of the Western powers, including Russia. In the Yellow Race 
doctrine, however, the Chinese and Japanese were lumped together. That 
situation had to change, however, as soon as new friend-enemy relations 
developed. The most prominent among them was the Berlin-Tokyo axis 
of Nazi Germany against its strongest enemy at that time, England and its 
British Empire. 
German racial theorists, earlier in the forefront of the Yellow Danger 
(Gelbe Gefahr) publications, had to rewrite their textbooks into a remark-
74 Quoted in C. Terry, M. Pellens, p. 95.  
75 Quoted from dr. G. B. Wood (1856) in Idem, p. 138.
76 D. Musto, p. 244, 245.
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able mixture of the classical position and a “Yellow Lovestory”. Still, the 
‘Northern Germanic Race’ must remain in the leading position, which led 
to a highly ambiguous treatment of the East.
So, in his historical ‘applied racial theory’, Heinrich Wolf fully agrees 
with the policies of Australia and New Zealand, ‘where the indigenous 
people are fully destroyed by the whites’, and that they strongly oppose 
the immigration of Chinese coolies and Japanese peasants: it is, indeed a 
struggle between ‘Germanisation or Orientalisation’.77 Wolf’s proto-Nazi 
racial stand was soon followed by one of its prominent ideologues.
In his Mythus (1930, etc.) Alfred Rosenberg was not only enthusiastic 
about the impact of Confucianism and Taoism on the racial characteris-
tics of the Chinese and their society. He also gave a long overview of the 
British opium attacks, which was introduced by some general remarks on 
the economic imperialism of the West that 
cotton and opium, waste-products of Europe, could infĳiltrate into China to 
destroy fĳirst the equilibrium of Chinese life in coastal cities and later every 
time farther into the interior ... even learned Chinese started to beautify 
their homes … with Western kitsch … but protests came from Chinese and 
Japanese intellectuals … to start a movement of racial renewal and libera-
tion of the East ... Today China has lost its typical mythical ideal … One may 
hope that missionaries, opium dealers and dark adventurers have to leave 
China soon … Like the large movement of renewal in Germany, China 
struggles for its myth, for its race and its ideals against the commercial race 
which dominates today all stock-markets and the deeds of nearly all gov-
ernments.78 
The Yellow Race doctrine is flexible enough to be used in the game “the 
enemy of my enemy is my best friend”. What is to be done, though, when 
both friends and enemies disappear like opium smoke? After the Japanese 
were conquered in 1945, happily for the heirs of the old empires, the rise 
of Mao and its “communism” in 1949 could keep the doctrine fresh and 
alive.
77 H. Wolf, p. 325. Wolf has headed a paragraph ‘Die gelbe Gefahr’ referring to Hous-
ton Chamberlain’s ‘Grundlagen des 19.Jahrhunderts’ and, in particular, Wilhelm Schall-
meyer’s influential ‘Vererbung und Auslese’ which accuses the British and French of 
occupying China ‘in a barbaric way’, whereupon it was subjected to ‘das schädliche Opi-
umlaster’ (p. 327; ‘the noxious sin of opium’). 
78 A. Rosenberg, p. 652-654.
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CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE
THE WEST AND ITS OPIUM IMPORT IN CHINA
The image of the Chinese was not very favorable in the Western percep-
tion to use an understatement. What was China’s own contribution to the 
world’s Opium Problem apart from providing the largest number of opi-
um consumers at the end of the 19th-century? To qualify this last ques-
tion immediately, we can reveal that Chinese already around 1830
routinely depicted [opium smokers] as physically and mentally decrepit, 
with a skeletal frame, a grey complexion, weak stamina, stained teeth, 
diminishing willpower and a lack of incentive to work.1
Many missionaries used similar words at the end of the century in their 
propaganda directed at the homeland to coax funds for the poor missions 
in such miserable countries like China. 
Around 1830, these opium victims were hated because they exposed 
the weakness of the Qing state, and they permanently demonstrated the 
Chinese defeat, the serious humiliation by the ‘foreign devils’: Opium was 
the poison of the West. Whoever supported these criminal Western for-
eigners was himself a criminal. Consumption of the poison was no less a 
crime than helping these foreigners to distribute the opium or assisting 
them in other ways (from money changing to translations). It is difffĳicult 
to condemn Chinese governments or local offfĳicials for these reactions. 
There is, furthermore, the classic reaction of all shopkeepers and some 
historians: “The Chinese wanted to buy the stufff itself, so we delivered!” 
This is an insufffĳicient as well as a demagogic answer: “The Chinese” do not 
want anything, only specifĳic Chinese people do. It presupposes prelimi-
nary knowledge available only to the sellers, and products available only 
to the importers. Aside from the fact that both sellers and importers knew 
perfectly well how poisonous the stufff was. 
Still, it is clear enough that too many Chinese were eager to buy opium 
so that “China” became synonymous with Opium. This reached such a 
degree that some Chinese started cultivating poppies, which contributed 
to the perception in the West known as the Yellow Menace. In all cases, 
1 L. Kwong, p. 1485; for the same kind of depiction from 1895 see R. K. Newman (1995), 
p. 766 with many other examples in Idem, note 3.
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however, opium ‘was intricately involved with the unfathomable interac-
tion between China, India, Britain, the United States, France, and other 
European nations …’2 
Under the impact of the present Chinese economic domination, the 
West has started to look more thoroughly into this Chinese opium histo-
ry. Some consensus about the Chinese victim position is being hesitat-
ingly accepted among serious Western scholars.3 How the Chinese 
handled this problem themselves mostly remains unclear. It is, therefore, 
the time to look at details of the Opium Problem from the victims’ view-
points. How active were Chinese producers, traders and mafĳia, and how 
were they treated and dealt with by the Chinese governments mainly in 
the period 1900-1950? 
The Chinese producers and distributors knew perfectly well how 
unlawful and morally objectionable their work was in offfĳicial Chinese 
eyes and discourses. They helped the foreigners to spread the Opium 
Problem across the country after the Opium Wars were lost. The large 
international context in which they operated must be stressed, and this 
made a fundamental distinction necessary between the Chinese in China 
and those living elsewhere in Asia (see ch. 25). Sometimes they interact-
ed, which gave the Chinese side of the Opium Problem a nearly universal 
Asian profĳile. Below, remarks about this context will precede the main 
subject of this part, which is the Chinese opium production and con-
sumption. Who can better describe this mutual relationship than the 
man, who—as representative of the British occupier—had to play a 
remarkable intermediary role? 
2 K. McMahon, p. ix.
3 One has to stress the word ‘serious’. A Dutch historical journal published recently an 
article from its ‘correspondent’ in China, B. de Groot (Historisch Nieuwsblad, September 
2010, p. 27). In China it was until 2009 normal to come up with a massive number of ‘colo-
nial clichés’ . But ‘now there is an economic crisis and China needs Europe desperately’, 
China even forgets the anniversary of the Second Opium War. However, the schoolbooks 
still tell these ‘colonial clichés’. An example of this is the following sentence, according to 
this expert: ‘In October 1860 the bandits from the West imposed a dishonest treaty on the 
corrupt Qing-government … To enrich Europe the Chinese people had to become 
addicted.’ Long before 1860 in the British Parliament, judgements about the Opium War 
were couched in similar language, while Multatuli wrote about a ‘Dutch robber state’. 
Even the robbers themselves, like Warren Hastings, thought of the opium trade as a kind 
of criminal act (see above). For De Groot all those stories are only told ‘to blacken Europe’. 
What is in crisis here? 
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A British Inspector ...
Who could better judge the opium situation in China than the top repre-
sentatives of those who produced and imported the opium? A most ener-
getic example was the British diplomat, traveler, writer and inspector, Sir 
Alexander Hosie (1853-1925). He made several long trips through many 
provinces of China, visited the same locations several times, and reported 
in many books about the diffferences and similarities, mostly in a dry 
accountants’ language. Hosie was also a member of a delegation to the 
Shanghai International Opium Commission (1909). He occupied a respon-
sible position. Largely based on Hosie’s positive advice and unconfĳirmed 
investigations, the British government was practically obliged to offfĳicially 
stop the lucrative opium imports from India (1917). However, the 
“Perfĳidious Albion” cynically built in loopholes in its treaties with China. 
The report which is important for our endeavors is Hosie’s two-volume 
On the Trail of the Opium Poppy (1914). They sketch journeys through six 
provinces, partly still unexplored, which were the chief centers of Chinese 
opium production. The results of this were published earlier in 
Parliamentary Papers around 1912. Two long appendices in this work 
explain the inception, organization and methods of the anti-opium cru-
sade; the second is a very useful summary of all the data he had gathered 
in the six most important opium provinces, Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, 
Szechuan, Yunnan and Kueichou.
The introduction to the fĳirst appendix is interesting, because it tells 
how it “all” started: during a British invasion into Tibet in 1903/04. The 
British exerted lethal force with their new Maxim machineguns against 
poorly armed Tibetans. A treaty was imposed on Tibet by the British occu-
pier, but the British were not satisfĳied by this: ‘the seal of the Amban, the 
representative of China—the suzerain of Tibet’ was absent. This led to 
new negotiations between the British Empire and China.4 
A special Chinese Envoy was send to Calcutta (September 1904) to 
negotiate with the Government of India. During this visit the Chinese 
Envoy, T’ang Shao-yi, ‘derived the impression that India was prepared to 
dispense with her opium revenue’. Hosie continues with the remarkable 
and symptomatic sentence that this Envoy
4 See A.Porter (ed.), the contribution of R. Moore, p. 434 fff. and the contribution of 
J. Osterhammel in Idem, p. 160 fff.. See also the Wikipedia article “Expedition to Tibet”.
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on his return to Peking … informed his Government that it was the Chinese 
craving for the drug, and not England’s desire to force it upon China, which 
was responsible for the continuance of the trafffĳic in Indian opium. Thus 
was initiated the campaign against the cultivation of the poppy and the 
consumption of opium in China ...5
From every point of view, this is breathtaking information! A very British 
man like Hosie, and one of the few opium experts, writes this baldly with-
out any remark. Whether Tang Shao-yi made a bold diplomatic manoeu-
vre or not by spiriting away the pivotal role of the British in addicting the 
Chinese, the fact is that—in hindsight—this became an opening move to 
solve one of the most complicated, large-scale and fundamental ques-
tions of a society. It is unbelievable that a Chinese Envoy would inform 
his own government of such a lie. One can only imagine that the British 
told the envoy to inform his government that no agreement would be pos-
sible if any accusations whatsoever were launched against the British 
(they could easily lead to very costly compensations in this Opium Case). 
In short, it would be worthwhile for someone to look in the archives again 
for the background of the negotiations about Tibet between China and 
the British. 
In my view, the British Balfour government’s arrogance and ignorance 
merged Curzon’s geopolitical speculations about Russia’s aims in China, 
and the interests of Calcutta’s cotton and opium merchants to make a 
Tibetan deal with China. In the long term, the British could have aimed at 
a Western land route into China (a rather utopian aim militarily), while 
intimidating Russia from doing the same. Both perceived China as a colos-
sus on feet of clay.6 The Chinese interest must have involved negating its 
dependence on Britain (and foreigners in general), which largely hinged 
on the British-Indian opium business. 
In any case, the Chinese were very quick to exploit the situation. An 
Imperial Decree (September 1906) was issued, expressing the worries of 
the Emperor about the ruinous efffects of the opium in his country and 
commanding ‘that within a period of ten years the evils arising from for-
eign and native opium be equally and completely eradicated’.7 
5 A. Hosie, vol. 2, p. 191, 192. The quotations below are from the following pages.
6 Both calculated their political future also in regard to Japan, which had already won 
a Chinese-Japanese War. The Russians wanted to secure their presence in the Far East 
(Vladivostok, Port Arthur); the Japanese were certainly the most aggressive as described in 
ch. 27. 
7 Quoted in Idem, p. 192. See also K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 566, 603.
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Two months later a series of detailed proposals were submitted that 
practically aimed at a strong central government grip on the poppy fĳields, 
production, consumers and trade. Contrary to similar attempts in the 
Dutch or French colonies, the Chinese central government really wanted 
to eradicate the entire poppy culture. The proposals did not intend to 
establish a state opium monopoly, as is often claimed.8 Some offfĳicials 
probably put forward such a plan, but that was not only contrary to sev-
eral 1906 proposals, the existence of the international settlements or 
Hong Kong made such a scheme impossible. Peking needed to destroy the 
poppy culture as part of the foreign occupation. That is what happened as 
testifĳied by Hosie and others.
The main difffĳiculty was, of course, how to deal with the huge British-
Indian opium interest of the main occupier. In article 10 an arrangement 
with the British was proposed
with a view to efffecting an annual decrease within the next few years of the 
import of foreign opium, pari passu with the decrease of native opium, so 
that both may be absolutely prohibited by the expiry of the time-limit of 
ten years. Besides India opium, the drug is also imported from Persia, 
Annam and the Dutch Indies in no small quantities. In the case of Treaty 
Powers negotiations should similarly be entered into with their representa-
tives in Peking to efffect the prohibition of such import ... 9
In stronger wording, the article continues to talk about ‘morphia ... the 
efffects of which are even more injurious than those of opium itself..’ and 
about the need to ban also the ‘instruments for its injection’.
A new series of concrete proposals were submitted (January 1907) to 
serve as a basis for negotiations concerning the import and taxation of 
Indian opium (raw and prepared), the consumption in the foreign settle-
ments in China, and the import of morphia: reduction of Indian import by 
10% every year starting from 1907; duties on native and Indian opium 
must be raised (but since the Indian opium is twice as strong as the native 
one, the tax increased twice as much); the large Hong Kong prepared opi-
um stock must be taxed with a very high duty, if its import into China can-
not be prevented; prohibition of selling opium in brothels, tea-shops, 
hotels, opium dens, restaurants or other public resorts in the foreign set-
tlements; prohibition of export of morphia to China including the syring-
es or injection needles. 
8 For instance, recently by B. de Groot (previous note 3).
9 Quoted in A. Hosie, vol. 2, p. 203, 204.
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Of course, they were followed by counter-proposals from the British-
Indian government: instead of reducing the import into China, they 
would be willing to reduce by one-tenth the annual export to China for 
three years (from 1901-5 this was 67,000 chests, of which China took 
51,000). And they promised also that if China diminished its own produc-
tion and consumption, they would ‘undertake to continue in the same 
proportion this annual diminution of the export after the three years in 
question’.10 
His Majesty’s Government wanted to receive additional information 
from Peking on several other minor issues. Only the gist of this fĳirst coun-
ter-reaction is important here: we, the British, will accept many things if 
you, the Chinese, do what you promised to do. This seems logical, proba-
bly reasonable, but this was not the case: it was only reasonable to assume 
that the Chinese could not entirely abolish opium, so the British-Indian 
import could continue anyway. It would have been logical if the British 
opium perpetrator had proposed a scheme for stopping its exports, since 
it had earned at least a billion pounds in this opium trade (see ch. 6 and 
7), after the international outcry about its opium performance, and since 
the abolition of slavery had been realized a century earlier. 
Several other proposals were exchanged. A new aspect was that the 
government of the United States interfered with a proposal to establish a 
joint International Commission to investigate the opium trade (May 
1908). This had the efffect that the Chinese-British negotiations could no 
longer remain secret, but had to proceed in the light of the media and 
public and that for the fĳirst time statistical data were gathered about the 
Opium Problem in many countries. 
They formed the preparations for the rather famous Shanghai 
Conference (1st to 26th February 1909), the start of a long series of interna-
tional conferences which still continues today, in fact. The good news for 
the Chinese was that a period of ten years was accepted after which the 
British import of opium was fully stopped; the bad news was that in a new 
agreement with China (May 1911), England put so many conditions and 
demands on the table that it gives the impression the British wanted to 
blow up the whole afffair.11
In the ten long articles plus annex of this latter agreement, the British 
demanded that the diminishing of the Chinese opium production should 
10 Idem, p. 208. The Persian-Turkish opium import was fĳixed at only 1,125 piculs annu-
ally (Idem, p. 212, 213), negligible compared to the British.
11 The literary text of this agreement is given in Idem, p. 220–227.
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go ‘in the same proportion as the annual export from India’ for seven 
years; this export will only cease ‘if clear proof is given of the complete 
absence of production of native opium in China’; it did not permit closure 
of the Canton and Shanghai ports for Indian opium until the very end of 
the whole process; India will stop its export only when China ‘has efffec-
tively suppressed the cultivation and import of native opium’ into any 
Chinese province; on confĳirmation of the agreement, China will immedi-
ately withdraw ‘all restrictions ... on the wholesale trade in Indian opium 
... and … all taxation on the wholesale trade …’; British offfĳicials must be 
allowed to continuously investigate the Chinese diminution of cultiva-
tion and ‘their decision as to the extent of cultivation shall be accepted by 
both parties to this agreement’; and so on. 
The important British offfĳicial carrying out this controversial work was 
the inspector, Sir Alexander Hosie. With a stifff upper lip, he produced an 
agreement like this without any comment. Even worse, at the end he put 
his “signature” below the following repetition of the lie the Chinese Envoy, 
T’ang Shao-yi, tried to sell to his government in 1904 (according to Hosie):
Thus was taken the fĳirst step towards the eradication of an evil for which 
the Chinese themselves have alone been responsible all along, and which 
a policy of drift has permitted to be widespread. The evil had its origin in 
China itself, and I feel bound to say that but for the help of Great Britain ... 
the progress that we see to-day ... would not have been realized. ... The 
Government of China ... has recognized that assistance, and repeatedly 
expressed its gratitude to the British Government.12
Indeed, offfĳicially, there came an end to the Indian-China opium relation-
ship. This was a rather abstract result, because many concurrent events of 
magnitude happened, including the abdication of the Empress and the 
start of something like a republic, which made this end diffferent than the 
result of all previous negotiations. 
The fate of Hosie is probably symptomatic of this. How often he com-
plained about the false estimations made by other experts! In the second 
long appendix in which he described his voyages through six Chinese opi-
um provinces, his own investigations were as superfĳicial as all previous 
ones. Without any doubt, he made interesting and sometimes useful 
observations, but mostly he simply reproduced the opinions of missionar-
ies. Generally, he provided a poorly amateurish performance.
12 Idem, p. 231.
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For example, Hosie visited Szechuan in January 1910, the province with 
the largest opium production, claimed to be not less than 238,000 piculs 
in 1906, which was reduced to 159,000 two years later. Hosie informs us 
further that the opium arrivals in 1910 in Ichang, the Yangtsze port, still 
amounted 28,370 piculs. In fact, during his trip a few days later ‘I ascer-
tained that poppy cultivation had entirely ceased after the season of 1908-
1909.’13 
Newman was not surprised about this mystery as he read from Hosie 
that in Szechuan now ‘hardly a stalk of poppy could be found’.14 The patri-
archal Sir Alexander could not avoid adding the very British comment 
that China now was raised ‘with all her faults in the estimation of the civ-
ilized world’: a new attempt was being made to transform victims into 
perpetrators. Indeed, in these crucial years a serious change took place, 
which can best be shown in the next table concerning the opium and oth-
er imports.
Table 46. Percentage Distribution of China’s principal Imports, 1870–191015












1870  63 693 43 28  3 --- ---
1880  79 293 39 25  5 --- ---
1890 127 093 20 20 15 3  0,3
1900 211 070 15 22 14 7  0,7
1910 462 965 12 15 14 5 2
 
It was about 70 years earlier when this “civilized” world smuggled opium 
to addict China on a large scale in favor of a few British soldiers, bureau-
13 Idem, p. 270. The interpretation or use of Hosie’s judgments is still ambiguous, even 
by a fĳine historian like McCoy; see his contribution to A. McCoy, A. Block (ed.), p. 245. 
Although he is clearly and rightly analyzing his case from the perspective of European 
colonialism as the creator of mass addiction, poppy cultivation and mass promotion of 
opium, the consequences of this are not followed with the same rigor. For instance, he 
(like all historians) presumed that the opium business was largely legal (Idem, p. 238). This 
was, however, only in the perception of the colonialists: from the start until the end, many 
if not most indigenous leaders protested against this opium trade. It is, furthermore, ahis-
torical and rather irrelevant to trace the use of opium back to several millennium B.C. 
(Idem, p. 239 fff.). 
14 R. K. Newman (1989), p. 548.
15 A. Feuerwerker, p. 49. I have rounded the fĳigures. The table is larger, but that is not 
very relevant here. One must realize, however, that in absolute terms the 1870 import con-
cerns 27, 388,000 taels and in 1910 it is twice as much, 55,556,000 taels. The cotton piece 
goods come from Lancashire; yarn and opium from India.
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crats in India and England, and opium criminals like the Sassoons, 
Jardines, etc. The majority of the 19th-century opium was the single most 
important Chinese import. Only in the 1890s was it surpassed by cotton 
piece goods. Whatever Hosie and others stated about the competing 
Chinese opium production, in these years apparently not a gram of 
Chinese opium was exported. Tea and silk remained the largest export 
goods.16
The actual Chinese defense against the opium assault was a direct 
 follow-up of the earlier defense under the spectacular leadership of 
Commissioner Lin Zexu. 
Now, at the end of the Indian-British-Chinese opium relationship 
(February 1918), a British gunboat manoeuvred in a remarkable way along 
the coast, and opium was again burned by Chinese offfĳicials. They also sug-
gested that the opium stocks of the foreign merchants or governments 
should be repatriated to India from which they were sent. Apart from gov-
ernment actions, there were substantial anti-opium protests—largely 
identical with anti-British and anti-foreigner opposition—which brought 
people into the streets. The highest British diplomat in China, Jordan, 
eager to get opium offf the British diplomatic agenda as quickly as possi-
ble, now supported this Chinese suggestion because the 
spontaneous withdrawal of the stocks would produce an excellent impres-
sion and be a just and generous act which would form a fĳitting end to a 
trade which has become a moral anachronism.17
Indeed, the time for a luxury existence of foreigners in China was running 
out. The Chinese had to put up with their provocative behavior until the 
end of World War II. The Chinese opium drama remained spectacular 
until the end. The gradual British retreat, which coincided with the abdi-
cation of the Empress and the start of the Republican period, had many 
consequences.
As in the beginning of the opium game, the largest opium profĳiteers, 
the Sassoons, made fabulous gains again: prices rose from about 3000 
16 The value of the tea export in 1870 is 27,647,500 taels, and in 1910 it is 38,083,000 
taels; for silk these fĳigures are 21,565,050 taels and 95,208,250 taels, respectively. Generally, 
in nearly all those years, China had a negative import-export balance with mainly the UK 
(British Empire). Also in this respect, the exploitation was going on until long after 1900. 
See Idem, table 16 p. 46 fff. 
17 R. K. Newman (1989), p. 557. For Jordan see also W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1096.
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taels to 16,000 taels per chest.18 And again: ‘Moral anachronism’ or not, 
under the umbrella of some British governmental institution as compen-
sation for their “losses”, the Sassoons got nearly ‘a virtual monopoly in the 
other Far Eastern markets on which India itself was now having to rely’.19 
18 During the fĳinancial year 1912-13 the Government of India received Rs. 43 million 
from opium taxes, etc. and the opium “merchants” (again the Sassoon family leading) Rs 
35 million in the same year. Idem, p. 555. That was a profĳit on the purchasing in India only, 
not yet on the selling in China.
19 Idem, p. 557. During the last phase of this Indian-British-Chinese opium relation-
Map 17. Estimated Annual Opium Production per Chinese Province, 1908
Source: en.wikipedia.org (China and Opium). The sources used by the mapmaker(s) are 
unknown; this map probably belongs to the propaganda effforts of the British government. 
See also map. 18 below. The map is reproduced from the British Government White Paper, 
China, No. 1, 1908. Piculs are nearly equivalent to chests. The fĳigures represent the annual 
production of piculs in each province. Added to this map is the comment of Lord Justice 
Fat: ‘We English, by the policy we have pursued, are morally responsible for every acre of 
land in China which is withdrawn from the cultivation of grain and devoted to that of the 
poppy; so that the fact of the growth of the drug in China ought only to increase our sense 
of responsibility.’
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In addition, the Shanghai Municipal Council, the governing body of 
the International Settlement in this city, failed to cooperate: ‘from 1907 to 
1913 the number of licensed opium shops in the Settlement increased 
from 87 to 560 and the revenue from licenses from 4,290 taels to 86,386 
taels’.20 
In the power vacuum the British left behind, the USA and Japan 
entered. In particular, the new imperialist Japan started a raging opium 
war, more cruel than the former and extending over a large part of East 
Asia. Japan had a particular opium relation with the Middle East (Persia, 
Turkey) and could circumvent India and the British. It used other meth-
ods as well and copied the old imperialist game of importing opium to 
addict Chinese, it also renewed or refĳined this game by starting produc-
tion of heroin and morphine on Chinese soil in the newly conquered parts 
of North China, Manchuria and Jehol, eventually with the assistance of 
some Chinese warlords. 
… and his American heirs
To counteract the British dominance, the other new imperialist, the USA, 
was transformed from the main opium transporter and smuggler into the 
main provider of American missionaries agitating in an anti-opium mood. 
It also gave a demonstration of dollar diplomacy by granting Peking a 
large loan. However, the aim to replace the British as the most favorable 
commercial partner of the Chinese came too late: the Japanese were ear-
lier, closer and more aggressive. The opium import in the USA became an 
increasing concern, and it gradually developed an anti-Japanese strategy.21 
Its offfĳicial anti-opium stand, however, was characterized by puzzling 
about whether the narcotics now imported on a large scale came from 
India, China or Japan. 
In China, its main concern became another British heritage: the big 
problem of extraterritoriality, the autonomous political and legal power 
of the occupying Western powers in the International Settlement. Here 
the British and the French still dominated. During the extensive negotia-
tions on the problems in the International Settlement in one conference 
ship, it was the controversial Sir Edward Grey, the English Minister of Foreign Afffairs 
(responsible for the outbreak of the First World War), who came to the conclusion ‘that 
the right thing to do was to give in to David Sassoon …’ (Idem, p. 555). 
20 W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1098 note 12.
21 W. Walker III, p. 44 fff.
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after another, the American Willoughby proved to be the best expert on 
opium in the scene. He quotes a Japanese writer, Kawakami (1924), to 
explain his case:
Not only is China surrounded by opium-using countries, but she has within 
her own territories several centers of the opium trade. Foremost of these 
centers is Shanghai, followed by Hongkong, Canton, Macao, Harbin and 
Dairen. The International Settlement in Shanghai is said to have at least 
500 opium stores, and the French Settlement 140. In the Foreign Settle-
ments the import and sale of opium is not forbidden, and it is but natural 
that they should become favorite rendezvous of opium addicts and the 
vantage-ground from which crafty smugglers, both foreign and native, make 
inroads into the interior of China.22
Indeed, Willoughby’s long discussion of all the international conferences 
shows the distressing reality that fĳirst and foremost the British and French 
governments obstructed the anti-opium measures with all possible tricks 
and lies in nurturing their extraterritoriality in China, while pretending at 
the same time that they were offfĳicially suppressing the opium business 
once and for all. Their interests coincided with those of the large opium 
dealers. 
That did not concern the Americans. Their government mostly sug-
gested that they were the best supporters of the Chinese case, while their 
private economic interests (American smuggling, banking, transporta-
tion through Hong Kong) continued as usual and without relevant gov-
ernment intervention. 
Therefore, the story of the imported opium did not stop, but entered a 
quite new phase after 1911 as will be detailed in the next sections. The 
main practical elements of the story, how the Chinese involvement in the 
opium production and consumption rose and declined, will be described 
later.
We are left here to interpret the story of “China and its Imported Opium 
Problem”. It seems as if there is still a cultural Opium Problem, which rep-
resents the most basic notions of the Western relations with China. One 
aspect of this is that we can fĳind something of the truth only through the 
enemies of Britain. From the German side, for instance, the influential 
sociologist Max Weber wrote around 1905 the following statement which 
is difffĳicult to fĳind in present-day British or American literature:
22 W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1141 note 29.
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Opium, the narcotic perceived as of a specifĳic Chinese nature, was still 
imported in modern times; it must be well-known that its acceptance in 
the country followed only after the fĳiercest opposition of the dominant elite 
was broken by a war from outside.23 
This import was, therefore, not the result of a civilizing mission or 
something similar (if Germans had been involved), but only of naked con-
quest by a ‘perfĳidious Albion’ and its brutal, mainly American smugglers. 
There are, however, quite diffferent remarks found in the Anglo-Saxon 
historiography, probably thanks to Hosie’s “positive approach” or British 
propaganda. The opportunity to demonstrate this is given by probably 
the most influential Western China watcher. Indeed, if we want to know 
how and why a new situation in the international relations emerged, we 
would receive ‘only one recommendation: read John King Fairbank!’24 A 
wise advice because in assessing the impact of the Western opium assault 
on China, Fairbank (1907-1991) went, in fact, one step further than Sir 
Alexander Hosie.
After a study lasting many decades, he made the following remarkable
fĳinal proposition, that the most natural way to meet the West on equal 
terms was to follow a Chinese minority tradition which had more in com-
mon with Western ways of commerce and violent competition than with 
Chinese ideals of bureaucracy and harmonious compromise. For example, 
one peculiarly menacing aspect of the “Western Ocean” (Hsi-yang) people 
in the early contact at Canton was that their uncouth and greedy ways 
appealed to tendencies deeply latent among the Cantonese populace. The 
outright commercialism of the Western “barbarians” met a quick response 
among the shopkeepers in Hog Land behind the opulent ghetto of the Thir-
teen Factories. Once Indian opium was brought by the private merchants 
in the Country (local) trade from India, commercial greed fostered the 
growth of the opium trade on both sides. It became the great bilateral Sino-
foreign joint enterprise of the nineteenth-century, and it succeeded far 
beyond anyone’s fears or foresight. It requires only a modicum of imagina-
tion to see the Cantonese opium entrepreneur, who did his bit to usher 
China into modern international commerce, as the inheritor of the Chinese 
tradition that had much in common with the Western trading world. Some 
of the seemingly “foreign influences” of the Republican Revolution may turn 
23 M. Weber, vol. 1, p. 519. Other remarks about opium can be found in Idem, p. 250, 
296 notes, 506 and in Idem, vol. 2, p. 292. Weber and his colleagues were critical opponents 
of the British “market behavior”. See for this H. Derks (2004), p. 102 fff. Max Weber never 
protested against the genocide German colonizers were committing in Southwest Africa 
against the Herrero at the time that he made this remark. This assault was loudly 
announced as part of a civilizing mission of the Germans in Africa. 
24 L. Blussé (2008), p. 100.
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out at second glance to have coincided with or grown from older Chinese 
trends that shared certain traits with the foreigners.25
One wonders what prevails in the mind of a brilliant historian who knows 
all the facts as described in detail in his many voluminous books. Anyway, 
there is no trace of a perception of the victim side of the Chinese or China. 
On the contrary, he equates at the start of a new episode in Chinese his-
tory (1911) ‘a Chinese minority tradition’ with a Western ‘uncouth and 
greedy’ commercialism. Now the victims truly become perpetrators. 
Fairbank proposes that a mix between these two (and not the old ‘har-
monious’, bureaucratic dominant tradition) was the basis of a Republican 
revolution. This mix became the new spirit for a new age which ultimate-
ly brought China ‘on equal terms’ with the West. In the end, Fairbank’s 
fĳinal proposition implies that the catalyst for all this was, indeed, opium. 
It is senseless to counteract Fairbank’s moralistic ‘fĳinal proposition’ 
with another moral appeal.26 Hard political-economic facts are more 
than enough. First, the reliance here on the private merchant’s opium 
business alone negates that two devastating opium wars and “peaceful” 
pressure exerted with a gun were needed to establish a so-called “free 
trade”. This trade was, therefore, not free at all. In addition, it was no 
trade: the Chinese could not participate in it unless they stuck to the 
Western rules relative to the product (opium) and the handling of the 
profĳits and the organization of the trade (through foreign mediators, 
banks or shipowners), to avoid undermining the British-Indian import 
position.
It should have been realized, therefore, that this had nothing to do 
with “commercialism”, which is by defĳinition a peaceful mutual relation-
ship between two parties on equal terms. Not only was it largely a military 
afffair, the West (or, generally, all imperialists) had simply nothing on 
offfer: throughout the 19th-century they had no products demanded in 
China; they came to conquer, to convert and to silence its victims by 
means of mass consumption of worthless opium, which had to be bought 
for high prices. 
25 J. Fairbank (ed.), p. 8, 9.
26 Interestingly, Fairbank belonged to the so-called ‘China Hands’ with Theodore 
White, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow and others. They were foreign service offfĳicers, jour-
nalists, American scholars and advisers to the USA government during World War II and 
afterwards. They were soon accused by the McCarthy administration of being too soft on 
Communism, that they had helped to defeat Chiang Kai-shek and a lot more nonsense. 
See Wikipedia “China Hands”.
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It should also have been obvious that all this had nothing to do with a 
‘great bilateral Sino-foreign joint enterprise’ but instead a one-sided harsh 
assault. The prey of the assault was too big, however, for the British and 
other old imperialists. During a 50-year-long assault by the New 
Imperialists, they soon understood that fĳixing such a job was only possi-
ble by “Vietnamization” of the struggle: to keep Chinese fĳighting against 
Chinese and seek what could come out of it in order to renew its original 
grip (USA by supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong; Japan by set-
ting up Chinese puppet regimes, cooperation with warlords, etc.). 
And what about the ‘quick response’ to the Western assault of those 
‘Cantonese opium entrepreneurs’ or some ‘Chinese minority tradition’, 
whatever that may be? It was largely through a Western-organised man-
agement that the West’s program of creating a mass market for opium in 
China was executed. It cannot be denied that ‘it succeeded far beyond 
anyone’s fears or foresight’ (although one can debate the degree to which 
this happened; see below consumption—production analysis). However, 
we cannot deny either that Chinese governments always remained highly 
motivated to suppress this opium habit as a Western import product 
(whether they were successful or not is another story). Mao Zedong and 
his CCP were no exception at the end of the Republican period and, 
indeed, continued a two centuries old tradition!27
The last comment on Fairbank’s ‘fĳinal proposition’ concerns the prod-
uct opium as handled in the British Crown colony Hong Kong until 1997. 
Fairbank could have checked what was left of his ‘great bilateral Sino-
foreign joint enterprise’ in this British colony in China. Seven years after 
his text was written, a well-informed commentator wrote:
In the 1990s, Britain faces one of the most frightening and dangerous 
influxes of crime that it has ever encountered. Before Communist China 
takes over Hong Kong in 1997, the world’s most ruthless criminal cartel will 
be stepping up its bid to take control of the underworld of Western society, 
and to spread within our culture like a criminal cancer. This cartel is the 
Chinese Triads—the yellow peril of the East, and now the West.28
27 On 22-12-2009 it was reported in my newspaper that “China” wanted to execute a 
British man (with the typical British name: Akmal Shaikh) because he imported four kilos 
of heroin. Gordon Brown has personally intervened, while the Foreign Offfĳice accused the 
Chinese authorities of not caring about the shaky mind of the smuggler: he must have 
been ‘psychotic’, ‘unbalanced’, ‘misled by others’ and so on. An old tradition in all respects!
28 Quoted in Y-K Chu, p. 1.
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That he is playing with the classical Western racism concerning the 
Yellow Danger must be clear after the previous chapter and that it is exag-
gerated will be discussed later. He rightly points, however, to the nasty 
efffects of the British stay in China. Under its colonial responsibility, it 
offfered a haven to a serious international criminal network based on opi-
um and its derivatives, and now it is involved in the usual activities of 
local gangsters: gambling, prostitution, etc.29 Certainly in this extent, it 
would not have been possible under Chinese rule. 
29 See also W. Walker III, p. 170–171 for how the American offfĳicials were misled by the 
British and Hong Kong government (including the nearby Portuguese colony of Macao). 
See for the British Hong-Kong opium history around 1900, the article of E. Sinn.
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CHAPTER  THIRTY-TWO
OPIUM PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION IN CHINA 
The imported opium led to a whole gamut of reactions in the Chinese 
societies: war, criminality, addiction, large profĳits to new experiments in 
law and healing practices. First, this word ‘societies’ is written on purpose 
in the plural, because in an immense country like China with its large 
ethnic, cultural, and political diversity, a fully unknown product like opi-
um must have had very diffferent efffects. Hosie already reports that 
‘Mahommedans, Thibetans and Mongols are not addicted to the habit, 
and not more than 1 per cent of the former are thought to be opium smok-
ers’.1 They are also inhabitants of China and, therefore, Chinese. Aren’t 
they? The anthropology of the Chinese opium consumer would be a very 
interesting chapter in our history, but apart from the few data below, 
there is nearly nothing known at the moment about this subject.
Some compensation for this is given in the fĳirst two sections below, 
before the real production and consumption data are analyzed. In previ-
ous parts the health and medical aspects of opium use have been dis-
cussed. Some brief remarks about the traditional Chinese medicine and 
Western medicine in China are made for reasons of comparison to stimu-
late more relevant research: Chinese medicine has become world famous 
through the acupuncture hype and the herbal basis of its prescriptions. 
But around 1900, what was its relation to Western thinking about health 
and its practice? More specifĳically: was there some relation with opium, 
let alone heroin and other chemical derivatives from Papaver somni-
ferum?
A very diffferent aspect of the Chinese reactions to the foreign imported 
opium is the moral-legal one. How did judges cope with these new habits 
which quickly captivated a million addicts with all possible conse-
quences?
So, before discussing any misunderstandings about the production and 
consumption patterns in the fĳirst half of the twentieth-century, let us look 
at the following notes on grassroots reactions to the Opium Problem from 
Chinese medical offfĳicers and judges. 
1 A. Hosie, vol. 2, p. 253, 256.
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The Healers and the Poppy
What was concluded about the European struggles between folk-healers 
and Enlightenment medical science can be repeated in some sense also in 
the case of China and India (see ch. 8, 10, 13, 22 and 28). The English or 
French intruders and aggressive opium dealers were also representatives 
of this Enlightenment science, and it was, therefore, no surprise that the 
opium import got unequivocal support from the Royal Commission 
(1893) thanks to its European medical members. In the most rude way, 
these medical doctors legitimated not only this socio-economic and polit-
ical assault, but violated as well the spirit and practice of the traditional 
Chinese and India health care system. 
The latter is well-known at present as Ayurvedic medicine, which uses 
opium in its prescriptions. It is, however, reported that the ‘earliest refer-
ence to its medicinal properties is in the Yogaratnakara, an Ayurvedic 
book written in Sinhala verse in the sixteenth-century.’2 At that time the 
Portuguese were in the realm, and they had the custom of bringing opium 
to kings and important people as a gift, not making a commercial profĳit 
from it. It could be, therefore, that the Ayurvedic scholars received the 
stufff (how much? for which kind of prescriptions?) from the Portuguese 
as one of the earliest proofs of West-East opium communication. I do not 
know whether something similar happened in Chinese medicine.
All this was similar to an assault on a health monopoly, which arose 
from the Enlightenment criticism of the folk-healing or lay medicaliza-
tion in Europe: this had to be eliminated to the advantage of the monop-
oly profĳit and status of the “people in the white uniform”. That foreigners 
introduced diseases like syphilis or opium and foreign doctors had no 
adequate treatment for them was one side of this inflated coin. That the 
latter did not bother about or understand any aspect of the indigenous 
healer theories and practices demonstrated their one-sided arrogance. As 
always, there were exceptions, but they did not influence the general atti-
tudes.
Still, like the missionaries the imported foreign medical personnel also 
in the end discovered that this Chinese snake was a bit too huge to 
 swallow; one had better get on speaking terms with it before trying to cre-
ate a performing dragon. There is no better method to do this than mak-
ing friends through the provision of health services. They must, however, 
2 C. Uragoda, p. 69 also for the following information.
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be understood as an improvement compared to the existing Chinese sys-
tem. Was that the case?
The Western doctors had just gained authority thanks to their new 
monopoly positions, and here in China they were backed in the end by 
the Western might: until the Boxer Rising they had nothing to fear. 
However, in Ch’ing China there was a generally unfavorable attitude 
towards the medical profession, especially by the educated class.3 
The practice of medicine has been considered ‘as an avocation, a side 
occupation, or else purely a business’. The patient’s relatives and friends 
largely decide whether a prescribed medicine is ‘cooling’ or ‘heating’, suit-
able or unsuitable to the patient. The richer the family, the more doctors 
who are engaged to write a prescription and explain the supposed cause 
of the illness. Chimin Wong and Lien-Teh were critical of this tradition, 
but they could not change the fact that the Western alternative had the 
handicap of being based on doctors and foreigners. 
They even quote at length a long poem from around 1750, entitled 
‘Lament of Medical Practice’, as if it was still relevant in 1936 with sentenc-
es like:
Having nothing to do they take to healing. What do such people know about 
the value of human life? Or that saving people is not a business proposition? 
... Before starting practice they just inquire what medicine the popular 
quacks are using and then try it on their patients. If some good results hap-
pen, they are themselves surprised ... How many innocent boys and girls, 
young husbands and wives, aged fathers and mothers have you killed? ... 
etc.4 
There were even writers who propagated the abolition of medicine. They 
did not have much influence, but it was symptomatic for a general anti-
3 For the following, K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 178–193. The 1000 pages of this 
history contain a fabulous compilation of medical data of all sorts, in particular about the 
19th and early 20th-centuries. It documents in all possible detail ‘the struggle between the 
old and new forces’ (p. 159 fff.) in medical practices triggered by the arrival of Western for-
eigners. Certainly, the second part is an extremely detailed who-is-who of foreign mission-
aries working in medical services after the 1850s and of physicians working after 1911. They 
died so quickly or stayed for such a short time that the book is overloaded with names! 
Apart from the establishment of many small hospitals, a few large ones and other medical 
institutions like many small opium refuges around 1900 in many places, the overall perfor-
mance of the missionaries and their doctors is not spectacular. Still, this book is rather 
unique for its data collection. Nearly all Medical Colleges (national, provincial and pri-
vate) were established after 1911 (p. 795 fff.); in 1934 there were 426 hospitals with 2,086 
physicians, 4,212 nurses and 27,553 beds. Of course, about one-third of all items were 
located in Kiangsu, with cities like Shanghai and Nanking (p. 814). 
4 Idem, p. 178, 179.
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Western attitude (in this case) combined with an anti-medical doctor 
one. This is not diffferent from the general attitude about medical doctors 
in Europe before the Enlightenment. Daumier in mid-19th-century 
France made the doctors into one of the main targets of his sharpest car-
toons thanks to their critical performance. They were the doctors who 
appeared in the European colonies! 
The emancipation of some Chinese doctors occurred through the 
adoption of Western knowledge and through the relative respect or fear 
which existed for those “white devils”. Their knowledge was spread in 
China for the fĳirst time by an English medical doctor, B. Hobson, who 
translated some English medical textbooks already in 1851. Very slowly, 
some Chinese took over much of the new knowledge so that with the 
establishment of the Republic (1911), radical changes occurred immedi-
ately in every walk of life: the super-powerful ‘Imperial College of Physicians 
was abolished and modern (= Western) trained doctors were for the fĳirst 
time in history appointed as medical offfĳicers in the President’s offfĳice’.5 
Here, the study of Dikötter on the impact of the modern medical sci-
ences is highly relevant.6 He documents in detail how a sexual revolution 
took place in a short time and mainly in all major cities. Here, indeed, the 
media were the message: many sex periodicals competed with each other 
for massive profĳits; sophisticated marketing strategies were successfully 
developed with the efffect that for a few cents new ideas could penetrate 
5 Idem, p. 159.
6 F. Dikötter (1995).
Ill. 32 ‘Quan shi jieshi dayan wen’ (Essay urging the World to give up opium) 
Source: This spectacular anti-opium poster was published ca. 1895 by the Shansi Mission 
(American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Archive). 
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also in the lower classes of society about sex education, the repressive 
position of women, marriage customs and so on. That in the same flood of 
publications the typical Western quasi-medical traits of contemporary 
racial and racist studies (from eugenics to biometrics and race purifĳica-
tion) could also be distributed as the ultimate modern idea is the other 
side of this coin. 
Unavoidably, contradictory forces (cultural) clashed when all modern-
izing groups and movements were all more or less radical anti-Western as 
in the nationalist movement.7 This dialectics of modernization resulted, 
therefore, also in the saving of much traditional Chinese medical knowl-
edge. This support was not only based in the countryside. It resulted also 
in an enormous drive to self-mobilization conflicting with all attempts to 
strengthen the uniforming power of the state. 
The victory of the CP China, Red Army and Mao did not alter this situ-
ation: that attractive, typically Chinese mixture of “old and new” resulted 
from this constellation, so that acupuncture, ginseng, massage and spe-
cifĳic gymnastic exercises became immensely popular around the world in 
the 1960s. 
Therefore, the diffference between a Chinese and a Western approach 
in health matters continues to haunt world politics and economics as the 
following example demonstrates. On the 10 October 2010 Zhou Xiaochuan, 
Governor of the Chinese Central Bank, met colleagues from the Western 
Central Banks in Washington. He was invited to give the speech of the 
day. He is called ‘friend’ and ‘partner’ by his German colleague, and now 
Zhou aims to explain what is, in fact, a partner today. According to the 
German weekly Die Zeit, he told the meeting:
The Western method is to prescribe pills, which would be able to solve a 
problem overnight. However—Zhou paused a while and smiled—he sticks 
to the Chinese healing methods in which one mixes ten herbs and waits for 
its long(er)-term efffect.8
It is also based on this “mixture” that Chimin Wong and Lien-Teh judge 
the opium problem as ‘one of the knottiest problems for China in the 
Modern Period’. 
7 Example: After 1930 the curriculum for medical colleges starts in the fĳirst year with 
36 lectures ‘Principle of Kuomintang’. K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 792. 
8 Marc Brost, Mark Schieritz in: Die Zeit, 11-11-2010, p. 26. It is a pity that the authors 
refrain to provide this answer to ‘What Zhou means by this, becomes clear two weeks 
later’ (at the G-20 conference). 
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They start their history with the usual speculation about the introduc-
tion of opium in Chinese history: it is mentioned once as an ingredient in 
a prescription in the fĳirst half of the eighth-century, a second time in a 
treatise in the tenth-century, next time in a popular work of 52 volumes 
with nearly 12,000 recipes (Pen-Ts’ao Kang-Mu or Great Herbal; 1596).9 
All this has, of course, nothing to do with their ‘knottiest problem’. 
Ultimately, the fĳirst mention of opium smoking comes from foreigners on 
Java and ‘as the Dutch controlled Formosan trade from 1624 to 1662’. In a 
Chinese publication of 1724, opium smoking, confĳined to a tiny part of the 
elite on the coast, is mentioned and explained for the fĳirst time: 
The confĳirmed opium smoker is described as black-faced, weak-voiced, 
watery-eyed, with prolapse of the bowels, and prospects of an early death.10
This characterization appears at the same time as the fĳirst known govern-
ment prohibition of opium (1729). 
A quite diffferent story concerns the use of the poppy as capsules and 
then as an extract. This custom came from Arab merchants, partly by sea 
to Canton or overland from Burma and India. It was never widespread, 
because the poppy was grown only piecemeal. 
The most worrying for the authors is the present use of morphia injec-
tions and heroin pills (‘red pills’) which led to a suicide epidemic. A report 
by the Shantung Road Hospital (Shanghai) concerning the years 1921-1926 
mentions a total of 4,802 cases of suicide. Of these, more than half were 
patients using opium. ‘No wonder people call opium the great curse of 
China.’
The fĳirst treatments of opium addiction resulted in a remarkable coop-
eration between Chinese and Western peoples. One of the latter, an 
American medical doctor and missionary, Macgowan, was inspired to this 
treatment as follows (ca. 1845):
9 K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 105. The title is also written as Bencao Gangmu 
and published at nearly the same time that Paracelsus worked in Europe, but much more 
relevant than this “inventor” of European homeopathy. Several similar encyclopedic proj-
ects were published before, but this one of Li Shi-chen (1518–1593) was not only a critical 
revision of them but added thousands of lesser-known recipes. About 2,000 substances 
(clearly divided into mineral, animal and plant) were discussed, including the famous gin-
seng, ‘the most celebrated plant in the Orient, on account of its root ... the cure-all ...’ 
(Idem, p. 110). The status of opium in the European pre-Enlightenment medicine and folk-
healing (teriaque) was more or less comparable with that of ginseng, which is also used as 
aphrodisiac. Even more comparable was ephedrine, which was well-known as a stimulant 
in Li Shi-chen’s 900 books.
10 Idem, p. 182.
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A philanthropic Chinese issued handbills where he recommended a simple 
mixture as a cure for the evil, insisting at the same time upon immediate 
and total abstinence from the drug. Because the remedy advocated was 
cheap, few trusted it. However, seeing that some success was obtained, Mac-
gowan adopted this idea and began to administer”empirical remedies, 
addressed chiefly to the imagination ... to a number of applicants”—not 
without some good results.11 
Twenty years later another American medical doctor-missionary, Barchet, 
opened a ‘Homeopathic Dispensary and Opium Refuge’ at Ningpo, and 
the funds for it came eventually from a government offfĳicial who had 
earned much money as inspector of the opium manufacture in India. He 
felt so much guilt that he sponsored the Church Missionary Society by giv-
ing £3,000 ‘for curing opium-smokers and combating the evil in other 
ways’.12 The treatment was done with ‘anti-opium pills’ (it is a pity that no 
ingredients are mentioned) which were also sold to opium smokers. 
There was such a demand for them that it ‘threatened to lose its charita-
ble character’; a remark too pious for pious people?
As in the European and Arab traditions, the Chinese folk-healing was 
based on a natural foundation of plants, animals and minerals. Therefore, 
it could not avoid being highly suspicious of the imported chemical and 
pharmaceutical pills and recipes. The large diffference with the European 
situation was, of course, that in China opium as a non-medical mass prod-
uct was introduced from outside in a military setting. From the same 
external address this autonomous product (isolated from its natural envi-
ronment or robbed of its function as one ingredient among many others) 
is used as a basis for “chemicalization”: heroin, morphine, etc. And later, 
this heroin or morphine are used in their turn as the source for other new 
products that produce new and stronger (better marketable) means to 
addict.
This procedure was also followed with another herbal product, coca 
leaves. Once it was functional within a specifĳic ethnic, medicinal constel-
lation of Peruvian mountain tribes. When European chemists started to 
11 Idem, p. 347, 348.
12 Idem, p. 379, 433. The ‘results had not been very satisfactory’ because the missionar-
ies had not enough personnel nor buildings. The Homeopathic Dispensary was, in fact, 
opened in 1878 (Idem, p. 420). In 1868 addicts had to pay $1 ‘as security’ (Idem, p. 407), and 
ten years later this was $3 (Idem, 420). In Peking an Opium Refuge was established in 1878 
through cooperation of a Chinese Anti-opium Society and the foreign missions in the city. 
In 1878 there were 78 smokers admitted with an average stay of 28 days; the next year there 
were 68 persons sheltered (average six weeks), while 385 were treated outside (Idem, 
p. 425). 
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extract cocaine from it and sold this product on the world market, every 
link to this previous constellation was gone. And, too often, the chemists 
and pharmacists started making jokes about this previous “primitive” 
constellation, denying the medicinal or other workings of the plant (ani-
mal or mineral) basis.
The best one could expect of this East-West confrontation was demon-
strated by the Dutch-American physician Snapper, who spent a few years 
in Beijing during the Second World War (partly as a prisoner of the 
Japanese). He must have been one of the last Western physicians serving 
in China. His main object of inquiry was the diffferences between diseases 
called “Western” (in fact: New York) and “Chinese” (in fact: Beijing).13 The 
obvious discovery was that the food, the daily diet, was the main reason 
for these diffferences, although the Japanese occupation resulted in seri-
ous malnutrition among the majority of the population. This is not an 
ideal situation to inquire into the food comparison.
Therefore, Snapper comes to the wrong conclusion that the Chinese 
are vegetarians: that is always true if there are no animals left to eat and 
one is ill-informed about Chinese diets which vary from region to region 
anyway.14
Snapper is more skilled at telling about his actual experience with opi-
um and heroin addicts in his hospital, the Peiping Union Medical College.15 
First, he rightly emphasizes that addicted opium smokers should not be 
identifĳied ‘with the opium and morphine addicts of the Western part of 
the world’. In China, the opium smokers generally do not show the pro-
gressive degeneration of the personality which is seen in the West: opi-
um-addicted people sufffer here and in the West from diffferent diseases. 
The former can be treated safely in the common wards, which is fully 
impossible with the latter. For the Chinese he prescribes:
In these cases usually the administration of a few cc. of opium tincture or 
of a mixture containing scopolamine, pilocarpine and dionine is sufffĳicient 
to still their craving for the opium pipe and to make them reasonably com-
fortable. Very often these patients beg to be cured of their opium habit, and 
a gradual decrease of the quantities of opium tincture given for relief of the 
craving usually sufffĳices to eradicate the addiction.16
13 I. Snapper, chapter 1. See also an interview with him in Time, 22 December 1941: 
‘Medicine:Torments of China’.
14 About the Chinese diets in several parts of the country, see H. Derks (1999), p. 7–12.
15 For the following see I. Snapper, p. 339–342.
16 Idem, p. 339. Scopolamine is a drug isolated by a German scientist Ladenburg in 
1880; it is derived from a plant of the nightshade family and is one of the active compo-
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This prescription and treatment are completely impossible with Western 
opium addicts: a morphine addict cannot be treated in a common ward, 
not even in a private room of an ordinary hospital. The patient becomes 
clinically depressed and is always in danger of committing suicide. There 
is, furthermore, the dangers of vasomotor collapse and cardiac failure, 
which is only seen in exceptional cases during the treatment of Chinese 
opium smokers. Evidently, smoking opium is much less dangerous than 
consumption by mouth or injection, while opium smoking seldom lead to 
‘degeneration of the personality’. However, the patients in his hospital 
told Snapper that this degeneration could have been fĳirst and opium 
smoking secondary. 
Also in China heroin addiction poses a fully diffferent and much more 
dangerous problem. This kind of poisoning is, according to Snapper, 
remarkably frequent here. Per year the emergency clinic ... handles about 
100 cases of acute opium poisoning. The fear of death in China is much less 
developed than in the West, and a relatively slight emotional upset is often 
sufffĳicient, especially in girls and women, to result in suicide. In Peiping, the 
taking of opium is the favorite method of accomplishing this purpose.17
Between July 1938 and July 1940 there were 198 cases of opium poison-
ing: 41 died within 24 hours; 16 others later; only 16 recovered. What 
happened to the rest is not clear; they still needed treatment after July 
1940.
It is clear that all the (anti-)drug treatments lagged behind laboratory 
practice or microbiological and pharmaceutical research by about thirty 
years. After 1900 this backward position began to be reversed, but the tur-
moil in the country was not very supportive. In hindsight, there was, how-
ever, a remarkable advantage to this backwardness. 
In China a very long tradition of folk-healing exists with now famous 
products like ginseng (imported from the USA in the early 19th-century). 
This was accompanied by several rather sophisticated kinds of medical 
nents of products like belladonna. Pilocarpine is an antidote for scopolamine or atropine 
poisoning. Dionine is better known as ethylmorphine and, therefore, one of the many 
derivatives of opium. It was invented by Merck in 1884. See for the details the relevant 
Wikipedia articles. At the moment dionine is a product of the Ghazipur opium factory, 
which also produces codeine, morphine, narcotine or thebaine. The Ghazipur factory is 
called by BBC News ‘the world’s largest opium factory’ (2008/07/21).
17 Idem, p. 340. Snapper writes that, although he cannot afffĳirm the curative influence 
of the drug coramin on the poisoning, this drug ‘seems to have a benefĳicial influence in this 
intoxication ...’ (Idem, p. 342). I can imagine why: this drug is produced from the cattle and 
pig cardiac muscle, which must be benefĳicial to Chinese vegetarians!
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techniques and methods. Massages, gymnastic exercises and acupunc-
ture became well-known thanks to the many international, alternative, 
social and religious movements beginning in the 1960s.18 
As TCM (“Traditional Chinese Medicine”), it has nowadays emancipat-
ed into a ‘recognized medical system in the western world’. However, the 
Western branch of it does not much resemble what Chinese apothecaries 
and pharmacists present on the corners of normal Chinese streets. The 
strong herbal basis of this folk-healing and its relative present popularity 
also among Western people have led to prescriptions aimed at healing 
opium or heroin addiction as well.19 
It is remarkable that in the new Peoples Republic, debates among 
Chinese medical and pharmaceutical scholars started immediately along 
the classical divide between traditional and modern. But already by the 
mid-1950s, the government ‘made a full-scale commitment to the whole-
sale acceptance and study of traditional Chinese medicine’ with ‘some 
fascinating discoveries, and has made Chinese medical practice today 
rather unique in the world’.20 A new embedding of healing methods in 
social and cultural settings was developed.
Cooperation between the several hundred thousand traditional 
Chinese herbalists and acupuncturists became absolute necessity, even 
without the positive incentives: otherwise, too many people had no med-
ical care at all. Another improvement concerns the health infrastructure. 
The barefoot doctor program and the policy of ‘the mass line’ became 
18 Two examples from many: in 2009 one in ten Australians received acupuncture 
treatment by some experts. Health insurance funds offfer rebates; statutory regulations 
have been implemented; acupuncture begins to integrate into mainstream health care; 
and so on. See article of C. Changli Xue et al, in: Chinese Medicine, 4 (2009). The Australian 
background of it can be traced back to the 1850s when the fĳirst Chinese immigrants arrived 
and worked in the gold fĳields. Acupuncture remained unregulated until 1970, when profes-
sionalization started. See for the following also www.nursegroups.com/article/traditional-
chinese-medicine.html. In 2006 a new journal Chinese Medicine (University of Macau) was 
published because since the 1990s ‘there has been a phenomenal growth of interest in 
traditional medicine knowledge and practices, which is evident in the increasing World 
Health Organization (WHO) activities and publications, such as Global Strategy for Tradi-
tional Medicine (2002-2005).’ Editorial no. 1.
19 For instance the OHAH product (Opioid + Heroin Antagonist Herbs) of www.
natureproducts.net. Another example: in the American Journal of Chinese Medicine, 4 
(1976), p. 403-407, an article about the acupuncture treatment of drug addiction in Paki-
stan (Shuaib BM) describes how Professor Wen’s technique of electro-acupuncture was 
used successfully for treatment of withdrawal symptoms in 19 drug abusers. Especially for 
opium addicts this kind of treatment was efffective: much shorter than with codeine sub-
stitution therapy, efffective, simple and more economical. See www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. 
20 The article of Kenneth Levin in: G.B.Risse (ed.), p. 107.
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spectacular and well-known. Both grew out of China’s woefully inade-
quate medical facilities and poorly trained personnel. 
The barefoot doctor program has been since 1965 a highly efffective tool 
to improve the health of the majority of the peasants all over this immense 
country. It is oriented to the specifĳic diseases and illnesses common in the 
area; traditional Chinese herbal medicine and acupuncture are standard 
in this program; the medical personnel are recruited from a specifĳic region 
and return after the training to their area. For Third World nations and for 
war situations (Vietnam), it was much more advantageous than the 
Western programs, which were characterized by expensive and often 
inefffĳicient practices, which almost never reached peasant populations 
since they were bound to cities.21 
The policy of ‘the mass line’ concerns the mobilization of the whole 
population to help the medical workers.22 The fĳirst projects were cam-
paigns to clean up the cities and eliminate the so-called “four pests”: rats, 
flies, bedbugs and mosquitoes, but in some areas also lice and grain-eat-
ing sparrows (only the latter received special attention in Western news-
reels, largely making fun of the people doing this action). Other ‘mass line’ 
projects concerned community hygiene, widespread vaccination pro-
grams, and they led to the virtually complete elimination of venereal dis-
ease. These kinds of projects were probably even more important to 
create a common solidarity, in which destitute, poor or degenerate peo-
ple also found acceptance and a social task. 
For the drug addicts there were special treatment and rehabilitation 
courses in special centers from 1950 onwards. But, in my view, it was this 
general improvement of health, the health infrastructure combined with 
the traditional medicinal techniques and mass actions which eradicated 
the large-scale opium and narcotic problems. It was the fĳirst country 
which succeeded in this task; folk-healing became healing of the folk.23 
21 See the article of Paul G. Pickowicz in: G.B.Risse (ed.), p. 124–147.
22 K. Levin in: G.B.Risse (ed.), p. 109 fff. The success of the “mass line” projects was also 
favored by the new Marriage Law of 1950 in which the status of women was completely 
reversed with the passage of equal rights legislation. They constituted half of the popula-
tion which became rather satisfĳied.
23 The present situation falls far outside the scope of this book. Now there is strong 
urbanization, individualization and increased wealth, reports are published regularly 
about a new drug addiction problem in China: it is estimated that in Yunnan province 
there are annually 50–60,000 heroin addicts thanks to Burmese heroin import. More than 
50 methadone treatment clinics have been opened in Yunnan. See article of Francis Wade, 
16-11-2010 in www.dvb.no “Burma fueling China’s heroin crisis”. Another report says: ‘With 
drug abuse on the rise in China, there could be estimated 2.3 million drug addicts in the 
country, according to a health offfĳicial’, etc. in: www.thaindian.com 26 June 2008. The same 
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The Judge and the Poppy
The heritage of the British, French and other foreigners in the coastal 
ports or the International Settlement had serious criminal aspects (see 
ch. 6 and 23). As the Western foreign occupiers slowly retreated and the 
Chinese had to take their fate into their own hands, they had to cope with 
brand new problems in many respects. Solutions had to be found by trial 
and error and often under the threat of competing warlords. An impor-
tant, but not properly researched aspect was the way judges had to cope 
with the new problems. The following acquaintance with their struggle 
for justice is another introduction to the analysis of the whole internal 
Chinese opium situation at the beginning of the 20th-century. 
The starting point is the fact that nearly all previous Chinese govern-
ments (national and provincial, notwithstanding their mutual tensions) 
regularly prohibited (and prosecuted) opium criminals, fought in wars 
against foreign opium nations, opium traders, opium users or opium pro-
duction.24 Indeed, some paid only lip-service to the general norm: 
Suppress Opium! and started or continued the illicit opium business. 
Except in the stories told by grandfathers and fathers, after 1911 every 
Chinese knew that this was an illegal and criminal trade. How were these 
opinions formed?
First and foremost by a huge anti-opium campaign of the national gov-
ernment before 1911. At all other Chinese levels, this triggered smaller ini-
tiatives. The judges only had to cope with the consequences. One of the 
main means through which this was done was a rather new criminal law 
practice. A Supreme Court (SC) was established by an imperial edict as a 
striking innovation (December 1906).25 After the revolution of 1911, the 
source reports a year later that ‘Number of young women drug addicts escalating in 
 Beijing’ (26 June 2009). The difffĳiculties with these reports is that their sources are not 
mentioned or are so ambiguous that they can also concern the usual secret service spam.
24 In the four volumes of H. Morse (1926), the prohibition of opium is documented 
time and again from vol. I, p. 215 onwards. For literal texts of these ‘Special Edicts’ and let-
ters from the Hoppo or the Hong merchants in 1820 only, see H. Morse (1926), vol. III, 
p. 385–388. Their last words were often ‘Feel a cold Shiver at this’. Apparently, it made no 
impression on the EIC because the number of its ships increased year after year as Morse’s 
statistics after these Edicts indicate (Idem, p. 389–398): in 1805 there were 17 EIC ships, in 
1816 already 29 and in 1820 still 23. All 311 ships had opium in the cargo apart from other 
‘Western Goods’ not beloved by the Chinese. By no means were they the only foreign 
ships; many American, French, Dutch, private English or Indian vessels were involved in 
the opium smuggling.   
25 For the following including the quotations, see M. van der Valk (ed.), p. 59, 60, 63, 
64, 67, 73, 74. This is a collection of 559 rules of the SC in 1915 and 1916 in Chinese and Eng-
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new constitution of Nanking guaranteed the law-courts’ independence. 
They functioned remarkably well until the warlords created so much cha-
os and civil war that this innovation also perished. Therefore, the rulings 
of the SC in these two years concerning opium and its use represent a seri-
ous attempt to come to terms with this phenomenon. 
We must conclude that—quantitatively—opium cases belong here to 
the less important subjects. Apparently, the large anti-opium campaigns 
of both the imperial and early republican government must have had 
their efffects. The overwhelming majority of cases concern family prob-
lems (marriage, abortion, adoption, divorce, inheritance and so on). I 
count only 18 “opium cases”. Here are a few examples:
‘A substance not actually opium’ is sold for the purpose of blending it. 
How shall we deal with it? The SC told a procurator of a High Court that 
the meaning of this is too unclear: if the substance is like opium, but 
blended with other matter and falsely designated as opium, it shall be 
punished according to article X; if the substance has nothing to do with 
opium, the offfense shall be punished according to article Y. 
In the same month (January 1915) the question was posed of whether 
swallowing opium as a form of medicine is included under smoking. SC 
answer: smoking is not the same as taking medicine. However, if opium 
medicine is taken as a substitute for smoking, it is certainly an offfense. 
The making and using of morphia (in pills) is sometimes done for the pur-
pose of withstanding ‘the craving for morphia’. What to do? asks the 
Fukien High Court, whereupon the SC answers: in all cases mention ‘the 
making of pills shall be punishable in virtue of … article ...’
The Ministry of Justice reported to the SC about a proposal to punish 
dealing in poppy seeds or keeping poppy seeds in order to deal in them. 
The difffĳiculty was that the text of the proposal did not cover the case well 
enough. This could imply that keeping a stock, without the intent to deal, 
is always punished which is ‘in disharmony with the principle of propor-
tion between offfense and punishment’. Do you, SC, agree with this inter-
pretation? This question was afffĳirmed but, in my opinion at least, the 
lish translation. They were mostly answers to requests of provincial or local law courts 
about whether their rulings were right or wrong. They represent as such a phase in the 
development of the modernization of the whole judicial system. ‘The SC has drawn into 
the discussion a large number of factors, which formerly were quite unknown in China; 
praiseworthy, indeed, but from the point of view of the simple district-magistrate highly 
confusing. Still ... they aim at either maintaining, or supplementing, sometimes even at 
altering the written law in force …’ (p. 26). It is impossible to discuss the highly interesting 
and complicated background of this development.
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judgement was itself unclear since the necessary distinction was not 
made between possession in order to deal or to use it oneself.
The SC also created a serious problem when the Shanghai district court 
asked: ‘… Shall the smoking of opium to which a tax stamp of the Ministry 
of Finance has been attached be punishable? …’26 This time the answer 
was crystal clear: ‘… the smoking of opium is always punishable, irrele-
vant whether tax has been paid or not …’ We do not fĳind the obvious con-
clusion that the Ministry of Finance was receiving money from criminal 
acts or, by necessity, becoming involved in criminal networks. 
Another case mentioned here concerns a Kansu peasant accused of 
illicit planting of poppy. He was contracted by A for a certain sum of mon-
ey. In turn, A contracted B for all the young poppy plants. At the time of 
the harvest, however, it was discovered that the peasant had absconded. 
Question: should A and B still be punished? The SC replied in the afffĳirma-
tive.27 
This casuistic continues with: if somebody keeps opium in his posses-
sion, never uses it but provides another with it, without having any profĳit, 
who is punishable? The SC rules that the original possessor is punish-
able.28 And so on.
Because of their low number, these cases suggest that, contrary to what 
happened later in China, the opium problem is under control at this time. 
They also show that nearly every internal Chinese element of this problem 
is somehow covered by legal activities and judgments. 
This demonstration of an orderly, managed society is given in a period 
in which, according to all imperialists and their historians, China was on 
the brink of collapse, the old empire disappeared in favor of a Republic, 
and warlords started to carry out their nasty business.29 
Dikötter made an extensive study of crime and its punishment in a lat-
er period. The opium problem was not addressed in particular, but a few 
data can be illustrative for the development of this problem in the 
Republican period.
26 Idem, p. 107; p. 129 the same question is asked by the Kwangtung High Court.
27 Idem, p. 311.
28 Idem, p. 328.
29 Recently, J. Madancy published a book about this anti-opium action. I could not use 
it. See also W. Willoughby, vol. II, p. 1095–1098, C. Trocki (1999a), p. 128 fff., while R.K. New-
man (1989) covers the same period and attempts to eradicate the opium production and 
trafffĳic in an interesting way. I hope Madancy analyzed in much more detail the perfor-
mance of all parties in the opium game, because Newman here largely confĳined his story 
to the British top bureaucrats in London, India and China.   
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In 1920 ‘the largest category of sentenced criminals among a registered 
national total of 41,911 cases were thieves (4,369) and opium smokers 
(2,939) sentenced to terms of several months …’30 This is only 7% for the 
latter. A few years earlier, in a Fengtian province prison, about 10% of the 
inmates were convicted for opium-related crimes.31 In 1920, however, in 
another prison ‘a vast majority’ was sentenced for morphine addiction; in 
1928 elsewhere a quarter of the inmates were sentenced for morphine 
possession, but in both situations only a handful for opium consumption.
Throughout republican China the majority of criminals were poor peo-
ple coming from the countryside sentenced to relatively short terms; the 
reverse was also appropriate: the higher the status of a social group, the 
lower its representation in prison populations.32 This is no exception from 
the daily practice in modern Western society. This is also true for the con-
clusion that prisons became sites of drug consumption and dealings.33
An important element in all these Chinese republican prison and 
crime data seems to be a clear shift from opium to heroin and morphine 
use. Also, there was a clear shift from theft as the main reason for impris-
onment until about 1920 to drugs-related crimes later: around 1930 a third 
was convicted for a drugs-related offfense and a quarter for theft, while 
already a year later the former was perceived as ‘the most common crime’. 
Indeed, now the Opium Problem has been aggravated into a heroin and 
morphine problem. Still, one wonders how relatively few people were 
“treated” by the judges and their prisons, in view of the supposedly huge 
consumption of drugs and local production.
 Chinese Republican Opium Production
Fairbank knew perfectly well that at the end of the 18th-century, opium 
was not yet a mass product in China spread by ‘uncouth and greedy’ 
Western merchants but only one of the many luxuries available to a few 
representatives of the elite. Obviously, it was already something illegal 
30 F. Dikötter (2002), p. 77. One of these must have been a morphine addict, Li Youling, 
a recidivist who had stolen iron bars because he was short of cash and desperate for a new 
dose. In 1917 he was given a two-month sentence after which he was sent back to the local 
court for supervision (Idem, p. 84). 
31 Idem, p. 97. In identifying the ca. 1,000 prison inmates in Fengtian province (1914), 
it appears that 256 inmates were convicted for theft, 143 for murder or wounding, 116 for 




and illicit. And he also knew that a Chinese opium production on some 
scale started after the Opium Wars. Who took the initiative to start a 
Chinese production which could bear this name is still an unanswered 
question, but it apparently happened despite the many exaggerations. It 
even became an import substitution that worried the British-Indian pro-
ducers and importers. It was long after the end of the Second Opium War, 
around 1875, however, when the following production level was reached.
For the pre-1911 situation the only production estimates from a reliable 
source that I could fĳind were: in the provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and 
Kwantung the production was less than 2,000 piculs per year (= 100 metric 
tons); even closer to the coast in the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, 
Shantung and Chihli it was 3,000-10,000 piculs per year (= 150-500 metric 
tons); and in some provinces along the Yangtze river (Hunan, Hupei and 
Anhwei) it was the same. A substantial production of more than 10,000 
piculs could be found in Manchuria, Shensi, Kweichow and Yunnan. The 
absolute exception was the province of Szechuan with a production of 
250,000 piculs a year (12,500 tons).34 In about ten provinces there was no 
opium production at all.
It was the dying empire which was able to launch an opium suppres-
sion program that was so successful that even in the province of Szechuan 
‘hardly a stalk of poppy could be found’ (British inspector Hosie). If 
Fairbank’s ‘great bilateral Sino-foreign joint enterprise of the nineteenth-
century’ had existed, it was now eradicated. This is so far the larger con-
text of the Chinese’s own performance. What happened later?
It is in fact Lossing Buck’s famous investigation of 17,000 Chinese farms 
all over the country which provides the fĳirst sound statistical results from 
before 1945.35 They concern, however, the utilization of the land. An eco-
nomic assessment of poppy growing has to rely on more and other data. 
Still, Lossing Buck’s study is a necessary prerequisite to arrive at such an 
assessment.
He cooperated with many experts, including the well-known geologist 
and geographer Cressey. Their work was very difffĳicult in a land flooded by 
foreign enemies, civil agitators and bandits of all sorts. Cressey tells, for 
34 W. Walker III, p. 8, 15.
35 J. Lossing Buck (1964), which concerns a reprint of the 1937 edition. Unfortunately, 
J. Lossing Buck et al. (1966) contains a most unreadable contribution in a Taiwanese pro-
paganda publication. It is only interesting that in this last book, no word about opium can 
be found. His pre-war investigations are fully indispensable contrary to the information 
received from amateur travelers or missionaries. See for this K.McMahon, p. 98 fff., which 
has a typical victims’ approach.
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Map 18. Opium Cultivation in China, 1920’ 
Source: W. Walker III, p. 33. Compared to map 17 much less provinces are afffected; 
it should have been the reverse taking into account the effforts of the war lords.
chapter thirty-two660
instance, that at the moment his book was about to appear, the publish-
ing plant was destroyed by the Japanese invasion of Shanghai early in 
1932: all maps, photographs, etc. were lost, and he had to start again. The 
map reproduced here provides a global image of the poppy-growing areas. 
It must be seen as a possible regional division and not as an actual one.36
Lossing Buck’s study already provides more precise information about 
the location of a poppy culture. His study is divided over the northern 
wheat and southern rice regions. The former is broken down into three 
and the latter into fĳive agricultural areas. The opium type of farming is 
located in only two areas of this rice region: in the Szechuan rice area 
about 11% is occupied by opium farming and in the Southwestern rice 
area, about 19%. The latter covers the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow 
and Kwangsi and the former, most of the provinces of Szechuan, Hupeh 
and Hunan. Another indication is that of the 156 localities studied, 29 or 
19% sold opium somehow.37 
The table indicates in fact a dramatic development. The attempts of 
the Chinese government to diminish the poppy culture reported above in 
the “Hosie paragraph” was successful. In North China farmers increased 
their planting of beans or other products as a substitute cash crop. But 
thanks to the subsequent anarchistic warlord period, this success was 
reversed.38 What more can be said about opium production in China?
One of Lossing Buck’s larger comments on the Opium Problem is quite 
symptomatic:
The growing of the opium poppy is afffected by political policy but is con-
fĳined largely to the frontier provinces, since its value per unit of weight is 
high, and is, therefore, easily transported. Tsinghai is an exception, as the 
provincial authorities do not allow its culture in that province. As one 
crosses the border of Kansu and Tsinghai, between Lanchow and Sining, 
one fĳinds a sharp demarcation between the areas growing the opium poppy 
and those where it has been completely suppressed.39 
36 Nowhere could an analysis or even a reasonable guess be found of the square miles 
of cultivated land per agricultural product per province (and period), so that also for 
opium a relevant analysis could be made.  
37 Idem, table 1 p. 34 and table 22 p. 234. The types of farming altogether do not cover 
the full 100%, so I added ‘about’.
38 Idem, p. 9.
39 J. Lossing Buck (1964), p. 206. Below it is impossible to cover all remarks about 
opium, which are many more than indicated in the index: see, for instance, also p. 34, 78, 
80, 87–91, 230–232, 304, 309, 313, etc.
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Estimated percentage of total crop area in the 
reporting localities
1904–9 1914–19 1924–9 1930–3
Crops whose acreage increased or was unchanged (selection)
Corn 22 11 14 16 17
Cotton 29 11 14 18 20
Opium 13 14  3 11 20
Rice 17 40 41 37 40
Soy-beans  7  8  9 10  8
Sweet potatoes 18 10 11 12 13
wheat 29 26 27 27 27
Crops whose acreage decreased (selection)
barley 10 24 23 20 19
millet 15 22 18 17 17
That the growing of the poppy is a matter of politics is an understatement 
in a country in which many political and military leaders (warlords) after 
about 1920 had connections to the opium underworld to get their activi-
ties fĳinanced. Cressey tells:
In many provinces farmers have been forced by the military authorities to 
raise opium for taxation purposes, and in this way considerable areas of the 
best land have been removed from food production.41
The warlords’ constant money demands led to a farmer’s dilemma: 
because this demand is so severe the peasants have to grow poppies, as it 
is the only product with which could pay such high “taxes”, while it is very 
risky to refuse. In addition: what happens after the harvest? Is the result 
paid in barter as “tax” to the military or fĳirst marketed before paying “tax” 
in cash? And are these “taxes” nothing but compulsory deliveries? All this 
remains in the dark or should be read between the lines. However, even at 
the time of Lossing Buck’s investigations, 1929-1933, there were still 
Chinese governments which prohibited opium growing: a remarkable 
example of “civil courage” in this chaotic period, when corruption is the 
country’s greatest plague. 
40 Quoted in A. Feuerwerker, p. 8 from J. Lossing Buck. 
41 G. Cressey, p. 144. See for the warlord’s opium revenue also James Sheridan’s contri-
bution to J. Fairbank (ed.), p. 291 fff.
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Not all of the provinces mentioned border foreign countries. However, 
the location of many poppy fĳields points to an important characteristic of 
the opium production: it concerns a cash crop and apparently largely an 
export product for Southeast Asia from Canton, for further sea export or 
other locations in China. At least, we have to conclude with Lossing Buck 
that opium together with tobacco belong to the crops of which 75% is 
sold (opium seeds nearly 80%). Only 15% of rice is sold and, therefore, 
85% is used on the farm for consumption or payments. Poppy products 
are also used for food and energy on the farm (about 20%) and for paying 
rent (1%).42 
While the above concerns some orientation to a market, another ele-
ment of opium production is related to the state-bureaucracy:
Taxation often influences land utilization, and in China this is most notice-
able in certain frontier provinces with the high opium tax which compels 
the farmer to plant opium in order to meet his tax bill.43
Also in this case, a farmer’s dilemma exists and a bureaucrat’s burden: to 
pay these state taxes, opium has to be grown, and when opium is planted, 
one has to pay a special high opium tax. The investigators counted 188 
diffferent taxes for diffferent grades of farmland. From 1908 to 1933 the tax 
burden was doubled. Generally, on high-grade land in China as a whole, 
the opium tax was 5% of all taxes, the road tax 10% and the military tax 
23%. There are, however, large diffferences in tax burdens.
In the wheat region the average on low-grade land was $4.05 per acre; 
in the rice region it was $7.05. By far the highest tax was paid in three 
localities in Szechuan: $27.85 per acre. Once broken down, the two largest 
components of this amount were $5.48 as opium tax and $10.94 for roads; 
the rest is for many other local purposes. On the highest-grade land in the 
wheat region, one had to pay on average $7.63 compared to $9.42 in the 
rice region. For the three expensive localities in Szechuan, the average 
was $33.56, of which $6.10 was the opium tax, $11.14 for roads, etc.44 From 
42 J. Lossing Buck (1964), p. 233, table 22 p. 234, fĳigure 5 p. 235 and table 23 p. 237. 
Opium stalks are all used on the farm mainly for fuel (86%) and the rest for ‘industrial’ 
purposes such as thatching and other building purposes, sandals or rope (see table 24, 
p. 238 and p. 239).
43 Idem, p. 323. See also G. Cressey, p. 316 for opium as ‘the most attractive crop for 
taxation’ in Szechuan. In p. 144 one can read: ‘In many provinces farmers have been forced 
by the military authorities to raise opium for taxation purposes, and in this way consider-
able areas of the best land have been removed from food production.’
44 Idem, p. 325.
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these taxes roughly 55% went to the hsien (county) government and the 
rest to national or local authorities. 
There is also a most dramatic picture of what the populations had to 
sufffer from 1904 to 1929 in terms of calamities, famines, starvation and 
even cannibalism (which was confĳined to some parts of the wheat region). 
The opium areas experienced a crop destruction of 20-80% during all 
these calamities. Whatever we know about the fabulous profĳits of the opi-
um trade, the peasants who have to do the dirty work earned the lowest 
wages of all!45 In particular in the Southwestern rice area, peasants must 
belong to the poorest of China: their savings and the value of their farm 
buildings are far below the Chinese average, while it houses the densest 
farm population.46 That’s also opium life in China. 
The last general question which remains concerns the danger of a 
Chinese world pollution with narcotics as, for instance, Black envisaged 
after 1997. Did this fear already exist in the Republican period? 
It must be a matter of gangster and smuggler activities for which, of 
course, no statistics exist. Neither Lossing Buck nor Cressey provide offfĳi-
cial data about opium as a Chinese export.47 Only from the fĳirst decade of 
the twentieth-century could the following table be composed about the 
value of opium trade compared to other products. It concerns all overseas 
trade, which is not necessarily confĳined to foreign destinations. Chinese 
coastal trafffĳic is intensive and far-reaching. It cannot be all Chinese trade 
either, as a substantial part concerns trade done by foreign companies. So, 
‘domestic trade’ is here exclusive of the overland and river trade that does 
not reach the customs authorities. 
This illustrates the proportion of the opium export or domestic trade, 
which is 0.3% and 7% of the total, respectively. It involves sums of $351,000 
and $4,563,000, respectively, which are not at all impressive even in 
the currency of the time. The fĳirst is less than the Yunnanese opium 
 smugglers made in one trip in 1917 (see below). It is a pity that there are no 
data for 1928, although the opium business flourished much better. 
If we should increase the 1908 opium fĳigures 1.5 times proportionately 
to the increase of the export-domestic trade, the result is around 1930: 
$1.890.000 and $29,110,000 respectively. If one takes a given price per 
45 Idem, table 1, p. 37 the heading ‘Wages of farm year labor, including value of food 
and other perquisites (in yuan)” is accompanied in Szechuan with nearly the lowest intake 
of calories ‘per adult-male unit per day’!  
46 Idem, table 1, p. 38. An explanation for this is probably the high taxation in the area 
(Id., p. 81).
47 See G. Cressey, p. 137–142.
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Table 48. Commodity composition of maritime Customs trade in 1908 and 1928 









Silk  83  14,1 187,6   7,7
Tea  32,8   4,1  37,1  19,7
Cotton and cotton 
textiles
 12,9   5,4  73 258,4
Grain and flour    ---  23,9  37,4  88,7
Beans and bean-cake  23,4  15,2 201,3  40,8
Oils and seeds  15,1  11,1  58,4  28,7
Tobacco and cigarettes   2,7   6,5  25,3  70,5
Sugar   1,4   5,2   0,3   2,6
Opium   0,9  11,7  --- [3.83]  --- [74.65]
Other 104,5  64,9 371 171,5
TOTAL 276,7 162,1 991,4 688,6
ounce of $2.7, these export-domestic trade amounts represent weights of 
respectively 700,000 ounce (about 21,000 kilo) and 10,781,481 ounce (about 
323,500 kilo). 
Why do I introduce these details? Because of a political statement in 
1930 made by a State Department offfĳicial, Stuart J. Fuller, an expert on 
narcotics; a statement similar to the one of Black in 1997. For some years 
Fuller was a consular offfĳicial in Tientsin, but his main “qualifĳication” was 
that he closely collaborated with the activist Harry Anslinger, the most 
influential designer of the American foreign policy on drugs before and 
long after 1945. In a London meeting (May 1936) Fuller sketched a Chinese 
opium problem of immense proportions:
Total opium poppy production in China amounted to 12,000-18,000  metric 
tons, only 1,325 tons of which were grown in Manchuria and Jehol. Yunnan, 
where suppression offfĳicials ordered farmers to grow poppies, produced 
more than 4,600 tons; Szechuan totaled nearly as much. Shensi and Kansu 
also showed signs of unusually large increases in opium growth from earlier 
years. ... a narcotic menace to the rest of the world. In 1934 alone ... some 
24,000 kilograms of acid acetic anhydride were imported into Shanghai, 
48 D. Perkins et al, p. 121, 361. Perkins thinks that ‘the only aspects of Chinese trade’ 
with ‘a clear negative impact was the import of opium’. Alas, he refrains from studying it 
because ‘it is customary for economists to eschew moral judgments’ (p. 133). Albert Feuer-
werker in J. Fairbank (ed.), p. 122 fff. provided the available offfĳicial trade data without a 
diffferentiation of export and domestic trade and, most remarkably, without mentioning 
opium, notwithstanding his knowledge (Idem, p. 125) that ‘opium was the most important 
import into China’ until the 1890s. Apparently, it suddenly disappeared.
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enough to produce 4.4 million average doses of heroin. China ... had the 
capacity to produce thirty to sixty times the world’s legitimate annual her-
oin requirements …49
Fuller also condemned the illicit trafffĳic to Canada and the United States 
from North China, accusing directly the Japanese Ministry of the Interior 
for its permission to produce the drugs. A year later the crusade against 
Japan’s and China’s production was stepped up; he called special atten-
tion to the clandestine manufacturing of narcotics in areas of China under 
Japan’s control (Peiping, Tientsin and Hopei). It is clear that Fuller greatly 
exaggerated. That is not to say that the Chinese Opium Problem in the 
Republican Period was a minor one. At that time the ambiguous “War On 
Drugs” was invented. In particular, the remarkable role of Japan should 
have been stressed. 
The South China Morning Post wrote about it as one of the strongest 
indictments of Japan’s opium policy and concluded with: 
Humanity has come to rely heavily upon American aid in the war on drugs.50 
Indirect accusations were made that Tokyo ‘not so much intended to poison 
the Chinese people’ but ...
Fuller oversimplifĳied contradictory information, and he accepted also the 
allegation that 90% of all illegal narcotics marketed internationally was of 
Japanese origin, including the 500 kg of heroin that reached the USA 
weekly. This alarmed American offfĳicials, but did not lead to any relevant 
actions towards opium suppression. The alarm and fear incited was 
enough, as usual with bureaucrats, but the relevant measures must be ini-
tiated by exterior sources or circumstances.
The Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury wrote that around 1937, about 
700,000 people worked in the opium business, China’s only billion-dollar 
retail trade. More than three-quarters of them lived in Kweichow, 
Szechuan and Yunnan. It even warned critics of the government in 
Nanking to be cautious because of its alliance with the former opium 
racketeers ‘now perfumed into respectability’ without changing ‘its essen-
tial nature of gangsterdom’. 
But Chiang Kai-shek’s alliance with opium was no reason for the British 
or the Americans to reconsider their own interests: it could have meant 
not only an anti-Chiang and anti-Japan policy, but also a coalition between 
them and the many Chinese anti-opium organizations, including the 
49 Quoted in W. Walker III, p. 99.
50 Idem, p. 102.
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Communist Party of Mao Zedong. The early successes of the Japanese 
army against Chinese cities, however, put the opium question in the back-
ground and the association with China at war as more urgent. 
Fuller mentions Yunnan as producing (or trading?) 4,600 tons of opi-
um (per year?). Yunnan was, indeed, an “opium sucked province”. Is it 
possible to get a straight picture of the situation here without using 
Fuller’s fĳigures?
Yunnan Opium Production and Trade
Yunnan (about 110,000 square miles) is a province with many hills and 
rough mountains with peaks above 5,000 meters and oval valleys (Ba 
Tze).51 About 80% of these valleys are planted with rice in the summer 
and broad beans, wheat and opium in the winter. The degree of terracing 
is high compared to other areas. The size of parcels, of not quite two-
thirds of an acre, is below the average for the region, and the size of the 
fĳields (0.12 acres) is the smallest in China. Cultivation must be intensive 
since the yields are high compared to all other areas. The cultivated acre-
age of Yunnan in the Republican period was about 25 million mou or 
about 1.7 million hectares (about 17% of the total surface).52
To give an impression of how labor-intensive opium production is, it is 
illuminating to know that to make one raw opium ball implies 230 hours 
of labor; one hectare results normally in about 13 kilo of opium, for which 
one has to work 816 labordays.53 In winter, the cultivated acreage must be 
divided over three products. How much is used for the poppy culture is 
not known to me, but in the previous table we can see how important 
beans are for food and export. So let’s suppose that 10% is reserved for 
opium or about 170,000 hectares, then this would result in a production of 
about 2.2 million kilo of raw opium. Under military or bureaucratic pres-
51 See for the following Idem, p. 87–91, p. 97 fff. G. Cressey, chapter 20 and D. Perkins et 
al, passim who made a reassessment of Lossing Buck’s fĳigures of all crop yields and output 
data in Yunnan and the other provinces from 1914–1957. See the article of M. Swain in D. 
Leese (ed.), p. 1066 fff. Also interesting is D. Duco, passim.
52 Calculated from Perkins table B. 14, p. 236 an average of the 1913 and 1933 fĳigures. It 
is not possible to calculate further the winter acreages of beans, wheat and opium, which 
is important data to assess the opium output. It is only logical that opium takes the minor 
position of the three: beans are after silk the largest export article of China in this period, 
and wheat is a most important food in winter time. This argumentation, however, is not 
necessarily the one of the Yunnanese peasants! 
53 D. Duco, p. 238 note 62.
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sure this percentage can, of course, increase. In that case, the production 
of 4,600 metric tons remains very high, but becomes a possibility.54 
The production of opium here is a copy of the Indian method and start-
ed after 1860. Many Yuannanese migrated to the southern parts of the 
province bordering what in the 20th-century became the Golden Triangle 
(Quadrangle). 
In China the end product is not provided in opium balls but in slabs 
which are typically called Yunnans. In other aspects of the opium produc-
tion, like the making of opium pipes or boxes, special tables or drawers, 
etc. “opium provinces” like Yunnan or Szechuan excel. Yunnan produces 
the cheapest pipes of pakton(g), Chinese silver, but also the most beauti-
ful ones for the landlords.55
Not unimportant for the production circumstances are the many ten-
sions between the Han Chinese (only 20%) in the valleys and the Hakkas 
or the descendants of many older aboriginal tribes in the mountains. The 
Han are mostly the landlords and the Hakkas the tenants, while the 
mountain people carry on their old tribal mode of life. They are, however, 
the landlords who insist that farmers sow poppy fĳields, while threatening 
to harm anyone who attempts to stop the farmers.56 
Rice is, of course, the dominant product, but Cressey mentions that in 
1923 poppy occupied two-thirds of the cultivated land during the winter 
season, as was the case in Kweichow. This is not well founded by Lossing 
Buck’s study. About Yunnan the latter states:
The area is suitable for production of the opium poppy because of the dif-
fĳiculty of transporting more bulky and less valuable products, and the rev-
enues of this trade have had an important influence on the political situation 
of the provinces within the area. Moreover, income from an acre of opium 
poppy is much larger than from any other winter crop which might be 
planted.57 
54 It is, therefore, a physical impossibility to produce 100 million taels of opium, which 
is about 67 million kilo, as J. Marshall, p. 25 states (the Cantonese tael = 1.33 lb.). Under very 
strong (military) pressure, one can squeeze about 5 million kilo raw opium out of Yunnan. 
Also, the other fĳigures about Yunnan are exaggerated.
55 In Duco the most excellent collection of pipes, etc. is given. Small wonder, because 
he is the Director of the Amsterdam Pipes Museum, with one of the most outstanding col-
lections in the world. Www.pijpenkabinet.nl.
56 W. Walker III, p. 23. Elsewhere (Szechuan) the republican provincial authority 
ordered this, and in Kansu it was the offfĳicials who did the same.
57 J. Lossing Buck (1964), p. 89.
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Map 19. Caravan Routes in the “Golden Quadrangle”, ca. 1900 
Source: A. Maxwell Hill, p.39
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The area was quite inaccessible except for the French railway from Indo-
China into the capital Yunnanfu, and a limited mileage of paved roads. 
Lossing Buck’s recommendation for the area is, therefore, the improve-
ment of transportation to other parts of China. This is followed by:
With such a development the growing of the opium poppy could be more 
easily suppressed and the mountainsides could be devoted more readily to 
uses such as forests and special tree products.58
At that time it was a very optimistic recommendation. Cressey’s informa-
tion about the capital Yunnanfu (about 140,000 inhabitants) states that
it is said that 90 per cent of the men and 60 per cent of the women are 
addicted to the habit of opium smoking. Many hsien produce from one to 
two million ounces and the removal of so much fĳirst-class agricultural land 
from useful production has induced a serious food shortage.59
This is not confĳirmed by Lossing Buck’s later study because the relation-
ship opium farming-food shortage is not made. Famines occurred many 
times and for many reasons (floods, droughts, insects, war or frost), most-
ly in the wheat region, double as many as in the rice region in which the 
opium areas are situated.60 
Cressey, furthermore, makes the classic mistake of perceiving smoking 
as addiction. His remark could concern here a smoking habit largely com-
parable to cigarette smoking, he has no data about real addiction and 
smoking habits. When he complains about the statistics for Yunnan and 
Kweichow, we have to consider ‘it is said’ as the whispering of some mis-
sionary.61 Still, with his remark Cressey pointed to a specifĳic market for 
Yunnan opium, which brings us to the trade aspects of the Yunnan case.
Because Yunnan is one of the few production areas, its export must be 
important. Modern studies reveal that this was increasingly the case after 
the quantities imported from British India had begun to decline thanks to 
this Yunnan (and Szechuan) import substitution:
The opium trade in the later years of the empire and throughout the Repub-
lican era (1912-49) was one of the most lucrative, but dangerous, enter-
prises for Yunnanese traders. Periodic government prohibitions, heavy 
58 Idem, p. 91.
59 G. Cressey, p. 375.
60 J. Lossing Buck (1964), p. 124–128.
61 His study was paid for by the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society (p. viii).
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taxation of the cultivation and transport of opium, and banditry were 
largely responsible for the high-risk/high-gain nature of the trade.62
This remark concerns, of course, the institutionalized smuggling practic-
es. From 1906 to 1911 the opium suppression was rather efffective in 
Yunnan as elsewhere. In the mid-1930s there was also a short period of 
prohibition. However, in every year there was always some opium grown 
and not only in remote areas. 
Part of this production remained in Yunnan (the “Yunnanfu market”), 
a part went in a northern direction into China. A substantial part, how-
ever, was exported by caravan to the Southeast Asian countries, but trad-
ers also imported opium of a diffferent quality from the southern Shan 
states. Chinese sources rightly maintain that opium was not an important 
export from the Yunnan production area 
until the 1920s, when the poppy was so widely cultivated that mountain 
people were no longer self-sufffĳicient in food grains … opium became … 
a kind of currency in Yi areas, where goods from Chinese caravans were 
measured in terms of their worth in opium.63
The southern part of Yunnan bordering Kokang became of strategic 
importance for opium smuggling and not only for this product. There was 
a regular trade between, for instance, Burma and Yunnan in tea, raw cot-
ton, cotton yarn and ‘probably opium’.64 In these districts local and for-
eign people were accustomed to intermingling with each other in some 
kind of business. Here, every winter and spring, caravans of 5,000 to 6,000 
mules were organized, carrying commodities into and from Yunnan. It 
was only part of the extensive trade networks from northern Yunnan to 
the southern Shan states in British Burma and ultimately Rangoon, Siam, 
Laos or Vietnam as the map shows. 
Trade between Yunnan and Southeast Asian countries must have had 
a long history, but the given routes were certainly also used for the opium 
trade from about 1860 onwards and after the 1920s when this trade became 
more and more illicit.65 It was favored by the increasing domination of 
specialized traders and transporters from Yunnan who, among others, 
still delivered ‘opium for the Siamese Government from the Shan States’. 
62 A. Maxwell Hill, p. 41.
63 Idem, p. 43.
64 Idem, p. 25 fff.
65 For the following see Idem, p. 34-45.
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Opium from the Shan States into Yunnan (and further into the Chinese 
interior), however, had to be smuggled during periods of efffective govern-
ment suppression of the drug and poppy growing. 
The Chinese entrepreneurs involved made huge fortunes by managing 
heavily armed transports, but they also had substantial costs as the fol-
lowing report (1917) demonstrates:
The whole expedition carried with it $400,000, which in Burma would be 
enough to purchase about 150,000 ounces of opium. There were about 200 
members and 160 horses when they started, but ... the band increased to 
300 people and 200 horses, with 170 rifles and pistols. It took 172 days to 
make the round trip. The group stayed in Rangoon for 42 days and camped 
47 times on the way.66
From 1900 onwards the main intermediary region of the opium trade and 
production was the Shan State Kokang or Guogan. It was in fact a “great 
entrepôt” for opium. The Yunnanese opium also went by caravan to 
Tonkin (via Mengzi, Lao Cai, etc.) or to Siam via the so-called Golden 
Road: Kengtung to Chiang Saen and Chiang Mai. Import and export of 
opium through this region were under the control of the Siamese govern-
ment. It maintained an opium monopoly from 1906 until 1957 (for the 
other developments in Southeast Asia, see the relevant chapter below). 
Around 1930, during the Nationalist regime, there was no pretense 
about the suppression of opium in Yunnan (or other provinces/regions), 
and opium shipments often received military protection.67 The illicit 
business became so intense that an anti-opium association complained 
that in Yunnan, ‘the black (opium) calamity is much worse than the red 
(communist) calamity’.68 
Chinese Opium Consumption
Here I have to limit myself to some remarks about the local Chinese con-
sumption during the heydays of the foreign opium power. That is easy 
because no reliable data about earlier periods are available. Accidental 
66 Quoted in Idem, p. 42. The price of an ounce (0.03 kilo) of opium is, therefore, about 
$2.7 or 10 yuan (1933 dollar) or 6.7 taels. See Perkins’s equivalents, p. xvii. Of course, this is 
only calculated to get a reasonable grip on fĳigures, weights or prices at the time. There 
were only a few caravans a year, but still, 150,000 ounces or 45,000 kilo are large transports. 
It is a pity that no information is given about whether it concerns raw or prepared opium.
67 W. Walker III, p. 48.
68 Idem, p. 69.
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remarks like the following can be found in a letter from a mandarin to his 
emperor (1838):
There are opium dens in every prefecture of the country, and they are kept 
as a rule by magistrates constables and soldiers from the army, who gather 
together dissolute youngsters from rich local families to indulge in the pipe 
where they can’t be seen. As most of the clerks in the magistrates share the 
same taste, they are sure to be protected. I beg your majesty to set a date a 
year from now after which all smokers who persist in their addiction will 
be put to death.69
Happily for the smokers the emperor decided not to attack the demand 
but the supply side, the English and the smugglers who had already been 
operating for four decades along the Chinese coasts. Carr, in turn, men-
tions in a classical exaggerating way the unbelievable story that as the EIC 
lost its monopoly on the opium trade in 1834, ‘private smugglers entered 
the game; within a year more than 2 million Chinese were addicts’ as if 
somebody was interested in counting them and could diagnose opium 
addiction.70 
From the quotation we note the memorable information that before 
the Opium Wars, opium use was confĳined to the well-to-do and involved 
Chinese bureaucratic corruption and assistance from the army. This is 
apparently confĳirmed from Taiping sources after the Opium Wars.71 
“Western” fĳigures must be used, however, which are unreliable as well, 
but they do exist. 
Now, the following reasoning is possible: one of the Chinese reactions 
to the Second Opium War was to produce opium locally, which is a good 
example of import substitution. Once this China-India competition devel-
oped on the Chinese market, the British-Bengal producers made appar-
ently so much product that prices decreased, and more Chinese people 
could affford to smoke opium. A booming consumption was the result, 
and the number of addicts increased into the many millions. Source: the 
amount of Western export divided by opium consumption per grain. Will 
this reasoning lead to a relevant explanation of the situation?
Several estimates exist about the consumption of opium in China. 
Balfour mentions one by Brereton for the year 1881:
… from the 400 million inhabitants three million were opium smokers. 
From these, the smokers of foreign opium are estimated at 1,000,000. The 
69 Quoted in C. Carr, p. 45. 
70 Idem, p. 45.
71 See V. Shih, p. 474 note 6.
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total estimated value of the opium smoked is £ 25,000,000 sterling, viz. 
Indian, £16,800,000; Chinese, £ 8,400,000. At these estimates, the smokers 
of foreign opium spend 11d. per man daily, and the smokers of the Chinese 
opium 2¾ d. daily.72
Here the judgment of Gelber is already complicated: it may be true that 
around 1870 a ‘great majority’ of the consumers smoked Chinese-grown 
opium, but in value the situation was exactly the reverse: the Indian opi-
um yielded double the turnover of the Chinese. Furthermore, Brereton 
did not diffferentiate between consumers and addicts. If we use the Gelber 
estimate that a third of the consumers in 1900 was addicted, then twenty 
years earlier there were one million addicts. In the last part of the century 
there must have been a tremendous increase in addicts.
The most sophisticated calculations come from Sir Robert Hart, inspec-
tor General of Customs with arguments like ‘every time a smoker needs 30 
to 40 pipes, which is x maces which makes 1,120,000,000 maces and, there-
fore, ...’. Still they allow us to answer roughly a question like who could 
pay for this stufff in China—say—from 1870 to 1920.
Spence has the simplest answer: ‘for a few coppers people could get a 
pipeful of opium ... in reach of urban dwellers and the poor’.73 What is a 
“pipeful”? A statistician like Hart went so far as to determine the value of 
one mace of prepared opium at
 about 3½d (English). Divided by the number of days in the year, the quan-
tity of prepared opium smoked daily ... 3,068,413 mace, and the value … 
£ 46,027 …74 
which must be an immense fortune at the time in 1870 as well as in 1920. 
It was available only to the very happy few and not to millions of ordinary 
72 E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 37. About the many ambiguous methods of calculating the Chi-
nese opium consumption, see the introduction of X. Paulès, p. 141–145, even without the 
examples given in my text. 
73 J. Spence (1990), p. 130. To substantiate this, Spence provides only examples of very 
well-to-do people like eunuchs, Manchu court offfĳicials from the palace bureaucracy, 
‘women in wealthy households’, ‘secretaries in the harried magistrates’ offfĳices’, ‘merchants 
preparing for business’, ‘soldiers on their way into combat’ (Idem, p. 131). That is not an 
answer to his own suggestive question: ‘Why did the Chinese of the mid- and late Qing 
begin to smoke so much opium?’ Like most other Western historians of foreign peoples 
and countries, Spence is also ridiculing his subjects because of an in-built and unfounded 
superiority: as the Qing government allows opium as medicine, but severely prohibits 
pushing the drug to users, Spence thinks of it as an ‘uneasy compromise’ (p. 131), while that 
was for decades the normal Western way of dealing with opium by family doctors and the 
authorities after the Chinese introduced this innovation two centuries ago! 
74 E. Balfour, vol. 3, p. 38.
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Chinese smokers. Hart supposes that the average smoker consumes three 
mace of prepared foreign opium. This sufffĳices for 30 to 40 pipes, so that 
Spence’s ‘a pipeful of opium’ must be a ridiculous remark, which cannot 
lead to any form of addiction.75 
In detail, Hart’s reasoning runs as follows relative to the situation of about 1880:
... the results arrived at are that 200,000 chests, or almost 13,000 tons (1680 
catties = 1 ton), of unprepared opium are consumed annually by 2,000,000 
opium-smokers; that these smokers expend £25,000,000 on opium; that 
this is an expenditure of, say, from 5d. to 11d. daily by individual smokers 
... from the statistical point of view it is safe to say that opium-smokers in 
China constitute simply two-thirds of one per cent of the population. On 
the supposition even that the quantity of native opium produced is ten 
times that of the foreign opium imported, the total will not yet sufffĳice for 
the consumption of even four per cent of the population. Four percent is a 
small percentage, but in China it means 12 millions of people. It is hardly 
credible, however, that native opium is produced in such quantity ..76 
This last warning is needed because Balfour quotes missionaries and trav-
elers, who gave the impression that from deep in the south of China unto 
the highest cold north, one is confronted only with ‘a sea of poppies ... 
superseding the growth of cereals’, so that normal food was not grown any 
more and hunger spread quickly.77 That was far from the reality.78 
75 The expert D. Duco, p. 103, provides the details: the smoking of opium is not imme-
diately addictive; the fĳirst time one smokes opium, one cannot feel anything. It fails 
because one smokes too little or too much, which is followed by sickness and vomiting. 
After one is accustomed, after one or two months, then one is really an addict. Spence’s 
‘one pipe’ must be less addictive than one cigarette. K. McMahon, p. 92 fff. provides details 
as well and several contradictory opinions: a beginner smokes one or two pipes (1841) or 3 
to 6 grains at a time (1853); sixty grains was a mace which would fĳill twelve pipes, and this 
should be the dose of a ‘temperate smoker’ (1895); two maces daily must be the dose of a 
serious addict, and few can bear this for any length of time (1895). Another thinks of it as a 
common dose (1908), while rich people can smoke even three to fĳive maces, according to 
the same source (he probably means that a rich man can pay for this quantity). Still, novel-
ists created persons who could swallow ten to twenty maces a day. A mace = about 4 gram; 
a grain = 0.06 gram; a pipe must be something of 0.18 gram.
76 E. Balfour, Idem. 
77 Idem, p. 29. 
78 F. Wakeman in J. Fairbank (ed.), p. 178 suggests that Hart’s calculation resulted in 
too low numbers of addicts; Jonathan Spence (1990) takes even 10% of the population as 
smokers (which is about 40 million or “better” about 30% of all adult men) with 3-5 % or 
15 million as heavy smokers. This is H. Gelber’s source. For about 1920 G. Cressey, p. 144 
states that ‘in many provinces farmers have been forced by the military authorities to raise 
opium for taxation purposes, and in this way considerable areas of the best land have been 
removed from food production’. If he has to write more concretely, it is only in the prov-
inces of Kansu (p. 192, 193), Szechuan (p. 315 fff.) and Yunnan (p. 375) that poppy fĳields 
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The difffĳiculty, however, with Hart’s calculation concerns the relation-
ship income-opium consumption. The latter averaged 8 d daily according 
to Hart, elsewhere he supposes that it is 10¾ d (which makes £17 a year). 
Around 1930 the highest wages in modern urban factories were ca. 23 
yuan per month and the lowest, ca. 12 yuan.79 Therefore, the highest 
wage was equivalent to £2.3 a month, whereas Hart’s smokers spent on 
average about one whole pound, which is close to half of their income in 
this category. For the lowest wage, equivalent to £1.2, it is nearly the entire 
monthly wage. 
For most workers around 1910, local factory wages paid no more than 
home handicrafts. They did not difffer much from the above wages, 
although there were also privileged jobs like supervisors with 32 yuan per 
month.80 It seems safe to conclude that foreign opium smoking cannot 
be an activity for the low echelons in society, so they eventually had to 
cope with the native opium of poorer quality or simply no smoking. This 
alternative—let’s remember—was exercised by the large majority of the 
Chinese. 
The dictionary tells us that the foreign drug was about three times as 
expensive as the native product, mainly produced and consumed in ‘Sze-
chuen’: one estimate is that 25,000 chests are produced annually, another 
estimates this at 265,000 chests, but the dictionary itself accepts two 
“facts”:
.. the one is that, so far as we know to-day, the native opium produced does 
not exceed the foreign import in quantity; and the other, that native opium 
was known, produced, and used long before any Europeans began the sale 
of the foreign drug along the coast.81 
No details are given for the second statement. It refers possibly to a very 
small native production somewhere in the vastness of China for medical 
purposes only. Lodwick even exaggerated this further by stating that the 
replace normally cultivated land. In particular, Yunnan must be a center of opium produc-
tion.
79 G. Hershatter, p. 148. The Chinese money system is very complicated and highly 
variable per province and period; the data to compare the diffferent currencies in a par-
ticular period are very difffĳicult to fĳind, while the real Western experts (like H. Morse) do 
have a complicated way of explaining the comparable and foreign exchange values. I will 
spare the reader the method I found that around the year 1900 in Canton one yuan must 
be one-tenth of a pound (1£= 240 d), of course, before the pound sterling was subdivided 
into 100 pence in 1971.   
80 See Susan Mann in: Th. Rawski and L. Li (ed.), p. 264 fff.
81 Idem, p. 37, 38.
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Chinese cultivation of opium began in the late 18th-century ‘and gradu-
ally spread to all parts of the empire. By the late 1880s it was a major crop 
in some parts of China ...’82 Again, no supporting details follow.
What should we think about this consumption story? It is repeated in 
general terms in most histories of the period without any proof and large-
ly based on the propaganda of missionaries or the guesses of anti-opium 
authorities, and disbelieved by far too few people: they are all more or less 
dubious estimates about millions of Chinese addicts. In the beginning of 
this section, I provided a model of how to think about this consumption, 
but I have the feeling that this way of thinking must be falsifĳied. The prob-
lem is how, but about the “why” we can consider the following.
There exists a formidable export of opium to the USA and Europe. 
Macao in China is mentioned several times83 and, indeed, it is well locat-
ed to organize this export. Canton, Hong Kong and Macao are not only 
situated very close to each other, all three were centers of a lively opium 
trade in all directions.
It remains remarkable that around 1900-1915 the Chinese government 
nearly succeeded in controlling the opium problem in a rather short time 
and that about thirty years later, Mao’s regime succeeded in eradicating 
the opium problem fully in a few years’ time. With so many millions of 
addicts and the complicated intermediary systems needed between pro-
ducer and consumer, this must have been a difffĳicult task. Unless the 
sources of the propaganda can be disclosed, there were probably many 
fewer addicts than cited, fewer production areas, lower production levels 
or, simply, false statistics in which, for instance, smokers are included 
with addicts, export fĳigures in one country were combined with import 
data elsewhere, and so on.
The following four examples give us much to think about because they 
are the only ones I found which are more or less based on Chinese prac-
tice and probably not on estimates, models or propaganda. The fĳirst con-
cerns the 1934-36 suppression campaign the government organized 
82 K. Lodwick, p. 12. See also p. 13 for ahistorical remarks mixing up situations from 
after the two Opium Wars with long before. She mentions herself the result of Robert 
Hart‘s investigation that still in 1864 ‘native opium was known in all ports, but few 
acknowledged it being grown in their areas’ (Idem, p. 13, 14). Indeed, this contradictory 
information not only negates Lodwick’s suggestions in the framework of her “blaming the 
victim” attitudes, but points in my view only to the smuggling practices and forced imports 
of the English, French, Dutch, etc., which had been occurring already for more than a half 
century. 
83 See C. Terry, M. Pellens, p.639; W. Walker III, passim.
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nationwide in order to show foreign nations the KMT’s serious intention 
to get rid of the opium problem.84 It became a bloody afffair: 2000 narcot-
ics offfenders or addicts were simply executed by fĳiring squads; exactly ten 
times as many were prosecuted, and 43,020 opium addicts registered. In 
the whole of China, four million smokers were registered. 
Between May and September 1936 a new campaign was held, this time 
in Shanghai only, in which 24,144 addicts were registered (included in the 
previous example?). Of these, about 5,600 (or 17,600 in another source) 
were sent to detoxifĳication clinics. One must realize that Shanghai (about 
three million inhabitants) was ‘built on opium’ and that here the heydays 
of the opium business were celebrated by many money interests. The sup-
posed result of both examples: from a national population of about 500 
million, less than 1% were smokers and less than 0.01% were addicts; in 
Shanghai itself, less than 1% of the population was defĳined as addicts.
The third example is from two years later. In 1938 the government of 
Manchukuo tried to take control of the opium business.85 This part of 
China was estimated to have between 500,000 and one million opium 
smokers. Not a bad estimate: in August 1938 more than 585,000 smokers 
had registered themselves in response to propaganda from the Central 
Commission for Opium Suppression. 
At the same time about 20,000 addicts were treated in some fĳifty 
national and local infĳirmaries. Smokers are not necessarily addicts, but a 
total of 20,000 addicts in a population of about 35-40 million is not much. 
The USA had the same population around 1870 and 77,000 opium addicts.86 
In 1938-1939 Manchukuo sufffered from war and a most rigorous foreign 
occupation during which 16 million people fled the region. This was not 
the case in the USA when recovering from its terrible civil war. Of course, 
the example does not permit us to extend the result over the whole of 
China, and it is possible to modify the comparison between the USA and 
Manchukuo (is a similar defĳinition of an opium addict used?87). 
84 F. Wakeman (1995), p. 271–272 and several notes on p. 414-415 for the fĳirst two exam-
ples.
85 W. Walker III, p. 122.
86 C. Terry, M. Pellens, table IV, p. 44.
87 The table I used here belongs to a discussion about numbers of addicts in the USA 
which must be confusing even for insiders with sentences like ‘It is, therefore, believed 
that at no time have there been more than 246,000 opium addicts in the United States’ 
(1924). If that should be the case, the number of addicts in Manchukuo is peanuts in an 
absolute sense!  
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The last example is probably the most realistic one and concerns Xavier 
Paulès’s analysis of the procedures in two Cantonese rehabilitation cen-
ters for drug addicts in the years 1937 and 1941. The following table sum-
marizes his fĳindings. It provides a view on some social and demographic 
features of the opium problem in a big city, which is probably a model for 
other similar cities in this period.



















workers 43 48  0–5 year 7 --- ---
jobless 19 12  5–10 year 7 --- ---
merchants 17 18 11–15 y 8 --- ---
coolies 7 16 16–20 y 11 1 ---
soldiers 4 1 21–25 y 10,5 7 2
policemen 2 --- 26–30 y 10,5 22 17
peasants 1 4 31–35 y 10 25,5 18
others 7 1 36–40 y 10 17 30
41–45 y 7 11,5 14
46–50 y 6 6 7
51–55 y 6 5 7
56–60 y 3  3 4
+ 60 year 4  2 1
100 100 100 100 100
A large proportion of these Cantonese smokers had a daily consumption 
of opium of less than one qian (= 3.8 gram) which corresponds to six or 
seven pipes smoked in about half an hour. This is drastically diffferent 
from Hart’s estimates, which has serious consequences for his much 
acclaimed calculations. It concerns here some individuals who smoke on 
social occasions. Therefore, about 10% of the male patients (in total 
about 1000) refused to call themselves a patient. Probably, their health 
was not deteriorating, or they did not think of themselves as addicts. The 
real addicts are clearly a subgroup. Also, this diffferentiation of Paulès is an 
improvement over previous interpretations.
88 Derived from the four fĳigures given in X. Paulès, p. 174, 175.
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In the Cantonese press, however, every smoker is an addict. This must 
be the result of the fĳierce anti-opium propaganda stressing the health 
problems of the individual and fĳinancial problems of his family. It 
described every user as an enemy of the Chinese nation, as supporting the 
humiliation of China and the imperialist repression, and many other right 
or wrong accusations. The users received specifĳic names like ‘opium-
smoking devils’ (yangui), ‘the spirits of the poppy’ (furong xianzi), ‘the 
damned’ (heiji zhongren) or ‘the immortals’ (xian). This supports the 
point of view in which opium smokers, whatever their degree of addic-
tion, are isolated from non-smokers and could be brought to the rehabili-
tation clinics, if some authority would do so. 
Even the Cantonese experts do not know how many smokers or addicts 
lived in the city: the estimates change from 21,721 in a rather precise inves-
tigation to 80,000, but the the most realistic conclusion is 40,000. The pop-
ulation of Canton was 1.2 million around 1930, making about 3% a user. 
Paulès thinks that about half of them were addicts.
The table indicates that these smokers and addicts are concentrated in 
specifĳic strata of the population: especially male manual workers in the 
25-48 age bracket. Certainly the rickshaw pullers are strongly represented. 
This demonstrates the importance of opium as an energizer to compen-
sate for physical exhaustion, but also the kind of relationship between the 
pullers and their patrons, providers of their rickshaws and housing. The 
coolie profession scores high on everybody’s perception of opium con-
sumption. 
This table suggests, furthermore, that there is a fundamental diffference 
between the consumption during the work to earn a living and the con-
sumption outside this in leisure time. The town-country distinctions fea-
ture in this table as well. Indeed, relatively many peasants lived in major 
Chinese cities before World War II, including their small businesses, com-
pounds and swines.89 
It is remarkable that no representatives of the “higher classes” were 
found, which must be the result of a selective police policy. Big city life in 
the last phase of the Republican Era was a severe and daily struggle against 
great miseries for a large majority of the population. That there were only 
3% of smokers in Canton does not seem alarming. If this percentage 
applied in all large cities (together at the time about 50-60 million inhab-
itants), then there were about 1.5-1.8 million smokers and half as many 
89 H. Derks (1999), p. 17 fff.; Idem (2004), p. 59 fff.
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addicts. Still, there are too many “Republican addicts” for all participants 
in the Opium Problem.
Enough suspicion is raised, however, by these examples. We need to 
inquire further: all this can lead to the conclusion that some of the Indian 
export to China as given above never reached the Chinese internal market. 
Within the Canton-Hong Kong-Macao region, this import could have 
been divided over two other directions: to the South (starting in Korea to 
Singapore and further to the Dutch East Indies) and to the USA. They are 
the most logical routes, certainly after about 1930 when morphine and 
heroin laboratories were erected by the Chinese mafĳia and the Japanese.90 
In addition: there is not only export by sea. As the Yunnan case proves, 
the overland export was also sizeable. Both exports can be subtracted 
from a Chinese inland consumption potential and incentives. 
The least one can say is: this argument and its consequences for the 
consumption and image of the Chinese should be the subject of very thor-
ough new research. 
My conclusion so far is that among the Chinese at the time, there were 
no more smokers and addicts than elsewhere in Asia. New research into 
this matter should, however, not take the direction Newman suggests and 
not just because of his following provocative conclusion:
It is clear, therefore, that the wilder accounts of Chinese opium consump-
tion cannot be correct. The stereotypical addict of the missionary literature 
was only one small part of a varied cast of opium users. Most opium smok-
ing in imperial China was a harmless and controllable recreation.91 
It is certainly true, as Sinn also argues, that in studying the opium prob-
lem, one has to suspend conventional prejudices; the personal use is often 
harmless (assuming a healthy lifestyle) and far from a crime.92 It is, fur-
thermore, good to repeat time and again that opium smokers are not nec-
essarily addicts. 
Still, one must be cautious with calling the use of opium harmless: it is 
too intimately connected with illicit production, smuggling, mafĳia, cor-
ruption and so on, let alone the direct relationship between opium and 
pogroms against the Chinese in the USA and elsewhere or the often seri-
ous political-economic efffects on societies, including wars.
90 C. Trocki (1999a), p. 133. For the earlier history of the Hong Kong-USA relations, see 
the excellent E. Sinn.
91 R. K. Newman (1995), p. 789.
92 E. Sinn, p. 18.
Opium Production and Consumption in China 681
In addition, there are real health hazards among the poor users, 
because they have to rely too often on poor quality stufff or vile adultera-
tions. One cannot isolate one from the other: together they form the 
Opium Problem, with diffferent gradations for each country. In my view, it 
is much better to diffferentiate all this by means of the perpetrator-victim 
dichotomy and its practice, while considering the following.
Because Newman reduces opium use to a medical case, he opposes in 
an untenable way the idea that opium is a ‘curse visited by imperialists on 
a weaker nation’. The poppy’s presence in China should be seen as ‘part of 
the geographical difffusion of a useful crop, and possibly as an element in 
the difffusion of central Asian cultures’.93 All this means: opium is a negli-
gible item in its physical efffects and in its cultural and social impact on 
Chinese society and history. 
Newman reduces opium, furthermore, to a purely Chinese phenome-
non (blaming the victims!) and denies the use of opium as an imperialist 
means to destabilize successive Chinese and Asian societies in favor of 
the private profĳits of some drug criminals or the imperialist doctrine of 
the so-called “free trade”. It is, however, not very clever to avoid sound his-
torical analyzes of the Opium Problem and its origins or the many critical 
comments of contemporaries. 
Newman provides interesting data but does not follow the right meth-
odology sufffĳiciently: systematic research of the relationship between con-
sumption-production-distribution of opium and its history. He is also 
remarkably uncritical about the backgrounds of the Royal Commission on 
Opium (1893-94)94: its conclusion concerning the harmlessness of opium 
is the opinion of dealers like Jardine or Sassoon and of the British and 
Dutch governments. As demonstrated at length, these governments were 
never prepared to lose their substantial opium profĳits, the trade and bank-
ing mechanisms to fĳinance and sustain their empires, and a work drug for 
the coolies.95 Whatever texts of treaties promised a solution for the 
Opium Problem, it immediately organized an underground way of con-
93 R. K. Newman, p. 790, 791.
94 Idem, p. 768.
95 C. Trocki (1999a), p.144. Whether there is a direct relationship between the result of 
the Royal Commission and the rapid expansion of the opium consumption in China 
(Idem, p. 130 fff.) should be studied further. There is, furthermore, a serious gap in our 
detailed knowledge about the question of why between 1860 and 1880 in China there was 
such an explosion in opium consumption. Who advertised this? Who organized this apart 
from, of course, the Sassoons, Jardines or Dents who were the best to exploit the possibility 
created by the British conquest?
chapter thirty-two682
tinuing the trade through its colonies like Hong Kong or Burma, where 
the Jardines, etc. were allowed to do what they always did. 
In addition, a new party with opium interests, the medical profession-
als with relations to the pharmaceutical industry, presented their unten-
able case for the fĳirst time: the “people in the white jackets” think of 
themselves as the ultimate fount of opium knowledge and decision-mak-
ing. 
The medical doctors are, furthermore, eager ‘to increase people’s depen-
dence on doctors to prescribe medicine, sought to curtail their right to use 
opium as a form of self-medication.96
It is strange that Newman does not discuss the repeated attempts of Asian 
governments to prohibit the opium production and consumption from 
the beginning of the 17th-century until the Chinese successes in Szechuan 
around 1910, and he does not discuss (only ridicules) the political eco-
nomic constellation created by the Western imperialism, the “pepper and 
tea for opium” mechanism, which made the Chinese economy largely 
dependent on the many foreign intruders. He does not discuss the moral 
conflict explicitly arising among the colonial leaders in Asia (Warren 
Hastings, Rafffles, Crawfurd, Coen, Mossel or Hogendorp and many oth-
ers) between their detailed knowledge of how socially bad opium was and 
their decision to use and exploit it anyway in their political and economic 
decisions. 
Last but not least, the British and other Western colonial powers did 
not introduce “modernization”, “democracy”, “capitalism” and whatever 
other values they preached at home. The violent narco-military assault hit 
Asian societies which were revolutionizing like the Chinese in the most 
unexpected and most unwelcome manner: this assault only aggravated 
and exploited existing misery and created new miseries to such a degree 
that China was unable to counter new external enemies like the Japanese. 
Before leaving the country in disgrace, the West had performed only a 
criminal act by creating unprecedented criminality. All the above belongs 
to the Opium Question. 
About Opium Gangsters
To illustrate the above criticism, a short history of the origin of all present 
opium gangsterism is appropriate. Almost by defĳinition that origin must 
96 E. Sinn, p. 18.
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be found in the framework of Western imperialism, Asian department. 
Herein the fĳirst commercial exploitation of the poppy was established in 
the middle of the 17th-century by the Dutch VOC (see ch. 11). Further 
preconditions for creating a narco-military organization of a mixed pri-
vate-state nature were developed then. The Dutch Amphioen Society (see 
ch. 14) could be seen as the fĳirst autonomous, purely private opium-deal-
ers organization backed by a state on a purely private profĳit basis, which 
was deliberately dealing in a “morally wrong product” in a corrupt way. 
That they earned fabulous amounts of money with this activity is, in fact, 
also perceived as a basic element of a criminal opium organization: only 
successful ventures get publicity!
Still something is “missing” in all this if one wants to become a full-
fledged criminal organization: the breach of law. But that was available, 
even among the Dutch. In the 17th-century there were many crimes which 
were punished severely by the VOC. They did not concern dealing in or 
producing opium as such, although everyone knew how dangerous (and 
attractive) this drug was. The private business of VOC employees was offfĳi-
cially prohibited and perceived as a criminal act, but mostly connived at. 
Occasionally, this corruption was attacked with draconian measures. 
That was the Dutch custom. 
At least from the beginning of the 17th-century, several Asian govern-
ments can be found which prohibited opium smoking and trade, threat-
ening them with serious punishments; in the 18th-century it was already 
difffĳicult to fĳind one which did not prohibit it. This was the case with gov-
ernments in the Middle East, Mughal India, China or the East Indies. It 
was also perceived as a typical “foreign crime”, introduced by the Western 
merchants-pirates-conquerors. This made the crime worse. 
Finally, there were not only geographical diffferences between laws, but 
many others which do not need elaborating here (see ch. 25).97 Anyway, 
the so-called “law of conquest” does not apply to them, but only to con-
quests. There is, furthermore, the remarkable fact that conquerors 
97 See the discussion about the study of law in the colonial context from Simon Rob-
erts in T. Ingold (ed.), p. 973–976. What was “customary law” and what was its relationship 
with the “colonial project”? From this “project” (what a misleading name!) is derived colo-
nial legislation as an application of colonial rule including its usual ridiculing of adat-rules 
and similar indigenous legislations Still, even this excellent handbook does not hide the 
extensive reliance of anthropology as a scientifĳic discipline on the “colonial project”: the 
question of whether this “project” was a criminal one is not discussed and that is, accord-
ing to me, the basic question which we can easily afffĳirm. 
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 themselves, time and again, from Jan Huygen van Linschoten onwards, 
thought of opium distribution as something morally wrong. 
The comparison with slavery points automatically to the remarkable 
discrepancy: at the same time that the British successfully fought the abo-
lition struggle, they embarked on the largest opium “injection” of foreign 
people ever (which was seen by many in England as a genuine criminal 
act) and on the coolie trade between China and the USA, a trade in “free 
slaves”.98 
The conclusion from the above seems unavoidable: the opium intro-
duction in China by the English was a criminal act, a matter of gangster-
ism as the ultimate consequence of the Western assault on China. Let’s 
see whether empirical data can support this complicated thesis, by show-
ing how Chinese society was destabilized and who did it. This, further-
more, has to highlight that it happened through opium as a source for 
profĳit and political gain and not through the opium addicts, as some still 
believe.99 
One thing must be understood: opium gangsterism in China is some-
thing very diffferent than Chinese gangsterism. The former dates from ca. 
1800 and is conducted by Western smugglers, traders, bankers and the like 
(including their Chinese collaborators), who together made the opium 
business.
Chinese gangsterism received its main influence (and got the most 
publicity) in China through Shanghai in the 1930s but existed from ca. 
1900. This was the time when gangster wars in Chicago were reported dai-
ly. 
The main characteristic was, of course, that in the 19th-century, Chinese 
laws were constantly being violated, fundamental diffferences between 
legal and illegal, trade and smuggling, Western and Chinese views, narco-
military actions and peaceful commercial negotiations were deliberately 
and constantly blurred or provoked by foreign intruders under the cloak 
of their extraterritoriality. 
98 G. Endacott, p. 127 fff.; D. Meyer, p. 115 fff. and ch. 17 the use of coolies in the Dutch 
East Indies in the tin mines on Billiton. The Dutch were, anyway, more consistent: they 
were the last in the world to abolish their extensive use of slaves (1868), embarked imme-
diately on an extensive coolie trade and use, and its government always continued to 
exploit opium until kicked out of Indonesia. 
99 Of course, the following is based on and only a shadow of the highly intriguing work 
of Brian Martin, Jonathan Marshall and Frederic Wakeman. In ch. 6 and ch. 7 mention is 
made about the background of the Sassoons, etc. Here mainly their activities in China are 
highlighted. See also S. Chapman, p. 131 fff.
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Around 1900 it was clear that a transformation had developed in all 
this: instead of an external assault from foreign pirates, smugglers, “legal” 
and illegal opium dealers, there were established internal interests ruling 
a Chinese underground. That transformation and its consequences are 
discussed here.
Shanghai was opened to the opium trade at the moment the biggest 
British opium dealer, Jardine, arrived in town (November 1843). He imme-
diately hired Chinese collaborators for the distribution, who must have 
been viewed as terrible traitors. It took only a few years before half of the 
total opium imported to China was concentrated in Shanghai; the other 
half was imported in the Hong Kong-Canton-Macao region. Profĳit from 
opium had given the Jardine fĳirm a commanding lead in both export from 
India and import into China. Thanks to its large shipping fleet, this fĳirm 
could sustain a coastal distribution system. It ‘ensured that this lead 
would be held whether opium imports were legalized or not’.100 
Jardine, Matheson and Co’s negative assessment about the possibilities 
for manufactured goods in China (and about the heavy tax on tea in 
England) encouraged, continued and accelerated investments in opium. 
This meant not only closer links to Indian opium production or transport, 
but also that ‘a more elaborate and expensive distribution and sales sys-
tem in China’ had to be developed. A large network of Chinese employees, 
merchants or offfĳicials was gradually established ‘who provided the mar-
ket information and the smuggling facilities which made the trade possi-
ble’.
This trade was so efffective and profĳitable that in the House of Commons 
and in the manufacturing branch, opium was blamed for absorbing the 
purchasing power of the Chinese to the detriment of all other imports. 
The complaints were directed fĳirst and foremost to Jardine personally, 
who defended himself by arguing that profĳit from opium was the catalyst 
of China’s foreign trade. 
Along two lines his company practically defended the opium trade as 
such. First, ‘to secure the opium trade from the possible interference of 
the British government through the British navy’.101 Second, to avoid the 
competition of ‘men of small capital’ and to oppose a legalization of the 
trade, because
100 E. LeFevour, p. 8 also for the following quotations.
101 Idem, p. 12.
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abolition of the smuggling system would lower delivery costs and thus 
would certainly increase competition and encourage the “men of small 
capital” arriving in China with high hopes for trade under the treaty. Legal-
ization might also have confĳined opium sales to Hong Kong where the 
quasi-monopoly advantages of the coastal system would have been impos-
sible.102 
From this one can learn how an underground system works in an imperi-
alistic setting: of course, outside legality, but also as monopoly (fĳighting 
against competitors) and through its own distribution network based on 
bribes; if something went wrong, this foreign company must be confĳident 
that it could rely on the navy. 
The Opium Wars gave Jardine, Matheson & Co. a great advantage: their 
share in the Indian export rose to two-thirds of the total with monopoly 
(and therefore high) prices. Its ships became better armed so that they 
could fĳight the Chinese underground competitors, pirates looking for 
profĳitable opium ships. These gangster fĳights became regular practice, the 
total number of illicit participants in the opium business increased expo-
nentially. 
From the 1840s Jardine easily mastered these new challenges and cre-
ated a new substantial extension to this whole opium network by moving 
from the Canton-Macao- Hong Kong region to Shanghai. He extended his 
fĳirm as well by its cooperation with Dent, forming a ‘duopoly’ and mixing 
legal (tea, silk, cloth) with illegal trade. In fact, this negated the border 
between what today would be called the upperground and underground, 
spreading corruption on a larger scale in society. The money details of the 
deals and trade are mentioned elsewhere (part 2 and appendix 1).
The Chinese helpers of Jardine and other foreign dealers were concen-
trated in Canton before the First Opium War. They acted as compradors, 
interpreters, shrofffs (to detect bad coins) and clerks. Each Jardine ship 
had a standard equipage of a comprador, a shrofff and an interpreter. 
Gradually, some of them established their own fĳirms to deal with the for-
eigners. At the headquarters in Hong Kong or Shanghai, there was a large 
Chinese stafff for repairing ships, warehousing and accounting. But these 
works always depended ‘upon the willingness of Chinese dealers to face 
the risk and expense of a nominally illegal trade’.103 
How the internal Chinese opium market really functioned is not very 
clear from the Jardine-Matheson papers, probably because the huge 
102 Idem, p. 13.
103 Idem, p. 22.
Opium Production and Consumption in China 687
imports were enough to know that it functioned anyway. But during the 
Taiping Revolts it was reported ‘that Chinese dealers could not supply 
areas where the imperial administration no longer existed since offfĳicial 
approval, or Taiping hostility, apparently determined conditions of distri-
bution and sale’.104 Apart from the necessity of assistance from state 
bureaucrats who depended in difffĳicult times often on revenue from opi-
um sales, this information is not very helpful.
In coastal regions, however, sometimes specifĳic Chinese guilds were 
established which controlled the distribution and became specialized in 
the illegal opium trade like at Swatow (now Shantou), north of Canton. 
The Opium Guild here frequently bought supplies from Hong Kong. It is 
said that the Chinese opium criminals stimulated the cultivation of local-
ly grown poppies and that they mixed this with the foreign one after the 
1850s. If available, this Chinese production must have been very small for 
decades and certainly did not influence the continuously increasing for-
eign imports at least until the 1890s. 
In addition, the mutual cooperation of Chinese and foreign merchants, 
bankers, pawnshops, etc. in the treaty ports led to relatively few invest-
ment opportunities. New business was put forward just when the profĳits 
of the Indian opium trade began to decline and Chinese fĳirms of Jardine’s 
size were established.105
For the time being, the main activities in the opium business can be 
seen, therefore, on the “foreign opium front”. After 1860 it was concentrat-
ed in the “autonomous” international settlements. In these decades, 
therefore, a criminal infrastructure must have been developed which cov-
ered an immensely large coastal area from Macao to Shanghai and their 
direct hinterlands with many “bridgeheads” in between. When “Peking” at 
last accepted legalization of the opium trade under intense pressure from 
the British and French governments, the European and American infra-
structure became “legalized” as well, but not the Chinese part of it. This 
Chinese part could now hide behind the Westerners, though, and it grew 
in quantity and quality. 
The moment the Chinese government was allowed (or could not be 
hindered) to return to its traditional anti-opium stand (in the 1890s), this 
infrastructure had to disappear underground again. Its opportunities 




now; coastal smugglers with their inland branches had to cope now with 
developed and mutually competing urban gangsters. 
On the “foreign opium front”, matters changed more profoundly. There 
was the competition between the Bengal and Malwa opium in India, 
practically a competition between the Jardine, Matheson, Dent group and 
the Sassoon group of Bombay and Hong Kong (see ch. 6). 
In Hong Kong David Sassoon had already opened a branch in the 1830s 
which concentrated on the illegal opium business. His fĳirm was also 
established in Calcutta and Singapore. In the 1850s, like Jardine and his 
colleagues (mostly in cooperation with the Americans Lindsay and 
Russell), the Jewish Sassoons (later in cooperation with the Jewish Ezra 
people and some Parsis) could therefore connect every link in the India-
China opium chain by the extension of their Peninsular and Oriental 
Steamship Company’s services. 
The Sassoons (& Co) had made a fortune with raw cotton exports from 
India to China. In India they were originally only involved in the opium 
business through banking activities (loans to poppy producers). In China, 
therefore, they could make quite diffferent trade connections (legally also 
in Chinese eyes). These eased their entry into China at the moment they 
started their opium business. 
Opium was used as payment for up-country purchases of tea and silk. 
They soon imported not only raw cotton, but staggering quantities of opi-
um for staggering numbers of consumers and addicts (see Appendix 1 for 
the precise data). 
It is difffĳicult to say which of the two groups, the British-American or 
the Jewish, was the most successful. Until the First Opium War Jardine’s 
certainly was. The competition became harsher during and after the 
Second Opium War when Sassoon sales on the coast were linked with 
increasing speculation at the Bombay sales and Calcutta auctions. They, 
furthermore, obtained a stake in the poppy production. This yielded con-
siderable benefĳits from the 1870s onwards, while Jardine went on the 
defensive.106 Jardine’s withdrawal from the trade was not far away: 
Early in 1871, the Sassoon group was acknowledged to be the major holder 
of opium stocks in India and in China; they were owners and controllers of 
70 per cent of the total of all kinds. ... Strict control of costs in India had 
allowed the group to undersell all others in China for fĳive years and against 
106 Idem, p. 27. See also Idem, p. 165 note 82 where Jardine wrote in a memo ‘how long 
this ruinous business’ of the Sassoons could last.
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this organization Jardine’s was defenseless; its withdrawal from the trade 
became inevitable ...107
This underselling involved not only taking smaller margins, but also by 
selling its “own” Malwa instead of the more expensive Bengal opium. The 
moment the Sassoons achieved a monopoly position, the prices of Malwa 
also increased. Another efffect, however, was much more important: the 
cheap opium greatly increased the number of consumers and, because 
this opium was of an inferior quality, the health hazards increased as well. 
This certainly happened in the lower classes, who lived in the cities with-
out a decent standard of living. 
Until the 1870s Jardine, Matheson & Co. had made a profĳit on their own 
opium investments of about 15% and 4% on agency business. That is what 
LeFevour found in their archive, but a proper cost-benefĳit analysis as 
attempted in Appendix 1 suggests much higher profĳits. Anyway, with 
these profĳits the company could easily overcome its withdrawal from opi-
um and started investments in other branches (railways and banking, for 
instance).108 Not only had their success turned upon the pivot of opium,
trade in drug also had the efffect of channeling a major part of the com-
mercial enterprise of several large Western and Indian fĳirms in China into 
the sale and servicing of one commodity for several decades. There was no 
alternative before the 1870s.109
The substantial Chinese opium consumer market at the end of the 19th-
century was, therefore, created by concerted actions from several direc-
tions: fĳirst and foremost by the decades of activities of the two large 
Western opium tycoons (the Jardines and the Sassoons), both backed by 
the Royal Navy; the activities of numerous Western “men of small capital”; 
the competition between expensive and cheap opium; the Chinese assis-
tants of the Westerners, who gradually started their own business; the 
107 Idem, p. 29.
108 For Jardine’s banking activities see E. Banks, p. 167, p. 206 fff. (relations with Roth-
schild or Samuel-Marcus bankers), p. 441 (Jardine, Matheson, Fleming ‘had emerged as the 
dominant corporate fĳinance house in Asia’); p. 507 (Fleming purchased in 1998 the remain-
ing 50% of Jardine Fleming from Jardine Matheson for $300 million), etc. See also S. Chap-
mann, p. 113 fff for the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) which was 
supported by ‘the leading Far Eastern merchant houses like Sassoons and Dents from the 
fĳirst [1865], but the most eminent British fĳirm in China, Jardine Matheson & Co, held aloof 
for a dozen years, until 1877.’ Idem, p. 142 fff. in which is shown how Jardine Matheson & 
Co. developed into a kind of NHM in the Dutch East Indies as discussed in ch. 18 including 
their original reliance on opium in order to establish a multi-functional enterprise. 
109 E. LeFevour, p. 30.
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continuously increasing populations of the International Settlements and 
their many opportunities for criminality of all sorts.
Around 1900 the imports from India and elsewhere declined because 
opium production was established in China itself by someone (Sassoons?). 
At the end of World War I, $40 million worth of opium still arrived annu-
ally only in Shanghai. The city had over eighty shops for selling the crude 
opium and 1,500 opium houses. Many of them were visited by coolies who 
smoked a mixture of opium and the residue (dross) of more fortunate 
smokers. The owners of these dens bought their supplies from three major 
opium businesses in the International Settlement: the Zhengxia ji, Guoyu 
ji and Liwei ji.
All three were owned by Swatow (Chaozhou) merchants who constituted 
their own guild which in turn, around 1906, bought the Persian and Indian 
opium from four foreign merchant houses: David Sassoon & Co, E.D. Sas-
soon, S.J. David and Edward Ezra.110
Four foreigners who worked so closely together that they practically acted 
as one fĳirm. Swatow people connected Cantonese gangs with Shanghai 
ones known as the Red Gang. The four foreign merchants were originally 
Jews from India. They reacted to the relative decline of the opium imports 
with a triple strategy: 1. they linked their businesses into the Shanghai 
Opium Merchants Combine (1913) and signed an agreement with the 
Swatow gangsters to buy their Indian (Bengal and Malwa) and Persian 
opium exclusively; 2. they made an agreement with the Municipal Council 
so that in the International Settlement the Combine’s opium had the 
monopoly; they, furthermore, asked from the Council to close down the 
small retail shops dealing in “smuggled” opium; 3. they reached a profĳit-
able opium duty agreement with the Yuan Shikai’s government (1915) in 
return for specifĳic payments. 
After these foreign and local gangsters had created a monopoly, they 
increased the prices, claiming that the Indian opium was of much better 
quality than the Chinese one. It helped: from 1912 to 1916 the price of their 
Bengal opium increased sixfold and of Malwa fĳivefold. These were usuri-
ous prices, because the world prices were much lower.111 They even man-
aged to forge an agreement with the warlord Feng Guozhang to sell their 
remaining stocks for $14 million payable in government bonds at 40% of 
110 F. Wakeman, p. 35.
111 Idem, p. 327 note 73.
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face value. The warlord’s pleasure lasted only briefly, because in January 
1919 most of these stocks were destroyed. 
But again Jewish opium dealers were accused of being behind all this. 
The medical doctors K. Chimin Wong/W. Lien-Teh reported in their 
History concerning the successful prohibition campaign of the central 
government:
The combine of Jewish merchants, who had been the principal promoters 
of the trade, began to rush opium into the country and accumulated a huge 
stock at Shanghai. Eventually, a bargain was struck with some unscrupulous 
offfĳicials, and about 1,500 chests of opium were purchased on behalf of the 
Central Government at the price of Tls. 6,200 per chest. When the news 
leaked out, the people all over the country raised an outcry, especially as 
the excuse for buying the opium was that it was destined for the manufac-
ture of medicine!112 
Once the legal trade ended the Swatow gang organized a new and illegal 
monopoly. But part of the opium money was available for speculation in 
real estate. In particular, the new quarters of the foreign rich were the 
objects of speculators, rapidly raising land values by 973% between 1906 
and 1936.113 One of the Ezra brothers even sold his property to the US 
Government.114
In the meantime all opium relations were established underground: 
the import, distribution and Chinese production. Nearly all warlords 
asked for their share in exchange for military protection of the opium in 
transit. Competition among gangs with gang fĳights occurred, and the four 
foreign providers had to go underground. The whole circuit was now a 
criminal one for all parties and for all legalistic considerations. 
Its international connections can be sketched by means of a most 
notorious example known as the Ezra opium case, involving a deal of the 
Ezra brothers. Their opium business was hidden behind the Dahloong Tea 
Company.115 The tea-for-opium mechanism remained intact long after its 
initiation. Their Combine once bought (1923-24) a multimillion-dollar car-
go of high-grade Turkish opium. This was shipped by a Japanese vessel 
from Constantinople to Vladivostok, where it was transshipped for the 
destination China. However, the captain of the ship made his own deal 
with rival opium smugglers: when he arrived at the coast near Shanghai, 
112 K. Chimin Wong, W. Lien-Teh, p. 603.
113 Idem, p. 66.
114 J. Marshall, p. 28.
115 F. Wakeman, p. 37 fff. and p. 328 notes 83–85. 
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he unloaded fĳifty chests of opium into a waiting junk and pocketed the 
profĳits. The smugglers brought the stufff to Shanghai where it was stored 
in one of the many underground warehouses in the French Concession 
and elsewhere in the International Settlement.
One of the Ezra brothers, Alexander, became aware of this. He went to 
his friends among the police who started an investigation. Indeed, they 
discovered an elaborate storage depot for opium, complete with false 
walls, secret doors, and a warren of tunnels. Alas, for the Ezra brothers 
and their colleagues, the revelations about their opium syndicate were 
publicised which
shocked the world and led to a recommendation by the League of Nations 
that all ships heading for the Far East be searched at the Suez Canal. Japan 
refused to support this measure, and the scheme was never adopted.116 
The downfall of the Ezra brothers followed a routine narcotics arrest 
(April 1933): Judah Ezra, just arrived at San Francisco, was arrested with 
his brother. Agents discovered an entire warehouse full of drugs worth 
$50 million. The Ezras were sentenced to twelve years in prison. Both 
were released in 1940, whereupon Judah returned to Japanese-occupied 
China. In 1947 their names circulated again in the press after workmen 
discovered a huge stash of narcotics hidden in the ceiling while renovat-
ing a former Ezra house. Anslinger’s Bureau of Narcotics accused Judah 
seven years later of supplying a large narcotics ring out of Hong Kong.117
The details of the history of Jewish opium gangs in China or the USA 
still remain to be uncovered, as does the investment history of the opium 
profĳits. The pious Ezra established several synagogues in Shanghai. The 
Sassoons speculated in all kinds of International Settlement real estate, 
116 Ezra himself never recovered the opium, because he was in serious difffĳiculty con-
cerning his nationality: if he had had the “right” nationality, he could have enjoyed extra-
territoriality and recovered the opium. Alas, it was discovered that he had the Turkish 
nationality and not the Spanish one as he claimed. Turkey, as a member of the central 
European powers which had fought against China, had forfeited its treaty privileges. Doc-
uments seized in the Ezra raid revealed, among others, that the Jewish opium syndicate 
had a deal with the Chinese navy, army and police to protect their narcotics. Publicity 
about it was now not benefĳicial for the Ezra brothers. 
117 J. Marshall, p. 28, 29. Here one can fĳind also all the details about the Ezra brother’s 
chief Shanghai Chinese collaborator, Ye Ching Ho, a most notorious and clever gangster 
with many political connections. He was very close to the Japanese occupiers as well as to 
Chiang Kai-shek. His story is comparable to the famous leader of the Green Gang, Du Yue-
sheng (see below). For the Western part of the opium business, Marshall also points to 
other American Jewish gangster bosses, which—like it or not—suggests a specifĳic expla-
nation. 
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but also in land on the outskirts of the city. This happened on such a scale 
that the Chinese authorities were afraid that the foreigners wanted to 
extend the Settlement, including its extraterritoriality privileges.118 
One conclusion from this short history of the opium criminality intro-
duced by foreigners in China is that there was a fundamental transforma-
tion from an illegal external assault by private Western smugglers 
inducing a learning process for Chinese smugglers and dealers violating 
Chinese laws, to the internal involvement of the same private foreigners 
in strong cooperation with full-fledged Chinese gangs. 
Another conclusion is that initially, these British and Indian-Jewish 
smugglers were backed (in)directly by the British Navy, EIC and British 
government: without this support, ready to wage war for the benefĳit of an 
opium market of/for British entrepreneurs, it would have been impossi-
ble for the Jardines or Sassoons and their Chinese criminal supporters to 
obtain their huge profĳits. For the period after the transformation, it was 
again the combination of foreign and Chinese criminals which could not 
succeed without the backing of military and state offfĳicials. This will be 
explained further in the next section about the relationship of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) movement with the opium business.
The last conclusion is a technical one: the “Jardine approach” was char-
acterized by a straightforward conquering of a market with a new prod-
uct, opium, involving all kinds of unorthodox methods (from the Gutzlafff 
Bible assistance to bribing everybody on the way ahead), and illegality 
was preferred since legality was too time-consuming. Cooperation with 
many helpers on a few aspects after the product was bought at auction: 
money, transportation, distribution to a place where it could be handed 
over to other parties; in short, act as mediators.
118 The Economist (May 29th 2010, p. 57) reports about the reopening of one of these 
synagogues, the Ohel Rachel, built in the 1920s. Judaism is too limited in China and not 
one of the fĳive offfĳicially recognized religions. Everything can change, they must have 
thought by opening this building without mentioning its history: ‘… the heritage signs 
posted on them typically give little detail about their previous signifĳicance’. The rabbi who 
organized the opening believes that Shanghai’s economic revival has made offfĳicials more 
confĳident in treating its complex history, and able ‘to use the past to benefĳit the future—
even if the past was not so much to their liking’. It is a pity that Jewish propaganda was not 
far away, because talking about a Jewish ghetto in old Shanghai is far beyond reality. The 
article ends with the words: ‘Some history is still too hard to face.’ Let’s hope for the 
rabbi that the Jewish opium history will not be faced again. It will be difffĳicult to negate 
C. Trocki’s (1999) sixth chapter which is headed ‘In the hands of Jews and Armenians’ 
(p. 109 -137).
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The “Sassoon approach” was characterized by management from the 
production in the poppy fĳield all the way to the consumer-addict, which 
allowed a “squeezing out” of every phase in the process in order to end up 
with the largest profĳits for the lowest cost. The work done through this 
last approach had to remain underground from the fĳirst smuggling to the 
fĳinal cooperation with their own Shanghai acquaintance and largely exe-
cuted by one’s own kin119; in short, it is the self-sufffĳicient form of a classi-
cal gang concentrated in one branch. 
The last remark concerns the drive for public respectability, knowing 
the highly dubious character of their work. This applies to the Jardines 
and to some Sassoons, some of whom managed to became British aristo-
crats: “respect” remained the dangerous concept of honor in the mafĳia 
scene.120 
KMT Opium Activities
The estimation at the time was that just the Shanghai drug trafffĳic brought 
in $6 million a month ‘to whomever controlled the city’. This contraband 
trade was, therefore, an irresistible lure for warlords. The most famous 
among them, the Kuomintang (KMT), was no exception. More than other 
warlords, the KMT leadership was intimately connected with the fabu-
lous and very quick transformation of an immense country like China 
from an imperial and/or feudal-patrimonial state with religious-moralis-
tic overtones and a strong agricultural base into an industrial, heavily 
urbanized, republican nation. 
From 1911 (abdication of emperor) to 1949 (victory of the Communist 
Party, CCP) this nation was politically dominated by many warlords and a 
few civil ones like Sun Yat Sen and Mao Zedong. They fought with each 
other in various coalitions about what to choose as the main model of 
state and society: a nationalist or a socialist one. 
After 1927 the KMT of Chiang Kai-shek became the leading organiza-
tion in the military-nationalist arena and the CCP of Mao Zedong led in 
119 A quite typical Jewish glorifying picture of the Sassoon family and their stay in 
Shanghai is given by David Kranzler on the Sugihara website www.pbs.org. For the Ezra 
brothers see Wikipedia ‘Edward Isaac Ezra’ and for the whole Jewish scene in Shanghai, see 
the article of Robert Cairns, Colorful Jewish community contributed much to Shanghai, in: 
www.dangoor.com/issue76/articles/76096.htm, etc.
120 Without any doubt the largest opium criminal of all from 1912-1951, Du Yuesheng, 
was still invited even after the war by the British Embassy as an honored guest, along with 
distinguished diplomats. J. Marshall, p. 43.
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the civil-socialist one. Both had to rely at some stage wholly or partly on 
the support of one or more imperialist powers. The simple reason was 
that these foreigners could not be removed from the Chinese coasts with-
out a military power which the Chinese did not have. In addition, they 
were a major source of money income for the feuding Chinese parties. In 
the Republican period the foreigners no longer contemplated conquering 
China, except Japan which perished like all the others. The foreigners 
were confĳined to playing the divide and rule game: the USA supported 
both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao at some stage; the Chiang’s White Terror 
against the Communists was not only assisted by gangsters, but also by 
police squads and the leadership of the French Concession (indirectly by 
other foreign powers in the International Settlement).121 Warlords and 
also Chiang Kai-shek during the White Terror played the power game by 
blackmailing representatives of foreign powers to pay huge sums in 
exchange for “protection”. 
It made Chinese life in this period pretty complicated and bloody: opi-
um addicts and Communists were murdered wholesale. Gangsters, police 
and military killed at least four thousand Communists or people who are 
defĳined as such. This is the main context of China’s exterior position, to 
which an equally important interior choice must be added. 
A paradoxical development can be seen. While notoriously anti-urban, 
the military-nationalists were practically confĳined to the new urban 
world, while the typically urban CP had to rely on the agricultural coun-
tryside, so that both had in fact the wrong ideological base to fulfĳill the 
tasks they wanted to perform. The warlords, including the Kuomintang 
(KMT), intended to conquer large parts or the whole of China with or 
without Japan, perceiving their military rule as a replacement for the 
imperial or old provincial rule, and to construct a society according to the 
top-down military hierarchy with all its consequences. It was the classical 
land-based state model overruling town and country. 
The socialists wanted a bottom-up civil society anyway, but ultimately 
had to replace the urban proletariat by peasants and much later by coun-
tryside communes and urban neighborhood organizations. 
The combination of these diffferent interior and exterior positions 
determined to a large extent not only the outcome of the struggle between 
the military versus the civilians, the KMT versus the CCP, the mutual civil 
wars from 1911-1949, the fate of the many imperialist intruders, but also 
121 F. Wakeman, p. 122 fff. and passim.
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the development of the opium business, consumption and production. 
Only this latter development will be illustrated here with the following 
examples.
For the outsider it was, anyway, highly confusing: around 1935 the 
whole country seemed to be one great opium den if one could believe the 
papers and the mostly very exaggerated (dis)information from all sides. 
According to the American observer Woodhead (December 1934):
It is rather curious to read in the newspapers on the same morning a report 
from one Chinese news agency stating that altogether 204 opium trafffĳickers 
have been executed in China during the current year; from another that at 
present there are about 30,000,000 opium and drug addicts in the country; 
and from a correspondent in Poseh (Kwangsi) a description of the arrival 
in that city of a caravan carrying 1,800,000 ounces of opium, which was 
stored in the offfĳices of the Opium Suppression Bureau …122
It is important to consider the intimate relationship between the war-
lords’ armies, including the KMT, and opium. Apart from the land taxes, 
opium was one of the main means to fĳinance their wars and state or pro-
vincial bureaucracies.123 After the last energetic anti-opium campaigns of 
the central government, opium became the concern of two powers: the 
upperground operating warlords and bureaucratic leaders from Peking or 
the provinces and the underground of several Chinese gangster organiza-
tions. Both were looking constantly to cooperate suspiciously with each 
other without losing their grip on their own fate. The rather complicated 
story of the warlords, their cliques and networks cannot be described 
here.124 Some opium relations of the fĳirst and a short profĳile of the Chinese 
mafĳia must sufffĳice.
Besides the KMT, there was the notorious warlord Wu P’ei-fu, main 
antagonist of Chiang Kai-shek and head of the so-called Chihli (or Zhili) 
Clique. Against all previous successful suppression measures, by mid-
1920, offfĳicials of this clique stimulated opium cultivation on a large scale 
in Fukien, Honan and Shensi. The related Canton government organized 
opium production in other parts of Fukien, Kweichow, Szechuan and 
Yunnan. In Manchuria poppy cultivation was started on a lower level, but 
122 Quoted in J. Marshall, p. 22.
123 About the many kinds of land taxes invented in this time to squeeze the peasants, 
see J. Sheridan, p. 24 fff.
124 For the following J. Fairbank (ed.), passim, mainly p. 294 fff.; W. Walker III, p. 31 and 
entry ‘Wu P’ei-fu’ in: Encyclopedia of World Biography (Thomson Gale, 2004).
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in most of China all remained “silent” on the opium front. Often one used 
the slogan: ‘Salvation from Poverty through Opium growth!”
Another one is the ‘Christian General’, Feng Yü-hsiang, active in the 
period 1912-1925 in Hunan and the northwest of China.125 He was one of 
the very few warlords who actively struggled against the opium business. 
When he settled in Ch’angte (Hunan), he embarked on a program to 
stamp out three vices: narcotics, gambling and prostitution. He estimated 
that 5% of the population here was addicted. He prohibited the sale and 
smoking of opium and had opium traders arrested. Feng’s men confĳiscat-
ed all possible drugs and just before he left Ch’angte in the spring of 1920, 
he publicly burned the stocks. The fĳire lasted three days and nights. 
Feng also looked to treating the victims. A sanitarium, stocked with 
medicine and food, was set up in order to cure the addicts. They were 
encouraged to come voluntarily for treatment, but those who were unwill-
ing were brought by force. If the treatment was successful, they were 
offfered a job. All this was a rather clever program, although it had its lim-
its: Feng was lax toward the upper class; no landowner, offfĳicial, merchant 
or other prosperous person was urged to go to the sanitarium.
By 1925 Feng Yü-hsiang had a reputation as a reformer. He was now 
operating in the northwest and had an ‘excessive preoccupation with the 
question of funds’, and notwithstanding his reputation, he started to prof-
it from opium sales. Opium was sold openly and illegally in Kalgan, so that 
a tax could be imposed. The only thing that can be said about it was that 
it came too late to save Feng’s position and generated too little money. A 
year later he invaded the distant Kansu along the Mongolian border, 
apparently motivated by the lucrative Kansu opium tax.126 
This example demonstrates that even the “white elephant” of a mili-
tary-warlord-reformer had to rely on opium due to the high cost of his 
military enterprise and the lack of other resources. That was never the 
case with the most spectacular example of the Shanghai Green Gang 
under the leadership of Du Yuesheng (or Yue-sheng) described earlier.127 
His relation to the main warlord must be highlighted below.
125 For the following see J. Sheridan, p. 91 fff., 157 fff. and passim.
126 Idem, p. 193, 196, 246.
127 For practical reasons, for the following I had to rely on, fĳirst, B. Martin (1995), 
although F. Wakeman (1995) and B. Martin (1996) are much more extensive. Martin and 
Wakeman collaborated. See also C. Trocki (1999a), p. 133 who relies on Jonathan Marshall’s 
study on opium business of the government. See also P. Brendon, p. 346 fff about the 
Shanghai opium situation: ‘at least half ‘ of the police offfĳicers was ‘involved in the opium 
trafffĳic’, etc. “Green Gangs” had a countryside and an urban base. The Shanghai GG had a 
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From 1927 (takeover of Shanghai by the KMT) there was a rather unsta-
ble relationship with this Green Gang, but after 1932 it was fully integrated 
into the nationalist’s power structure. Its functions: opium fĳinancing, 
anti-communist struggle and “special (intelligence) operations”. 
Initially, Du Yuesheng tried a divide and rule policy:
According to the minutes of the … CCP Shanghai ... Du Yuesheng ... offfered 
to keep in check the activities of all Green Gang groups throughout Shang-
hai in return for the CCP’s not moving against the opium trafffĳic … There is 
reason to believe that just such a deal lay at the heart of the Green Gang’s 
cooperation with the … [KMT] … in the anti-Communist coup of April 12, 
1927 …128 
The gangsters knew everything about “protection”, and since they accept-
ed the KMT’s protection, they had to pay a substantial price. Also, the 
KMT-Nanjing government, in order to “regulate” its taxes, always contem-
plated the possibility of an offfĳicial opium monopoly. The entrenched 
interests of the Green Gang were seriously challenged, and before 1933 it 
paid $40 million in opium revenue, which later jumped to $30 million 
monthly. By that time Du Yuesheng’s company (‘Da Kongsi, The Big 
Company’), like the Japanese in Tianjin, had set up heroin and morphine 
laboratories. It was so successful that “China” could start a very profĳitable 
export of these substances to the USA. 
The consequences were serious and had a global impact:
American gangsters beginning with Arnold Rothstein and going on to 
Meyer Lansky, Charles “Lucky” Luciano, Louis “Lepke” Buchalter and Jasha 
Katsenberg forged links with Chinese drug lords, both in Shanghai and 
California, to obtain supplies for the growing American narcotics market.129 
country base as well; its traditions provided organizational and legitimizing structure for 
the criminal activities in this multi-million city. They constituted ‘one hundred thousand 
or so gangsters’ in Shanghai spread over distinct and competing groups busy with opium, 
prostitution, gambling, kidnapping, protection and labor contracting. Du Yuesheng is also 
prepared to organize on a substantial scale boycotts of or resistance to the Japanese or 
relief for refugees. He never forgets his fĳinancial opium interests when cooperating with 
the Shanghai bourgeoisie. His original power base was situated in the French concession, 
cooperating with representatives of the French government. From 1932 he succeeded in 
establishing a Chinese power base in this concession after some difffĳiculties: as the gang-
ster boss of bosses, he also played an important role in the politics of Shanghai. And this is 
only part of the Du Yuesheng story: his close relations with the Kwomintang, the Japanese 
but also the American secret services is astonishing reading. See J. Marshall, p. 38–42.
128 B. Martin, p. 65, 66.
129 C. Trocki (1999a), p. 133. They are nearly all gangsters with a Jewish background. It 
seems at least logical that they also had relations with the Sassoon opium and Shanghai 
real estate empire with all its connections to an upperworld.
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Du and other right-wing leaders in the KMT were also involved in estab-
lishing “fascist cells” of black-shirted bully-boys to raid left-wing presses, 
bookstores, schools and universities. He also became the ‘sworn brother’ 
of Dai Li, “Chiang’s Monster”; the Mayor of Shanghai was on his payroll for 
Ch$500,000 a month! As the spider at the centre of the web of an offfĳicial 
opium monopoly, it enabled him ‘to promote his opium interests quite 
openly’, and so on. After 1933 the KMT and gangsters developed many 
ties so that what Marshall concluded became true: Chiang Kai-shek 
pragmatically forged alliances with provincial bosses and urban gangsters 
who demanded protection for their stake in the opium trafffĳic. Chiang him-
self soon learned the political potential of the trafffĳic and used it to fĳinance 
his wars against the Japanese, Communists, and rival warlords. By moving 
to centralize the trafffĳic under his personal control under the guise of “sup-
pression”, he sought to extend his regime’s control. As a result, corruption 
and gangsterism, part of Chiang’s unhappier inheritance, thrived as never 
before.130 
This policy continued in fact until the victory of the Red Army and the 
CCP could defĳinitely end the opium menace in China. However, outside 
China the system Warlords + Opium remained intact in Southeast Asia 
and elsewhere as we have seen, while the Chinese remained involved in 
the opium trafffĳic. For Americans, far away in some Washington offfĳice, it 
was difffĳicult to discover the diffference between one Chinese and the oth-
er. 
A Mao Opium Case?
It is well-known that after Mao came to power, one of the fĳirst programs 
implemented was against the use, trade, production and cultivation of 
opium. In February 1950 Premier Zhou Enlai issued an extensive order 
against opium. The fĳirst action of its kind had been started about forty 
years earlier (1906), but after a spectacular beginning, it stopped through 
the subsequent warlordism and the massive spread of opium and its 
derivatives by nearly all warring parties (propaganda also claimed the 
same of Mao and his compatriots, but it was never proved). The 1950 pro-
gram, however, must be qualifĳied in all probability as the fĳirst concerted 
action on this scale which was successful. Therefore, some details must be 
mentioned. The key parts of this opium liberation program as executed at 
130 Quoted by C. Trocki (1999a), p. 133.
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the county level (in this case in Yanhe, a county of Guizhou) are the fol-
lowing:
1. Deep and broad propaganda about the dangers of opium, encouraging 
the masses to participate in opium suppression. 2. Prohibiting poppy grow-
ing. The local cadres, anti-bandit troops, and leaders of mass organizations 
were to carry out inspections and encourage peasants who raised poppy to 
uproot it themselves. Those who refused were to be dealt with by the Pub-
lic Security Bureau. 3. To prohibit opium shipment, manufacture and sales. 
Those things are entirely evil, and those who dared to challenge the law 
would be punished. Those who produced opium had to give up their equip-
ment to be destroyed by the masses ... 4. Prohibiting opium smoking. As 
opium had been poisoning the county for a long time there were many 
opium addicts, with the greatest numbers among the workers and the peas-
ants, and it was important to educate them so that they could cure them-
selves. Those who were deeply addicted … could be registered and receive 
anti-opium pills ... Those who, in the end, could not be cured, besides under-
going forced labor, would not be eligible to receive the fruits of the struggle 
with feudalism …131 
Chao Zhongli tells how in Yanhe county in December 1950, 1663.3 ounc-
es of opium were found. In addition, 274 pipes were confĳiscated, 15 opi-
um addicts were ‘purifĳied’, and only 6 mu (= ca. 1 acre) of poppy were 
discovered. The latter achievement was due to the fact that poppy sprouts 
were difffĳicult to see in this season among other sprouts. In January of the 
next year, 10 mu was found somewhere in the mountains, while ‘the evil 
landlord Xiao Xiaofeng’ had hidden 10 jin (= ca. 13 pound) of opium. 
At the end of 1951, the yield of the police was not bad: 6,171 mu (= ca 
1,000 acres) of poppies were uprooted, 148,000 ounces of opium collected, 
272 pipes burned, and 36 opium criminals sentenced from four months to 
two and a half years. During the third and fĳifth campaigns, some opium 
was found, but the report says that after two years, opium ‘vanished like a 
pufff of smoke’. 
The only thing we can say about these fĳigures is that notwithstanding 
its location in or near a classical opium region, the given quantities are 
not very impressive. Elsewhere, the period necessary to make this change 
131 From Document 19 in A. Baumler (ed.), p. 181–186. It concerns a translation from 
the Chinese of Chao Zhongli’ s memoirs published in: Guizhou wenshi ziliao 2(1990), 
p. 87–93. In 2007 this district was situated in the prefecture of Tongren with about four 
million inhabitants; on average the districts have about 400,000 inhabitants. In 1950 this 
must have been substantially lower. A reasonable guess seems to be 80,000 to 100,000 
people. See also an article in a China Now magazine (1977), reproduced on the SACU (Soci-
ety for Anglo-Chinese Understanding) website: www.sacu.org/opium.html.
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would be much longer. Working at top speed, it could take between two 
and four years in rural areas, and fĳive to ten years in urban centers, 
depending on demographic features and the patience of the investigators. 
This must have been achieved because, indeed, the Opium Problem in 
China ‘vanished like a pufff of smoke’ after 150 years of Chinese struggle 
against the foreign import. The subject, however, did not disappear as a 
propaganda item.
During the years 1940 to 1949, Mao Zedong and his compatriots still 
had many remarkable friends in the USA in the highest echelons of soci-
ety, including the US Army (“China Hands”). There existed a substantial 
distrust of Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalists.132 This friendly relation-
ship could easily change with new persons in the State Department or 
secret services. In these circles a strange mixture of opportunism and 
hypocrisy with sectarian belief-systems was (and is) the rule: cooperation 
with Chinese opium criminals like Du Yuesheng or with Chinese pirates 
could be perceived as highly attractive regardless of the offfĳicial anti-opi-
um policy. As a “Cold War” raged, everything became possible, as the fol-
lowing story demonstrates.133
In Alfred McCoy’s unsurpassed The Politics of Heroin, there is an appen-
dix with a clear title: ‘Isn’t It True That Communist China Is the Center of the 
International Narcotics Trafffĳic? No’.134 McCoy’s argument runs as follows, 
which is symptomatic of his highly sound complaint about the devastat-
ing agitation of secret services in the present world.
Once Mao and the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
offfĳicial and unofffĳicial spokesmen in the US and Taiwan charged that ‘the 
Chinese Communists were exporting vast quantities of heroin to earn 
much-needed foreign exchange’. In particular, the American director of 
132 J. Taylor, passim; see, for instance, the rows between the conservative general Sit-
well and Chiang Kai-shek, whereas the former was heavily influenced by Mao-friendly 
authors like Edgar Snow, Harold Isaacs, etc. Sitwell explained that ‘it was not in the nature 
of Chinese to be Communists’, etc. (see idem, p. 191 fff.), in his mouth a form of “philo-
semitism”.
133 See J. Marshall, p. 42 fff.
134 A. McCoy, p. 145–148. Quotations are from these pages. They concern the radical 
right-wing Harry Anslinger (1892–1975), a hard-boiled intelligence addict, ‘the Father of 
the War on Drugs’ or ‘America’s fĳirst drug czar’. In the 1930s, as Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics (within the Treasury Department!) he became well-known for his cru-
sade against marihuana with messages like: ‘There are 100,000 total marijuana smokers in 
the US, and most are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their Satanic music, 
jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage. This marijuana causes white women to seek 
sexual relations with Negroes, entertainers and any others.’ Quoted at present on all web-
sites on “Anslinger”. See D. Musto, passim in particular chapter 9. 
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the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), Harry Anslinger, was busy spread-
ing this accusation together with Taiwanese offfĳicials. As late as 1961 he 
reports:
One primary outlet for the Red Chinese trafffĳic has been Hong Kong. Herioin 
made in Chinese factories out of poppies grown in China is smuggled into 
Hong Kong and onto freighters and planes to Malaya, Macao, the Philip-
pines, the Hawaiian Islands, the United States, or, going the other direction, 
India, Egypt, Africa and Europe.
According to Anslinger, Los Angeles alone received 40% of the smuggled 
contraband from China’s heroin and morphine plants. After his retire-
ment, Taiwanese offfĳicials continued with the propaganda like ‘Red China 
exported some US $800 million worth of narcotics last year …’, etc. 
It was quite easy to check these messages since Hong Kong and Burma 
were always named as transit points. The English customs and police offfĳi-
cials in these locations regarded the charges as ridiculous. One of them 
declared (1971):
We’ve never had a single seizure from China since 1949, and I’ve been here 
since 1947. We have customs posts out on the boundary, and the search is 
quite strict. There is only one road and one rail connection so it is quite 
easy to control. 
In the Burma-China borderlands, several leaders of Shan rebel groups 
(usually conservative, Christian and monarchist) asserted in 1971 that 
there ‘are absolutely no opium caravans’ crossing the Chinese border. 
This was a confĳirmation of the fĳindings of a BBC television crew six years 
earlier, but also of CIA agents who were very active in the region. Their 
intelligence teams learned during the 1960s that the Chinese had trans-
formed the patterns of the hill tribe agriculture in Yunnan so that opium 
would not be a major crop.
On top of this came the written declarations of former collaborators of 
Anslinger. The bureau now concluded that there had been a major post-
war upheaval in the international opium trade: ‘the rapid suppression of 
China’s illicit production’ in the mid-1950s. There were, furthermore, sev-
eral complaints (1971) about the abuse of the name of the FBN by Anslinger 
like: 
Every time Anslinger spoke anywhere he always said the same thing—“The 
Chicoms are flooding the world with dope to corrupt the youth of America” 
... It was kind of like the “Marijuana rots your brains” stufff the old FBN put 
out. It really destroyed our credibility, and now nobody believes us. There 
was no evidence for Anslinger’s accusations, but that never stopped him. 
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Notwithstanding this, Taiwanese offfĳicials continued with their damning 
of the People’s Republic, but now the chief of the FBN, John Warner, 
offfered the following explanation (October 1971):
The Taiwanese floated a series of nonattributable articles in the right-wing 
press, quoting … British police offfĳicers in Hong Kong saying “we have seized 
fĳive tons of opiates in Hong Kong this year”. And the article would then 
state that this came from Red China. Actually, it comes from Bangkok. The 
real object of this sudden mushrooming of this kind of propaganda is to bar 
China from the U.N.
Twenty years later the expert William Walker declared:
Available evidence does not support this conclusion [the Anslinger-Taiwan 
allegations. H.D.]. It therefore ought to be relegated to the array of misper-
ceptions of the PRC held by U.S. policymakers that served to prolong a 
hostile relationship.135
 So many proofs of policy lies are seldom available; normally, they are 
published and go unpunished. In that case it should be a premium on the 
substantial morphine, etc. import from England and the USA. They were 
cynical enough to organize this through their enemy Japan. At the time 
they tried to reverse this policy, ‘Japanese, Koreans and others were ready 
to fĳill the gap …’136 
In addition to McCoy’s and Walker’s information, it is possible to point 
to the following. From a much earlier publication, the Anslinger people 
could have realized the ambiguous content of their propaganda. There 
was already a CIA report from 1956 which explicitly examined charges of 
Chinese Communist involvement in the opium trade.137 The fĳirst sen-
tence of the summary is crystal clear, although written in the Cold War 
terminology of the day:
There is no reliable evidence to indicate that the government of Communist 
China either offfĳicially permits or actively engages in the illicit export of 
opium or its derivatives to the Free World. There is also no reliable evidence 
of Chinese Communist control over the lucrative opium trade of Southeast 
Asia and adjacent markets. There is evidence, however, that small quanti-
ties of raw opium produced by minority tribes in Yunnan Province, Com-
munist China, move over the Burmese border. The annual earnings of the 
135 W. Walker III, p. 219.
136 Idem, p. 218.
137 See Central Intelligence Agency (1956). This secret report was approved for release 
in November 2003, and it is now available on the Internet under its report title. Even so, 
several large parts of even this 54-year-old report are blotted out, and the ‘source refer-
ences’ (appendix C) are left offf. 
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Chinese Communist tribes from such sales probably would not exceed US 
$500,000 per year.138
Time and again this CIA report indicated that one has to look at Burma 
instead of China or that there ‘are a considerable number of unreliable 
reports alleging that Communist China is involved …’ etc.139 The indica-
tions the CIA had for its judgment referred to the ‘intensive campaign 
against opium production, trade and addiction’ of the CPC, the ‘complete 
lack of reliable reports on extensive production of opium’ and to reports 
‘that other Bloc countries of the Soviet Bloc have been buying opium from 
the Free World’!140
Blaming the Chinese victims has varied aspects, and many foreign 
institutions had an interest in doing so, which does not alter the relation-
ship between the original opium perpetrators and their victims. It is a pity 
that even recently, professional historians still proceed on the same road, 
which can be demonstrated with another example.
In Taiwan there was a research fellow working at the Institute of 
Modern History called Yung-fa Ch’en. He recently ‘discovered that profĳits 
from opium production and sales by the CCP made a substantial contri-
bution to the economic development of the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area 
and the fĳinancing of its government’.141 This happened in the period 1941-
1943 when the Communist Party sufffered from a serious fĳinancial crisis 
with the Japanese and Nationalist enemies before the gate. Later, Mark 
Selden, one of the famous American pro-CCP scholars, stated that the 
‘Yan’an Way’ of economic development was demonstrated for the fĳirst 
time in that area, which became the model for the Cultural Revolution 
and for the Third World as well. This was the so-called “Dazhai experi-
ence”, which was soon afterwards dropped by the CCP as irrelevant.142 
Ch’en says, therefore, that this Yan’an (Yenan) Way would have been 
‘simply impossible’ without the opium trade and that Selden made a big 
mistake. The CCP acknowledged this last “fact” later as well for diffferent 
138 Idem, p. 1.
139 Idem, p. 28, but see also p. 3, 5, 7.
140 Idem, p. 5.
141 C. Yung-fa, p. 263, 264.
142 The importance of the Yan’an (Yena) episode is comparable with the whole ‘Long 
March’ story. If one is seriously able to corrupt a story like this, one has indeed arrived at 
an important result (propaganda). However, even the American political scientist David 
Apter’s contribution to T. Saich, H. van de Ven (ed.), p. 193–235 does not support the fol-
lowing Chen Yung-fa’s paper, although it analyzes Mao’s role in Yan’an as a contribution 
to collective action. See, in particular, p. 232 note 31. 
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reasons. A bit more interesting is the historical question of whether the 
CCP crisis of the 1940s and some use of opium by the CCP could be attrib-
uted to a Nationalist economic blockade and Japanese offfensives? 
It seems to me quite understandable that Mao under such miserable 
circumstances tried to solve at least his fĳinancial problems with the means 
both the well-armed Nationalists and Japanese had used since the very 
beginning of their threatening regimes. He needed money or, probably, 
the opium itself, because incentives had to be given to enhance the cotton 
production in the area (his soldiers depended on this cotton for their 
clothes) while threatened by the Nationalists and the Japanese. Still, all 
this must be proved!143 Whatever one thinks about Mao’s policies, it is a 
fact that only a few years later Mao defĳinitely solved the Opium Problem 
for China like no one had before. 
Through Ch’en, the Taiwanese propaganda makes of this: as self-styled 
‘most fervent champion of Chinese national interests’, the CCP ‘loudly 
condemned the Western powers for their opium trade’ and now it con-
tributed itself to ‘this infamous trade’. This Nationalist Taiwanese accusa-
tion is clear, and the profĳit one supposedly gained from it must be obvious 
in circles of people uninformed about the Nationalist’s backgrounds. We 
may be happy, anyway, that now also this side acknowledges that it con-
cerns ‘an infamous trade’. 
Accusations published in scientifĳic publications have to be measured 
against scientifĳic and not political criteria. Is that possible in this case? I 
am very glad that Yung-fa Ch’en confesses immediately after his accusa-
tion:
... I should emphasize that the statistical evidence used is far from precise. 
That evidence is drawn primarily from a documentary study ... published 
in the political atmosphere of post-Mao liberalization. I have no way of 
checking the accuracy of these materials. But from my own experience in 
handling original party documents collected by the Nationalist intelligence 
143 Also in an earlier CCP and Mao period (1930s), the rather easy exploitable opium 
was a logical source in case of fĳinancial difffĳiculties, and the Communists had only a few 
small sources of money except the opium business. See F. Wakeman (1995), p. 139, 140. S. 
Shuyun, on numerous places, describes how during the Long March the Red Army or parts 
of it had to rely on opium (eventually dissolved in water) as medicine for the soldiers or 
looted stocks of opium in the settlements they arrived at. Shuyun, therefore, could write 
that opium ‘was one thing that the Red Army was never short of’ (p. 103). Still, this is some-
thing very diffferent from a regular involvement in growing poppy, producing opium or its 
derivatives heroin and morphine, or trading-smuggling these products with the help of 
gangsters like the Nationalists and all other warlords were doing.  
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apparatus, I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of these Communist-
compiled documents ... held in libraries on Taiwan.144
In addition to this, the author apologizes for ‘carelessness by transcribers’, 
‘numerical contradictions’, etc. and still all this ‘casts no serious doubts on 
my sketch ...[and] ... my conclusions with respect to the importance of the 
opium trade’! Later on he, for instance, mentions ‘obvious errors that I 
cannot explain’ or refers to ‘only the fragmentary materials noted above’, 
etc.145 
Last but not least, this article copies and is therefore based on only one 
intelligence report produced 40 years later than the events they describe. 
It is quite paradoxical that Ch’en’s statistical adventure is based on an 
intelligence report of the Taiwanese secret service led by Dai Li (1897-
1946). His offfĳice was called the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics while 
Dai Li himself was for some ‘China’s Himmler’ and for Jonathan Spence, 
anyway, ‘Chiang’s Monster’.146 This is hardly worthy of a scholar. 
And it is clearly not the judgment of China watchers like Tony Saich 
when he accepted Yung-fa Ch’en’s intelligence report as a scholarly con-
tribution to his reader. It is also serious that recent publications not only 
copied Ch’en’s results but uncritically used and even exaggerated them in 
the framework of anti-Mao or anti-Chinese publications like Fenby’s his-
tory or Chang-Halliday’s and Taylor’s biographies.147 
Let’s take a look in, for instance, the Mao biography by Chang and 
Halliday. They wrote a chapter entitled ‘Revolutionary Opium War (1937-
45)’. It starts with remarks about a grain tax Mao imposed on the Yenan 
peasants and the salt potentials of the area which were neglected. No 
sources are given for either item. The chapter continues with:
The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 made Mao look round for an 
alternative source of funding in case Moscow was unable to continue its 
144 C. Yung-fa, p. 264.
145 Idem, p. 290 and 294 note 2.
146 J. Spence (2004), p. 29 fff.
147 J. Fenby, p. 308 fff. used Chen Yung-fa’s product and called it a ‘groundbreaking 
study’ without mentioning the Taiwanese secret service source, let alone McCoy’s devas-
tating criticism of that secret service or the provisos Yung-fa made himself. J. Taylor, p. 242 
also simple adopted the KMT report, symptomatic of his one-sided portrait of Chiang Kai-
shek. Even an excellent study like C. Trocki (1999a), p. 134 produces strange information 
about opium production and export in Shandong (Shantung) from 1927-1952 under CCP 
leadership. This northeastern coastal province was a classical area of “famous” warlords 
(Zhang Zongchang, Han Fuju) from 1924 until 1937 when Japan took over full power until 
its surrender in 1945, after which the KMT-Red Army fought severely until 1949. No, there 
was no peaceful year to grow poppies in this region for the arch-enemy of the occupiers!
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subsidy. The answer was opium. Within a matter of weeks, Yenan bought 
in large quantities of opium seeds. In 1942, extensive opium-growing and 
trading began. To a small circle, Mao dubbed his operation ‘the Revolution-
ary Opium War.148
The information came from ‘Mao’s old assistant, Shi Zhe’ who also said 
about growing opium: ‘It did happen ... If this thing gets known, it’s going 
to be very bad for us Communists.’ 
That is the propaganda message, which presupposes that Chang and 
Halliday also think of opium as ‘an infamous trade’. That is, again, the only 
positive remark. If the authors had written what Sun Shuyun quoted in 
extension from an offfĳicial source (Second Army History Committee, 1991) 
about the role of opium in some parts of the Red Army during the famous 
Long March, nothing could have been ‘going very bad for Communists’.149 
The authors also refer to a ‘carefully researched study’ from ‘that year’ 
which put the opium growing area at 30,000 acres, the credentials of 
which are given above. Yung-fa Ch’en states that Mao made his alleged 
opium decision under the influence of the Nationalist and Japanese 
attacks; the ‘German invasion of Russia’ had, therefore, nothing to do with 
it, but “sounds better”. It is, furthermore, very difffĳicult to fĳind some infor-
mation about the informant Shi Zhe. I agree that this ‘old assistant’ is 
much more sympathetic than information of the ‘Assistant of Dai Li, 
Chiang’s Monster’.150
148 J. Chang, J. Halliday, p. 337. “Yenan” is another name for Yan’an in the central north 
province of Shaanxi.
149 S. Shuyun, p. 103 and note 9 chapter 5, p. 290.
150 Whether now the Opium Problem was solved in China must be taken with some 
grains of salt. What was left was apparently a heroin problem and a related HIV/AIDS 
problem. Of course, it must have been a small problem compared with the many millions 
of opium addicts from before 1950. During a stay in September 2002 at a conference orga-
nized by the World Health Organization/Beijing Institute of Mental Health, David Smith 
heard about ‘an escalating heroin problem in China ... and because of frequent needle 






This part of the study is aimed at the only historical investigation into the 
opium victim problem. It seems logical that it leads to the following 
reflection.
From the very beginning of this History of The Opium Problem, we have 
been confronted with its basic complexity, which it never lost. This com-
plexity could never be reduced to a personal problem of one person or 
victim. This has many, rather important consequences.
This means directly, for instance, that scholarly disciplines like medi-
cal or psychological sciences are not very helpful for understanding, let 
alone solving the Opium Problem. I do not imply that medical “facts” can 
be left out of consideration, as is not done in this History either: see 2.4; 3.1; 
3.4 and so on. They are a substantial part of The Problem itself, certainly for 
the 19th-century Western opium history. 
At least for analytical purposes, therefore, we should always perceive 
this Opium Problem as an externally induced problem: it originates from 
outside and then develops into something. 
If personalized, this perception is important for the following reasons: 
neither a victim’s problem nor an addict’s problem can be solved from 
“inside” the victim or addict (probably only the “side-efffects”). In the treat-
ment of addicts and victims, we encounter the same “internal myth”, 
when opium addiction is expected to be treated by other addictive drugs 
like cocaine or medicines, or that LSD can help to prevent a concentra-
tion camp “syndrome” as if the victim had invented concentration camps 
in his own mind. 
Basically, therefore, medicalization, psycho-treatments, meditation, 
etc. are useless, largely sources of income for therapists, while in excep-
tional cases interesting for curing side-efffects. The victim’s problems 
should be explained, understood and treated or related to, fĳirst and fore-
most, “actions” in social-cultural or political environments appropriate to 
the victim or addict, from which some individual treatment should be 
“derived”.
How substantial a part of the Opium Problem this is can be seen in the 
relation between this medical knowledge and profession and the socio-
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biological approaches invented and implemented in the European and 
American 19th- and early 20th-century. The often claimed natural or 
racial disposition for opium or gambling and other vices of the Asian or 
the Chinese (laziness of the Javanese!) does not exculpate the Western 
introduction of opium. The most extreme consequence of this perception 
is that opium (or cocaine for that matter) is imported and distributed 
among the people in order to make them work harder and longer (for the 
boss) or deliver more money for the industry/fĳinanciers of for drugsdeal-
ers and that victims of this “treatment” are seen as criminals to be locked 
up or, worst, eliminated as worthless bodies. 
In other words: in the treatment of all those externally induced vices 
on victims or victim-countries, the environment or outside world and its 
history should be considered of overriding importance rather than of lim-
ited value. The success of the collective treatment of the Opium Problem 
in the largest victim-country, China, after 1950 is that in a political, eco-
nomic and social way, this treatment was induced. In fact, it was method-
ologically along the same path as its introduction by the Western states 
and their criminal smugglers and other dubious supporters. 
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PART SEVEN
THE STORY OF THE SNAKE AND ITS TAIL
The Problem
This complicated History of the Opium Problem from about 1600 to 1950 
has brought us to all the corners of the world. It is inappropriate in this 
last chapter to come up with something like conclusions or “lessons to be 
learned for the future”. This future, the history of this problem from 1950 
to the present (and later!) must fĳirst be told and analyzed. The dark pre-
dictions of Ahmed Rashid in the Preface do not sound very optimistic, but 
we cannot avoid describing the paths to that future, analyzing the prob-
lems or testing propositions. The aim of this last part is to do this con-
cisely and not very systematically.
If this history needed to be abridged to a few one-liners, we could use: 
“The West produced the Opium Problem for and from the East” or “In the 
period 1900-1950 the West stumbled into the reverse movement” or “The 
West has now become the China from after the Opium Wars” or “The 
Snake (for many in the proportion of a Dragon) has bitten in its own tail 
which can lead to a lethal injury” (Rashid’s prediction).
Interested readers cannot be satisfĳied with this. For them, the follow-
ing reflections are made, which supplement those given after every part of 
the study. First, they describe more or less basic elements of the Opium 
Problem, starting with a kind of problem defĳinition. Next, the specifĳic his-
tory of this problem will be annotated through some main features, fol-
lowed by interpretations of both the problem and the history at issue. In 
short: the History of the Opium Problem is too complicated to be captured 
in one-liners or in conclusions.
1.
The following six main elements of the original Opium Problem show its 
complexity from the very beginning of its existence. 
There is, fĳirst, a producer/production Opium Question. It is formed by a 
Dutch overproduction of opium in Bengal and an underconsumption of 
VOC opium in Malabar and the inability of the VOC to pay for the Malabar 
pepper in cash. This is, in my view, the origin of the Opium Problem in 
world history.
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Using opium (for the East) in order to buy a bulk good like pepper (for 
the West) leads to the creation of opium as a mass product with some 
invented market price. This was not a simple question of supply and 
demand, but more a matter of “challenge and response” in the framework 
sketched. From the end of the 18th-century onwards, the English had to 
cope by exchanging opium for Chinese tea; this also increased the activi-
ties of all competitors in both the tea and the opium trade and produc-
tion. 
If the Dutch had not waged so many wars against their competitors, 
they would have had cash enough to pay for the pepper: instead, they 
decided to use opium as money. From a commercial point of view, cer-
tainly a clever idea at the time, and in the long term it provided the Dutch, 
English and French with unheard profĳits unmatched by any other trade 
product until oil. 
The efffects after 1663 were that all competitors of the Dutch (fĳirst and 
foremost the English, but also the Portuguese or French) started to 
increase the production of opium and used it in exchange for pepper or as 
money to buy other products. This attracted merchants from everywhere, 
including pirates, “smuggling” or selling the stufff and eager to make a 
profĳit as the Dutch were doing. The consequence was that, particularly 
with opium, the harsh competition led to large quantities of cheaper opi-
um on a market: even the Dutch with their import and export monopolies 
had to exchange one pound of opium for 110, 100, 60 and even 50 or 40 
pounds of pepper. 
Second, there is a quality Opium Question: the VOC Bengal quality was 
soon given a higher commercial and user’s value than the indigenous one 
from the Middle East or from Malwa. The English experienced the same 
opium competition between Bengal and Malwa about 150 years later and 
solved it by military and bureaucratic force. After this internal Indian 
Opium War (ca. 1800) the English had to deal again about 75 years later 
with the same kind of diffference between the Bengal opium and the indig-
enous Chinese one. 
This leads, next, to a consumer Opium Question. The quality diffferences 
already determined to a large extent not only the price, but also the kind 
of consumers. In the former period the relatively small quantities were 
consumed by the elite as medicine, for pleasure and, eventually, for killing 
competitors. Now a tension arose between the rich and the poor or less 
rich people. This developed in such a way that by the end of the 19th-cen-
tury, the “less rich” were transformed into the poor thanks to the intro-
the story of the snake and its tail 713
duction of a new management construction called the Opiumregie. The 
poor often had to consume poor quality stufff mixed with all kinds of 
undefĳinable fĳillers; more often than not, this was an additional assault on 
their health. 
Another crucial element of the consumer side is that the intruders 
actively searched for consumers, if needed by force, in order to continu-
ously enlarge the opium market. The most “healthy” supply and demand 
was formed by as many addicts as possible. The continuous state of war 
introduced in the realm by the assaults of the Portuguese and Dutch cre-
ated this market through the fĳighting customs of the many thousands of 
nayros, indigenous warriors. 
Whether a social-cultural Opium Question arose on the Malabar coast 
should be studied anew. Anyway, travelers’ reports mention several times 
how these nayros were stupefĳied by the drug and killed en masse by the 
Western weapons. Furthermore, the frenetic attempts to spread 
Christianity lead to remarkably xenophobic, intolerant or racist remarks 
and probably segregation measures. In addition, opium was reserved for 
the pagan primitives and not for the Europeans.
This immediately created the moral Opium Question: the Dutch deci-
sion-makers knew beforehand how bad this product was from the litera-
ture (Van Linschoten, ca. 1595) and from the Portuguese with their rather 
extensive health infrastructure in Goa. The medical doctor Willem 
Schouten and other contemporary travelers also warned of opium’s bad 
efffects, but this was used as a reason to blame the victims, not to accuse 
the producers and traders as, for instance, a Persian ruler did as early as 
1621. Because this indigenous ruler prohibited opium use in a production 
area, a legal Opium Question developed as well. 
This original six-fold Opium Problem developed in history in the sense 
that new elements were added, but nothing of the original complexity 
was lost. In particular after the second half of the 19th-century, the medi-
cal and pharmaceutical elements were added in both Europe and Asia. 
Furthermore, the criminalization of the Opium Problem after about 1890 
led to the establishment of an extensive underground and gangsterism.
2.
The Opium Problem did not exist in the Asian world before the 1660s. 
There was no opium problem in European societies and the Americas 
before the middle of the 19th-century. No opium problem in all non-
Asian societies before that date. There was also no such problem in 
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Spanish and Portuguese Asian colonies before the competition with the 
Dutch got out of hand. This is remarkable since they knew about opium 
and its qualities. The knowledge of “Asian opium” (afyūn) was spread in 
Europe by the Portuguese. They had done much research, on which the 
other Europeans relied. Apart from a few Portuguese sources, the Dutch 
and English learned something about Asian opium for the fĳirst time in 
Van Linschoten’s writings about amphioen (ca. 1595). 
3.
The competition among Western “colonizers” and traders in Asia must 
have been an astonishing and ridiculous spectacle for the indigenous peo-
ple. Until the 17th-century the usual reasons for waging war inside Europe 
were of a religious and dynastic-political nature. For centuries trade as 
such was peaceful, including in the much more developed Arabian or 
Chinese trade networks; “warring trade” was identical with piracy. 
However, from that period onwards and mainly outside Europe, the 
combination of religion, dynasty (state) and trade led to Western “monop-
oly wars”. This is nothing but the dynastic motive to become sole ruler in 
a market. It was the normal European way of communication with the 
people in the East and of the mutual European competition in the East. 
The result was always: the elimination of a specifĳic market and, therefore, 
of the very basis of trade; trade in an imperialistic framework can never be 
“free” and was, therefore, directed by war, repression, intolerance and 
exclusion.
New research must be done on this topic, but also on the question of 
why the West started communicating in such a belligerent way with ter-
ritories outside Europe from the beginning. The former answer “the 
Western need for slaves” is no longer sufffĳicient. The world’s latest experi-
ences in the Afghan opium war demand a new explanation, in which the 
course of the opium history should be a main feature. 
4.
Before 1950 there were three diffferent opium circuits with their own 
resources and histories:
a. the internal European one in which Levant (mainly Turkish) opium is 
distributed through Mediterranean ports like Venice and Marseille. The 
opium from this source is used, processed, consumed from about the 
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15th-century, in fact, only for medical purposes at least until 1900. The 
parties involved were, in particular, West European merchants, distribu-
tors (folk-healers, apothecaries, pharmacists, medical doctors) and all 
sorts of consumers in town and country. Until about 1860 this trade and 
consumption were fully legal.
Opium was one of many hundreds of ingredients used in all kinds of 
healing practices; it was normally mixed with other substances and never 
used pure. This purifĳication, characteristic of modern science, happened 
in the middle of the 19th-century in the framework of a new division of 
labor: apothecaries, pharmacists and medical doctors, backed by a new 
pharmaceutical industry, distanced themselves from a “lay public” and 
marketed new opium products like laudanum, heroin, morphine, codeine, 
etc. They were used in West Europe and the USA to cure many pains and 
sorrows as separate medicines for all ages. 
These drugs were now only available on prescription. The new profes-
sionals were superimposed on “everybody and everything else” as masters 
in a health infrastructure strongly intertwined with state institutions and 
the pharmaceutical industry. They were mainly responsible for the “side-
efffects”: addictions, criminal circuits, extensive policing, new authoritari-
an laws and so on. From this background developed the internal-Western 
Opium Problem at the end of the 19th-century. 
b. the internal Middle Eastern-Indian one in which mainly Persian and 
Indian opium is distributed through ports along the coasts of the Arabian 
Sea like Hormuz, Surat or Cochin. The opium from these sources is pro-
duced, processed and distributed mostly for medical aims (mixed with 
other substances), but also for recreational purposes at the many courts. 
In addition, it is said that it was used by warriors going into battle and as 
a poison to kill competitors in princely milieus. This concerns the period 
from the 13th-century to the middle of the 17th-century. 
c. the external European circuit prepared by the Portuguese but really 
opened up by the Dutch VOC as it distributed opium as a bulk product for 
the fĳirst time, and poppy as a cash crop. This happened after 1663 when 
the Dutch chased the Portuguese away and defeated them on the Malabar 
Coast (southwestern India), while importing opium as payment for 
Malabar pepper. This Opium Box of Pandora was opened exclusively in 




The most spectacular example of how the “Western Snake” (this time in 
the shape of the American CIA) bit its own tail is the transformation of 
the British colony Burma into one of the largest narco-military powers in 
the world (see ch. 24), which is probably the main opium, heroin, etc. 
producer for American and European consumers.
Even today, Myanmar is handled with kid gloves as a consequence of 
the outworn American containment policy of the Cold War. Japan, as the 
USA’s fĳirst Asian partner, gave Myanmar $1.2 million to eradicate opium 
cultivation: in the Shan area opium farmers should be encouraged to shift 
to alternative crops (2003). It did not help the opium farmers, as the fol-
lowing quotation reveals, but benefĳited their military rulers. 
Therefore, McCoy’s highly relevant statement at the time of the 
Vietnam War still sheds light on the present situation in which Myanmar 
and Afghanistan play the leading roles in opium business:
After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over twenty years, 
the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has 
used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime 
ministers, topple governments, and crush revolutions. But U.S. offfĳicials in 
Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium trafffĳic a quaint 
local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to offfĳicial involvement 
… [which] has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have 
covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have 
carried opium, and individual CIA agents have winked at the opium trafffĳic. 
As an indirect consequence of American involvement in the Golden Tri-
angle region, opium has steadily increased [until about 1996. HD.], no. 4 
heroin production is flourishing, and the area’s poppy fĳields have become 
linked to markets in Europe and the United States. Southeast Asia’s Golden 
Triangle already grows 70 percent of the world’s illicit opium and is capable 




It is inappropriate to start this History of the Opium Problem in prehistory 
or antiquity, in old Indian or Chinese history before the attempts to elim-
inate them by aggressive representatives of the “white race” with their 
1 A. McCoy et al., p. 353.
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Christian civilizing mission. In all these periods, there was no opium 
problem whatsoever. If the poppy was used among many other herbs, it 
was for its oil or taste of its seeds, for the energy generated by burning its 
stems and bulbs. Only in a few cases was its juice used as an ingredient in 
a specifĳic medicine for a few people. This was true for both the European 
history of medicines and pharmacy and for the Indian or Eastern one; for 
the European teriaca as well as for the Eastern Ayurveda prescriptions. 
It, therefore, makes no sense to refer to these old histories to legitimize 
drug use or production today or to start popular histories of opium and 
other drugs to suggest that “people” are addicts by nature. This is certainly 
not the case for opium or cocaine and, of course, for their derivatives: the 
Opium Problem came into existence after the middle of 17th-century in 
the framework of Western imperialism. 
2.
A geographical limitation of this History of the Opium Problem is the fol-
lowing. Although European imperialism also afffected Africa and the 
Americas, it is only in Asia that opium became a spectacular means of 
European economic and political repression and the largest and most 
long-lasting source of extracted wealth. In the Americas opium was intro-
duced not earlier than the 19th-century. Coca leaves, an indigenous South 
American product, were also used locally by the Spanish intruders like 
opium (17th-century), but as cocaine its use dates from the end of the 
19th-century. Opium in Africa is a recent phenomenon now that Nigeria 
has been transformed into an important drug trafffĳic center between the 
East and the consumer markets of Europe and the USA.
3.
From about 1450 small quantities of opium were not exceptional within 
the normal (and legal) European and later American cash “medical trade 
networks” on shop levels. Four hundred years later, this was still the case. 
In the East, however, a very diffferent situation existed. The quantities 
traded after 1650 were very much larger (bulk trade) and mostly not for 
medical aims, while the trade networks were narco-military ones. During 
a large part of this period, there was a fundamental weakness: “the West” 
had nothing on offfer for “the East”, while they could get pepper, spices and 
many other interesting products and resources only by cash payments. 
Therefore, this trade was largely transformed into barter until far in the 
19th-century: opium for pepper (Dutch), opium for tea (British). 
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4.
It was the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) which introduced the Opium 
Question into world history in the period 1663 to about 1700 along the 
Malabar coast by starting the exchange of opium for pepper on a large 
scale. It is worthwhile recapitulating this historical introduction. 
Until the 1660s the Dutch bought opium through the “normal” market 
route: in the available markets, for current prices, cash money for quite 
“normal” customers (the VOC itself or for its royal clients). Over the whole 
period of about 1620-1663 the maximum amount purchased and sold in 
this way was in total 6,000-7,000 pounds or about 160 pounds per year on 
average.2 Indeed, this half a pound a day is a very small quantity and was 
used in all probability largely as medicine or as gifts to authorities. It was, 
therefore, a product which yielded no profĳit relative to its cost, certainly 
not for a company accustomed to 200% profĳits or more on its deals. 
From 1663 onwards, once the Dutch were the military masters of the 
coast, a new policy was adopted: opium in exchange for pepper, which 
resulted over the next 35 years in an exchange of about 500,000 pounds, 
which is about 12,500 pounds per year on average or 35 pounds a day. This 
equals the regular consumption of many people. Only as an indication of 
how many, a simple calculation is sufffĳicient: with a daily use of 2 grams 
per person, about 9,000 persons could be supplied. But the story is not just 
that 500,000 pounds of opium were exchanged for 40 million pounds of 
pepper only on the Malabar coast over 35 years (average of 80 lb pepper 
for one pound amphioen, the current Dutch word for opium). 
It is the fĳirst time in history that quantities of opium like this were in 
circulation; it is the fĳirst time that they were needed to buy the top-prior-
ity product of all European colonial trade (until the beginning of the 
19th-century), pepper. And it is the fĳirst time that opium replaced large 
pay ments with cash money. 
5.
A major element in the opium history is, thus, the close connection 
between Western imperialism and colonialism in the East and opium 
importation. This happened, fĳirst, with the explicit aim to earn as much 
money as possible and to create the possibility to transport pepper, tea, 
etc. to Europe. From the end of the 19th-century, the European powers 
2 See, for example, O. Prakash (1984), p. 193-195 and passim.
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changed their raison d’etre in the East from trade profĳits into exploitation 
through colonization. Now, opium was given an additional purpose: to 
make the workforce more willing, and weaken human protests.
Interpretation History
1.
The valuation of trade products varied greatly in the many landscapes 
and territories encountered: Japanese silver could be exchanged for gold 
in China; saltpetre was worthless or not needed in northern India, but in 
Europe the possession of it decided whether one could win a war or not; 
etc. The consequences were that Europeans always had to choose between 
piracy, war, robbery, conquest, paying with silver and gold bullion or bar-
tering Asian products with Asian products. The last aspect led to an ener-
getic intra-Asian trade by Europeans. Thanks to this, they became strong 
competitors of the traditional Arab, Indian and Chinese maritime traders.
The overland-trade was too difffĳicult for Europeans and remained, 
therefore, in the hands of the indigenous merchants and other interests. 
For the new European merchant-conquerors, this overland-trade became 
“smuggling”, which should be eliminated (stimulus for many guerrillas). 
Apart from the lethal competition among the European competitors, 
there were endless reasons on sea and land for small or large conflicts 
with indigenous interests. The West and the East were caught in a perma-
nent war after the arrival of the European Christians. A Kipling question, 
“whether the twain shall meet”, was most likely inspired an utopian 
 naiveté. 
2.
It would be a serious mistake to perceive the History of the Opium Problem 
separately from the history of imperialism and colonialism of the East. 
This started with the Portuguese and Spaniards, then the Dutch, a bit later 
the English and the French; the Danes, Swedish, Russians, etc. somewhere 
in between. I am not referring to a chronological sequence. 
After a short period in which the Portuguese were “alone”, representa-
tives of nearly all these Western countries were “on the scene”. In difffer-
ent periods, diffferent intruders held the hegemonic position somewhere 
in Asia. The Dutch and the English were the most spectacular ones and 
covered the largest territories. All this seems obvious, but it is not. 
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For the opium history, complementarity is important. In some way or 
another, all foreign intruders played a more or less important roles, 
because after the Dutch brought large quantities of opium into the mar-
kets of several coastal areas in Asia, in due time all the others took over 
this lucrative initiative and spread the use of opium among a much larger 
population. The most successful were the English and their assault on 
China. 
This led to reactions among indigenous merchants (both inside and 
outside “their” countries) which again deepened the penetration of opi-
um with all its devastating social and economic consequences. 
All these interests competed with each other in reaching the custom-
ers, needing as many addicts as possible, lowering prices to enter the mar-
kets, and increasing prices once a monopoly position was achieved.
3.
Recently, the centenary of the Shanghai International Opium Commission 
of 1909 was commemorated in Shanghai with much pomp. The United 
Nations Offfĳice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) belonged, of course, to the 
organizing institutions. In many publications and websites this important 
event in 1909 nowadays leads to often contradictory comments.
It will be difffĳicult to discover the diffferences between 1909 and today in 
one of the fĳirst sentences of a report:
Although the original plan was to limit the conference to the situation in 
Asia, it was argued that the issue could only be addressed if all the major 
producing, manufacturing and consuming nations attended. A compromise 
that ensured that delegates only acted in an advisory capacity to their gov-
ernments allowed most of the colonial powers of the time to attend.3
China was in 1909 the only nation which could report progress in the 
prohibition of opium. It was at the time the country with perhaps the larg-
est production and, certainly, the largest consumption. However, the 
whole world knew that the British Empire was the most responsible party 
and which Western nations it supported in their drive to fabulous drug 
profĳits. 
In 1909 it was the British who objected against a realistic reporting of 
the drug relationships. The “poor addicts” stand was chosen to polish the 
3 On the UNODC website www.unodc.ord/unodc/en/frontpage/this-day-in-history-
the-shanghai-opium-commission-1909.htm.
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image of the British imperial producers, let alone the involved fĳinanciers, 
bankers, traders or American shippers. 
Of course, the other main producers-distributors like the Dutch or 
Japanese supported the British. Also in all following international confer-
ences, nothing was said nor researched about the backgrounds of these 
producers or fĳinanciers of the Opium Problem. It took 90 years before a 
program against money laundering could be started by UNODC in 1997, 
and only because the USA had launched the so-called War on Terrorism. 
The British objections in 1909 aimed at a bilateral agreement with 
China without interference by third parties. Offfĳicially, they promised to 
gradually eliminate their opium sales to China, while apparently expect-
ing that China would not eliminate its own poppy cultivation. As the 
British inspector Hosie could see and report: the Chinese government 
largely kept its word, to everyone’s surprise. Alas, in the period of the 
Chinese warlords until their defeat by the People’s Republic Army and the 
CCP, this promising result was largely negated. 
The centenary of the 1909 Shanghai conference also led to the publica-
tion of a history of this period. The preface by Antonio Maria Costa, 
Executive Director of the UNODC, starts with the following paragraph:
For those who doubt the efffectiveness of drug control, consider this. In 
1906, 25 million people were using opium in the world (1.5% of the world 
population) compared with 16.5 million opiate users today (0.25% of the 
world population). In 1906/07, the world produced around 41,000 tons of 
opium—fĳive times the global level of illicit opium production in 2008. ... 
the illegal production of opium is now concentrated in Afghanistan (92%). 
Same for coca. ...Today coca leaf production is concentrated in three Andean 
countries: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. International drug control can take 
some of the credit.
At the moment Costa has the best information about the drugs markets at 
his disposal. However, one may seriously doubt whether this is also the 
case for the historical data. Was, for instance, the world production in 
1906 ‘around 41,000 tons’? 
In 1922 the Opium Commission of the League of Nations estimated the 
annual world production at 3,515 tons. At the same time the Committee of 
Experts of the League estimated it as 8,600 tons, of which 5,000 concerned 
the Chinese production.4 This last fĳigure is also the bottleneck in the rea-
soning: for 1906 one expert gave 584,000 pikul as the total Chinese produc-
tion and another 76,063 chests, which decreased to 40,000 chests in 
4 Quoted by T. Tong Joe, p. 12, 13.
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1909-10.5 If one accepts that a pikul and a chest are both about 62 kg, one 
arrives at estimates for China alone between 36,208 tons and 4,716 tons, 
respectively (2,480 in 1909-10). An impossible result relative to Costa’s 
41,000 tons for the whole world; this apart from the temptation to show 
the absolute number of 1.5% and 0.25% of the world population in respec-
tively 1906 and 2008! 
4.
At the end of the 19th-century, both Asian and West European develop-
ments were interrelated in some way thanks to the following develop-
ments:
a. the Western chemical industry and science had replaced the herbal 
basis of drugs;
b. the Western pharmaceutical industry and science had replaced the tra-
ditional herbal knowledge and experience; 
c. the Western missionaries replaced the usual opium-is-good-for the-
Orientals into an opium-is-bad-for-the-Western moral (and, therefore, 
less good for the Orientals);
d.  the Western national states, based on moral and racist concepts, 
started to replace the liberal non-intervention of the state by increas-
ing intervention into the private lives of its own citizens. 
Interpretation Problem
1.
The “mechanism” for why the situation grew from bad to worse in French 
Southeast Asia can be summarized as follows. The French colonists, like 
all other colonial regimes, were urged by the mother country-state (which 
was attacked from all sides, including by the anti-opium lobby) to curb 
opium consumption and, therefore, the related criminality. At the same 
time, however, these regimes wanted (and were urged by the mother 
country) to increase the colony’s profĳitability. The moral wishes could be 
met and the greed of the colonial bureaucrats satisfĳied by increasing the 
prices on all levels and, therefore, negatively afffecting the “public” con-
sumption. 
5 Idem, p. 25; the last two fĳigures are from Holmes in note 4, which was published in 
the Encyclopedia Britannica.
the story of the snake and its tail 723
But if these bureaucrats were not personally involved in the smuggling, 
they had detailed knowledge about the smuggling they stimulated. The 
bureaucrats’ high monopoly prices stimulated the smuggler’s lower pric-
es, while increasing consumption and criminality. The strict oikoidal wish 
‘to remove the private profĳit motive that had encouraged consumption 
and addiction’6 had, therefore, the reverse efffect: opium smuggling in 
Indochina became more widespread after 1900 with the 100% state 
monopolies and was so strongly stimulated that it evolved into a real 
scourge. 
This criminality led to new state measures, (secret) military and police 
organizations, more widespread corruption or a stronger competition 
between the various colonial governments. Through this spiral the (colo-
nial) state and its (expatriate) bureaucrats proved their necessity: for a 
long period they had built up substantial experience with the smuggling 
phenomenon, especially with opium from the beginning of the 17th-cen-
tury.7 That this occurred only after the foreign powers themselves defĳined 
what was “smuggling” and criminality was silenced loudly. 
The problem is, of course, that the Western state and its self-styled 
monopoly is representative of the foreign conquering state only. Basic to 
this state is, fĳirst, the policy from the mother country that the main tasks 
of the colonial state are to organize the exploitation of the colony in favor 
of private interests in the mother country by means of securing the safety 
(military) and create the preconditions for continued undisturbed exploi-
tation (infrastructure works; legal facilities; police). The second policy 
guideline of the mother country immediately limits the fĳirst: the colony 
has to pay for itself. The third maxim adds to the efffects of the second one: 
the colony has to contribute to the wealth of the mother country-state. This 
last maxim led to an acceleration of the exploitation, which would have 
been unnecessary if the mother country had paid for its bureaucrats. 
Thus, the colonial bureaucrats (military, police, offfĳicials) had to remain 
very involved in the narco-military organization of the opium, cocaine, 
6 E. van Luĳk, J. van Ours, p. 1.
7 E. van Luijk, J. van Ours demonstrate how scholars can became ideologues of a 
specifĳic state policy. They had no realistic view on the efffects of state monopolies in this 
period but concluded (p. 16) ‘that the change in policy per se did indeed induce a substan-
tial reduction in opium use. Apparently, by taking over the opium market the government 
removed the profĳit motive to stimulate consumption’ (italics by authors. HD). Simply 
astonishing is the ‘lesson’ they derive from their analysis, ‘that the consumption of even 
addictive drugs is price-responsive, and a policy of socializing the hard-drug trade need 
not be as immoral as it sounds’ (p. 16, 17). What the state is doing cannot be immoral ...
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heroin, etc. trade because their own income depended on the drugs prof-
its, their own status in the bureaucratic hierarchy depended on the result 
of their work in the exploitation of the colony; their own possibility to 
make a fortune as an expatriate in the colony depended on their freedom 
to exploit an underground. It is only through fear and terror that this 
underground spread and gave these bureaucrats the freedom to fĳill their 
pockets undisturbed. 
The French colonialism was quite diffferent in its ideological setting 
from the Dutch or English. This concerned not only the superior position 
of the bureaucracy and its direct rule. In the East Asian setting it con-
cerned the way the model French gouvernement opium monopoly became 
organized in a highly centralized and repressive way. But the most aston-
ishing development was still to come.8 
2.
“Opium management” by the American state was handled by McCoy et al. 
as the introduction of the “surveillance state” at home, imported from the 
colony (Philippines), where the practice of it was tested in rather rigorous 
form. Based, however, on this new history of the opium problem, the 
mechanism could receive a more universal character.
In the fĳirst place the Portuguese started in the 16th-century with a sys-
tem of passports for all traders, so that their trafffĳic and the content of the 
cargo could be controlled. This was done to limit the Dutch or Arabian 
competition and “smuggling” (their defĳinition). The control was executed 
by Portuguese warships mainly in the Arabian Sea and along the Indian 
West coast.
The Dutch not only copied this system in the VOC period in the East 
Indies, but extended it much further in several ways. The Chinese traveler 
Ong-Tae-Hae reported that already before 1780, Chinese groups needed 
passports to travel around and to check whether they lived in “ghettos”. 
Apparently, this surveillance was introduced after the Dutch massacred 
about 20,000 Chinese in Batavia (1740), their main competitors in the opi-
um trade (instead of “pious consumers”) who were always accused of 
“smuggling”, etc.
The French introduced the Opiumregie system after about 1870 in 
Indochina. This was also copied by the Dutch and extended into a detailed 
8 A. W. McCoy et al. See also for an update on www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi011.htm 
based on the 2003 edition.
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control system of the private lives of the addicts and users, who needed 
specifĳic licenses. They established a special Opium police as well with an 
extensive and expensive surveillance apparatus with its own navy to con-
trol the many government opium dens and “smuggling”.
All these measures were a consequence of the opium monopoly posi-
tion of the states, which they spontaneously claimed for themselves to 
ensure regular revenues to sustain their offfĳicials, the state bureaucracy, 
the army and navy. They were in fact only directed against specifĳic foreign-
ers and added, therefore, to the general racism in the colonies and at 
home (the Dutch, English or French did not consider themselves as for-
eigners: the colonies were their property, weren’t they?).
The main efffect of all these practices was that foreign criminals were 
automatically created.
This was also the consequence of quite diffferent surveillance practices, 
which were described for the city government of San Francisco already 
around 1880, and foreshadowed the countrywide repression of non-con-
formist behavior of their own citizens by the Anslinger administration lat-
er. This is the fĳirst narco-policing of the own Western citizens. 
While the opium surveillance activities in the Philippines colony were 
directed to the specifĳic foreigners, in the San Francisco case their own citi-
zens became foreigners for the bureaucracy and its leadership. 
3.
At the end of Part 2 we showed how around 1900 the “British-Induced 
Opium Problem” had proliferated into a world drug problem, still with 
opium as its nucleus, but now with derivatives like heroin and morphine 
and alternatives like cocaine. The latter three products added brand-new 
techniques from a rather new technology (chemistry) to the opium pro-
duction and trafffĳicking. Before they left the German laboratories and fac-
tories (Bayer, Merck, etc.) or US gadget shops and created an immense 
drug problem, we had entered the fĳirst decade of the twentieth-century.9 
9 As was the case for opium, it is useless and ahistorical to refer to some old practice 
from Peruvian Indians for cocaine comparable to the qat chewing in Yemen, Somalia, etc. 
Certainly, the Spanish colonists did deal a bit with coca leaves like the Portuguese or 
Dutch with Papaver somniferum, but they never created a problem comparable to the 
Opium Problem, nor made coca into a business product outside the Potosi mines in 
Bolivia. Coca was used there to stimulate the miners to work harder and longer. The Span-
iards were much less commercially oriented than the Portuguese; they were the settler 
colonists who used drugs to extract more energy from the slaves on their plantations, 
mines, etc. No, cocaine was re-invented by German chemists as a new drug in the second 
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The problems related to these new chemical products became fĳirst and 
foremost confĳined to the Western world, in particular the USA. In addi-
tion, the whole infrastructure created by the opium production and trade 
through the offfĳicial and illicit channels has made it much easier for these 
new Western products to fĳind a world market. In reverse, the opium 
which was largely confĳined to the East Asian countries could now come 
much more easily into the Western hemisphere, not in the least because 
heroin and morphine are derivatives from the same Papaver somniferum. 
Therefore: without opium, no heroin and morphine. Indirectly, the enor-
mous fĳinancial profĳits created by the opium production and trade must 
have been the stimulus to give cocaine its very quick expansion.
To show how the West received “a cigar from the own box” and created 
many present world problems with its new chemical products, it is not 
necessary to go into detail about the chemical background and character-
istics of the products involved. The experience with opium and the Opium 
Problem was defĳinitely the basis on which the new products could be 
launched successfully. That happened in particular in the period 1900-
1940. What happened during and after World War II was an exponential 
growth of the same problem. 
4.
The chapter devoted to a History of the USA Opium Problem became a 
consumer-oriented story for two main reasons: after the Civil War the 
USA discovered a serious Opium Problem at home. The very fĳine 
Christians with their bright Bible knowledge who now occupied this ex-
British colony discovered nearly always the mote in their brother’s eye 
and never the beam in their own. Certainly, in particular the USA was 
increasingly the victim of massive opium imports from all corners of the 
globe. 
In addition, its own new pharmaceutical industry, mainly busy with 
opiates and cocaine-related medicines, contributed seriously to the med-
icalization of Americans. Secondly, the “side efffects” of this victimization 
were counterattacked in several ways:
a.  the prevailing view of the opiate addiction as a vice; 
b.  the guilt was largely placed on the back of the Chinese. At the end of 
the 1960s, a serious researcher of the narcotic problem wrote that 
half of the 19th-century and became a commercial product creating a Cocaine Problem in 
the beginning of the 20th-century. 
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there is a mystic scene of oriental opulence where languid mandarins gen-
tly pufff ivory-inlaid pipes, fĳilling the air with a sinister blue haze.10 
c. the pharmaceutical industry not only created part of the problem, but 
also came with the “solution”: medicines to cure and the experts to pre-
scribe these medicines (further medicalization); 
d.  the spiritual or moral experts had the same double-sided “face”: they 
created the “vice” and the “crime”, after which could come the solution: 
the religious prescriptions (of competing sectarians) and the establish-
ment of a rigorous legal and prison system; 
e.  the bureaucrats on the diffferent (competing) political levels created 
the “vice” by adding a big increase on top of the normal market prices 
through taxes and duties, which made the products so expensive that 
smuggling had to be organized which later was called the “under-
ground”, the “mafĳia” and “organized crime”. 
It is not surprising that David Courtwright concluded his in-depth study 
on the addiction problem before 1940 with a devastating criticism:
Another fundamental feature of American narcotic laws is that they were 
passed, interpreted, and defended on the basis of misleading, even fraudu-
lent, information. In attempting to assess the extent of addiction at diffferent 
points in time, I have necessarily considered a variety of offfĳicial estimates. 
These fĳigures consistently were shaded either upward or downward, 
depending on whether government offfĳicials were attempting to obtain 
more stringent regulations or defending the stringent regulations already 
in place. The ethic that intelligent narcotic policy should be predicated on 
accurate data was almost totally lacking prior to 1940 …11 
5.
The following table is appropriate here without much comment. It docu-
ments an important supply side of the Opium Problem and how the “bite 
of the snake” functions. It, furthermore, shows the development of that 
“cosy” Turkish opium scene for medical aims only of the 19th-century 
into a post-World War II global production center (see ch. 8). This scene 
has now defĳinitely lost its innocence. The expenses are related to bribes, 
travel and conversion; X in the fĳirst row is related to seed and labor. It is 
evident that there were more drug supply routes, but they did not difffer 
much in principle.
10 W. Eldridge, p. 1.
11 D. Courtwright, p. 7.
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Table 50. A Supply Side of the Opium Problem Around 1970 (in US$)12
Weight Buying Price Selling Price Expenses Profĳit
Opium
Turkish producer to 
fĳirst middleman
10 kg --- 180 X 180 minus X
First middleman to 
agent
--- 180 250 --- 70
Agent to Istanbul 
exporter
--- 250 280 --- 30
Crossing of Syrian 
border
--- 280 650 90 280
Cost of conversion of 
opium into base 
morphine
--- 650 850 60 140
Morphine
Crossing of Lebanese 
border
1 kg 850 1000 50 100
Refĳining of morphine 
in Lebanon
1 kg. 1000 1200 50 150
Transport to Beirut 
(couriers and 
accomplices)
--- 1200 1500 75 225
Beirut–Marseilles 
(couriers)
--- 1500 2000 100 400
Commission to local 
agent in Marseilles
--- 2000 3000 200 800
Conversion to heroin 
in Marseilles




--- 4000 7000 500 2500
Entry into US --- 7000 12500 1000 4500
American wholesalers --- 12500 22500 --- 10000
These are moderate wholesale prices; exaggerated fĳigures circulate widely 
like, for instance, 28,500 dollars a kilo in New York or 36,000 dollars a kilo 
in Chicago; the UN even calculated a street selling price of heroin of 
430,000 dollars a kilo in 1971 ! In the American streets at the time, pure 
heroin was sold in bags of 5 milligram for US$5. However, too often the 
addict had to pay this price for heroin “cut” with 50% lactose. Whatever 
the substance, 1259 people died as a result of a heroin overdose in 1971 
in New York alone. 
12 C. Lamour, M. Lamberti, p. 67, 68.
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What Could Be Done? 
This question was posed by Alfred McCoy at the end of a most thrilling 
and influential scientifĳic analysis of the modern opium problem.13 The 
painstaking way in which he uncovered the role of secret services like the 
CIA in the narcotic business as the main tool in a dubious and unsuccess-
ful foreign policy has undoubtedly produced shock-waves among largely 
embedded journalists, politicians and bureaucratic decision-makers. The 
cure of the “Commies Problem” in Asia, mainly directed against China, 
has become the Western nightmare no. 1. That it was proved once again 
how naively the new imperialists entered the international scene with 
conquering plans, fully overestimating their own capabilities, is one side 
of McCoy’s study; an important aspect, but still a side-show, in this history 
of the Opium Problem. 
Concerning this Problem, he demonstrated how from before World 
War II until the 1970s, Western governments and their bureaucratic insti-
tutions, in particular their police and army, were unable and too often 
unwilling to stop neo-colonial policies in which the narcotic business 
(always accompanied by illicit weapons deals) is a most important ele-
ment.
His study also had a moral incentive: ‘to end America’s heroin plague’. 
It is not McCoy’s fault that his nearly heroic attempt did not have the 
result he hoped for. ‘Obviously, something must be done,’ he wrote, pro-
posing to use one of the following three strategies:
(1) cure the individual addicts; (2) smash international and domestic nar-
cotics syndicates; or (3) eliminate illicit opium production. Since it is 
extremely difffĳicult to cure individual addicts without solving the larger 
social problems and almost impossible to crush the criminal syndicates, the 
only realistic solution is to eradicate illicit opium production.14 
One point can be made immediately: the fĳirst strategy does not concern 
my study, and there are many means available and experimentally proved 
for the individual curing of addicts. For the Asian countries the social 
treatment Chinese addicts got after 1950 seems to be the most successful 
one. In addition, however dramatic personal problems may be, they are 
minor compared to the problems related to the other two strategies. 
Therefore, we shall concentrate on them here.
13 A.C. McCoy et al., p. 354-362.  
14 Idem, p. 355.
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Many scholars followed McCoy’s example and documented the direct 
(and most often indirect) assault of British and American policymakers 
on East Asia, more specifĳically on China. Carl Trocki’s conclusion, twenty 
years after McCoy, is still correct, alas, ten years after his own well-known 
study:
Ironically, it was the combination of opium and warlords which on the one 
hand destroyed the Qing, but on the other sowed the seeds for the next 
opium plague, one which would sweep out of Asia and wreak a kind of 
poetic justice on the former colonial powers.15 
Indeed, the boomerang efffect of this kind of Western assault on Asia has 
received new a much broader empirical basis, a more complicated his-
torical explanation and meaning in this study. 
This opium history demonstrates that one thing never can be left out of 
consideration: to question the role of the state which hides itself in the 
West behind dubious Christian morality and policing or suggesting it 
would save its citizens from the bad world outside; it is a state which acts, 
once out of sight of its citizens, in (neo)colonies, as the worst violator of 
everything it stands for at home.
The Chinese history teaches us how difffĳicult it was to resist these 
attacks by the West, but it succeeded by partly copying the quasi-invinci-
ble strongest weapons of the West, its technology and dubious imports of 
opium. It demonstrated an efffective case of import substitution, in eco-
nomic terms, while half a century later a regime came to power which 
efffectively eradicated opium production, consumption and trade. An 
example to be followed by “the West”?
Other proposals to solve this opium problem are given time and again. 
They are mostly far from realistic. One has to consider the diffferent mar-
ket constellations also in the prohibition of private opium consumption 
in Western and Eastern countries, because in the former it was/is con-
fĳined largely to the well-to-do circles and in the East to the poorer ones. 
Addens’ reasonable four-point program to solve the opium problem was 
directed only at combating Eastern opium consumption: 1. an improve-
ment in labor conditions; 2. better medical provision for the population; 
3. control of the production of raw opium, including the prevention of 
illicit trafffĳic and 4. ‘above all, the fĳilling up of the spare time of the popula-
tions by recreation and sport for instance’.16 An interesting approach with 
15 C. Trocki (1999a), p. 171.
16 T. Addens, p. 86.
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reminiscences of the successful 1950 anti-opium programs in the new 
China. 
It is now 60 years later. The latest information about Chinese criminal-
ity refer ‘to the golden years of social order in the 1950s when ... it was not 
necessary to lock one’s door at night’.17 Whether this was a myth or not is 
not important here: if true, the present situation sketched seems alarm-
ing. The author writes:
About 40 per cent of the heroin from the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan ... is now trafffĳicked into China and beyond. The same percent-
age of the heroin originating in the Golden Triangle of Laos and Burma also 
flows into China ... The drug consuming market in China has exploded in 
recent years. 
The central thesis of this new study seems to be: “the market created the 
crime”, and this is utter nonsense. In modern China supply-demand rela-
tions for all products, services or information do not exist. That is the case, 
often for diffferent reasons, in most countries in the world! She apparently 
does not demonstrate the relativity and proportionality of her Chinese 
crime and execution fĳigures, for instance, by comparison with the “mar-
ket” society par excellence, the USA: her story feeds sensationalism.
But apart from all this, the author could know that her central thesis 
cannot be proved or supported: the reasons she mentions herself are 
revealing enough. Many crimes are committed ‘by itinerant rural workers 
fleeing the countryside, where there are too many people chasing too lit-
tle work’; there is ‘no criminal code’ only a ‘culture of punitiveness’; the 
corruption among police, party and government offfĳicials is widespread; 
large government anti-crime campaigns in the 1980s ‘were encouraging 
crime’; serious political struggles … 
All this has nothing to do with the Market (whatever defĳinition one 
uses), but with a serious malfunctioning of the state, provincial or local 
bureaucracies, fundamental urban-rural contradictions and discrepan-
cies in the basic care of the people (see further Addens’s proposals above). 
Specifĳically, drug criminals—social-economic criminals par excellence—
can easily fĳind out how to exploit all these bottlenecks. And, as in the case 
of the USA-CIA, a specifĳic Chinese foreign policy of supporting Burma, 
17 This quotation and the following data are from a review in the Times Literary Sup-
plement (28-1-2011, p. 10). This is the last information I could consult for this history of the 
Opium Problem. It concerns a study of Susan Trevaskes (Policing Serious Crime in China). 
Of course, this book falls outside the scope of my history.   
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Afghanistan, and Pakistan makes China vulnerable to accepting their 
main export articles: drugs.
Anyway, this is not covered by this History of the Opium Problem. A 
sequel should study the reasons why the Opium Problem in the “New 
China” became aggravated again. In this case, one can be pessimistic 
about the future to which Ahmed Rashid referred in the preface; an opi-
um future in the 1950s was for China still a ‘golden’ one. 
Map 20. CIA Map of International Drug “Pipelines”, November 2009
Source: en.wikipedia.org (Drugroutemap.gif) 
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APPENDIX 1
FROM RAGS TO RICHES TO RAGS, CA. 1775-1914
There were several theoretical approaches in the past (from world systems 
approach to dependence and neo-liberal theories) to try to understand the very 
imprecise concept of “globalization”. They were all too abstract, could not with-
stand empirical criticism and produced extravagant nonsense (Wallerstein, 
Gunder Frank). The practical idea of the commodity chain (Topik, Gootenberg, 
etc.) is much more revealing. It provides the opportunity to look in a proper way 
into the connections between production (labor), consumption and distribution 
(trade), including the interventions of state bureaucracies and similar institu-
tions or price fluctuations. 
It is surprising that no one has looked into the spectacular tea/pepper-opium-
silver, etc. chains, thanks to which we can add another important variable, the 
relationship between the diffferent “uppergrounds and undergrounds”. 
In theory, a commodity chain is certainly not enough by itself: in the links of 
the chain, it is important to look around and see how and why the existing net-
works there operate. That is much more complicated than just a flow of com-
modities and money. The important features in the chain and network “inspire” 
each other in making a realistic history possible. I hope that this book contributes 
to the making of a chain-network of the opium history.
A small compensation for this aim is the following answer to the question: Is 
it possible to make a numerical reconstruction of the whole process from plant-
ing the poppy in 19th-century India to consumption of opium in China? It could 
result in a chain of production, distribution and consumption starting with the 
poor peasant and ending with the poor consumer, while showing the main fea-
tures of the existing networks. Somewhere in between we can fĳind the fĳield in 
which enormous profĳits were made by the foreign bankers, traders and so on. 
Indeed, a chain from rags to riches to rags. In fact, this is overstretching the pos-
sibilities of the sources at the moment. However, much more and detailed data 
can be found in other sources.
The following must be perceived, therefore, as an efffort to pave the road to 
that result, in the hope that somebody takes up the challenge. For the time being 
the data given show a sequence of
*  planting of the poppy by the peasant;
*  production and circulation of opium in India;
*  work in a Patna or Benares opium factory;
*  sales of the end-product (raw or prepared opium) in public auctions in Cal-
cutta (or Bombay);
*  export from India to several destinations, but mainly to China;
*  import in Canton;
*  distribution (prices) in China;
*  consumption and addiction in China.
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The comments are confĳined to some explanation of the given tables. The excel-
lent Digital South Asia Library (DSAL) contains the historical statistics of British 
India from 1840-1920 (Statistical abstract relating to British India). They are used 
as the main source and correction of other sources. However, additional informa-
tion is badly needed. 
Diffferent authors often provide diffferent data while consulting the same 
sources. Sometimes contradictory conlusions are drawen. If they do not difffer too 
much, I leave it as it is. Otherwise I devote a short discussion to it.
Costs of the fĳirst treatments
In Bengal the British planted about 550,000 acres of poppy every year (= 2,225 
million square meters or 750,000 bighas).1 About 3/4 of this was irrigated. The 
average production is 4½ seer per bigha or 15 English pounds per acre, which 
makes about 60,000 chests in total.
‘There is, in fact, no crop known to the agriculturist, unless sugar-cane, that 
requires so much care and labour as the poppy’ (E. Balfour, p. 30). After which fol-
lows a detailed description of all the work and how it has to be done in the Malwa 
region. ‘One acre of well-cultivated ground will yield from 70 to 100 pounds of 
chick. The price of chick varies from three to six rupees a pound, so that an acre 
will yield from 200 to 600 rupees worth of opium at one crop’ (Idem). 
Next, this harvest underwent several treatments (separation of the oil, etc.) 
and ended with making balls of eight to ten ounces each. They are fĳinally packed 
in chests of 150 cakes; ‘the total cost of the drug at the place of production being 
about fourteen rupees per chest including all ex penses’ (Idem, p. 31).
Table 51. Expenses and profĳits of cultivating one bigha of Malwa opium ca. 1823
Expenses (rupees) Receipts (rupees)
5 seers of seed  0.9 5 seers (pukka) 40
manure  2 sale of seed (3 M.)  4
watching expense  4 total income 44
weeding, plowing, etc.  6
cutting and gathering  4 minus expenses 29.9
watering  6 minus village dues  1.8
linseed oil  1
rent to Government  6
Total 29.9 Net Income 12.15
Source: John Malcolm, A Memoir of Central India Including Malwa and Adjoining Pro-
vinces … (London: Kingsbury, Parbury & Allen, 1823), quoted in C.Trocki (1999a), p. 183, 
see also p. 68. 
1 See the very detailed data in J. Wiselius, (1886), p. 196 fff.
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A bigha corresponds to about 2/3 acre or about 2700 sq. meters. One seer is about 
1 kg. One Rupee is 2 shillings; it was devalued in 1899 to 1s 1d.
In the table are given the data for a “good season”. For a tolerable season the 
expenses were estimated at 31.10 rupees and the receipts at 32.11 so that a net 
income is left of 1.01 rupee. In a bad season a loss per bigha is estimated of 9 
rupees. Because in a bad season the prices of opium were probably higher, the 
loss may turn out to be a little less. 
The peasant could hope for a production of 4-5 seers (kg) per bigha and an 
income of Rs. 200 for about 14 bighas. Wiselius informs us that the Behar (Bengal) 
poppy planters received 25 shilling gross per year, reminding us that much is 
deducted ‘before the planter receives this money’. Per bigha the peasant is paid 
33-38 shilling gross. In Benares the peasants got more from their bigha, 38-42 shil-
ling gross.
In the 1870s the peasants gradually stopped working for the British govern-
ment and in particular the poppy production, since they preferred the better paid 
sugar, potatoes, etc. for the local Indian market: the British were forced to respond 
with an increase in the “poppy wages”. In addition, it is more expensive to buy 
Malwa opium in the independent states than Bengal opium on government con-
tracts. The former is nearly twice as expensive. There is also the trend, however, 
that the yields in Bengal decrease whereupon Malwa opium must be bought in 
order to sustain or expand the export. 
Production of opium in India and its market prices
In Bengal (NW Provinces and Oudh) in 1797, the total area of poppy cultivation 
amounted to 9,460 bighas, but nearly a century later it has increased to 928,241 
bighas (E. Balfour, p. 31).
In 1878-79 the total output in British India was 91,200 chests with an export 
value of £12,993,985, and the net profĳit to the British Indian Government was 
£7,7000,671 (Id., p. 30); about half Bengal and half Malwa opium. Of this about 
£1,000,000 was exported to Burma and the Malay settlements, the remainder to 
China.
From the year 1784 to 1801 the market price of crude opium from the cultivator 
ran from 16 to 21 salimshahi rupees per durri, a measure of 5 pucka seers, each 
seer being 90 sal. rupees. ‘This was the price of the drug by the grower in the fĳirst 
stage and a better criterion than that of the manufacturer in its prepared state’ 
(Id., p. 30). In 1801 this price rose to 25 rupees, in 1804 to 27, quickly increasing to 
42—its maximum—in 1809. Later it gradually fell to 29 in 1814, then rose again to 
33 in 1818; it reached 38-39 in 1820. 
For later years the following table documents the situation:
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Source: J. Wiselius (1886), p. 201.
The work in a British opium factory in India
There exists a painstakingly detailed description of the work in an opium factory, 
the Ghazipur Factory, forty miles below Benares. The writer is Rudyard Kipling, 
who visited the factory in January 1888.2 His friend was the Opium Agent at 
Ghazipur, Harry Rivett-Carnac. This man earned 3,000 rupees a month, equiva-
lent to £2,700 per annum. In that case, in 1888 £1 = Rupees 13.3; 1,000 Rupees is 
about £76.0. Other exchange rates are also available. At the time Kipling, who 
was addicted to both alcohol and opium, earned one-fĳifth of the wage of this 
Opium Agent.
2 R. Kipling. See for detailed information on Kipling’s trip www.kipling.org.uk/rg_
opium1.htm. Colonel Harry Rivett-Carnac held a ‘second-rate appointment—the opium 
commissionership at Ghazipore ...’ The Indian bestselling author of Sea of Poppies, Amitav 
Ghosh (2008), provides the present image of the opium factory (still running): ‘The Ghazi-
pur and Patna Opium Factories together produced the Wealth of Britain.’ Interview: www.
outlookindia.com.
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Public sales 
Table 53. Public Sales of Bengal opium of the EIC in Calcutta, 1787–1829
Year Chests sold Average price per chests 
In rupees
Results of sales 
In rupees
1787 3693 470 1 735 710 
1792 2982 525 (535) 1 884 624
1797 4172 426 (286) 1 777 272
1802 2840 1378 (1383) 3 913 520
1807 4208 1276 5 369 408
1812 4769 1955 9 323 395
1817 3552 1876 (2178) 6 663 552
1822 3360 2062 (3089) 6 928 320
1827 7461 1328 9 908 208
Source: J. Rowntree, p. 284, 285 statistical tables supplied by Maurice Gregory. The data 
are derived from the Report of the Royal Commission on Opium (1895), vol. 7, p. 61 and 
62. For the second column see also J. Richards (2002-2), p.159 (except for the year 1827).
One chest is about 140 lbs which difffers from 60–72 kg; one seer = about 1 kg. 
In the original tables the year is indicated as “1829-30”, which is here given as 
“1829”. The selected data indicate the sales or export or revenue in the given year. 
For all years see J. Rowntree, p. 284 fff. and J. Richards (2002-2), p. 159 fff.
Table 53 difffers sometimes considerably from the one given in C.Trocki 
(1999a), p. 65 of the same period. His fĳigures are given as well in brackets in the 
third column. Part of the explanation is that Trocki only provides Patna data, but 
this is not true for data after 1798. Further reasons for the diffferences are not 
known. The table from H. Morse (1926), vol. iv, p. 383 titled ‘Opium, 1818-27’ gives 
no information about which phase of the process is covered and is, therefore, 
useless.
From 1860 to 1880 the annual average production of ‘provision’ opium was 
50,154 chests, and in that period the price of crude opium varied from Rs. 4.8 to 
Rs. 5 a seer. The actual cost of a chest of Bengal opium ‘including interest on the 
capital and all indirect charges, is as follows:
‘68 seers 2 chittak at 75° consistence, equals 73 seers at 70° consistence at Rs. 5 per 
seer ....................................................... Rs. 365 (Behar.) ........... Rs. 341 (Benares)
Cost of manufacture and packing, interest on capital, charges for pensions, and leave 
allowance of offfĳicers     71      66
Total ................................................... Rs. 436 ........... Rs. 407
Being an average of Rs. 421’ (E. Balfour, p. 38). 
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Exports of Indian opium
This important subject is documented by many sources, and it could be expected 
that then the question would become crystal clear. Alas, the reality is diffferent. 
There is even the suspicion that many people have an interest to create a chaos 
to hide interesting backgrounds. To entangle the real constellation here would be 
too time consuming.
Table 54. Exports of Indian opium in chests (1829-1902)
Year Exports of opium in chests Net revenue to indian 
government in rupees
1829 9 678 (9 678) [16 257] ---
1832 16 083 (9 385) [21 985] ---
1837 29 679 (19 307) [34 373] 15 864 450
1842 35 887 (16 518) 15 765 810
1847 23 877 (23 877) 16 633 848
1852 61 157 37 179 320
1857 74 966 59 183 750
1862 82 217 61 991 980
1867 86 930 70 480 650
1872 82 934 68 704 230
1877 92 820 65 216 520
1882 91 800 72 167 780
1887 90 096 60 908 870
1892 75 384 63 906 840
1897 56 069 27 906 550
1902 65 603 48 649 985
Source: J. Rowntree, p. 286, 287 statistical tables supplied by Maurice Gregory. He derived 
these data from Financial and Commercial Statistics of British India, 10th Issue (Calcutta, 
1903); see also E. Balfour, p. 38, 39 for these revenues in £ for the years 1871-1881 and 
for 1800-1860. 
The fĳigures in parentheses in the second column are mentioned by J.C. Baud 
(1853), p. 214. The given diffferences are quite mysterious since two times similar 
data are given and three times much lower ones. This table also difffers consider-
ably from M. Greenberg/C.Trocki (1999a), p. 95. Their data are given in brackets. 
In this case the matter could be solved as follows: there must be a large diffference 
between data from the arrivals of opium from several sources in Canton and the 
export from India (see next paragraph “Destinations”). At last, this table difffers by 
50% from J. Richards (2002-2), p. 160-162.
Table 54 is, anyway, not clearly defĳined: is it the total export or only of Bengal 
opium? An answer is suggested by B. Lubbock (p. 286), who gave details about 
the sales during 1845. They were attended by contenders of fĳive nationalities: 
English, Scottish, American, Parsee and Hindi. The Bengal sales (Patna + Benares) 
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of opium were 21,526 chests and Malwa opium sales 18,321 chests ‘making an 
export for the year of 39,847 chests’. In the missing details of table 54, an amount 
of 36,942 chests is indicated for ‘1844-45’ and an amount of 20,553 chests for the 
year ‘1845-46’. It is not logical to choose ‘1844-45’ to compare with Lubbock’s data 
of 1845, as then a gap of nearly 20,000 chests must be explained. My suggestion is 
that in table 54 only the data about Bengal opium are given. The remaining difffer-
ence of nearly 1000 chests can be explained as follows: it must be the quantity left 
for consumption in India, or it is simply a typing error.
To get a better grip on these fĳigures, ten-year totals are calculated from the same 
sources as Rowntree reproduced. Although there is a question of defĳinition 
between the two, they are combined in the following table:
Table 55. Bengal Opium Export after Sales from India and Financial results of EIC and 
Government of India, 1787-1900**
Years Chests Results in rupees
1787–1800 51 427 25 764 000
1800–1810 39 474 55 302 000
1810–1820 41 788 84 687 000
1820–1830 48 464 90 990 000
1830–1840 228 507 159 123 000*
1840–1850 363 370 214 041 000
1850–1860 670 421 405 565 000
1860–1870 777 232 586 361 000
1870–1880 919 028 681 049 000
1880–1890 898 721 681 576 000
1890–1900 702 039 478 308 000
Totals 1787-1900 4 740 471 3 371 068 000
* During this decade in the fĳirst fĳive years there was no indication of the net revenue to 
the Indian Government. For the other fĳive years, the revenue was 67,425,000 rupees.
** The third column gives round sums. 
Let’s suppose that the 1870 rule of 1000 rupees = 100 pounds was appropriate for 
the whole period. Then the EIC and the British Indian government received from 
the sales of Bengal opium alone £337,106,800 largely as net revenue. During this 
period nearly fĳive million chests of Bengal opium were exported, which is 325 
million kilo. Together with the Malwa opium there must have been an export of 
about 600 million kilo of opium, if one supposes that the 1829 division (see 
below) is appropriate for the whole period. Can this estimate be substantiated 
further through data about the destination of the Indian opium? 
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Ill. 33. The Manufacture of Opium in India, 1900
Source: The picture is probably made in Ghazipur north of Calcutta by Bourne & Shepherd; 
www.plantcultures.org.
Destinations
The opium export from India was not only destined for Canton or other Chinese 
ports (Macao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, etc.). In this section many export data and 
destinations are given which should be made the subject of further research. In 
addition, we must remeber that Turkish opium also arrived in Canton, albeit 
much smaller quantities than Bengal or Malwa (C. Trocki, 1999, p. 95). In the 
given period it cannot be more than 10%, so one can expect that 600 million kilo 
also arrived in China during the 19th century plus one decade.
That century started with an Indian export of opium to China of 1500 chests 
(E. Balfour, p. 34). Baud provides data until the middle of the century, but alterna-
tive information about the pre- and post-Opium War period is necessary as well 
as about specifĳic years.
The following fĳigure 12 concerns the pre-Opium War period and the EIC per-
formance only.
It is worthwhile scrutinizing specifĳic years. Take, for example, the shipping 
expert Lubbock’s stories for 1829 or 1841. In short, he reveals the following.
1829
Lubbock mentions that in this year 7,006 chests of Bengal opium were received 
at Lintin, 137 chests in Macao. Furthermore, 6,542 chests of Malwa opium 
arrived as well. Of this kind of opium, 315 chests were brought to Macao. In a 
shipwreck 233 chests were lost. In addition, 700 chests of Turkish opium were 
brought to Lintin by American bottoms.3 The above list of Rowntree gives for 
3 B. Lubbock, p. 70.
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Figure 12. Indian EIC Export to China of Bengal and Malwa Opium, 1809-1839 (x 1,000 
chests) 
Source: H. Derks based on data from A. Le Pichon, 2007, p. 19; selected years. 
1828-29 an amount of 8,578 chests of Bengal opium. This means that about 1500 
chests or 15% were sold during the voyage from Calcutta to Canton, so that 85% 
went to China in this year. For the same kind of bookkeeping of the stocks and 
deliveries in 1833, see H. Morse (1926), vol. iv, p. 372.
1841
On the outward run to China, many clippers arrived fĳirst in Singapore. In January 
and February fĳive clippers landed in total nearly a thousand chests (924).1 This is 
about 4% of the total export, so 96% went to China. 
1 Idem, p. 241.
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Table 56. Export of Bengal Opium from Calcutta to Several Destinations, 1809–1850 in 
chests (selected years)







1809 3 200 --- --- --- --- --- 3 200
1811 3 600 --- --- --- --- --- 3 600
1813 3 300 --- --- --- --- --- 3 300
1816 3 376 (2,700) 74 213 62 583 42 4 350
1818 3 575 (2,900) 12 44 119 549 7 4 306
1820 3 591 (1,700) 57 797 45 657 5 5 152
1822 3 207 (3,300) 9 439 50 395 5 4 100
1824 5 365 (3,400) 65 294 73 1 258 31 7 086
1826 5 861 (3,800) 30 172 64 435 36 6 568
1828 4 903 (6,700) 18 62 23 1 582 7 6 554
1830 5 590 (7,400) 12 162 8 1 344 12 7 116
1832 7 530 (6,800) 12 162 5 1 842 13 9 385
1834 9 480 (7,800) 12 30 6 1 512 20 11 050
1836 10 493 (14,900) 12 132 19 2 107 2 12 734
1838 14 499 (19,600) 12 189 19 3 483 50 18 221
1840  5 817 728 46 19 11 424 123 17 410
1842 11 867 728 75 19 4 505 71 16 518
1844 14 709 728 222 19 3 822 39 18 792
1846 20 668 728 85 19 4 277 45 24 990
1848 27 870 728 50 19 4 352 15 32 287
1850 30 996 728 75 19 3 997 25 35 093
Source: J. C. Baud, p. 214. Instead of Strait Settlements he had «Pulau Pinang and further 
Eastwards». The 1809–1813 fĳigures and those in brackets are given by A. Le Pichon, 
p. 19
From this table we can learn not only the large diffferences between several 
 sources, but also that 75-80% of the Bengal opium on average was destined for 
China, 10-15% to the Strait Settlements and 5-10% to Java. In all the years 
together about 434,000 chests with Bengal opium were exported to the given 
destinations. During the First Opium War with China, the export to China 
decreased in 1839/40 to 3,755, and the next year it was 5,817. Afterwards, it 
increased very quickly. 
About the Malwa opium Baud provides much less data, as the following table 
shows. At that time it was still located outside British India. Under the heading 
‘To Elsewhere’ is meant export to Malabar, Goa or Mauritius. 
So with the exception of one year, all Malwa opium (about 95%) went to 
China. This was a total of 227,091 chests.
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Table 57. Export of Malwa Opium from Bombay to Several Destinations, 1809-1850 in 
chests (selected years)







1809  1 000 --- --- --- --- --- 1 000
1811  1 400 --- --- --- --- --- 1 400
1813  1 600 --- --- --- --- --- 1 600
1815   700 --- --- --- --- --- 700
1817  1 200 --- --- --- --- --- 1 200
1819  1 000 --- --- --- --- --- 1 000
1821  1 700 --- --- --- --- --- 1 700
1823  3 900 --- --- --- --- --- 3 900
1825  6 700 --- --- --- --- --- 6 700
1827  5 600 --- --- --- --- --- 5 600
1829  7 700 --- --- --- --- --- 7 700
1831 12 900 --- --- --- --- --- 12 900
1833 14 000 --- --- --- --- --- 14 000
1835 11 700 --- --- --- --- --- 11 700
1836 20 882 (15,400) --- --- ---   191 --- 21 073
1838 17 353 (14,800) --- --- ---   153 9 17 515
1840 12 022 25 --- --- 3 700 6 15 762
1842 18 521 --- --- ---   376 2 18 899
1844 14 883 --- --- ---   229 59 15 171
1846 17 389 --- --- ---   26 158 17 573
1848 21 392 --- --- ---   376 48 21 811
1850 16 513 --- --- ---  70 14 16 597
Source: A. Le Pichon, p. 19 for the years 1809–1835 and for the fĳigures in parentheses; 
the rest J.C.Baud, p. 215. The indication --- means: not available and/or not known.
Destination Ceylon (Sri Lanka)
Until 1815 Ceylon was a Dutch colony, but the central part of it was formally 
ruled by the Kandyan kingdom. In that year the English also annexed this king-
dom and started to govern the whole island. The fĳirst opium arrived as a luxury 
with them, because opium consumption among the Malay troops in the British 
army was high, and these soldiers were held in high esteem by the British author-
ities ‘but the use of opium rendered them unfĳit for service at an early age’ (C. 
Uragoda, p. 71). Apparently, a large part of the imported opium must have come 
from Malwa, because the British started to levy an exceptionally high import 
duty of 20 rixdollars per pound. Later this was reduced to 5 rixdollars, by 1840 it 
became one shilling per pound, and in 1885 even one rupee per pound. 
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Table 58. Growth of Opium Trade in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 1840/1900 in lb








Source: C. Uragoda, p. 70.
This enormous growth in the consumption can be indicated also as follows. 
Around the middle of the century, opium dens were introduced on Ceylon by the 
English government: the fĳirst appeared in 1850, a second came ten years later, 
but then apparently the sky was the limit: in 1890 there were 31, seven years 
later 56 and in 1907 already 65. Of course, the revenues for the government 
increased in the same way: from Rs. 4,100 to Rs. 122,189 in 1907 (Idem, p. 72). 
The anti-opium lobby made a lot of trouble about it later ‘against forcing opium 
on uninterested countries’ (Idem, p. 75).
Key position Singapore
Table 59. The Opium Smuggling of Singapore, 1835/1865 in chests (selected des -
tinations)
Country 1835 1841 1843 1845 1848 1852 1857 1863 1865
China 422 5 437 2 559 1 730 2 746 1 854 1 933 1 887 931
Indochina 4 429 281 329 518 464 209 160 153
Java 164 223 42 14 170 271 804 1 032 676
Penang and 
Malacca
61 131 57 163 139 257 263 449 400
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Total 1 285 7 550 3 974 3 196 4 547 4 069 4 188 4 558 3 081
Source: M. van Os, p.66 who copied the data from Wong, A Study of the Trade of Singapore.
After the Second Opium War was won by the British, the opium position of 
Singapore became less important. Hong Kong and Shanghai took over control, 
and from a British point of view there came an end to the smuggling practices. 
Furthermore, the use of steam ships made a stop in Singapore less necessary, 
with all the consequences for the entertainment industry. Still, there was a rea-
sonable compensation for this in the increased opium trade with the East Indies. 
The table gives no information about an “internal transformation”: the Bengal 
opium lost much of its dominant position to Malwa and in particular Middle 
Eastern opium. For this last sort, Singapore retained its key position for the whole 
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of Southeast Asia. The quick rise of the demand from Penang/Malacca (and the 
ignored Sumatra) is due to the growing influx of Chinese tin-laborers. 
Period 1910 to 1918
The British indicated (A. Hosie, vol. 2, p. 208) that from 1901-5 annually 67,000 
chests were exported, of which 51,000 went to China. It is unclear whether this is 
Bengal plus Malwa opium. In any case the period of serious reductions of the 
export to China started around 1907. The next table shows that 75% went to 
China (1911); at the beginning of World War I (1914) this decreased to 45%. A 
year later the entire opium export of India to China collapsed to about 10%. 
Japan and French Indochina remain strong clients during this war. For the Treaty 
ports the fĳigures for 1904 are also given as about £1.5 million, which doubled ten 
years later, but fully collapsed at the start of the war.
The next table gives the data about the same period but in quantities, in chests.
Table 60. “British” Indian Export of Opium to Various Countries, 1911/1920 (in £; selected years) 
Destinations 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1918 1920
French 
Indo-China
207 722 325 500 99 018 129 502 291 425 627 243 386 041
Java 386 825 362 120 383 408 472 199 282 252 ? ?
Siam 10 217 190 657 263 177 164 030 204 328 300 097 350 000
Hong Kong 3 963 264 3 019 858 2 400 084 1 084 093 110 712 77 772 130 234
Straits 
Settlements
1 692 053 1 099 801 704 870 226 500 80 572 83 023 112 880
United 
Kingdom
927 2 907 1 180 18 433 58 148 --- ---
Treaty ports, 
China
2 203 670 3 614 887 3 242 902 27 833 --- --- ---
Macao --- --- 236 420 18 295 --- --- ---
Japan --- 76 817 129 545 119 913 100 659 195 957 406 390
Other 45 565 36 420 15 659 19 223 47 543 21 064 74 717
Total 8 510 243 8 728 967 7 539 236 2 280 031 1 175 639 1 605 156 1 9060 262
Source: E. La Motte, p. 9 and 10 quoted from Statistical Abstract relating to British India. Exports of 
Opium and DSAL, 1910-1920 no. 164.
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Table 61. “British” Indian Export of Opium to Various Countries, 1911-1917 (in chests) 
Destination 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
Cochinchina* 805 875 2 690 2 035 3 440
Java 3 010 3 265 2 650 1 835 1 965
Straits Settlements 5 098 1 537 755 605 239
China** 19 575 4 061 1 000 734 500
United Kingdom 11 115 498 199 0
Ceylon 50 105 80 65 80
Mauritius 10 19 23 65 120
Other 2 815 1 929 3 160 3 248 2 366
Total 31 374 11 906 10 858 8 786 8 710
Source: E. La Motte, p. 48 quoted from Statistical Abstract relating to British India. Data 
on Japan are omitted for some reason.
* “Cochinchina” is about South Vietnam and, therefore, only a part of French Indochina.
** “China” must be Hong Kong, Macao and Treaty Ports together.
EIC ships from Calcutta to Canton, 1775-1820
H. Morse (1926), vol. II, p. 436-452 and vol. III, p. 389-398 gives long lists of EIC 
ships which arrived in Canton. They are certainly not all of the ships that came in 
China nor all of the English ships. In the 1775 to 1804 period, 499 EIC ships 
arrived (30 years). From 1805-1820 there were 311 EIC ships (16 years). Most of 
them brought chests with opium in the cargo, apart from the smugglers and ships 
of other nationalities. 
Import Trade of Canton, 1833 
Of course, this table concerns the import of only one year shortly before the out-
break of the First Opium War. Indeed, nearly half of the British import concerns 
opium. The Americans imported nearly as many “Western goods” as the British, 
but lagged far behind them in the opium import. A remarkable aspect is the 
American silver import. As discussed in ch. 6, the “Bullion Game” resulted in a big 
switch with the turning point in 1827: before then, the British had to pay for their 
tea by means of silver; later, the Chinese had to pay the forced opium import with 
silver. The following Chinese silver drain provided a good business for the 
Americans as this table shows. The table also demonstrates that 75% of the total 
import came from “Eastern products”. “The West” had not much to offfer Chinese 
consumers. In other years this disparity is even more obvious when all the other 
“Eastern goods” receive their notation.
Morse also gives the data of the export trade of Canton in the same year (1833). 
The total British export is 21 million dollars; 43% concerns tea, and now they 
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Table 62. Import Trade of Canton, 1833 ( in Spanish $)
Goods British American Total
Company Private     Total
Woollens 2 127 386  389 958  2 517 344   --- ---
Cotton goods  275 217  351 957  627 174   --- ---
Metals  112 643  48 915  161 558   --- ---
Furs ---  17 306  17 306   --- ---
Other Western 
products
---  118 584  118 584   --- ---
Total Western 
products
2 515 246  926 720  3 441 966 2 907 936  6 349 902
Cotton 1 842 332  4 884 407  6 726 739   --- ---
Opium --- 11 618 716 11 618 716  500 000 ---
Sandalwood 75  41 400  41 475   --- ---
Tin, Banka ---  92 192  92 192   --- ---
Pepper ---  190 757  190 757   --- ---
Other Eastern 
goods
---  1 344 448  1 344 448   --- ---
Total Eastern 
products
1 842 407 18 171 920 20 014 327  500 000 20 514 327
Total Goods 4 357 653 19 098 640 23 456 293 3 407 936 26 864 229
Silver ---  20 500  20 500  682 519*  703 019
Total Imports 4 357 653 19 119 140 23 476 793 4 090 455 27 567 248
Source: H. Morse (1926) vol. iv, p. 369; D. Meyer, p. 42 for the year 1828.
* In addition, there are bills on London for a total of 4,772,516 dollars.
export also silver and gold (valued at nearly 7 million dollars in 1833), the pay-
ments for the opium import (33% of the export)!
It is interesting to compare this table with the same one for the year 1820 in H. 
Morse (1926), vol. III, p. 383. Here the Company imported silver worth 2.7 million 
dollars, and Americans imported about the same amount. The value of the opium 
import (only ‘private’) in 1820 was 6.5 million dollars or about 45% of all goods 
(double that of all ‘Western Products’).
Prices of opium, 1800-1914
The fluctuation of prices was in the beginning clearly related to the smuggling 
activities until the First Opium War. In 1832, the year of the foundation of 
Jardine, Matheson & Co, the overall value of the opium export to China was esti-
mated at $11.6 million (£7.7 million). The market price of Bengal per chest in this 
year fluctuated between $940 and $625, Malwa opium between $720 and $490 
(A. Le Pichon, p. 19). After the Opium War the prices were “legal” for the Western 
appendix 1750
Table 63. Prices of opium per chest, in Spanish $ as given in Canton, Macau or Hong 
Kong, 1800-1880
Month–year Patna Benares Malwa
07 1800 557 525 ---
04 1805 1430 1430 ---
03 1810 1090 --- ---
(?) 1815 --- --- ---
12 1820 1550 --- 1450
04 1825 780 --- 580
03 1830 800 --- 745
07 1835 675 630 575
(?) 1840 --- --- ---
03 1845 640 580 ---
04 1850 510 515 595
04 1855 320 335 420
04 1860 782 770 600
03 1865 415 397 635
09 1870 580 540 570
04 1875 595 570 570
10 1880 610 --- 720
Source: C. Trocki (1999a), p. 81, 82. One Spanish $ = 4s 2d = about 2 Rupees; £1 = 4 dol-
lars until 1814, later one used the rate £100 = $ 416.67. The tael of currency at Canton 
was treated as equivalent to 6s.8d or £1 = taels 3 (H. Morse, 1926, vol. 1, p. xxii). 
merchants and tended to be leveled down in the mutual competition. Malwa 
opium, which was always perceived to be a lesser quality than Patna could reach 
the same quantities and sometimes even more. This does not relate, of course, to 
Malwa versus Bengal (= Patna + Benares) opium.
‘The average price realized on a chest of Bengal opium for the ten years ending 
1880-81 may be taken at Rs. 1280; the average profĳit ... may be taken at Rs. 1280-421 
= Rs. 859’ (E. Balfour, p. 38).
Another calculation comes from M. Greenberg, p.129: in 1821 the Chinese paid 
$8,314,600 for 4,628 chests of opium (Malwa and Bengal combined); this is an 
average price of $1,796 per chest. Two years later this price was dropped to $1,204 
per chest. The table above shows that much later the chest price mostly was 
about $400.
Shanghai, 1913
Ellen La Motte visited Shanghai in 1915/16 and gathered many data on the opi-
um business in the “native city” as well as in the International Settlements. The 
Chinese authorities were not allowed to enter, this, not in the least because of 
their nefarious reputation as “big opium dens”. In October 1907 there were 
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87 licensed opium shops in the International Settlement.2 Less than seven years 
later there were 663! In 1907 the average monthly revenue from opium licenses, 
dens and shops altogether was 5,450 taels. Seven years later the shops alone pro-
duced a revenue of 20,960 taels; in total in 1913, a license revenue was received 
of 86, 386 taels. Opium could be offfĳicially sold in taverns, foreign liquor sellers, 
Chinese wine shops, tea shops, a Chinese theater and a club, all apart from spe-
cial opium shops. Retail-prices are not given.
Production and Prices in China from about 1870-1914
E. Balfour, p. 29 gave the following fĳigures:
Manchuria  400,000 pikuls
Western China total   97,000    „
Western Hou-pe district    2,000    „
Eastern Sze-chuen   45,000    „
Yunnan   40,000    „
Kwi-choo   10,000    „
Most poppy production was not, as bold, in Sze-chuen (Szechuan) and Yunnan. 
In the former the ordinary price was 820 rupees for 133 1/3 lbs. avoirdupois. At 
Hankow it had risen to 930 rupees. 
The estimates of the Chinese production vary widely, because the authorities 
almost never visited the poppy fĳields. What Alexander Hosie did is very exclusive, 
and it gave his actions and estimates a wide audience. For the situation around 
1885, Wiselius (1886, p. 200) refers to an expert, Dr. J. Dudgeon, who stated that 
the Chinese production was 400,000 pikuls. A consul of Ichang estimated only 
200,000 pikuls. 
The price of North China opium per Chinese ounce was 2.8 to 3.2 taels; Malwa 
opium at New-chang 5.8 taels; Patna opium 5.4; Chinese 2.8.
Sze-chuen opium exported to the coast, to Hankow, in 1880 was 927 pikuls; at 
Hankow a ad valorem duty of 7 1/2 percent was added. 
In 1776 ‘the drug which cost in Calcutta Rs 500 the chest, was sold in China for 
500 dollars’ (E. Balfour, p. 33, 34).
After World War I the mafĳia (including the Sassoon family and the Ezra 
Brothers) could not hide behind the English legality of the opium import in 
China. From 1912 to 1916 a chest of Bengal opium increased sixfold in price, Malwa 
fĳivefold, because in a combined efffort these families had achieved a monopoly 
position on the Chinese market. These usurious prices were far above the world 
prices at the time: 
‘In 1914 a chest of Indian opium sold for 6,800 taels wholesale; 10,000 taels retail 
in Shanghai and 50,000 taels retail in remoter places. Shipped to a non-China mar-
ket, the same chest was worth the equivalent of only 500 taels’ (F. Wakeman, p. 36 
and p. 327 note 73).
2 E. La Motte, p. 39–43 quoting Shanghai Municipal Council sources, pamphlets and 
papers.

the dutch opium import, 1678 – 1816 753
APPENDIX 2
 THE DUTCH OPIUM IMPORT 1678-1816
J.C. Baud, one of the highest offfĳicials in the 19th-century Dutch East Indies, also 
acted as the fĳirst opium historian who luckily enjoyed gathering the necessary 
fĳigures. He is the source of the following data of the 17th, 18th and beginning 
19th-century opium import, mainly from Bengal. They can be compared with 
modern studies (Om Prakash). I have concluded that the totals are reliable; in the 
details many diffferences can be seen.1 
However, new investigations should be carried out. For instance, Governor-
General Speelman (from 1681-1684) estimated the sale of opium around 1677 in 
Mataram at 600 picul a year, which is about 78,000 pounds.2 The importer of this 
opium is not given, so we probably must conclude that Baud’s fĳigures, which are 
lower and certainly not confĳined to Mataram, represent Dutch imports only. N. 
Struick wrote that in 1640 the import weighed not more than 187 pounds and ten 
years later 648 pounds; again 27 years later the opium import was in full swing 
with 10,025 pounds. For the next year Struick mentions Baud’s fĳigure as given in 
the following table.3
For the whole of the 17th-century, the Dutch opium import by the VOC 
weighed about 2.5 million pounds in the East Indies alone; in the 18th-century 
this increased to nearly 13 million (12,634,145) pounds; until the middle of the 
19th-century it was 2.5 million (2,516,875). 
1 It is a pity that E. Jacobs’ many tables (p. 305–373) difffer in a way which cannot be 
discussed seriously. Although she knows Baud’s study, she apparently had other sources 
but did not indicate why she did not follow Baud. Her fĳigures difffer strangely from Baud’s. 
I think that the problem is centered in her methodology. She announces (p. ix) that her 
study ‘does not concentrate on a few years or decades, but ... [on] .. a “long” eighteenth-
century’. Her basic material, however, is exactly concentrated on a ‘few years or decades’: 
(1) Sep. 1711-Aug. 1713; (2) Sep. 1730–Aug. 1732; (3) Sep. 1751-Aug. 1753; (4) Sep. 1771–Aug. 
1773 which is even followed by a period of one year (5) Sep. 1789–Aug. 1790. There are also 
mis-calculations: previous tables in which sometimes opium is mentioned cannot be sum-
marized in the totalizing table 47 on p. 373. It remains, furthermore, in the dark what was 
done with all these fĳigures. See also the soft but relevant criticism of G. Souza (2009-1), p. 
115. 
2 F. de Haan, vol. 4, p. 14.
3 N. Struick, p. 8.
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Table 64. Dutch Opium Import in East Indies by the VOC, 1678-1745 (selected years)4 
Years Dutch pounds Years Dutch pounds
1678 67 444 1712 23 345
1680 35 847 1714 159 355
1682 52 181 1716 97 440
1684 74 810 1718 46 690
1686 17 302 1720 110 925
1688 55 533 1722 112 955
1690 63 525 1724 95 700
1692 92 699 1726 46 667
1694 117 067 1728 161 148
1696 105 733 1730 177 915
1698 186 306 1732 124 700
1700 69 020 1734 172 550
1702 60 538 1736 138 096
1704 145 870 1738 127 042
1706 95 864 1740 229 398
1708 --- 1742 108 508
1710 104 690 1744 153 090
At the end of the 18th-century, the VOC was sufffering from serious corruption 
and the many wars. In 1798 there came an end to its history, after almost two 
centuries. The Dutch Government took over all its debts and tasks and continued 
with the opium “business as usual”.
Table 65. Dutch Opium Import in East Indies by the VOC and Dutch or English 
Government, 1746-1816 (selected years)5
Years Dutch pounds Years Dutch pounds
1746 136 143 1782 76 250
1748 217 500 1784 59 550
1750 188 500 1786 184 650
1752 171 514 1788 153 000
1754 180 425 1790 126 750
1756 174 000 1792 34 500
1758 174 000 1794 248 196
1760 174 000 1796 130 000
1762 80 550 1798 153 495
4 J.C. Baud, p. 101, 102. D. Duco, note 117 p. 241 refers to Baud, p. 115 in which, however, 
the given fĳigures are not provided; in addition, the fĳigures as such cannot be correct. For a 
copy of Baud’s complete list, see E. Vanvugt (1985), p. 405–409. 
5 J.C. Baud, p. 158, 159. 
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Years Dutch pounds Years Dutch pounds
1764 62 700 1800 67 500
1766 119 850 1802 67 500
1768 119 850 1804 68 000
1770 108 000 1806 54 000
1772 108 000 1808 54 000
1774 108 000 1810 54 000
1776 81 300 1812 40 500
1778 91 760 1814 73 250
1780 122 870 1816 73 250
Table 66. Dutch Opium Import by the Dutch Government on Java and Madura only, 
1817-1850 (selected years)6
Years Dutch pounds Years Dutch pounds
1817 68 750 1835 58 125
1819 68 750 1837 52 250
1821 99 625 1839 52 250
1823 60 125 1841 53 250
1825 35 875 1843 54 525
1827 64 000 1845 54 625
1829 72 125 1847 50 625
1831 60 250 1849 52 500
1833 52 875
Table 67. Total Dutch Opium Imports in the East Indies, 1678-1850
All years 1678-1700: 1 853 578 Dutch pounds weight
All years 1700-1722: 2 196 657 " "
All years 1722-1745: 3 402 073 " "
All years 1746-1769: 3 506 954 " "
All years 1770-1795: 3 092 416 " "
All years 1796-1816: 1 573 460 " "
All years 1817-1839: 1 452 000 " "
All years 1840-1850: 586 125 " "
Totals 1678-1745: 7 452 308 Dutch pounds weight 
Totals 1746-1816: 8 172 830
Totals 1817-1850: 2 038 125
Totals 1678-1850: 17 663 263 “ “ “ 
6 Idem, p. 172. 
Table 65. Continued.
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APPENDIX 3
THE AMPHIOEN SOCIETY SWINDLE
The VOC opium business in the 18th-century was organized as follows: the VOC 
bought the raw opium in Bengal (see appendix 2) and sold it in Batavia to its cli-
ents, the opium dealers, in an auction. The latter distributed it further among the 
opium consumers in the archipelago, mainly Java.
The Amphioen Society (AS) opium business was organized as follows: the 
VOC bought the raw opium in Bengal and sold its distribution monopoly to the 
AS who sold it in Batavia to its clients, the opium dealers, in an auction. The latter 
distributed it further among their clients. The AS was, therefore, a brand new 
player in the opium market and acted as intermediate trader or middleman. This 
made the chain more complicated and raised the price for the consumer. That is, 
if the number of the consumers remained the same. After 1745 the opium dealer 
not only had to pay the usual purchasing price of the VOC + the VOC costs + VOC 
profĳits, but also the AS purchasing price + AS costs + AS profĳits. More than ever, 
the opium dealers were, therefore, highly motivated to increase the number of 
consumers. 
VOC opium trade AS opium trade






















1721 927 175 790 850 4.51 1745 975  136   633 650 4.65
1722 356 52 152 430 2.92 1746 1200  174   800 670 4.6
1723 941 136 197 210 1.45 1747 1500  218  1000 670 4.59
1724 1113 163 315 280 1.93 1748 1428  207   911 640 4.4
1725 597 87 49 80 0.56 1749 1300  189   817 630 4.32
1726 822 119 324 390 2.72 1750 925  134   569 620 4.25
1727 434 63 171 390 2.71 1751 1199  172   609 510 3.54
1728 1251 181 552 440 3.05 1752 1090  160*   585* 540* 3.66*
1729 985 143 391 400 2.73 1753 1243  180   618 500 3.43
1730 1039 151 380 370 2.52 1754 1295  188   667 520 3.55
1731 1005 146 375 370 2.57 1755 1200  174   634 530 3.64
1732 1405 204 691 490 3.39 1756 1200  174   679 570 3.9
1733 370 54 150 410 2.78 1757 1200  174   733 610 4.21
1734 1354 196 482 360 2.46 1758 1200  174   756 630 4.34
1735 974 141 337 350 2.39 1759 1200  174   974 810 5.6
Table 68. Opium performance of the VOC and Amphioen Society (AS), 1721-1768
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From 1722 onwards, Baud’s fĳigures (previous appendix) are in variance with 
those used by J. de Jonge from less than thirty years later. I do not know why this 
happened. The diffferences are, for instance, of a magnitude in 1722 of 112,955 
(Baud) and 51,620 (De Jong). A possible explanation could be that in the usual 
VOC notation of “1722/23” one takes the fĳirst and another the second year. For a 
longer period this difffĳiculty could be negated. Take, for example the period 1728-
1737. It leads in Baud to 1,423,436 pound weight against in De Jong to 1,507,778, 
which is still a diffference of 5-6%. 
Another explanation is that Baud used a Batavian administration and De 
Jonge one in Amsterdam. In that case a new source of swindle could be indicated.
The AS existed until 1794. During this half century it kept to its obligation to 
buy at least 1200 chests from the VOC for only seven years.
Table 68. Continued
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1736 1227 178 601 490 3.38 1760 1200  174   714 600 4.1
1737 788 114 614 780 5.39 1761 537  81   232 430 2.86
1738 668 98 386 580 3.94 1762 210  32   108 510 3.38
1739 997 145 640 640 4.41 1763 418  63   209 500 3.32
1740 1090 158 331 300 2.09 1764 508  76   208 410 2.74
1741 1062 154 512 480 3.32 1765 799  120   352 440 2.93
1742 1532 225 1415 920 6.29 1766 937  141   312 330 2.21
1743 1011 147 1064 1050 7.24 1767 799  120   297 370 2.48
1744 1000 145 1064 1060 7.34 1768 511  77   347 680 4.51
Total 22131 3374 11981 540 3.55 Total 24074 3505 13499 560 3.85
Source: J. de Jonge, vol. 11 (1883), p. 106-116; numbers with * are estimates.
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APPENDIX 4
FROM VOC OPIUM TO RAFFLES’ HERITAGE
In the Dutch language there is a translation of an abridged version of Rafffles’ 
famous History of Java by J.E. de Sturler, De Geschiedenis van Java (1836). Sturler 
served the Dutch government in the East Indies for about twenty years. In the 
end he was ‘resident of a substantial part of Java’ (p. vii). All fĳigures below are 
derived from this edition, because in the English original of 1817 these data are 
not given (not, at least, in the edition I had to study). 
In the introduction to de Stuler’s translation (p. xvii-liv), several “budgets” are 
given, which are reproduced here. They concern the years 1795-1815 and provide 
a specifĳic perspective on what happened in the Dutch East Indies in those years. 
They clearly show how important opium was in the economic life of the colony. 
In the discussion about these “budgets”, Rafffles also referred to previous centu-
ries in order to show how advantageous the British government of Java was.
In 1791 a commission was sent to the East Indies by a Dutch “Parliament” (Staten 
van Holland) to investigate how profĳitable (or not) the VOC was. According to 
Rafffles, this commission was installed to introduce ‘free trade’ on Java. Ultimately, 
it proposed to ‘free for private trade’ only Bengal and the Coromandel coast (at 
the time fully controlled by the British), whereas Java was perceived as more 
closed for private trade to counteract the British competition. 
This points again to one of the largest misunderstandings in the current histo-
riography, as if colonialism and imperialism were merely side-efffects of capitalist 
free trade. 
The mission also published the following result.
It is called a budget, but it was a list of actual incomes and expenditures dis-
covered by the commission. It announced that the fĳigures ‘exclude the direct 
trade with China’, but nowhere is the extent of this trade given.
Table 69. Incomes and Expenditures of the VOC in 1795 (x guilders)
Incomes Expenditures
General rights and taxes 2 350 000 For the “overhead” of the expenses:
Freight VOC ships  50 000 on Cape of Good Hope  150 000
Additional incomes  460 000 in Bengal  33 120
1. Profĳits on the trade in India*: in Surat  40 000
opium 1 250 000 Army East Indies  2 571 314
tin  228 000 Wages for civilians  1 000 000
mace  43 000 Ammunition, etc.  100 000
nutmeg  90 000 Repair of buildings, etc.  400 000
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Incomes Expenditures
clove  420 000 Rent praus, etc.  200 000
Japanese copper  292 000 Hospitals  100 000
Profĳits on the trade in Surat: Confĳiscations  18 000
sugar  190 000 Presents to local princes  32 000
camphor  10 000 Interest on Indian loans  100 000
tin  18 000 Transport of VOC goods  200 000
Profĳits in Japan:  76 000 Unforeseen expenses  100 000
Profĳits in Coromandel:  33 000 Indigenous products  4 519 400
2. Profĳits on the return cargo: Insurance on shipments to 
Indie
 212 700
cofffee 6 813 281 Freight return cargos  3 300 000
pepper 1 958 273 Sea insurance in Indie  200 000
tin  196 365 Shipments in Indie  699 030
cotton yarn  99 750 Transport 2320 soldiers and 
civilians
 219 240
indigo  110 580 Return trip 450 people  28 350
sugar 1 767 000 Earnest-money for 2020 
military
 303 000
salpetre  385 605 Gratifĳication for 300 
civilians
 60 000
sapan wood  61 560 Recognition to Admiralty  360 000
cowries  40 584 Contribution to Admiralty  500 000
camphor  65 025 Total cost of VOC in Europe  1 000 000
cardamom  18 810 Annual interest  4 758 000
tamarind  43 700 Dividend of 12½% to 
participants
 831 000
arack  46 000 --- ---
cinnamon 2 000 000 --- ---
clove  812 500 --- ---
mace  937 500 --- ---
nutmeg  561 000 --- ---
Bengal piece goods  970 000 --- ---
Surat piece goods  550 000 --- ---
Freight and recognition duties 
on private trade
 200 000 --- ---
Total incomes 23 087 533 Total expenditures 22 035 154
Source: T. Rafffles, Geschiedenis van Java, p. xxxiv
* In the logic of the table, I suppose, it concerns here India (in practice Bengal), although 
a term like “Indie” is ambiguous (tin in India?); the later-mentioned “Indische retourladin-
gen/ return cargo” must refer to the “Dutch” East Indies.
Table 69. Continued
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The advantage (“Batig Slot”) is here, therefore, not more than fl. 1 052 379. It is 
obvious that if proper bookkeeping had been exercised, a substantial negative 
outcome would have been the result. (Example: if only the depreciation on ships, 
fortifĳications, etc. or losses in quality and quantity of products or plantation man-
power were considered, the expenditures should have been in excess of 30 mil-
lion). It is remarkable that nearly a quarter of all given expenditures refers to 
interest on loans and dividends for the members of the Opium Society (see previ-
ous appendix), while another quarter is spent on the repression machine of the 
army and navy. Thus, the main elements of the narco-military constellation are 
present.
It is unclear which status such a table had. One may expect that it is an overly 
optimistic estimation to support the decision to go on with the VOC. It is impor-
tant that “parliamentary research” in 1795 led to it. Based on these fĳigures, the 
conclusion was drawn that the VOC show must go on, the trade has to be extend-
ed and the costs reduced. 
The table documents diffferences between the inter-Asian trade (everything 
mentioned under 1; my addition) and the trade directed to Europe. Opium is still 
the largest source of income in this inter- Asian trade (nearly 50%). Of course, this 
is not the case if the total picture is considered. However, before the profĳit of e.g. 
cofffee could have been fĳigured in, it would have been sold in Europe. Therefore, 
the reasoning is not appropriate (or much less so): opium was not important 
for the Dutch in the exploitation of the archipelago. On the contrary: as demon-
strated below, the opium business was extended in a remarkable way, notwith-
standing the complaints of decision-makers like Van Hogendorp, Daendels or 
Rafffles. 
Rafffles used the following table to demonstrate how the profĳits of the VOC 
diminished decade after decade and fully disappeared in the end. It is an appro-
priate answer to the previous table and its authoritative authors. 
Table 70. Accumulated Profĳits and Losses of the VOC 1613-1693 (x guilders)
1613–1653 1613–1663 1613–1673 1613–1683 1613–1693
Total profĳits 101 704 417 142 663 776 206 072 335 259 250 069 322 735 812
Total expenses  76 177 735 117 616 961 161 271 745 212 282 020 274 416 305
Pure profĳit  25 526 682  25 046 815  44 800 590  46 968 949  48 319 507
Source: T. Rafffles, Geschiedenis van Java, p. xxv
In this way it was also estimated that the pure profĳit 
from 1613 to 1697 was only   38 696 527
 to 1703 “ “  31 674 645
  to 1713 “ “  16 805 598
 to 1723 “ “   4 838 925
 to 1724 “ “   1 037 777 
 to 1730 “ “ –  7 737 610
 to 1779 “ “ – 84 985 425.
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Again ten years later the loss of the VOC was 74 million guilders, which again 
increased to 85 million, of which 68 million was loaned by ‘the Dutch nation’ (see 
the interest to be paid by the colony to the metropolis in the previous table).
A new era was starting after the French Revolution and the subsequent occu-
pation of the Netherlands by Napoleon. One of the most important Dutch col-
laborators of the French, Daendels, became the new Governor-General in the 
East Indies. 
Table 71. The Budget of Governor-General Daendels ca. 1808 (x 1000 rixdaalder and 
guilders)
Receipts Costs
rixd.    fl rixd.        fl
Landrent 2 000 5 000 Wages civilians 1 000 2 500
Opium 1 120 2 800 Army 1 227 3 068
Cofffee 4 500 11 250 Ammunition making 180 450
Pepper 160 400 Navy 250 625
Tin 400 1 000 Fortifĳications, etc. 200 500
Japanese copper 250 625 New works 400 1 000
Spices 1 000 2 500 Law and police 150 375
Wood 250 625 Carrying trade 300 750
Rice 250 625 Transport military, etc. 300 750
Others 500 1 250 Indigenous products 300 750
Packing, etc. 100 250
Interest 400 1 000
Unforeseen 903 2 258
Total receipts 10 790 26 975 Total costs 5 790 14 475
Source: T. Rafffles, Geschiedenis van Java, p. liv
This time the ‘pure profĳit’ is, therefore, estimated at 5,000,000 rixdaalder or 
12,500,000 guilder. Whether this corresponds to reality is doubtful after the seri-
ous losses in the previous period and the fĳigures in the following table. It is safe to 
say that here the intentions of the new Governor-General are shown. 
Again opium is among the highest sources of income: 12% of the total income. 
Daendels needed more than twice as much as the 1795 commission; the military 
involvement was twice as great as well (50% of all costs concern repression). The 
narco-military elements were potentially more expressed. 
At the end of De Geschiedenis van Java, an interesting comparison is added 
between the period before Daendels, Daendels’ government and Rafffles’ govern-
ment. For the opium history it is not necessary to reproduce the entire table. 
Therefore, the given totals/losses are not the additions of the given subjects; the 
results are added by me.
One difffĳiculty is that under Rafffles the ‘Javasche Roupij’ (Java rupee) was 
introduced to replace the Dutch rijks(rix)daalder (nearly 2.5 guilder) and guilder 
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currency. To make a comparison possible, I have converted rupees to guilders in 
rounded fĳigures. 
What is the conversion rate? The answer could be very complicated according 
to J. Bucknill, p. 195 fff. and passim; the Wikipedia article ‘Netherlands Indies gul-
den’ is also helpful (see also J. Bastin, p. 19 fff.). Around 1765 the silver rupee was 
worth 30 stuivers (= 30 x 0.05 guilder) while a rixdaalder was 48 stuivers (stiver) 
and the guilder 20. Thirty years later this was more or less the same. 
The value the new silver roupij - rupee received from Rafffles’ government 
seemed to be 30 stuivers (stivers) or 120 duits (doits). Rafffles experimented also 
with copper, tin and paper money. I have chosen to use this last given value, but 
also to provide the Java roupij fĳigures, in case a diffferent conversion rate becomes 
necessary. 
Table 72. Comparison between the periods before, during and after Daendels’ govern-
ment (x 1000 roupij and guilders)
Before Daendels came
1802-1803 1803-1804 1804-1805
Subjects    Roupij Guilders  Roupij Guilders Roupij Guilders
Landrent --- --- --- --- --- ---
Leases 594.3 891.5 595.3 892.9 762.4 1 143.6
Opium 54.5 81.8 54.4 81.7 61.3 91.9
Taxes and duties 532.7 799.1 520.7 781.1 616.4 924.6
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Totals 2 226.4 3 339.6 1 979.2 2 968.8 2 458.8 3 688.2
Costs 1 631.9 2 447.9 2 240.9 3 361.4 1 819.4 2 729.1
Results 594.5 891.7 -261.7 -392.6 639.4 959.1
During Daendels’ government
1808-1809 1809-1810 1810-1811
Subjects Roupij Guilders Roupij Guilders Roupij Guilders
Landrent 34.7 52.1 34.7 52.1 23.8 35.7
Leases 288.5 432.8 720.2 1 080.3 558.2 837.3
Opium 1.5 2.3 215.8 323.7 549.1 823.7
Taxes and duties 290.2 435.3 182.5 273.8 515.7 773.6
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Totals 2 056.3 3 084.5 2 632.9 3 949.4 3 440.4 5 160.6
Costs 86.1 129.2 2 290.1 3 435.2 3 547.2 5 320.8
Results 1 970.2 2 955.3 342.8 514.2 -106.8 -160.2
During Rafffles’ government
1812-1813 1813-1814 1814-1815
Subjects Roupij Guilders  Roupij Guilders Roupij Guilders




Subjects Roupij Guilders  Roupij Guilders Roupij Guilders
Leases 1 518.3 2 277.5 1 025.1 1 537.7 1 090.9 1 636.4
Opium 614.1 921.2 583.3 874.9 375.3 562.9
Taxes and duties 953.2 1 429.8 672.3 1 008.5 442.6 663.9
Totals 4 995.9 7 493.9 5 418.7 8 128.1 6 549.6 9 824.4
Costs 3 707.9 5 561.9 2 171.7 3 257.6 1 571.4 2 357.1
Results 1 288 1 932 3 247 4 870.5 4 978.2 7 467.3
Source: T. Rafffles, Geschiedenis van Java, appendix
A few conclusions relevant for the opium history are the following:
1. Before Daendels, the opium income nearly doubled in two/three years’ time.
2. During Daendels’ government the opium income became nearly ten times 
larger than in 1804 and more than doubled within the two years 1809-1810! The 
fĳigures of 1808/09 are not reliable; the diffferences in all respects with the sub-
sequent periods are too large.
3. During Rafffles’ government the opium income increased once, but then 
decreased substantially, while still remaining six times higher than “before 
Daendels”. 
4.  Compared to the previous period Rafffles’ government is generally much more 
profĳitable, notwithstanding the decrease of the opium income. This trend is 
not continued. On the contrary: the opium incomes of the new Dutch colonial 
state increased sky high, along with the general budget problems. 
Table 72. Continued.
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APPENDIX 5
THE FRENCH AND DUTCH OPIUM FACTORIES
Probably the oldest modern opium factory is the Bengal one in Gaziphur (1820), 
which is still in operation: in 2008 it produced for the USA and Japan together 
not less than 200-250 metric tonnes of opium (Wikipedia)! This is twice the total 
sold in the whole of Ceylon and Southeast Asia in the best year of 1926. 
Impressions of this early factory (Patna, 1850) are given on p. 62.
However, the French opened the last factory in the craftsmen era and the 
Dutch, the fĳirst in the machine age. In addition, they both functioned within the 
new Opiumregie system. This was developed in the French Southeast Asian colo-
ny of Cochinchina. 
From both factories specifĳic numerical data are given below, to show how 
they operated in detail. First, the French opium factory (bouillerie), which oper-
ated from the revenue farm period and came under the Opiumregie in 1881. It was 
established ca. 1874 in Cholon near Saigon. 
The production process was carried out largely with manual labor. It followed, in 
short, the steps described in detail in W. Groeneveldt’s report (p. 46-49).
The raw opium arrived in the harbor of Saigon from Bengal and was immedi-
ately brought to the storehouse of the tjandoe factory. It was packed in chests of 
40 balls. The quantity of the balls needed is carried to the fĳirst section of the fac-
tory (bouillerie d’opium), in which four large stoves (fourneaux pour grandes bas-
sines) are situated, each provided with two large kettles of 300 liters for opium 
water. The water is used for boiling the opium and later the peelings of the balls 
for making the écorces (opium bark), a product which was in high demand among 
poorer people. In this part of the building there were also other stoves, each with 
34 fĳireplaces (altogether thus 136).
The laborers started by cutting the balls in two and taking the opium out of 
them with wet hands; the peelings were put aside for later boiling, while the 
inner parts were fĳirst boiled in the large kettles. The opium content of 2½ balls 
was put in a copper pan (52 x 12 cm) together with four liters of opium water and 
boiled on a charcoal fĳire until sufffĳiciently concentrated. After it was removed 
from the heat, stirring continued to prevent the substances from sticking to the 
wooden spoon. From this a ball was prepared, and two of them had to fĳill a pan.
This stage took two hours, and then a new procedure was started. The pan was 
put upside down on a soft charcoal fĳire, whereupon the substance fell apart in 
small slices which were removed immediately. These black-brown “pancakes” 
(crêpes) were so crispy within a few minutes that they fall apart if touched. The 
pieces were gathered in other copper pans (69 x 18 cm), each containing the 
equivalent of fĳive balls. Twelve liters of opium water were added, and after soak-
ing for about 18 hours, the “pancakes” had disappeared.
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This result was fĳiltered twice after the substance was boiled on a hot charcoal 
fĳire. After 2½ hours it was beaten until it was cold. The fĳinal product was weighed 
and transported to the factory storage.
In the store it was saved for four months in large, closed, copper barrels (300 
liter), fĳilled halfway so some fermentation could take place. After this period the 
tjandoe with a 9.15% morphine content was ready to be packed. This was done in 
flat square boxes, and the cover was fastened by a drop of solder. 
 












Quantity in thails Opium revenue 
 x 1000 $*
Tjandoe Écorces Tjandoe Écorces
1881 350 616 --- --- ---  --- ---
1882 560 601 24 159 716 604 31 406 1 252 43
1883 725 544 29 000 886 589 42 630 1 532 37
1884 956 578 37 758 1 156 003 51 082 1 697 35
1885 850 568 33 038 1 040 068 43 419 1 763 54
1886 1050 543 40 904 1 276 711 61 061 1 891 44
1887 1070 511 38 080 1 192 372 50 638 1 840 53
1888 850 498 31 385 958 459 66 250 1 724 58
1889 800 512 30 609 957 213 71 402 1 407 58
* This $ is not an American dollar, but the indication of piasters. One piaster in this period 
is valued at 5.55 French francs; until 1913 this is nearly equal to 1 US$. 
 
The Dutch Opium Factory in Batavia was established in 1898 following a secret 
proposal of W. Groeneveldt (1890). Many discussions for and against exist (J. 
Rush, chapter 10 and 11). About the technicalities of such a factory, the opinions 
of Groeneveldt, Struick, Haak or Winselius varied widely. The fĳirst had studied 
the case the best. 
A most important aspect of this debate concerned the morphine content of 
the raw opium and of the tjandoe made from it. Today a normal, unadulterated 
opium of any type, in the air-dry condition, usually has between 8% and 19% of 
morphine. The principal commercial opiums generally have approximately the 
following morphine contents: Yugoslavia 15%; Turkey 13%; Iran 11%; India 11% 
(www.poppies.org). 
In the Groeneveldt debate Haak wrote 
‘that from one catty (16 thails) raw opium 8 thails tjandoe are derived, so that the 
good quality tjandoe (from Bengal opium) has to contain at least 16% morphine, if 
during the process no morphine is lost. According to the same calculation the Levant 
opium must give a tjandoe of 26% and more morphine content. However, Haak 
found in the tjandoe of the lease contracts [in East Indies. H.D.] ... not more than 
1 The table is a combination of the tables from W. Groeneveldt, p. 44, 49 and 63.
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8.85 % morphine, because—according to him—this was mixed with other ingre-
dients to increase the weight. Now, if the Opiumregie should make tjandoe without 
such a mixture, the users would get tjandoe with 20-30% morphine, which is to a 
large extent ruinous for them.’2 
Therefore, Groeneveldt wisely proposed that the factory produce tjandoe of 
about 10% morphine content. During his visit of the opium factory in Saigon, he 
found that the tjandoe there had a 9.15% morphine content.
Haak missed the mark because he supposed that raw opium consists only of 
concentrated poppy juice (heulsap in Old Dutch). To a certain degree, however, 
raw opium also contains poppy leaves. The weight of this element is at least 5 
thails in every ball of Bengal opium of 2.5 catty. Therefore, per catty there remains 
only 14 thails of raw opium. 
The above knowledge is incorporated in the following account of the factory 
process. I have chosen the example of the year 1913, which is in principle not dif-
ferent from the other years. All fĳigures are in kg and rounded. The production 
process is in the sequence 1, 2 … etc. to 8.
In the factory accounts and elsewhere, the designations A, B, C ... to G, or H and K 
boxes are used for diffferent contents, cost price and weight: A has 200 small 
tubes, B 100, etc. to K with two larger tubes. A thousand tubes of the smallest 
kind weighed about half a kilo; the tubes in box K weighed 24.5 kilo. The smallest 
measure was 193 mg (1/2 mata).
As the pictures show, the Dutch Opium Factory was not small, and it was well 
equipped with modern machinery. A stafff of a dozen Europeans managed it with 
about a thousand indigenous workers. The Europeans received monthly salaries; 
the workers’ wages were paid per day and calculated per thail. In 1912 they were 
paid 9.4 cents per thail, in 1913 it was 8.6 cents per thail. That made between 10 
and 15 guilders a month; the Europeans got about 50 times more, excluding a 
specifĳic “bonus” and/or privileges like trips to the Netherlands or Dutch pensions. 
In 1913 the factory had already reached its maximum production capacity. 
However, by expanding the storage buildings, the mixed tjandoe could be stored 
for three months before being used to fĳill the tubes. This improved the quality of 
the product and was an argument to increase prices.
Apart from the preparation of the raw opium, mainly imported from Bengal, the 
factory made specifĳic products like tikee. Furthermore, there were opium pills (in 
tubes I) which were sold only among the tin miners on the islands of Bangka 
(Banka) and Belitung (Billiton). A special kind of raw opium was also prepared 
for some elite customers in Java. 
2 Idem, p. 130.
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1. STOREHOUSE RAW MATERIALS 2. MECHANICAL OPIUM PREPARATION
 added to stock:  from 1: 189,684
 Bengal raw opium 182,875 added:
 Levant raw opium 4,209 a. leaking tubes 145
 djitjing 2,216 b. from smuggling 332
 total stock 234,554 100% total 190,161 100% 
from this:  from this:
a. to mechanical opium prep. 189,684 80% a. to mixing 2,903 2%
b. to tikee department 894 1% b. to storeroom prep. 122,573 64% 
c. to storeroom 43,976 19% c. lost in preparation 64,655 34% 
 
3. STOREROOM OPIUM PREPARATION 4. MIXING ROOM
added: added:
a. from Mech. O. Prep. 122,573 a. from storeroom op. prep. 111,284
b. from stock 17,656 b. sugar 2,540
total 140,229 100% c. increase 906
total 100% 114,730
from this: from this:
to mixing room 111,284 79% to storeroommixed opium 114,730
5. STOREROOM MIXED OPIUM 6. FILLING ROOM
added: added:
a. from mixing room 114,730 a. storeroom mixed opium 113,950
b. in stock 10,716 b. stock fĳilling room 1,853
total 125,446 100% total 100% 115,803
from this: from this:
a. to fĳilling room 113,950 91% a. fĳilling of tubes 98% 113,561
b. to tikee storeroom 654 0.5% b. fĳilling losses 2% 4,973
c. to stock mixed opium 10,842 8.5%
7. PREPARATION TIKEE, RAW OPIUM, 
PILLS
8. STOREROOM PACKED TJANDOE
from several stocks: added:
a. tikee 647 a. from fĳilling room 113,561
b. raw opium Bengal 153 b. from preparation tikee, etc. 6,594
c. raw opium Levantine 657 total 100% 120,155
d. opium pills 5,137
total 6,594 100%
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from this: from this:
to storeroom packed tjandoe 6,594 
a. tubes A to G 92% 110,674
b. tikee 662
c. raw Bengal opium 191
d. raw Lev. opium 660
e. opium pills 218
f. stock storeroom tjandoe 7,750
These last items from 8 are the end products (weighing 120,155 kg) packed in 
wooden boxes with tubes. They are send to Opiumregie, which had to take care of 
the selling and distribution. So, very roughly, 200,000 kilo of raw opium were 
needed to make 110,000 kilo of prepared opium in tubes (excluding the weight 

























































Figure 13. East Indies: Production Cost of Opium Factory and Sales Revenue of Opium 
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Figure 14. East Indies: Production Cost of Opium Factory and Sales Revenue of Opium 


















































Figure 15. East Indies: Opium Factory, Production cost, 1900-1940 (x 200,000 Dutch guil-
ders)





































Figure 16. East Indies: Opium Factory, Production cost, 1900-1940 (per thail x 10 cents)
Source: The data for the fĳigures 13-16 are all derived by H. Derks from the Year Accounts of 
the Opium Factory and Opiumregie, (Batavia; 1913-1940). 
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Amphioen, afffĳion, afĳion, afyūn  (Arabia, East Indies) names for products de-
rived from the Papaver Somniforum, now called 
opium.
Awar-awar  (East Indies) leaves from a plant (Ficus septica) 
used for mixing with tikee or other opium for 
smoking in the Opium Factory (Batavia) or 
elsewhere.
Ball  of raw opium (India) weighed about 3 pounds; 
measure used at the EIC factories in Patna and 
Ghazipur.
Bhang  is a cannabis (hashish) preparation originally 
sold to Indian laborers under the farming sys-
tem in 19th-century Malaya and India.
Bhar  common weight: in Goa 463 pounds, in Bantam 
369 pounds, in Batavia 408 pounds, etc.
Bigha  (India) = 2/3 acre or about 2,700 m2; in opium 
districts 1 acre = 1.33 bigha.
Boule  (Indochina) the same as ball, but 1.6-1.8 kg.
C(h)andu  (India) opium prepared for smoking (same as 
tjandoe) by dissolving raw opium in water and 
boiling it several times into a paste.
Candy or Khandi  contains 20 maunds; common weight: in Bengal 
1493-1642 pounds, but in Bombay 560 pounds 
and in Surat 746 pounds, etc.
Catty (Chinese) or Kati  1.33 lb or about 605-618 grams or 16 taels (or 
tahils); in India 1.25 Dutch pounds; one catty = 
16 tail.
Chee  (Southeast Asia) a weight equivalent to one-
tenth of a tahil.
Chest  (India), Caisse (Indochina) unit of raw Bengal 
opium = 140 lbs or about 60-72 kg also, indeed, 
a chest made of mangowood containing 40 balls 
of raw opium.
Ch’ien  (Chinese) = copper coin (with hole); 1000 ch’ien 
is 1 tael.
Chis  (Southeast Asia) = weight of 1/4 tahil; the maxi-
mum quantity for consumption in government 
dens was two chis = 1/5 tahil.
Djitjing  (East Indies) is the name of the dross, the residue 
left in opium pipes (also written jicing).




Dollar  name for the Spanish or Mexican silver dollar 
which was used for a long time as the standard 
commercial currency of Southeast Asia and 
Chinese coastal foreign settlements; worth 
about 4 shillings.
Dross  see djitjing.
Duit, doit  (Dutch) = copper coin; 8 duit is 1 stuiver [around 
1817, 4 duit were equal to 1 stuiver (stiver)].
Dutch guilder  (florin) is almost two English shillings.
English pound  20 shillings.
French livre  is about one English shilling.
Geleng  (East Indies) are opium “cigarettes” or “pills” 
made from a tikee mix weighing about 100 mg; 
1 thail = 300 gelengs; a geleng is the smallest 
purchasable quantity of opium.
Grain  (English): 1 lb (avoirdupois) contains 7,000 
grains = 454 grams metric which makes the 
weight of a grain = 0.06 gram.
Guilder  (Dutch currency) = 20 stuiver = 10 dubbeltjes. 
Heren XVII  are the Seventeen Gentlemen, the Board of the 
VOC in Amsterdam.
Hoon  (Southeast Asia) = weight of 1/25 tahil; the mini-
mum quantity for consumption in government 
dens in Dutch East Indies was two hoons = 1/50 
tahil = 19.3 gram; others defĳine a hoon as ‘equiv-
alent to one-tenth of a chee’ which results in a 
one-hundred of a tahil, which is not an East 
Indies hoon.
Jin  (China) is the same as a catty = 1.33 pounds. 
Kati  see Catty.
Kongsi  is a partnership, company or even a secret soci-
ety to run an enterprise or opium farm.
Koyan  1 last = minimum 3,000 Amsterdam lbs = 1,482 
kg (this weight varied widely).
Lakh  (India) = 100,000 rupees and £10,000; in Malayan 
countries it is used for 10,000 rupees 
(Hobson-Jobson).
Mace  about 3.8 gram or 63 grains or about 1/10 of a 
tael (= 4.2 gram).
Madat, medak, madap  (East Indies) general names for smoking opium 
often mixed with some local (tobacco) leaves.
Mata  (East Indies) about 380 mg; 100 mata = 1 tahil.
Mata-mata  (East Indies) spies or agents of the opium farm.
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Maund or Man  (India) whatever the weight always contained 
40 seers; common weight: in Bengal 75-82 
pounds, in Surat 30 pounds, in Bombay about 
76-80 pounds or about 40 kg; 30 maund = 1122 
kg
Mu  (China) is 0.16 acre.
Nanyang  (China) name for Southeast Asia.
Pagoda  (India) golden coin worth 6-8 English shil-
lings.
Parekan  (East Indies) dependent servant of a lord.
Peranakan  (East Indies) name for locally born Chinese or 
“Chinese mestizo”.
Piaster  (Indochina) valued at 1:5.55 French franc around 
1900; sometimes written as $.
Pikul  (Chinese) = 100 catty or 133.33 pounds or 60.5-
61.8 kg (in Dutch-East Indies 62.5 kg); the Malay 
picul or Chinese tan was 136 pounds; mostly the 
same as chest; one picul opium = 125,000 gram 
= 1,600 thail = 160,000 mata.
Pound  (as weight): Amsterdam lb = 494 gram =1.09 lbs 
avoirdupois (av.); 125 Amsterdam lbs = 1 pikul = 
100 kati = 61.75 kg = 136.14 lbs av.
Puputan  (Bali) literally ‘ending’; ritualized, dynasty-end-
ing defeat by military sacrifĳice or collective 
suicide.
Rixdollar  (Dutch) = rixdaalder, rijksdaalder = 2.5 guilders, 
sometimes 3 guilders = 60 light stuivers = 48 
heavy stuivers; equals also 0.888 Spanish real 
(dollar).
Rupee  (silver; India) = 0.1 £ sterling end of 18th-century; 
2 shillings (until 1872-3), devalued to 1s 1d in 
1899; 1000 rupees is again £100 in 1870, but £50 
in 1878; worth approximately one-half of a 
Spanish silver dollar. The silver Java rupee was, 
for instance, 120 duits-doits in 1817 (see 
Appendix 4).
Seer  = 1.9-2 lb or about 1 kg or 1 ¼ catty.
Spanish dollar  (rial/real of eight) about fĳive English shillings = 
1.125 Rixdollar (Dutch).
Straits Settlements  a British colonial construction made up of 
Singapore, Penang and Melaka.
Stuiver  (Dutch) = 0.05 guilder = 16 penning (60 light-
stuivers = 1 Rixdollar; 40 heavy stuivers = 1 
Rixdollar. 
Tahil  = 38 grams or 100 mata.
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Tael  (silver) = both a weight and a currency. As a 
currency it is 4s 6d; around 1830 £1 = 3 taels; as 
a weight, one Canton tael = 1/16th catty or about 
42 grams or 700 grains; in Indochina 37.6 gram.
Thail  0.04 kg and for some 0.05kg = 100 mata.
Tikee  (East Indies) is made for special customers. It is 
prepared opium mixed with carved awar-awar. 
The cheapest kind of tikee has the form of a pill 
or cigarette consisting of tobacco soaked in 
opium.
Tjandoe  (East Indies) is the opium product resulting from 
a series of manipulations of raw opium (like dis-
solution, roasting, fermentation) so that it can 
be use for smoking.
Tolas  (Burma) = weight of 0.31 tahil; the maximum 
quantity of opium one is allowed to sell to indi-
viduals is 3 tolas or 0.927 tahil and also the quan-
tity which allows the police to put the proprietor 
in jail.
Triad  the union of heaven-earth-man; the concept 
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Cathcart embassy (see British Empire, 
embassy)
Catholicism 7, 19, 26, 38, 39, 125, 141, 152, 
153n41, 193, 206-208, 212, 353, 376, 397, 
398, 474, 562, 615, 619
Celebes (see Indonesia)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 387n10, 
424, 428, 436, 437, 442, 456, 457, 478, 
487, 488, 490, 702-704, 716, 729, 731, 
732
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 89, 95, 103, 136, 150n31, 
151, 159, 164, 166, 168, 169, 175, 175n12, 
177, 208n41, 216, 257, 278, 469, 745, 
746, 748, 765
Chandra, Siddharth 369n21
Chapman, Stanley 73n60, 75, 76n69, 
684n99
chastity 200
Chatterjee, Kumkum 172n4, 173, 179
Chaudhuri, B. 87, 98, 101n31
Chaudhuri, K.N. 38n6, 99n23, 100n27, 
102n33, 141n20, 153n40, 171, 172, 182, 
182n30
index 801
530n78, 567, 648 (see also Japanese 
Empire, Taiwan)
Fu(o)kien 459, 460, 500, 513, 602, 655, 
658, 696
Hong Kong (see China) 9, 36, 43, 48, 
66-68, 71-74, 75, 89, 91, 97, 102, 103, 
372, 406, 434, 442, 450, 473, 484, 487, 
488, 501, 521-524, 543-545, 547, 
549n31, 567, 589, 631, 638, 641, 676, 
680, 680n90, 682, 685-688, 692, 702, 
703, 746, 747 (see also  Japanese 
Empire)
Imperial Decree (government) 43, 68, 
117, 119, 123, 131n12, 140, 186, 297n9, 
375, 493, 529, 543, 630, 654, 680, 687, 
694, 695
International Settlement 89, 411-413, 
553, 620n64, 631, 637, 638, 654, 687, 
690, 692, 695, 750, 751
Kansu 629, 656, 660, 664, 667, 674n78, 
697
Kitchen God 601
kongsi 296, 299n12, 301, 359, 359n6, 452, 
464, 464n9, 465, 466, 478, 698
kotow 9, 14
Koxinga 490, 500 (see also Formosa)
Kuomintang (KMT) 489, 490, 517, 
647n7, 693-695
Kwantung Leased Territory 510
Kweichow 658, 660, 665, 667, 669, 696 
Long March 617, 705n143, 707
Manchukuo 510, 517, 518, 520, 522, 677, 
677n87
Manchuria 68, 69, 494, 509, 512, 513, 517, 
518, 520, 521, 637, 658, 664, 696, 751





Nanking (Massacre) 66, 516-518, 645, 
655, 665
‘Overseas’ Chinese (see Southeast Asia)
Peking  15, 85, 333, 510, 515, 604n20, 
630-632, 637, 649n12, 687, 696 (see 
also Beijing)




Red Army 617, 647, 699, 705n143, 
706n147, 707 
Chinese hate 20n1, 117, 118, 256, 259, 263, 
545, 546n27, 556, 596, 597, 620-622, 
622n71, 625
Chinese – Indian relations 87, 88, 93, 
94, 99, 103, 228, 278, 321, 357, 448, 672, 
673, 680, 688, 735, 742-745, 746, 748
Chinese – Indonesian relations 265, 
372, 449, 460, 467, 469, 471, 472, 474, 
476, 483
Chinese – Japanese relations 493, 494, 
496, 497, 510, 511-513, 516, 517, 520, 522, 
561, 638, 692, 719
Chinese junks 228, 261, 274, 468, 469, 
470
Chinese law 11, 12, 43, 60, 66, 67, 481-483, 
628, 654-656 (see also law)
Chinese Massacre (1740) 216, 221, 226, 
256
Chinese medicine (see herbs, medical 
doctors)
Chinese migrants 332, 459, 460, 463, 
474, 475, 477, 545n26 (see also Chi-
nese, coolie; Chinese, ‘Overseas’; 
immigrant, immigration)
Chinese nationalism 85, 459 
Chinese opium (see Opium, Chinese)
Chinese, ‘’Overseas” (see Southeast 
Asia, “Overseas”)
Chinese poppy (see poppy, Chinese)
Chinese – Portuguese relations 96, 97, 
136, 145, 146, 150n31, 159, 273
Chinese Republic 73, 414, 514n46, 551, 
657, 694, 697 (see also Kuomintang, 
warlords)
Chongzhi, Xu 525 (see also warlords)
Communist China 437, 475, 477, 478, 
487, 488, 641, 646, 701, 703, 704
Communist Party 126, 415, 423, 429, 446, 
526, 543, 598, 615, 647, 666, 698, 699, 
705
Confucianism,  13, 15, 70, 70n49, 398, 
482, 483, 572, 625
coolie xiv, 96n20, 97, 261, 264, 300, 328, 
328n12-330, 414, 463, 464, 466, 472, 
514, 533, 553n43, 625, 678, 679, 681, 
684n98, 690 (see also Chinese 
migrants)
Dai Li 699, 706, 707
Du Yuesheng (see Opium, dealers)
Formosa 176, 235, 273, 374, 395, 434, 493, 
495, 498-500, 501, 501n22-502n24, 503, 
505, 505n27-507, 509, 513, 513n45, 520, 
index802
487, 489, 526, 597, 608, 617, 629, 653, 
653n23, 658, 660, 663, 664, 666-
667n54, 669-671, 680, 702, 703, 751
Zheng He 469
chloral 128, 388, 557
chlorodyne 114, 115, 117, 128
chloroform 388
Christianity 4, 5n5, 7, 11, 19, 153n39, 220, 262, 
398, 427, 514, 607, 610, 619, 713 (see 
also assault)
Churchill, Winston (see British Empire)
CIA (see Central Intelligence Agency) 
cigarettes 328, 535n9, 664
city 30, 46, 73, 74, 114, 136, 143, 145, 147, 168, 
184, 185, 187, 194n13, 195, 216n51, 257, 
264, 268, 268n27, 273, 386, 411, 441, 
451, 456, 465, 524, 544, 555, 574, 582, 
616, 637, 649n12, 678, 679, 690, 693, 
694, 696, 697n127, 725, 750 (see also 
urbanization)
civilization 8, 15, 56n19, 95, 136, 190, 224, 
283, 284, 325, 397, 403, 414, 455, 486, 
503, 507, 509, 570n70, 604n20, 618, 
623n72
class 38, 79n78, 114, 116, 191, 201, 247n14, 268, 
328, 357, 383, 411, 425, 439, 442, 471, 
532n2, 544, 555, 555n46, 566, 575, 581, 
583, 588, 618n61, 645, 647, 679, 689, 
697
clergy 7, 14n10, 38, 116, 247n14, 258, 269n30, 
609
clipper xv, 64, 64n34, 65, 67, 69, 71, 99, 496, 
500, 540-542, 587, 743
‘Closed Door’ policy (see British Empire)
Coca Cola 568, 569, 578, 587, 588
cocaine xvi, 117-119, 128, 135, 317, 318, 336, 
338, 342, 343, 343n47, 345-347, 
347n54, 348, 350, 352, 367, 372, 375, 
379, 386, 387n11, 389-391, 393, 509, 
522, 539, 557, 567-569, 575, 577-579, 
579n91, 580-582, 582n100, 583, 588, 
624, 650, 709, 710, 717, 723, 725, 725n9, 
726 (see also coca leaves)
cocaine factory 317, 342, 344, 345, 345n49, 
367, 579
cocainomania 575
coca leaves 317, 342, 343, 345-347, 350, 557, 




Red Gang (see Opium, dealers)
Revolution of 1911-12 xvii, 73, 82, 91, 551, 
632, 638, 645n3, 654, 694
Shanghai 67, 72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 81, 93, 
357, 372, 385, 411, 413, 517, 518, 520, 
554, 556, 557, 575, 584, 629, 632, 633, 
637, 638, 645n3, 648, 656, 660, 664, 
665, 677, 684-686, 690, 693n118, 694, 
694n119, 697, 697n127-699, 746, 750 
(see also French Concession, Interna-
tional Settlements)
Shanghai Opium Merchants Com-
bine 690-692
Shansi 629, 646
Shantung 513, 515n48, 658, 706n147
Shantung Road Hospital 648
shar 20, 21n5
Shensi 629, 658, 664, 696 
Sino-Japanese War 497, 502, 606
Summer Palace Beijing 13
Sun Yatsen 597
Swatow gang (see Opium, dealers)
Szechwan 85, 338, 439, 440n44
Taiping 68, 72, 72n56, 85n92, 88, 476, 
483, 543, 603, 603n17, 608, 612n43, 
672, 687
Taiwan 176, 228, 473, 474, 487, 495, 498, 
522, 529, 530, 589, 590, 608n33, 
658n35, 701-704, 705, 706, 706n147 
(see also Formosa)
Taoism 572, 625
Tianjin 516, 520, 605-607, 608, 698
Tibet 440n44, 597, 629, 629n4, 630
Tientsin Treaty (1858) 545
Treaty of Commercial Relations 
(1903) 545 
Treaty of Nanking (1842) 604
Treaty of Wang Hea (1844) 545
Treaty ports 9, 500, 687, 747, 748
triad 464, 524, 641 (see also gang)
warlords 7, 414, 512, 517, 551, 608, 
608n33, 637, 641, 654-656, 661, 691, 
694-696, 697, 699, 705n143, 706n147, 
721, 730
White Terror 695
Yellow Danger (-Menace, -Peril) 8, 16, 
153, 543, 545, 558, 597, 600, 610, 616, 
617, 619 – 621, 621n67, 622 – 623n72, 
624, 625, 627, 641, 642
Yü-hsiang, Feng 697
Yunnan 82, 82n86, 338, 398, 421-423, 
433, 435, 439, 441, 457, 471, 478, 485, 
index 803
corruption 4, 39, 57, 64, 66, 68, 69, 73, 85, 
88, 93, 120, 126, 176, 176n13, 176n16, 
200, 201n29, 217, 224, 242n5, 247, 253, 
269, 340, 375, 376, 412, 446, 447, 457, 
458, 506, 525, 565, 577, 661, 672, 683, 
686, 699, 723, 731, 754 
costs (see Opium, related costs) 
cough 108, 196
Country Trade 52, 64, 94, 176n16, 278, 321, 
397, 448
court, monarchical 24, 31, 181, 181n26, 183, 
188, 233, 248, 263n15, 271, 422, 601, 
602, 673n73, 715 (see also oikos)
Court, Pieter de la 243, 243n9
Courtwright, David T. 532, 534, 534n5, 
555n46, 573, 577n89, 582, 582n99-
584, 727
Crawfurd, John (see British Empire)
Cressey, George B. 658, 661, 662n43, 663, 
667, 669, 674n78
criminalization 128, 188, 236, 237, 341, 425, 
466, 554, 588, 713
criminality 7, 37, 11, 80, 106, 116, 124, 219, 
269n30, 269n33, 316, 334, 376, 391, 
396, 410n28, 413, 422, 465, 473, 477, 
479, 482, 487, 558, 582, 583, 603, 
628n3, 643, 682, 684, 687, 690, 691, 
693, 697n127, 715, 722, 723, 731
Criminal Law 390, 461, 480-482, 484, 
580n94, 657
criminal organization,  46, 92, 123, 117, 393, 
400, 425, 466, 478, 484, 486, 575, 596, 
602, 627, 641, 642, 656, 729 (see also 
gang, kongsi, triad)
criminals 9, 72, 116, 117, 120, 123, 139, 216, 217, 
374, 411, 412, 420, 426, 466, 481, 483, 
542, 581, 595, 612, 635, 654, 681, 683, 
683n97, 687, 693, 694, 700, 701, 710, 




cultivation, opium (see Opium, cultiva-
tion)
Cultivation System (see Dutch Empire)
currency xvii, 232, 311, 354, 367, 521, 532, 
670, 750, 763
Daendels, Herman Willem (see Dutch 
Empire)
Dai Li (see China)
Dam, Pieter van (see Dutch Empire)
codeine 128, 194, 347, 388, 557, 570, 570n72, 
587, 650n16, 652n19, 715
Coen, Jan Pietersz. (see Dutch Empire)
Cold War 415, 423, 424, 485, 487, 530, 701, 
703, 716
Coleridge, Samuel T. 113, 384
Colijn, Hendrik (see Dutch Empire)
Collis, Maurice 5, 43n21, 71n51, 606, 609, 
609n36, 610
Colombia 473, 539, 549n31, 721
Colombo 136
colonialism xiii, 3, 11, 32, 143, 153n41, 172, 
219n57, 223, 279, 353, 374, 415, 456, 
474, 475, 487, 526, 530n78, 539, 593, 
619, 619n62, 634n13, 718, 719, 724, 759
colonial repression xv, 14, 125, 140, 145, 171, 
223, 227, 233, 254, 264, 266, 279, 281, 
284, 287, 329, 365, 375, 396, 402, 416, 
425, 470, 425, 526, 545, 547, 566, 607, 
622, 679, 714, 717, 725, 761, 762 (see 
also assault)
colonial state (see state, colonial)
colonizer xii, 5, 38, 44, 55, 56, 87, 95, 125, 137, 
150, 158, 191, 260, 277, 396, 403, 406, 
424, 426, 428, 432, 442, 451, 471, 499, 
503, 507, 509, 510, 559, 561, 564, 614, 
615, 639, 714
Committee on Drug Addictions 573
commodity (chain) 64, 72, 73, 83, 110, 449, 
467, 664, 689, 735
Communist Party, Chinese (see China)
competition 23n11, 39n12, 40, 54, 69, 75, 78, 
94, 97, 136, 143, 146, 150, 166, 176, 221, 
222, 232, 274, 278, 291, 307, 310, 331, 
333, 346, 360, 378, 387, 398, 415, 451, 
452, 475, 485, 495, 531, 541, 551, 559, 
563, 623, 639, 672, 685, 686, 688, 689, 
691, 712, 714, 719, 724
comprador 66, 80, 95, 173, 606, 686
concentration camp 519, 561, 562, 709
Conference of Shanghai (1909) 119, 338, 556, 
557, 575, 632, 720, 721





contraband trafffĳic (see illicit trade)





273, 281, 282, 287, 291, 300, 307-309, 
311, 317, 322, 326, 328, 332, 338, 348, 
357, 362, 364, 365, 369, 373, 375, 378, 
379, 397, 406, 431, 467, 469, 482, 508, 
556, 689n108, 753, 754, 758, 759, 769, 
770 (see also archipelago, Asian con-




Amphioen Society (see Opium, dealers) 
Batavia 59, 159, 160-162n71, 169, 175, 
176n13, 178, 184, 198, 201, 208n40, 
212n45, 216, 217, 221, 224, 229, 231, 
234n86, 235, 239-245, 247n14, 248, 
250n18, 253, 256-258n4, 259, 261, 264-
268, 269n32, 273, 274, 279, 281, 285, 
295, 296-298, 299, 301, 303, 304, 307, 
315, 321-323, 329-331, 332, 334, 352, 
358, 359, 362, 365n15, 368, 369, 463, 
469, 473, 479n28, 480, 483, 724, 757, 
766
Baud, Jean C. 44, 178n19, 189, 197, 198n18, 
200, 229, 229n74-230n75-78, 231, 234-
236, 237, 240, 241, 286, 291, 297, 307, 
313n21, 313n23, 314, 321n-323, 323n4-
325, 330n17, 350, 360n, 362, 368, 740, 
742, 744, 745, 753, 754, 758
Bencoolen 219, 252, 275, 284n16, 322, 
322n2
Billiton 295, 296-298, 299-301n16, 302-
304, 304n26, 329, 473
Billiton Mining Company 293, 295, 307, 
328, 378
Broecke, Pieter van den (see Opium, 
dealers)
Coen, Jan Pietersz. 175, 208, 212n45, 
219n57, 221-224, 260, 261, 480n30, 682
Colijn, Hendrik 227, 349
Cultivation System 309
Daendels, Herman Willem 274n48, 280, 
287, 288, 292, 292n32, 321, 379, 761, 
762, 763
Dam, Pieter van 180n25, 200, 201
Dutch Cocaine Factory 317, 344, 345, 
345n49, 367, 579
Dutch – English wars (see Europe, Eng-
land)
Dutch Ethical Policy 152, 332
Dutch Opium Factory (see Opium, fac-
tory)
Daumier, Honoré iv, 42, 646
death 3, 31, 107, 117, 127, 129, 137, 158n56, 180, 
198, 199, 204, 206, 222, 258, 277, 
301n17, 329, 497, 503, 508, 533, 543, 
561, 571, 572, 621, 648, 651, 672 
death penalty 83, 84, 230, 236, 240, 269, 350, 
351, 421, 460, 495
decadence 7, 414
delirium  571
demand and supply xiii, 35, 41, 49, 54, 
54n14, 58, 69, 84, 98, 101, 122, 179, 
230n77, 232, 254, 295, 313, 329, 346, 
361, 365, 374, 376, 417, 423, 431, 438, 
441, 442, 449, 461, 482, 487, 488, 508, 
510, 517, 518, 525, 527, 568, 578, 599, 
607, 608, 617, 640, 649, 661, 672, 687, 
692, 712, 713, 716, 727, 728, 731, 747, 
765
Dent & Co (see Opium, dealers)
derivatives xiii, 21, 24n14, 348, 352, 386n9, 
486, 488, 510, 512, 515, 517, 553, 587, 
613, 624, 643, 650n16, 699, 703, 
705n143, 725, 726 (see also heroin, 
morphine)
Derks, Hans 61n31, 127n8, 175n11, 182n29, 
255n1, 341, 396n2, 403n13, 406n23, 
471n15, 495n6, 585n105, 595n3, 
639n23, 650n14, 743, 771
Descours-Gatin, Chantal 403n15, 404n16, 
405n20, 407, 415, 418, 433, 435
despotism 3, 14, 284
diarrhoea 24, 108, 571n74
Dikötter, Frank 474n19, 596, 597, 
597n4-598n6, 646, 656, 657n30
Dipanagara, prince (see Indonesia)
diplomacy 65, 273, 343, 618, 637




divide and rule 5n5, 146, 151, 220, 224, 258, 
260, 263, 266, 268, 282, 288, 315, 442, 
442n49, 454, 465, 522, 695, 698 
dysentery 108, 331
Duco, Don H. 62, 178n19, 179n20, 421n8, 
443n53, 574, 613n46, 666n51, 667n55, 
674n75, 754n4
Dutch Cocaine Factory (see Dutch Empire)
Dutch Empire 19, 20n1, 26, 122, 153n39, 162, 
175, 187, 189, 195, 199, 201n29, 202, 204, 
207, 214, 216, 218, 221, 224, 227, 231, 
234, 236, 239, 239n, 255, 262, 264, 271, 
index 805
158, 158n56, 161, 161n67, 162, 185, 198, 
199, 713
Semarang 258, 259, 265, 265n19, 279, 
285n22, 358, 359, 469, 476
Seventeen Gentlemen 200, 202, 204
Struick, Nicolas 334, 334n27, 359, 360, 
361, 364, 365, 753
Valckenier, Adriaan 256, 256n2, 257, 
260, 260n11
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
(VOC) 38n6, 39, 40, 57n21, 135, 144, 
144n24, 160, 161, 163-165, 166-168, 169, 
176, 187, 190n5, 200, 202-205, 208, 213, 
216, 222-224, 236, 239, 252, 267, 278, 
279, 281, 308, 362, 367, 375, 376, 378, 
683, 711, 712, 754, 757
Wiselius, Jakob 19, 62, 90n5, 99, 100, 121, 
121n1, 122, 183, 330, 357, 369, 395, 400, 
405, 737, 738, 751
Zwaardecroon, Hendrick 169, 169n19
duties 66, 154, 263, 284, 298, 310, 365, 470, 
479, 527, 547, 549, 550, 631, 727, 760, 
763, 764
Du Yuesheng (see Opium, dealers; see also 
China)
East Asia 47, 147, 311, 339, 563, 615 (see also 
Asian continent)
East India Company (see British Empire)
East Indies (see Dutch Empire)
East-West relations 14, 126, 128, 192, 228n71, 
385, 386, 477, 523, 650, 652, 652n18, 
673n73, 711 (see also chinatowns, ori-




EIC (see British East India Company)
Eliot, Charles 493, 512
elite 22, 30, 31, 56n19, 59, 66, 74, 105, 114, 116, 
118, 124, 125, 137-141,184n33, 185, 187, 
188, 190, 191, 206, 217, 226, 233, 237, 
242, 245, 261, 268, 269n32, 274, 275, 
281, 290, 313n21, 316, 319, 341, 358, 373, 
376-378, 383-386, 390, 398, 402, 403, 
439, 441, 443, 446, 455, 463, 469, 470, 
478, 496, 507, 539, 559, 572, 639, 648, 
657, 712, 767
embassy of 1787 and 1793 (see British 
Empire)
empire building xiii, 216
enemy 13, 16, 19, 39, 44, 78, 145, 146, 153, 161, 
162, 180, 202, 206, 207, 211, 215, 221, 
Dutch violence xvi, 202, 204, 205, 208, 
210-212, 212n45, 213, 216, 219n57, 223, 
226, 227, 256, 259n7, 261, 263, 269, 481 
(see also assault)
East Indies Company (see Dutch Em-
pire, Vereenigde)
Heutz, Johan van 227
Imhofff, Gustaaf W. van (see Dutch Em-
pire) 241, 242, 242n6, 247, 248, 252, 
256-258, 260, 377
Java 19, 470, 476, 479-481, 483, 527, 577, 
580, 648, 710, 744-748, 755, 757, 759, 
760, 762, 770
Java War 226n68, 307, 312, 364, 370, 472
Kaempfer, Engelbert 180n25, 198, 199, 
201, 201n30, 499, 499n16
King (House) of Orange 288, 297, 302, 
307, 310, 317, 378
law of conquest 55n18, 683
Lombok 226, 332, 342, 350, 561
Loudon, John  295n1, 297, 297n10, 301, 
301n16-304, 304n26, 305
Mataram 20, 213, 226, 226n68, 230, 258, 
259, 266, 272n42, 273, 753
Moluccas 37, 151n34, 198, 216, 222, 230, 
260n10, 265, 284, 322, 324
Multatuli 189, 240, 287n25, 315, 317, 319, 
373, 628n2
Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij 
(NHM) 239n1, 307-310, 311n11-313n24, 
314, 317, 318, 323, 352, 364, 372, 396, 
472, 477, 689
octroy 204, 205, 207, 241, 246, 248, 377
Ong-Tae-Hae 277, 467, 479-480n30, 481, 
483, 724 
Opium- Zoutregie (see Opium, regie)
Outer Districts 292, 305n28, 319, 321, 
322, 324, 325, 327, 329, 342, 365, 770
Paludanus 27n18, 28, 28n21
passports, Dutch 151, 168, 479, 724
Pax Neerlandica 332
Pelsaert, Francisco 152n38, 176n14, 184, 
184n34-186, 186n44
perkeniers 221
Prince of Orange 202, 248, 297
Reede, Hendrik van 168
Rochussen, Jan J. 286, 286n23, 330n17, 
360n8
Scheltema, Johan 373-374n2, 375
Schouten, Wouter 39n10, 136, 136n4, 
146n28, 152, 152n38-153n39, 155n48, 
index806
277, 280, 303, 324, 325, 367, 473, 522, 
533, 616, 675
France, French, (the) xv, xvi, 42, 51, 57, 
74, 96, 173, 282, 287, 333, 334, 338, 340, 
353, 371, 378, 379, 381, 383, 385, 385n6, 
387, 388, 388n14, 389, 391n22, 394, 
395, 397, 398, 400, 404, 406, 407, 409, 
410n28, 415, 419, 421, 425, 432, 486, 
489, 525, 526, 528, 570, 570n70, 724, 
725, 747, 765 (see also French Empire)
French Revolution 125, 279, 762
Marseille 127, 386n8, 570, 570n70, 
714, 728
Paris 140, 384, 385, 387, 389, 391, 398, 
412
Rhône-Poulenc 345, 387n12
Germany 21n7, 108, 109, 119, 120, 137n10, 
191, 194, 194n13, 267n25, 345, 347, 465, 
514, 531, 559, 565, 615, 619, 621, 622n71, 
624, 625
German 61, 70, 75, 80n81, 163n2, 198, 
258, 501, 515n48, 516, 527, 532, 542, 
579, 580, 599, 609, 615, 615n51, 616, 
617, 621, 622n70, 624, 625, 638, 
647, 706, 707, 725, 725n9
Germanisation 625






Netherlands – Holland 5, 28, 40, 140n16, 
186, 190n4, 206, 207, 212, 239n1, 243, 
247n14, 248, 250n18, 258, 269n31, 279, 
281, 282, 290, 291, 296, 298, 299, 308, 
312, 313, 315, 315n27, 316, 346-348, 371, 
373-375, 378, 379, 386n8, 432n28, 444, 
479, 481, 496, 565, 598, 759, 762, 763, 
767 (see also Dutch Empire)
Amsterdam 29, 40, 127, 160, 163, 
166n9, 206, 208, 217, 223, 242n6, 
247, 247n14, 253, 296, 315n27, 316, 
342, 345, 346, 372, 385n6, 667n55, 
758 
Spain 21n7, 51, 54, 54n11, 88, 206, 212, 
398, 501, 562, 563, 565, 619 (see 
also Spanish Empire)
William I, king 282, 284n16, 289, 296, 
307-311, 317
William III, king – stadhouder 207 
William IV, stadhouder 248 
William V, stadhouder 248, 282
226, 233, 260, 263, 268, 286, 288, 297, 
325, 331, 333, 353, 376, 398, 411, 414, 
496, 527, 530, 561n55, 619, 622n71-625, 
679, 703, 706n147
England (see Europe)
English – Dutch wars (see Europe, Eng-
land)
English Parliament (see Europe)
Enlightenment 125, 140, 140n16, 288, 388, 
425, 563, 644, 646, 648n9
Estado da Índia 136, 140, 141, 144, 155
Europe 138, 140, 144, 164, 171, 176n13, 179, 181, 
191, 192, 205, 208, 210, 214, 215, 231, 260, 
285, 303, 345, 347, 377, 383, 386, 392, 
403, 424, 461, 478, 494, 518, 540, 554, 
587, 599, 622, 628n3, 644, 648n9, 713, 
714, 717, 719 (see also assault)
Belgium 29, 127, 284n16, 414, 465
Antwerp 127
Ghent 191, 192
England (UK) 3, 5, 9, 12, 13n7, 15, 28, 36, 
40, 41, 51, 53, 54, 57, 59, 77-79n76, 85, 
88, 100, 106, 108, 112, 112n11, 113, 118, 
124n4, 125, 127, 140, 191,`194, 206, 207, 
216, 283, 290, 347, 383n3, 384, 388, 
390, 456, 496, 514, 516, 532, 533, 535, 
540, 543, 559, 587, 589, 604, 605, 623, 
624, 630, 632, 635, 684, 703, 747 (see 
also British Empire)
English – Dutch wars 207, 210, 214, 
221, 222, 224, 244, 278, 284n16
English Parliament 59, 81, 85, 532, 
596, 610, 628n3, 629 
Great Britain 12, 44, 79n77, 119, 
449n64, 455, 556, 605, 633 (see 
also England)
Liverpool 94, 110, 118, 455
London 36, 40, 41, 43, 52, 52n8, 
54n14, 59-61, 66, 73-76, 87, 90, 91, 
94, 94n14, 110, 112, 118, 123, 137n10, 
140, 162, 169n19, 172, 456, 493, 
508n35, 514, 617, 664
Pharmacy Act (1868) 111, 114n17
Royal Commission on Opium 79n77, 
82n86, 85, 117, 129, 129n10, 135, 180, 
644, 681, 681n95, 739
Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade (SSOT) 117, 614
Treasury 59, 189, 230, 246, 292, 392, 
405, 488, 578n90, 581, 701n134
Europeans 144, 146, 151, 169, 188, 199, 
207, 210, 212, 219-221, 236, 257, 264, 
index 807
French Empire 5n7, 29, 51, 99, 107, 108, 
137n10, 279, 284n16, 345, 347, 383, 
383n3, 385, 388-391, 391n22, 392, 393, 
396, 398, 410, 414, 415, 444, 496, 535, 
565, 625n77, 628 (see also Asian con-
tinent, assault, Southeast Asia; 
Europe, France)
French Concession 411-413, 516, 638, 
692, 695, 697n127
French Navy 42, 94, 392, 393, 396, 411-
414
Indochina 333, 381, 385, 392, 393, 397, 
400, 406, 410, 410n28, 414-416, 418, 431, 
433, 435-438, 438n39, 486, 525, 526, 
528, 552, 723, 724, 746, 747, 748
Mendès-France, Pierre 415
Moulin Rouge 386, 396
Napoleon 78, 88, 94, 278, 279, 281, 282, 
287, 288, 321, 375, 379, 389, 397, 607, 
762
Tonkin 333, 381, 398, 402, 404n16, 418, 




First Vietnam War 396, 415, 485, 488
fraud 9, 169, 177, 191, 230, 239, 336, 341, 362, 
371, 404, 405, 433, 570, 727
free trade 16, 42, 43, 53, 58, 59, 94, 110, 119, 
123, 168, 222, 243, 275, 283, 285, 291, 
374, 375, 402, 431, 447, 470, 482, 537, 
541, 563, 599, 618, 619, 681, 759
French Concession (see French Empire)
French Navy (see French Empire)
French Revolution (see Europe, France)





Furber, Holden 52n6, 66n, 176n16, 278n2
Gaastra, Femme 5n7, 53n10, 153n41, 176n16, 
178n19, 191n6, 203, 208n41, 212n45, 
219n57, 226, 239n1, 242n5, 245, 
247n14, 248n16, 250n18, 259n7, 
260n10, 274n48, 278n3, 297n9, 499n16
gang 46, 57, 73, 123, 412, 517n54, 588, 690, 
691, 692, 692n117, 693, 694, 697, 
697n127, 698 (see also criminal orga-
nization)
gangsters 123, 412, 413, 483, 518, 524, 551, 
584, 585n105, 596, 642, 663, 665, 682, 
United Kingdom (UK) (see Europe, 
England)
expenditures 80, 100, 176n13, 328n13, 339, 
506, 759, 760, 761
export (see Opium, export)
extraterritoriality 411, 547, 637, 638, 684, 
693
Ezra Brothers  (see Opium, dealers)
Fairbank, John K. 67, 80n79, 612n41, 639-
641, 657, 658, 664, 696
famine 39, 57, 60, 126, 131, 330, 463, 533, 
533n3, 618, 663, 669
farmers 30, 57, 239, 270, 660, 661, 662n43, 
664, 667, 674n78 (see also peasant) 
farmers, opium (see Opium, farmers)
Farquhar, major (see British Empire; 
Opium, dealers)
Ferguson, Niall 35, 35n1, 48, 79n75, 123
Feuerwerker, Albert 612n41, 634n15, 661
fĳilm 384, 385
Florence (see Europe, Italy)
(folk)-healer 21-23n11, 127, 137, 137n8, 138-
141, 191, 389, 390, 535, 644, 715
foreign crime 146n28, 269n30, 279, 683, 
693, 725
foreign devils 431, 480, 501, 541, 600-602, 
608, 617, 627, 693
foreigners xi, 145, 152, 181, 198, 204, 207, 214, 
215, 226, 232, 233, 255, 256, 262, 272, 
284, 285, 298, 403, 411, 417, 459, 460, 
466, 467, 470, 496, 554, 575, 588, 599, 
603, 605, 606, 610, 612, 627, 628, 630, 
635, 640, 644, 645, 648, 654, 690, 695, 
725
foreign policy xvi, 153, 169, 204, 205n34, 213, 
216, 223, 236, 254, 264, 267, 279, 280, 
284n16, 286, 287, 350, 353, 376, 396, 
398, 401, 402, 411, 413, 414, 419, 425, 
430, 442, 454, 471, 472, 480, 486, 489, 
506, 515, 516, 526, 529, 539, 541, 545, 
554, 559, 561, 567, 588, 589, 590, 595, 
606, 607, 609, 631, 636n39, 639, 
640n26, 641, 658, 664, 677, 704, 723, 
729, 731 (see also assault)
Formosa (see China) 






Groeneveldt, Willem 265n20, 333-336, 404, 
765-767
Grotius, Hugo 144, 481
guilt(y) 5, 11, 14, 19, 85, 86, 124, 205n34, 
227n69, 237, 255n1, 258n4-260n11, 
385, 463, 547n28, 564, 607, 616, 623, 
649, 726
Gujarat (see India)
Gutzlafff, Carl 70, 71, 71n51, 71n53, 72, 72n56, 
553n43, 596, 609, 609n36, 610n38, 693
Haan, Frederik de 217, 217n55, 219, 234, 252, 
252n24, 271n41, 272, 272n42, 273, 
274n48 
Hakka 464n9, 667




Harrison Narcotic Act (1914) 581, 582
Hart, Robert 14n10, 16, 50, 79n76, 81, 673, 
674, 674n78, 675, 678
hashish 28n22, 30, 32, 91, 120, 183, 185, 379, 
385, 386, 390, 557, 613n46
Hastings, Warren 45, 50, 55, 57, 57n21, 59, 
61, 66, 173, 280n8, 628n3
Hayter, Alethea xiin, 386n9
healers (see folk-healers)
health(y) 24, 31, 37, 116, 117, 124, 127, 127n8, 
128, 137, 194, 195, 253, 290, 351, 389-391, 
391n22, 410, 440, 483, 569, 571, 574, 
575, 578, 587, 593, 616, 652n18, 
653n23, 678-680
health hazards 403, 588, 616, 621, 643, 644, 
647, 652, 681, 689
health infrastructure/ organization 107n3, 
128, 138, 140, 191, 425, 616n52, 652, 653, 
707n150, 713, 715
Hegel, Georg W. 284
Helffferich, Emil 307n, 318, 318n34
herbarium 22, 23, 28
herbs 23, 31, 32, 107, 155, 157, 158, 162n71, 188, 
535, 537, 602, 643, 647-649, 652, 
652n19, 653, 717, 722 (see also Chinese 
medicine, medical doctors)
heroin (factory) xvi, 73, 120, 128, 194, 316, 
345, 346, 372, 375, 384, 386n9, 387, 
387n11, 390, 391, 396, 413, 415, 419, 420, 
422, 423, 426-428, 430, 438, 447, 483, 
488-490, 510, 511, 515-518, 520, 522, 
523, 525, 527, 536, 553, 554, 557, 558, 
684, 686, 688, 690, 692n117, 695-699, 
705n143, 713 (see also Opium, deal-
ers)
gambling 39n11, 40, 45, 97, 199, 296, 301, 303, 
329, 333, 405, 411, 412, 422, 446, 447, 
468n12, 470, 483, 484, 500, 524, 583, 
620, 622, 642, 657n31, 697, 697n127, 
710
ganja 91, 183, 439, 557
Geary Act (1892) 545
Gelber, Harry G. 14n10, 607-608n33, 610n38, 
614n47, 673, 674n78
Generale Missiven 164, 234, 252, 254
Geneva Convention (1925) 346, 493








Gladstone, William E. 11, 12, 12n2, 603
Glaxo-Smith-Kline 549
Goa (see India)
God(s) 19, 22, 38, 39, 40, 70, 71, 146, 153, 206, 
233, 258, 259, 267, 376, 387, 440, 481, 
532, 588, 601, 609
Godfather 412, 413
Godske, commander 167, 167n13
Goens, Rijcklof van 167, 167n13, 190n4, 234 
Goh, Daniel P. 459n2, 464, 464n7, 478, 
482n33
gold 53, 59, 61n33, 97, 165, 176, 181, 186, 
190n4, 271, 274, 281, 315, 543, 719, 749 
Goldbaum, David 580, 580n95, 581
golden age 29, 94, 181, 206, 244, 731
Golden Crescent 731
Golden Orchid Society 601
‘Golden Road to Cathay’ 439, 486, 671
Golden Triangle (Quadrangle) (see South-
east Asia)
Goldman Sachs bank 75
gold rush 97, 471, 543, 544, 652n18
Gootenberg, Paul 317n33, 342n46, 346n50, 
578n90, 580, 735
Gotō, Shimpei 506
Greenberg, Michael 45n25, 53n9, 60n30, 




hypocrisy 16, 39, 43, 44, 46, 122, 190, 288, 
304, 348, 349, 373, 403, 539, 547, 612, 
701
hypodermic syringe 390
ideology xii, xiii, xvi, 5, 8, 8n12, 40, 64, 113, 
114, 127, 286, 289, 308, 374, 470, 478, 
482, 483, 487, 493n1, 519, 530, 537, 554, 
582, 597, 625, 695, 723n7, 724
illicit production 123, 124, 256, 315, 412, 437, 
457, 458, 514, 542, 583, 656, 680, 686, 
702, 716, 721, 729
illicit trade 8, 66, 68, 73, 83, 116, 117, 240, 
245n11, 316, 357, 423, 457, 488, 510, 513, 
516, 518, 542, 543, 602, 608, 654, 665, 
703, 726, 730 (see also smuggling, 
smugglers; Opium, trade)
immigrant 47, 301, 303, 441, 456, 460, 461, 
466, 467, 470, 472, 532, 534, 544, 550, 
621, 621n68, 652n18 (see also China, 
Chinese migrants)
immigration 545n26, 588, 614n48, 621n68, 
625 (see also China, Chinese 
migrants)
imperialism xiii, 3, 8n12, 32, 47, 49, 52, 79, 
121, 125, 127, 141, 153n41, 172, 189, 
219n57, 239n1, 277, 280, 280n8, 286, 
309, 395, 400, 415, 425, 474, 487, 531, 
534, 537, 540, 563, 589, 590, 593, 618, 
619, 625, 682, 683, 715, 717, 718, 719, 
759
Imperial College of Physicians 646
Imperial Decree  (see China, Imperial)
imperial reciprocities 589, 612
import (coca leaves, cocaine) 345, 346n52, 
350, 557, 578, 580, 710
import (non-opium, non-coca),  xii-xvii, 
20, 35, 36, 41, 43, 54, 61, 95, 99, 168, 169, 
176, 199, 221, 260, 261, 264, 271, 273, 
285, 316, 329, 333, 425, 449, 469, 472, 
502, 547, 634, 644, 749
import monopoly (opium) (see Opium, 
import) 
import, opium (see Opium, import)
import substitution 85, 658, 669, 730
in-between people 270, 483
income 77, 239, 245, 247n14, 272n42, 287, 
291, 292, 292n32, 298, 314, 315, 327, 
328n13, 335, 339, 349, 363, 364, 367, 
403-405, 408, 430, 444, 490, 506, 509, 
544, 555, 667, 736, 759, 764 
572, 578, 580, 582, 582n100, 583, 584, 
599, 624, 637, 641n27, 643, 648-
653n23, 657, 665, 680, 698, 701, 702, 
707n150, 715, 716, 725, 726, 728




histori(ans)ography xi-xiv, 3, 5-8n11, 9n13, 
12, 14n10-16, 19, 20, 24, 30, 42, 44, 47, 
53, 56, 57n21, 75, 126, 129n10-131, 153, 
163, 172, 176n16, 180n25, 190, 202, 
212n45, 219n57, 242, 259, 278, 282, 317, 
318n34, 353, 356, 396, 441, 485, 493n1, 
499, 519, 533n3, 569, 593, 594, 595n3, 
599, 601, 606, 607, 610, 610n38, 613, 
625, 627, 628n3, 634n13, 639, 640, 
645n3, 656, 673n73, 676, 676n82, 
680n90, 691, 692, 704, 707, 709, 711, 
714, 716-721, 725n9, 731n17, 735, 736, 
753, 759, 762, 764
Hmong (see Southeast Asia)
Ho Chi Minh (see Southeast Asia)
Hodder, Rupert 473-475, 483
Hodgson, Barbara 113n12, 114n16, 193, 
194n13, 385n6
Hogendorp, Dirk van 281, 282, 288, 290, 373
Hogendorp, Gijsbert K. van 141, 143n21, 
282n11-285, 288-290, 682, 761
Hogendorp, Willem van 281, 285n22
Holmes, Sherlock 384
homeopathy 648n9
Hong Kong Bank 75, 76
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) 75, 
76, 76n67, 689n108
Hormuz 31, 145, 150, 177, 469, 715
hortus botanicus 28, 29
Hosie, Alexander 85n91, 317, 372n27, 629-
631, 633, 634, 634n13, 635, 639, 643, 
658, 660, 721, 747, 751
household xiii, 127n8, 128, 208n41, 287n25, 
325, 328n12, 328n13, 405, 406, 444, 
469, 541, 549, 587, 601, 673 (see also 
oikos)
House of Orange 202, 248, 288, 297, 302, 




Hustaert, Jacob 166, 167, 167n15
hygiene 574, 578, 653
index810
Patna 55, 57, 57n21, 59, 62, 87, 98, 171, 
177, 179, 200, 251, 253, 281, 362, 449, 
484, 735, 738-740, 750, 751, 765
Srinagar 58, 185
Surat 26n18, 31, 37, 38n6, 39, 39n10, 
41n14, 96, 141, 150, 152n38, 159, 160, 
163, 164, 166n10, 169, 175, 176, 182, 
230n75, 231, 715, 759, 760
Zamorin 146, 147, 150, 161, 166, 166n10
indigenous consumers 106, 324, 325, 327, 
365, 425, 435, 509
indigenous market 93, 199, 212, 215, 222, 
239, 251, 275, 287, 307, 331, 333, 374, 
448, 466, 712, 719, 720
indigenous medicine 195, 644 (see also Chi-
nese medicine, folk-healers)
indigenous nationalism 95, 396, 401, 442, 
442n49, 459, 470, 472, 526, 634n13
indigenous people-societies 16, 17, 106, 152, 
152n38, 153, 153n39, 179, 190, 198, 208, 
212, 215, 215n50, 217, 223, 224, 235, 236, 
241, 252, 261, 262, 265, 266, 274, 279, 
281, 284, 289, 296, 298, 308, 319, 327, 
376, 401, 403, 405, 406, 417, 424, 460, 
466, 469, 474, 481, 503, 525, 531, 533-
535, 561, 595, 625
indigenous producers 57, 231, 233, 291, 309, 
313, 334, 375, 377, 466, 616, 717, 760, 
762, 767
indigenous rulers 144, 151, 171, 199, 215, 224, 
226, 232, 270, 280, 287, 291, 296, 319, 
350, 361, 375, 377, 383, 421, 470, 471, 
501, 683, 713
Indochina (see French Empire)
Indonesia (see also Asian continent; Dutch 
Empire, VOC) 
Aceh 198, 226, 307, 322, 332, 333, 342, 
350, 419
Amangkurat II 236
Ambon 199, 220, 321, 432n28
archipelago xvi, 19, 50, 126, 151,  151n34, 
159, 160n64, 177, 178, 182, 188, 199, 
205n34, 214-216, 220, 221, 226, 227, 
229-231, 234, 236, 239, 247, 262, 
264n18, 265n20, 271, 274, 279, 280n8, 
284n16, 290-292, 297, 315, 317, 319, 321, 
327, 329, 332, 334, 336, 338, 339, 
350n62-352, 357, 372, 379, 417, 469, 
483n36, 757, 761
Bali 198n19, 216, 226, 227n69, 275, 276, 
279, 280, 321, 322, 324, 329-332, 342, 
561
India xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, 3, 8n12, 24, 26n18, 27, 
36, 39, 50, 55, 77, 79n77, 87, 89, 91, 95, 
96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 121, 130, 145, 163, 
178, 183, 211, 228, 253, 291, 321, 397, 
403, 406, 410, 422, 441, 448, 456, 457, 
522, 532n2, 572, 629, 631, 719, 735-738, 
740 (see also Asian continent, assault, 
British Empire)




Ayurveda 24, 175n12, 572, 644, 717
Behar 183, 737-739
Benares 87, 96, 98, 172, 174, 177, 182, 183, 
334, 422, 433, 435, 449, 735, 737-740, 
750
Bengal merchants 292, 362, 365n15, 397, 
672, 690, 712, 740, 747, 749
Bengal opium (see Opium, production)
Bombay 64, 68, 87, 92-96, 98, 172, 253, 
449, 464, 688, 735, 745
Buddhism 264n18, 441, 526, 572, 608n33
Calcutta 12n4, 46, 52, 58, 60, 64, 64n34, 
65, 87, 90, 90n5, 98, 100, 101, 292, 330, 
368, 369, 449, 629, 688, 738, 739, 742, 
743, 744, 748, 751
Calicut 41n14, 136, 143, 146, 147, 150, 212
Cannanur 165, 166
Cochin 136, 146, 156, 163, 166-168n17, 169, 
176n13, 278, 469, 715
Coromandel 151, 153n39, 161, 171, 175, 176, 
182, 244, 245, 262, 759, 760
Diu 96, 143, 154
Ghazipur 90, 650n16, 738, 742
Goa 26, 27, 39, 39n10, 87, 92, 95, 96, 142, 
145, 147, 152, 155-159, 163, 165, 713, 744
Gujarat 26n18, 159, 160n64, 177, 228, 271
Hindu(ism) 141, 146, 147, 150, 161n67, 181, 
184n35, 185, 533, 571, 572
Hugly 64
Kerala (see Malabar)
Malabar xiii, 27, 64, 93, 135, 136, 139, 143, 
144, 146, 150, 150n33, 152, 156, 157n52, 
159, 161n67, 162-164, 166, 168-170, 175, 
177, 185, 190n5, 213, 273, 711, 713, 718, 
744
Malwa opium (see Opium, production)
Mughal India 55-57, 57n21, 174, 175, 179-




299, 318, 345, 349, 376, 412, 423, 449, 
466, 474, 475, 506, 528, 579, 589, 685, 
687, 689, 692
Inquisition 140 
International Criminal Court 481, 642
International Opium Commission 119, 120, 
349, 406, 433, 493, 505n26, 575, 616, 
629, 632, 638, 720, 721
International Settlement 89, 411-413, 553, 
620n64, 631, 637, 654, 687, 690, 692, 
695, 750 (see also China)
international trade 6, 67, 73, 98, 143, 187, 
346, 469, 474, 488-490, 507, 511, 552-
554, 558, 639, 665, 701, 702
International War Crimes Tribunal 521 
Iran (see Middle East)
Islam 24, 146, 147, 150, 182, 184n35, 226, 262, 
535n9, 563, 572, 597, 623
isolation, economical 13, 32, 390
isolation, political-social  6, 13, 268, 463, 




Itinerario 25, 27n19, 29, 41, 142, 147n, 156, 
157, 196
Japan(ese) Empire xvi, 42, 75, 76, 78, 91, 119, 
146, 151, 176, 201, 221, 222, 235, 263, 
284, 311, 342, 347, 354, 385, 395, 412-
414, 432, 437, 444, 456, 473-475, 493, 
494, 496, 503, 517, 529, 530
colonization 506, 507, 509, 511





Kwantung (Army) 510, 513n45, 519 
Meiji Revolution 495, 496
Nanjing China 520, 521
narcotics production-trade 505, 505n25, 
505n27, 508, 509, 511, 513, 514, 516, 520
North China 512-516, 517n54, 518, 519
Sino-Japanese War 497, 497n9, 502
Jardine, William (see Opium, dealers; see 
also British Empire)
Java (see Dutch Empire, see also Indonesia)
Java War (see Dutch Empire)
Jejeebhoy, Jamsetjee (see Opium, dealers; 
see also British Empire)
Banda 151n34, 202, 219, 219n57, 220-224, 
226, 256, 263, 264
Bangka (Banca) 231, 264, 291, 293, 295-
297, 299-301, 303-305n28, 322, 324, 
329, 473 (see also Billiton)
Bantam 20, 38, 198, 199, 214, 226, 230, 




Borneo 89, 103, 157, 220, 275, 284, 290, 




Celebes 233, 279, 284, 321, 340, 374n2, 
449, 563





Madura 226, 234, 279, 317, 319, 322, 324, 
325n7, 334, 360, 364, 366, 755, 770
Mataram (see Dutch Empire)
Moluccas (see Dutch Empire)
Oei Tiong Ham 476, 482
Outer Districts (see Dutch Empire)
Palembang 55n18, 199, 232, 264n18, 266, 




Sulawesi 216, 233, 286, 332, 447
Sumatra 26n18, 38n6, 199, 214, 252, 254, 
275, 284, 316, 321, 324, 352, 354, 561, 
744, 745, 747 (see also Dutch Empire, 
Aceh, Palembang)
Industrial Revolution xvi, 125, 472
infrastructure 64, 102, 107, 128, 129, 138, 140, 
191, 216, 259, 342, 345, 361, 396, 425, 
486, 503, 506, 557, 616, 652, 653, 687, 
713, 715, 723, 726
injection needle 514, 583, 631, 651, 684 
investigation 79n78, 114, 124, 129, 163, 276, 
277, 280n8, 285, 301, 323, 336, 341, 359, 
390, 430, 463, 464, 509, 513, 525, 553, 
567, 611, 629, 632, 633, 658, 658n35, 
661, 662, 676n82, 692, 701, 706, 709, 
753, 759
invest(or)ment 15, 60, 65, 73, 75, 76, 88, 166, 
176, 179, 202, 241, 250, 281, 297, 297n10, 
index812
laudanum (see Opium)
law 8n12, 11, 12, 43, 60, 66-69, 83, 115, 116, 143, 
144, 215, 217, 269, 279, 290, 323, 333, 
336, 338, 340, 348-352n68, 392n25, 
412, 441, 443, 466, 479, 480-484, 495, 
500, 501, 503, 507, 509, 517, 540, 552, 
557, 566, 574, 579, 581-583, 588, 601, 
604, 605, 608, 612n44, 614, 617, 621, 
628, 654, 654n25, 683, 683n97, 684, 
693, 700, 715, 727, 762
law of conquest (see Dutch Empire, see also 
assault)
legalization 68, 605, 685, 687
legal opium (see Opium)
League of Nations 102, 326, 340, 346, 409, 
440, 445, 552, 692, 721 
legitimation 5, 6, 16, 19, 201n29, 202, 205, 
206, 213, 233, 259, 284, 336, 395, 400, 
547, 572, 595
Le Pichon, Alain 68, 71n51, 71n52, 91n11, 743-
745, 749 
Lewin, Ludwig 20n2, 21, 22, 109n, 513, 573
license 54n11, 65, 90, 204, 222, 296-299, 
305n28, 321, 324, 325, 329, 333, 351, 
351n66, 352, 404, 410, 439, 486, 503, 
505, 543, 550, 555, 564, 637, 725, 751
Lindemann, Mary 138n11, 140n16, 192n8
Linschoten, Jan Huygen van 25-29, 32, 
39n10, 41, 41n17, 56, 136n4, 142, 147, 
155-158, 196, 200, 201, 201n28, 229, 684, 
713, 714
Li-Schi-Tschin 229 
Lin Zexu (Tse hsu) 67, 84, 105, 635 
Liverpool (see Europe, England)
Lodwick, Kathleen 14n10, 81n82, 82n87, 
84n90, 610, 610n38, 612, 613n46, 614, 
675, 676n82





Lossing Buck, John 658, 658n35, 660-663, 
666n51, 667, 669 
Loudon, John F. (see Dutch Empire)
LSD 379, 387n10, 709
Luang Prabang (see Southeast Asia)
Lubbock, Basil 64n34, 65n37, 65n39, 67, 69, 
69n45, 71n53, 740-742 
Luciano, Charles ‘Lucky’ (see Opium, deal-
ers)
Jewish opium gangs 584, 585, 585n105, 688, 
691, 692, 692n116, 692n117, 693, 
694n119, 698n129 (see also Opium, 
dealers)
Jews 20n1, 45, 46, 46n27, 66, 74, 75, 93, 94, 
118, 124, 125, 157, 182, 248, 255n, 
267n25, 393, 402, 403, 464, 471, 473, 
542, 545, 546n27, 549n33, 572, 
580n95, 585n105, 595, 620n64, 
621n68, 690, 693n118
Kaempfer, Engelbert (see Dutch Empire)
Kansu (see China)
Karen (see Southeast Asia)




King of Orange (see Dutch Empire)
Kinh (see Southeast Asia) 








Kremers, Edward 114n17, 196n16, 387n12, 
388n14, 551, 579n92 
Kwantung Army (see Japan) 
Kwantung Leased Territory (see China)
Kweichow (see China)
Kwong, Luke S.K. 70n47, 627n1
labor (exploitation) xiii, xiiin3, 63, 90n5, 
111, 141, 175, 175n11, 185, 200, 214, 216, 
221, 223n60, 247, 247n14, 262, 264, 
265, 281-283, 296, 297n8, 299, 299n12-
301n15, 304, 309, 329, 330, 345, 377, 
402, 412, 414, 417, 449, 461, 464-466, 
472, 473, 478, 517, 523, 529, 544, 547, 
548, 560, 583, 616, 620, 621, 663n45, 
666, 698, 700, 727, 730, 735, 747, 765
La Motte, Ellen 5, 89n4, 90, 91, 451, 451n68, 
454, 455, 494n5, 513, 514, 514n46, 515, 
747, 748, 750, 751n2
Lansky, Meyer (see Opium, dealers)
landlords,  263n15, 667
land utilization 87, 658, 662
Laos (see Southeast Asia)
index 813
422, 602, 608, 618, 634n13, 640, 641, 
649, 657, 699, 712, 726
Mataram (see Indonesia)
materia medica 114, 499 
Matheson, James (see Opium, dealers)
McCoy, Alfred W. 257n, 396, 396n3, 415n37, 
420n6, 423, 424, 485n, 489, 525, 
538,  556, 559n, 561n53, 564n61, 589, 
614n49, 634n13, 701, 701n134, 703, 
706n147, 716, 724, 729, 730





medicalization 113, 128, 391n22, 709, 727
medical doctors, medicines, sciences (see 
also apothecaries, homeopathy, 
pharmacists)
ancient xii, 21
Arab, Muslim 24, 24n14, 29n26, 30-32, 
36, 41n14, 127, 141, 158, 192, 220, 377, 
572, 715
Chinese 22, 65, 82n86, 229, 273, 512, 602, 
643, 645-647, 651n14, 652, 652n18, 
653, 655, 673n73, 675, 691, 697 (see 
also herbs)
early European 23, 26, 28, 28n20, 29, 45, 
47, 108, 128, 137, 137n10, 138-140, 156, 
158, 168, 191, 192, 192n8, 194-196, 201, 
202, 377, 714, 715 (see also folk-heal-
ers)
Hindu, Indian 159, 162n71, 572 (see also 
India, Ayurveda)
modern (Western) xv, 7, 72, 82, 90, 105, 
107, 113, 114, 114n17, 118, 127n8, 129, 188, 
338, 343, 346, 348, 351, 351n66, 371, 
383, 387, 388, 388n13, 389, 391, 497, 
499, 510, 511, 549, 566, 568, 573, 574, 
575, 577, 578, 580n94, 581, 583, 588, 
645, 646, 650, 681, 682, 709, 713, 715, 
717 (see also Enlightenment, medi-
calization)
tribal 424, 425, 502, 535, 564, 649, 650
Meiji Revolution (see Japan)
Meilink-Roelofsz, M. 152n38, 203, 209, 
228n71, 264n18, 265, 266n21, 269n30, 
271, 273n 




luxury 26, 31, 41, 47, 58, 72, 97, 135, 157, 
161n67, 162, 181, 271, 277, 303, 346, 377, 
383, 386n8, 407, 478, 500, 602, 612, 
613, 613n46, 616, 635, 745
Lyall, Alfred  (see British Empire)
Macao (Macau)  (see Portuguese Empire, 
see also China)
Macartney Embassy (see British Empire, 
embassy)
Macaulay, Thomas B. (see British Empire)
madat (madak) (see Opium)
Madura (see Indonesia)
Mafĳia Complex 129, 582, 584, 585 




Malwa opium (see Opium, production)
management xv, 57, 131n12, 166, 296, 301, 
305, 311, 317, 329, 333, 336, 354, 360, 




Manila 177, 228, 256, 538, 563, 564
Manrique, Fray Sebastien (see Portuguese 
Empire)
Mansvelt, Willem 308-315, 317, 318 
mantri-politie 328 
Mao Zedong (see China)
maps 26, 351, 469, 583, 636, 660




Marshall, Jonathan 126n7, 517n54, 552, 553, 
667, 684, 691n114, 692n117, 694n120, 
696n122, 697n127, 699 
Martin, Brian G. 684n99, 697n127, 698n128
Martin, Montgomery 36 
Marx, Karl 11n, 36, 38n8, 56n19, 59, 60n27, 
182n29, 532n2, 533, 533n3, 543
maslac (see Opium)
massacres 55n18, 152, 205n34, 216, 221, 222, 
224-227, 227n69, 240, 242n6, 255n1, 
256-263, 268, 276, 280n8, 332, 333, 
428, 470, 471, 508, 533, 516, 561, 713, 
724
mass line projects 652, 653, 653n22
mass products xvi, 12, 26, 31, 47, 79, 96, 177, 
190n5, 200, 202, 207, 236, 367, 378, 
index814
489, 508, 525, 542, 543, 549, 569, 570, 
572, 585n106, 587, 632n10, 637, 691, 
692n116, 714, 727, 728, 742, 766
Yemen 29, 30
military 123, 124, 126, 136n4, 144, 145, 174, 181, 
182, 196n16, 202, 208,  212, 213, 221, 
227, 227n69, 239, 244, 254, 281, 286, 
296, 304n26, 308, 321, 329, 331, 341, 
349, 376, 396, 397, 406, 419, 427, 431, 
446, 469, 495, 516, 552, 560, 608, 640, 
649, 661, 674n78, 695, 723, 760
Ming dynasty (see China)
Minh-Mang, king (see Southeast Asia)
Ministry of Finance (see Dutch Empire)
Ministry of Justice (see Dutch Empire)
missionary 14n10, 70, 74, 151, 502, 532n2, 
553, 609n35, 611, 612, 614, 619n62, 648, 
649, 680
Mocha (see Middle East)
modernization 226, 350, 351, 369, 425, 563, 
615, 647, 654n25, 682
Moluccas (see Indonesia)
money 16, 26, 229, 236, 241, 243, 244, 245, 
247, 248, 253, 263, 265, 269n31, 280, 
289, 291, 296, 298, 308, 310, 327, 340, 
341, 355, 373, 377, 406, 430, 452, 454, 
475, 502, 517, 539, 579, 584, 594, 656, 
661, 675n79, 712, 718, 721, 735, 759, 763
Mongkut, king (see Southeast Asia)
monopoly 6, 15, 26, 35, 40, 44, 47, 55, 57, 
57n21, 58, 59, 79n77, 87-89, 92, 99, 102, 
116, 123, 128, 137, 143, 151, 164, 166, 171, 
189, 199, 208, 213, 221, 223, 232, 239, 
274n48, 283, 292, 311, 312, 325, 334, 
335, 338, 352, 365, 389, 390, 400, 413, 
431, 445, 455, 470, 476, 497, 498, 505, 
515, 523, 533, 543, 552, 557, 564, 580, 
589n3, 636, 644, 686, 689, 698, 720, 
725, 751, 757
monsoon 64, 65, 500 
morality xi, 7, 14, 16, 36, 37, 70, 143, 145, 239, 
252n24, 286, 311, 401, 404, 523, 612, 
612n44, 613, 730
Morgan, J.P. bank (see British Empire) 
morphine xv, xvi, 22, 91, 105, 110, 114, 117, 119, 
194, 195, 316, 327, 328, 335, 336, 338, 
340n42, 341, 345-348, 375, 388, 390, 
393, 413, 428, 433, 440, 457, 488-490, 
498, 510-514, 522, 548, 554, 569, 570, 




merchant xii, 15, 20, 29-31, 37, 39, 39n12, 43, 
45, 46, 57, 57n21, 61, 69, 73-75, 79n78, 
88, 98, 143, 163, 172, 182, 204, 211, 220, 
228, 241, 331, 377, 421, 452, 470, 479, 
542, 563, 602, 605, 606, 608, 630, 639, 
640, 648, 657, 678, 683, 689n108, 690, 
691, 712, 719
Merck pharmaceutics 345, 347n54, 387, 
387n11, 393, 549, 555n46, 578, 579, 
579n91, 580, 580n94, 599,  650n16, 
725
Merlin, David 8n11, 22
Mexico 97, 473, 539, 573, 580, 581 
Middle East xi, xv, 21, 26n18, 29, 30-32, 36, 
107, 127, 141, 150, 154, 155, 159, 165, 199, 
228, 271, 307, 377, 443n53, 456, 468, 
488, 526, 528, 552, 607, 637, 683, 712, 
715
Aden 27, 154, 154n42, 159, 271, 458, 469
Afghanistan xiii-xv, 21n7, 31, 32, 79n77, 
120, 213, 485, 531, 716, 721, 731, 732
Anatolia 22, 315, 316
Arabian Sea 24, 141, 145, 601, 724
Arab medical knowledge (see medical 
doctors)
Arabs 143, 159, 255, 262, 273, 331, 397, 
454n73, 458




Egypt xii, 8n11, 21, 27, 28n22, 41n14, 108, 
143, 145, 150, 155, 166, 192, 310, 315, 389, 
570, 622, 702
Iran 31, 103, 155, 158n57, 410n28, 457, 458, 





Persia 26, 41n14, 81, 93, 97, 108, 143, 145, 
150, 150n33, 154, 155, 158, 158n57, 160, 
161n67, 164, 166, 167, 194, 200, 201, 239, 
264n18, 501, 570, 572, 631, 690, 715 (see 
also Iran) 
Persian Gulf 93, 144, 145, 155, 158n57, 177, 
228
Smyrna 110, 111, 570 
Turkey  28, 28n22, 41n14, 54, 66, 81, 90, 
97, 103, 108-110, 112, 150, 155, 166, 194, 







occupation, military 57, 145, 205n34, 207, 
214, 215, 224, 228, 244, 264, 291, 321, 
322, 348, 350, 354, 364, 379, 397, 400, 
413, 414, 415, 432, 437, 456, 471, 488, 
499, 507, 509, 513, 521, 524, 526, 561, 
565, 631, 650, 677
octroy (see Dutch Empire)
Oei Tiong Ham (see Indonesia)
oikos, oikoidal  6, 15, 16, 35, 89, 123, 125, 
153n41, 182, 182n29, 302, 308, 309, 312, 
401, 405, 495, 563, 619n62, 723 (see 
also court, household)
Old China Trade (see British Empire)
Ong-Tae-Hae (see Dutch Empire)
‘Open Door’ policy (see British Empire)
opiates 107, 113, 127, 116, 192, 389, 439, 564, 
575, 584, 703, 726
opiomanie 435
Opium (see also poppy)
afyūn 27n18, 155, 159n59, 171, 183, 601, 714
amfĳio(e)n 26n18, 27, 155, 404 (see also 
amphioen)
amphioen 155, 155n48, 159n59, 164, 
164n4-169, 184, 185, 198-200, 214, 234, 
250, 252, 272, 272n42, 274, 285, 287, 
296, 362, 377, 714, 718 (see also Dutch 
empire)
Chinese opium 20, 73, 85, 102, 119, 271, 
421, 440, 601, 602, 607, 633, 636, 667, 
684, 751
Commonwealth, Opium 120
consumption (use) xiii, 16, 19, 111-114, 
127, 128, 135n2, 154, 155, 179, 183-188, 
194, 229n74, 230, 234, 235, 237, 240, 
241, 272n42, 280, 285n22, 287, 291, 
292, 303, 319, 321, 324, 325n7, 327, 
327n10, 333, 335, 336, 338, 347-350, 
352, 357, 358, 370, 383, 383, 388, 389, 
392, 393, 401, 418, 421, 423, 424, 426, 
433-438, 438n39, 441, 446, 448, 452, 
453, 472, 478, 496, 503, 510, 523, 527, 
529, 534n5, 544, 545n26, 552, 564, 
566, 567, 572, 573, 576, 577, 603, 
607n30, 608, 609n36, 612, 616, 627, 
630, 631, 640, 643, 651, 657, 671-676, 
Morse, Hosea B. 5n7, 14n9, 14n10, 15
Mossel, Jacob  (see Opium, dealers; see also 
Dutch Empire)
Moulin Rouge (see Europe, France)












Napier, Lord (see British Empire)
Napoleon, emperor (see French Empire)
narco-business xvi, 73, 98, 341, 352, 367, 
442, 449, 490, 513, 522, 525, 554, 575, 
584, 665, 684, 692, 698, 701, 729
narco-consumer complex xiii, 113, 120, 126, 
201n29, 213, 351, 386, 411-413, 457, 477, 
489, 518, 548, 553, 554n44, 574, 575, 
581, 587, 653, 663, 692n116, 697, 725, 
727
narco-military state xiv, 3, 4, 14, 61, 87, 88, 
123, 124, 181, 236, 247, 280, 286, 287, 
325, 342, 361, 365, 373, 378, 379, 419, 
423, 438, 456, 486, 490, 498, 507, 511, 
515, 530, 604, 682, 683, 702, 716, 717, 
723, 761, 762
narcotic death 107, 117, 473, 677
narcotics 73, 113, 338, 348, 350, 351, 367, 386, 
431, 458, 510, 511, 516, 517, 522, 581, 598, 
608n33, 637, 664
nationalism 152, 353, 431, 459, 486, 511, 526, 




Nederveen Pieterse, Jan 5n5, 239n1
nepotism 94
Netherlands (see Europe, Netherlands)
Newbold, Thomas John (see British Em -
pire)
Newman, R. K. 82n86, 82n87, 85n93, 598, 
599n9, 609n34, 609n36, 627n1, 634, 
634n14, 635n17, 656n29, 680, 681, 682
New York (see USA)
New York Times (see USA)
Nigeria 120, 717 
index816
688-690, 692-694, 694n119, 
698n129, 751
Swatow gang 687, 690, 691
den, opium 44, 46, 86, 118, 280, 287, 303, 
321, 333, 335, 336, 349, 350, 360, 386, 
396, 404, 406, 412, 431, 435, 447, 448, 
455, 490, 503, 516, 517, 524, 525, 555, 
594, 598, 616, 619, 631, 872, 690, 696, 
725, 746, 750, 751
distribution xii, 8n12, 37, 59, 73, 75, 91, 
128, 140, 227, 230n76, 230n77, 234, 
239, 246, 287, 304, 311, 319, 321, 322, 
335, 338, 345, 348-350, 357, 361n, 369, 
379, 390, 401, 403, 426, 449, 463, 472, 
478, 486, 487, 497, 515, 527, 558n50, 
564, 581, 602, 681, 684-687, 691, 693, 
735, 757, 769
eating 26, 26n18, 36, 114, 272n42, 410n28, 
443, 488, 544, 607n29, 613n46, 623
export xv, 5n6, 9n13, 51, 52, 60, 66, 72, 73, 
77, 77n72, 80n81, 82n87, 87, 91, 95, 98, 
99, 102, 103, 163, 165, 170, 177, 178, 231, 
298, 330, 342, 438, 442, 487, 520, 
534n5, 553, 632, 664, 670, 676, 680, 
735, 740, 743, 747 (see also Opium, 
import)
factory 62, 90, 124, 334, 335, 337, 338, 
340n42-342, 348, 351, 354n73, 355, 
404, 410, 453, 456, 510, 518, 527, 606, 
650n16, 735, 738, 738n2, 765, 766, 769, 
770
farmer 31, 77, 230, 239, 246, 247, 252, 255, 
292, 319, 357-361n, 365, 366, 369, 401, 
404, 406, 407, 452, 472, 473, 478, 483, 
528, 716 
for tea 3, 6, 15, 20, 30, 52, 64, 65, 92, 98, 
106, 110, 120, 123, 174, 212, 250, 424, 564, 
619, 631, 635n16, 691, 712, 717, 735
for pepper 30, 30n28, 41, 136, 156, 162, 
162n71, 163-165, 167, 167n13, 168, 170, 
176n13, 181, 186, 199, 209, 212, 232, 252, 
367, 377, 712, 715
Golden Triangle (see Southeast Asia)
import monopoly 166, 214, 230, 246, 247, 
274, 292, 317, 330, 395, 712
import, opium 12, 61n33, 65-68, 72, 79, 
80, 80n79, 80n80-83, 90, 96-98, 100, 
106, 108-110, 112n11, 117, 154, 165, 166, 
169, 178, 192, 199, 227, 229, 231, 239, 
273, 286, 292n32, 308, 332, 341, 
351n66, 368, 388, 422, 433, 444, 457, 
496, 502, 516, 525, 532, 534n5, 545, 
678, 680, 681n95, 711, 715, 718, 722, 723, 
723n7, 735, 741, 745, 746 
cultivation xii, 36, 55, 58, 82, 82n86, 89, 
90, 101, 111, 155, 171, 172, 188, 318, 410, 
419, 420, 422, 429, 430, 438, 440, 490, 
509, 510, 551, 606, 608, 630, 633, 634, 
634n13, 636, 659, 666, 670, 676, 687, 
696, 699, 716, 721, 737
dealers 
American  xii, xv, 17, 54, 66, 68, 307, 
314, 315, 317, 321, 367, 421, 481, 500, 
501, 513, 536, 542, 584, 605, 608, 
612, 638, 639, 697, 698, 728
Amphioen Society 239, 240, 243, 
243n8, 244, 246, 248, 252-254, 
269n32, 278, 282, 288, 311, 312, 321, 




Broecke, Pieter van den  28n20, 30, 
159, 159n58, 159n59, 160, 175, 229, 
230n75 (see also Dutch Empire)
Buchalter, Louis L. 584
Dent & Co 64n34, 66, 77, 500, 501, 
566, 599, 688
Du Yuesheng 412, 413, 694n120, 697, 
697n127, 698, 701
Ezra Brothers  554, 691, 692, 692n116, 
751
Farquhar, major 45, 448
Hung Chi Shan Tang 520-522
Jardine, William 13, 15, 43, 123, 124, 
553, 554, 593, 596, 599, 605, 609, 
623, 681, 682, 685-689, 689n108, 
693, 694 (see also Matheson)
Jejeebhoy, Jamsetjee 68, 92, 94
Katsenberg, Jasha 584, 698
Lansky, Meyer 584, 698
Luciano, Charles ‘Lucky’ 584, 698
Matheson, James 44, 45, 45n26, 48, 
64n34, 65-67, 71, 72, 75-77, 83, 92, 
94, 95 (see also Jardine)
Mossel, Jacob 214, 242-245, 245n11, 
247, 248, 250, 682 
Red Gang 690
Rothstein, Arnold 584, 585n105, 698
Russell, Samuel 605
Sassoon, family 64n34, 66, 76, 77, 
80n80, 92, 93, 93n13, 111, 123, 124, 
403, 554, 596, 599, 605, 623, 635, 
636, 636n18, 681, 681n95, 684n99, 
index 817
prohibition, opium 9, 20n2, 83, 155, 188, 
214, 229, 236, 304, 340, 350, 406, 407, 
408, 410, 421, 441, 500, 545, 557, 564, 
583, 700
regie, Opium 299, 304, 305n28, 319, 321, 
324, 325, 325n7, 327, 329, 333, 333n25, 
334-336, 336n31, 338, 339, 350, 368, 
341, 342, 348, 350-352, 366, 368, 409, 
418, 433, 435, 523, 527, 528, 564, 713, 
724, 765, 767, 769, 771 
Question 711, 712, 713 
related costs 12, 53, 166, 173, 176n13, 239, 
247, 252, 283, 284, 297n10, 298, 299, 
303, 315, 318, 348, 349, 353, 358, 360, 
365, 365n15, 368, 371, 392, 407, 408, 
454, 458, 490, 521, 567, 594, 671, 686, 
688, 736, 757, 761, 762, 763, 770
revenues 77, 79, 89, 98, 100, 122, 129, 248, 
292, 354, 367, 372, 402, 406, 428, 450, 
455, 518, 526, 527, 552, 553, 616, 740, 
746 (see also profĳits)
shipping  73, 130, 144, 223, 278, 403, 476, 
607, 685 (see also clipper, Chinese 
junks)
smoking xv, 3, 20, 31, 83, 84, 97, 105, 117, 
118, 155, 194, 195, 199, 214n48, 229, 234, 
253, 340, 384, 436, 443, 448, 456, 495, 
524, 535, 543, 557, 570, 576, 613, 623, 
648, 656, 674n75 (see also madat)
trade xi, xiii, 12, 350, 369, 370, 372, 421, 
444, 446, 449, 451, 488, 489, 496, 497, 
500, 521, 527, 528, 541, 549, 552, 555, 
564, 567, 573, 599, 602, 608n33, 614, 
634n13, 638, 664, 669, 671, 685, 687, 
746, 757 (see also illicit trade, smug-
glers)
victims xii, xiii, 4, 7, 7n10, 19, 36, 86, 103, 
118, 119, 124, 125, 130, 150n31, 189, 205, 
254, 517, 539 , 594, 598, 609, 627 (see 
also blaming, death, death penalty, 
narcotic death)
war, opium 370, 531, 606, 706, 707, 712, 
714 
Wettig Opium (see Dutch Empire)
orientalism 7, 383, 385, 623
Orta, Garcia de (see Portuguese Empire)
Ottoman empire  (see Middle East)
‘Overseas Chinese’ (see Southeast Asia)
Outer Districts (see Indonesia) 
Owen, David E. 35, 35n2, 54n13-56, 58, 180, 
315n27, 499, 500, 540, 589n2
Padang (see Indonesia)
547, 549, 550, 558, 558n50, 566, 576, 
602, 605, 608, 627, 629, 631, 634, 637, 
639, 641, 670, 680, 685, 690, 726, 746, 
749, 754, 755, 766
laudanum 107, 191, 304, 384, 572
(il)legal opium 327, 357, 413, 437, 444, 
567, 685, 687, 688, 713 (see also Wet-
tig Opium)
madat (madak) 20n2, 234, 272n42, 273
maslac 28, 28n22
mecones 22, 28n21
money, opium  (see money)
monopoly, opium (see monopoly) 
Opium War, First xii, xiv, 6, 398, 444, 
500, 540, 541, 543, 604, 686, 742, 744, 
748, 749
Opium War, Second 13, 398, 411, 439, 
449, 451, 452, 464, 543, 545, 547, 
549n33, 603, 604n20, 605, 607, 628n3, 
658, 672, 676n82, 686, 746
peasants 69, 101, 105, 111, 127, 172-174, 
226, 255, 256, 270, 291, 375, 429, 430, 
463, 557, 615, 625, 653, 661, 663, 
666n52, 678, 679, 695, 696n123, 700, 
706, 737
pipes 7, 68, 72, 303, 384, 392, 404, 441, 
447, 497, 501, 502, 509, 527, 543, 594, 
598, 613n46, 619, 650, 667, 667n55, 
672-674, 674n75, 678, 700, 727
policy 35, 47, 58, 72, 77, 78n74, 85, 118, 
122, 236, 244, 253, 274n48, 282, 
289,  292, 292n32, 307, 315, 329, 332, 
335, 339, 340, 344, 350, 373, 374n2, 
398, 416, 431, 444, 446, 495, 502, 503, 
510, 512, 513, 513n45, 518, 519, 523, 525, 
527, 530, 539, 540, 545, 552, 567, 582, 
588, 589, 607, 615, 616n53, 636, 660, 
664, 665, 699, 701, 703, 716, 718, 723n7, 
727, 729, 730, 731
production 231, 520, 526, 528, 548, 552, 
556, 578, 580, 594, 608, 632, 635, 636, 
643, 657, 658, 661, 662n43, 664, 666, 
667, 675, 702, 704, 711, 716, 721, 728, 
735, 736, 738
Bengal opium 3, 220, 227, 229, 229n74, 
231, 235, 239, 241, 244, 246, 248, 251, 
252, 269n33, 273, 278, 281, 307, 311, 314, 
335, 341, 364, 543, 602, 688, 689, 690, 
711, 712, 736, 737, 739, 741-744, 750, 
751, 757, 765 – 769
Malwa opium 688, 689, 690, 712, 736, 
737, 741, 742-745, 747, 749, 750
index818
Philippines (see American Empire, Span-
ish Empire)
pipes, opium (see Opium, pipes)
piracy 145, 210, 269n30, 297, 596, 714, 719
Plassey, battle of (see British Empire)
pogrom 20n1, 124, 125, 255n1, 278, 545, 558, 
619, 622, 680
poison 26n18, 27, 31, 115, 116, 157, 194, 201, 
277, 288-290, 291, 304, 346, 373, 389, 
403, 420, 486, 496, 497, 514, 517, 545, 
604, 617, 627, 650n16, 651, 651n17, 665, 
700, 715
poppy xiv, 8n11, 21, 21n7, 22, 24, 31, 75, 90n5, 
180, 229, 286, 338, 350, 357, 424, 478, 
490, 535, 557, 603, 604, 607, 613, 629, 
631, 636, 644, 654, 664, 666, 669, 679, 
681, 683, 705n143, 717
Chinese poppy xii, 604, 608, 629, 631, 
634, 644, 648, 659, 662, 664, 666, 681
papaver somniferum 4, 8n11, 21, 22, 
28n21, 31, 155, 185, 201, 569, 725n9, 726
poppy cultivation xii, 3, 32, 50, 55, 58, 
59, 83, 89, 90, 100, 101, 111, 124, 154, 173, 
174, 251, 285, 286, 419, 439, 440, 
443n53, 448, 510, 526, 551, 608, 630, 
631, 634, 634n13, 656, 658, 660-662, 
667, 670, 671, 674n78, 688, 694, 696, 
700, 715, 716, 721, 735, 736, 737, 751 (see 
also yields)
poppy balls 201
poppy heads 180, 180n25, 194, 572, 648
poppy flowers 404, 767
poppy seed 24, 28n21, 110, 158, 180, 286, 
424, 655, 717
poppy syrup 24, 28n21, 126, 201, 229, 767
Port Arthur (see China)
Portugal (see Europe)
Portuguese Empire xiv, 26, (see also Asian 




cartazes 151 (see also passports)
Macao (Macau)  64-66, 70, 96n20, 97, 
98, 102, 152, 224, 228, 273, 406, 434, 
442, 460, 488, 518, 522, 544, 557, 558, 
602, 638, 676, 680, 702, 742, 747, 748
Manrique, Fray Sebastien 156n49, 157, 
157n53, 158, 220
Orta, Garcia de 26, 92, 155, 155n48, 157, 
157n52, 157n53
pain 21, 107, 127, 137, 191, 192, 196, 571, 573, 
581, 599, 715
pain killer 21, 108, 196, 197, 388, 390, 424, 
432, 502, 536, 537, 547, 578, 613








passports (see Dutch Empire, Portuguese 
Empire)
Patna (see India)
Pax Neerlandica (see Dutch Empire)
Pearl Harbor (see American Empire)
peasants (see Opium, peasants)
Peking (see China) 
Pelsaert, Francisco (see Dutch Empire)
penal law 338, 348
Peoples Republic of China (see China)




Persian Gulf (see Middle East)
Peru 343, 345, 346n52, 347, 579, 580, 649, 
721, 725n9
pharmacist 111, 112, 114, 137, 192n8, 535, 547, 
548, 555n46, 567, 570, 650, 652, 715, 
717 (see also apothecary)
pharmaceutical industry xv, 110, 113, 129, 
345, 387, 387n11, 387n12, 393, 482n34, 
510, 535, 548, 558, 577-579, 581, 682, 
715, 722, 726, 727 (see also American 
pharmaceutical association, indus-
try)
pharmaceutical products 549, 649, 579, 649
Pharmaceutical Society (British, 1841) 107, 
114n17
pharmacology 21, 29n26, 369, 393, 425, 535, 
569, 651, 652
Arab 23, 29n26, 107, 127, (see also medi-
cal doctors, Arab)
Pharmacy Act (British, 1868) 111, 114n17, 115 
(see also Europe, England)
Philadelphia (see USA)
Philippine Commission (see anti-opium)
Philippine Revolution (see American 
Empire, Spanish Empire) 
index 819
race (human) 8, 8n12, 15, 259, 277, 393, 415, 
455, 459, 459n1, 507, 511, 512, 533, 543, 
560, 562, 597, 600, 603, 609, 609n35, 
610, 617-619, 619n62, 620n64, 621, 623, 
625, 647, 716 (see also China,  Yellow 
Danger; racism)
racial purity 474
racism 5, 118, 207, 259, 260n9, 300, 401, 459, 
460, 511, 546, 554, 562, 596, 597, 599, 
619, 621, 642, 725 
Rafffles, Thomas S. (see British Empire)
Rama, kings (see Southeast Asia)
Rangoon (see Southeast Asia)
Rashid, Ahmed xi, xiv, xv, 204, 530, 711, 732
Raynal, Guillaume 171, 177, 188
real estate 93, 478, 691, 692, 698n129 (see 
also property)
rebellion 226, 256n2, 443, 543, 547, 606, 
622n71
reciprocity 14, 15, 16, 143 (see also imperial 
reciprocities)
Red Army (see China)
Red Gang (see Opium, dealers)
Reede, Hendrik van (see Dutch Empire)
rehabilitation 653, 678
religion 4, 32, 70, 70n49, 139, 140, 146, 147, 
157, 262, 474, 534, 585n105, 600, 612, 
615, 617, 693, 714 (see also Calvinism, 
Catholicism, Christianity, Islam, 
Protestantism)
Renard, Ronald 421, 438, 441n46, 443n52, 
477, 478, 478n26
repression  (see colonial repression)
revenue (see Opium, revenues) 
revenue farm 358n4, 366, 400-405, 765
Revolution of 1911-12 (see China)
Rhône-Poulenc (see Europe, France)
Richards, John F. 53n9, 77n72, 89, 178n19, 
739, 740
Ricklefs, M.C. 190n4, 208n41, 222, 224n63, 
230n78
risks 65, 66, 92, 94, 95, 143, 210, 251, 475, 567, 
621
Rochussen, Jan J. (see Dutch Empire)
Rockefeller Foundation (see USA)
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (see USA)
Rosenberg, Alfred (see Germany)
Rothschild bank (see British Empire)
Rothstein, Arnold (see Opium, dealers)
Rowntree, Josua 57n21, 58n, 60n, 77n72, 118, 
154n42, 156, 157n, 388n13, 603n18, 
604n19, 605, 739, 740-742
Vasco da Gama 147, 157n52
Pottinger, Henry (see British Empire)
poverty 4, 45, 113, 114, 126, 235, 256, 463, 607, 
615, 616, 697
Prakash, Om 39n12, 41, 136n4, 154n46, 160, 
160n62, 160n64, 170n20, 175n, 176, 
177n17, 178n19, 183n32, 187n47, 210, 
228, 231, 718n
preaching 72, 151, 543, 607, 610n38, 611, 614
prehistory of opium 8n11, 716
prescription 23, 24, 29, 107, 116, 139, 201, 389, 
535, 544, 580, 582, 582n100, 624, 643-
645, 648, 651, 652, 715, 717, 727
prices 167, 167n13, 168, 169, 176n13, 199, 219, 
229, 230, 233, 239-241, 244, 251-253, 
272, 273, 295, 296, 300, 307, 313, 335, 
339, 340, 342, 343, 346, 355n75, 358, 
359, 362, 365, 368-372, 375, 405, 430, 
434, 452, 505n27, 534, 550, 558, 
582n100, 671n66, 691, 728, 737, 738, 
749
Prince of Orange (see Dutch Empire)
private interest 37, 88, 182, 278, 286, 298, 
723 
profĳits xvi, 87, 100, 357, 359, 363, 366, 371, 
698 (see also opium, revenue)
prohibition (see Opium, prohibition; see 
also law)
property 8, 14n9, 45, 76, 215, 215n49, 233, 
281, 290, 302, 329, 345, 348, 350, 351, 
353, 376, 412, 443, 474, 500, 530, 559, 
691, 725 (see also real estate) 
prostitutes 329, 389, 411, 412, 497, 517, 583, 
621
prostitution 97, 335, 411, 484, 500, 551, 583, 
642, 697, 697n127  (see also brothel)
protection (state) 15, 40, 68, 69, 208, 266, 
321, 332, 411, 412, 447, 507, 513, 518, 558, 
612n44, 671, 691, 695, 697n127, 698, 
699 
Protestantism 7, 376, 474, 532, 609
public health (movement) 116, 117, 124, 
127 (see also health)







silent (profĳits) 72, 106, 240, 245, 323, 479, 
598, 697
silver (drain) 9n13, 16, 41, 52, 53, 53n9, 54, 
54n14, 61, 61n33, 69, 79n76, 83, 88, 123, 
165, 181, 186, 190n4, 202, 232, 254, 292, 
311, 311n14, 398, 483, 528, 529, 541, 563, 
617, 667, 719, 735, 748, 749, 763
Singapore (see Southeast Asia)
Sinn, Elizabeth 73n, 75n63, 484, 544n23, 
547n28, 549n31, 642n29, 680, 680n90, 
682n
Sino-Japanese War (see China, Japan)
slavery xi, xii, xiiin, xvi, 5, 5n5, 35, 36, 36n4, 
44, 48, 97, 98, 141, 150n31, 158, 175, 
175n11, 184, 189, 190, 198, 199, 207, 208, 
208n41, 216, 216n, 217, 221, 223, 224, 
242n6, 244, 245, 245n11, 254, 256, 257, 
261, 273, 279, 280, 286, 288, 290, 309, 
329, 330, 375, 377, 417, 443, 472, 532n2, 
533, 539, 563, 619, 621, 632, 684, 
684n98, 714, 725n9 (see also anti-slav-
ery policy)
sleep 27, 28, 156, 158, 158n56, 200, 201n29, 
384, 497, 571, 573
Slicher van Bath, Bernhard  xviii
Smith, Adam 243 
Smith, Arthur H. 459, 459n1, 460, 461, 466, 
470, 609n35, 617, 618, 618n61
smugglers xii, xv, 12, 17, 43, 61, 66, 68, 70, 78, 
88, 91, 92, 94, 96, 120, 147, 168, 236, 
239-241, 252, 298, 316, 321, 323, 333, 
350, 366, 370, 449, 489, 500, 536, 538, 
542, 565, 602, 605, 612, 638, 663, 672, 




Society for the Suppression of the Opium 
Trade (SSOT) (see anti-opium; 
Europe, England)
soldiers 32, 39n12, 60, 141, 185, 186, 204, 
205n34, 210, 221, 224, 234, 242n6, 
247n14, 272n42, 296, 346, 419, 423n13, 
460, 472, 490, 502, 522, 562n56, 577, 
587, 604n20, 608, 613, 634, 672, 
673n73, 678, 705, 705n143, 745, 760
Somalia 29 (see Middle East)
Soviet Union 530 
Southeast Asia (Nanyang) xv, 54n14, 72, 98, 
177, 216, 255, 358n4, 395n1, 396, 401, 
414, 415, 417, 421, 424-426, 432, 434, 
Royal Commission on Opium (see Europe, 
England)
Royal Navy (see British Empire, British 
Navy)
Rush, James R. 288n, 327n9, 333n25, 
334n27, 358n5, 472, 473, 476n23, 
477n, 766




salt 59, 99, 174, 175, 184, 271, 274, 274n48, 
275, 311, 336, 343, 351, 353, 364, 369n31, 
400, 500, 507, 576, 706, 707n150




Sarit Thanarat (see Southeast Asia)
Sassoon, family (see Opium, dealers; see 
also British Empire,)
savages 262, 501, 504, 508
Sax Rohmer 385, 620n64
scandals 386, 388n13, 390
Scheltema, Johan (see Dutch Empire)
Schouten, Wouter (see Dutch Empire)
Scott, James (see British Empire)
scum 206, 210, 224, 258, 260, 261, 376 
secret service 26, 354n70, 356, 387, 486, 
490, 588, 590, 654, 698, 701, 706, 
706n147, 729 (see also Central Intel-
ligence Agency)
Semarang (see Indonesia)
settlers 7, 45, 47, 152, 175n11, 219, 221, 223, 
263, 407, 425, 459, 461, 503, 531, 533-
535, 535n9, 536, 537, 559, 560, 580n95, 
595, 725n9
Seventeen Gentlemen (see Dutch Empire)
sex 26, 31, 113, 157, 188, 200, 201, 224, 385, 
386, 555, 620, 624, 646, 647, 701n134
Shan (see Southeast Asia)
Shanghai (see China)
Shanghai Opium Merchants Combine (see 
China)
Shansi (see China)
Shan State Army (SSA) (see Southeast Asia)
Shantung (see China)
Shantung Road Hospital (see China)
shar 20  (see China)
Shensi (see China)




Shan (state) 420, 421, 423n13, 426-431, 
438-440, 442, 442n49, 490, 670, 671, 
702, 716
Sarit Thanarat 446, 447 
Siam 70, 103, 147n, 213, 254, 381n, 398, 
400, 449, 469, 485, 670, 671, 747 (see 
also Thailand)
Singapore 44, 45, 46, 64, 89, 130, 275, 
277, 284n16, 285, 301n16, 310n11, 321, 
330, 331, 332, 355, 402, 437, 437n37, 
442, 447-452, 454, 456, 457, 461, 472, 
474, 478, 479, 482, 485, 522, 527, 531, 
534n5, 548, 680, 688, 746
Straits Settlements (see Malaysia, Sin-
gapore)
Thailand 381n, 398, 415, 419, 420, 421, 
427, 429, 432, 442, 443, 446, 457, 458, 
474, 477, 488, 601 (see also Siam)
Souza, George B. 96, 96n20, 136n4, 753n1
Spain (see Europe, Spain)
Spanish Empire (see also Asian continent, 
assault) 
Philippines 235, 395, 417, 419, 425, 474, 
498, 499, 539
speculation, economic 131, 452, 468, 688, 
691
Spence, Jonathan D. 9n13, 55n17, 80n79, 
126, 468n12, 593, 673, 673n73, 674, 
674n75, 674n78, 706
spices 38n6, 110, 157n52, 160, 176, 208, 220, 






state (general) xvi, 15, 16, 37, 38, 40, 54, 73, 
75, 116, 122, 125, 126, 137, 141, 172, 243, 
284, 287, 319, 335, 375, 395, 396, 402, 
418, 442, 471, 480, 482, 495, 511, 589, 
589n3, 594, 595, 710 (see also oikos, 
surveillance)
American  15, 423, 474, 496, 530, 530n79, 
533, 540, 541, 546, 548, 551, 552, 555, 
556, 558, 574, 588, 615, 618n61, 621, 
664 (see also CIA, State Department)
Asian  64, 88, 143, 161n67, 220, 229, 263, 
280n8, 406, 420, 421, 423n13, 427, 441, 
451, 485, 489, 490, 529, 597, 627, 647, 
670
437, 449, 451, 455, 466, 471, 473, 477, 
486-490, 525, 613n46, 662, 716, 722, 
765 (see also Asian continent, as-
sault, French Empire, Japanese Em -
pire)
Annam 381, 400, 402, 405, 414, 418, 435-
437, 631
Arakan 157, 177, 397, 442
Aung San, president 428, 442, 526
Burma xvii, 50, 81, 89, 90, 130, 157, 381, 
397, 406, 414, 417, 419-421, 423, 427, 
428, 431, 434, 437 – 439, 441, 443, 457, 
471, 477, 485, 487, 490, 526, 648, 
653n23, 670, 671, 682, 702, 704, 716, 
731, 737 (see also Myanmar)
Cambodia 147n, 215n49, 333, 381, 398, 
400, 402, 404n16, 418, 435-437, 444
Cochinchina 46n28, 80n81, 90n5, 333-
335, 381, 398, 402-405, 407, 408, 410, 
418, 433, 436, 437, 449, 748, 765, 766
Golden Triangle (Quadrangle) 420, 422, 
423, 477, 478, 485, 486, 667, 668, 716, 
731
Hmong 410, 411, 421, 426, 427, 431, 432, 
526, 528, 529
Ho Chi Minh 415, 416
Karen 426, 427, 442, 443
Kedah 215n49, 232, 454
Kinh 427
Laos 381n, 397n, 398, 410n, 418-423n13, 
426, 427, 432, 435-438, 438n39, 457, 
477, 485, 526, 528, 670, 731
Luang Prabang 438, 528
Malacca (Strait of) 26n18, 60, 89, 144, 
147n, 154, 177, 215n49, 220, 227-229, 
231, 241, 253, 264, 265, 271-273, 290, 
295, 301n16, 321, 447, 469, 746, 747
Malaysia 381n, 442, 447, 454, 458, 461, 






‘Overseas Chinese’ 265, 274, 459, 459n2, 
463, 473, 474, 477, 478, 480, 483, 599
Palaung Women 420
Rama, kings 421, 443, 444
Rangoon 423, 428, 428n20, 430, 431, 
440n44-442, 486, 670, 671







tobacco 5n7, 20, 20n2, 21, 41, 51, 155, 157, 158, 
162n71, 181n27, 183, 195, 198, 214, 
214n48, 273, 285, 393, 424, 448, 497, 
502, 507, 525, 535, 563, 572, 613n46, 
662, 664
Tong Joe, Tan 408n27, 505n27, 513n45, 





trade monopoly 232, 233, 277
trade routes 150n33, 462, 468, 526
traditional medicine (see medical doctors)
Tracy, Sarah W. 535, 536, 537n11
tranquilizer 389, 424
treacle (theriaca, triakel, teriaca)  23, 191, 
192, 192n8, 193, 193n11, 194, 195, 717
Treasury (see Europe, England)
Treaty of Commercial Relations (1903) (see 
China)
Treaty of Nanking (1842) (see China)
Treaty of Wang Hea (1844) (see China)
Treaty ports (see China)
triad (see China)
Trocki, Carl A. 6, 7n9, 8n11, 35n2, 46n27, 49, 
51n3, 53n10, 80n79, 93n13, 105, 162, 
162n71, 177n18, 198n20, 299n12, 383n1, 
396, 401n8, 402n11, 419n2, 449, 450, 
452, 454n74, 460n4, 465, 466, 472, 
478, 534n5, 584, 608n33, 612, 656n29, 
680n90, 681n95, 693n118, 697n127, 
698n129, 706n147, 730, 742, 750
Turkey (see Middle East)
underground 120, 341, 527, 550, 582, 588, 
681, 685-687, 691, 692, 694, 696, 713, 
724, 735  (see also upperground)
United Kingdom (UK) (see Europe, Eng-
land)
United Nations 430, 488, 595 
United Nations Offfĳice on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) 420, 721
United States of America (USA) (see also 
America, North)
Adams, John Q. 14, 15, 61n31, 541, 599
American Civil War 537, 544, 547
American Empire
Cuba 553, 559
British  16, 54, 54n11, 57, 79, 88, 92, 122, 
172, 290, 376, 425, 442n49, 496, 518
colonial  47, 55, 79, 88, 89, 92, 99, 101, 121, 
123, 135, 172, 189, 207, 213, 240, 243n8, 
246, 247, 277, 279, 285-288, 291, 293, 
295, 296, 301, 308, 313, 315, 317, 319, 
322-324, 327-329, 333, 338, 339, 345, 
349, 357, 361, 364, 365, 378, 379, 393, 
400-402, 404, 425, 426, 482, 560, 565, 
723
Dutch 37, 78, 172, 189, 202, 204, 206, 278-
280, 282, 284, 285, 288, 302, 309, 316, 
329, 335, 343, 348, 363, 378, 379, 481, 
482, 628n3





Straits Settlements (see Southeast Asia)
Struick, Nicolas (see Dutch Empire)
Subrahmanyam, Sanjay 141n20, 145n26, 
150n31, 163n1
sugar 164, 175, 184, 256, 266, 271, 309, 318, 
334, 364, 469, 476, 501, 502, 535, 583, 
606, 664, 736, 760, 768 









surveillance (state) 526, 556, 589, 724, 725
Swatow gang (see China; Opium, dealers)




Taiwan  (see China, Formosa)
Taoism (see China)
tax farm(er)s 46, 263n15, 270, 401, 404, 425, 
452, 454 
taxing 121, 402, 403, 524
tea (see Opium, for tea)
Terry, Charles E. 97n21, 119, 493n2, 513, 
542n, 544n, 566n63, 574-576, 624n, 
676n83, 677n86




upperground 686, 696, 735 (see also under-
ground)
urbanization 588, 599, 653n23 (see also 
city)
Urdang, George (see Kremers, Edward) 
Valckenier, Adriaan (see Dutch Empire)
Van Long, Deo 432 
Vanvugt, Ewald 5, 47n29, 178n19, 212n45, 
224n61, 227n69, 229n74, 246n, 256n3, 
281n9, 287n, 311n15, 333n25, 349n59, 
362n10, 363n, 364n, 368, 368n18, 
754n4
Vasco da Gama (see Portuguese Empire)
Venice (see Europe)
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie 
(VOC) (see Dutch Empire)
Vichy Fascists (see French Empire)
victims (see Opium, victims) 
Victoria, queen (see British Empire)
Viet Minh (see French Empire)
Vietnam (see French Empire)
Vietnam War, First (see French Empire)
Vietnam War, Second (see USA)
village 45, 108, 136, 150, 159, 184, 205, 210, 219, 
236, 303, 328, 356, 389, 406, 424-426, 
602, 616, 736 
violence xvi, 47, 123, 144n24, 202, 204, 205, 
208, 210, 212, 212n45, 213, 216, 219n57, 
223, 256, 259n7, 261, 263, 269n30, 460, 
481, 496, 516, 589n3, 608
VOC (see Vereenigde) 
wages 173, 206n37, 247n14, 502, 663, 
663n45, 675, 737, 759, 762, 767
Wakabayashi, Bob T. 493n1, 519, 520n59, 
529
Wakeman, Frederic 3n1, 9n13, 12n2, 674n78, 
677n84, 684n99, 690n110, 697n127, 
705n143, 751
Walker, Timothy D. 137n8, 139n15, 140, 
155n48, 158n57
Walker, William O. III 493n1, 498n, 511n40, 
515n49, 517n52, 518n55, 608n33, 
637n21, 642, 658n34, 659, 665, 
667n56, 671n, 677n85, 703 
war (see Opium, war)
warlords (see China)
‘War On Drugs’ (see USA)
‘War on Terrorism’ (see USA)
Pearl Harbor xiv, 414
Philippine Revolution 561, 562n56 
Philippines 235, 374, 374n2, 395, 417, 
419, 425, 474, 498, 499, 531, 538, 
539, 556, 559, 562-564n61, 565-
567, 569, 589, 724, 725 (see also 
Spanish Empire)
American government 43, 374n2, 398, 
415, 475, 493, 496, 498, 510, 515n48, 
518, 545, 552, 560-562, 588, 589, 638, 
665, 699, 716, 724, 727
American heroin plague 489, 730
American merchants 69, 82, 314, 371, 
449n64, 496, 541, 542, 547, 548
American Moral Empire 344, 385, 415, 
460, 532, 536n29, 547, 564, 609n35, 
610, 614, 615, 618, 618n61, 637
American dealers (see Opium, dealers)
American Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion 535, 565
American pharmaceutical industry 345, 
547, 548, 569, 579, 588, 599
American state (see state, American)
Anslinger, Harry 487, 553, 554, 577n89, 
664, 692, 701n134-703, 725
Boston 61, 534, 542
Los Angeles 482n34, 534, 702
New York 36, 169n19, 508n35, 534, 542, 
550, 558, 558n50, 567, 573, 577, 582, 
583, 587, 650, 728 
New York Times 392n24, 392n25, 
482n34, 494, 499, 502, 503, 505, 510, 
513-515n48, 554n44, 556, 556n49, 557, 
561n55, 564, 564n62, 570n70 
Philadelphia 534, 535, 548, 549, 558n50, 
587
Rockefeller Foundation 552
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 517, 542, 554n44
Roosevelt, Theodore 621
San Francisco 484, 534, 544, 548, 549, 
550, 555, 555n47, 556, 558, 558n50, 
570, 577, 587, 589, 692, 725
State Department 530n79, 540, 559, 
664,701 
Stilwell, Joseph 552, 553
US Bureau of Narcotics 553
Vietnam War, Second 431, 485, 487, 526, 
590, 716
‘War On Drugs’ 16, 120, 129, 531, 535, 
535n9, 554, 554n44, 558, 589, 665, 
701n134
index824
World Economic Crisis 346n52, 516 
World War I 47, 91, 316, 346, 346n52, 393, 
395, 411, 494, 510-512, 543, 552, 554, 
562n56, 577, 589, 606, 622n71, 637, 
690, 747, 751 
World War II xiv, xvii, 47, 73, 76, 90, 130n11, 
131n12, 310, 346, 348, 349, 353, 367, 
385, 388, 394, 410, 415, 428, 432, 437, 
446, 457, 477, 485, 516, 519, 520, 521, 
525, 526, 528, 530, 552, 567, 569, 577, 
588, 635, 640n26, 650, 679, 726, 727
xenophobia 118, 259, 575 














Zeldin, Theodor 388n15, 389, 391n22 
Zheng He (see China)
Zwaardecroon, Hendrick (see Dutch 
Empire)
Ward, Kerry xiiin3,  176n13, 204n32, 216, 
216n51
water-boarding (see USA)
Weber, Max 38, 38n8, 153, 153n41, 172, 
182n29, 589n3, 638, 639n23 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich xvi, xix
Wertheim, Wim xix, 349, 371 
West-East relations xiv, 4-7n9, 8, 9, 11, 13-16, 
24, 32, 37, 38n8, 39, 41, 42, 49, 52, 56, 
70, 83, 119, 124, 125, 130, 135, 140, 144, 
145, 168, 172, 174, 175n11, 180, 182, 190, 
196, 207, 208, 210, 212, 224, 233, 255, 
261, 264, 268n25, 280, 319, 383, 395n, 
407, 414, 423, 456, 466, 481, 529, 547, 
594, 610, 623, 638, 639, 640, 641, 645, 
711 (see also assault, civilization, colo-
nialism, East – West relations, impe-
rialism, missionaries, racism)
‘Wettig Opium’ (see Opium, legal; see also 
Dutch Empire )
‘White Man’s Burden’ (see British Empire)
White Terror (see China)
William I, king (see Europe, Netherlands)
William III, king – stadhouder (see Europe, 
Netherlands)
William IV, stadhouder (see Europe, Neth-
erlands)
William V, stadhouder (see Europe, Neth-
erlands)
Willoughby, Westel W. 12n2, 15n, 43, 44, 
79n76, 593n2, 603n18, 605n21, 635n17, 
637n20, 638, 656n29
Wiselius, Jakob (see Dutch Empire)
World Bank 443 
